BAF and FI-BAF
Abstract
Audit logs are an integral part of modern computer systems due to their forensic value. Protecting audit logs on a physically unprotected machine in hostile environments is a challenging task, especially in the presence of active adversaries. It is critical for such a system to have forward security and append-only properties such that when an adversary compromises a logging machine, she cannot forge or selectively delete the log entries accumulated before the compromise. Existing public-key-based secure logging schemes are computationally costly. Existing symmetric secure logging schemes are not publicly verifiable and open to certain attacks.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Pub Defense Publication
- Publication Date
- Jul 01, 2012
- Source ID
- 10.1145/2240276.2240280
Entities
People
- Attila A. Yavuz
- Michael Reiter
- Peng Ning
Organizations
- Army Research Office
- National Science Foundation
- North Carolina State University
- University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill