Security of Cyber-Physical Systems in the Presence of Transient Sensor Faults
Abstract
This article is concerned with the security of modern Cyber-Physical Systems in the presence of transient sensor faults. We consider a system with multiple sensors measuring the same physical variable, where each sensor provides an interval with all possible values of the true state. We note that some sensors might output faulty readings and others may be controlled by a malicious attacker. Differing from previous works, in this article, we aim to distinguish between faults and attacks and develop an attack detection algorithm for the latter only. To do this, we note that there are two kinds of faults—transient and permanent; the former are benign and short-lived, whereas the latter may have dangerous consequences on system performance. We argue that sensors have an underlying transient fault model that quantifies the amount of time in which transient faults can occur. In addition, we provide a framework for developing such a model if it is not provided by manufacturers.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Pub Defense Publication
- Publication Date
- May 09, 2017
- Source ID
- 10.1145/3064809
Entities
People
- Insup Lee
- James Weimer
- Junkil Park
- Miroslav Pajic
- Radoslav Ivanov
- Sang Hyuk Son
Organizations
- Daegu Gyeongbuk Institute of Science and Technology
- Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
- Duke University
- National Science Foundation
- Office of Naval Research
- University of Pennsylvania