Hassling: How States Prevent a Preventive War
Abstract
Low‐level military operations outside of war are pervasive in the international system. These activities have been viewed as destabilizing by both academics and policy makers, as miscalculations or missteps in conducting low‐level operations can risk escalation to war. I show the opposite can be true: these operations can prevent escalation to a greater war. I examine a type of low‐level conflict that I call “hassling” in the common framework of bargaining and war. The critical feature of hassling is that it weakens a targeted state. I find that when a rising power rules out peaceful bargains, hassling the rising power can prevent a preventive war, with efficiency gains for the involved states. This intuition is formalized in a dynamic model of conflict and is explored through examinations of Israel's Operation Outside the Box (2007), the United States' involvement in Iraq (1991–2003), and Russia's operations in Ukraine (beginning in 2014).
Document Details
- Document Type
- Pub Defense Publication
- Publication Date
- Jun 24, 2020
- Source ID
- 10.1111/ajps.12538
Entities
People
- Peter Schram
Organizations
- Office of Naval Research
- Vanderbilt University