Computing Stackelberg strategies in stochastic games
Abstract
Significant recent progress has been made in both the computation of optimal strategies to commit to (Stackelberg strategies), and the computation of correlated equilibria of stochastic games. In this letter we discuss some recent results in the intersection of these two areas. We investigate how valuable commitment can be in stochastic games and give a brief summary of complexity results about computing Stackelberg strategies in stochastic games.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Pub Defense Publication
- Publication Date
- Dec 01, 2012
- Source ID
- 10.1145/2509002.2509011
Entities
People
- Charles L. Isbell
- Joshua Letchford
- Liam Macdermed
- Ronald Parr
- Vincent Conitzer
Organizations
- Alfred P. Sloan Foundation
- Army Research Office
- Division of Computing and Communication Foundations
- Division of Information and Intelligent Systems
- Duke University
- Georgia Tech