Algorithmic rationality
Abstract
We summarize our work on a general game-theoretic framework for reasoning about strategic agents performing possibly costly computation. In this framework, many traditional game-theoretic results (such as the existence of a Nash equilibrium) no longer hold. Nevertheless, we can use the framework to provide psychologically appealing explanations to observed behavior in well-studied games (such as finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma and rock-paper-scissors).
Document Details
- Document Type
- Pub Defense Publication
- Publication Date
- Jun 01, 2011
- Source ID
- 10.1145/1998549.1998551
Entities
People
- Joseph Halpern
- Rafael Pass
Organizations
- Air Force Office of Scientific Research
- Army Research Office
- Bulgarian Science Fund
- Cornell University
- Division of Computing and Communication Foundations
- Division of Information and Intelligent Systems
- National Science Foundation