THE KANSAS CITY FLOOD AND FIRE OF 1951
Abstract
The study of the behavior of civilians and trained disaster fighters during the Kansas City flood and fire of 1951 was concentrated on (1) the problem of civilian adaptation to prolonged threat of disaster, and (2) the reaction of trained personnel to a new and unusually severe disaster. Review of the civilian response resulted in the following conclusions: (1) past experience and established expectations may render warnings less credible; (2) conflicting reports may make the situation ambiguous and confront the individual with choice of alternatives in the situation; (3) motivations may color perception of the situation in such a way as to minimize the sense of threat; and (4) subjects may be unable to interpret correctly the evidence at hand. Review of response of the trained workers indicated that (1) uncertainty about the threat, and helplessness to combat it were major anxiety-producing factors; and (2) esprit de corps and the loyalty to the chief established and enforced the group standards. Extrapolation of the findings to an atomic attack suggested that (1) security measures must be maintained to prevent the element of surprise; (2) soldiers should be aware of the effects of, defense against, and use of the bomb; and (3) follow-up attack is essential to achieve the greatest use of the bomb.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Aug 25, 1952
- Accession Number
- AD0004617