Morality constrains the default representation of what is possible
Abstract
As humans, we think not only about what is, but also what could be. These representations of alternative possibilities support many important cognitive functions, such as predicting others’ future actions, assigning responsibility for past events, and making moral judgments. We perform many of these tasks quickly and effortlessly, which suggests access to an implicit, default assumption about what is possible. What are the default features of the possibilities that we consider? Remarkably, we find a default bias toward representing immoral or irrational actions as being impossible. Although this bias is diminished upon deliberative reflection, it is the default judgments that appear to support higher-level cognition.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Pub Defense Publication
- Publication Date
- Apr 18, 2017
- Source ID
- 10.1073/pnas.1619717114
Entities
People
- Fiery Cushman
- Jonathan Phillips
Organizations
- Harvard University
- Office of Naval Research