Leading dynamics to good behavior
Abstract
In this note we report recent results on the problem of leading natural dynamics to good behavior in games that have both high-quality and low-quality equilibria. We show how a central agency can use a public-service advertising campaign to help "nudge" players' behavior towards a high-quality equilibrium, even if only a fraction of players pay attention. We also discuss results analyzing how well-motivated learning rules, when given additional global information about a game, can be used to effectively reach high-quality equilibria.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Pub Defense Publication
- Publication Date
- Jun 01, 2011
- Source ID
- 10.1145/1998549.1998553
Entities
People
- Maria Florina Balcan
Organizations
- Air Force Office of Scientific Research
- Division of Computing and Communication Foundations
- Georgia Tech
- Office of Naval Research