InkFiltration: Using Inkjet Printers for Acoustic Data Exfiltration from Air-Gapped Networks
Abstract
Printers have become ubiquitous in modern office spaces, and their placement in these spaces been guided more by accessibility than security. Due to the proximity of printers to places with potentially high-stakes information, the possible misuse of these devices is concerning. We present a previously unexplored covert channel that effectively uses the sound generated by printers with inkjet technology to exfiltrate arbitrary sensitive data (unrelated to the apparent content of the document being printed) from an air-gapped network. We also discuss a series of defense techniques that can make these devices invulnerable to covert manipulation.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Pub Defense Publication
- Publication Date
- May 04, 2022
- Source ID
- 10.1145/3510583
Entities
People
- Akash Deep Singh
- Julian De Gortari Briseno
- Mani Srivastava
Organizations
- National Science Foundation
- United States Army Research Laboratory
- University of California, Los Angeles