Supply Chain Hardware Intercepts for Electronics Defense (SHIELD)
Abstract
Counterfeit electronic parts are becoming ubiquitous, and pose a threat to the integrity and reliability of DoD systems. Detection of counterfeit components by current means is expensive, time-consuming, and of limited effectiveness. Maintaining complete control of the supply chain using administrative controls incurs substantial costs and has limitations. Current methods of detection involve a wide variety of techniques ranging from functional testing to physical inspections which may still miss certain classes of counterfeits. There have also been attempts by the semiconductor market to protect electronic components through the use of technology embedded in the component or its packaging. However, most methods are specific to a manufacturer's component and as such address only those issues deemed critical to that manufacturer. Some methods can be circumvented, or require slow, expensive, off-site forensic analysis to verify authenticity. The Supply Chain Hardware Intercepts for Electronics Defense (SHIELD) program, leveraging and expanding on previous activities in the IRIS program, will develop a technology capable of confirming, at any time, the authenticity of once-trusted parts, even after they have transited a complex global supply chain. SHIELD will prevent counterfeit component substitution by incorporating a small, inexpensive additional silicon chip ("dielet") within the Integrated Circuit (IC) package. The dielet will provide a unique and encrypted ID as well as anti-tamper features. The microscopic-size dielet embedded in the electronic component packaging will be inductively powered and scanned by an authentication induction coil brought into very close proximity to the packaged chip, thus allowing for verification of chip identity.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Accomplishment
- Publication Date
- Oct 01, 2016
- Source ID
- 13d2f1cd8c56d6ccfcfe1242a8a9ed09