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
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
A Preliminary Investigation of Delinquency In The Army



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A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION OF
DELINQUENCY IN THE ARMY

Approved: 15 February 1954



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Appreciation is also expressed to the following consultants for the study—Leon Festinger, Bernard Fox, Neal Miller, Helen Peak, and Arnold Rose—and to the members of the field teams who participated in the collection of the data.

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BRIEF

This study of delinquency in the Army was undertaken at the request of the Office of the Provost Marshal General. The objective of the study was to make a general survey of the many possible factors that may be influencing delinquency (especially AWOL) in the military service.

At each of six posts in the First and Second Army areas, a group was selected from the enlisted men confined to the stockade and another group was selected from the enlisted men in regular duty status. Questionnaires were given to a total of 616 men in confinement status and 1216 men on regular duty. Personal interviews were conducted with 299 of these men.

The study indicated that the causes of delinquency in the Army are extremely complex and no single factor could be singled out as responsible for the majority of delinquent behavior. In general, delinquency in a man's Army career appeared to be most highly related to his personal characteristics at the time he entered the Army.

It was found that delinquents differed from non-delinquents with respect to a number of background and personal characteristics. Compared to the non-delinquents:

(1) As a group, the delinquents had less education. They also were younger.

(2) More of the delinquents came from civilian backgrounds characterized by fewer economic and social advantages.

(3) The parents of the delinquents were more frequently absent from home during the time these boys were growing up. Family life tended to be less congenial and the members of the family not as close to one another. The reaction of the delinquents to their families was more often unfavorable (for example, more of them said that they felt unwanted at home or that they were ashamed of their parents). However, both delinquent and non-delinquent groups indicated that they had experienced similar patterns of family discipline.

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(4) The delinquents more often reported that they had not gone around with a group of boys during adolescence.

(5) The delinquents far more frequently reported pre-Army delinquent behavior.

(6) More of the delinquents were characterized by the following personality traits:

(a) Aggressive behavior: They reported such traits as being quick to anger or making special efforts to be unpleasant to people whom they did not like.

(b) Escapist tendencies in the face of difficulties: They admitted more instances of frequent drunkenness, sick calls, and job changes.

(c) Lack of long-range goals: They did not save money nor buy bonds as often as the non-delinquents and tended, moreover, to spend their pay checks in the first few days after receipt. In general, they expressed a "do what you want today and let tomorrow take care of itself" philosophy.

The traits just mentioned appeared to be related to a general unconcern with commonly accepted morals, rather than any special dissatisfaction with Army life. Certain specific Army situations, however, did appear to be related to delinquent behavior:

(1) Men in a "state of transition" between assignments or commands were more likely to go AWOL than soldiers integrated into regular outfits.

(2) A majority of both the delinquent and non-delinquent soldiers felt that only some or a few of their officers and noncoms took a personal interest in the men. This felt lack of personal interest on the part of their leaders appeared to be a contributing factor in delinquency.

(3) A larger proportion of the delinquents reported that they had planned, at initial entrance into the Army, to make the Army a career.

(4) There was some evidence that for some soldiers the desire to avoid combat duty is a contributing factor to AWOL.

(5) "Family problems" was a reason frequently listed by men who had gone AWOL. A high proportion of both the delinquent and non-delinquent groups reported willingness to go to one of the several official channels (company commander, first sergeant, chaplain, Red Cross) for help in handling personal and family problems. However, soldiers who went AWOL apparently had had more difficulty in effectively utilizing these channels, especially the company commander. In view of the frequent mention of "family problems" by delinquents as a reason for AWOL, the lack of effective use of the existing channels may be an important factor in delinquency.

(6) The enlisted men in both the delinquent and non-delinquent groups appeared to be rather uncritical of the AWOL offender. Thus, there is apparently little social pressure against AWOL behavior from the soldier's Army buddies.

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The following conclusions seem warranted concerning the administrative procedures for handling AWOLs:

(1) The regulation requiring the AWOL soldier to pay only his own expenses involved in apprehension costs apparently has had little effect on the delinquency rate.

(2) The automatic transfer hypothesis (that is, that a soldier may deliberately go AWOL for more than 29 days in order to get an automatic transfer from his outfit) is neither ruled out nor definitely substantiated by the present study.

(3) Although a third of the men in the delinquent group were classified as "bucking for a Bad Conduct Discharge," the limitations of the present study preclude a definite estimate of the proportion of men who deliberately went AWOL hoping to get a Bad Conduct Discharge.

While it is recognized that the study of the effects of stockade treatment was exploratory, such evidence as was obtained did not indicate a significant relationship between type of stockade treatment and attitudes implying unsuccessful future adjustment to the Army.

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**A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION OF
DELINQUENCY IN THE ARMY**

CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
BRIEF	v

Chapter 1

BACKGROUND FOR THE RESEARCH

Introduction.	3
The Problem	4
Plan of Study	9

Chapter 2

PROCEDURE

Data Collection	14
Statistical Analyses	18
Characteristics of the Data	19
Characteristics of Delinquent and Control Samples.	19
Attrition	19
No Answers.	19
Criterion Contamination	21
Heterogeneity of Stockade Sample	22
Effects of Stockade Confinement	23

CONFIDENTIAL

Page

Chapter 3

PRE-ARMY FACTORS

Introduction.	24
Background Variables	24
Socio-Economic Status of the Soldier's Home	24
Psychological Characteristics of the Soldier's Home Background	27
Personality Variables	33
Aggression	34
Escape Behavior	35
Long-Range Goals	36
Pre-Army Delinquent History of the Soldier	38
Discussion and Conclusions	39

Chapter 4

SITUATIONAL FACTORS: PRIMARILY INHIBITING

Introduction.	40
Punishment	40
Social Pressure	44
Identification With Army Goals	49
Conclusions.	53

Chapter 5

OTHER SITUATIONAL FACTORS

Introduction.	54
Variables Within the Military Situation.	54
General Satisfaction With the Army	55
Leadership	55
Regularity and Discipline.	59
Army Job	62
Possibilities of Recognition	64
Physical Conditions of Army Living.	66
State of Transition	67
Combat Duty	69
Variables Related to the Civilian Culture	70
Hardship to Family and Specific Emergencies	70
Official Channels for Handling Emergency Problems	72
Conclusions.	75

x

CONFIDENTIAL

Chapter 6
INTER-STOCKADE ANALYSIS

Introduction.	77
Attitudes of Stockade Prisoners.	78
Attitudes Toward Treatment.	78
Morale of Stockade Prisoners.	79
Indicators of Future Adjustment to Army.	80
Stockade Treatment and Army Adjustment.	81
Sample.	81
Stockade Classifications.	81
Comparison of Stockade Classifications and Criterion Variables.	82
Conclusions.	83

Chapter 7

SUMMARY

Conclusions.	85
Discussion.	86
Future Research.	88
BIBLIOGRAPHY.	91

APPENDICES

Appendix

A Stockade Group Questionnaire.	93
B Control Group Questionnaire.	115
C Stockade and Non-Stockade Interviews.	135
D Personal History Code.	143
E Tests of Significance on Weighted Samples.	146
F Effects of Stockade Confinement.	148
G Army Satisfaction Score.	150

CONFIDENTIAL

LIST OF FIGURES

<u>Figure</u>	<u>Page</u>
1 Enlisted Stockade Confinements	5
2 Comparison of "AWOL to Duty" Rate with Stockade Confinements During Month.	6
3 Enlisted "Duty to AWOL" Rate During Month.	8
4 Enlisted "Duty to AWOL" Rate by Day of Month.	10

LIST OF TABLES

<u>Table</u>	
1 Questionnaire Samples	15
2 Weighted Samples.	16
3 Interview Samples	17
4 Characteristics of Delinquent and Control Samples.	20
5 Comparison of Delinquents and Controls on Socio-Economic Status	26
6 Comparison of Delinquents and Controls on Home Background Score	33
7 Comparison of Delinquents and Controls on Pre-Army Delinquent History.	38
8 Comparison of Delinquents and Controls on Army Satisfaction Score	55
9 Correlations Between Opinion About Interest of Leaders and Willingness to Seek Aid Through Official Channels.	75
10 Criterion Variables Compared With Stockade Classifications	82

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**A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION OF
DELINQUENCY IN THE ARMY**

CONFIDENTIAL

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Chapter 1

BACKGROUND FOR THE RESEARCH

INTRODUCTION

A request for the initiation of research on the problem of delinquency in the Army was made to the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, by the Office of the Provost Marshal General in January 1952.¹ As a result of this request, plans were made for the Human Resources Research Office to conduct a coordinated program of research covering the areas outlined in the basic letter.²

This report presents the results of a preliminary investigation conducted during the last half of 1952 along the general lines set forth by the Office of the Provost Marshal General. The specific questions asked by the OPMG were:

(1) What are the causes of delinquency in the Army (especially Absence Without Leave), and what are the factors responsible for the recent increase in delinquency?

(2) What are the most effective methods of restoring prisoners to duty?

The present study is concerned primarily with the causes of delinquency in the Army and only secondarily with the other problems listed. The principal method used is a comparative analysis of information obtained from stockade prisoners and non-stockade troops through questionnaires and interviews. While the limitations of such data in providing definitive answers to the questions raised by the OPMG are fully recognized, a survey-type study was decided upon as a first step for these reasons:

(1) The previous studies which had been made on delinquency in the Army had concentrated primarily on background, personality, and

¹D/F to AC of S, G-1, Attn: Human Relations and Research Branch, from the PMG, dated 31 Jan 1952, Comment No. 1.

²This research was initially conducted on a coordinate basis with the currently inactive Army Attitude Assessment Branch, Troop Information and Education Division, Office of the Chief of Information, Department of the Army.

CONFIDENTIAL

related variables.¹ It was believed that the previous work could be extended, while still utilizing questionnaire and interview data, by taking a more comprehensive approach, as well as by taking into account recent administrative changes with respect to the treatment of delinquents.

(2) An experimental study, one alternative to the survey approach used in this study, while capable of yielding more definite information on any specific aspect of the problem, involves a "calculated risk" in limiting the range of information obtained. Such a risk is better taken after a preliminary exploration of the area, and consequent determination of the most promising variables to manipulate in later experimental work.

THE PROBLEM

The establishment and maintenance of stockades is based upon the expectation that, at any given time, approximately one per cent of the enlisted men in the Army will be confined to a stockade.² In order to obtain specific information on the reported increase in the number of confinements, data on the proportion of enlisted men in the stockades have been assembled for the past few years. These data (Figure 1) show that this proportion has varied considerably. It was as low as 0.5 per cent for only a brief period of time late in 1950. This low point was followed by a fairly rapid rise in confinements to a high of 1.5 per cent in August 1952.

The question next arises as to the reasons for the increase in stockade confinements during 1951 and early 1952. One factor may have been an administrative change made (June 1951) in the criterion for a man absent without leave being "dropped from the rolls as deserter," which was lowered from 90 to 30 days. The OPMG recognized that this change may have resulted in a greater proportion of AWOLs being court-martialed and sentenced to a stockade. In the main, however, the increase in stockade confinements was thought by the OPMG to be a direct result of an increased incidence of the more serious forms of delinquency—especially AWOL. To study this hypothesis the proportion of soldiers who return to duty from AWOL status during the month ("AWOL to duty") has been compared with the proportion of soldiers confined to stockades during the month (Figure 2).

These data show that, in general, fluctuations in the proportion confined during the month were coincident with the fluctuations in the proportion of "AWOL to duty." Thus, the question as to reasons for the

¹Feldman, H. and Maleski, A. A., "Factors Differentiating AWOL From Non-AWOL Trainees," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, Vol. 43, 1948; Johnson, W. and Otness, R., "A Study of 200 Violators of General Court-Martial Probation," *U.S. Naval Medical Bulletin*, Vol. 48, 1949, pp. 81-92; U.S. Department of the Army, *Absence Without Leave* (unpublished pamphlet).

²Information provided by the Confinement Branch, Operations Division, OPMG.

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ENLISTED STOCKADE CONFINEMENTS (Continental Command, 1949-52)




Figure 1

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COMPARISON OF ENLISTED "AWOL TO DUTY" RATE WITH STOCKADE CONFINEMENTS DURING MONTH

(Continental Command, 1949-52)




Figure 2

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increase in confinements would seem to reduce to a question as to the factors responsible for the increase in AWOL. As a matter of fact, 87 per cent of the stockade prisoners were charged with AWOL or desertion.

To obtain quantitative data, as distinguished from informal speculation about the factors responsible for the change in AWOL and confinement rates, is a difficult matter. However, because the problem of AWOL and the confinement of AWOLs is the major focus of this study, whatever facts are available about the trends in this form of delinquency should be examined before proceeding further into the description of the present research. Figure 3 shows the proportion of soldiers who were reported as AWOL during each month ("duty to AWOL") for the period April 1948 (the first month for which firm statistics are available) to November 1952.

These data show a gradual decrease in the "duty to AWOL" rate from the 2.2 per cent first shown in April 1948 to a low point of about 1.4 per cent late in 1950. This decline was followed by a rather rapid increase during 1951 to a high of 2.7 per cent in January 1952.

The reversal in the AWOL downward trend took place shortly after a period of rapid build-up in the enlisted strength of the Army coincident with the beginning of the Korean operation. Given the present data, it is not possible to separate the effects of the rapid build-up, and subsequent turnover in personnel, the introduction of a combat situation, attitudes toward the Korean operation, and related factors. However, with considerable confidence, one hypothesis which was offered to explain the increase in AWOL rate—namely, the increase in the draftee population—can be ruled out. The assumption was that a disproportionate number of draftees, as contrasted to volunteers, tend to go AWOL. To anticipate one of the findings from the present study, the results indicate a significant tendency for volunteers rather than draftees to be delinquent.

Indirect evidence as to some factors associated with changes in delinquent rates is provided by an analysis of the "general" prisoner population, i.e., prisoners who have been given a general court-martial. Acknowledging that these prisoners are more serious offenders than the average AWOL, it is nevertheless of interest to note that between 1948 and the present a significant change occurred in the ages of prisoners given general courts-martial. Taking into account changes in age distribution in the Army as a whole, there has been an increasing tendency for the younger age groups (under 20) to contribute disproportionately to the general prisoner population.¹ This finding suggests that the characteristics of this age group have changed in some way, or at least that its members react differently to the current military situation.

The data in Figure 3 give some indication of a tendency for the peaks in the "duty to AWOL" rate to occur after a holiday period. This point

¹Data obtained from an analysis of monthly reports of the Corrections Branch, Office of the Adjutant General.

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ENLISTED "DUTY TO AWOL" RATE DURING MONTH
(Continental Command, 1948-52)




Figure 3

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is brought out more clearly by an inspection of the trends in number of men in AWOL status by day of the month. These data for two typical months (October and November 1952), as presented in Figure 4, show:

(1) The number of men in AWOL status was highest at the beginning of the month, just after payday, and dropped off steeply to a low point at the end of the month. Apparently, the amount of money that a soldier has in his pocket is an important factor in whether he decides to go AWOL at any particular time.

(2) The peaks in the graph tend to occur after a non-work day. This finding reflects the fact that the soldier is less subject to direct military control when he is off duty, and perhaps feels the increased attraction of civilian pursuits on weekends and holidays.

To emphasize the magnitude of the problem, it should be pointed out that during the summer of 1953 about two per cent of the enlisted strength of the Continental Command were being reported in AWOL status each month. Thus, if the enlisted strength were 1,000,000 men, 20,000 would be reported "duty to AWOL" sometime during the month. The continued existence of an AWOL rate at such a level points up the significance of the problem and the need for understanding and control of the basic causes of delinquency in the Army.

PLAN OF STUDY

The purpose of the present study, as was mentioned earlier, was in a large degree exploratory. To implement this general objective it was decided to conduct a questionnaire study supplemented by interview material. Accordingly, a questionnaire was constructed to provide a fairly comprehensive coverage of factors that may influence delinquency in the Army.

Previous investigators have found that delinquents differ from non-delinquents with respect to a number of background and personality factors. The studies conducted during World War II showed that delinquents tended to come from civilian backgrounds marked by an unfavorable home environment.¹ Associated with these background characteristics were the findings that delinquents tended to have lower intelligence,² less education,³ and more of a history of pre-Army delinquency⁴ than did

¹Blair, W. R. N., *A Comparative Study of Offenders and Non-Offenders in the Canadian Army*, Canadian Army Operational Research Memorandum No. 1, 1950; Feldman and Maleski, *op. cit.*; Stouffer, Samuel A. and Otness, R., "100 Civilian Delinquents in the Navy," *Journal of Clinical Psychopathology*, Vol. 47, No. 8, 1946, pp. 251-290.

²Clark, J., "Intelligence Test Results Obtained From A Specific Type of Army AWOL," *Journal of Educational and Psychological Measurement*, Vol. 8, 1948, pp. 677-682; Fuchs, E. F. and Chyatte, C., "On the Intelligence of Soldier-Criminals," *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology*, Vol. 40, No. 6, 1950, pp. 753-755; U. S. Department of the Army, *op. cit.*

³*Ibid.*

⁴Feldman and Maleski, *op. cit.*; Stouffer and Otness, *op. cit.*

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ENLISTED "DUTY TO AWOL" RATE BY DAY OF MONTH
(Second Army, October-November 1952)




Figure 4

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non-delinquents. In the personality area, the delinquents tended to show more aggressive and escape behavior,¹ drunkenness,² emotional instability,³ and general psychopathic traits.⁴ A number of items bearing on these variables were included in the questionnaire designed for this study. This was done in order to have a check on the above findings, to determine if the general characteristics of delinquents had changed since World War II, and possibly to relate these variables to current situations in the military environment.

Hypotheses derived from interviews with officers in the field who were responsible for the apprehension and confinement of delinquents were another source of items in the questionnaire. These officers suggested that draftees may be more unwilling to serve than volunteers and consequently may have contributed disproportionate numbers of men to the stockade populations. They also suggested that some men may deliberately go AWOL in order to get a Bad Conduct Discharge or an automatic transfer from their unit, and that changes in the Army regulations regarding the payment of apprehension costs may have been a contributing factor in the increase in delinquency. Poor leadership, family problems, and broken homes were mentioned as possible variables which may predispose men to delinquency.

In addition, previous studies had indicated that, in terms of military experiences, delinquents are more likely to be volunteers⁵ (in contrast to the hypothesis held by some officers), have less service time and less combat experience,⁶ and display resentment toward and lack of identification with military life.⁷

These leads were utilized to formulate a number of hypotheses which were explored in questionnaire and interview items. The questionnaire⁸ that was finally developed covered the following areas:

- (1) Census-type data, such as age, education;
- (2) Family background, such as occupation of parent, income, family relationships;
- (3) Military experience, such as length of service, type of outfit, combat service;

¹Feldman and Maleski, *op. cit.*

²Blair, *op. cit.*; Feldman and Maleski, *op. cit.*

³Clark, *op. cit.*; Stouffer and Otness, *op. cit.*

⁴Feldman and Maleski, *op. cit.*; Johnson and Otness, *op. cit.*

⁵U.S. Department of the Army, *op. cit.*

⁶Stouffer and Otness, *op. cit.*

⁷U.S. Department of the Army, *op. cit.*; Feldman and Maleski, *op. cit.*; Stouffer and Otness, *op. cit.*

⁸See Appendices A and B. Throughout this report, where a comparable question is asked of both delinquents and controls, the "B" form of the questionnaire (administered to the controls) was quoted. The "A" form (administered to the delinquents) differs slightly on those items dealing with situations in the Army before the soldier entered the stockade: The past tense is used, and the question is preceded by "Before you came to the stockade. . ." or "When you were back in your outfit. . ."

CONFIDENTIAL

- (4) Social attitudes, such as attitudes toward military service, leadership, Bad Conduct Discharge;
- (5) Personality variables, such as aggressive behavior, impulsiveness;
- (6) Prison experiences and attitudes, such as reaction to stockade personnel, intention of "making good" on release.

The interview (Appendix C) was designed to explore more intensively certain areas covered by the questionnaire, such as attitudes toward leadership and job satisfaction.

Additional information on stockade prisoners was obtained from personal history records (Appendix D). However, only limited use was made of these data because the records were incomplete for many individuals.

It should be emphasized that the factors determining AWOL behavior are complex. The soldier brings certain characteristics to the military situation; these interact with the objective characteristics of the military situation in some complicated way. This interaction determines the relative strength of the soldier's avoidance tendencies (i.e., his tendencies to reject or avoid military life) as opposed to his inhibitory tendencies (i.e., his tendencies to accept military life and conform to military rules, which inhibit the AWOL response).

To make the data easier to present, the problem has been somewhat oversimplified. In Chapter 3 the pre-Army characteristics of the soldier have been related directly to AWOL behavior without any attempt to describe the patterns of interaction (among these and other variables) which presumably determine the relative strength of the inhibitory and avoidance tendencies. In the next chapter certain factors in the military situation have been considered in terms of their contribution to the soldier's tendencies to conform to Army life. In Chapter 5, other situational factors, both military and civilian, have been considered in terms of their contribution to the soldier's tendencies to reject military life. Thus, the organization of the empirical results is as follows:

PRE-ARMY FACTORS

Background: Social class, home background.

Personality: Aggressiveness, escape tendencies, long-range goals, pre-Army delinquency.

SITUATIONAL FACTORS: PRIMARILY INHIBITING

Punishment, social pressure, identification with Army goals.

SITUATIONAL FACTORS

Military: General satisfaction with the Army, leadership, regularity and discipline, Army job, recognition, physical conditions of Army living, transition, combat duty.

Civilian: Home problems, channels for handling emergency problems.

An attempt has been made to analyze the influence of the soldier's pre-Army characteristics on his reactions to the military situation.

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For brevity, these hypotheses will not be discussed at this point but will be reserved for presentation along with the analyses of the data.

In addition to the above analyses, a preliminary study was made on the problem of the effects of stockade treatment. These data are presented in Chapter 6.

CONFIDENTIAL

Chapter 2

PROCEDURE

DATA COLLECTION

The original research design called for administering the questionnaire to random samples of the stockade and non-stockade populations in the entire First and Second Army areas. However, this became impossible because of excessive attrition among men in the original sample at certain posts,¹ the deactivation of one post during the survey period, and small unique populations at certain other posts. Therefore, the universe of this study was redefined as comprising the stockade and non-stockade populations at the following six posts in the First and Second Army areas:

Camp Drum, New York	Fort Lee, Virginia
Fort Devens, Massachusetts	Fort Eustis, Virginia
Fort Campbell, Kentucky	Fort Meade, Maryland

Data collection for the stockade sample was accomplished by randomly selecting (i.e., selecting in such a way that every man had equal opportunity with every other man to be chosen) men from a total stockade roster. Questionnaires were administered by the research field team leader to groups of approximately 30 to 60 men. Data collection for the control (non-stockade) sample was accomplished by randomly selecting units previously stratified according to size. Rosters were then drawn up for each unit selected, and men were randomly selected from the rosters. Again the field team leader administered the questionnaire to groups of approximately 30 to 60 men. The relevant data on the questionnaire samples are presented in Table 1.

¹Of the posts eliminated because of excessive attrition among troops in the sample before collection of data began, two were the first stockades visited in the respective Army areas, and thus the high rate of attrition was due to the usual difficulties encountered in the initial stages of collection. The remaining post eliminated because of attrition was engaged in training operations in the field, and many of the men in the sample could not be reached for testing.

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Table 1
QUESTIONNAIRE SAMPLES

Post	Number Called	Number Reporting	Number Refusals	Number Illiterate	Number in Sample
STOCKADE GROUP					
Camp Drum	89	89	0	0	89
Fort Devens	112	105	1	0	104
Fort Campbell	101	92	0	1	91
Fort Lee	77	69	8	4	57
Fort Eustis	75	75	2	1	72
Fort Meade	220	214	2	9	203
Total	674	644	13	15	616
CONTROL GROUP					
Camp Drum	80	70	0	0	70
Fort Devens	209	189	0	0	189
Fort Campbell	411	344	0	0	344
Fort Lee	181	177	0	1	176
Fort Eustis	192	162	0	1	161
Fort Meade	318	276	0	0	276
Total	1391	1218	0	2	1216

For administrative convenience, the same sampling rate was not used at all six posts. Therefore, to obtain a total sample that would be representative of all six posts, weights had to be applied so as to equalize the sampling rate. That is to say, weights had to be applied so that the ratio of the men selected to the total number of men at the post would be the same for all posts. The weighting was accomplished, in general, by randomly reproducing or deleting cases; a sampling rate was chosen that would minimize the deletion of cases. The new samples formed in this manner are called the weighted samples. The pertinent data on the weighted samples are presented in Table 2. In all statistical computations on the weighted samples, the error variance was estimated, using the number of cases in the original samples (Appendix E). This procedure avoids any artificial inflation of significance due to the addition of cases.

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Table 2
WEIGHTED SAMPLES

Post	Number in Original Sample	Number in Weighted Sample
STOCKADE GROUP		
Camp Drum	89	82
Fort Devens	104	242
Fort Campbell	91	203
Fort Lee	57	134
Fort Eustis	72	72
Fort Meade	203	259
Total	616	992
CONTROL GROUP		
Camp Drum	70	163
Fort Devens	189	82
Fort Campbell	344	575
Fort Lee	176	414
Fort Eustis	161	454
Fort Meade	276	234
Total	1216	1922

On the basis of their responses to the questionnaires, the men in the stockade sample were stratified into three categories for selection of an interview sample:

(1) Pre-Army delinquent (PAD—all men who report a pre-Army delinquent history).

(2) "Bucking for a Bad Conduct Discharge" (BCD—men who report a preference for a BCD over staying in the Army but report no pre-Army delinquent history).

(3) Neither pre-Army delinquent nor "Bucking for a Bad Conduct Discharge."

In the same manner, the non-stockade sample was stratified into two categories:

(1) Pre-Army delinquent

(2) Not pre-Army delinquent

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The interview samples were then randomly selected from these categories at three posts: Camp Edwards, Fort Campbell, and Fort Meade. The pertinent data on the interview samples are presented in Table 3.

The interviews were of the structured type (using guide questions), conducted by interviewers who had some psychological training. Since the selection for representation on the basis of delinquency background was made from questionnaire data, the interviews were administered after the questionnaire data had been collected.

Table 3

INTERVIEW SAMPLES

Post	PAD ^a	BCD ^b	Non ^c	Total
STOCKADE GROUP				
Camp Edwards				
Number called	16	15	13	44
Number interviewed	12	15	11	38
Fort Campbell				
Number called	30	14	40	84
Number interviewed	26	10	32	68
Fort Meade				
Number called	17	19	18	54
Number interviewed	15	15	15	45
Total interviewed	53	40	58	151
CONTROL GROUP				
Camp Edwards				
Number called	20	NA	26	46
Number interviewed	14	NA	25	39
Fort Campbell				
Number called	45	NA	61	106
Number interviewed	34	NA	42	76
Fort Meade				
Number called	21	NA	20	41
Number interviewed	17	NA	16	33
Total interviewed	65	NA	83	148

^aPAD—men who report a pre-Army delinquent history.

^bBCD—men who are classified as "bucking for a Bad Conduct Discharge" and are not pre-Army delinquents.

^cNon—men who are neither pre-Army delinquent nor "bucking for a Bad Conduct Discharge."

NA: Not applicable.

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STATISTICAL ANALYSES

The first problem in the analysis was to determine whether the relationships between the questionnaire items and the delinquency—non-delinquency criterion were similar among the several posts. If the relationships were different at any given post because of unique conditions, then considerable information would be lost by combining the several posts into the weighted samples. To answer this question the differences between the stockade and the control samples on responses to the multiple choice questions were tested for statistical significance within each post. The chi-square statistic was used in all such tests. The over-all statistical significance of each question was determined by summing the chi squares across posts and taking the significance level with 6n degrees of freedom.

One hundred and twelve tests of significance were computed in this manner. Eighty-five were significant at the .01 level,¹ 8 were significant between the .01 and .05 levels, and 19 indicated probabilities greater than the .05 level. Where the over-all chi square was significant at the .05 level or better, the differences between the stockade and non-stockade groups were inspected for interaction with posts. The following results were obtained from this analysis:

- (1) On five questions the difference between the stockade and control samples was significant at the .05 level at two or more posts, but there was a reversal in the sign of the mean difference from one post to another. For example, to the question, "Where were you living just before you came into the Army this time?", at post 12 the stockade sample significantly more frequently reported living in a town of 25,000 people or less, while at post 16 the control sample significantly more frequently made this response.
- (2) On 13 questions there was a reversal in the sign of the mean difference at two or more posts but the significant differences all had the same sign.
- (3) On 44 questions the differences between the delinquents and controls were in the same direction at every post but not all differences were statistically significant at every post.
- (4) On 31 questions the differences between the delinquents and controls were in the same direction and statistically significant at every post.

¹"Significant at the .01 level" ($p < .01$) indicates that, if there were no difference between the stockade and the non-stockade populations at the six posts with respect to the variable in question, the observed difference in responses would occur by chance only about once in a hundred samples of comparable size. Similarly, "significant at the .05 level" ($p < .05$) indicates a probability of five in a hundred that the observed difference would be due to chance. In this report, a difference has been considered "significant" if it was equal to or less than the .05 level. In a few instances, other levels are cited for specific reasons.

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It was concluded from these data that all posts could be combined to contrast the differences between the delinquents and non-delinquents.

In addition to being used for the intra-post analysis just described, the unweighted sample was used for the analysis of the interview data and the questionnaire items which the men answered in their own words. This was done for convenience, because the construction of a weighted sample in each instance would have been rather laborious. In general, the interview and free-response question data have been used as supplementary material; consequently, the necessity for weighting was not as paramount as in the case of the multiple-choice questionnaire items.

To obtain an unbiased estimate of the difference between the stockade and control populations, the responses for each multiple choice question were recomputed on the weighted sample. Unless otherwise specified, the percentage data presented in the later sections of this report are weighted sample estimates of the true differences between stockade and control populations. In addition, the differences between stockade and control samples were tested for significance on the weighted sample for all questions where the differences between stockade and control groups were not uniformly significant or insignificant at every post.

In order to obtain unbiased estimates of the relationships between variables existing in the stockade and control samples, cross-tabulations were computed on the weighted sample.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DATA

Characteristics of Delinquent and Control Samples

Certain relevant data on background characteristics of delinquents and controls, together with comparative data on selected Army experiences, are presented in Table 4.

Attrition

Attrition among men selected for the original sample was 9 per cent in the stockade group and 13 per cent in the control group. Some of the reasons for questionnaire attrition were illiteracy, refusals, and failure to report for testing.

No Answers

The percentage of "No Answer" to any particular question ranged from about 0.2 to 17 per cent, the most frequent figure being in the neighborhood of 2 per cent. On most questions the percentage of "No Answers" was about two to three times greater in the stockade than in the control group. In computing the percentages cited in later sections of this report the "No Answer" category was eliminated, and the figures represent the percentage of the individuals who actually responded to the item.

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Table 4
CHARACTERISTICS OF DELINQUENT
AND CONTROL SAMPLES

Variable	Delinquents	Controls
<i>Education</i>	%	%
Below 7th grade	13	5
7th-8th grade	32	21
9th-11th grade	42	31
High school graduate and above	13	43
Median educational level	8.3 grades	10.1 grades
<i>Age^a</i>	%	%
Under 18 years	1	1
18-20 years	21	9
21-23 years	46	42
24 years and over	32	48
Mean age	22.6 years	24.5 years
<i>Race^b</i>	%	%
White	67	83
Negro	33	17
<i>Marital Status^c</i>	%	%
Married	35	36
Single	63	61
Separated, divorced, or widowed	2	3
<i>Method of Entry into Army</i>	%	%
Volunteered	63	50
Drafted	32	47
From Reserve or National Guard	5	3
<i>Time in Army^d</i>	%	%
Under 6 months	12	13
6 to 12 months	14	8
12 to 18 months	18	13
18 months to 2 years	14	25
Over 2 years up to 3 years	10	5
Over 3 years up to 5 years	18	15
Over 5 years	14	21
Median duty time	20.7 months	21.9 months

(Continued)

^aPercentages computed on unweighted sample.

^bPercentages computed after eliminating other races and "no answers."

^cPercentages computed after eliminating 16% "no information."

^dFor delinquent group, figures include stockade time. Percentages computed after eliminating 5% "no answers."

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Table 4 (Continued)

CHARACTERISTICS OF DELINQUENT AND CONTROL SAMPLES

Variable	Delinquents	Controls
<i>Army Grade</i>		%
Private		22
Private First Class		27
Corporal		27
Sergeant and above		24
<i>Combat Experience in Korean War</i>	%	%
None	70	77
Under enemy fire or bombing	5	9
In actual combat	25	14
<i>Times AWOL (counting any times not caught)</i>	%	%
Never	10	82
One or two times	46	13
Three times or more	44	5
Percentage of repeat offenders ^c	61%	
Percentage of unsentenced prisoners ^f	23%	
Median length of time unsentenced ^g	23 days	
Median length of sentence ^h	4.1 months	
Percentage charged with AWOL or desertion ⁱ	87%	

^cPercentages computed after eliminating 20% "no information."

^fPercentages computed after eliminating 15% "no information."

^gComputed on unweighted sample after eliminating 22% "no information."

^hPercentages computed after eliminating 22% "no information."

ⁱPercentages computed after eliminating 9% "no information."

Criterion Contamination

Although most of the hypotheses being tested are oriented around the problem of AWOL, some 13 per cent of the men in the stockade sample were confined because of some other offense. The question arose as to whether the men in this group might exaggerate the differences between the delinquents and the controls since in general they are the more serious offenders. To check this point, the differences between the stockade group charged only with either AWOL or desertion and the

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stockade group charged with some other offense were computed for the following variables:

- (1) Pre-Army delinquency history
- (2) "Bucking for a Bad Conduct Discharge"
- (3) General Army satisfaction
- (4) Socio-economic status
- (5) Education

The difference for each variable was tested for significance. Two variables, socio-economic class and "Bucking for a BCD," proved to be significant at the .05 and .01 levels respectively. A greater proportion of the AWOLs were classified as coming from a low socio-economic background, and more AWOLs were classified as "Bucking for a BCD," as compared with the other offenders. Thus the presence of the latter offenders in the stockades would, if anything, tend to lessen the differences between the delinquents and controls. It was therefore concluded that the presence in the stockade sample of the 13 per cent who were charged with some offense other than AWOL was not a seriously biasing factor.

Heterogeneity of Stockade Sample

Not all of the soldiers in the stockade group came from organized outfits at the six posts which constituted the control population. This was due to the fact that soldiers who are dropped from the rolls of their outfits after being AWOL more than 29 days are usually confined near the point of apprehension. The question arose as to whether the presence of these soldiers in the stockades might exert some extraneous influence on the results. To check this possibility, the differences between the prisoners who came from the six posts involved in the control sample and the prisoners who came from some other posts were computed on the following relevant variables:

- (1) Number of different outfits to which the man had belonged
- (2) "Bucking for a Bad Conduct Discharge"
- (3) General Army satisfaction
- (4) State of transition (moving from one post to another, etc.)

The difference for each variable was tested for significance, with only one significant difference being found. (The differences on two variables were at approximately the .50 level; on the other variable the difference was at the .20 level, but in the direction of the prisoners from the control posts.) The stockade prisoners from posts other than those providing the control population were more likely to be in a state of transition than were the prisoners from the posts in the control sample. This, of course, was to be expected but it does place some limitations on the interpretation of the transition variable. It was concluded that, other than for variables concerned with location and movement, the presence of stockade prisoners from other posts was not a seriously biasing factor.

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Effects of Stockade Confinement

A major inherent weakness of this study lies in the fact that the data on delinquents consist of "self-report" material collected after the soldier had broken regulations and was confined to a stockade. There is the possibility that many of the significant differences that were found are simply due to the fact that the delinquent group was confined to stockades and the control was not. Stockade life is not pleasant and, for that reason, constitutes a situational variable that must be carefully considered.

Two analyses were made for the purpose of checking on possible stockade effects in this connection. One analysis was made within the control group, comparing soldiers who reported having gone AWOL and those who reported never having gone AWOL. Another analysis within the stockade samples compared groups classified according to the seriousness of their delinquency. Details of these analyses are given in Appendix F.

Although it is apparent from these analyses that a general stockade effect was exaggerating the differences between the delinquents and the controls, it was concluded from these data that the differences cannot be entirely explained in terms of this variable.

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Chapter 3

PRE-ARMY FACTORS

INTRODUCTION

This chapter considers the influence of the soldiers' civilian experiences which might act as predisposing factors to delinquency in the Army. Two general types of variables are analyzed here: (a) background factors that are presumed to have influenced the present personality structure of the soldier, and (b) personality characteristics that may partially determine the way the soldier reacts to the military situation. These personal variables are hypothesized as interacting with situational variables to produce delinquent behavior.

The background factors considered are socio-economic status and home background. Personality variables considered are aggression, escape behavior, degree of striving for long-range goals, and pre-Army delinquency.

BACKGROUND VARIABLES

Socio-Economic Status of the Soldier's Home

Studies of civilian delinquency have shown that the delinquency rate is higher among lower social and economic groups.¹ Although the exact nature of the influencing factors is unknown, a similar relationship is to be expected between socio-economic status and delinquency in the Army. Several items were included in the questionnaire in order to study this relationship. The relevant data were analyzed for both the delinquent and the control groups.

¹Gleuck, Sheldon and Glueck, Eleanor, *Unravelling Juvenile Delinquency*, The Commonwealth Fund, New York, 1950.

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	Delinquents (%)	Controls (%)
Reported income of father		
Under \$1000	26	13
\$1000 to \$2000	25	18
\$2000 to \$3000	18	23
\$3000 to \$5000	21	29
\$5000 to \$10,000	7	13
Over \$10,000	3	4
	(p < .01) ^{1,2}	
Reported occupation of father ³		
Laborer		
Farm laborer		
Service worker	43	30
Operator		
Craftsman, foreman		
Sales worker	30	34
Clerical worker		
Manager, proprietor		
Farmer	27	36
Professional man		
	(p < .01)	
Reported educational level of soldier		
Below 7th grade	13	5
7th-8th grade	32	21
9th-11th grade	42	31
High school graduate and above	13	43
	(p < .01)	
Reported race of soldier		
White	67	83
Negro	33	17
	(p < .01)	
Family reported to be often broke and borrowing		
Yes	28	11
No	72	89
	(p < .01)	

¹All tests of significance in this report were computed with item choices grouped as indicated by the spacing and vertical ruling in the answer categories. Where no groupings are indicated, the computations were based on all item choices.

²Significant at the .01 level (p = .01) indicates that the probability is less than one in a hundred that the difference could have occurred by chance. Similarly, significant at the .05 level indicates a probability of five in a hundred.

³Occupation data computed on the unweighted sample.

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On these items the percentage of delinquents was consistently higher in the categories indicative of a relatively low socio-economic background. The differences between delinquents and controls are all significant at the .01 level. Race was included in this set of items under the assumption that the differences between the two groups are in part due to the well-known lower socio-economic status of Negroes as compared to whites.

A method of holding this variable constant was needed for certain comparisons in later analyses, so an over-all index of the soldier's socio-economic status was calculated on the basis of his educational level and his father's occupation. The comparison between delinquents and controls on this combined estimate is presented in Table 5. As was to be expected from the analysis of the separate items, the differences between delinquents and controls on the over-all estimate of the socio-economic level of the soldier's home background were significant at the .01 level. Although the two distributions overlap considerably, the relationship is sufficiently marked to be of practical value in predicting delinquent behavior.

Table 5

COMPARISON OF DELINQUENTS AND CONTROLS ON SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS

Group	Criteria		Delinquents (%)	Controls (%)
	Educational ^a Level	Occupation ^b of Father		
I	(c) A ↔ A		6	16
II	{ A ↔ B } { B ↔ A }		16	28
III	{ A ↔ C } { C ↔ A } { B ↔ B }		28	32
IV	{ B ↔ C } { C ↔ B }		36	19
V	C ↔ C		14	5
Significance level			(p < .01)	

^aEducational level of soldier is grouped as follows:

A—High school graduate or above.

B—8th to 11th grades.

C—Below 8th grade.

^bOccupation of father is grouped as follows:

A—Professional men, farmers, and managers.

B—Clerical, sales, and skilled workers.

C—Operators, service workers, and farm and unskilled laborers.

^cA ↔ A indicates an individual who has both "A" education level and "A" father's occupation; A ↔ B indicates an individual who has both "A" education level and "B" father's occupation, etc.

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Psychological Characteristics of the Soldier's Home Background

Social scientists have long postulated a correlation between the characteristics of the home environment during the formative years and later adult behavior traits. The general prediction that is relevant here is that the lack of warm family relationships during childhood is related to maladaptive adult behavior. Specifically, as mentioned in Chapter 1 of this report, there is some evidence that an unfavorable home background predisposes the individual to delinquency in the Army.¹ A number of items therefore were included in the questionnaire and the interview to evaluate certain characteristics of the soldier's home background.

Physical Presence of the Parents

The actual physical presence of parents in the home would seem in most cases to be a prerequisite for a favorable home environment. Accordingly, the following questions were used to compare the delinquent and control groups.

	Delinquents (%)	Controls (%)
Is your mother living?		
Yes	85	86
No	15	14
	(Not sig.) ²	
If No, how old were you when she died? ³		
14 years and under	70	47
Over 14 years	30	53
	(p < .01)	
Is your father living?		
Yes	72	77
No	28	23
	(Not sig.)	
If No, how old were you when he died? ³		
14 years and under	66	53
Over 14 years	34	47
	(p < .01)	

¹Blair, *op. cit.*

²In this report, differences smaller than $p < .05$ are not considered significant.

³Computed on the unweighted sample.

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	Delinquents (%)	Controls (%)
If both parents are now living, are they living together, separated, or divorced?		
One or both parents not living	26	28
Living together	51	60
Separated	10	4
Divorced	13	8
	(p < .01)	

When you were a child, how much of the
time would you say your mother was at home?

At home most of the time	72	84
Away part of the time on a job	14	10
Away most of the time on a job	9	4
Was not working, but spent most of her time away from home	2	0
Other	3	2
	(p < .01)	

When you were a child, how much of his free
time did your father (or stepfather) spend
with the family?

Most of his free time	63	78
Some of his free time	17	14
Very little or none of his free time	14	5
Other	6	3
	(p < .01)	

Although no significant differences were found in the proportion of men with one parent deceased, the age of the individual at the time of the parent's death proved to be significantly less for the delinquent group. This finding indicates that the physical presence of the parents during the formative years is important. It is confirmed by the other items concerning physical presence of the parents, all of which showed a significant difference between the delinquents and the controls—the delinquents reporting more frequently than did the controls that one or both parents were absent.

Family Discipline

The type of family discipline is an aspect of parent-child relationships that is considered to be especially important in the child's development as a member of the community. It was expected that, as compared to the controls, the delinquent group would tend to have experienced a relatively inconsistent or lax home discipline and thus be less amenable to the strict discipline imposed in the military situation. Several items were included to explore this particular area.

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	Delinquents (%)	Controls (%)
How strict was your mother (or stepmother) when you were a child?		
She usually let me do pretty much what I wanted to do	16	18
Sometimes she was very strict and sometimes very easy	24	24
She was usually strict but very kind	51	53
Usually she was very strict and hard with me	6	3
Other	3	2
	(Not sig.)	
How strict was your father (or stepfather) when you were a child?		
He let me do pretty much what I wanted to do	19	17
Sometimes he was very strict and hard and sometimes very easy	26	28
He was usually strict but very kind	40	45
Usually he was very strict and hard with me	15	6
Other	0	4
	(Not sig.)	
I usually had regular chores to do at home.		
Yes	77	80
No	23	20
	(Not sig.)	
At our house everyone came and went as he pleased.		
Yes	37	32
No	63	68
	(p < .05)	

On items where the soldier was asked directly about the type of family discipline, no statistically significant differences were found. The one item showing a slight but statistically significant difference is only an indirect indicator of discipline and could be related to other factors. Thus there is little evidence of a difference between delinquents and controls with respect to type of family discipline.

Family Relationships

Some indications of the cohesiveness and general atmosphere of affection in the family were sought in the following questions.

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	Delinquents (%)	Controls (%)
Our family enjoyed doing things together.		
Yes	85	91
No	15	9
	(p < .01)	
Our whole family usually got together for evening meals.		
Yes	83	90
No	17	10
	(p < .01)	
Our family always tried to be together for holidays.		
Yes	88	93
No	12	7
	(p < .01)	
How did your family get along when you were a child?		
Everyone got along well	51	59
There was arguing now and then	39	38
There was a lot of arguing or fighting	10	3
	(p < .01)	

Differences between delinquents and controls were statistically significant for all items. These reported differences were not large, but they do show the expected trends in that the controls tended to report a more cohesive and congenial family atmosphere than did the delinquents. These data suggest that the personal relationships within the family have an influence on later adult behavior.

Attitudes Toward the Family

Questions in this section were designed to gauge the soldier's reactions to his family life. In view of the evidence that the delinquents tend to report a more unfavorable home environment, it was expected that the soldier's reported feelings toward the family would also differ. The data are as follows:

	Delinquents (%)	Controls (%)
I often felt that my parents picked on me.		
Yes	12	5
No	88	95
	(p < .01)	

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	Delinquents (%)	Controls (%)
I often felt that my parents treated my brothers or sisters better than me.		
Yes	16	7
No	84	93
	(p < .01)	
I could always count on my family if I needed help.		
Yes	87	96
No	13	4
	(p < .01)	
I often felt ashamed of my family.		
Yes	8	5
No	92	95
	(Not sig.)	
I often felt that I was not wanted at home.		
Yes	15	4
No	85	96
	(p < .01)	

With only one exception, statistically significant differences were shown between delinquents and controls in their reactions to the family environment. The delinquents more frequently made unfavorable responses than did the controls.

Peer Group Membership

A psychological factor of the soldier's home background which has especial application to Army life is his association with other boys during the formative years. Since Army life requires men to live in a group, the ability to get along with other people is important to a successful adjustment. Also, the soldier's "esprit de corps" and his ability to work as part of a team depend in part upon his capacity for and acceptance of membership in groups in general. The following items were included in the questionnaire to explore this area.

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	Delinquents (%)	Controls (%)
When you were about 14 years old, who did you usually go around with?		
A group of boys	33	43
A couple of boys	34	37
One other boy	8	6
Mostly by myself	25	14
	(p < .01)	
How often did your family move from one house to another when you were a child?		
Never moved	22	27
Moved one or two times	50	58
Moved every few years	23	12
Moved almost every year or oftener	5	3
	(p < .01)	

Differences between delinquents and controls on the two questions were fairly substantial. This may have been due to the fact that peer group membership is more specifically related to adjustment in the Army than are the other home background factors. Whatever the explanation may be, the findings suggest that a man's ability to make himself part of a group may have an important relationship to tendencies toward delinquent behavior in the Army.

Home Background Score

To relate home background to certain other variables (to be discussed later in this report), an over-all estimate of the "favorableness" or "unfavorableness" of the soldier's home environment was prepared. The over-all measure was established before the individual items were analyzed, with 22 of the home background items being used.¹ For each item the favorable response or responses were scored "1" and the neutral or unfavorable responses were scored "0"; the home background score consists of the sum of these scores. The relevant data are presented in Table 6.

As was to be expected from results on the individual items, the mean difference between the delinquents and controls was statistically significant. These data strongly suggest that an unfavorable home background is a predisposing factor to delinquency in the Army.

Since unfavorable home background may be associated with low socio-economic status of the home, it was surmised that the apparent relationship between the home background score and delinquency might be due to the fact that the delinquents tend to come from homes of low

¹The question on peer group associations ("When you were about 14 years old, who did you usually go around with?") was not included.

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Table 6
COMPARISON OF DELINQUENTS AND CONTROLS
ON HOME BACKGROUND SCORE^a

Item	Delinquents	Controls
Mean	13.6	15.7
Standard deviation	4.15	3.08
Number in sample	616	1216
Significance level	(p < .01)	

^aBased on 22 questionnaire items, each scored "1" or "0".

socio-economic level. To investigate this possibility, the differences between the delinquents and controls on the home background score were computed with socio-economic status held constant.¹ A significant difference still was shown on the home background variable. It was therefore concluded that the relationship of home background with delinquency is not solely related to socio-economic class.

PERSONALITY VARIABLES

This study does not readily lend itself to the systematic evaluation of the personality differences between the delinquents and the non-delinquents. However, several aspects of personality were explored in order to obtain some idea of the personality characteristics of the delinquent group.

Four personality components will be considered in this section:

- (1) Aggression
- (2) Escape as a characteristic reaction to frustration
- (3) Degree of striving for long-range goals
- (4) Pre-Army delinquent history

¹The following technique was used to hold variable X (socio-economic status) constant:

(a) The significance of the differences between delinquents and controls on variable Y (home background) was tested, using only the soldiers who were low on variable X (i.e., soldiers from homes of low socio-economic status).

(b) The significance of the differences between delinquents and controls on variable Y was tested, using only the soldiers who were high on variable X.

If both tests were significant, it was concluded that the relationship of variable Y to the criterion of delinquency could not be accounted for by the relationship between variables X and Y. That is to say, the relationship of X to the criterion was not completely determining the relationship of Y to the criterion.

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Aggression

It was hypothesized that there is an aggressive component in delinquency and, hence, the delinquent group would report a more characteristic pattern of aggressive behavior than would the non-delinquents. The following items were designed to study this variable.

	Delinquents (%)	Controls (%)
How quickly do you get angry at people when they do things you don't like?		
I get angry very quickly	38	21
I get angry after a while	13	25
It takes a lot to make me angry	45	52
I never get angry	4	2
	(p < .01)	
Do you ever go out of your way to make things tough or unpleasant for people you don't like?		
Often	9	3
Sometimes	15	13
Seldom or never	76	84
	(p < .01)	
Suppose you were working on a job where your boss was always nagging at you. What would you do?		
Tell him to lay off if he knows what's good for him	9	4
Some other response	91	96
	(p < .01)	
Do you often have to tell people to mind their own business?		
Often	20	6
Sometimes	36	33
Seldom	30	42
Never	14	19
	(p < .01)	
Do people often get on your nerves so much that you feel like doing the opposite of what they want?		
Often	31	9
Sometimes	36	37
Seldom	20	37
Never	13	17
	(p < .01)	

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It is evident that the delinquents tended to give the aggressive response significantly more frequently than did the controls. These data confirm the expectation that the delinquent group tends to show more aggressive behavior than do the non-delinquents.

Because of the common belief that people of the lower socio-economic levels tend to express their aggression more openly than do other social classes, the question arose as to whether the obtained relationship between aggression and delinquency is linked with the lower socio-economic status of the delinquent group. To study this point, the differences between the delinquents and the controls were retested on two items ("Often tell people to mind their own business" and "Go out of way to make things unpleasant") with socio-economic class held constant. Although the differences in this analysis were less marked, the delinquents were still significantly more likely to express aggression than were the controls. Thus the aggressive items were related to delinquency independently of the differences in the socio-economic background of the two groups. It is concluded that aggressive tendencies may be predisposing to AWOL.

Escape Behavior

Since AWOL may represent an "escape" from a frustrating situation, it was expected that those individuals whose characteristic reaction to frustration was escape would tend to be more frequently AWOL than those individuals who handled their problems in other ways. The following items were considered, for purposes of the present analysis, as indirect indicators of escape behavior:

	Delinquents (%)	Controls (%)
In the last year, how many times have you been on sick call?		
None	25	32
One or two times	31	44
Three or more times	44	24
	(p < .01)	
How often have you been really drunk in the past year?		
Weekly or oftener	19	3
Every few weeks	14	8
Every few months	11	11
Very seldom	31	38
Never	25	40
	(p < .01)	

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	Delinquents (%)	Controls (%)
Suppose you were working on a job where your boss was always nagging at you. What would you do?		
Quit the job and take my chances at getting another	27	19
Some other response	73	81
	(p < .01)	

These responses show that delinquents and controls differed significantly on the escape items, with the delinquents showing substantially more indication of escape behavior. In addition, as in the aggression items, when socio-economic class was held constant for a representative item (sick call) the difference between the delinquents and controls was still significant. Thus, as expected, the tendency to escape behavior as a reaction to frustration appears to be related to AWOL.

Long-Range Goals

In considering the problem of delinquency, it seems reasonable to suppose that soldiers who have very little to lose by such behavior would become delinquent more frequently than individuals who have long-range goals, achievement of which would be jeopardized by delinquency. For this reason it was expected that items concerning striving for long-range goals would be important in differentiating between delinquents and controls. The following items were included in the questionnaire in order to explore this area:

	Delinquents (%)	Controls (%)
Are you setting aside a certain amount of money each month for savings or a war bond?		
Yes, regularly	31	43
Once in a while	16	22
No, I am not	53	35
	(p < .01)	
How long does your Army pay check usually last?		
Usually spend it the first few days	41	17
Usually get through the month	45	55
Usually have some left over	14	28
	(p < .01)	

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	Delinquents (%)	Controls (%)
Suppose you were looking for a job. You heard of one job that paid a lot of money, but would last only a short time. You heard of another job that didn't pay so much, but gave you a chance to work up in a few years. Which job would you take?		
The job that paid a lot of money but lasted a short time	17	8
The job that didn't pay so much, but you could work yourself up	83	92
	(p < .01)	
Do you agree with the idea—"do what you want to do today and let tomorrow take care of itself?"		
I agree very much	30	11
I agree pretty much or a little	16	17
I disagree pretty much or a little	22	26
I disagree very much	32	46
	(p < .01)	
Have you given any thought to the kind of job or career you would like to settle down at?		
Have definite plans for the future	45	39
Thought a lot about it but have not quite decided	42	51
Thought a little about it	7	7
Haven't thought about it at all	6	3
	(p < .05)	

The differences between delinquents and controls were statistically significant at the .01 level except for the item concerning definite plans for a career. The lack of marked differences on this item may be due to interaction with socio-economic status; when this variable was held constant, the controls from a middle or high socio-economic background more frequently reported having career plans than did delinquents from similar backgrounds ($p < .01$). However, within the low socio-economic group, the delinquents reported career plans somewhat more often than did the controls ($p < .10$).

When socio-economic status was held constant for the item "How long does your Army pay check usually last," the differences remained significant at the .01 level. Thus, although there may be some interaction between long-range goals and socio-economic status, the socio-economic level does not appear to be determining the relationship between long-range goals and delinquency.

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Judging from their relative lack of striving for long-range goals, it is concluded that delinquents show less responsible behavior than do the controls. An influencing factor in this area may be the finding that delinquents tend to be younger than the controls: The mean age of the delinquents was 22.6 years, and the mean age for the controls was 24.5 years.

Pre-Army Delinquent History of the Soldier

In considering the relationship between the soldier's pre-Army background and his adjustment to military life, a history of pre-Army delinquency seemed particularly relevant. One would expect that those individuals who were delinquent in civilian life would tend to continue to be delinquent in the Army.

For purposes of this study the subjects were classified, on the basis of their responses to the questionnaire, as "pre-Army delinquents" if:

- (1) The subject reported one or more civilian arrests and the offense was other than a minor traffic violation, or
- (2) The subject gave the indicated response to four of these questions:
 - (a) When you were younger, did you ever take things off cars or out of stores? (Very often; Pretty often; A few times)
 - (b) If you did not finish high school (or grade school), what is the main reason you dropped out of school? (Got into trouble and had to leave)
 - (c) Did you like to fight when you were a kid? (I liked fighting); How often did you get into fights when you were a kid? (Often)¹
 - (d) Did you ever play hooky from school? (Often)
 - (e) Did you ever run away from home? (Two or three times; More than three times)
 - (f) Before you came into the Army, were you ever fired from a job? (Once or more)

The comparison of delinquents and controls on pre-Army delinquent history, so defined, is presented in Table 7.

Table 7

COMPARISON OF DELINQUENTS AND CONTROLS ON PRE-ARMY DELINQUENT HISTORY

Category	Delinquents (%)	Controls (%)
Classified as pre-Army delinquent	37	13
Not classified as pre-Army delinquent	63	87
Number in sample	(616)	(1216)
Significance level	(p < .01)	

¹Both questions had to be answered in the indicated manner for a point to be scored.

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The data show that the delinquents were markedly more likely to report a pre-Army delinquent history than were the controls. Of all the pre-Army variables studied, this one was the most highly related to the criterion. This finding is, of course, not unexpected but may point to some essential similarities in the influencing factors of civilian and military delinquency.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

An important point to note in the evaluation of these results is the fact that all the data relevant to the areas discussed have been presented. No data have been eliminated because of lack of significant differentiation between delinquents and controls. In view of this fact, the data show a surprising number of significant differences between the two groups. This is in part due, of course, to the large number of cases used in this analysis, which makes a relatively small difference statistically significant. Nevertheless, the data could contribute to the construction of a psychological test for the prediction of delinquency, if such a test were administratively feasible.

The analysis has shown that socio-economic status and to some extent degree of goal striving were related to delinquency in the sense that a higher percentage of soldiers from a relatively impoverished home background tended to go AWOL as compared to soldiers from a high socio-economic background. However, as will be developed more fully in later chapters of this report, one would expect that an individual who comes from a poor home would find considerable gratification in the regular food and security that the Army provides. There is some evidence in our data that this is the case. Apparently, the reason that low socio-economic status is associated with delinquency is the relative lack of internalized inhibitions against delinquency within this social group. In general most of the background and personality variables (with the possible exception of the findings on peer group membership) appear to be related to a lack of concern with commonly accepted morals rather than any special predisposition to dislike the Army. Thus, pre-Army delinquency is the factor most highly associated with delinquency in the Army.

From the analysis of the background and personality variables, the following conclusions were drawn:

- (1) The civilian experiences of the soldier prior to Army entrance are partial determinants of delinquent behavior in the Army.
- (2) Of the variables studied, reported pre-Army delinquent history is most highly related to delinquency in the Army.
- (3) Socio-economic status, as evaluated in this study, is significantly related to delinquency in the Army.
- (4) The psychological characteristics of the soldiers' home background, reported aggressive and escape behavior, and reported degree of striving for long-range goals are all related to delinquency in the Army. These relationships cannot be accounted for by the lower socio-economic status of the delinquent group.

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Chapter 4

SITUATIONAL FACTORS: PRIMARILY INHIBITING

INTRODUCTION

The situational factors to be discussed in this chapter are considered from the standpoint of their effect on the inhibitory tendencies (tendencies to conform) of the individual. In terms of the discussion presented in Chapter 1, it is believed that these factors would, if operating at a maximum and in the expected direction, tend to reinforce the individual's inhibitory tendencies, and thus would tend to prevent delinquency. These factors are: (a) punishment, (b) social pressure, and (c) identification with Army goals.

PUNISHMENT

The basic assumptions are that the punishment for any given offense is relatively constant throughout the Army, and that punishment in general would act as a deterrent to delinquency. Obviously, however, as far as the prisoners in the stockade are concerned, the Army's system of punishment has not been wholly effective in keeping soldiers from getting into trouble. The question arises as to whether the delinquents were not aware of the consequences of their behavior or whether they went AWOL with the full realization that they would receive a stockade sentence and possibly a Bad Conduct Discharge. The following items were used to explore this area:

	Delinquents (%)	Controls (%)
In the outfits you have been in, what usually happened to men who went AWOL?		
They usually got away with it	7	3
They usually got only company punishment	33	47
They usually got a court-martial	60	50
	(p < .01)	

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	Delinquents (%)	Controls (%)
At the time you broke military rules before you were sentenced to this stockade, what did you think would happen to you?		
I didn't think anything would happen	4	
I thought I might get only a bawling out	2	
I thought I might get company punishment (extra duty or restriction)	15	
I thought I might get a stockade sentence, but not a Bad Conduct Discharge	32	No comparable question
I thought I might get a stockade sentence, plus a Bad Conduct Discharge	19	
I didn't really think at all about what might happen to me	24	
I absolutely did not break any military rules	4	

According to these responses, about half of the delinquent group went AWOL expecting to get a stockade sentence or a stockade sentence plus a Bad Conduct Discharge. Thus expectation of the possibility of confinement apparently was not a deterrent factor for approximately 50 per cent of the delinquents.

On the other hand, about half of the delinquent group apparently did not expect a stockade sentence when they became delinquent. This suggests that there is some ambiguity concerning the certainty of confinement for the AWOL offence; for some of the men, this lack of certainty that they would be imprisoned may be weakening the deterrent effects of punishment. Additional evidence in this connection was the finding that only about half of the control group reported that men who went AWOL from their outfits usually got a court-martial.

Further evidence concerning the delinquents' relative lack of sensitivity to punishment is provided by the item on company punishment:

	Delinquents (%)	Controls (%)
Were you ever given company (administrative) punishment?		
Never	36	62
One time	30	24
Two times	14	9
Three times	8	2
Four times	3	1
Five times	1	0
More than five times	8	2
	(p < .01)	

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The responses to this question indicate that 64 per cent of the delinquent group had received company punishment one or more times. This suggests that the delinquents tend to have been in trouble for which they received company punishment before they are finally given a court-martial. It might be expected that those delinquents who had received company punishment in the past would expect additional company punishment, rather than a stockade sentence, for their present offense. This was not the case. The data show that delinquents who had received company punishment expected a stockade sentence about as frequently as did men who had not been punished at company level.

In the preliminary stages of the present study, Army personnel suggested that possibly the Bad Conduct Discharge was a motivating factor for some individuals, in the sense that they deliberately went AWOL in the hope of obtaining a Bad Conduct Discharge. Eight items were included in the questionnaire for the purpose of identifying those individuals who could be considered as "bucking for a Bad Conduct Discharge." A soldier was so classified if he responded as indicated to either question 1 or 2, plus one other of items 3 through 8:

- (1) If you had to choose between finishing your tour of duty in the Army or taking a BCD, what would you do? (Take a BCD)
- (2) Did you purposely go AWOL (or commit some other offense) in order to get a BCD? (Yes)
- (3) At the time you broke military rules before you were sentenced to this stockade, what did you think would happen to you? (I thought I might get a stockade sentence plus a BCD)
- (4) After you go back on duty, do you think you will go AWOL or commit some other court-martial offense? (I'm pretty sure I will)
- (5) How hard do you think it would be for a soldier with a BCD to get a good job in civilian life? (The BCD wouldn't make any difference at all)
- (6) What do the men back in your old outfit think of a soldier who tries to get a Bad Conduct Discharge? (It doesn't make much difference to most of them) (They would think what he did was all right) (They would think more of him because he did it)
- (7) What do your parents or relatives think of a soldier who tries to get a BCD? (It wouldn't make much difference to most of them) (They would think what he did was all right) (They would think more of him because he did it)
- (8) The Army is setting up retraining (rehabilitation) centers for stockade prisoners so that they can go back to regular duty with the Army. Would you like to go to such a retraining center? (No)

This classification was carried out for the delinquent group only, since many of the items did not apply to the non-delinquent group. Thirty-six per cent of the delinquent group were classified as "BCD." This finding, of course, does not mean that everyone so classified went AWOL

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deliberately in order to get a BCD. The following item provides further evidence on this point:

	Delinquents (%)
Did you purposely go AWOL (or commit some other offense) in order to get a BCD?	
Yes	18
No	82

Although 18 per cent responded affirmatively to the above question, it should be remembered that the effect of being in the stockade is an unknown biasing factor. It is concluded that, although the findings suggest possible motivational implications of the BCD for some individuals, the evidence is not strong enough to warrant a definite statement to this effect.

Another aspect of the Army system of punishment in which a motivational factor could operate is the 30-day criterion for dropping an AWOL soldier from the rolls of his outfit. On the assumption that a soldier who is trying for an automatic transfer to another outfit would probably know about the 30-day criterion, the following item was used to explore this area:

	Delinquents (%)	Controls (%)
How long does a soldier have to be AWOL before he is dropped from his outfit and assigned to a camp near where he is picked up?		
5 days	2	4
12 days	2	2
29 days ¹	70	36
59 days	3	3
90 days	3	9
One year	0	1
He is kept on the company roster no matter how long he is AWOL	3	11
I don't know	17	34
	(p < .01)	

The responses show that a large proportion of the delinquent soldiers knew the correct number of days, while relatively few of the non-delinquent soldiers knew the correct answer. However, the data do not show whether the delinquents knew the correct answer before going AWOL, or whether

¹The test of significance was based on this category versus all others.

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they learned it after their sentence and stockade confinement. Thus, it is concluded that the automatic transfer hypothesis is neither ruled out nor definitely substantiated by the above data.

Another consideration in this area, suggested as a possible contributing factor in delinquency, was the fact that the soldier no longer has to pay the complete cost of apprehension (his own and the guard's travel costs). The following data are relevant:

	Delinquents (%)	Controls (%)
Suppose a soldier goes AWOL and is picked up at home by the Military Police. He is taken back to his post under guard. Who pays the travel costs?		
The Army pays <u>all</u> travel costs	12	6
The soldier pays the cost of <u>only his own</u> trip back ¹	17	11
The soldier pays the cost of <u>his own</u> travel and the <u>guard's</u> travel	46	67
I don't know	25	16
	(p < .01)	

While the delinquents differ significantly from the controls, only a relatively small percentage in either group actually knew the correct answer to this question. Therefore, it was concluded that the fact that the soldier no longer has to pay the complete cost of apprehension is a relatively unimportant factor in delinquency.

SOCIAL PRESSURE

As mentioned earlier, the most frequent form of delinquency in the Army is AWOL. "Absence without leave" is an offense unique to the Armed Forces, in the legal sense of the term. In addition, the term "AWOL" may denote an offense ranging in seriousness from an hour's unexplained absence to a prolonged absence from duty. For some soldiers AWOL represents the only means of escape from a situation in which they are unwilling participants. For these reasons, it was expected that the men in the Army would be relatively non-hostile toward the AWOL offense, as compared to other delinquent acts.

In order to explore reactions of various groups to men who go AWOL and men who may be using repeated AWOL as a means of getting a Bad Conduct Discharge, appropriate items were included in the questionnaire.

¹The test of significance was based on this category versus all others.

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	Delinquents (%)	Controls (%)
What do the men in your outfit think of a soldier who goes AWOL?		
They think of him as almost a criminal	13	05
They think he doesn't amount to much	16	35
It doesn't make much difference to most of them	59	56
They think what he did was all right	8	3
They would think more of him because he did it	4	1
	(p < .01)	

What do the men in your outfit think of a soldier who tries to get a BCD (Bad Conduct Discharge)?		
They think of him as almost a criminal	14	15
They think he doesn't amount to much	29	57
It doesn't make much difference to most of them	41	25
They think what he did was all right	10	2
They would think more of him because he did it	6	1
	(p < .01)	

What do your parents or relatives think of a soldier who goes AWOL?		
They think of him as almost a criminal	18	23
They think he doesn't amount to much	36	60
It wouldn't make much difference to most of them	31	15
They think what he did was all right	12	2
They would think more of him because he did it	3	0
	(p < .01)	

What do your parents or relatives think of a soldier who tries to get a BCD?		
They think of him as almost a criminal	18	33
They think he doesn't amount to much	47	57
It wouldn't make much difference to most of them	24	9
They think what he did was all right	7	1
They would think more of him because he did it	4	0
	(p < .01)	

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The responses on these items show:

(1) The hypothesis that the men in the Army are relatively non-hostile to AWOL tends to be confirmed. Only 40 per cent of the control population stated that a soldier who goes AWOL is considered as "almost a criminal" or that "he doesn't amount to much."

(2) Delinquent soldiers reported more frequently than did non-delinquents that the men in their outfit were not hostile toward the AWOL type of delinquency ($p < .01$).

(3) Delinquent soldiers reported more frequently than did non-delinquents that their parents or relatives did not greatly disapprove of AWOL delinquency ($p < .01$).

(4) In both delinquent and non-delinquent groups significantly more soldiers reported a critical attitude toward a soldier who tries to get a Bad Conduct Discharge than toward a soldier who goes AWOL ($p < .01$).

(5) In both delinquent and non-delinquent groups significantly more soldiers reported disapproval of AWOL delinquency from parents or relatives than from Army peers ($p < .01$).

As noted above, a difference was found between delinquents and non-delinquents in reporting that Army peers disapproved of AWOL. A question as to the practical significance of these results therefore arose. The following interpretations were considered:

- (1) Possible differences among outfits in the degree of social pressure against AWOL

A large proportion of the delinquent group comes from combat arms units. Therefore, it was hypothesized that there might be less disapproval of delinquency among men in combat arms units, as compared to the technical and administrative services. This hypothesis was tested, and no significant differences were found. It was concluded that the difference between delinquents and non-delinquents regarding disapproval of delinquency from Army peers could not be attributed to type of outfit as represented in the present study.

- (2) Possible differences in degree of negative feelings among the associates of delinquents as compared to the associates of non-delinquents

Although no direct tests were made of this question as such, some evidence suggests that delinquents associate with different types of people than do non-delinquents. For example, delinquents report more drinking and gambling among their associates. Assuming that delinquents have reference to their close associates in reporting feelings about delinquency, this may partly account for the lesser degree of social pressure from Army peers reported by the delinquents.

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- (3) Possible differences in the extent to which delinquents are integrated into their outfits

Data previously presented indicate that proportionately more delinquents were in a state of transition (i.e., moving from one outfit to another) than were non-delinquents. By definition, a man in transition is not integrated into an outfit. In addition, delinquents tend to report knowing fewer men in their outfit than do the non-delinquents, as indicated by the following item:

	Delinquents (%)	Controls (%)
How well did you know the men in your outfit?		
I knew almost everyone pretty well	50	57
I knew a few of them pretty well	27	35
I hardly knew any of the men	23	8
	(p < .01)	

In order to rule out the possible effect of transition status on this item, delinquents not in transition were compared with non-delinquents not in transition, and the delinquents still reported knowing fewer men. It was concluded that degree of integration into the outfit is a significant factor in delinquency and is a possible explanation of the observed differences with respect to reporting whether Army peers disapprove of delinquency.

- (4) "Projection" as a possible explanation of obtained differences between delinquents and controls

When a soldier is convicted of some offense and sentenced to a stockade his self-concept suffers, and he is faced with the necessity for reconciling his status as a prisoner with his values, goals, and ideals. It would seem reasonable to suppose that, under these circumstances, he might "project" a less critical attitude, on the part of Army peers, parents, and relatives, than is actually the case. While no evidence is available, one way or the other, on this point, the possibility should be noted that part of the obtained differences might be due to "projection" on the part of the delinquents.

The inhibiting effect of social pressure depends not only upon the amount of pressure but also upon the individual soldier's sensitivity to social norms. One item was used as an indicator of the sensitivity of the soldier.

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	Delinquents (%)
Do you ever feel ashamed of being in the stockade?	
Never	30
A little ashamed	24
Pretty much ashamed	12
Very much ashamed	34

These data suggest that a majority of the men in the delinquent group are relatively insensitive to social pressure.

The following relationships were found between feeling ashamed and other variables:

(1) Delinquents classified as "Bucking for a Bad Conduct Discharge" were less likely to feel ashamed than were delinquents not so classified ($p < .01$).

(2) Delinquents who had been pre-Army delinquents were less likely to feel ashamed than were offenders who did not have a pre-Army history of delinquency ($p < .01$).

The delinquents who reported feeling ashamed of being in the stockade were compared with the non-delinquents on the following variables: (a) frequency of reporting that men in their outfits disapproved of AWOL; (b) frequency of reporting that men in their outfits disapproved of trying to get a Bad Conduct Discharge. As expected, no significant difference was found with respect to AWOL. With respect to a BCD, however, the delinquent group still tended to report more frequently than did the non-delinquents the lack of negative feelings against a soldier who is trying to get a Bad Conduct Discharge.

As mentioned earlier, the delinquents reported less disapproval of delinquency from family and friends than did the non-delinquents. It was suspected that this difference could be related in part to the lower socio-economic status of the delinquents, since previous studies¹ have indicated less social pressure against delinquency among the lower socio-economic classes. Hence, it was hypothesized that the socio-economic background of the soldier would be correlated with the extent to which he reported strong feelings against delinquency from parents and relatives. This relationship was tested and within the delinquent group was found to be significant at the .01 level. Among the non-delinquents it was significant at the .05 level as related to going AWOL, but was not significant as related to the Bad Conduct Discharge. It was concluded that at least part of the differences between delinquents and controls with respect to reported disapproval of delinquency from family and friends may be due to actual differences in the civilian environments.

¹Glueck and Glueck, *op. cit.*

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Finally, it was suspected that a general factor of dissatisfaction with the Army might be operating to influence the soldier's report of social pressure. To test this hypothesis, a correlation was computed between the "Army satisfaction score"¹ and the reported amount of disapproval of delinquency from parents and relatives. This correlation was significant at the .01 level, with the individuals who were less satisfied with the Army tending to report less disapproval of delinquency from parents and relatives. In order to evaluate the significance of this factor, delinquents were compared with non-delinquents on reported disapproval of delinquency from parents and relatives, with "Army satisfaction score" held constant. Since delinquents still reported significantly less disapproval, it was concluded that these differences are not wholly attributable to a general factor of dissatisfaction with the Army.

IDENTIFICATION WITH ARMY GOALS

In the preliminary investigation of the present problem, it was the feeling of some of the officers interviewed that the country as a whole was not supporting the Korean war effort as completely as during the period of World War II. It was thus suggested that this lack of popular support, transferred to the individual soldier, might be a contributing factor in the problem of delinquency. To explore the soldiers' attitudes concerning the necessity and value of the job they are doing in relation to the overall goals of the Army, the following questions were used:

	Delinquents (%)	Controls (%)
Do you feel that the work or training you are doing is necessary to the Army?		
All of it is necessary	44	47
A little of it is necessary	24	27
Much of it is unnecessary	14	13
Most of it is unnecessary	18	13
	(p < .05)	
Right now, in what way do you think you could be of greatest service to your country?		
By being a soldier	28	53
By going to school as a civilian	8	11
By working as a civilian	64	36
	(p < .01)	

¹See Chapter 5 for fuller discussion of this score and Appendix F for the items included.

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	Delinquents (%)	Controls (%)
Do you think the things we are fighting for are worth risking your life for?		
Yes	42	57
I think so, but I'm not sure	16	16
Undecided	17	14
I don't think so, but I'm not sure	7	6
No	18	7
	(p < .01)	

These responses make it clear that delinquents and controls differ significantly in their perception of the value and necessity of the job they and the Army are doing. Further analysis showed, as expected, that soldiers who had planned to make the Army a career had a higher commitment to the war effort than non-career soldiers. Also, as expected, soldiers bucking for a BCD had a significantly lower commitment to the war effort than those not in this group. It was further found that these items were highly correlated with general satisfaction with the Army; however, when general satisfaction was held constant, a significant difference still remained between controls and delinquents.

A word should be said concerning possible differences in the soldier's commitment to the Korean operation in comparison to the situation during World War II. In a study¹ conducted about midway in World War II, the following data were obtained:

	AWOLS (%)	Privates 6 mos. & over (%)	Noncoms (%)
If it were up to you to choose, do you think you could do more for your country as a soldier or a war worker?			
As a soldier	19	31	45
Undecided	8	10	14
As a war worker	73	59	41

¹Stouffer, Samuel A. et al., *The American Soldier: Adjustment During Army Life* (Vol. 1 of *Studies in Social Psychology in World War II*), Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1950.

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In the present study, the data on a similar question are as follows:

	Delinquents (%)	Controls (%)
Right now, in what way do you think you could be of greatest service to your country?		
By being a soldier	28	53
By going to school as a civilian	8	11
By working as a civilian	64	36

Although one must keep in mind that these two bits of data are not strictly comparable, because of differences in sampling and in the wording of the question, the general indications are that commitment to the Army goals was not much different during World War II than it is in the present conflict.

From the finding that career soldiers have a higher commitment to the goals of the military service, it would be expected that this group would be less likely to become delinquent than draftees and reservists. The following data are pertinent:

	Delinquents (%)	Controls (%)
How did you come into the Army this time?		
I volunteered for the Regular Army	63	50
I was drafted	32	47
I was called in from the Reserves	2	3
I was called up with the National Guard	3	0
	(p < .01)	

When you first came into the Army did you plan
to make the Army a career?

Yes	32	17
No	61	79
Just can't remember	7	4
	(p < .01)	

How much active military duty (counting any
stockade time) have you had?

1 month or less	3	5
Over 1 month up to 3 months	3	4
Over 3 months up to 6 months	6	4

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	Delinquents (%)	Controls (%)
How much active military duty (counting any stockade time) have you had? (Continued)		
Over 6 months up to 1 year	14	8
Over 1 year up to 18 months	18	13
Over 18 months up to 2 years	14	25
Over 2 years up to 3 years	10	5
Over 3 years up to 5 years	18	15
Over 5 years	14	21
	(p < .01)	

The data on these three items seem somewhat contradictory, in that they indicate that volunteers and men who planned, on initial entrance, to make the Army a career were more likely to become delinquent than men who had been drafted, or did not plan to make the Army a career. Only the finding that non-delinquents tended to have more active service time (especially in the "over 5 years" category) was in the expected direction. It must be concluded that volunteering for Army service and/or planning to make the Army a career at time of initial entrance into the Army are not good predictors of a successful adjustment to Army life.

The question arises as to why volunteering for Army service and initially planning to make the Army a career are inversely related to successful adjustment in the Army. First of all, it was found that the volunteers tended to be more satisfied with certain material aspects of Army life than were draftees and reservists, and that delinquent soldiers who reported planning to make the Army a career also tended to report liking their Army job ($p < .05$) and feeling that their work or training was necessary to the Army ($p < .05$). Thus it does not appear that volunteers have a greater tendency to go AWOL because of greater distaste for Army life.

There is evidence, however, to indicate that volunteers are characterized by certain background variables that tend to predispose them to delinquency. For example, volunteers were slightly more likely to have been pre-Army delinquents ($p < .10$), and were more likely to be from a lower socio-economic background than draftees or reservists ($p < .05$).

A clue to the tendency for volunteers to be more satisfied with certain material aspects of Army life was the finding that soldiers from a relatively low socio-economic background also tended to be more satisfied with these aspects of Army life; and, as mentioned above, volunteers tended to come from a low socio-economic background.

In summary, it was found that the delinquents showed less commitment to Army goals than did non-delinquents. However, volunteers and men who initially planned to make the Army a career were more likely to become delinquent in spite of their higher commitment to Army goals. Finally, there is some evidence to indicate that soldiers' commitment to

CONFIDENTIAL

Army goals was not much different during World War II than it is in the present conflict. Therefore, from the limited data available, it would appear that the increase in AWOL cannot be attributed to a difference in commitment to the war effort between present-day and World War II soldiers.

CONCLUSIONS

(1) There is little evidence in this study to indicate that recent administrative changes, regarding (a) criterion for "dropped from the rolls as deserter" and (b) payment of apprehension costs, have had any adverse effect on AWOL rate in the Army.

(2) This study produced only slight evidence to indicate that the use of the Bad Conduct Discharge as a means of getting out of the Army is motivational to delinquency.

(3) The evidence indicates that Army enlisted personnel in this sample are relatively uncritical of the AWOL offender. The soldiers regard their parents and relatives as being more critical of delinquency in the Army than are the soldiers' Army associates.

(4) There is some evidence to suggest that lack of integration into an organized outfit and lack of sensitivity to social pressure are factors in delinquency.

(5) At the present time, at least, volunteering for military service and/or planning to make the Army a career at time of initial enlistment are not good indicators of successful adjustment to Army life.

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Chapter 5

OTHER SITUATIONAL FACTORS

INTRODUCTION

In this American culture where such great emphasis is placed upon personal freedom and independence of the individual, Army life is a unique type of existence. Because the Army's jobs are many and complicated, and because it handles such large groups of men, a specific chain of command must of necessity exist, with its concurrent restrictions, regulations, discipline, and appropriately delegated authority. The goals of the individual soldier must be subordinated to the larger goal of the Army.

The individual soldier, however, conditioned as he has been to personal independence, and often losing sight of the over-all purpose and value of the job he is to do, finds himself in a situation where he may feel restricted and confined. This situation may conflict with his personal goals and means of satisfaction, and he may become excessively frustrated. Certainly he has had to handle conflict situations in civilian life, but there more channels for resolving these conflicts have been open to him. Now, the dissatisfactions which may arise from regularity and discipline, from discontent with his job or outfit, from an unsatisfactory relationship with his officers, from fear of combat, or from separation from his family and friends, must be resolved in one of very few ways. He can "grin and bear it," which he often does because of social pressure or fear of punishment; he may become aggressive and overtly express hostility toward his officers or his Army peers; or he may go AWOL.

It is the purpose of this section to (a) examine the factors within the military situation and those involving the separation from civilian life which may cause the soldier excessive conflict and thus may precipitate delinquency and (b) examine the type of soldier who responds to these factors by going AWOL.

VARIABLES WITHIN THE MILITARY SITUATION

The soldiers' attitudes toward the following aspects of Army life will be examined as possible sources of conflict: (a) general satisfaction with

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the Army, (b) leadership, (c) regularity and discipline, (d) Army job, (e) possibilities of recognition, (f) physical conditions of Army living, (g) "State of Transition," (h) combat duty.

General Satisfaction With the Army

The possibility exists that most of the differences between delinquents and controls with respect to specific situational factors may be explained by postulating that the delinquents feel a generalized dissatisfaction with the Army. It was therefore decided to measure this factor by combining a number of items into an "Army satisfaction score." Sixteen items were used for this purpose, with each item being scored "1" or "0" in such a way that a high score indicated high satisfaction with the Army. A list of the items used and the indicated scoring of each item is included in Appendix G. The differences between delinquents and controls on the Army satisfaction score are shown in Table 8.

Table 8
COMPARISON OF DELINQUENTS AND CONTROLS
ON ARMY SATISFACTION SCORE*

Item	Delinquents	Controls
Mean	6.3	7.6
Standard deviation	3.4	3.5
Number in sample	616	1216
Significance level	(p < .01)	

*Based on 16 questionnaire items, each scored "1" or "0".

The data presented in Table 8 show that the delinquents had a significantly lower mean Army satisfaction score than did the non-delinquents. This score has been useful throughout the analysis of the situational factors to hold general satisfaction with the Army constant so that specific areas of possible conflict or dissatisfaction could be examined without the influence of these generalized effects.

Leadership

During the preliminary analysis of the problem of delinquency in the Army, many officers suggested that "poor leadership" might be a contributing factor. While no direct evidence was obtainable on the actual quality of leadership to which the delinquent and control groups had been subjected, several items were used to explore the soldiers' attitudes toward their leaders. It was hoped that from the analysis of these items

CONFIDENTIAL

certain inferences could be made regarding (a) the quality of leadership as seen by the men and (b) the characteristics of soldiers who tend to react most negatively to Army leadership. The following items were used for this purpose:

	Delinquents (%)	Controls (%)
How many of your officers take a personal interest in their men?		
All of them	13	22
Most of them	16	23
Some of them	19	25
Very few of them	30	22
None of them	22	8
	(p < .01)	
How many of the noncoms take a personal interest in the men?		
All of them	10	9
Most of them	19	29
Some of them	24	30
Very few of them	27	25
None of them	20	7
	(p < .01)	
If you had a serious personal problem, would you go to the First Sergeant for help?		
Pretty sure to go there	35	42
Might go there	30	41
Would never go there	35	17
	(p < .01)	
If you had a serious personal problem, would you go to the Company Commander for help?		
Pretty sure to go there	50	56
Might go there	28	37
Would never go there	22	7
	(p < .01)	

CONFIDENTIAL

	Delinquents (%)	Controls (%)
How much do you think the officers or noncoms who were over you are to blame for the trouble you are in?		
A lot	47	No comparable question
Some	24	
Very little	29	
Do you think the officers are fair in their treatment of the men?		
Yes	29	No comparable question
No	71	

From these data it can be seen that the delinquents responded more negatively to leadership than did the controls, in the sense that the delinquents more often reported that their leaders were not interested in the men, and in the sense that the delinquents indicated less willingness to go to their leaders in regard to personal problems. Further evidence of negative reactions toward leadership are the findings that 71 per cent of the delinquents reported that their officers or noncoms were partially to blame for the trouble they were in and 71 per cent reported that the officers were not fair in their treatment of the men.

It should also be noted that even within the control group only 45 per cent of the men felt that all or most of the officers took a personal interest in their men, and only 38 per cent felt that all or most of the noncoms took a personal interest in their men. This would indicate a somewhat negative feeling toward leadership even on the part of the control group. Further evidence of this is found in the answers to the free-response question, "What do you think are the main reasons men go AWOL?"; 28 per cent of the delinquents and 27 per cent of the controls gave leadership as their reason.

It was suspected that the leadership variable was not functioning in isolation of other factors within the Army situation, but rather might be one of several interacting variables, some or all of which were acting to precipitate delinquent behavior. To explore these relationships, selected leadership items were correlated with satisfaction with Army job and outfit, reactions to the regularity and discipline in the Army, and feelings concerning the possibilities of recognition in the Army. A significant relationship was found to be present. That is, those soldiers (both delinquents and controls) who responded negatively to leadership also tended to be more dissatisfied with their Army jobs and outfits, responded more negatively to items concerning the regularity of Army life and Army discipline, and more often tended to feel that they do not have a chance to get ahead in the Army or do not get appropriate respect in the Army.

CONFIDENTIAL

The question then arose as to whether delinquents and controls showed a specific difference in their attitudes toward leadership, or whether the apparent difference was simply connected with these other factors or some larger factor such as a generalized dislike of the Army. In an attempt to answer this question, the Army satisfaction score, which was set up as an index of this generalized dissatisfaction with the Army (and which includes all of the above-mentioned items with the exception of reaction to outfit), was employed as a means of isolating the influence of the leadership variable. The following results were obtained:

(1) The leadership items proved to be correlated with the Army satisfaction score; that is, soldiers who reacted negatively to Army life in general also tended to report negative attitudes toward leadership.

(2) When the Army satisfaction score was held constant, a significant difference ($p < .01$) was still found to exist between delinquents and controls in attitudes toward leadership.

In view of the latter finding, it may be concluded that in their reaction to leadership the two groups show a difference which is not solely related to a generalized dissatisfaction with the Army.

In an attempt to further determine the type of individual who reacts most negatively to leadership, certain background variables were examined in their relation to leadership. It was suspected that pre-Army delinquency would be related to reactions to leadership; the supposition was that pre-Army delinquents have had negative or frustrating experiences with persons in a position of authority, and the resultant negative feeling toward authority in general may be carried over to the Army situation. It was further suspected that socio-economic background would be related to the soldier's reaction to leadership, since this is assumed to be an important factor in determining the individual's response pattern to authority figures in general. These areas were explored as follows:

(1) Relation of leadership reactions to pre-Army delinquency

Within the control group a significant relationship ($p < .01$) was found between pre-Army delinquency and negative attitudes toward leadership. Within the delinquent group, however, these two variables were not significantly related, with the exception of two items.¹ A significant correlation between these two variables had been expected within both groups; however, the findings suggest that the effects of the stockade upon the delinquents may have increased their negative feelings toward leadership and thus tended to obscure differences attributable to pre-Army delinquency.

¹A significant relationship ($p < .05$) was found between pre-Army delinquency and the items concerning seeking help from the first sergeant or the company commander. These items, however, may not be pure indicators of negative feelings toward Army leadership since they may include personality variables involved in the individual's taking the initiative to seek help.

CONFIDENTIAL

In holding the variable of pre-Army delinquency constant, and then comparing delinquents and controls on the leadership items, a difference significant at the .01 level was found. This finding indicates that the more negative attitude of delinquents toward leadership cannot be explained entirely by pre-Army delinquency (which is greater among the delinquents than the controls).

(2) Relation of leadership reactions to socio-economic background

The researchers expected that negative attitudes toward leadership would prove to be correlated with socio-economic status. However, in the delinquent group only one item ("Would you go to the First Sergeant for help in a serious personal problem?") proved to be significant at the .01 level, and this in the direction of more negative attitudes among those from the higher socio-economic group. In the control group there proved to be no correlation between socio-economic status and reactions to leadership.

In summary, the differences between delinquents and controls in the attitudes they reported toward leadership cannot be entirely explained in terms of a general dissatisfaction with the Army, nor by the influence of the background variables investigated. It appears, therefore, that there may have been a real difference in the type of leadership to which the men had been subjected. In the main, this difference seems to have been concerned with the amount of personal interest shown by officers toward their men.

Regularity and Discipline

Army life presents a situation which may introduce environmental stresses not present in civilian life. The required conformity to regimentation is an abrupt change for the average American who has been conditioned to independence and personal freedom. It was suspected, therefore, that the frustration arising from this situation might be a factor in precipitating delinquent behavior. To explore the soldiers' reactions to regularity and discipline the following items were used:

	Delinquents (%)	Controls (%)
How much does it bother you when you are ordered to do things that you don't see a good reason for doing?		
A great deal	46	24
Quite a bit	14	23
Not much	27	40
Not at all	13	13
	(p < .01)	

CONFIDENTIAL

	Delinquents (%)	Controls (%)
Do you like wearing a uniform?		
Yes	55	59
No	45	41
	(Not sig.)	
Do you like the order and regularity of Army life?		
Yes	34	45
No	66	55
	(p < .01)	
Do you like having to be neat and orderly all the time in the Army?		
Yes	86	85
No	14	15
	(Not sig.)	
Do you think Army discipline is too strict?		
Yes	51	26
No	49	74
	(p < .01)	

From these data, it can be seen that:

- (1) Delinquents did not differ from controls on the items concerning clothing and personal appearance.
- (2) Delinquents differed markedly from the controls in their reactions to authority or taking orders, the regularity of Army life, and discipline.

This latter group of items will be of most use in the attempt to ascertain soldiers' attitudes toward regularity and discipline in the Army. In regard to the item concerning discipline, however, it should be noted that the effects of a court-martial and stockade confinement may have operated to magnify the delinquents' reactions to discipline, thus making it difficult to determine their previous feelings regarding it.

Since regularity and discipline are presumed to be fairly constant aspects of the Army situation, it would be expected that differences

CONFIDENTIAL

appearing between delinquents and controls in this area would be linked with background and related characteristics of the soldiers. In examining the kind of individual who reacts most negatively to regularity and discipline, this variable was studied in relation to pre-Army delinquency, socio-economic status, and home background characteristics. The following results were obtained:

(1) Pre-Army Delinquency

When the pre-Army delinquency variable was held constant, the delinquents differed significantly ($p < .01$) from the controls in their reactions to regularity and discipline. This finding indicates that the more negative reactions of the delinquents cannot be entirely explained by the influence of pre-Army delinquency.

(2) Socio-Economic Status

Within the delinquent group, socio-economic status was found to be correlated with only one item, that concerning the regularity of Army life ($p < .05$). In this case, delinquents from a low socio-economic background reacted more negatively to regularity than those from a middle or high socio-economic background. Within the control group, two items (those concerning taking orders and the regularity of Army life) were significantly related ($p < .01$) with socio-economic status. However, the more negative reactions came from the soldiers from a middle or high socio-economic background. When the socio-economic status was held constant, delinquents reacted more negatively than controls to the items concerning taking orders ($p < .05$) and discipline ($p < .01$) but the differences disappeared on the item concerning regularity. Thus, although there appears to be some interaction, socio-economic status does not wholly account for the differences between delinquents and controls on these items.

(3) Home Background

The delinquent group showed only a slight tendency for soldiers from a less satisfactory home background to react more negatively to regularity ($p < .20$) and discipline ($p < .10$). This tendency was slightly greater within the control group ($p < .05$).

Thus, though variables outside the Army may slightly influence the soldier's reactions to regularity and discipline, these reactions seem to be more closely linked with the Army situation itself. It should be noted that these items may be representative of a general dissatisfaction with the Army. Since all the items used to explore this variable are included in the Army satisfaction score, it was not feasible to test whether this variable may be influencing delinquent behavior independent of a generalized dissatisfaction with the Army.

CONFIDENTIAL

Army Job

Dissatisfaction with one's job can be an unhappy and frustrating situation under any circumstances. In civilian life the individual has relatively free choice in considering all the factors and making an appropriate change. In the Army, however, this is often impossible. It was hypothesized, therefore, that dissatisfaction with one's job or outfit might be a factor in precipitating delinquent behavior in the Army. The following item from the questionnaire was indicative of the soldiers' attitudes toward their jobs:

	Delinquents (%)	Controls (%)
How do you feel about your Army job?		
Never had a job in the Army ¹	24	10
Very satisfied	22	18
Satisfied	19	46
Dissatisfied	15	15
Very dissatisfied	20	11
	(p < .01)	

On this question delinquents reported more dissatisfaction with their Army jobs than did the non-delinquents. More specific information regarding attitude toward Army job was provided by the following items from the interview:

	Delinquents (%)	Controls (%)
What is your present Army job?		
Skilled	12	37
Semiskilled and unskilled	72	62
Basic training or no job	16	01
	(p < .01)	
Do you think you are specially fitted to do any of these kinds of work?		
Yes	61	58
No	39	42
	(Not sig.)	

¹This category not used in the test for significance.

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	Delinquents (%)	Controls (%)
Are any of these jobs the kind of thing you always wanted to do?		
Yes	38	43
No	62	57
	(Not sig.)	
Do any of these jobs give you the opportunity to learn something you might find useful or that you would like to do when you get out of the Army?		
Yes	40	54
No	60	46
	(p< .01)	
What kind of a job do you think you will get when you get out of the Army?		
Unskilled	73	54
Professional or skilled	17	31
Go to school	10	15
	(p< .01)	

Thus, in the interviews the delinquents more frequently reported having unskilled Army jobs and expecting to obtain unskilled jobs upon separation from the Army. These data, together with the tendency of the delinquents to feel that their Army jobs did not give them something they would find useful when they got out of the Army, suggest that the delinquents may have felt resentful because of the relatively unskilled nature of their Army jobs.

However, certain other findings from the interview tend to argue against the above interpretation. The delinquents reported having had an unskilled civilian job prior to Army entrance significantly more frequently than did the non-delinquents, but they also reported having liked their civilian jobs as well as did the non-delinquents. In addition, they reported liking less responsibility on the job than did the non-delinquents. Thus, while the delinquents more frequently reported having an unskilled job in both the Army and civilian life, they reported more dissatisfaction only with the Army job. These findings suggest that attitude toward Army job may be only a facet of a generalized dissatisfaction with the Army on the part of the delinquent group. However, when the delinquents and controls were compared with Army satisfaction score held constant, the delinquents still reported more dissatisfaction with Army job. Thus, the results are not wholly explainable by postulating a factor of generalized dissatisfaction.

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It seems more likely that the results may be interpreted by focusing attention upon the finding that delinquents tended to feel that their Army job did not give them something they would find useful outside the Army. This finding from the interview data is further supported by the following questionnaire item:

	Delinquents (%)	Controls (%)
Do you get a chance to learn a trade or skill you would like to follow?		
Yes	34	50
No	66	50
	(p < .01)	

Quite possibly the delinquents expected to learn a skill which would be useful in civilian life. Since many of them reported having no opportunity for learning something useful, this may have been the basis for their dissatisfaction with their jobs.

Possibilities of Recognition

During the preliminary analysis of the present problem, it was suggested that soldiers who have not "gotten ahead" in the Army, through promotions and positions of authority, may tend to adjust to Army life less successfully than soldiers who have achieved this kind of recognition. Thus it was suspected that the delinquent group would have a mean rank significantly lower than the control group. This hypothesis could not be tested, however, because complete information concerning the rank of the delinquents before entering the stockade was not available. Examination of this problem, therefore, was confined to the soldiers' perception of their chances of recognition in the Army.

When the soldiers were asked what rank they expected to have when they left the Army, the delinquents significantly more often reported expecting a low rank than did the controls (p < .01). This appears, however, to have been due primarily to the fact that all delinquents were demoted to the rank of Private upon being sentenced to the stockade.

Only the following questions, therefore, were used in exploring the recognition variable:

	Delinquents (%)	Controls (%)
Do you feel that all men have a chance in the Army regardless of their past?		
Yes	44	59
No	56	41
	(p < .01)	

CONFIDENTIAL

	Delinquents (%)	Controls (%)
Do you feel that the Army gives a man a good chance to get ahead?		
Yes	47	63
No	53	37
	(p < .01)	

It can be seen from these data that delinquents were significantly less optimistic than the controls in their attitudes toward having a chance to get ahead in the Army.

It seemed likely that the soldier's perception of his chances of getting ahead in the Army would be related to other variables within the Army situation; therefore, the two attitude items were correlated with the leadership and transition variables, and with job satisfaction. Significant relationships were found except on the transition variable. Thus, the functioning of a general factor was again suspected. To test this, the Army satisfaction score was held constant; delinquents were still less optimistic than controls in their perception of chances to get ahead in the Army. In the group with a middle or high rating on the Army satisfaction score the difference was significant at the .01 level, while in the group with a low rating the significance level was .20.

To assess the influence of background factors on the soldier's perception of chances to get ahead in the Army, the following variables were considered:

(1) Pre-Army Delinquency

No correlation was evident between pre-Army delinquency and perceived chances of getting ahead in the Army, with one exception: Within the delinquent group, soldiers who were pre-Army delinquents more often felt they did not have an equal chance, regardless of their past ($p < .01$).

(2) Socio-Economic Background

Within the delinquent group, socio-economic background was not related to perceived chances of getting ahead in the Army. Within the control group, however, soldiers from a middle or high socio-economic background more frequently felt they did not have a good chance of getting ahead than did those from a low socio-economic background ($p < .01$). When socio-economic background was held constant, delinquents were significantly ($p < .01$) less hopeful than controls in their perception of chances to get ahead.

CONFIDENTIAL

In summary, the differences between delinquents and controls in their perception of chances to get ahead in the Army cannot be explained by a general dissatisfaction with the Army nor by the background variables investigated. It appears, therefore, that a real difference may exist in opportunities presented to different soldiers. Whether or not this may be a cause of delinquent behavior, however, is still undefined. In this connection, it should be remembered that this examination was based, not on the recognition already achieved, but on the soldiers' expectations as to what might be achieved; this attitude may very well have been influenced by stockade effects. Also the soldiers may have been realistically aware that a court-martial and stockade confinement might jeopardize chances for advancement in the Army.

Physical Conditions of Army Living

To anyone who has been in the Army, the mess sergeant has long been the subject of jokes and criticisms. The same is true, to a lesser extent, for barracks living. For the purposes of this study, it is important to know whether these complaints about the physical conditions of Army living arise from a dissatisfaction strong enough to be a factor in precipitating delinquent behavior, or whether they are merely the accepted way of "letting off steam," or giving expression to a general dislike of the Army. The following items were used in studying this area:

	Delinquents (%)	Controls (%)
Is the food better than in civilian life?		
Yes	14	15
No	86	85
	(Not sig.)	
Is there enough privacy in the Army?		
Yes	23	35
No	77	65
	(p < .01)	
Do you like living in a barracks with a group of men?		
Yes	42	50
No	58	50
	(p < .01)	
Are living conditions better than in civilian life?		
Yes	15	14
No	85	86
	(Not sig.)	

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These responses show that dissatisfaction with food and living conditions in general was reported with nearly equal frequency by both delinquents and controls. Delinquents, however, reported more dissatisfaction with barracks living and the lack of privacy than did the controls.

From the hypothesis that soldiers from relatively impoverished homes would tend to react more favorably to living conditions in the Army, it was expected that a correlation would exist between reactions to these items and socio-economic status. This was found to be true within the control group. It was not found to be true within the delinquent group; however, stockade effects might have been obscuring this latter correlation to the extent that confined soldiers tended to be reacting to stockade conditions rather than conditions in their old outfits.

It seemed likely that differences in opinions on living conditions might be attributable to a general factor of dissatisfaction in the Army. It was found that when the general dissatisfaction in the Army, as indicated by the Army satisfaction score, was held constant, these opinion differences tended to disappear except on one item in a specific group.¹ Unfortunately, results in this latter test are partially determined statistically because these opinion items were also used as part of the Army satisfaction score. Nevertheless, the data suggest that, although the men on the whole tend to hold rather unfavorable attitudes toward living conditions in the Army as compared to civilian life, there is little evidence that living conditions in the Army play any great part as a specific precipitating factor in delinquency.

State of Transition

During the preliminary study, the suggestion was made that problems or frustrations which arise during periods when a soldier is in a state of transition may precipitate delinquent behavior more often than those which arise when the soldier is in a state of relative stability. For example, it was suspected that frequent changes in outfit would tend to interfere with the individual's integration into the group; feeling insecure, and also feeling less social pressure from the group because he does not consider himself a part of it, the individual would more often tend to show delinquent behavior patterns. Such periods of transition or relative instability might occur when the soldier had changed outfits frequently, had just joined an outfit, was on the way to another unit, was waiting to be shipped overseas, or had been in the Army only a short time. Three questions were used to explore the extent to which transition or frequent change might be a factor in delinquent behavior.

¹Among the group of soldiers with a low rating on the Army satisfaction score, a difference, significant at the .01 level, remained between delinquents and controls on the item concerning lack of privacy. Just what other factors may be operating to cause this difference is not known.

CONFIDENTIAL

	Delinquents (%)	Controls (%)
What is your present assignment in the Army?		
In basic training	11	11
Just joined an outfit	22	18
In an outfit for some time ¹	32	53
On my way to another unit in the States	12	1
Waiting to be shipped overseas with a unit	3	1
Waiting to be shipped overseas as a replacement	5	1
At a separation center waiting for a discharge from Army	3	3
Another assignment (specify)	12	12
	(p < .01)	

During the past 12 months how many different organized outfits (companies, batteries, or detachments) were you assigned to for duty? (Do not include basic training).

None	19	22
One outfit	39	32
Two	24	30
Three	11	9
Four	4	4
Five or more	3	3
	(Not sig.)	

How much active military duty (counting any stockade time) have you had?

6 months or less	12	13
Over 6 months	88	87
	(Not sig.)	

As these responses show, delinquents and controls do not differ in the number of outfits they have been in, nor in the proportion of men who have been in the Army a short time. Thus, from the data available, it would appear that the relatively unstable periods arising from changes in outfit or from recent entrance into the Army are not influencing delinquent behavior.

¹The test of significance was based on this category versus all others (omitting the last two categories).

CONFIDENTIAL

However, a significant difference does appear on the item concerning assignment.¹ Only 32 per cent of the delinquents as opposed to 53 per cent of the controls had been in an outfit for some time, while 20 per cent of the delinquents as opposed to 3 per cent of the controls reported that they were on their way to another outfit in the States, or waiting to be shipped overseas. It was expected that, if being in this state of transition were particularly frustrating to the soldier, this variable would be correlated with general satisfaction in the Army. However, no such correlation was found. It would appear that this situation of transition influences delinquency only in the sense that when a soldier is on the move or waiting for shipment, he has more opportunity to go AWOL than when he is more permanently located. For men reporting they were waiting to go overseas (delinquents 8%, controls 2%), the additional factor of fear of combat may be influential. This will be discussed more fully in the following section.

Combat Duty

Informal reports from the field have indicated that many soldiers go AWOL while enroute to the Port of Embarkation to be shipped overseas. These reports suggest that, during wartime, avoidance of combat duty may be an important motivational factor in delinquency.

Unfortunately, little evidence is available one way or the other on this topic. Since "avoidance of combat" is a socially unacceptable excuse for going AWOL, it is no surprise that almost none of the stockade group gave this as a reason for their delinquency. However, when delinquents were asked about their Army assignment prior to going AWOL, the following results were obtained:

	Delinquents (%)	Controls (%)
What is your present assignment in the Army?		
Waiting to be shipped overseas	8	2
Some other assignment	92	98
	(p < .01)	

Although only 8 per cent of the delinquents reported "waiting to be shipped overseas," the difference between the delinquents and the controls in this respect is statistically significant. Unfortunately, the question as stated would not pick up soldiers who realized that they would be

¹When the prisoners from posts other than the six posts in the control sample are eliminated, the differences between the delinquents and controls are still significant on this variable.

CONFIDENTIAL

going overseas sometime in the near future, but were not as yet definitely alerted. Thus, it is quite possible that a greater proportion of soldiers fall in this category than the figures tend to indicate.

Another suggestion to be tested was that combat experience might increase a soldier's tendency to go AWOL. As to the relative amount of combat experience of the delinquent and non-delinquent groups, the following data were gathered:

	Delinquents (%)	Controls (%)
Have you been in combat or under enemy fire during the Korean War?		
No, not during the Korean War	70	77
Under enemy fire or bombing but not in actual combat in Korea	5	9
Yes, I have been in actual combat during the Korean War	25	14
	(p < .01)	

These findings show that the delinquents more frequently reported combat duty than did the controls. These data tend to support the hypothesis that combat experience may increase the likelihood that a man may go AWOL, perhaps because of possible disorganizing effects of combat duty, or because of the combat veteran's intolerance of "stateside" garrison duty.

VARIABLES RELATED TO THE CIVILIAN CULTURE

Typically, a tour of duty in the Armed Forces involves the necessity for a prolonged separation from family and friends, and partial isolation from other desirable features of civilian existence. It was hypothesized that certain variables connected with the soldiers' separation from civilian life were in some cases operating to precipitate delinquency.

Hardship to Family and Specific Emergencies

The following item gives some indications about this area:

	Delinquents (%)	Controls (%)
Does your being in the Army cause any special hardships or problems to your wife or family?		
No	41	70
Yes	59	30
	(p < .01)	

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The delinquents thus reported much more frequently that their being in the Army was causing special hardships to wife or family. When these men were asked to describe these problems, the most frequent responses were: (a) financial deprivation to family (45%) and (b) inadequate facilities for taking care of family near the military post, and the impermanency of military life (53%).

As expected, reporting special hardships to wife or family was significantly related to believing that one should be deferred, but was not significantly related to socio-economic status. In addition, when the delinquents were asked a free-response question, "Just how did you get into the trouble that got you into this stockade?", the most frequent answer was family problems (35%).

Additional information regarding possible influence of home problems comes from the data on leaves and passes. In response to the question asked of the delinquent soldiers as to how they had gotten into trouble, 16 per cent reported that they had been unable to get leaves or passes when they had attempted to get them, had been promised them, or felt they deserved them. Of this group, 68 per cent reported having gone AWOL because of home problems and emergencies. This finding raised the question of possible differences between delinquents and controls in success in obtaining leave. To explore this problem the following question was used:

	Delinquents (%)	Controls (%)
How often have you asked for leave and been refused?		
I have never asked for leave ¹	24	20
Got leave every time I asked for it	13	53
Was refused leave once	19	16
Was refused leave twice	14	6
Was refused leave more than twice	30	5
	(p < .01)	

Thus, while a few more delinquents than controls report never having asked for leave, the delinquents report having been refused leave significantly more often. It was further found that this item was significantly related ($p < .01$) to general satisfaction with the Army; that is, those reporting having been refused leave two or more times also reported

¹This category was omitted in test of significance.

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being dissatisfied with the Army in general. However, when general Army satisfaction was held constant, a significant difference ($p < .01$) still appeared between delinquents and controls. It was further suspected that seeking of leave might be related to certain background variables such as pre-Army delinquency or home background; however, no relationships were found to exist between these variables. When socio-economic status was held constant, significant differences still remained between delinquents and controls.

No direct evidence is available as to the efficacy and equity with which leaves and passes actually are handled, and it is, of course, realized that many "emergencies" are mere rationalizations furnishing excuses to leave the base. Nevertheless, the above data tend to indicate enough occasions when a soldier has been unable to obtain the leave which he feels he deserves, or which he needs for a real emergency, to warrant some consideration of this problem by the Army.

Further evidence on the home problem issue deals with the soldiers' "distance from home."

	Delinquents (%)	Controls (%)
About how close to your home are you stationed now?		
Less than 50 miles	13	5
50 to 300 miles	32	17
300 to 1000 miles	35	59
More than 1000 miles	20	19
	$(p < .01)$	

These responses show that significantly more of the delinquents report being stationed comparatively close to home than do the non-delinquents. This finding, coupled with the informal observation that many delinquents are picked up near their homes, suggests that the home situation exerts some attraction for the delinquent soldier, although family problems may not be specific in this connection. Taken as a whole, the above findings appear to indicate that family problems may be fairly important in delinquent behavior.

Official Channels for Handling Emergency Problems

The Army has set up various channels for handling emergency and personal problems. The finding that family problems may be important contributors to delinquency suggests that the soldiers' opinions of these channels should be evaluated. While, strictly speaking, this variable

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should have been discussed under "Variables Within the Military Situation," it is included at this point because of its relevance to the problems arising from the civilian culture.

In order to explore this area, the following items were included in the questionnaire:

	Delinquents (%)	Controls (%)
If you had a serious personal problem, where would you go for help?		
Would you go to the RED CROSS for help?		
Pretty sure to go there	33	34
Might go there	32	44
Would never go there	35	22
	(p < .01)	
Would you go to the CHAPLAIN for help?		
Pretty sure to go there	55	56
Might go there	31	38
Would never go there	14	6
	(p < .01)	
Would you go to the FIRST SERGEANT for help?		
Pretty sure to go there	35	42
Might go there	30	41
Would never go there	35	17
	(p < .01)	
Would you go to the COMPANY COMMANDER for help?		
Pretty sure to go there	50	56
Might go there	28	37
Would never go there	22	7
	(p < .01)	

Of the four possible channels, the chaplain and the company commander were most preferred, and the first sergeant and the Red Cross were least preferred. Delinquents and controls differed significantly, the controls being more willing to go to these channels for help.

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When the proportion of soldiers who reported that they would be "Pretty sure to go" to one or more of these channels was computed, it was found that 83 per cent of the control group and 76 per cent of the delinquent group fell into this category. It would seem then that a good majority of the respondents even in the delinquent group indicate a willingness to use at least one of these channels for solving their personal difficulties. Whether or not they actually make use of these channels and whether or not these channels adequately deal with their difficulties is, of course, another matter. Some evidence on the first point was elicited by the following item:

	Delinquents (%)	Controls (%)
Have you ever tried to see your Company Commander?		
No	50	56
Yes, tried once	26	20
Yes, tried more than once	24	24
	(p < .05)	
If yes, were you able to get to see him?		
I was able to get to see him without any trouble at all	31	82
I was able to get to see him, but it was a lot of trouble	30	13
I could not get to see him at all	39	5
	(p < .01)	

The evidence indicates not only that delinquents tried more often to see the company commander, but also that they were unsuccessful at getting to see him. The tendency for delinquents to report more frequently trying to see the company commander would seem reasonable, on the supposition that delinquents more frequently get into trouble than do non-delinquents. Assuming that the delinquents' reports of greater difficulty in seeing the company commander are reliable, this finding would tend to indicate that difficulty in seeing the company commander may be a factor in delinquency.

Of passing interest are the correlations obtained between reporting that officers and noncoms take a personal interest in their men, and reporting willingness to seek help through the various official channels. These data are presented in Table 9.

CONFIDENTIAL

Table 9

CORRELATIONS* BETWEEN OPINION ABOUT INTEREST OF LEADERS AND WILLINGNESS TO SEEK AID THROUGH OFFICIAL CHANNELS

Channels	Opinion of Officers' Personal Interest	Opinion of Noncoms' Personal Interest
Chaplain	.11	.13
Company commander	.32	.24
First sergeant	.28	.29
Red Cross	.18	.18

*Coefficient of contingency, computed within the control group only.

As one might expect, opinion of officers' personal interest correlated most highly with willingness to go to the company commander, and almost as highly with willingness to go to the first sergeant. Similarly, opinion of noncoms' personal interest correlated most highly with willingness to go to the first sergeant, and almost as highly with willingness to go to the company commander. It is interesting to note that willingness to seek aid from the chaplain correlated least highly with opinion of personal interest on the part of leaders. Apparently, the men do not consider the chaplain as closely allied with Army administrative authority as is the Red Cross.

CONCLUSIONS

The evidence presented in this chapter appears to support the following statements:

(1) Other things being equal, a soldier in a state of transition is more likely to go AWOL than a soldier who is integrated into a regular outfit.

(2) The majority of the soldiers in the sample felt that only some or a few of the officers and noncoms took a personal interest in the men. This felt lack of personal interest appears to be a contributing factor in delinquency.

(3) Hardships to family and specific emergencies were frequently mentioned as a reason for AWOL and appear to be important precipitating factors.

(4) Most soldiers (both delinquents and non-delinquents) appeared to be willing to go to one or more of the official channels for handling emergency and personal problems. However, soldiers who go AWOL apparently have more difficulty in using these channels.

CONFIDENTIAL

(5) Although avoidance of combat appears to motivate some few individuals, it is not possible to assess the importance of this variable from the present data.

(6) The physical conditions of Army living apparently are not influencing delinquency to any appreciable extent.

(7) In comparison to the controls, the delinquents were more frequently dissatisfied with their Army job and more frequently felt that they did not have the opportunity to get ahead in the Army.

(8) More generalized dissatisfaction with the Army was found among the delinquent group, but this general dissatisfaction did not account for the differences between delinquents and controls with respect to specific situational variables.

CONFIDENTIAL

Chapter 6

INTER-STOCKADE ANALYSIS

INTRODUCTION

The problem of the effect of the stockade experience upon the attitudes of prisoners returned to duty is a significant and continuing one for the Army. It is pointed up in the fact that a substantial proportion of the men in the stockades (61%)¹ were repeaters. Formal Army policy recognizes that strict penal methods often fall short of their mark in serving to modify and correct the attitudes of prisoners. This policy considers the function of the stockade to be one of rehabilitating the prisoner for active service whenever possible. AR 600-330/AFR states that:

"Discipline will be administered on a corrective rather than a punitive basis, and provision will be made for programs designed for the rehabilitation of prisoners. Such programs should provide equal opportunities for prisoners, and should be designed to prepare for successful return to duty those prisoners whose sentences do not include punitive discharges and those with punitive discharges who are considered potentially restorable. . . . Prisoners of potential value to the military service who have been sentenced to punitive discharge and whose return to duty will not adversely affect the esprit-de-corps and good name of the service should be restored to duty upon successful completion of any restoration training provided."²

In line with this emphasis the Army has in recent years established rehabilitation centers designed to emphasize the corrective aspects of penal methods in the hope of reducing the number of repeat offenders and punitive discharges. Such retraining centers are, however, few in number. For the most part, programs for the rehabilitation of prisoners are included in the agenda of stockades which at the same time hold in varying degrees to a policy of strict disciplinary methods. Moreover, Army regulations are sufficiently broad in statement that considerable variation in

¹Percentage of prisoners on whom data were available. No information regarding previous offenses was obtained in 20 per cent of the sample.

²Army Regulations 600-330/AFR 125-32, May 1951.

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interpretation and practice occurs among different stockades. In field visits preliminary to this research, the research teams received the impression that type of treatment given prisoners at the various stockades varied considerably.

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the attitudes of the prisoners in the stockade and to explore possible relationships between the type of stockade treatment they receive and certain criteria of probable successful adjustment when they are restored to duty. The limitations of this kind of data without a follow-up study are fully realized. It is hoped, however, that the findings from this necessarily exploratory study on the effects of stockade treatment will point the way for future research in this area.

ATTITUDES OF STOCKADE PRISONERS

The fact of being imprisoned in a stockade represents a marked change in living conditions as compared with normal Army life. All forms of communication with the outside are severely curtailed. All property or equipment in the possession of prisoners must be authorized and inspected daily by the confinement officer. Any formal rank which may have been attained in normal Army life is revoked. All activities of the day, be they work detail, drill, calisthenics, or meals, may be punctuated by roll calls which serve to remind the prisoner of his demonstrated inability to conform to Army codes.

Attitudes Toward Treatment

How do the prisoners view the life in the stockade? The following data give some clues as to the kind of attitudes they hold:

	Delinquents (%)
How much interest do the stockade officers and noncoms take in the welfare of the men?	
A lot of interest	20
Some interest	29
Very little interest	24
No interest at all	27
On the whole, how would you say the men are treated in the stockade?	
Most of the time the men get equal treatment	32
Once in a while some men get better treatment than others	28
Some men get picked on most of the time	40

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	Delinquents (%)
How do the stockade authorities treat the prisoners?	
Much harder than they need to	35
Somewhat harder than they need to	30
Just as hard as they need to	28
Somewhat easier than they need to	5
Much easier than they need to	2

Judging from these responses, most of the prisoners appeared to feel that they were treated more severely than was necessary. Only about half of the group felt that the stockade officers took an interest in the men and only a third felt that most of the men got equal treatment. These data, while not particularly startling, indicate that the men's attitudes toward the stockade treatment were on the whole rather negative.

Morale of Stockade Prisoners

In the light of the men's attitudes toward stockade treatment, one would expect that the morale of the men in the stockades would be relatively low. Though no direct measures of morale were employed, the following items give some indication of this area:

	Delinquents (%)
Do you ever think of trying to escape from the stockade?	
Very often	10
Pretty often	2
Sometimes	13
Seldom or never	6
Never	69
How well do you know the other men in the stockade?	
I know nearly everyone pretty well	32
I know a few men pretty well	49
I hardly know any of the men	19
How do the men in the stockade get along together?	
Everyone gets along well	42
There is arguing and fighting now and then	51
There is a lot of arguing and fighting	7

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To the extent that these items are indicators of morale, the findings suggest that morale in the stockades was not excessively low. Possibly the best indication was the finding that 42 per cent of the prisoners reported that everyone got along well and only 7 per cent reported there was an excessive amount of arguing and fighting.

Indicators of Future Adjustment to Army

Since one function of the stockade is to rehabilitate prisoners for restoration to military duty, of major importance are the prisoners' attitudes that bear upon their future adjustment to Army life. The following items were used to explore the prisoners' attitudes toward further military duty:

	Delinquents (%)
If you had to choose between staying in the stockade or going back to an organized outfit, what would you do?	
Stay in the stockade	19
Go back to my <u>old</u> outfit	25
Go back to a <u>new</u> outfit	43
Don't know what I would do	13
If you had to choose between finishing your tour of duty in the Army or taking a BCD, what would you do?	
Take a BCD	35
Would stay in the Army in any outfit	31
Would stay in the Army only if I were sent to my old outfit	7
Would stay in the Army only if I were sent to a new outfit	16
Don't know what I would do	11
After you go back on duty, do you think you will go AWOL or commit some other court-martial offense?	
I am up for discharge, will not return to duty	12
I am pretty sure I <u>will not</u> go AWOL or commit some other offense	45
I can't tell whether I will go AWOL or commit some other offense	31
I am pretty sure I <u>will</u> go AWOL or commit some other offense	12

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Judging from these results, the prisoners' attitudes appeared to be rather unfavorable insofar as they indicated the probability of making a successful adjustment upon restoration to regular duty. When asked "If you had to choose between finishing your tour of duty in the Army or taking a BCD, what would you do?", only 31 per cent of the prisoners stated without qualification that they would choose to stay in the Army. In the light of these data, it seems imperative to examine the possible relationship between type of treatment in the stockade and the above indices of future adjustment to Army life.

STOCKADE TREATMENT AND ARMY ADJUSTMENT

The major hypothesis tested in this analysis is that the type of stockade treatment experienced by the prisoner is related to his anticipated successful adjustment upon restoration to duty status. This hypothesis is the basic assumption upon which rehabilitation centers are established, and as such must be carefully evaluated.

Specifically, the present study is designed to explore the relationship between a treatment oriented toward rehabilitation (as opposed to a more punitive orientation) and certain indices of future adjustment to Army life. So far as is known, the relative effectiveness of these two opposing orientations in preventing the recurrence of delinquency has not been empirically demonstrated.

Sample

The stockades used in this analysis are the original six used in the main investigation, and an additional four stockades from the First and Second Army areas on which it has been possible to obtain data. Thus, a total of 10 stockades are used in the analysis of type of stockade treatment against the criterion variables.

Stockade Classifications

At each stockade visited, the field team leader interviewed the stockade commander and made informal observations of the stockade procedures. On the basis of the statements made by the stockade commander and informal observations, each stockade was classified as either: (a) primarily rehabilitative in orientation, (b) neutral with respect to rehabilitative or punitive orientations, and primarily characterized by strict adherence to Army regulations, or (c) primarily punitive in orientation. These classifications were, of course, impressionistic and must be regarded as tentative since their reliability has not been definitively established. Five stockades were classified as primarily rehabilitative, three as adhering strictly to Army regulations, and two as primarily punitive in orientation.

CONFIDENTIAL

Comparison of Stockade Classifications and Criterion Variables

The stockades were analyzed with respect to the proportion of men in each stockade who were favorable or unfavorable on the three items considered as indications of the soldier's future adjustment to Army life. These data are presented in Table 10.

Table 10

CRITERION VARIABLES COMPARED WITH STOCKADE CLASSIFICATIONS
(per cent)

Item	Rehabilitative					Neutral			Punitive	
	A	B	C	D	E	A	B	C	A	B
If you had to choose between staying in the stockade or going back to an organized outfit, what would you do?										
Stay in stockade or don't know	31	28	54	24	40	44	22	48	30	32
Go back to an outfit	69	72	46	76	60	56	78	52	70	68
If you had to choose between finishing your tour of duty in the Army or taking a BCD, what would you do?										
Take a BCD or don't know	48	44	79	36	50	56	40	43	64	55
Finish tour of duty	52	56	21	64	50	44	60	57	36	45
After you go back on duty, do you think you will go AWOL or commit some other court-martial offense?										
Pretty sure I will go AWOL	24	8	37	12	11	27	11	25	13	15
Can't tell whether I will go AWOL	39	40	36	24	36	40	40	27	45	38
Pretty sure I will not go AWOL	37	52	27	64	53	33	49	48	42	47

Because of the small number of stockades involved, no formal statistical tests of significance were computed. However, it is apparent from inspection of the data that no consistent relationships were found between the ratings of the stockades and the three indices of the soldier's future adjustment to Army life.

Two major difficulties affect interpretation of the above results. First, the classifications of the stockades may be invalid. Second, the distribution of prisoners within the stockades may not have been random with respect to certain characteristics of the prisoners that influenced their answers to the three criterion questions. Unfortunately, at this

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stage of the analysis, little can be done about the first ambiguity. However, the second problem was investigated, with the following results:

(1) The personal characteristics items found to be correlated with the criterion questions were tested for randomness between stockades. The distributions of the stockade prisoners were found to be significantly different with respect to the following items:

- (a) Entrance into Army
- (b) Race
- (c) Father's occupation
- (d) Age
- (e) Educational level
- (f) Plans to make Army a career

(2) Since the stockades were significantly different with respect to the distribution of these six variables, they were ranked in terms of the relative proportion of men who could be expected to make a favorable response to the criterion questions on the basis of these biasing variables. The stockades were then divided into two groups, one containing a greater proportion of soldiers who tend to be rather "favorable" with respect to the personal characteristics variables and the other a greater proportion who tend to be rather "unfavorable".

The group of stockades in which the inmates possessed rather "favorable" background characteristics included A and B of the rehabilitation, A and B of the neutral, and A of the punitive stockades. The remainder of the stockades constituted the "unfavorable" group. As can be seen from Table 10, this grouping of stockades to reduce possible biasing effects of the personal characteristics variables did not serve to bring out any consistent relationship between the type of stockade treatment and the criterion questions.

One of the stockades in the sample had recently been set up specifically as a rehabilitation center. The regular stockade on the same post is classified as punitive by the ratings for this study. In view of the fact that no consistent relationship was found between classifications of type of treatment and the criterion questions when all stockades were considered together, it was thought that a comparison between these two formally different stockades would be of interest. The responses to the same three questions were analyzed for the men in these stockades, and no significant differences were found. However, these results must be regarded as tentative since the rehabilitation center had been set up less than one month prior to the collection of the data. Quite possibly the short time the men had been exposed to the influence of the rehabilitation center was responsible for the lack of significant differences.

CONCLUSIONS

(1) Many stockade prisoners tend to possess attitudes that appear to be unfavorable to making a successful adjustment upon restoration to regular military duty.

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(2) No relationship was found between ratings of type of stockade treatment and certain indices of future adjustment to Army life.

(3) While the data are not definitive, it is concluded that, at least, a question is raised as to whether or not the rehabilitation-oriented treatment is more effective than ordinary stockade procedures.

CONFIDENTIAL

Chapter 7

SUMMARY

CONCLUSIONS

While the conclusions drawn from self-report data must necessarily be tentative, the data appear to support the following statements:

(1) The causes of delinquency in the Army appear to be extremely complex, and no one factor can be singled out as contributing overwhelmingly to delinquency.

(2) Of the variables studied, the personal characteristics of the soldier at the time he enters the Army appear to be most highly related to delinquent behavior in the Army. The delinquents and the controls were significantly different with respect to the following background and personality variables:

- (a) Socio-economic status
- (b) Home background
- (c) Pre-Army delinquency
- (d) Aggressiveness
- (e) Escape tendencies
- (f) Long-range goals

As mentioned in Chapter 3, these results indicate that a psychological test could be constructed that would predict delinquency in the Army with some degree of success. However, it must be remembered that the present data have been collected after the fact of AWOL, with consequent exaggeration of some effects. A cross-validation of the present variables, excluding this factor, may tend to lower the correlations to the extent that such a test would be impractical, especially at a time when the manpower needs of the services are at a high level.

(3) The personal characteristics that tend to predispose some soldiers to delinquency in the Army appear to operate in such a way as to lower the individual's inhibitions against delinquent behavior rather than to arouse any special dissatisfactions with Army life.

(4) With regard to Army situational variables, the following findings can be reported:

(a) Other things being equal, a soldier in a "state of transition" is more likely to go AWOL than a soldier who is integrated into a regular outfit.

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(b) The enlisted personnel in the present sample tended to be relatively non-hostile toward a soldier who goes AWOL.

(c) The majority of the soldiers in the sample felt that only some or a few of the officers took a personal interest in the men. This felt lack of personal interest appears to be a contributing factor to delinquency.

(d) In the present sample the soldiers who had volunteered and those who had planned, at initial entrance into the Army, to make the Army a career were more likely to go AWOL than soldiers who had not planned to make the Army a career.

(e) There is some evidence that the desire to avoid combat duty is a contributing factor to AWOL for some individuals.

(f) "Family problems" were frequently mentioned as a reason for AWOL. Most soldiers in the sample would be willing to go to one of the official channels for help in handling family and personal problems. However, there is some evidence to indicate that soldiers who go AWOL have more difficulty in utilizing these channels effectively.

(5) There is little evidence to show that the regulation requiring the AWOL soldier to pay only his own expenses involved in apprehension costs has been decisive in affecting the delinquency rate.

(6) The automatic transfer hypothesis (that is, that a soldier may deliberately go AWOL for more than 29 days in order to get an automatic transfer from his outfit) is neither ruled out nor definitely substantiated by the data from the present study.

(7) Although 36 per cent of the delinquent group were classified as "bucking for a Bad Conduct Discharge," the evidence is not definitive regarding the proportion of soldiers who deliberately go AWOL in order to get out of the Army by means of a Bad Conduct Discharge.

(8) In the very limited exploratory study of the effects of stockade treatment, such evidence as was obtained shows no significant relationship between stockade treatment and attitudes implying unsuccessful adjustment to the Army.

DISCUSSION

Concerning the factors responsible for the increase in the AWOL rate, the present data are such that in most instances only speculations are in order. Two factors should be noted: (a) the increase in the AWOL rate occurred shortly after the rapid build-up of military strength for the Korean operation, and (b) the age of delinquents tended to become progressively younger from 1948 to the present time, and in the present sample the AWOLs tended to be younger than the non-AWOLs.

One hypothesis was that the increase in the AWOL rate was due to the influx of draftees and reservists who were more unwilling to serve and consequently contributed heavily to the AWOL rate. However, in the present study the proportion of volunteers and men who entered the Army

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planning to make it a career was greater in the delinquent group than in the non-delinquent. Thus, this hypothesis can be dismissed as incompatible with the present data.

Since the increase in AWOL rate was roughly coincident with the Korean operation, another possible explanation is that the desire to avoid combat duty was responsible for the AWOL rise. The data suggest that this may be a factor, but its weight could not be assessed from the information in the present study.

Another explanation that has some support from the present study is the hypothesis that, with a rapid build-up in the enlisted strength of the Army, the handling of the men became more impersonal, and they were shipped about a great deal. Under such conditions, it is difficult to maintain high esprit de corps and group membership. The present findings on transition, leadership, and integration into the outfit tend to support this hypothesis.

Finally, a much more subtle explanation is the possibility that the draftees tend to have a demoralizing effect upon the regular Army personnel. Data in this study indicate that draftees tend to be more negative towards the Army than the volunteers. However, although the draftees dislike the Army, they are not as likely to go AWOL as are the volunteers. On the other hand, the personal characteristics of the volunteers tend to make them delinquent-prone, and their successful adjustment to Army life may depend more upon identification with the goals of the military service, their esprit de corps, and similar values. If these identifications tend to be broken down by the impact of the more unfavorable attitudes of the draftees, then a relatively high proportion of the volunteers may become delinquent.

A word should be said regarding the possibility that the dynamics of AWOL behavior and the characteristics of AWOL soldiers are different in the combat situation as compared with garrison duty. A study conducted during World War II¹ suggested that the principal difference between a group who had deserted from combat and a group who had not deserted was in terms of their psychological reaction to combat—the deserters showing more anxiety symptoms than the non-deserters. Also, a recent informal survey, conducted by the HumRRO research team on the adjustment of men who were shipped overseas from "state-side" stockades, suggested that these men were not markedly different from the regular replacement personnel in their adjustment to combat conditions. These limited data suggest that the problems of adjustment in combat may be quite different from the problems involved in adjustment to garrison duty.

¹Rose, A. M., "The Social Psychology of Desertion From Combat," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 16, 1951, pp. 615-629.

CONFIDENTIAL

FUTURE RESEARCH

The data in the present study provide valuable leads for the understanding and control of delinquency in the Army. While no one finding is sufficiently well established to warrant recommendations regarding administrative changes designed to reduce the incidence of delinquent behavior, the over-all findings imply that certain areas are in need of further investigation.

(1) The results on the effects of stockade treatment suggest a need for establishing whether different types of stockade treatment are related to differential adjustment upon restoration to regular duty. The research requirements here are as follows:

- (a) Two stockades with equal physical facilities.
- (b) Assignment of the guard personnel at random to the two stockades.
- (c) Input of prisoners at random between the two stockades.
- (d) Radical differences between the two stockades with respect to treatment of prisoners.
- (e) A follow-up study on each restored prisoner to determine the success of his future adjustment to the Army.

(2) The results on the situational variables that may be affecting the AWOL rate suggest that controlled experiments may be fruitful in the following areas:

- (a) Methods of increasing the integration of the men into the company.
- (b) Methods of instilling more negative attitudes towards AWOL among enlisted personnel.

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Appendix A

STOCKADE GROUP QUESTIONNAIRE

AAB Study 2
Form A

Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. July 1952

WHAT WE WANT YOU TO DO

1. Read every question or statement carefully to make sure you understand it before marking your answer.
2. Mark some answer to every question. If you have more to say, add it, but first mark one of the suggested answers.
3. If there is anything you don't understand, please raise your hand and ask about it.
4. Check and make sure you have answered every question before you turn in your paper.

**BE SURE YOU DO NOT WRITE YOUR NAME OR SERVICE NUMBER
ANYWHERE ON THIS QUESTIONNAIRE**

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How to Answer These Questions

Most of these questions have several different answers printed right after the question. In front of each answer is a line like this: _____. Read all of the answers under a question, then put a check mark, like this ☒ in front of the answer you pick.

1. How did you come into the Army this time? (Check one)
63 I volunteered for the Regular Army
32 I was drafted
02 I was called in from the RESERVES
03 I was called up with the National Guard
N = 988¹
2. Where were you living just before you came into the Army this time? (Check one)
14 Farm
16 In a small town (up to 2,500 people)
12 In a town with more than 2,500 up to 25,000 people
22 In a city with more than 25,000 up to 100,000 people
36 In a large city with more than 100,000 people
N = 984
3. When were you born? (write in) _____
(MONTH) (DAY) (YEAR)
4. In what state were you born? _____
(NAME OF STATE OR FOREIGN COUNTRY)

YOUR ARMY BACKGROUND

5. What was your last assignment before being sent to the stockade? (Check one)
11 In basic training
22 Just joined an outfit
32 In an outfit for some time
12 On my way to another unit in the States
03 Waiting to be shipped overseas with a unit
05 Waiting to be shipped overseas as a replacement
03 At a separation center waiting for discharge from Army
12 Another assignment (specify):
N = 972

¹The total number of cases in the weighted sample who responded to the item. The percentage figures are based on this N. The total number of cases in the weighted sample is 992.

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6. During the 12 months before you were sent to this stockade, how many different organized outfits (companies, batteries or detachments) were you assigned to for duty? (Do not include basic training. Check one answer)

19	None	11	Three
39	One outfit	04	Four
24	Two	03	Five or more

N = 981

7. Have you been in combat or under enemy fire during the Korean War? (Check one)

70 No, not during the Korean War
 05 Under enemy fire or bombing but not in actual combat in Korea
 25 Yes, I have been in actual combat during the Korean War
 N = 962

8. If you were in Korea during the Korean War, when did you return to the States? (Check one)

70 I have not been in Korea during the Korean War
 00 I arrived from Korea less than one month ago
 03 I arrived from Korea one to three months ago
 06 I arrived from Korea three to six months ago
 21 I arrived from Korea more than six months ago
 N = 931

9. What are you in the stockade for? (Check one)

85 AWOL
 15 Something else. (What? _____.)
 N = 971

10. Just how did you get into the trouble that got you into this stockade? (Tell exactly what happened, how it happened, and why you think it happened)

11. How much do you think each of these people is to blame for the trouble you are in? (Check one answer for each of the five types of people)

	a lot	some	very little	N
a. The soldiers I went around with	09	08	83	507
b. The officers or noncoms who were over me	47	24	29	654
c. The Army in general	49	23	28	635
d. Myself	42	35	23	661
e. Other people (describe _____.)	29	14	57	499

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12. About how close to your home was your last duty station before you were sent to the stockade? (Check one)

05 Less than 20 miles
08 20 to 50 miles
11 50 to 100 miles
21 100 to 300 miles
15 300 to 500 miles
20 500 to 1000 miles
20 More than 1000 miles

N = 983

13. How many times altogether have you been AWOL (Absent Without Leave) counting any times you were not caught? (Check one answer)

10 Never have been AWOL

25 One time
21 Two times
16 Three times
08 Four times
05 Five times
15 More than five times

N = 980

14. How long were you in the Army the first time you went AWOL for a day or more? (Check one)

08 Never have been AWOL

08 1 month or less
13 Over 1 month up to 3 months
15 Over 3 months up to 6 months
15 Over 6 months up to 1 year
11 Over 1 year up to 18 months
07 Over 18 months up to 2 years
09 Over 2 years up to 3 years
09 Over 3 years up to 5 years
05 Over 5 years

N = 982

15. How much ACTIVE military duty (counting any stockade time) have you had? (Check one)

03 1 month or less
03 Over 1 month up to 3 months
06 Over 3 months up to 6 months
14 Over 6 months up to 1 year
18 Over 1 year up to 18 months
14 Over 18 months up to 2 years
10 Over 2 years up to 3 years
18 Over 3 years up to 5 years
14 Over 5 years

N = 981

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16. What do YOU think are the main reasons why men go AWOL?

YOUR CIVILIAN BACKGROUND

17a. Is your mother living? (Check one)

85 Yes

15 No

N = 989

b. If No, how old were you when she died?

_____years old

18a. Is your father living? (Check one)

72 Yes

28 No

N = 977

b. If No, how old were you when he died?

_____years old

19a. If both your parents are now living, are they living together, separated or divorced? (Check one)

26 One or both of my parents are not living

51 Living together

10 Separated

13 Divorced

N = 873

b. If separated or divorced, how old were you when they were first separated or divorced?

_____years old

20. What is your father's (or stepfather's) job? If he is retired or he is not living, describe the last job he had. Describe carefully what he does.

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21. During 1951, what would you guess was the income of your parents (or your guardians)? If you do not know for sure, give the best guess you can. (Check one)

26 Under \$1000
25 Between \$1000 and \$2000
18 Between \$2000 and \$3000
21 Between \$3000 and \$5000
07 Between \$5000 and \$10,000
03 Over \$10,000

N = 920

22. When you were a child, how much of the time would you say your mother was at home? (Check one)

72 At home most of the time
14 Away part of the time on a job
09 Away most of the time on a job
02 Was not working, but spent most of her time away from home
03 Other _____

N = 963

23. How strict was your mother (or stepmother) when you were a child? (Check one)

16 She usually let me do pretty much what I wanted to do
24 Sometimes she was very strict and sometimes very easy
51 She was usually strict but very kind
06 Usually she was very strict and hard with me
03 Other _____

N = 962

24. When you were a child, how much of his free time did your father (or stepfather) spend with the family? (Check one)

63 Most of his free time
17 Some of his free time
14 Very little or none of his free time
06 Other _____

N = 944

25. How strict was your father (or stepfather) when you were a child? (Check one)

19 He let me do pretty much what I wanted
26 Sometimes he was very strict and hard and sometimes very easy
40 He was usually strict but very kind
15 Usually he was very strict and hard with me

N = 911

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26. What kind of family life did you have when you were a child? (Check "Yes" or "No" for each of the 11 items below).

	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>N</u>
a. Our family enjoyed doing things together	85	15	912
b. Our family was often broke and borrowing money	28	72	869
c. Our whole family usually got together for evening meals	83	17	901
d. At our house everyone came and went as he pleased	37	63	888
e. I often felt that my parents picked on me	12	88	875
f. I often felt that my parents treated my brothers or sisters better than me	16	84	873
g. I could always count on my family if I needed help	87	13	898
h. I often felt that I was not wanted at home	15	85	881
i. I often felt ashamed of my family	08	92	868
j. Our family always tried to be together for holidays	88	12	895
k. I usually had regular chores to do at home	77	23	888

27. How did your family get along when you were a child? (Check one)

- 51 Everyone got along well
- 39 There was arguing now and then
- 10 There was a lot of arguing or fighting

N = 963

28. How often did your family move from one house to another when you were a child?

- 22 Never moved
- 50 Moved one or two times
- 23 Moved every few years
- 05 Moved almost every year or oftener

N = 984

29. When you were about 14 years old, who did you usually go around with? (Check one)

- 33 A group of boys
- 34 A couple of boys
- 08 One other boy
- 25 Mostly by myself

N = 984

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30. When you were younger, did you ever take things off cars or out of stores? (Check one)

07 Very often
04 Pretty often
32 A few times
57 Never

N = 987

31. How far have you gone in school? (Check only one answer indicating the highest grade you completed)

04 Less than 5th grade	16 Finished 10th grade
03 Finished 5th grade	11 Finished 11th grade
06 Finished 6th grade	09 Finished 12th grade
11 Finished 7th grade	04 Some college but didn't finish
21 Finished 8th grade	00 Graduated from college
15 Finished 9th grade	

N = 988

32. If you did not finish high school (or grade school), what is the main reason you dropped out of school? (Check one)

12 I finished high school
05 Failed classes, or thought I would fail
06 Got into trouble and had to leave
42 Had to help support my family
21 Just didn't like school
14 Some other main reason (What? _____.)

N = 958

33. If you were working before you came into the Army, how satisfied were you with the last job you had? (Check one)

13 I was not working before I came in the Army
53 Very satisfied with my job
27 Satisfied with my job
05 Dissatisfied with my job
02 Very dissatisfied with my job

N = 984

34. Before you came into the Army were you ever fired from a job? (Check one)

09 Never had a job
70 Never fired
16 Fired once
05 Fired more than once

N = 984

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35. Were you arrested when you were a civilian? (Check one)

- 60 Never
- 20 Once
- 20 More than once

N = 971

36. If you were ever arrested when you were a civilian, what were the charges against you? (List any charge ever made against you by the police, including any ones where you were not to blame.)

37. In general, how did your family (parents, brothers, sisters or wife) feel when you went into the Army? (Check one)

- 01 I have no family
- 43 Very much upset
- 29 Somewhat upset
- 12 They didn't mind much one way or the other
- 10 Somewhat in favor of it
- 05 Very much in favor of it

N = 973

38. Does your being in the Army cause any special hardships or problems to your wife or family? (Check one)

- 41 No
- 59 Yes (Describe in detail) _____

N = 949

LIKES AND DISLIKES IN THE ARMY

39. At the time you came into the Army, did you think you should have been deferred? (Check one)

- 70 No, I don't think I should have been deferred
- 30 Yes, I should have been deferred. Why? _____

N = 924

40. When you first came into the Army, did you plan to make the Army your career? (Check one)

- 32 Yes
- 61 No
- 07 Just can't remember

N = 974

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41. How much does it bother you when you are ordered to do things that you don't see a good reason for doing? (Check one)

46 A great deal
14 Quite a bit
27 Not much
13 Not at all

N = 974

42. Soldiers have said different things about Army life. How do you feel about the different things listed below? (Check one answer for each different thing listed)

	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>N</u>
a. Do you like wearing a uniform?	55	45	974
b. Is the food better than in civilian life?	14	86	967
c. Do you like the regularity of Army life?	34	66	966
d. Is there enough privacy in the Army?	23	77	964
e. Do you think the officers are fair in their treatment of the men?	29	71	898
f. Do you think the noncoms are fair in their treatment of the men?	24	76	890
g. Do you like having to be neat and orderly all the time in the Army?	86	14	971
h. Do you like living in a barracks with a group of men?	42	58	960
i. Do you feel that all men have an equal chance in the Army, regardless of their past?	44	56	975
j. Do you feel that the Army gives a man a good chance to get ahead?	47	53	941
k. Do you get a chance to learn a skill or trade you would like to follow?	34	66	950
l. Are living conditions better than in civilian life?	15	85	967
m. Do you think Army discipline is too strict?	51	49	959
n. Does a man get more respect than in civilian life?	28	72	962

43. How well did you know the men in your last outfit before you came to the stockade? (Check one)

50 I knew almost everyone pretty well
27 I knew a few of them pretty well
23 Hardly knew any of the men

N = 960

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44. When you came to the stockade, how did you feel about leaving the men in your last outfit? (Check one)

12 Was glad to get away from them
36 Didn't care one way or the other
22 Disliked leaving them but didn't feel too strongly about it
30 Hated to leave them

N = 976

45. What is your background like compared to the men back in your old outfit? (Check one)

09 Much better than theirs
09 Better than theirs
61 About the same as theirs
13 Not as good as theirs
08 Much worse than theirs

N = 971

46. Which of the following best describe your friends in the Army?
(Check one answer for each pair)

48 They like or don't mind too much being in the Army
52 They dislike the Army

N = 931

83 Some have gone AWOL one or more times
17 None has gone AWOL

N = 914

60 Would like to work themselves up in the Army
40 Don't care about getting promotions

N = 921

65 Have told off the noncoms at least once or twice
35 Never talk back to noncoms

N = 917

46 Like to drink a lot
54 Drink little or not at all

N = 913

57 Seldom gamble for money
43 Gamble a lot for money

N = 890

47. How did you feel about the last Army job you had before you came to the stockade? (Check one)

24 Never have had a job in the Army
22 Very satisfied
19 Satisfied
15 Dissatisfied
20 Very dissatisfied

N = 968

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48. Do you feel that the work or training that you were doing was necessary to the Army? (Check one)

- 44 All of it was necessary
- 24 A little of it was unnecessary
- 14 Much of it was unnecessary
- 18 Most of it was unnecessary

N = 976

49. Right now, in what way do you think you could be of greatest service to your country? (Check only one)

- 28 By being a soldier
- 08 By going to school as a civilian
- 64 By working as a civilian

N = 969

50. Do you think the things we are fighting for are worth risking your life for? (Check one)

- 42 Yes
- 16 I think so, but I'm not sure
- 17 Undecided
- 07 I don't think so, but I'm not sure
- 18 No

N = 979

EXPERIENCES IN THE ARMY

51a. Did you ever try to see your company commander (in the last outfit you were in before being sent to the stockade)? (Check one)

- 50 No
- 26 Yes, tried once
- 24 Yes, tried more than once

N = 976

b. If Yes, were you able to get to see him? (Check one)

- 42 I never tried to get to see him
- 18 I was able to get to see him without any trouble at all
- 18 I was able to get to see him, but it was a lot of trouble
- 22 I could not get to see him at all

N = 926

52. Did you think you were getting a square deal in your last outfit? (Check one)

- 33 Most of the time
- 40 Sometimes
- 27 Never

N = 977

CONFIDENTIAL

53. In your last outfit before coming to the stockade how many of the officers took a personal interest in their men? (Check one)

13 All of them
16 Most of them
19 Some of them
30 Very few of them
22 None of them

N = 970

54. In your last assignment, how many of the noncoms took a personal interest in the men? (Check one)

10 All of them
19 Most of them
24 Some of them
27 Very few of them
20 None of them

N = 973

55. If you were back in your outfit, and you had a serious personal problem where would you go for help?

- a. Would you go to the RED CROSS for help? (Check one)

33 Pretty sure to go there
32 Might go there
35 Would never go there

N = 958

- b. Would you go to the CHAPLAIN for help? (Check one)

55 Pretty sure to go there
31 Might go there
14 Would never go there

N = 968

- c. Would you go to the FIRST SERGEANT for help? (Check one)

35 Pretty sure to go there
30 Might go there
35 Would never go there

N = 949

- d. Would you go to the COMPANY COMMANDER for help? (Check one)

50 Pretty sure to go there
28 Might go there
22 Would never go there

N = 961

CONFIDENTIAL

56. Were you ever given company (administrative) punishment? (Check one)

- 36 Never
- 30 One time
- 14 Two times
- 08 Three times
- 03 Four times
- 01 Five times
- 08 More than five times

N = 976

57. How often have you asked for leave and been refused? (Check one)

- 24 I have never asked for leave
- 13 Got leave every time I asked for it
- 19 Was refused leave once
- 14 Was refused leave twice
- 30 Was refused leave more than twice

N = 977

58. In the last year, how many times have you been on sick call?
(Check one)

- 25 None
- 31 One or two times
- 20 Three to five times
- 09 Six to ten times
- 15 More than ten times

N = 982

59. How fair is Army justice, in your opinion? (Check one)

- 10 Fair almost always
- 16 Fair most of the time
- 30 Fair about half of the time
- 44 Unfair most of the time

N = 978

60. On the whole, would you say that you have gotten fair treatment in the Army? (Check one)

- 40 Yes
- 60 No

N = 945

60a. Explain your answer _____

61. Did the Commanding Officer in your last outfit know your name?
(Check one)

- 75 Yes
- 25 No

N = 942

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62. In the outfits you have been in, what usually happened to men who went AWOL? (Check one)

- 07 They usually got away with it
- 33 They usually got only company punishment
- 60 They usually got a court-martial

N = 946

63. What do the men back in your old outfit think of a soldier who goes AWOL? (Check one)

- 13 They think of him as almost a criminal
- 16 They think he doesn't amount to much
- 59 It doesn't make much difference to most of them
- 08 They think what he did was all right
- 04 They would think more of him because he did it

N = 958

64. What do the men back in your old outfit think of a soldier who tries to get a BCD (Bad Conduct Discharge)? (Check one)

- 14 They think of him as almost a criminal
- 29 They think he doesn't amount to much
- 41 It doesn't make much difference to most of them
- 10 They think what he did was all right
- 06 They would think more of him because he did it

N = 957

65. What do your parents or relatives think of a soldier who goes AWOL? (Check one)

- 18 They think of him as almost a criminal
- 36 They think he doesn't amount to much
- 31 It wouldn't make much difference to most of them
- 12 They think what he did was all right
- 03 They would think more of him because he did it

N = 915

66. What do your parents or relatives think of a soldier who tries to get a BCD? (Check one)

- 18 They think of him as almost a criminal
- 47 They think he doesn't amount to much
- 24 It wouldn't make much difference to most of them
- 07 They think what he did was all right
- 04 They would think more of him because he did it

N = 937

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67. How long does a soldier have to be AWOL before he is dropped from his outfit and assigned to a camp near where he is picked up?
(Check one)
- 02 5 days
 - 02 12 days
 - 70 29 days
 - 03 59 days
 - 03 90 days
 - 00 One year
 - 03 He is kept on the company roster no matter how long he is AWOL
 - 17 I don't know

N = 953

68. Suppose a soldier goes AWOL and is picked up at home by the Military Police. He is taken back to his post under guard. Who pays the travel costs? (Check one)
- 12 The Army pays all travel costs
 - 17 The soldier pays the cost of only his own trip back
 - 46 The soldier pays the cost of his own travel and the guard's travel
 - 25 I don't know

N = 970

STOCKADE EXPERIENCES

69. At the time you broke military rules before you were sentenced to this stockade, what did you think would happen to you? (Check one)
- 04 I didn't think anything would happen
 - 02 I thought I might get only a bawling out
 - 15 I thought I might get company punishment (extra duty or restriction)
 - 32 I thought I might get a stockade sentence, but not a BCD
 - 19 I thought I might get a stockade sentence plus a BCD
 - 24 I didn't really think at all about what might happen to me
 - 04 I absolutely did not break any military rules

N = 959

- 70a. Did you purposely go AWOL (or commit some other offense) in order to get a BCD? (Check one)
- 82 No
 - 18 Yes

N = 950

- 70b. If Yes, when did you first make up your mind to try for a BCD?
- 76 I did not purposely try to get a BCD
 - 15 Before I ever got in the stockade
 - 09 While I was in the stockade

N = 846

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71. Do you ever feel ashamed of being in the stockade? (Check one)

- 30 Never
- 24 A little ashamed
- 12 Pretty much ashamed
- 34 Very much ashamed

N = 970

72. Do you think your sentence was harder or easier than most other Army men have been getting for the same offense? (Check one)

- 36 Much harder
- 19 Somewhat harder
- 34 About the same as most others get for the same offense
- 07 Somewhat easier
- 04 Much easier

N = 932

73. Do you ever think of trying to escape from the stockade? (Check one)

- 10 Very often
- 02 Pretty often
- 13 Sometimes
- 06 Seldom or never
- 69 Never

N = 973

74. How does your family feel about your being in the stockade? (Check one)

- 31 They don't know about it
- 08 They think of me as almost a criminal
- 12 They think I don't amount to much
- 36 They think what I did was not very bad
- 13 They don't think I've done anything wrong

N = 910

75. How much interest do the stockade officers and noncoms take in the welfare of the men? (Check one)

- 20 A lot of interest
- 29 Some interest but you have to keep after them
- 24 Very little interest
- 27 No interest at all

N = 959

76. On the whole, how would you say that the men are treated in the stockade? (Check one)

- 32 Most of the time the men get equal treatment
- 28 Once in a while some men get better treatment than others
- 40 Some men get picked on most of the time

N = 967

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77. How well do you know the other men in the stockade? (Check one)

32 I know nearly everyone pretty well

49 I know a few men pretty well

19 Hardly know any of the men

N = 975

78. How do the men in the stockade get along together? (Check one)

42 Everyone gets along well

51 There is arguing and fighting now and then

07 There is a lot of arguing and fighting

N = 967

Explain your answer _____

79. In what ways would you say you are different from the men in this stockade? (Check all the ways in which you think you are different.)

I am more honest

I am not as noisy as they are

I do not swear and use dirty language as much

I am smarter than they are

I keep out of trouble more

I come from a better background

I don't feel that I am any different from them

80. How do the stockade authorities treat the prisoners? (Check one)

35 Much harder than they need to

30 Somewhat harder than they need to

28 Just as hard as they need to

05 Somewhat easier than they need to

02 Much easier than they need to

N = 963

81. When a man leaves the stockade and goes back to a regular company, how do you think the officers and noncoms will treat him? (Check one)

51 They are likely to pick on him

40 They are likely to watch him until he proves himself

09 They are likely to treat him the same as the other men

N = 962

82. If you had to choose between staying in the stockade or going back to an organized outfit, what would you do? (Check one)

19 Stay in the stockade

25 Go back to my old outfit

43 Go back to a new outfit

13 Don't know what I would do

N = 960

CONFIDENTIAL

83. If you had to choose between finishing your tour of duty (hitch) in the Army or taking a BCD, what would you do? (Check one)

- 35 Take a BCD
- 31 Would stay in the Army in any outfit
- 07 Would stay in the Army only if I were sent to my old outfit
- 16 Would stay in the Army only if I were sent to a new outfit
- 11 Don't know what I would do

N = 963

84. After you go back on duty, do you think you will go AWOL or commit some other court-martial offense? (Check one)

- 12 I am up for discharge, will not return to duty
- 45 I am pretty sure I will not go AWOL or commit some other offense
- 31 I can't tell whether I will go AWOL or commit some other offense
- 12 I'm pretty sure I will go AWOL or commit some other offense

N = 951

85. How hard do you think it would be for a soldier with a BCD to get a good job in civilian life? (Check one)

- 07 Almost impossible
- 18 Very hard
- 29 Pretty hard
- 46 The BCD wouldn't make any difference at all

N = 960

86. The Army is setting up retraining (rehabilitation) centers for stockade prisoners so that they can go back to regular duty with the Army. Would you like to go to such a retraining center? (Check one)

- 29 Yes
- 51 No
- 20 Have no idea

N = 931

a. Give the reasons for your answer here: _____

PERSONAL OPINIONS

87. Do you agree with the idea—

"do what you want to do today and let tomorrow take care of itself?"

(Check one)

- 30 I agree very much
- 05 I agree pretty much
- 11 I agree a little
- 11 I disagree a little
- 11 I disagree pretty much
- 32 I disagree very much

N = 954

CONFIDENTIAL

88. How quickly do you get angry at people when they do things you don't like? (Check one)

- 38 I get angry very quickly
- 13 I get angry after a while
- 45 It takes a lot to make me angry
- 04 I never get angry

N = 968

89. Do you ever go out of your way to make things tough or unpleasant for people you don't like? (Check one)

- | | | | |
|----|-----------|----|--------|
| 09 | Often | 21 | Seldom |
| 15 | Sometimes | 55 | Never |

N = 971

90. How often have you been really drunk in the last year? (Check one)

- 19 Weekly or oftener
- 14 Every few weeks
- 11 Every few months
- 31 Very seldom
- 25 Never

N = 967

91. Suppose you were looking for a job. You heard of one job that paid a lot of money, but would last only a short time. You heard of another job that didn't pay so much, but gave you a chance to work yourself up in a few years. Which would you take? (Check one)

- 17 The job that paid a lot of money but lasted a short time
- 83 The job that didn't pay so much, but you could work yourself up

N = 956

92. Suppose you were working on a job where your boss was always nagging at you. What would you do? (Check one)

- 09 Tell him to lay off if he knows what's good for him
- 51 Try to talk it over with him
- 27 Quit the job and take my chances at getting another one
- 13 Stick it out and say nothing

N = 955

93. Did you like to fight when you were a kid? (Check one)

- 22 I liked fighting
- 47 I didn't either like or dislike it
- 31 I didn't like it at all

N = 970

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94. How often did you get into fights when you were a kid? (Check one)

- 25 Often
- 31 Sometimes
- 36 Seldom
- 08 Never

N = 971

95. Did people think you had a hot temper as a kid? (Check one)

- 37 Yes
- 36 No
- 27 I don't know

N = 967

96. Did you ever play hookey from school? (Check one)

- 25 Often
- 55 A few times
- 20 Never

N = 963

97. Did you ever run away from home? (Check one)

- 70 Never
- 19 Once
- 06 Two or three times
- 05 More than three times

N = 971

98. Before you came to the stockade, how long did your Army pay check usually last? (Check one)

- 41 Usually spent it the first few days
- 45 Usually got through the month
- 14 Usually had some left over

N = 949

99. Just before you came to the stockade, were you setting aside a certain amount of money each month for savings or war bonds? (Check one)

- 31 Yes, regularly
- 16 Once in a while
- 53 No, I was not

N = 959

100. Do you often have to tell people to mind their own business? (Check one)

- 20 Often
- 36 Sometimes
- 30 Seldom
- 14 Never

N = 966

CONFIDENTIAL

101. Have you given any thought to the kind of job or career you would like to settle down at? (Check one)

- 45 Have definite plans for the future
- 42 Thought a lot about it, but have not quite decided
- 07 Thought a little about it
- 06 Haven't thought about it at all

N = 963

102. Do people often get on your nerves, so much that you feel like doing the opposite of what they want? (Check one)

- 31 Often
- 36 Sometimes
- 20 Seldom
- 13 Never

N = 966

103. Do you ever feel that people criticize you too much without any good reason? (Check one)

- 17 Often
- 26 Sometimes
- 35 Seldom
- 22 Never

N = 964

104. How often do people hurt your feelings? (Check one)

- 21 Often
- 32 Sometimes
- 31 Seldom
- 16 Never

N = 965

105. What rank do you expect to have when you get out of the Army? (Check one)

- 53 Private (E-1 or E-2)
- 12 Private First Class (E-2)
- 13 Corporal (E-4)
- 11 Sergeant (E-5)
- 04 Sergeant First Class (E-6)
- 07 Master or First Sergeant (E-7)

N = 924

106. Are there any ways in which you think the stockade ought to be improved? (Be specific): _____

107. If you have any suggestions or comments on ANY subject, please write them here: _____

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Appendix B
CONTROL GROUP QUESTIONNAIRE

AAB Study 2
Form B

Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. July 1952

WHAT WE WANT YOU TO DO

1. Read every question or statement carefully to make sure you understand it before marking your answer.
2. Mark some answer to every question. If you have more to say, add it, but first mark one of the suggested answers.
3. If there is anything you don't understand, please raise your hand and ask about it.
4. Check and make sure you have answered every question before you turn in your paper.

**BE SURE YOU DO NOT WRITE YOUR NAME OR SERVICE NUMBER
ANYWHERE ON THIS QUESTIONNAIRE**

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How to Answer These Questions

Most of these questions have several different answers printed right after the question. In front of each answer is a line like this:_____. Read all of the answers under a question, then put a check mark, like this ☒ in front of the answer you pick.

1. How did you come into the Army this time? (Check one)

50% I volunteered for the Regular Army
47 I was drafted
03 I was called in from the RESERVES
00 I was called up with the National Guard

N = 1907¹

2. Where were you living just before you came into the Army this time?
(Check one)

13 Farm
15 In a small town (up to 2,500 people)
21 In a town with more than 2,500 up to 25,000 people
21 In a city with more than 25,000 up to 100,000 people
30 In a large city with more than 100,000 people

N = 1907

3. When were you born? (write in) _____
(MONTH) (DAY) (YEAR)

4. In what state were you born? _____
(NAME OF STATE OR FOREIGN COUNTRY)

5. What is your race? (Check one)

83 White
16 Negro
01 Oriental
00 American Indian
00 Other (What? _____)

N = 1918

6. Are you: (Check one)

36 Married
61 Single
03 Separated or divorced
00 Widowed

N = 1914

¹The total number of cases in the weighted sample who responded to the item. The percentage figures are based on this N. The total number of cases in the weighted sample is 1922.

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YOUR ARMY BACKGROUND

7. What is your present Army Grade? (Check one)

- | | | | |
|----|---------------------|----|--------------------------|
| 22 | Private | 14 | Sergeant |
| 27 | Private First Class | 06 | Sergeant First Class |
| 27 | Corporal | 04 | Master or First Sergeant |

N = 1914

8. What branch of the Army are you in? (Check one)

- | | | | |
|----|-------------------|----|-----------------|
| 07 | Engineers | 24 | Transportation |
| 04 | Artillery | 02 | Armored |
| 02 | Medical | 04 | Ordnance |
| 07 | Ground Infantry | 23 | Quartermaster |
| 11 | Airborne Infantry | 05 | Military Police |
| 04 | Signal | 07 | Other |

N = 1904

9. What is your present assignment in the Army? (Check one)

- 11 In basic training
- 18 Just joined an outfit
- 53 In an outfit for some time
- 01 On my way to another unit in the States
- 01 Waiting to be shipped overseas with a unit
- 01 Waiting to be shipped overseas as a replacement
- 03 At a separation center waiting for discharge from the Army
- 12 Another assignment (specify): _____

N = 1877

10. During the past 12 months how many different organized outfits (companies, batteries or detachments) were you assigned to for duty? (Do not include basic training. Check one answer)

- 22 None
- 32 One outfit
- 30 Two
- 09 Three
- 04 Four
- 03 Five or more

N = 1907

11. Have you been in combat or under enemy fire during the Korean War? (Check one)

- 77 No, not during the Korean War
- 09 Under enemy fire or bombing but not in actual combat in Korea
- 14 Yes, I have been in actual combat during the Korean War

N = 1884

CONFIDENTIAL

12. If you were in Korea during the Korean War, when did you return to the States? (Check one)

76 I have not been in Korea during the Korean War
00 I arrived from Korea less than one month ago
06 I arrived one to three months ago
06 I arrived three to six months ago
12 I arrived from Korea more than six months ago

N = 1868

13. About how close to your home are you stationed now? (Check one)

02 Less than 20 miles
03 20 to 50 miles
02 50 to 100 miles
15 100 to 300 miles
26 300 to 500 miles
33 500 to 1000 miles
19 More than 1000 miles

N = 1918

14. How many times altogether have you been AWOL (Absent Without Leave) counting any times you were not caught? (Check one answer)

82 Never have been AWOL
10 One time
03 Two times
02 Three times
01 Four times
01 Five times
01 More than five times

N = 1917

15. How long were you in the Army the first time you went AWOL for a day or more? (Check one)

81 Never have been AWOL
02 1 month or less
01 Over 1 month up to 3 months
02 Over 3 months up to 6 months
03 Over 6 months up to 1 year
03 Over 1 year up to 18 months
02 Over 18 months up to 2 years
02 Over 2 years up to 3 years
02 Over 3 years up to 5 years
02 Over 5 years

N = 1906

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16. How much ACTIVE military duty (counting any stockade time) have you had? (Check one)

- 05 1 month or less
- 04 Over 1 month up to 3 months
- 04 Over 3 months up to 6 months
- 08 Over 6 months up to 1 year
- 13 Over 1 year up to 18 months
- 25 Over 18 months up to 2 years
- 05 Over 2 years up to 3 years
- 15 Over 3 years up to 5 years
- 21 Over 5 years

N = 1819

17. What do YOU think are the main reasons why men go AWOL? _____

YOUR CIVILIAN BACKGROUND

18a. Is your mother living? (Check one)

- 86 Yes
- 14 No

N = 1915

b. If No, how old were you when she died?
_____ years old

19a. Is your father living? (Check one)

- 77 Yes
- 23 No

N = 1912

b. If No, how old were you when he died?
_____ years old

20a. If both your parents are now living, are they living together, separated or divorced? (Check one)

- 28 One or both of my parents are not living
- 60 Living together
- 04 Separated
- 08 Divorced

N = 1824

b. If separated or divorced, how old were you when they were first separated or divorced?
_____ years old

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21. What is your father's (or stepfather's) job? If he is retired or he is not living, describe the last job he had. Describe carefully what he does.

22. During 1951, what would you guess was the income of your parents (or your guardians)? If you do not know for sure, give the best guess you can. (Check one)

13	Under \$1000	29	Between \$3000 and \$5000
18	Between \$1000 and \$2000	13	Between \$5000 and \$10,000
23	Between \$2000 and \$3000	04	Over \$10,000

N = 1765

23. What were you doing most of the last six months before you came into the Army? (Check one)

75 Working
03 Looking for work
09 Going to school
11 Working and going to school
02 Other_____

N = 1904

24. What kind of work did you do before you came into the Army?

25. When you were a child, how much of the time would you say your mother was at home? (Check one)

84 At home most of the time
10 Away part of the time on a job
04 Away most of the time on a job
00 Was not working, but spent most of her time away from home
02 Other_____

N = 1891

26. How strict was your mother (or stepmother) when you were a child? (Check one)

18 She usually let me do pretty much what I wanted to do
24 Sometimes she was very strict and sometimes very easy
53 She was usually strict but very kind
03 Usually she was very strict and hard with me
02 Other_____

N = 1895

CONFIDENTIAL

27. When you were a child, how much of his free time did your father (or stepfather) spend with the family? (Check one)

- 78 Most of his free time
- 14 Some of his free time
- 05 Very little or none of his free time
- 03 Other _____

N = 1874

28. How strict was your father (or stepfather) when you were a child? (Check one)

- 17 He let me do pretty much what I wanted to do
- 28 Sometimes he was very strict and hard and sometimes very easy
- 45 He was usually strict but very kind
- 06 Usually he was very strict and hard with me
- 04 Other _____

N = 1839

29. What kind of family life did you have when you were a child? (Check "Yes" or "No" for each of the 11 items below)

	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>N</u>
a. Our family enjoyed doing things together	91	09	1877
b. Our family was often broke and borrowing money	11	89	1813
c. Our whole family usually got together for evening meals	90	10	1840
d. At our house everyone came and went as he pleased	32	68	1823
e. I often felt that my parents picked on me	05	95	1831
f. I often felt that my parents treated my brothers or sisters better than me	07	93	1780
g. I could always count on my family if I needed help	96	04	1847
h. I often felt that I was not wanted at home	04	96	1830
i. I often felt ashamed of my family	05	95	1817
j. Our family always tried to be together for holidays	93	07	1856
k. I usually had regular chores to do at home	80	20	1844

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30. How did your family get along when you were a child? (Check one)
- 59 Everyone got along well
 - 38 There was arguing now and then
 - 03 There was a lot of arguing or fighting
- N = 1884
31. How often did your family move from one house to another when you were a child? (Check one)
- 27 Never moved
 - 58 Moved one or two times
 - 12 Moved every few years
 - 03 Moved almost every year or oftener
- N = 1912
32. When you were about 14 years old, who did you usually go around with? (Check one)
- 43 A group of boys
 - 06 One other boy
 - 37 A couple of boys
 - 14 Mostly by myself
- N = 1908
33. When you were younger, did you ever take things off cars or out of stores? (Check one)
- 01 Very often
 - 33 A few times
 - 01 Pretty often
 - 65 Never
- N = 1905
34. How far have you gone in school? (Check only one answer indicating the highest grade you completed)
- 00 Less than 5th grade
 - 12 Finished 10th grade
 - 02 Finished 5th grade
 - 08 Finished 11th grade
 - 03 Finished 6th grade
 - 27 Finished 12th grade
 - 06 Finished 7th grade
 - 11 Some college but didn't finish
 - 15 Finished 8th grade
 - 05 Graduated from college
 - 11 Finished 9th grade
- N = 1909
35. If you did not finish high school (or grade school), what is the main reason you dropped out of school? (Check one)
- 44 I finished high school
 - 03 Failed classes, or thought I would fail
 - 01 Got into trouble and had to leave
 - 24 Had to help support my family
 - 16 Just didn't like school
 - 12 Some other main reason (What? _____)
- N = 1832

CONFIDENTIAL

36. If you were working before you came into the Army, how satisfied were you with the last job you had? (Check one)

10 I was not working before I came in the Army
41 Very satisfied with my job
36 Satisfied with my job
11 Dissatisfied with my job
02 Very dissatisfied with my job
N = 1887

37. Before you came into the Army, were you ever fired from a job? (Check one)

07 Never had a job
79 Never fired
12 Fired once
02 Fired more than once
N = 1905

38. Were you ever arrested when you were a civilian? (Check one)

79 Never
14 Once
07 More than once
N = 1889

39. If you were ever arrested when you were a civilian, what were the charges against you? (List every charge ever made against you by the police, including any ones where you were not to blame.)

40. In general, how did your family (parents, brothers, sisters or wife) feel when you went into the Army? (Check one)

01 I have no family
34 Very much upset
43 Somewhat upset
11 They didn't mind much one way or the other
09 Somewhat in favor of it
02 Very much in favor of it
N = 1892

41. Does your being in the Army cause any special hardships or problems to your wife or family? (Check one)

70 No
30 Yes (Describe in detail)
N = 1888

LIKES AND DISLIKES IN THE ARMY

- 124

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46. How well did you know the men in your outfit? (Check one)

- 57 I knew almost everyone pretty well
- 35 I knew a few of them pretty well
- 08 Hardly knew any of the men

N = 1877

47. How would you feel about leaving the men in this outfit?

(Check one)

- 07 Would be glad to get away from them
- 29 Don't care one way or the other
- 48 Would dislike leaving them but wouldn't feel too strongly about it
- 16 Would hate to leave them

N = 1904

48. What is your background like compared to the men in your outfit?

(Check one)

- 05 Much better than theirs
- 14 Better than theirs
- 78 About the same as theirs
- 03 Not as good as theirs
- 00 Much worse than theirs

N = 1897

49. Which of the following best describe your friends in the Army?

(Check one answer for each pair)

- 39 They like or don't mind too much being in the Army
- 61 They dislike the Army

N = 1875

- 58 Some have gone AWOL one or more times
- 42 None has gone AWOL

N = 1862

- 76 Would like to work themselves up in the Army
- 24 Don't care about getting promotions

N = 1850

- 59 Have told off the noncoms at least once or twice
- 41 Never talk back to noncoms

N = 1853

- 34 Like to drink a lot
- 66 Drink little or not at all

N = 1847

- 81 Seldom gamble for money
- 19 Gamble a lot for money

N = 1836

CONFIDENTIAL

50. How do you feel about your Army job? (Check one)

10 Never - have had a job in the Army

18 Very satisfied

46 Satisfied

15 Dissatisfied

11 Very dissatisfied

N = 1905

51. Do you feel that the work or training that you are doing is necessary to the Army? (Check one)

47 All of it is necessary

27 A little of it is unnecessary

13 Much of it is unnecessary

13 Most of it is unnecessary

N = 1906

52. Right now, in what way do you think you could be of greatest service to your country? (Check one)

53 By being a soldier

11 By going to school as a civilian

36 By working as a civilian

N = 1883

53. Do you think the things we are fighting for are worth risking your life for? (Check one)

57 Yes

16 I think so, but I'm not sure

14 Undecided

06 I don't think so, but I'm not sure

07 No

N = 1897

EXPERIENCES IN THE ARMY

54. Do you think you are getting a square deal in your present outfit? (Check one)

59 Most of the time

34 Sometimes

07 Never

N = 1907

55a. Have you ever tried to see your company commander? (Check one)

56 No

20 Yes, tried once

24 Yes, tried more than once

N = 1893

CONFIDENTIAL

55b. If Yes, were you able to get to see him? (Check one)

- 52 I never tried to get to see him
- 39 I was able to get to see him without any trouble at all
- 06 I was able to get to see him, but it was a lot of trouble
- 03 I could not get to see him at all

N = 1829

56. How many of your officers take a personal interest in their men?
(Check one)

- 22 All of them
- 23 Most of them
- 25 Some of them
- 22 Very few of them
- 08 None of them

N = 1895

57. How many of the noncoms take a personal interest in the men?
(Check one)

- 09 All of them
- 29 Most of them
- 30 Some of them
- 25 Very few of them
- 07 None of them

N = 1899

58. If you had a serious personal problem, where would you go for help?

a. Would you go to the RED CROSS for help? (Check one)

- 34 Pretty sure to go there
- 44 Might go there
- 22 Would never go there

N = 1860

b. Would you go to the CHAPLAIN for help? (Check one)

- 56 Pretty sure to go there
- 38 Might go there
- 06 Would never go there

N = 1867

c. Would you go to the FIRST SERGEANT for help? (Check one)

- 42 Pretty sure to go there
- 41 Might go there
- 17 Would never go there

N = 1839

d. Would you go to the COMPANY COMMANDER for help? (Check one)

- 56 Pretty sure to go there
- 37 Might go there
- 07 Would never go there

N = 1864

CONFIDENTIAL

59. Were you ever given company (administrative) punishment? (Check one)

- 62 Never
- 24 One time
- 09 Two times
- 02 Three times
- 01 Four times
- 00 Five times
- 02 More than five times

N = 1897

60. How often have you asked for leave and been refused? (Check one)

- 20 I have never asked for leave
- 53 Got leave every time I asked for it
- 16 Was refused leave once
- 06 Was refused leave twice
- 05 Was refused leave more than twice

N = 1908

61. In the last year, how many times have you been on sick call? (Check one)

- 32 None
- 44 One or two times
- 17 Three to five times
- 04 Six to ten times
- 03 More than ten times

N = 1907

62. How fair is Army justice, in your opinion? (Check one)

- 25 Fair almost always
- 40 Fair most of the time
- 27 Fair about half of the time
- 08 Unfair most of the time

N = 1896

63. On the whole, would you say that you have gotten fair treatment in the Army? (Check one)

- 82 Yes
- 18 No

N = 1868

63a. Explain your answer _____

64. Does the Commanding Officer in your present outfit know your name? (Check one)

- 76 Yes
- 24 No

N = 1832

CONFIDENTIAL

35. In the outfits you have been in, what usually happens to men who go AWOL? (Check one)

- 03 They usually get away with it
- 47 They usually get only company punishment
- 50 They usually get a court-martial

N = 1829

66. What do the men in your outfit think of a soldier who goes AWOL? (Check one)

- 05 They think of him as almost a criminal
- 35 They think he doesn't amount to much
- 56 It doesn't make much difference to most of them
- 03 They think what he did was all right
- 01 They would think more of him because he did it

N = 1882

67. What do the men in your outfit think of a soldier who tries to get a BCD (Bad Conduct Discharge)? (Check one)

- 15 They think of him as almost a criminal
- 57 They think he doesn't amount to much
- 25 It doesn't make much difference to most of them
- 02 They think what he did was all right
- 01 They would think more of him because he did it

N = 1873

68. What do your parents or relatives think of a soldier who goes AWOL? (Check one)

- 23 They think of him as almost a criminal
- 60 They think he doesn't amount to much
- 15 It wouldn't make much difference to most of them
- 02 They think what he did was all right
- 00 They would think more of him because he did it

N = 1832

69. What do your parents or relatives think of a soldier who tries to get a BCD?

- 33 They think of him as almost a criminal
- 57 They think he doesn't amount to much
- 09 It wouldn't make much difference to most of them
- 01 They think what he did was all right
- 00 They would think more of him because he did it

N = 1849

CONFIDENTIAL

70. How long does a soldier have to be AWOL before he is dropped from his outfit and assigned to a camp near where he is picked up? (Check one)
- 04 5 days
 - 02 12 days
 - 36 29 days
 - 03 59 days
 - 09 90 days
 - 01 One year
 - 11 He is kept on the company roster no matter how long he is AWOL
 - 34 I don't know
- N = 1846

71. Suppose a soldier goes AWOL and is picked up at home by the Military Police. He is taken back to his post under guard. Who pays the travel costs? (Check one)
- 06 The Army pays all travel costs
 - 11 The soldier pays the cost of only his own trip back
 - 67 The soldier pays the cost of his own travel and the guard's travel
 - 16 I don't know
- N = 1893

72. Have you ever been sentenced to a stockade? (Check one)
- 97 Never
 - 03 Once
 - 00 2 times
 - 00 3 times
 - 00 More than 3 times
- N = 1901

73. For what offense were you in the stockade? (Check one)
- 96 I have never been in a stockade
 - 02 AWOL
 - 02 Something else (What?_____)
- N = 1835

74. When a man leaves the stockade and gets back to a regular company, how do you think the officers and noncoms treat him? (Check one)
- 18 They are likely to pick on him
 - 66 They are likely to watch him until he proves himself
 - 16 They are likely to treat him the same as the other men
- N = 1885

75. If you had to choose between finishing your tour of duty (hitch) in the Army or taking a BCD, what would you do? (Check one)
- 03 Take a BCD
 - 90 Finish my tour of duty
 - 07 Don't know what I would do
- N = 1885

CONFIDENTIAL

76. How hard do you think it would be for a soldier with a BCD to get a good job in civilian life? (Check one)

- 21 Almost impossible
- 39 Very hard
- 30 Pretty hard
- 10 The BCD wouldn't make any difference at all

N = 1872

PERSONAL OPINIONS

77. Do you agree with the idea—

"do what you want to do today and let tomorrow take care of itself"?
(Check one)

- 11 I agree very much
- 05 I agree pretty much
- 12 I agree a little
- 12 I disagree a little
- 14 I disagree pretty much
- 46 I disagree very much

N = 1890

78. How quickly do you get angry at people when they do things you don't like? (Check one)

- 21 I get angry very quickly
- 25 I get angry after a while
- 52 It takes a lot to make me angry
- 02 I never get angry

N = 1890

79. Do you ever go out of your way to make things tough or unpleasant for people you don't like? (Check one)

- 03 Often
- 13 Sometimes
- 35 Seldom
- 49 Never

N = 1893

80. How often have you been really drunk in the last year? (Check one)

- 03 Weekly or oftener
- 08 Every few weeks
- 11 Every few months
- 38 Very seldom
- 40 Never

N = 1891

CONFIDENTIAL

81. Suppose you were looking for a job. You heard of one job that paid a lot of money, but would last only a short time. You heard of another job that didn't pay so much, but gave you a chance to work yourself up in a few years. Which job would you take? (Check one)
- 08 The job that paid a lot of money but lasted a short time
 - 92 The job that didn't pay so much, but you could work yourself up
- N = 1889
82. Suppose you were working on a job where your boss was always nagging at you. What would you do? (Check one)
- 04 Tell him to lay off if he knows what's good for him
 - 71 Try to talk it over with him
 - 19 Quit the job and take my chances at getting another one
 - 06 Stick it out and say nothing
- N = 1887
83. Did you like to fight when you were a kid? (Check one)
- 13 I liked fighting
 - 51 I didn't either like or dislike it
 - 36 I didn't like it at all
- N = 1902
84. How often did you get into fights when you were a kid? (Check one)
- 12 Often
 - 34 Sometimes
 - 46 Seldom
 - 08 Never
- N = 1901
85. Did people think you had a hot temper as a kid? (Check one)
- 24 Yes
 - 47 No
 - 29 I don't know
- N = 1898
86. Did you ever play hookey from school? (Check one)
- 10 Often
 - 58 A few times
 - 32 Never
- N = 1897
87. Did you ever run away from home? (Check one)
- 86 Never
 - 10 Once
 - 03 Two or three times
 - 01 More than three times
- N = 1897

CONFIDENTIAL

88. How long does your Army pay check usually last? (Check one)
17 Usually spend it the first few days
55 Usually get through the month
28 Usually have some left over
N = 1870
89. Are you setting aside a certain amount of money each month for savings or war bond? (Check one)
43 Yes, regularly
22 Once in a while
35 No, I am not
N = 1898
90. Do you often have to tell people to mind their own business? (Check one)
06 Often
33 Sometimes
42 Seldom
19 Never
N = 1898
91. Have you given any thought to the kind of job or career you would like to settle down at? (Check one)
39 Have definite plans for a career
51 Thought a lot about it, but have not quite decided
07 Thought a little about it
03 Haven't thought about it at all
N = 1897
92. Do people often get on your nerves so much that you feel like doing the opposite of what they want? (Check one)
09 Often
37 Sometimes
37 Seldom
17 Never
N = 1894
93. Do you ever feel that people criticize you too much without any good reason? (Check one)
42 Almost never
49 Only once in a while
07 Fairly often
02 Nearly all the time
N = 1887
94. How often do people hurt your feelings? (Check one)
49 Almost never
46 Sometimes
05 Very often
N = 1896

CONFIDENTIAL

95. What rank do you expect to have when you get out of the Army?
(Check one)

- 05 Private (E-1 or E-2)
- 14 Private First Class (E-3)
- 33 Corporal (E-4)
- 20 Sergeant (E-5)
- 07 Sergeant First Class (E-6)
- 21 Master or First Sergeant (E-7)

N = 1854

96. Are there any ways in which you think your outfit ought to be improved?

97. If you have any suggestions or comments on ANY subject, please write them here:

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APPENDIX C

STOCKADE AND NON-STOCKADE INTERVIEWS

STOCKADE INTERVIEW

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS FOR INTERVIEWER:

Hello. My name is _____. I'm with the man who gave you the questionnaire. The reason you are here is because we want to give as many men as we can a chance to talk as they want to about Army life. You probably didn't have time to do this much on the questionnaire. We don't have time to talk to everyone so we went down a list and picked people by chance.

I want to repeat what was said when you took the questionnaire. We are going to many Army posts and stockades to talk to soldiers about their experiences in the Army. We want to hear what many men have to say. The names of the men we talk to will not be taken down and no one will know what any single man says. We're interested in what you really believe—there are no right or wrong answers. It's your opinion we want.

1. How have things gone since you came here?
2. How have your feelings changed since you came here?
 - a. How have your feelings changed toward the Army?
 - b. How have your feelings changed toward people around you?
 - c. What do you think is the reason for this?
3. If a buddy of yours in your old outfit asked you what it is like living in a stockade, what would you tell him?
 - a. Anything else?
4. What would you say the stockade officers are like compared with officers back in your regular outfit?
 - a. Have the stockade officers helped you in any way since you have been here?
 - b. Have you ever tried to see the confinement officer for an interview?
5. What do you think the stockade officers think of the men who are in here?
 - a. Are there any who treat you differently?
6. Would you say that you think more or less of officers than before you came into the stockade?
 - a. What do you find are the best ways of getting along in the stockade?

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7. Do you think a man will be treated better if he does his job well in the stockade?
 - a. In what way? or Why not?
8. Do most of the men you go around with in the stockade feel this way?
 - a. If not, how do they feel?
9. What is your biggest gripe here (Who/what gives you the hardest time)?
 - a. How do you get around it?
 - b. What does this make you feel like doing?
10. Do the men get away with as much here as in the regular outfit?
 - a. What do they do?

Now we would like to talk about some of your experiences in the Army before you came to the stockade. You've been in the Army—let's see, how many months? In that time—

11. What kind of officers and noncoms have you had? Tell me some experiences you had with them before you came here.
 - a. What did you like or dislike about them (him)?
 - (1) Officers
 - (2) Noncoms
 - b. Can you tell me some things they did that made you feel this way?
12. In general, how well would you say the officers and noncoms in your outfit knew you and the other men?
 - a. Did they take an interest in the men and their problems?
13. Officers and men in the Army are pretty much separated by where they live, in their clubs, in the privileges they have and so on. How do you feel about this?
 - a. Why do you think this is done? For what purpose or reason?
14. How well do you think your officers knew their jobs? Did they know what they were doing?
 - a. In what way did they show this?
15. Would you say the officers you had before coming here were fair to the men?
 - a. In what way?
 - b. Can you give me some examples—something that happened to you?

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16. Suppose you were an officer—how would you handle the men?

Would you:

- a. Tell them what to do and exactly how to do it, or give them a job and let them do it on their own?
(1) Why would you do it this way?
- b. Would you give reasons for your orders, or would you just give orders and expect them to be followed without question?
(1) Why?
- c. Would you be more strict or less strict on the men than most of the officers you have had?
(1) Why?

17. What kind of an officer or noncom would you like to serve under?

Let's talk about another area of your Army experience. Let's talk about your Army jobs.

18. What were your Army jobs before you came here?

- a. What did these jobs involve?
- b. What did you have to do?
- c. Were you told exactly how to do the job, or were you asked to figure things out for yourself? Did you mind?

19. Do you think that you were specially fitted to do any of these kinds of work?

20. Were any of these jobs the kind of thing you always wanted to do?

21. Did any of these jobs give you an opportunity to learn something that you might find useful or what you would like to do when you get out of the Army?

- a. What kind of job do you think you will get when you get out of the Army?

22. What about each of these jobs did you like best? What was wrong with them?

23. What did you think of the men who worked on these jobs with you?

- a. How did you get along with fellow workers?
- b. Did any of them become your friends?

Now we have some questions about your experiences before you came into the Army.

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24. What was the last job you had before you came into the Army?
 - a. How did you feel about it—did you like it or dislike it?
 - b. What did you like or dislike about it?
25. What kind of a boss did you have?
 - a. How did you get along with him? What did you like or dislike about him?
26. How far did you go in school? Why did you drop out?
27. What were the school teachers like that you had when you were in school?
 - a. How did you get along with them?
28. How did the fellows you went around with like school?
29. What was the neighborhood like that you were brought up in?
30. Who were you living with in your childhood?
31. Tell me something about the people you were living with. What were they like?
 - a. What was your Father (or stepfather) like?
 - b. What was your Mother (or stepmother) like?
32. Who made you mind most? How did they make you mind?
 - a. Who was the boss in your family?
33. If you had children how would you want to bring them up?
34. Would you bring them up the way you were brought up?

We're just about through now. Just a couple more questions.

35. Why do you think you got into trouble in the Army?
36. How do you think you will get along when you get out of the stockade?

_____ Talkative	_____ Not talkative
_____ Cooperative	_____ Cynical
_____ Dominant	_____ Submissive
_____ Sincere	_____ Falsification; lying
_____ Free expression of feelings	_____ Defensive, evasive
_____ Time of Interview	

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NON-STOCKADE INTERVIEW

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS FOR INTERVIEWER:

Hello. My name is _____. I'm with the man who gave you the questionnaire. The reason you are here is because we want to give as many men as we can a chance to talk as they want to about Army life. You probably didn't have time to do this much on the questionnaire. We don't have time to talk to everyone so we went down a list and picked people by chance.

I want to repeat what was said when you took the questionnaire. We are going to many Army posts and stockades to talk to soldiers about their experiences in the Army. We want to hear what many men have to say. The names of the men we talk to will not be taken down and no one will know what any single man says. Whatever we talk about will not be given back to anyone at the Post here. We're interested in what you really believe—there are no right or wrong answers. It's your opinion we want.

1. What outfits have you been in?
2. How long were you in each of them?
3. How have things gone since you came to this outfit?
4. If a buddy of yours back home asked you what it's like being in the Army what would you tell him?
5. How have your feelings changed since you have been in the Army—
 - a. Toward the Army?
 - b. Toward the people around you?
 - c. What do you think is the reason for this?
6. Do you think a man will be treated better if he does his job well in the Army?
 - a. In what way? (or, Why not?)
7. Do most of the men you go around with feel this way?
8. How do the men in your outfit get along together?
 - a. If not, what is the trouble?
9. What would you say you like most about being in the Army?
 - a. Explain more fully. Tell me more about that.

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10. What is your biggest gripe here? (Who/what gives you the hardest time?)
 - a. How do you get around it?
 - b. What does this make you feel like doing?
11. How do the men get away with things here?
 - a. Nearly everybody goofs off some time or other. How do the men get away with it here?
12. What kind of officers and noncoms have you had? Tell me some experiences you have had with them. (Examples)
 - a. What did you dislike (like) about them (him)?
 - (1) Officers
 - (2) Noncoms
 - b. Can you tell me some things they did that made you feel this way?
13. In general, would you say the officers and noncoms in your outfit know their men pretty well?
 - a. Do they take an interest in the men and their problems?
 - b. Have they helped you in any way? (If not, have you ever had a problem with which you wanted help? What did you do?)
14. Officers and men in the Army are pretty much separated by where they live, in their clubs, in the privileges they have, and so on. How do you feel about this?
 - a. Why do you think this is done? For what purpose or reason?
15. How well do you think your officers know their jobs? Do they know what they are doing?
 - a. In what way do they show this?
16. Would you say the officers you have are fair to the men?
 - a. In what way?
 - b. Are there any who treat you differently?
 - c. Can you give me some examples—something that happened to you?
17. Suppose you were an officer. How would you handle the men? Would you:
 - a. Tell them what to do and exactly how to do it, or give them a job and let them do it on their own?
 - (1) Why would you do it this way?
 - b. Would you give reasons for your orders, or would you just give orders and expect them to be followed without question?
 - (1) Why?

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- c. Would you be more strict or less strict on the men than most of the officers you have had?
(1) Why?

18. What kind of an officer would you like to serve under?

Let's talk about another area of your Army experience. Let's talk about your Army job.

- 19. What Army jobs have you had?
 - a. What did you have to do?
 - b. Were you told exactly how to do the job, or were you asked to figure things out for yourself? Did you mind this?
 - c. What about each of these jobs did you like best? What was wrong with them?
- 20. Do you think that you were specially fitted to do any of these kinds of work?
- 21. Were any of these jobs the kind of thing you always wanted to do?
- 22. Did any of these jobs give you an opportunity to learn something that you might find useful or what you would like to do when you get out of the Army?
 - a. What kind of job do you think you will get when you get out of the Army?
- 23. What do you think of the men who work on these jobs with you?
 - a. How did you get along with fellow workers?
 - b. Did you make any good friends?

Now we have some questions about your experiences before you came into the Army:

- 24. What was the last job you had before you came into the Army?
 - a. How did you feel about it—did you like or dislike it?
 - b. What did you like (or dislike) about it?
- 25. What kind of boss did you have?
 - a. How did you get along with him? What did you like or dislike about him?
- 26. How far did you go in school? (Why did you drop out?)

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27. What were the school teachers like that you had when you were in school?
 - a. How did you get along with them?
28. How did the fellows that you went around with like school?
29. What was the neighborhood like that you were brought up in?
30. Who were you living with in your childhood?
31. Tell me something about the people you were living with. What were they like?
 - a. What was your father (stepfather) like?
 - b. What was your mother (stepmother) like?
32. Who made you mind the most? How did they make you mind?
 - a. Who was the boss in your family?
33. If you had children how would you want to bring them up?
 - a. Would you bring them up in the way you were brought up?
34. Have you ever been in trouble in the Army, including company punishment, or stockade experiences, if any?
 - a. If so, what happened? Why?
35. How do you think you will get along in the Army?

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Appendix D

PERSONAL HISTORY CODE

CODE CATEGORIES

Personal History Record, DD 502

P.A.D. STATUS:

PAD
BCD
Both PAD and BCD
Non

RANK:

Private
Private First Class
Corporal
Sergeant
Sergeant First Class
Master or First Sgt.
No information

ORGANIZATION:

Engineers
Artillery
Medical
Ground Infantry
Airborne Infantry
Signal

Transportation
Armored
Ordnance
Quartermaster
No information
Other (ASU) (TSW) (Hq. DET)
(Military Police) (etc.)

ARMY AREA AND POST:

Camp Edwards
Camp Drum
Fort Hancock
Fort Monmouth
Fort Dix
Fort Devens
Brooklyn Army Base
All other in 1st Army

Fort Knox
Fort Campbell
Fort Lee
Fort Eustis
Fort Meade
Fort Holabird
All other in 2d Army

Army Area 3
Army Area 4
Army Area 5
Army Area 6
No information
Area not known
MDW
Outside ZI

RACE:

White
Negro
Other, no information

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MARITAL STATUS:

Single
Married
Separated or divorced
Widowed
No information

SIBLINGS:

None
1
2
3
4
More than 4
No information

CHILDREN:

No children
Children
No information

RELIGIOUS PREFERENCE:

Protestant
Catholic
Hebrew
None indicated, No information

PRISONER'S OFFENSE:

Fraudulent Enlistment, Appointment
or Separation
Desertion
AWOL (Absence Without Leave)
Missing Movement
Disrespect Towards a Superior
Officer
Assaulting or Willfully Disobeying
Officer
Insubordinate Conduct Towards
N.C.O.
Failure to Obey Order or Regulation
Arrest and Confinement (Break
of arrest, escape)
Loss, Damage, Willful Sale of
Military Property
Drunken or Reckless Driving
Drunk on Duty
Misbehavior of Sentinel or Guard
Murder, Manslaughter
Rape
Larceny and Wrongful Appropriation
Robbery

PRISONER'S OFFENSE (Continued):

Forgery
Assault
General Article (Disorders and
Neglects to the Prejudice of
Good Order and Discipline in
the Armed Forces)
No Information Given
Other

**ESTIMATE OF LENGTH OF TIME
IN STOCKADE:**

Date
Questionnaire
Administered

Edwards	15 July
Drum	21 July
Monmouth	24 July
Dix	30 July
Devens	6 Aug

Knox	16 July
Campbell	22 July
Lee	30 July
Eustis	4 Aug
Meade	12 Aug

**Base Date in Prisoner's Personal
History Record**

0-7 days
8-14 days
15-30 days
Over one month up to 2 months
Over 2 up to 4 months
Over 4 up to 6 months
Over 6 months
Inadequate information

Time directly given
Based on date of Form
Based on unsentenced data
Date of Form unreliable

NUMBER OF PREVIOUS OFFENSES:

None
1 Previous offense
2 Previous offenses
3 Previous offenses
4 Previous offenses
5 or More
N.A. or No information

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SENTENCE STATUS:

Unsentenced
Sentenced
N.A.

LENGTH OF TIME AWOL:

Up to 2 days
3-6 days
7-14 days
15-31 days
32-45 days
46-59 days
Over 2 months up to 4 months
Over 4 months up to 6 months
Over 6 months
No information
Not AWOL

CUSTODY:

Minimum
Medium
Maximum
No Answer

PUNITIVE TYPE DISCHARGE:

No or Discharge Suspended
BCD
DD
Unsentenced
No information

**LENGTH OF TIME BETWEEN
UNSENTENCED AND SENTENCED
STATUS:**

1-7
8-14
15-21
22-30
Over one month up to 2 months
Over 2 months up to 4 months
Unsentenced
No information
Sentenced on or before arrival
at stockade

PAROLE:

No
Yes
No answer

TERM OF CONFINEMENT:

Unsentenced
0-30 days
31-60 days
61-90 days
91-120 days
121-150 days
151-180 days
More than 180 days
No information

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Appendix E

TESTS OF SIGNIFICANCE ON WEIGHTED SAMPLES

1. For all chi-square tests computed on the weighted samples, the inflation of the chi-square statistic due to the addition of cases in the weighted samples was compensated in the following manner:

- a. The ratio of the unweighted N_u to the weighted N_w was computed:

$$\frac{N_u}{N_w} = \frac{1832}{2914} = .63$$

- b. All chi squares computed on the weighted samples were multiplied by .63. This is equivalent to multiplying all observed and theoretical frequencies by .63.¹

$$\chi^2 = \sum \left[\frac{(f_o - f_e)^2}{f_e} \right]$$

Multiplying by .63

$$.63\chi^2 = .63 \sum \left[\frac{(f_o - f_e)^2}{f_e} \right] = \sum \left[\frac{(.63f_o - .63f_e)^2}{.63f_e} \right]$$

2. For all critical ratios computed on the weighted samples, the inflation of the critical ratio due to the addition of cases in the weighted samples was compensated in the following manner:

- a. All critical ratios computed on the weighted samples were multiplied by .79. This is equivalent to dividing the variances by the unweighted N in order to estimate the standard errors.

¹This involves a slight error since $\frac{N_u}{N_w}$ for the stockade sample is equal to .621 and $\frac{N_u}{N_w}$ for the control sample is equal to .633.

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$$C.R. = \frac{\bar{X}_1 - \bar{X}_2}{\sqrt{\frac{\sigma_1^2}{N_{w_1}} + \frac{\sigma_2^2}{N_{w_2}}}}$$

Multiplying by .79

$$.79 C.R. = \frac{\bar{X}_1 - \bar{X}_2}{\sqrt{\frac{\sigma_1^2}{N_{w_1}} + \frac{\sigma_2^2}{N_{w_2}}}}$$

$$.79 C.R. = \frac{\bar{X}_1 - \bar{X}_2}{\sqrt{\frac{\sigma_1^2}{.79N_{w_1}} + \frac{\sigma_2^2}{.79N_{w_2}}}}$$

$$.79 C.R. = \frac{\bar{X}_1 - \bar{X}_2}{\sqrt{\frac{\sigma_1^2}{.63N_{w_1}} + \frac{\sigma_2^2}{.63N_{w_2}}}}$$

$$.79 C.R. = \frac{\bar{X}_1 - \bar{X}_2}{\sqrt{\frac{\sigma_1^2}{N_{u_1}} + \frac{\sigma_2^2}{N_{u_2}}}}$$

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Appendix F

EFFECTS OF STOCKADE CONFINEMENT

ANALYSIS WITHIN CONTROL GROUP

It was expected that, if the effects of stockade confinement were not wholly responsible for the obtained differences between delinquents and controls, the same pattern of differences would exist between those soldiers in the control group who reported having been AWOL one or more times, and those soldiers who reported never having been AWOL. Using only non-delinquents who had never been in a stockade, the significance of the differences between the AWOL-one-or-more-times group and the never-been-AWOL group was computed for many of the questionnaire items.

(1) Items concerned with personality and background variables

Fifteen personality and background items that were significant at the .01 level against the stockade-control criterion were retested against the AWOL-NonAWOL criterion with the following results:

Number of Items	Significance Level
10	$p < .01$
3	$p < .05$
1	$p < .10$
1	$p < .20$

(2) Items concerned with the soldiers' reaction to Army life and with Army experiences

Forty attitude and experience items that were significant at the .01 level against the stockade-control criterion were retested against the AWOL-NonAWOL criterion with the following results:

Number of Items	Significance Level
16	$p < .01$
4	$p < .05$
1	$p < .10$
5	$p < .20$
2	$p < .30$
11	$p > .30$

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One item was significant at the .20 level but the direction of the difference was reversed compared to the difference between the delinquent and control groups.

WITHIN-STOCKADE ANALYSIS

It would, of course, be possible to make a comparable analysis within the delinquent group by comparing a group of prisoners with relatively severe sentences and a group with relatively light sentences. Unfortunately, such objective data were not available; consequently no systematic within-stockade analysis was attempted. However, a few of the questionnaire items were retested using a more seriously delinquent group versus a less seriously delinquent group as determined by the responses of the stockade group to the following items: (a) "After you go back to duty, do you think you will go AWOL or commit some other court-martial offense?"; (b) "If you had to choose between staying in the stockade or going back to an organized outfit, which would you do?"

(1) Items concerned with personality and background variables

Eight personality and background items that were significant at the .01 level against the stockade-control criterion were retested against the less seriously delinquent-more seriously delinquent criterion with the following results:

Number of Items	Significance Level
7	$p < .01$
1	$p > .30$

(2) Items concerned with the soldiers' reaction to Army life and with Army experiences

Six attitude and experience items that were significant at the .01 level against the stockade-control criterion were retested against the less seriously delinquent-more seriously delinquent criterion with the following results:

Number of Items	Significance Level
3	$p < .01$
1	$p .05$
2	$p > .30$

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Appendix G

ARMY SATISFACTION SCORE

For the purpose of getting some notion of the general over-all satisfaction of delinquent soldiers as compared to the controls, a number of items were combined in a score. The following list shows the items thus used, as well as the percentages¹ and significance level² for each item. The responses indicated by ** were scored +1.

	Delinquents (%)	Controls (%)
How much does it bother you when you are ordered to do things that you don't see a good reason for doing?		
A great deal	46	24
Quite a bit	14	23
** Not much	27	40
** Not at all	13	13
	(p < .01)	
Do you like wearing a uniform?		
** Yes	55	59
No	45	41
	(Not sig.)	
Is the food better than in civilian life?		
** Yes	14	15
No	86	85
	(Not sig.)	
Do you like the order and regularity of Army life?		
** Yes	34	45
No	66	55
	(p < .01)	

¹Percentages are given only for those who answered the question.

²Test of significance computed with item choices grouped as indicated.

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	Delinquents (%)	Controls (%)
Is there enough privacy in the Army?		
** Yes	23	35
No	77	65
	(p < .01)	
Do you like having to be neat and orderly all the time in the Army?		
** Yes	86	85
No	14	15
	(Not sig.)	
Do you like living in a barracks with a group of men?		
** Yes	42	50
No	58	50
	(p < .01)	
Do you feel that all men have an equal chance in the Army, regardless of their past?		
** Yes	44	59
No	56	41
	(p < .01)	
Do you feel that the Army gives a man a good chance to get ahead?		
** Yes	47	63
No	53	37
	(p < .01)	
Do you get a chance to learn a skill or trade you would like to follow?		
** Yes	34	50
No	66	50
	(p < .01)	
Are living conditions better than in civilian life?		
** Yes	15	14
No	85	86
	(Not sig.)	
Do you think Army discipline is too strict?		
Yes	51	26
** No	49	74
	(p < .01)	

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	Delinquents (%)	Controls (%)
Does a man get more respect than in civilian life?		
** Yes	28	31
No	72	69
	(Not sig.)	
How do you feel about your Army job?		
Never had a job in the Army ¹	24	10
** Very satisfied	22	18
** Satisfied	19	46
Dissatisfied	15	15
Very dissatisfied	20	11
	(p < .01)	
Do you feel that the work or training that you are doing is necessary to the Army?		
** All of it is necessary	44	47
** A little of it is unnecessary	24	27
Much of it is unnecessary	14	13
Most of it is unnecessary	18	13
	(p < .01)	
Right now in what way do you think you could be of greatest service to your country?		
** By being a soldier	28	53
By going to school as a civilian	8	11
By working as a civilian	64	36
	(p < .01)	

¹This category was omitted in test of significance.