Model Checking Distributed Mandatory Access Control Policies
Abstract
This work examines the use of model checking techniques to verify system-level security properties of a collection of interacting virtual machines. Specifically, we examine how local access control policies implemented in individual virtual machines and a hypervisor can be shown to satisfy global access control constraints. The SAL model checker is used to model and verify a collection of stateful domains with protected resources and local MAC policies attempting to access needed resources from other domains. The model is described along with verification conditions. The need to control state-space explosion is motivated and techniques for writing theorems and limiting domains explored. Finally, analysis results are examined along with analysis complexity.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Pub Defense Publication
- Publication Date
- Jul 15, 2015
- Source ID
- 10.1145/2785966
Entities
People
- George Coker
- Lee Pike
- Perry Alexander
- Peter Loscocco
Organizations
- Galois, Inc.
- National Security Agency
- United States Department of Defense
- University of Kansas