An oscillating tragedy of the commons in replicator dynamics with game-environment feedback
Abstract
Classical game theory addresses how individuals make decisions given suitable incentives, for example, whether to use a commons rapaciously or with restraint. However, classical game theory does not typically address the consequences of individual actions that reshape the environment over the long term. Here, we propose a unified approach to analyze and understand the coupled evolution of strategies and the environment. We revisit the originating tragedy of the commons example and evaluate how overuse of a commons resource changes incentives for future action. In doing so, we identify an oscillatory tragedy of the commons in which the system cycles between deplete and replete environments and cooperation and defection behavior, highlighting new challenges for control and influence of feedback-evolving games.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Pub Defense Publication
- Publication Date
- Nov 08, 2016
- Source ID
- 10.1073/pnas.1604096113
Entities
People
- Ceyhun Eksin
- Joshua Weitz
- Keith Paarporn
- Sam P Brown
- William C. Ratcliff
Organizations
- Army Research Office
- Georgia Tech