Design space exploration and optimization of path oblivious RAM in secure processors
Abstract
Keeping user data private is a huge problem both in cloud computing and computation outsourcing. One paradigm to achieve data privacy is to use tamper-resistant processors, inside which users' private data is decrypted and computed upon. These processors need to interact with untrusted external memory. Even if we encrypt all data that leaves the trusted processor, however, the address sequence that goes off-chip may still leak information. To prevent this address leakage, the security community has proposed ORAM (Oblivious RAM). ORAM has mainly been explored in server/file settings which assume a vastly different computation model than secure processors. Not surprisingly, naïvely applying ORAM to a secure processor setting incurs large performance overheads.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Pub Defense Publication
- Publication Date
- Jun 23, 2013
- Source ID
- 10.1145/2508148.2485971
Entities
People
- Christopher W. Fletcher
- Ling Ren
- Marten Van Dijk
- Srinivas Devadas
- Xiangyao Yu
Organizations
- Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
- Massachusetts Institute of Technology
- National Science Foundation
- United States Department of Defense