The dynamics of cooperation, power, and inequality in a group-structured society
Abstract
Most human societies are characterized by the presence of different identity groups which cooperate but also compete for resources and power. To deepen our understanding of the underlying social dynamics, we model a society subdivided into groups with constant sizes and dynamically changing powers. Both individuals within groups and groups themselves participate in collective actions. The groups are also engaged in political contests over power which determines how jointly produced resources are divided. Using analytical approximations and agent-based simulations, we show that the model exhibits rich behavior characterized by multiple stable equilibria and, under some conditions, non-equilibrium dynamics. We demonstrate that societies in which individuals act independently are more stable than those in which actions of individuals are completely synchronized. We show that mechanisms preventing politically powerful groups from bending the rules of competition in their favor play a key role in promoting between-group cooperation and reducing inequality between groups. We also show that small groups can be more successful in competition than large groups if the jointly-produced goods are rivalrous and the potential benefit of cooperation is relatively small. Otherwise large groups dominate. Overall our model contributes towards a better understanding of the causes of variation between societies in terms of the economic and political inequality within them.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Pub Defense Publication
- Publication Date
- Sep 21, 2021
- Source ID
- 10.1038/s41598-021-97863-7
Entities
People
- Athmanathan Senthilnathan
- Denis Tverskoi
- Sergey Gavrilets
Organizations
- Army Research Office
- National Institute for Mathematical and Biological Synthesis
- Office of Naval Research