Sequential Equilibrium in Computational Games
Abstract
We examine sequential equilibrium in the context of computational games (Halpern and Pass 2015), where agents are charged for computation. In such games, an agent can rationally choose to forget, so issues of imperfect recall arise. In this setting, we consider two notions of sequential equilibrium. One is an ex ante notion, where a player chooses his strategy before the game starts and is committed to it, but chooses it in such a way that it remains optimal even off the equilibrium path. The second is an interim notion, where a player can reconsider at each information set whether he is doing the “right” thing, and if not, can change his strategy. The two notions agree in games of perfect recall, but not in games of imperfect recall. Although the interim notion seems more appealing, in a companion article (Halpern and Pass 2016), we argue that there are some deep conceptual problems with it in standard games of imperfect recall. We show that the conceptual problems largely disappear in the computational setting. Moreover, in this setting, under natural assumptions, the two notions coincide.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Pub Defense Publication
- Publication Date
- May 31, 2019
- Source ID
- 10.1145/3340232
Entities
People
- Joseph Halpern
- Rafael Pass
Organizations
- Air Force Office of Scientific Research
- Alfred P. Sloan Foundation
- Army Research Office
- Cornell University
- Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
- Microsoft Research
- National Science Foundation