Best experienced payoff dynamics and cooperation in the centipede game
Abstract
We study population game dynamics under which each revising agent tests each of his strategies a fixed number of times, with each play of each strategy being against a newly drawn opponent, and chooses the strategy whose total payoff was highest. In the centipede game, thesebest experienced payoff dynamicslead to cooperative play. When strategies are tested once, play at the almost globally stable state is concentrated on the last few nodes of the game, with the proportions of agents playing each strategy being largely independent of the length of the game. Testing strategies many times leads to cyclical play.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Pub Defense Publication
- Publication Date
- Jan 01, 2019
- Source ID
- 10.3982/te3565
Entities
People
- Luis R. Izquierdo
- Segismundo S Izquierdo
- William H. Sandholm
Organizations
- Army Research Office
- Ministry of Education, Culture and Sport
- National Science Foundation
- University of Burgos
- University of Valladolid
- University of Wisconsin–Madison
- University of the East