Security Analysis of Accountable Anonymity in Dissent
Abstract
Users often wish to communicate anonymously on the Internet, for example, in group discussion or instant messaging forums. Existing solutions are vulnerable to misbehaving users, however, who may abuse their anonymity to disrupt communication. Dining Cryptographers Networks (DC-nets) leave groups vulnerable to denial-of-service and Sybil attacks; mix networks are difficult to protect against traffic analysis; and accountable voting schemes are unsuited to general anonymous messaging.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Pub Defense Publication
- Publication Date
- Aug 01, 2014
- Source ID
- 10.1145/2629621
Entities
People
- Aaron M. Johnson
- Bryan Ford
- David Wolinsky
- Ewa Syta
- Henry Corrigan-gibbs
- Shu-chun Weng
Organizations
- Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
- Naval Information Warfare Systems Command
- United States Naval Research Laboratory
- Yale University