Shortest path interdiction problem with arc improvement recourse: A multiobjective approach
Abstract
We consider the shortest path interdiction problem involving two agents, a leader and a follower, playing a Stackelberg game. The leader seeks to maximize the follower's minimum costs by interdicting certain arcs, thus increasing the travel time of those arcs. The follower may improve the network after the interdiction by lowering the costs of some arcs, subject to a cardinality budget restriction on arc improvements. The leader and the follower are both aware of all problem data, with the exception that the leader is unaware of the follower's improvement budget. The effectiveness of an interdiction action is given by the length of a shortest path after arc costs are adjusted by both the interdiction and improvement. We propose a multiobjective optimization model for this problem, with each objective corresponding to a different possible improvement budget value. We provide mathematical optimization techniques to generate a complete set of strategies that are Pareto‐optimal. Additionally, for the special case of series‐parallel graphs, we provide a dynamic‐programming algorithm for generating all Pareto‐optimal solutions.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Pub Defense Publication
- Publication Date
- Apr 01, 2019
- Source ID
- 10.1002/nav.21839
Entities
People
- J. Cole Smith
- Tim Holzmann
Organizations
- Air Force Office of Scientific Research
- Clemson University
- Office of Naval Research