Collective action and the evolution of social norm internalization
Abstract
People often ignore material costs they incur when following existing social norms. Some individuals and groups are often willing to pay extremely high costs to enact, defend, or promulgate specific values and norms that they consider important. Such behaviors, often decreasing biological fitness, represent an evolutionary puzzle. We study theoretically the evolutionary origins of human capacity to internalize and follow social norms. We focus on two general types of collective actions our ancestors were regularly involved in: cooperation to overcome nature’s challenges and conflicts with neighboring groups. We show that norm internalization evolves under a wide range of conditions, making cooperation “instinctive.” We make testable predictions about individual and group behavior.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Pub Defense Publication
- Publication Date
- May 22, 2017
- Source ID
- 10.1073/pnas.1703857114
Entities
People
- Peter J. Richerson
- Sergey Gavrilets
Organizations
- Army Research Office
- Division of Environmental Biology
- University of California
- University of Tennessee