Evolution of social norms and correlated equilibria
Abstract
We consider social norms as collections of beliefs or superstitions about events occurring in nature. These events have no inherent meaning, but individuals can choose to believe that they do. Specifically, individuals can interpret events as prescribing behaviors for themselves along with expectations of the behaviors of others. We show how evolutionary competition between such beliefs can give rise to both prescriptive and descriptive self-enforcing norms that can allow populations to coordinate behavior. Our model provides an evolutionary account for how normative meaning emerges in an inherently meaningless world.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Pub Defense Publication
- Publication Date
- Apr 11, 2019
- Source ID
- 10.1073/pnas.1817095116
Entities
People
- Bryce Morsky
- Erol Akçay
Organizations
- Army Research Office
- University of Pennsylvania