Breaking the Design and Security Trade-off of Look-up-table–based Obfuscation
Abstract
Logic locking and Integrated Circuit (IC) camouflaging are the most prevalent protection schemes that can thwart most hardware security threats. However, the state-of-the-art attacks, including Boolean Satisfiability (SAT) and approximation-based attacks, question the efficacy of the existing defense schemes. Recent obfuscation schemes have employed reconfigurable logic to secure designs against various hardware security threats. However, they have focused on specific design elements such as SAT hardness. Despite meeting the focused criterion such as security, obfuscation incurs additional overheads, which are not evaluated in the present works. This work provides an extensive analysis of Look-up-table (LUT)–based obfuscation by exploring several factors such as LUT technology, size, number of LUTs, and replacement strategy as they have a substantial influence on Power-Performance-Area (PPA) and Security (PPA/S) of the design. We show that using large LUT makes LUT-based obfuscation resilient to hardware security threats. However, it also results in enormous design overheads beyond practical limits.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Pub Defense Publication
- Publication Date
- Jun 27, 2022
- Source ID
- 10.1145/3510421
Entities
People
- Avesta Sasan
- Gaurav Kolhe
- Hamid Mahmoodi
- Houman Homayoun
- Sai Manoj P. D.
- Setareh Rafatirad
- Tyler David Sheaves
Organizations
- Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
- George Mason University
- San Francisco State University
- University of California