Long-Span Program Behavior Modeling and Attack Detection
Abstract
Intertwined developments between program attacks and defenses witness the evolution of program anomaly detection methods. Emerging categories of program attacks, e.g., non-control data attacks and data-oriented programming, are able to comply with normal trace patterns at local views. This article points out the deficiency of existing program anomaly detection models against new attacks and presents long-span behavior anomaly detection (LAD), a model based on mildly context-sensitive grammar verification. The key feature of LAD is its reasoning of correlations among arbitrary events that occurred in long program traces. It extends existing correlation analysis between events at a stack snapshot, e.g., paired call and ret, to correlation analysis among events that historically occurred during the execution. The proposed method leverages specialized machine learning techniques to probe normal program behavior boundaries in vast high-dimensional detection space. Its two-stage modeling/detection design analyzes event correlation at both binary and quantitative levels. Our prototype successfully detects all reproduced real-world attacks against sshd, libpcre, and sendmail. The detection procedure incurs 0.1 ms to 1.3 ms overhead to profile and analyze a single behavior instance that consists of tens of thousands of function call or system call events.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Pub Defense Publication
- Publication Date
- Sep 20, 2017
- Source ID
- 10.1145/3105761
Entities
People
- Danfeng (daphne) Yao
- Naren Ramakrishnan
- Trent Jaeger
- Xiaokui Shu
Organizations
- Air Force Research Laboratory
- Australian RL Commission
- Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
- IBM Research
- Office of Naval Research
- Pennsylvania State University
- United States Army Research Laboratory
- Virginia Tech