The Price of Anarchy in Games of Incomplete Information
Abstract
We define smooth games of incomplete information. We prove an ’’extension theorem” for such games:price of anarchy bounds for pure Nash equilibria for all induced full-information games extendautomatically, without quantitative degradation, to all mixed-strategy Bayes-Nash equilibria withrespect to a product prior distribution over players’ preferences. We also note that, for Bayes-Nashequilibria in games with correlated player preferences, there is no general extension theorem forsmooth games.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Pub Defense Publication
- Publication Date
- Mar 27, 2015
- Source ID
- 10.1145/2737816
Entities
People
- Tim Roughgarden
Organizations
- Air Force Office of Scientific Research
- National Science Foundation
- Office of Naval Research
- Stanford University