Beating the best Nash without regret
Abstract
Nash equilibrium analysis has become the de facto solution standard in game theory. This approach, despite its prominent role, has been the subject of much criticism for being too optimistic . Indeed, in general games, natural play need not converge to Nash equilibria. In games with multiple equilibria, it is unclear how players are expected to coordinate; even in games with a unique equilibrium, finding it may involve unreasonable expectations on player communication or computation.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Pub Defense Publication
- Publication Date
- Mar 01, 2011
- Source ID
- 10.1145/1978721.1978727
Entities
People
- Georgios Piliouras
- Katrina Ligett
Organizations
- Air Force Office of Scientific Research
- Cornell University
- Division of Computing and Communication Foundations
- Johns Hopkins University
- National Science Foundation
- National Science Foundation Division of Mathematical Sciences
- Office of Naval Research