PRECISION TRACKING SPACE SYSTEM

Abstract

The FY 2011 program is balanced, reflecting the goals of the current Missile Defense Program: Continue a defense of the territory of the United States against rogue nation ballistic missile threats, Enhance missile defense to defend our deployed forces, allies, and friends against regional threats, Prove our Ballistic Missile Defense System works before making production decisions, Deliver reliable, high quality, and fiscally sustainable missile defense products, and develop future missile defense capabilities that are adaptable and responsive to intelligence based judgments including defeating large missile raid sizes of all ranges early in their flight. The best way to dissuade, deter, and defeat ballistic threats is through integrated ballistic missile defense capabilities - weapons, sensors, and Command and Control, Battle Management and Communications. A potential or actual attack may cross regions and may fly higher and faster than stand-alone, autonomous capabilities operated by a single Military Service can defend against. Integrated missile defense capabilities draw on space-, land-, and sea-based assets operated by multiple Services to provide both the best sensor information on the enemy missile`s location and track as well as a more diverse and effective set of weapon options for the Combatant Commander to defeat the attack - all connected by a unifying command, control, battle management and communication system. As a result, an effort funded in a Program Element may be critical to the success of efforts in other Program Elements - we refer to these connections as ``interdependencies.`` Throughout the budget justification material, we have attempted to highlight interdependencies in order to fully explain the relationship between different parts of the proposed program. Our submission reflects the greater emphasis on defense of U.S. forces, allies, and friends from regional threats posed by thousands of short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. The most cost-effective missile defense architecture is one that emphasizes intercepts of a threat missile in the early phases of flight. The BMDS sensors can observe early intercepts to determine if a second or third intercept attempt is necessary. Additionally, intercepting earlier in the flight forces the threat to deploy countermeasures early, decreasing their effectiveness. As the Department shifts focus to address the looming threat of regional forces in large numbers, we`ve aligned our sensors` investments with these objectives. Our systems engineering and architecture work uncovered gaps in our ability to 1) address large raid sizes, and 2) intercept the enemy early in his trajectory when the enemy is most vulnerable - assess - then reengage if necessary.

Document Details

• Document Type: R2 Budgetary Justification
• Publication Date: Oct 01, 2011
• Source ID: 0604883C_4_0400_PB_2011
• Change Summary Explanation: In FY10 the MDA Engineering and Advanced Technology Directorates will conduct requisite system architecture studies and system engineering to define space-born sensor system capability needs that will provide the system engineering foundation for the FY11 new start. No FY 2011 data provided in PB10.
• Service Agency Name: Missile Defense Agency

Entities

Organizations

• Missile Defense Agency

Tags

Communities of Interest

• C4I
• Space
• Weapons Technologies

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

• Acquisition
• Ballistic Missiles
• Battle Management
• Command And Control
• Contracts
• Cost Analysis
• Defense Systems
• Detectors
• Engineering
• Lessons Learned
• Orbits
• Precision
• Procurement
• Space Systems
• Spacecraft
• Systems Engineering
• Test And Evaluation

Readers

• Missile Defense Systems.
• Strategic Security Studies

Technology Areas

• Fully Networked C3
• Fully Networked C3 - Command and Control
• Space