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MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

**THE PROPAGANDA MACHINE IN COMMUNIST CHINA-
With Special Reference to Ideology, Policy, and
Regulations, as of 1952**

FC

Research accomplished

under contract with

HUMAN RESOURCES RESEARCH INSTITUTE

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

Research Memorandum

NUMBER 37

H R R I PROJECT

"Chinese Documents Project"

THE PROPAGANDA MACHINE IN COMMUNIST CHINA-
with Special Reference to Ideology, Policy, and Regulations,
as of 1952

by


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Chief Contributor

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Preface

THE CHINESE DOCUMENTS PROJECT

This report is one of a series of studies prepared by the staff of the Chinese Documents Project, under the direction of Dr. Theodore H.E. Chen of the University of Southern California. The Project was initiated in 1951 by the Human Resources Research Institute, of the Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Montgomery, Alabama, to help meet Air Force needs for knowledge regarding both the probable psychological effects of air weapons and the potentialities of psychological operations linked to the use of air power. For evaluating the contribution of the studies toward these ends, some understanding of the background and history of the Project is necessary.

Objectives. Ideally, research in support of the psychological potential of air operations would provide (1) specific recommendations regarding the psychological employment of air power, and (2) specific estimates of the psychological effects to be expected in planned uses of air weapons. Unfortunately, these recommendations and estimates are in turn dependent upon far more intimate knowledge of the culture, organization, and current psychology of the "target populations" than presently exists. The Chinese Documents Project was undertaken to help remedy this deficiency in the case of Communist China. Specifically, the objectives set forth in the contract were:

To produce "an integrated series of preliminary project reports" on major segments, undertakings and aspects of the Chinese Communist regime and on reactions of the Chinese populace to these.

From these preliminary studies, to produce an overall analysis of the regime and reactions to it, indicating in particular its strengths and vulnerabilities.

Resources. Two chief resources were considered essential and made available for carrying out the aims of the Chinese Documents Project. The first was Chinese language documents from behind the Bamboo Curtain. The second was social scientists of Chinese descent and with long years of experience in China.

Evaluation of Documents. The shortcomings as well as the values of documents from behind the Bamboo Curtain were calculated from the start. It was realized that Communist reports of numbers and quantities, and Communist accounts of specific behavior, events, and conditions might be accurate, approximate, or distorted—depending upon which degree of veracity the Communists regarded as the most expedient. The operational code of the Chinese Communist Party makes this unmistakable and inevitable. On the other hand, it is recognized by social scientists and laymen alike that even the most biased documents can be made to yield highly valuable information.

General Procedure and Staff. The fact that the documents from which such information was to be drawn were in the Chinese language and necessarily included a steady flow of newspapers and periodicals, made imperative the continuous rapid scanning of a vast amount of material in Chinese. Two alternative procedures were available, neither of them entirely ideal. One was to give a list of topics to translators and have them select and translate appropriate items from the documents. The translations would then go to experienced American social scientists for analysis. This procedure, however, was regarded as cumbersome, and certain to yield misinterpretations. The alternative procedure involved the use of scholars whose native language was Chinese but who had also had American graduate training in the social sciences. It required that they scan the original Chinese language documents and employ whatever insights, general methods, and techniques they possessed

both in the selection of items and in the production of analyses in English. This latter general procedure was adopted as the more efficient one. How it operated is indicated in the Introduction below.

Project Termination. The studies by individual staff members, which were produced during the first two years, were to have been supplemented by further studies and capped by an up-to-date analysis of the Chinese Communist regime as a whole. However, the Project was terminated in the summer of 1953 before these could be produced, and before the studies already made had been critically appraised and revised. Nevertheless it has been decided to publish and reproduce with a minimum of editorial revision those considered worthy of dissemination.

Suggested Uses of Reports. In the case of the earlier of these preliminary reports, a score or so copies of an advance unedited edition have already been distributed in Air Force and other government offices. The responses received from this very limited circulation indicate that it would be useful to have suggestions on the possible uses and limitations of the reports for field operations, short-range policy planning, longer-range intelligence estimates, and future intelligence research. The following are therefore offered.

For direct use in psychological field operations, parts of the reports have been and will be suitable, although as a whole they were not intended for such use without checking and integrating with other intelligence studies. For short-range policy planning, the same should be said, particularly since many parts of the reports have continuing current relevance. For use in long-run intelligence estimates, these reports are "dated"; the Chinese Communist regime itself, however, has been dynamic and changing and can only be understood in the light of its dated changes, particularly those since the Communists came to power in 1949. As to use in the planning of future intelligence research, such dated research as this assumes (1) that future periodic reassessments be made on each significant aspect of the Chinese Communist regime, and (2) that, in these, the traits and trends set forth hypothetically in earlier studies be used as base lines and checked, sharpened, and extended, or if necessary revised, for purposes of estimate and prediction. Such data as are available from behind the Communist "curtains" obviously need critical reworking as later disclosures are made.

While certain uses can be made of studies like these on separate aspects of a regime, other uses, particularly on the strategic level, are dependent on integrating those segmentary studies into overall analyses of the regime as a whole. Research has certainly not accomplished this satisfactorily for the China of the recent past and present, and cannot do so until gaps in the segmental studies are identified and filled, whether by documentary or other investigations. So far as use of these research reports is desired on the confidential governmental level, it must, of course, assume prior "coordination" with "classified" information. For, to the end of their work, most of the participants in the Chinese Documents Project were foreign nationals. On a strictly unclassified level on the other hand, the Air Force, in making these studies available to scholars outside the government, allows them to be added to that common fund of knowledge which scholars in turn can use to help assist the government as well as enlighten the public.

Administration of the Contract. The Chinese Documents Project was administratively launched in 1950 by Dr. Frederick W. Williams, then Program Director of the Psychological Warfare Research Directorate, and Dr. Raymond V. Bowers, then Director of the Human Resources Research Institute. Research contract No. AF 33(038)-25075 with the University of Southern California covering the Project work became effective in May 1951. Dr. T. H. E. Chen became the Principal Investigator and Dr. Williams the Contract Monitor. In January 1952 Major Clarence N. Weems, Jr. spent about seven weeks with the Project staff while the first four preliminary reports were being completed. In July 1952, when the next set of preliminary reports was being completed, responsibility for monitoring the Project fell upon the newly created Far Eastern Branch of the Division and its chief, the undersigned, who is now Project Officer.

THE PRESENT STUDY

Orientation. As to what propaganda is, what it should be, and what use governments should make of it, there are very diverse views. One view widely heralded of late in the United States, for

instance, has been that the government's official propaganda service (under the International Information Administration) should dispense information only, even in its counter-propaganda. Others, in contrast, regard propaganda as a weapon of political warfare to be used in accordance with the same principles as those determining the use of other weapons of cold and hot wars. If there is any priority assumption implicit in this present study by Dr. Yu, it is that, regardless of our views as to what propaganda *should be* and what use any government *should make* of it, we must know what it actually *is* in such Communist countries as Mainland China and what use their governments *are actually making* of it. Taken one step further, this means that we must know any government's propaganda—organization, methods, contents, etc.—as it is determined by the given country's background culture, its current societal nature, and its immediate internal conditions and external relations. One out of a multitude of instances is that of characteristics due to the degree of illiteracy in the Chinese culture and the measures being taken by the current (Communist) People's Republic of China both to change that cultural feature and more immediately to adapt their propaganda to it.

Uses. The significance and utility of such concrete particularistic knowledge of Chinese Communist propaganda appear to be unquestionable. It provides definite insights into the nature and functioning of the present Chinese Communist regime as a whole. It opens the way for the perception of relevant vulnerabilities of that regime. It assists the policy decisions and operational planning of those concerned directly or indirectly with Communist China. Illustrative of these last are those responsible for the United States own propaganda and counter-propaganda, mentioned above. Equally concerned are those who spar with the words and acts of international diplomacy and who attempt to estimate the intentions of Communist China. Their efforts are inevitably conditioned by their conceptions of China's use of propaganda in such sparring, in avowing intentions, and in consolidating home support. Similarly, those who are trying to judge the psychological effects of the United States and other countries' social, economic, political, and military impact upon Communist China, must make allowances for the prior and simultaneous conditioning of the people by the regime's own domestic propaganda. And this, of course, includes those who judge the psychological effects of Air Force and other military gestures and acts in times of strain and stress.

The Author's Studies. Strictly speaking, the nature and role of propaganda must be sensed, identified, and interpreted in each given situation—for example, in each instance of "anti-American" propaganda within Communist China. But the nature and effects of it in each given situation are dependent to a very real degree upon the effects of the telescoped accumulation of propaganda in the recent past. And thus, the general direction, content, organizational facilities, methods, and effects of recent propaganda in and by Communist China become an essential background for interpreting any given case of its current and immediate propaganda. It is to help provide this background and to indicate tentatively its trends, as well as to offer material on relatively current propaganda, that Dr. Yu has produced two studies. In his mind, one of the first and most fundamental ways of obtaining an over-view of propaganda from behind the Bamboo Curtain, is to investigate the organizational make-up, professed functions, and assigned tasks of the "propaganda machine," and to inspect available reports on the nature and effects of the machine's efforts. These he undertakes in the present study. As a super-structure upon this foundation, his second study, *The Strategy and Tactics of Chinese Communist Propaganda*, investigates how the Chinese Communist propaganda itself is designed and manipulated, and in particular how the Communist Party "reforms" men's minds and arouses mass emotion and action. In these two exploratory studies together, moreover, a basis is developed and hints are given for relating the propaganda machine and policies to the problem of "strengths and weaknesses" of the regime. In the further pursuit of these problems, and in increasingly technical methods of research for checking on concepts and trends in this entire sphere, will lie the fulfillment of these exploratory studies.

The Author. The background which the author has brought to bear upon this and his succeeding study in this project, is a cross-cultural one partaking of both Chinese culture and the United States version of Euro-American culture. Born in Hankow in central China in 1921, Frederick T. C. Yu received his early education in China, completing it at the University of Nanking in East China, where he graduated in 1944. Coming to this country in 1947, he took graduate work at the University

of Iowa, receiving an M. A. in journalism in 1948. Then, while serving as an instructor there from 1949 to 1951, he completed his work for a Ph. D. in mass communications (1951). His dissertation was a content analysis study of the treatment given China in Chicago metropolitan daily newspapers. He is now teaching at Stetson University, Deland, Florida.

Editorial Policy. Although our re-editing of this study has consisted mainly of such minor changes as a few rearrangements of material and the insertion of certain subtitles, the Laboratory's publishing schedule does not permit negotiating the details of such changes with the author. This, however, makes it necessary that Dr. Yu be considered chief contributor instead of sole author. The form, spelling, punctuation, and italicizing of transliterations of Chinese titles, especially in the footnotes, have been left as they were in the copies transmitted to us by the chief investigator of the project.

MAURICE T. PRICE
Project Officer

Introduction to Project Studies

Objective and Tasks. The general goal assigned to the Chinese Documents Project was the delineation of the psychological and sociological vulnerabilities of the Chinese Communist regime. Sub-goals could be designated in general terms, but, because of the Bamboo Curtain, only tentatively in much detail. It was accordingly planned by the chief investigator that the research would be concerned with two main tasks:

To depict the structure and organization of the Chinese Communist state and regime, and to portray the organs and methods they use to control the population; and

To evaluate the successes and failures of the Communist program in China in order to assess the weaknesses and vulnerabilities of the regime as a whole.

These two tasks were elaborated and somewhat modified as the materials accumulated and the work progressed. According to the original plan, the Project was to run for three years, culminating in a comprehensive estimate of the vulnerabilities of the Chinese Communist regime as a whole. The unexpected termination of the Project after two years, however, not only prevented that overall evaluation but cut off a number of the projected specialized studies. During the two years in which the contract actually operated, the overall objectives and tasks remained practically as stated above. They implied, of course, a knowledge of Chinese society prior to the inauguration of the Chinese Communist regime in 1949; and they were illuminated by comparisons, where feasible, with Soviet Russia's Communist regime.

Data and Methods. The main body of data for both initial orientation and research analysis was extracted, not from already selected and translated excerpts published in English on the periphery of China, but directly from such primary sources in the Chinese language as government laws and regulations, official programs, leaders' pronouncements, special instructions for different groups and organizations under Communist control, expositions of objectives in different Communist-sponsored campaigns and of their implementation and success or failure, criticisms of deficiencies and of persons allegedly responsible for such deficiencies, illustrative incidents from factory, farm, and community, and readers' letters and editorials in Chinese Communist and non-Communist periodicals. These source materials were inspected by the chief investigator for general relevance both to the objectives of the Project as a whole and to specific studies undertaken or contemplated; and by each staff member for detailed relevance to his own selected research topics. As these materials were fundamentally historical documents, the initial approach and methods used were necessarily historiographic. They had to be viewed in their historical context and judged on the basis of their internal or textual nature. At the same time, they were examined from the standpoint of whatever preliminary conceptualization and frames of reference the individual had adopted for his special study and topics. Their data were classified and processed in accordance with whatever methods and techniques he judged most appropriate. Yet each research project, from the preliminary plans down to the methods and procedures, and finally the report itself, was discussed critically not only with the chief investigator but also with a staff committee in a staff conference. No outside substantive or methodological experts were called in to assist in shaping up individual studies. In summary, each report was therefore primarily the product of the individual scholar working under the guidance of the chief investigator.

Difficulties, Limitations, and Strengths. The problem of estimating how far a country's laws and regulations are actually enforced, how far state and group programs are carried out, and objec-

tives are attained, and in what manner obvious propaganda is to be evaluated, is not new; but the problem is acute in an Iron or Bamboo Curtain regime where propagandic purposes permeate so many documents, statements, and activities. Fortunately the Communists' criticism and self-criticism, and their resort to purges, result in indirect disclosures of the degrees of compliance with laws, programs, and objectives, and in indirect information on the reactions of the population to the new regime. Again, the geographic and statistical distribution of any given behavior among government agencies, party echelons, or the non-Communist population, is often most obscure; but, on the other hand, the significance of such distribution may sometimes be estimated roughly by the nature of the consequent policies adopted to deal with it. Sometimes, therefore, the broad outlines of law and official policy become most significant; at other times, the vivid representation of personal or group reaction to individual organizational measures is the orientation of a report. In spite of the difficulties and limitations of inadequate data, of distance and inability to make direct observations on the spot, it is believed that the reports produced under the contract—reports grouped around such major topics as party and government, rural economic conditions, propaganda and coercive campaigns, reactions in the family, school, farm, factory, and community—open up perspectives and disclose successive patterns of behavior, which make significant contributions to our knowledge and understanding of Communist China. And in so doing they give the context, often the distinct outlines, and oftener still the pulsing feeling, if we may say so, of the vulnerabilities of the regime.

Personnel. This kind of product was made possible only because the researchers, themselves of Chinese ancestry and of many years' experience in China, were aware of the overtones in the Chinese-language materials and could visualize the behavior portrayed or implied, as well as relate it to the concepts and modes of analysis which they had assimilated in their social science training. All had been through Ph.D. graduate training in leading universities of the United States, with all but one having received this degree. Moreover, practically all had had post-collegiate experience in China relevant to their major research interests. They differed, of course, in their experience in applying recent Occidental research techniques and in communicating their ideas to English reading publics. The result on the whole, however, is that their studies are believed to have an authentic quality which we feel is a major requirement for understanding Chinese communism* and its impact on the Chinese people.

THEODORE H. E. CHEN
Principal Investigator

* Although in this study the word "communism" is printed with a small letter in accordance with the *Manual of Style* of the U.S. Government Printing Office, it is used only to designate the current communism of the international Communist movement and/or its parties.

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Summary

The Communist regime in China has at its command one of the largest and perhaps most powerful propaganda machines in the world. Through this immense machine, which is conscientiously administered and vigorously utilized, the Communist Party is able to mobilize the population for the attainment of specially prescribed goals, to disseminate new values, to mold patterns of motivation and to facilitate its political, economic, social, and educational control of the nation.

Nature of this Study

This is an institutional analysis of the propaganda machine in Communist China today. It is just one part of the study of how propaganda as a means of control is manipulated by the Chinese Communists to facilitate the tasks of the Party leadership and to mobilize the minds and effort of the population.

It is not the purpose of this study to present a detailed inventory of the physical means of propaganda in Communist China: the number of newspapers, magazines, radio stations, meetings, books, etc. Nor does this paper seek to analyze or evaluate the content of propaganda, by which is meant the stream of communications issued through the mass media in Communist China for domestic consumption. Rather, an effort is made to obtain some preliminary insight into the Communist propaganda theories and principles and to examine the organizational aspects of the propaganda machine. To be specific, this paper aims at developing preliminary generalizations on the major characteristics of Chinese Communist propaganda behavior and at presenting a general picture of the structural and functional organization of the propaganda apparatus. It is believed that such knowledge will open the way to a more refined analysis of the content of propaganda and will help avoid errors in interpretation and generalization in later stages of analytical research.

Scope and Purpose of Chinese Communist Propaganda

The word "propaganda" employed in the present study must be understood in its broadest sense. It is generally impossible to delimit precisely the field of propaganda in Communist China, because it ranges from elementary education to agricultural production and encompasses all vehicles of human expression and every possible means of influencing attitudes, including even violence.

Although propaganda has become practically omnipresent in every phase of social life in China and its techniques are subtle and diversified, all Communist propaganda emphasizes one fundamental concept: class struggle, which is the real essence of Marxism-Leninism and Mao's Thought. The central purpose of Communist propaganda is "to awaken, heighten and sharpen the class consciousness of the masses," from which the real strength or power of the regime is supposed to generate.

The Control of Propaganda

The Communist Party assumes the self-assigned role of organizer, teacher, guide, and leader of the masses and arrogates to itself a complete monopoly of class leadership. The direction of propaganda therefore necessarily falls into the hands of the Party, which alone is qualified to conduct the so-called "political education" of the masses.

Organization

The motor of the immense Communist propaganda machine is the Department of Propaganda of the Central Committee of the Party. From its headquarters at Peking, the department gives direction to the general principles as well as specific details with regard to nationwide propaganda activities. Closely geared to the Department of Propaganda are three kinds of organizations, all operating directly or indirectly under the control of the Party. Firstly, there are the propaganda departments of the Party's bureaus or sub-bureaus in various administrative areas, provinces, and principal municipalities. Under these departments, which are immediately responsible to the Party's Department of Propaganda at Peking, are the propaganda networks, which extend to almost every individual in China and affect the words and thoughts of them all. Secondly, there are the government agencies under the Committee of Educational and Cultural Affairs of the Government Administration Council. There is the Press Administration, which controls all the newspapers and radio stations in the country and also manages the *Hsin Hua* News Agency, the only pipeline of information of all newspapers in China today. There is the Publications Administration, which puts out books as well as periodicals considered "correct" by the Party and prevents "undesirable" readings from appearing before the Chinese reading public. There is the Ministry of Cultural Affairs, supervising all art and literary activities in the country. There is the Ministry of Education, which has control over all colleges, schools, and all programs of adult and informal education. Thirdly, in addition to the Party and government agencies, there are the so-called "mass organizations," such as the Resist-America Aid-Korea Association, Sino-Soviet Friendship Association, All-China Federation of Labor, New Democratic Youth Corps, and thousands of others. These are the organizations through which the Party maintains its closest and most extensive contacts with the population. The harmonious performance of propaganda by these organizations is achieved by the Party's shrewd system of interlocking directorates, in which a few Communist leaders at any level in the Communist organizational structure, hold concurrently leading positions in the Party, the government, and the important mass organizations. All these organizations are welded into a monolithic unity highly responsive to direction and control exerted from above by the Party.

Tentative Generalizations

The present study aims only at developing generalizations on the major characteristics of the Chinese Communist propaganda behavior and presenting a general picture of the structural and functional organization of the propaganda machine. It does not seek to evaluate the power or strength of the machine; such evaluation must wait until after an analysis of the propaganda strategies and content has been made. However, one can draw a few general, *tentative* conclusions with regard to the machine itself.

Firstly, there is no doubt that, regardless of the impact of propaganda on the Chinese people, the Communist regime has developed a system which brings the largest number of people into direct and close contact with the Party. The propaganda machine provides for the Party more than one channel to transmit its messages to the people. Through this immense propaganda machine the Party tries to assure itself that what ought to be known to the people IS known and what should be felt by the people IS felt.

Secondly, even though the propaganda machine may not be always successful in producing the particular thoughts and attitudes desired by the Party, it is at least very effective in keeping out information and ideas that might operate to weaken the Party's program. The machine is designed to operate in such a way that it screens all public information before it reaches the people and makes it practically impossible to have any free public exchange of ideas among men.

Thirdly, the propaganda machine serves another important function by providing for the Party a continuous flow of information on the sentiment of the people. Every unit or outlet of the machine functions as an "information antenna" for the Party. Such information gives the Party an incontestable element of superiority, because it not only helps the Party in its planning of propaganda but also enables it to act quickly to counteract the "erroneous beliefs" of the people or any opposing propaganda.

Outlook

It is apparent that propaganda is definitely to play a more important role in the Communist society. This is evidenced by the Party's recent repeated emphasis on the importance of propaganda as a means of organizing and educating the masses and by its unusual exertions in the establishment of propaganda networks. The fact that the propaganda machine is being constantly tightened up and geared to a higher speed of performance can have two possible implications. It may imply that the Communist regime has made enough gains in propaganda that it expects more profitable returns from it. On the other hand, it may strongly suggest that the Party has realized the masses' loss of enthusiasm for the Communist program and therefore needs a stable and effective propaganda machine to regain the support of the population, which may not have been completely convinced.

It is hard to decide at this moment to what extent the Communist propaganda has been effective in changing the minds of men in China. That is a problem to be answered in later stages of research.

CHINESE COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA – NATURE, CONTENT, AND ORGANIZATION

The Communist regime of China is conducting propaganda—or, as the Communists put it, “a political warfare”—against the people on a scale hitherto unparalleled in Chinese history; and it controls almost all means of human expression and nearly every technical vehicle for disseminating ideas. To use propaganda as an instrument of power or a means of control, is, of course, not a unique policy. Almost all governments resort to some kind of propaganda.

1. *Use with Coercion*

Lenin once declared that the Soviet regime rested on a balance of coercion and persuasion. This dictum, often quoted in Chinese Communist literature, is a master key to the understanding of the dynamics of the Chinese Communist society. It also probably best calls attention to one of the most truly important features of communism in China.¹

To think of Communist China as a police state which rests on force alone is to lose sight of this other very important aspect of the regime: propaganda. A description of the Communist society which deals only with the coercive aspects would be inadequate, indeed misleading. The Communist regime does not rule the nation only by police and firing squad; the Communists have always depended also upon their large army of “propagandists,” which constitutes an important source of the strength of the Party.

It should be noted that the Chinese Communist Party declares the “People’s Republic of China” to be “a state of the people’s democratic dictatorship.” The regime claims to employ the two methods, democracy and dictatorship, at the same time. The method of dictatorship is the method of coercion; the method of democracy is the method of persuasion. In a speech delivered in 1950, Mao Tse-tung explicitly stated.

The people’s democratic dictatorship has two methods. Toward the enemy, it uses the method of dictatorship, namely: it does not allow them to take part in political activities for certain necessary periods; it compels them to obey the law of the people’s government and compels them to work and remold themselves into new men through labor. Toward the people, it is the opposite; it does not use compulsion, but democratic methods, namely: it does not compel them to do this or that but uses democratic methods in educating and persuading them.²

In his often-quoted book, *On People’s Democratic Dictatorship*, Mao further emphasized:

...Only when there is the people’s state, is it possible for the people to use democratic methods on a nationwide and overall scale to educate and reeducate themselves, to free themselves from the influence of reactionaries at home and abroad (this influence is at present still very great and will exist for a long time and cannot be eliminated quickly), to unlearn the bad habits and

¹For a detailed study of Lenin’s views on the relations of party and masses and his theories on propaganda or “persuasion,” see Alex Inkeles’ *Public Opinion in Soviet Russia, A Study of Mass Persuasion* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950).

²“Chairman Mao’s Closing Speech” (an abridged text), *People’s China*, Vol. II, No. 1, July 1, 1950, p. 25.

thoughts acquired from the old society and not let themselves travel on the erroneous path pointed out by the reactionaries, but to continue to advance and develop toward socialist and Communist society. The methods we use in this field are democratic, that is, methods of persuasion, and not coercion....³

2. A Priority Responsibility

One may tend to believe that it is only in the present process of rapid and forced social change in China that the Communist regime has to apply large-scale propaganda because it has to promulgate and secure acceptance for an unstable, markedly new and shifty set of social norms. A brief review of the Party's history would reveal that the extensive use of propaganda is no new trick to Chinese Communists. Today they are merely intensifying their pressure of persuasion on the people. As early as 1929 Mao Tse-tung pointed out in one of the most important documents of the Communist Party concerning the Red Army that "propaganda is the Red Army's first and most important task." He declared:

The objectives of the Red Army's propaganda are to enlarge the scope of political influence and to win over the vast masses of people. Only by realizing this task of propaganda can we hope to organize the masses, to arm the masses, to establish our regime, to eliminate the reactionary forces and to swell the tide of revolution.... To overlook this task (propaganda) is to give up or abandon the Red Army's first and most important duty....⁴

One high-ranking Party official, recently speaking before a large group of Communist cadres or political workers in Northwest China, said that "our Party, by tradition, pays great attention to propaganda work" and that "the most important problem today is to mobilize the whole Party to engage in propaganda." He further stressed: "The first and the most important task of all government institutions is political guidance. Every one of our cadres should consider himself a political worker. He should educate all working personnel and teach them the method of using propaganda to push forward our work so that they can all become propagandists of our Party."⁵

3. The Nature and Concept of Chinese Communist Propaganda

It has been implied that Chinese Communist propaganda is a composite from various sources, including Soviet theory and practice. Our chief interest here, however, is not in differentiating these sources, but in an overall view of some of the salient characteristics of Chinese Communist propaganda. Certain of these have a distinctive character, even where shared by Soviet propaganda, which should be pointed out for the benefit of the Western reader.

Propaganda as an Institution. Persuasive propaganda in Communist China is not a sporadic and momentary phenomenon but an institution of great importance in itself. It is a continuous and highly organized activity carried on by men whose role as propagandists is persistent and thoroughly formalized.

Unlike the Nazi propaganda, which was mainly the job of Dr. Goebbels and his machinery, propaganda in Communist China is not only the responsibility of the Party's Department of Propaganda and of the cadres, as noted above, but is regarded as the task of all Party members.

³ Mao Tse-tung, *On People's Democratic Dictatorship* (Peking: English Language Service, New China News Agency, 1949), p. 13.

⁴ Mao Tse-tung, *Chung Kuo Kung Ch'an Tang Hung Chün Ti Ssu Chün Ti Chiu Ts'u Tai Piao Ta Hui Chieh I An (Resolutions of the Ninth Meeting of the Representatives of the Fourth Army of the Chinese Communist Red Army)* (Hong Kong: New Democracy Publishing Co., 1949), p. 26.

⁵ Hsi Chung-hsün, "To Struggle for the Consolidation of Marxism, Leninism, and Mao's Thought," in *Jen Min Jih Pao (People's Daily, Peking)*, September 9, 1951.

The department, under the Central Committee of the Party, of course, has the highest authority in the planning and execution of propaganda, but Party members, cadres, members of the New Democratic Youth Corps, and all activists and government workers at all levels, are supposed to participate in this activity. It is formally written in the Constitution of the Chinese Communist Party that a Party branch, the basic organization of the Party, has four main duties, the first of which is "to carry on propaganda and organizational work among the masses of the people...." It is also an often-repeated phrase in speeches and writings of Communist leaders and official documents that one of the natural duties of a Communist Party member is to engage in propaganda at all times and places.

To make propaganda an institution of great importance by itself and a constant, nationwide activity seems to be one of the Party's major efforts or objectives today. This is evidenced in the Party's recently redoubled exertions to build up a vast propaganda network throughout the whole nation. This project was first started in 1950 by the Department of Propaganda of the Party's Northeast Bureau on an experimental basis. Apparently satisfied with the results of the experiment, the Central Committee of the Party in January 1951 issued a decree calling for the establishment of a nationwide propaganda network.⁶ This directive was immediately given wide publicity through all media of communication in the country and the newspapers, magazines, and other publications have been flooded with stories telling of experiences and developments in setting up this system in different parts of the country.

Fu Cheng-sheng, head of the Department of Propaganda of the Party's Northeast Bureau, who first experimented with the network system and whose long report on his accomplishments in Manchuria is now required reading for all Party members in Communist China, writes that propaganda is "the Party's fundamental correct method of leading the masses of people." He points out: "The Party's task of mass propaganda is the most important method of consolidating the unity of the Party and people; it is the most important method of the Party for educating the people; it is the Party's most important method of explaining its policies to the people and of mobilizing them to carry out decisions of the Party and the people's government." He repeatedly emphasizes the necessity of carrying on propaganda on a permanent basis which, according to the Party, is a very important point not yet fully realized by all its members. It is stated in a Party directive on setting up the Party's propaganda network that "one of the main weaknesses of our Party's propaganda work is that Party officials of different levels still consider propaganda the job of some special people and a task only temporary in nature and that no system has necessarily been established to make propaganda a constant and permanent task of all Communist Party members to be systematically directed and managed by the Party's committees of different levels."⁸

The *Jen Min Jih Pao*, the authoritative Party paper in Peking, echoes in an editorial:

...In fact, we have already made no small accomplishments and accumulated much experience in our propaganda work. But our accomplishments and experiences, measured against the need of the masses of people, are still not enough. Therefore, we should do our very best to raise our performance in the field of propaganda to a higher level. That is to say, we should raise our propaganda to such a level as to make it an institution by itself and a constant and permanent task of all Communist Party members.⁹

⁶The organization and operation of the nationwide propaganda network will be described in detail in a later discussion on the organizational and functional aspect of the Communist propaganda in China.

⁷Fu Cheng-sheng, *Tung Pei Ch'ü Chien Li Hsüan Ch'üan Wang Ti Ching Yen (Experiences of Building Up Propaganda Networks in the Northeast District)* (Mukden: Northeast People's Publishing Co., 1951), p. 25.

⁸"Decisions of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on Building up the Whole Party's Propaganda Network Among the Masses of People" (issued January 1, 1951), in *Hsin Hua Yüeh Pao (New China Monthly)*, Vol. III, No. 3, January 1951, p. 507.

⁹*Jen Min Jih Pao* (Peking), January 3, 1951.

Propagating "The Truth" a Dignified Job. The word "propaganda" is now in popular disrepute in the English-speaking world and has acquired unpleasant or even sinister connotations. One American scholar remarks that "an effective way in Anglo-Saxon society to insult, belittle, or expose a man is to call him a propagandist." But in Communist China today, the popular word "propaganda" is used by Party members with all respect and dignity.

This contrast cannot be explained only by a difference of language or culture, and there is more than a mere matter of semantics involved. The Chinese Communists believe, or at least are taught and hypnotized to believe, that propaganda is a sacred job. Underlying this notion is the claim of the Communists that they propagate "truth," which is not only "scientific," and "correct" but also, to use Mao's famous expression, "universally true." The Party's *Jen Min Jih Pao* has this to say:

Our Party, during the long-time revolutionary struggle in the past, carried on ceaseless propaganda to the masses of people to point out the right road to the victory of the Chinese Revolution. It has been proved by facts that our Party's propaganda is completely correct and responsible. But some of our comrades point out, 'We don't need propaganda because we represent truth; reactionary rumors which are contrary to truth...will eventually defeat themselves.' This is very incorrect. If we don't propagate the truth, what then is the significance of the truth? If a Communist Party member does not propagate truth to the masses of people, what is then the need of having such a Communist Party member? TRUTH MUST BE PROPAGATED. Truth, after being propagated and mastered by the masses of people, will produce tremendous material power. The most important duty of propaganda of truth should therefore be imposed upon all Communist Party members who are most decided and determined to fight for the truth.¹⁰

No Distinction Between Propaganda and Education. Another characteristic of the Communist conception of propaganda is the recognition of propaganda and education as one and the same thing. Both are regarded as "methods of persuasion." One can almost say that in Communist China education is one part of propaganda or vice versa.

According to the Communist viewpoint, all school teachers, journalists, writers, novelists, playwrights, and all other "cultural" workers are propagandists in the sense that they all perform the same "sacred duty," that is, "propagate truth to the masses of people, to educate them and to organize them." In fact, much of the work of the Ministry of Education deals directly with propaganda. In an official report on China's educational policies, Minister of Education Ma Hsu-lun set four guiding principles for all educational workers in 1951, and the very first principle was "To push with great vigor the Resist-America Aid-Korea patriotic education and to eliminate imperialism thoroughly, particularly the cultural influences of aggression spread in China by the American imperialists."¹¹ Ma also ordered schools of all levels to engage in mass propaganda throughout the whole nation so that all people in China might receive "education in patriotism." It is apparent that such activities for education in patriotism are propaganda rather than education, as the terms are commonly understood.

Another important project of the Ministry of Education is the "winter school movement" and it set as its goal the education of more than 35,000,000 Chinese adults in 1951. In Hopei alone, more than 30,000 "winter school" teachers were trained to conduct adult classes. The adults were to be taught simple written Chinese and given heavy doses of Communist propaganda in the winter months when the farmers normally have comparatively little to do after the harvests. The purpose

¹⁰ *Jen Min Jih Pao* (Peking), January 3, 1951. Capitalization of words in the quotation is by the author of this study.

¹¹ *Hsin Hua Yueh Pao* (New China Monthly), Vol. IV, No. 4, August 1951, pp. 897-8.

of these winter schools, as specified in one official directive from the Ministry of Education, is "to further the people in the patriotic Resist-America Aid-Korea education, to push forward such movements as the increase of economic production and the patriotic pact, and to carry on education on major government policies such as land reform, democratic reform, mutual assistance in production and the marriage law."¹²

In 1942, Mao Tse-tung gave a definition of a propagandist and clearly pointed out that every teacher is one. He asked:

What is a propagandist? Not only is the teacher a propagandist, the newspaper reporter a propagandist, the literary writer a propagandist, but all our cadres in all kinds of work are also propagandists. Take for instance the military commanders. They do not necessarily issue statements but when they want to talk to soldiers and deal with people, what are they doing but carrying on propaganda work? Anyone engaged in talking with another person is engaged in propaganda work....¹³

Includes the Role of the Agitator. It is commonly believed that Chinese Communist propaganda is just a colossal sales promotion campaign in which the product is ideological. It is quite true, of course, that the Communists are trying to sell Marxism-Leninism and Mao's New Democracy to the Chinese people. However, it would be erroneous to believe that the Communist propagandists aim only at ramming into the minds of the masses the Communist line of thought. A more complete statement would be that a Communist propagandist in China has a twofold purpose: (1) to spread ideological doctrines or disseminate the Party line, and (2) to incite or arouse people to spontaneous action. In other words, the Communist mass persuasion is a combination of propaganda or elucidation of ideas, and agitation or call to action.

This point should be clarified because Lenin took great pains to distinguish carefully between propaganda and agitation, but these two are often recognized by the Chinese Communists as one and the same thing.¹⁴ There is much discussion of this problem in the Soviet literature. It is significant to note that the organization which is charged with the general responsibility for molding and mobilizing public opinion in the Soviet Union is the Department of Propaganda and Agitation of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. This is commonly known as the Agit-Prop Department. The corresponding organization in Communist China is the Department of Propaganda under the Party's Central Committee, although the word "agitation" is not used in the official title.

Lenin rejected the idea that the presence or absence of a "call to action" can be used to distinguish between propaganda and agitation. He accepted as fundamental the classical definition of Plekhanov, who stated: "A propagandist presents many ideas to one or a few persons; an agitator presents one or a few ideas, but he presents them to a mass of people."¹⁵ In Bolshevik thought, propaganda has more to do with the development of the more advanced members and natural leaders of the masses, and the agitators or organizers bring the Party's messages to the people through agitation. In other words, propaganda in the Soviet Union is actually a precondition for agitation.

The Chinese Communists make no distinction between propaganda and agitation. Very often the two words are used interchangeably. It is generally understood, however, that a Chinese Communist propagandist is supposed to be an agitator at the same time, in the sense in which the terms have come to be used in the Soviet Union. Sometimes, the hyphenated expression of "propagandist-agitator" is used, but "propagandist" seems to be the preferred word in the Chinese

¹² *Chieh Fang Jih Pao* (Liberation Daily, Shanghai), November 13, 1951.

¹³ Mao Tse-tung, "Fan Tui Tang Pa Ku" ("Opposing Party Formalism") in *Cheng Feng Wen Hsien* (Ideological Remoulding Documents) (Hong Kong: New Democracy Publishing Co., undated), p. 33.

¹⁴ The distinctions between propagandists and agitators are discussed in great detail in Alex Inkeles' *Public Opinion in Soviet Russia*; four chapters of the book deal with personal oral agitation in the Soviet Union.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 39.

Communist literature. This is probably because propaganda is a much more common and familiar word to the Chinese people. In an editorial supporting the Party's decision to build up a nationwide propaganda network in China, the authoritative *Jen Min Jih Pao* quotes Stalin's statement that "agitation at all times and places is the Party's main instrument" and emphasizes its belief that the statement is correct. Immediately after the quotation, the paper explains in a parenthesis that "the word agitation used here, according to the customary use of Chinese language, could better be translated as propaganda."¹⁶

Except for the difference in the use of terms, the Chinese Communists are actually applying the Bolshevik theories and practices in their effort to formulate and utilize public opinion. There is hardly one article on propaganda in the Chinese Communist literature which fails to quote from Lenin or Stalin about the subject. Recently the Committee on Cultural and Educational Affairs of the Government Administration Council published a book on propaganda and agitation. It is one of the series of the *Reference Materials in Culture and Education* supposed to be required reading for all cadres and Party members. The book is a collection of 41 articles on propaganda and agitation, with 13 articles by Lenin, Stalin, and other Soviet leaders, and editorials from *Pravda* occupying more than half of the whole volume. It is openly admitted by the Communist regime in China that in propaganda and agitation it follows exactly the "wisdom" of Lenin and Stalin and the "correct examples" of the Soviet Union. Actually, the present Chinese "propagandists" and "reporters," according to the Bolshevik theory, are engaged largely in agitation rather than in propaganda, because they have more to do with the masses of people than with leaders.

An Operational Definition. Therefore, in a study of propaganda in Communist China, one has to understand the word in its broadest sense. It is generally impossible to delimit precisely the field of propaganda in Communist China because it ranges from conducting elementary education to furthering agricultural production and encompasses all vehicles of human expression and every means of influencing attitude, including even violence. For the purpose of this paper, an operational definition of the term as follows might be useful: Propaganda is an institution of social control which, ranging from political education or persuasive indoctrination to agitation or incitement, is continually and persistently applied to the masses of people for the purpose of giving them selected information, preparing them, and leading them gradually to follow the Party in understanding and, eventually, in action.

4. *The Substantive Touchstone of Chinese Communist Propaganda—the Class Struggle*

It goes without saying that all programs of the Communist regime in China are based on Marxism-Leninism as well as Mao's theoretical thinking, which is an adaptation of Marxism-Leninism to China's practical situation. One Communist propagandist in China expresses the foundation of Communist propaganda as follows:

To neglect propaganda of Marxism-Leninism and Mao's thought is a serious political mistake....To pay attention only to the job to be done and not to pay attention to the raising of the political and ideological consciousness of the masses to a higher level will not result in good work. The job might be considered done in terms of form and statistics but politically and ideologically it is still undone.

There is a long-range objective in whatever work we are doing, and that is to march through New Democracy to socialism. Therefore, in whatever work we undertake, we must pay great attention to the task of carrying on the education of the people in Marxism-Leninism, so that they can help build up the New Democracy of today and walk into socialism in the future.

¹⁶ *Jen Min Jih Pao* (Peking), editorial, January 3, 1951.

We must make every Chinese citizen, after going through this propaganda education, visualize the bright picture of the future and therefore struggle aggressively for its realization. Otherwise, our work will be deadly colorless, lacking in political content, routine and eventually mistaken....

That is to say, if we carry on only propaganda of our daily tasks in a mechanical and matter-of-fact way and do not consider Marxism-Leninism as the foundation of all our propaganda work, we will commit the error of empiricism.¹⁷

To be more specific, the whole program of the Chinese Communist propaganda stems from one fundamental basis: class struggle, which is the real essence of Marxism-Leninism. In other words, at the present stage in the development of Chinese communism, the chief purpose of Communist propaganda is to awaken, heighten, and sharpen the class consciousness of the masses, where the real strength or power of the regime is supposed to be generated.

Politics as Class Struggle. Ai Ssu-ch'i, the most authoritative theoretician in Communist China,* gives the following often-quoted statement which best summarizes the fundamental basis of the Communist philosophy. He says: "Politics, to put it briefly, is nothing but a centralized form of class struggle; it is just a relationship of oppression and control of one class by another class." He points out that "the fundamental content of our Party's political task is to raise the level of consciousness of the revolutionary class, to pull together forces of all the revolutionary classes to oppose the control of the reactionary class and fight for the possession of the power to rule the nation." He further states: "There are only two kinds of political tasks: one is the task of propaganda and education, and the other is the task of organization. Both aim at raising the level of political consciousness of the revolutionary class...."¹⁸

This interpretation follows exactly the theories of Marxism-Leninism. Class consciousness is, for Marx, the basis of political consciousness. But Lenin further develops the idea—and this is perhaps his greatest contribution to the propaganda of Marxism—that class consciousness left to itself becomes entirely bound up in the "economic struggle" and will be confined to a mere "trade-unionist" consciousness. Therefore, Lenin advocated that this class consciousness be awakened, educated, and brought into the battle in a larger sphere than the worker-employer relations alone and that this task be assigned to an elite group of professional revolutionaries, the conscious vanguard of the proletariat.¹⁹

Vice-Chairman Liu Shao-ch'i, at present said to be the No. 2 man in Communist China (after Mao), or the No. 3 (after Mao and Chu), discussing the "mass line" in his classic book, *On the Party*, summarizes the ideological basis of propaganda as follows:

With us, therefore, everything is dependent on and determined by the people's consciousness and self-activity, without which we can accomplish nothing and all our efforts will be in vain. But as long as we rely upon the consciousness and self-activity of the masses and as long as such consciousness and self-activity are genuine, then with the addition of the Party's correct leadership, every aspect of the great cause of the Party will finally triumph. Therefore, when the masses are not fully conscious, the duties of Communists—the vanguard of the masses of the people—in carrying

¹⁷ Ma T'ieh-ting, *Ssu Hsiang Tsa T'an (Miscellaneous Talks on Thought)* (Hankow: Wuhan Popular Books Publishing Co., 1951), Book V, pp. 11-13.

¹⁸ Ai Ssu-ch'i, *Li Shih Wei Wu Lun—She Hui Fa Chan Shih Chiang I (Historical Materialism—Lectures on History of Social Development)* (Peking: Workmen's Publishing Co., June 1951), first revised edition, pp. 83-86.

¹⁹ See Jean-Marie Domanach, "Leninist Propaganda," in *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Summer, 1951.

*While this is given as the author's estimate, he is also very well aware, from his own quotations elsewhere, that within the Party Liu Shao-ch'i speaks of Mao's Thought as "the highest theoretical attainment of the Chinese people."—Project Officer

out any kind of work is to develop their consciousness by every effective and suitable means. This is the first step in our work which must be done no matter how difficult it is or how much time it will take.

Only when the first step has been taken can we enter upon the next step. In other words, when the masses have reached the necessary level of consciousness, it is then our responsibility to guide them in their action—to guide them to organize and fight. When this is brought about, we may further develop their consciousness through their actions. This is how we lead the masses step by step to fight for the basic slogans of the people as put forth by our Party.²⁰

Chief Movements as Class Struggle. This concept of class is present in virtually all programs of the Communist regime in China. Take, for instance, the three biggest movements that are in full swing in Communist China today: the land reform, the Resist-America Aid-Korea Movement, and the suppression of "counter-revolutionaries." The ultimate objective of land reform is definitely not the division of land among poor peasants but, as Liu Shao-ch'i puts it, "the elimination of the landlord class." The suppression of "counter-revolutionaries" is obviously the annihilation of the "reactionaries" or the classes of people considered undesirable or dangerous by the regime. The Resist-America Aid-Korea Movement lends itself to being dramatized as a class struggle on a world basis or, as the Communists phrase it, a struggle of the "class of democracy" against the "class of imperialism represented by America."

As an illustration of how class consciousness is manipulated in the propaganda of land reform, we quote Ai Ssu-ch'i again:

...The reason that the masses of peasants can stand up and take part in the struggle for land reform is mainly because they are awakened, enlightened and guided by the working class (the Communist Party) and possess the right consciousness. They no longer believe that landlords are born to be superior and have the right to oppress the peasants. Under the guidance and education of the Communist Party, they (the peasants) now realize that the landlord class, which gets food without working, is not a class higher than the peasants but that the working and laboring peasants are a class superior to the landlord class....They now understand that it is not the landlords feeding the peasants but the peasants feeding the landlords. They now understand that it is not the peasants who depend upon landlords for a living but actually the landlords who depend upon the peasants. Therefore, only the conscious peasants who can ideologically degrade and look down on the landlord class have the courage for the struggle....²¹

At present, a major objective of propaganda in Communist China is to equip the masses of people with "courage" to participate actively in the struggle. And the element of courage, according to Communist reasoning, can be instilled into the people only by heightening and sharpening their class consciousness in order to build up their self-respect and self-confidence and prepare them to fight. This is especially true in the case of the Resist-America Aid-Korea Movement, in which propaganda is manipulated to convince the people that their sufferings were largely due to exploitation by the American imperialist class, that their survival depends upon the elimination of the imperialists, that the United States of America is a vulnerable enemy and nothing but a "paper tiger," and that the omnipotent Communist Party will unquestionably lead them to victory. In the case of propaganda for the suppression of "counter-revolutionaries," every effort is made by the

²⁰Liu Shao-ch'i, *On the Party* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1950), pp. 57-58.

²¹Ai Ssu-ch'i, *op. cit.*, p. 126.

regime to convince the masses that the revolutionary class can survive only after all "reactionaries" are annihilated, and that the masses must be fearless in punishing anyone who is against the cause of the Communist revolution.

The Communist Party's Ideological Reasoning. These examples should suffice to indicate that "class struggle," which is the real dynamic of Marxism-Leninism, is also an ever-present theme of all propaganda works in Communist China. The significance of this fact is that it sets forth the doctrinal bases on which the Party claims its unique position of leadership, responsibility, and privilege in China, amounting to an inviolable political monopoly. As specified in the Party Constitution of 1945, the "ultimate aim" of the Chinese Communist Party is the realization of communism and, in the course of revolutionary struggle toward this aim, the Party "must endeavor to become the core of all revolutionary mass organizations and of the revolutionary state organs."²²

Consider for a moment the Communist line of reasoning through which they claim this role. The basis of the "people's democratic dictatorship" is the alliance of the working class, peasant class, and urban petty-bourgeoisie. The working class is declared to be the leading class in the revolutionary struggle because, in the words of Mao Tse-tung, "only the working class is far-sighted, just and unselfish and richly endowed with revolutionary thoroughness."²³ The "vanguard" of the working class is none but the Communist Party, which is the "highest form of proletarian class organization." As a self-constituted elite, the Party therefore arrogates to itself a complete monopoly of class leadership.

But how is this numerically small elite class to lead the masses of the population? This question, simple as it may sound, is an important point to be considered because here one can discover the secret of the Communist society and its strength.

To many it may seem that Communist China is ruled completely by coercion. True, as rulers in a totalitarian state, the Chinese Communists apply coercive measures on a tremendously large scale. But they are markedly different from old tyrannies because, in spite of the ruthlessness of their methods of control, they claim to rule the country by persuasion rather than by coercion and make an elaborate show, at least, of doing so.

Liu Shao-ch'i, the Party leader quoted earlier, has this to say about the Party's method of guiding the masses:

We should lead the masses forward, but there should be no commandism. We should be intimately connected with the masses, but we should reject tailism.* We should start from the level already attained by the masses in developing their consciousness and leading them forward. We must adjust the highest principles to the greatest possible connections with the masses in our work. Such is our mass line.²⁴

Myth of Unity with the Masses. A fundamental myth of the Communist Party in China is that it is intimately united with that sacred entity called "the masses." One very popular Communist expression is that "the Party learns from the masses"; another favorite cliché of the Chinese Communist is that "the policy and methods of work of the Party must originate from the masses and go back to the masses."²⁵ Sometimes it even seems to be claimed that the masses, rather than the Party, initiate all the programs of the regime. It appears at least that most of the programs of the regime are "desired" and "demanded" by the masses of the population, and the Party simply acts

²²The Constitution of the Chinese Communist Party, adopted by the Party's Seventh National Party Congress on June 11, 1945. A text of the constitution is in Liu Shao-ch'i, *On the Party* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1950), pp. 155-204.

²³Mao, *On People's Democratic Dictatorship*, p. 16.

²⁴Liu Shao-ch'i, *op. cit.*, p. 66.

²⁵*Ibid.*, p. 52.

* I.e., lagging behind.—Project Officer.

to "satisfy the people." For instance, it is the "people" who want to "volunteer" to go to the Korean front; it is the "people" who "demand" the suppression and severe punishment of the "reactionaries"; it is the "people" who "insist" on carrying out a "thorough democratic reform" in society. According to Communist literature in China, it is the "creative initiative" and "highly-elevated political consciousness" of the "people" which make them sign the World Peace Appeal (Stockholm), take part in the Patriotic Pact, actively participate in the Resist-America Aid-Korea Movement and make a higher record of production than is required. It is an often-repeated theme in the Chinese Communist documents that the Party never does anything without the "sanction of the people."

In evaluating this vital and constantly reiterated myth, one must remember that until the establishment of the "People's Republic of China" late in 1949, the Communist Party was a minority group in China and many of its theories and principles were comparatively unpopular in the country. Although all programs of the Communist regime are declared to be "in the interest of the people." Marxist-Leninist theories of class and political consciousness appear strange and even meaningless to the ordinary Chinese peasants or workers. The claim of the Chinese Communists that they are just workers who are armed with the weapon of Marxism-Leninism and are acting, not on the basis of self-interest, but as the "representatives of social forces," still sounds paradoxical to probably the majority of the Chinese people. To this writer, it just does not seem possible that in a short period of two or three years the masses of the population can suddenly have "become conscious of their natural duties" and "volunteered to bear their historical mission of building a new, Communist society."

One can readily see that there actually exists a wide gap between the Party and the masses. But the Chinese Communists insist, and they may believe, otherwise. They often refer to the Party and the masses as one "harmonious unity." The question of the extent to which this claim may be true is beyond the scope of this paper. It is apparent, at least, that the Chinese Communists are making an all-out effort in propaganda to gear their policies to the receptivity of the masses and make it appear that everything they do is on the initiative of the people.

"Self-emancipation" under Guidance. Theoretically the Chinese Communists believe in the "self-emancipation" of the people and insist that "the masses of the people make their history" and that "their emancipation must be based on their own consciousness and willingness." But they are not unaware of the practical realities. They realize that the "class consciousness" of the people cannot automatically elevate itself to a higher level and that, unless "correctly guided," such consciousness can easily go astray and lead to a trade-unionist type of consciousness. They therefore consider it the "natural duty" of all Communists to guide the masses in the development and elevation of their consciousness, because Communists alone are supposed to be on the highest level of consciousness and possess the "correct" ideology of Marxism-Leninism. As Liu Shao-ch'i said: "In the struggle for the emancipation of the people a Communist should act and can only act as a leader or guide for the masses of the people."²⁶

The general principle of the development of the political consciousness of the people is set forth in the much-quoted formula of Mao Tse-tung, who said: "We should learn from the masses before we can educate them." Liu Shao-ch'i interprets this concept as follows:

Only when our comrades have humbly learnt from the masses of the people, crystallized the knowledge and experience of the people and turned it into systematic knowledge of a higher order, will they be able to take positive steps to develop the consciousness of the people and give guidance to the people's activities. It will certainly be futile, if instead we should self-conceitedly devise a set of schemes out of our own imagination, or mechanically introduce a set of schemes from historic or foreign experiences in order to develop the consciousness of the masses and to guide them.²⁷

²⁶*Ibid.*, p. 58.

²⁷*Ibid.*, pp. 59-60.

Models for Intermediate and Backward Elements. Liu, like all other Communist leaders, is fully aware of the fact that the development of the consciousness of the people is no easy task because, as he further elucidates:

In all sections of the masses there are generally to be found the relatively active elements, the intermediate elements and the backward elements. In the initial stages the active elements are usually in the minority, while the intermediate and the backward elements make up the broad masses. In accordance with the mass line, the majority, that is, the intermediate and the backward elements, must be taken care of, otherwise the advanced sections will become isolated and nothing can be done satisfactorily. The slogans of action and the forms of struggle and of organization we put forward before the masses must be acceptable to the intermediate and the backward elements. The development of the self-consciousness and self-activity of the masses concerns chiefly these people. A mass movement is possible only when these people are awakened and inspired to action.

We must pay particular attention to educating, uniting and organizing the active elements so that they may become the nucleus of leadership among the masses. However, it must be clearly understood that we are not organizing the active elements merely for their own sake and that it is absolutely impermissible to isolate these elements from the intermediate and the backward masses. Our sole intention is to attract and set in motion the intermediate and backward elements through the active elements. In other words, it is for rallying the broadest possible masses that the active elements are to be organized. If the intermediate and backward masses are not yet awakened, we must know how to enlighten them as well as how to wait for them. If we are unwilling to wait, but recklessly rush forward with a small number of the active elements following us, we shall isolate ourselves from the masses and end in failure.²⁸

One fundamental characteristic of the "intermediate and backward elements" is that, aside from being illiterate, the majority of them are of a low cultural level. Fully realizing this fact, Liu points out a special means of approach to these people in the development of their political consciousness. What Liu recommends is actually what is known in the Soviet Union as "oral agitation." "Oral agitation" does not mean only the endless oration of the Party members. Agitation takes many forms in Communist China and one of the forms is the planting of "models" or "heroes" or "living examples" in factories, farms, and other social groupings as objects for the masses to follow and compete with. To illustrate this point, we quote Liu Shao-ch'i again:

In our work it is all the more necessary to combine individual guidance with general directives and to set a whole campaign in motion by breaking through at one point in view of the rather low cultural level of the masses of the Chinese peasantry and other sections of the people, except for the intelligentsia. General directives alone will never succeed with masses of a low cultural level. This is due to the fact that the masses, especially the peasantry, usually consider problems on the basis of their personal experiences instead of on the basis of our general propaganda and slogans. In our work we should break through at one point to give an example to the masses and let them see and understand things by themselves. Only by giving demonstrative examples to the masses can we encourage them, particularly the intermediate and backward elements, by affording them the opportunities and facilities to understand the problems, thereby

²⁸*Ibid.*, pp. 63-64.

instilling in them confidence and courage to act under our Party's slogans and to culminate in an upsurge of mass enthusiasm.

The reason that recently army heroes, labour heroes and model workers in different places have been playing an outstanding role and have become the best propagandists and organizers of the masses is due to the very fact that through such living personalities, examples, and experiences familiar to the people the masses are enabled to understand the issues, thus heightening their consciousness and self-confidence. This also explains why revolutionary reconstruction in China's revolutionary bases is playing an educational and enlightening role for the people of the whole nation and is developing the entire nation's consciousness and self-confidence. The same is true of a leadership's breaking through at one point in order to draw concrete experiences for the reinforcement of its general directives. It is difficult for the masses to understand general directives which are not borne out by concrete experiences familiar to them.²⁹

Summary on Class Struggle. In summary, the Chinese Communist reasoning through which Marxist-Leninist conceptions of the class struggle are linked to Chinese Communist conceptions of propaganda (including agitation) may be simplified into the following steps:

- (1) The Communist revolution is basically a class struggle.
- (2) In the revolutionary class struggle, self-emancipation of the masses is the only possible way to success.
- (3) Self-emancipation is possible only when the masses reach the right level of political or class consciousness.
- (4) Class consciousness cannot elevate itself to a higher level; unless constantly and correctly stimulated it will either go astray or lead to a trade-unionist type of thinking.
- (5) Only the Communist Party is qualified and able to lead the masses in the development of their consciousness because the Party is the "organized vanguard of the Chinese working class and the highest form of its class organization."
- (6) In all sections of the masses there are generally to be found relatively active elements, intermediate elements, and backward elements; and in the development of class consciousness the intermediate and backward elements which form the majority of the population must be given the major consideration.
- (7) A general procedure in the development of the class consciousness of the masses is to educate and organize the active elements so that they may become the nucleus of leadership among the masses and attract and set in motion the intermediate and backward elements.
- (8) In view of the rather low cultural level of the intermediate and backward elements of the population, agitation rather than propaganda, as the terms are understood in the Soviet Union, is the best approach, because they consider problems on the basis of their personal experiences and do not easily comprehend general propaganda and slogans.
- (9) In developing the entire nation's consciousness, propagandists should not attempt to follow any fixed policy or rules but should "break through" at selected points in order to use living examples and concrete experiences for executing propaganda policies and for improving methods at different stages.
- (10) Since the ultimate aim of the Communist regime is the realization of communism and since the political consciousness of the masses must be constantly heightened, sharpened, and elevated to higher levels, persuasive propaganda, as a means of social control, should not be regarded as a sporadic and momentary phenomenon, but must be carried on in whatever is done by the Party and government and on a permanent basis.

²⁹*Ibid.*, pp. 65-66.

5. *The Organizational Machine for Chinese Communist Propaganda*

In order to carry out the above propaganda role, the Chinese Communist Party has at its disposal a machine which controls every means of human expression and every technical vehicle for disseminating ideas.

The motor of this immense machine is the Department of Propaganda, under the direction and supervision of the Chairman of the Central Committee of the Party, the Central Political Bureau, and the Central Secretariat. Closely geared to the machine are the several administrations and ministries under the Committee of Cultural and Educational Affairs of the Government Administration Council of the Central People's Government. They are: the Press Administration, which owns or controls all the newspapers and radio stations in China; the Publications Administration, which has not only the monopoly of all publications but also the control of all publishers, circulation agencies, printing houses, and bookstores throughout the nation; and the Ministry of Cultural Affairs harnessing in the service of the regime all individuals and organizations engaged in what the Chinese Communists have defined as "cultural activities." There is also, of course, the Ministry of Education, which, though extremely important as a propaganda agency, will not be covered in this study because a study of education will be a project in itself.* Besides these Party and government institutions there are also propaganda agencies such as the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association; the Resist-America Aid-Korea Association; the Committee of Democratic Reform in Factories, Mines, and Enterprises; and the Chinese New Democratic Youth Corps.

Viewing the immense propaganda machine of the Communist regime as a whole, one can make the following generalizations concerning its organization and function. The Party's Department of Propaganda determines both the general line and the specific course of propaganda; the above-mentioned government agencies control all the available mass media; and the "operational propagandists corps," largely composed of members of the Party and the New Democratic Youth Corps and other "aggressive activists," handle all agitation activities.

* This was not undertaken due to the early termination of the Chinese Documents Project as a whole.--
Project Officer.

THE DEPARTMENT OF PROPAGANDA OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY

Before exploring the organization and activities of the Party's Department of Propaganda, it is necessary to understand its place within the total Party structure. This requires a brief examination of the Party organization as a whole.

1. *The Party—the Pyramid of Power*

According to the Party's Constitution, "the Party's organizational structure is based upon democratic-centralism, which means centralism on the basis of democracy and democracy under centralized leadership." (Article 14.) The fundamental principles of this democratic-centralism are as follows: (a) the leading bodies of the Party at all levels must be "elected"; (b) the leading bodies of the Party at all levels must submit reports at fixed intervals to the lower Party organizations which "elect" them; (c) each individual Party member shall submit to the decisions of the Party organization to which he belongs, while "minorities" shall submit to the decision of "the majority"; (d) the lower Party organizations shall submit to the higher Party organizations, and all divisional Party organizations shall submit to the Central Committee; and (e) Party discipline shall be strictly observed and Party decisions carried out unconditionally. The first two principles seem to represent the democratic aspects of the Party and the last three principles, the centralist or dictatorial aspect. It is commonly believed, however, that in practice the intensive application of the principles of centralism seems to have overshadowed the democratic aspects. This is a point which further discussion will attempt to clarify.

In general, the Party operates on three major levels: the central organization, the provincial and border regional organizations, and the basic or local organizations. The basic organizations are the Party branches located in factory, mine, village, enterprise, street, company of the Army, office, or school, wherever there are three or more Party members. In the Western world these branches are usually referred to as "cells." These basic organizations are joined into intermediary units—city, county (*hsien*), or district organizations,—which in turn form the provincial and border region organizations. The central organs, of course, form the highest echelon of the Party.

It is important to note that all local Party branches have the power to make independent decisions but that this power is strictly limited by the condition that "such decisions do not conflict with the decisions of its higher Party organization or of the Central Committee." (Article 25 of the constitution.) Another important provision in the constitution is that every Party member may carry on within the Party and in Party meetings free and practical discussion to express his or her views on Party policy and on various issues, before decisions are reached; but "when a decision is reached, it must be abided by and carried out unconditionally." (Article 21.) The power of Party members is further limited by another provision of the constitution which states that "before the Central Committee has made any statement or decision, no departmental or lower Party organization or its responsible personnel shall be free to make any statement or state views on any issue of a national character, although private discussions and suggestions to the Central Committee are allowed." (Article 25.)

The real power of the Party obviously lies in the hands of the Central Political Bureau, which summons the Central Committee to meet in plenary session once every half-year, and the

Central Committee in turn decides and convenes the National Party Congress, theoretically the supreme body of the Party. As specified in the Constitution, "the Central Political Bureau shall be the central leading body of the Party and direct all the work of the Party during the intervals between the plenary sessions of the Central Committee." (Article 34, paragraph 2.) The Central Secretariat, on the other hand, attends to the daily work of the Central Committee "according to the decisions of the Central Political Bureau." (Article 34, paragraph 3.)

In order to facilitate the direction of the work and activities of provincial and regional Party organizations, the Central Committee establishes central bureaus and sub-central bureaus, each of which has jurisdiction over several provinces or border regions (provided in Article 27 of the Constitution). All these bureaus are, of course, held responsible to the Central Political Bureau.

2. *The Party's Department of Propaganda*

The Department of Propaganda is created under the provision of Article 34 of the constitution, which states:

The Central Committee shall, according to the needs of its work, set up departments (such as Organization Department, Propaganda Department, etc.), commissions (such as Military Affairs Commission, Party Press Commission, etc.), and other organs to function in their respective fields under the direction and supervision of the Central Political Bureau, the Central Secretariat, and the Chairman of the Central Committee.

The main function of these departments, commissions, and other organs is, of course, to help the masses of people "elevate their political consciousness to a higher level," or, to be specific, to bring the decisions of the Party and government to the people, explain them, generate approval for them, and mobilize the people to active support or participation.

Very little information is available about the organization and function of this department, for it seems to have been the policy of the Party not to give much publicity to the inside story of how the Party actually operates. However, even a casual newspaper reader in Communist China will not fail to feel the overwhelming power and authority of the Party's propaganda apparatus, which exerts influence over almost all aspects of the society. The long arm of the Department of Propaganda touches a vast variety of activities, which range all the way from interpreting the philosophy of Marxism-Leninism to answering simple questions from a worker in a small factory; and from deciding policies on national newspapers to criticizing some obscure "blackboard newspaper" in a little village at a far-off place. With the movement of building up "nationwide propaganda networks" in full swing since January 1951, the Department of Propaganda has now under its command a vast and powerful army of "propagandists" as well as "reporters" who carry the voice and influence of the Party to every corner of the nation.

Like the Party, which operates in various levels according to the system of "democratic-centralism," the Communist propaganda apparatus also constitutes an elaborate hierarchical structure within which several major strata can be distinguished. Actually, there is a department or committee of propaganda in every Party organization at all levels. This is provided by Article 28 of the constitution which states:

In order to carry on various kinds of practical work, a Party committee at any level may, under its unified leadership, set up departments or commissions to take charge of Party affairs, propaganda and education, military affairs, economic affairs, and the mass work as the situation may require....

At the very top is the Department of Propaganda directly under the Central Political Bureau. Orders or directives from this central leading organization are first received by the departments of

propaganda of the central bureaus and sub-bureaus, each of which exerts control over several provinces or border regions. The main bureaus are the following: the North East Bureau, the North China Bureau, the Northwest Bureau, the Southwest Bureau, the Central-South Bureau, and East China Bureau. Under the departments of propaganda of these bureaus are the propaganda departments of the provincial or border regional Party organizations, which in turn direct the departments of propaganda of the cities, counties (*hsien*), and districts (*ch'u*). At the very bottom stand the Party branches which actually form the backbone of the Communist propaganda. According to an official publication of the Party, there were in 1950 about 250,000 such Party branches in China, and the total membership of the Party was given as 5,800,000.³⁰ Under each of these Party branches is a department or committee of propaganda headed either by the secretary of the branch or a Party member who is supposed to be highly efficient in propaganda and organization.

As specified in the constitution, a Party branch has the following duties:

- (1) to carry on propaganda and organizational work among the masses of the people in order to realize the standpoint advocated by the Party and the decisions of the higher Party organizations;
- (2) to pay constant attention to the sentiments and demands of the masses of the people, to report such sentiments and demands to the higher Party organizations, to pay heed to the political, economic and cultural life of the people, and to organize the masses of the people to solve their own problems;
- (3) to recruit new members, to collect Party membership dues, to check and verify the records of Party members, and to enforce Party discipline among members; and
- (4) to educate the Party members and organize their studies.

With the exception of Item 3, which deals with the management of Party affairs, all the listed duties of a Party branch are concerned with propaganda. Item 1 is clearly propaganda in an operational sense. Item 2 requires members to report the public opinion or reactions of the people to the higher Party organizations, which undoubtedly need the knowledge of the "psychological climate" of the masses of people for further propaganda activities and plans. Item 4 deals with intra-Party education, which aims actually to equip the Party members with better knowledge, techniques, and methods to carry on propaganda and organizational work among the masses of people. Since Party branches exist in almost all factories, mines, villages, enterprises, streets, companies of the Army, offices, or schools "where there are three or more Party members," it is not hard to understand how propaganda plans designed by the Department of Propaganda in Peking can be carried out to every corner of the nation and that its impact is felt even at the lowest levels.

So far as propaganda and especially agitation are concerned, these Party branches are indeed the most important units, because they actually engage in the battle to change the minds of men. According to Liu Shao-ch'i, "one of the fundamental organizational principles of the Party is the building of basic organizations and fortresses of the Party on the basis of production units or concentration points of the masses."³¹ This organizational principle greatly facilitates the propaganda work of the Party because it not only brings the Party closer to the people but also places it in an advantageous position to engage in propaganda and agitation for higher production. The propagandists of a Party branch in a factory are themselves workers. They know their fellow workers, their families, background, tastes, needs, problems, etc., and know how to talk to them and convince them in their own language. They have various ways and means of bringing the messages of the Party to the people and of urging the people to achieve the aims prescribed by the Party. They publish "wall newspapers," distribute pamphlets, present talent shows, organize demonstration parades and accusation meetings, conduct political study classes, lead in all kinds of "pacts" such as the "Patriotic Pact," "Family Pact," "Peace Pact," and "Production-Increasing Pact," and visit families of workers or simply "talk" to the workers or people in their own surroundings.

³⁰ Department of Propaganda of the South China Sub-bureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, *Chung Kuo Kung Ch'an Tang Ch'eng Li San Shih Chou Nien Chi Nien Chuan Chi (Special Issue on the Thirtieth Anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party)* (Canton: South China People's Publishing Co., 1951), Vol. 3., p. 146.

³¹ Liu Shao-ch'i, *op. cit.*, p. 136.

One of their favorite methods in agitation is to make themselves "model workers" by producing more than required in a regular schedule, working longer hours, demanding less pay, and "voluntarily contributing" their earnings to the Resist-America Aid-Korea campaign. These planted paragons of Communist virtue provide the Party with a constant supply of Stakhanovites or model workers and enable it to "take pride" in the many "wonders" of production and national reconstruction which are all "volunteered" by the people. Such "wonders" should indeed be credited chiefly to the constant propaganda and agitation of the propaganda departments or committees of the Party branches.

However, these propaganda departments or committees on the lowest levels are important only for their operational activities. Although they report sentiments or reactions of the masses of the people and often make recommendations to the higher Party organizations, they have no part in the general planning of propaganda policies, which is completely in the hands of the Department of Propaganda of the Party's Central Committee in Peking. Their activities follow strictly the pattern and schedule decided by the national authorities. For instance, no local Party branch is supposed to make any decision on slogans for special occasions, and all are required to use the ones authorized by the Propaganda Department at Peking. Even unintentional mistakes through misunderstanding or misjudgment committed by lower Party organs are strictly forbidden. The following comments which appear in the *Hsüeh Hsi*, the most authoritative magazine for political indoctrination in Communist China today, illustrate how a Party committee in a small city is severely "criticized" for not following closely the slogans issued for national use.

In the June 22 issue of the *Tung Pai Jih Pao*, the Northeast Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party published the 'Circular of the Heilungkiang Provincial Committee of the Chinese Communist Party Concerning Unauthorized Changes of the Political Slogans for May 1 by the Members of the K'e Shan *hsien* Committee of the Party.' According to the circular, the K'e Shan *hsien* committee members made many changes of the political slogans for 'May 1' issued by the People's Political Consultative Council and used instead such slogans as: to support the Declaration of the Peace Appeal, we should accelerate our Manure and Fertilizer Movement; we should pick up more manure, build more huts, make more hen houses and pig pens...and other phrases or sentences which lack political content. Their reasons for changing the authorized slogans are: the slogans prepared by the PPCC are just general principles; slogans must be united with the actual condition of local areas. At the solemn demonstration meeting, thousands of people of the Ming Li village of this *hsien*, from the *ch'ü* and village cadres to the masses, never shouted a political slogan. They all shouted: 'Pick up manure,' 'Make pig pens,' 'Clean hen houses,' etc....

It is necessary, of course, to unite the general political slogans of a national character with actual conditions. It is also necessary to mobilize the masses to support these slogans with actual works. But the correct method of uniting realities is not to change freely or omit political slogans but to use these slogans to educate the masses, to enable them to understand deeply the meaning of every slogan and its close relation to the life of the people of different walks... and to elevate the political consciousness of the masses to a higher level....³²

The local Party branches are also told what priority to give to what issues at what time and to what extent. The only autonomy which the local Party branches have in propaganda lies in the choice of methods and approaches in carrying out the directives from the higher Party organizations.

The Department of Propaganda at Peking guides, directs, and supervises the nationwide propaganda activities. It is not an operational organization, although it has a wide range of responsibilities and a vast variety of activities. It does not own or control the Party newspapers,

³² *Hsüeh Hsi (Learning)*, Vol. IV, No. 8, August 1, 1951, p. 25.

which are under the jurisdiction of the Party Press Commission, also set up by the Party's Central Committee. It does not operate the radio stations or make films, since these activities come under the Committee of Cultural and Educational Affairs of the People's Government. Nor does it issue orders directly to the political commissars and "cultural workers' corps" who are supposed to carry on propaganda and education in the Red Army. The department decides the content of the books and materials for the political learning (*Hsüeh Hsi*) of both Party members and the masses of the people and, in fact, edits the majority of such books, but it does not publish them under the name of the department. Such books are all published by the publishing companies that are either owned or controlled by the Publications Administration of the government. With the exception of slogans for special occasions, important documents such as those relating to the establishment of propaganda networks in the country, and decisions on criticism and self-criticism, most of the propaganda directives are issued under the name of the propaganda departments of the Party's central bureaus in different areas.

It seems that the Department of Propaganda prefers to remain in the background in supervision and control and tends to shy away from unnecessary publicity with regard to its own activities. In fact, this department, probably one of the most important agencies of the Politburo, is comparatively obscure, so far as publicity is concerned. Unlike Dr. Goebbels, who was recognized both nationally and internationally, Lu Ting-yi, director of the department, is not yet widely known to the Chinese people. Nor does Lu make frequent public appearances. He has given speeches and written articles of a significant nature on culture and education and Mao's Thought, on such important occasions as the Party's thirtieth anniversary and the convening of major national conferences. Otherwise, his name does not often appear in the papers.

The obscurity of the department and its chief should not lead one to the erroneous belief that the department is preoccupied only with planning propaganda or issuing general directives and leaves the operation completely in the hands of government agencies or lower Party organizations. A closer look at the propaganda machine in Communist China as a whole would reveal that the hidden authority and influence of this department is present in virtually all propaganda and educational activities in the country. Sometimes it is indeed amazing to see how well informed is this central propaganda organ in Peking on all propaganda activities in the country, including even the accomplishments or failures of a propaganda department or committee of a Party branch in a small factory in a far-off country town. For instance, in the *Shih Shih Shou Tz'e (Current Affairs Handbook)*, which is published by the state-owned People's Publishing Company at Peking and is supposed to be used by all propagandists in North China, there are often articles on propaganda methods which are illustrated with actual examples, including perhaps the methods used by a propagandist in a small village 2,000 or 3,000 miles away from Peking. In the November 5, 1951 issue of the above-mentioned *Handbook*, the author of an article entitled "To Put the Marriage Law in Practice Resolutely" cites cases from some villages in Fukien, Chekiang, and Shansi.³³ These three provinces are widely separated. Should such illustrations be actual cases, their citation would indicate that the propaganda authorities in Peking are in close touch with all local propaganda organizations in the country and are highly efficient in control and supervision.

Actually carrying out the propaganda decisions of Peking are the propaganda departments of the Party's central bureaus in different areas, with centers in Shanghai (for the East China Bureau); Wuhan, the Wuchang-Hankow-Hanyang metropolitan area (for the Central-South Bureau); Sian (for the Northwest Bureau); Peking (for the North China Bureau); Mukden (for the Northeast Bureau); Chungking (for the Southwest Bureau); and many other big cities for important sub-bureaus. For instance, the Department of Propaganda of the Party's South China sub-bureau at Canton is extremely active.

These departments of the Party's bureaus and sub-bureaus prepare periodical "propaganda outlines" or "important points on propaganda" for "propagandists" and "reporters" at local levels. In some areas, these outlines are circulated on a monthly basis; in others, they appear

³³ *Shih Shih Shou Tz'e (Current Affairs Handbook)*, No. 26, November 5, 1951, pp. 22-26.

every two months. Special outlines are distributed when there are particular issues. These outlines cover a wide range of topics and instruct local propagandists exactly how they should express themselves on a given issue. Most of them deal with the interpretation of national and international events and actual tasks being carried on in different localities. For instance, the Department of Propaganda of the Hopei Bureau in July included an outline of propaganda for the prevention of drought and the elimination of pests.³⁴

In addition to official "propaganda outlines," each of these propaganda departments of the Party's central bureaus puts out a "propaganda handbook" published by the official People's Publishing Company, which has branches all over China. For example, there are the *Current Affairs Handbook*, published in Peking, the *Propagandists' Handbook* in Sian, the *Propagandist* in Hankow, and the *Canton Propagandists* in Canton. All these handbooks are small booklets, about two-thirds as large as a pocket-size book in America. In each issue there are articles about special occasions and instructions to propagandists as to what they should stress in their speeches to the masses; articles interpreting current affairs; questions and answers on problems which are likely to be raised by common people; reference materials for wall newspapers or blackboard papers; songs that can be used for mass meetings; cartoons which could be reproduced by local talent without much difficulty; and discussions on propaganda methods and appeals.

Take the November 25, 1951 issue of the *Canton Propagandists* (*Kuang Chou Hsüan Ch'uan Yüan*), for instance. In this 45-page fortnightly there are articles, stories, statistics, cartoons, and many other materials that are prepared to help propagandists to push forward the major programs of the regime such as the Production-Increase and Austerity Movement, the Resist-America Aid-Korea Campaign, the Marriage Law, Patriotic Pact, Suppression of Counter-revolutionaries, etc. This issue was published at the time when the Production-Increase and Austerity Movement was in full swing. One-third of this issue deals with this special movement as a response to a call made by Mao Tse-tung in the third session of the National Congress of the People's Political Consultative Council which ended on November 1, 1951. The first article, entitled "How to Develop the Large-scale Production-Increase and Austerity Movement in Canton," explains the meaning and objectives of the movement and specifies methods of conducting "ideological mobilization" for this movement. The second article recommends the learning of the working methods of Ho Chien-hsiu, a much-publicized woman model worker. This article is followed by two cartoons concerning the above-mentioned movement. The third article deals with the "plans" of a group of workers of Locomotive No. 562 of the Canton Railroad Sub-bureau to increase production by hard work and thrift. Then follows a column of statistical information showing how much one can waste through ignorance of thrift and of correct working methods. A seven-page article, entitled "Questions and Answers on the Korean Situation," is specially provided as "reference material for propagandists in their talks." Most of the questions are ones such as the following, which are likely to be raised by common people. "What is the recent development of the Korean situation?" "What is our attitude in the Korean peace talks?" "What is the fundamental spirit of our proposals in the peace parleys?" "Why and how does America obstruct and delay these negotiations?" "Why should the Americans spread the rumor that we have murdered prisoners-of-war?" "What should be the attitude of our people while the Americans continue to obstruct the peace talks?" Immediately following this article is another cartoon under the title of "Bankruptcy of America's Atomic Lies," showing three American figures—Truman, Ridgway, and a poker-faced fat merchant—scared by Stalin's answers to *Pravda* concerning atomic weapons.

Included in this issue is also a folk song, "Blessings of Peace-loving People," which is written in popular story-telling rhythmic form and local Canton dialect. Another article, entitled "To Propagandize the Marriage Law under Banners and Drums," suggests to propagandists what to do and say in explaining the law to people. For the propaganda of the suppression of "counter-revolutionaries," there is one article telling how one factory worker successfully cooperated with fellow-workers and "eliminated" Liang Lin, "a secret agent and a remaining element of feudalism."

³⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 51-54.

Following this article is a series of seven comic pictures showing how P'an P'ei-chen, a woman propagandist, carries on the propaganda of the "Patriotic Pact." At the time when this issue of the propaganda handbook was published, the biggest local event in Canton was the Fair of Local Special Products. The editor of the handbook remarks: "This fair is a big classroom of education in patriotism. It is hoped that all propagandists and comrades will mobilize more people to go to the fair, organize group visitings and conduct discussions after visiting the fair." Five short comments written by people from various areas are printed in this issue, all pointing out the "remarkable progress" of the new regime as reflected in the fair. The last column in the handbook is "the propagandists' letterbox" which is used to answer questions from propagandists about their works. On the back cover of the handbook is a song, "Long Live the Leader of the People," with words by Vice-Premier Kuo Mo-jo.

It is significant to note that although these handbooks are published by different branches of the People's Publishing Company and differ in format and makeup, the contents are highly synchronized. In dealing with a special topic, there may be minor differences in the choice of words and expressions, but the major points are essentially the same. Take, for instance, the celebration of the second anniversary of the People's Government. The date of this occasion is October 1. Almost the entire September issue of each of these handbooks starts with one long article on "What to Propagate in Celebrating October 1" and contains identical materials for the use of the propagandists in their speeches, wall newspapers, cartoons, and other media. This identity in the content of the handbooks in different locations is obviously no mere coincidence. Probably all propaganda materials are prepared by the authorities in Peking and distributed to the departments of propaganda of the Party's bureaus or sub-bureaus well in advance.

These propaganda departments assume other important responsibilities besides offering assistance to local propagandists by means of propaganda outlines and handbooks. Their responsibilities range from deciding educational policies in schools to answering questions from newspaper readers. At present, all these departments are preoccupied with one important project: the establishment of propaganda networks throughout the whole country. This aspect of Chinese Communist propaganda will be discussed in more detail later.

In examining the organizational and functional aspects of the Department of Propaganda of the Party, one has to keep in mind the hand-in-glove relationship between the Party and the government. It has been stated that the Propaganda Department at Peking does not own or control the newspapers and broadcasting stations in China. Such a statement, however, is true only to the extent that the department does not own the mass media under its very name. These facilities are placed under the supervision of the Committee of Cultural and Educational Affairs of the Government Administration Council of the Central People's Government which, as any observer of Communist China will agree, is nothing more than a front organization of the Party. Therefore, in actual practice the Department of Propaganda of the Party exercises very effective control over newspapers, the radio, and other media of communication.

The Government Administration Council establishes three committees under which are placed different ministries, bureaus, administrations, and commissions.³⁵ The Committee of Cultural and Educational Affairs, one of the three overall committees, is charged with the supervision and direction of all propaganda and indoctrination activities as well as the program of schools.

Article 41 of the fifth chapter of the Common Program contains specific provisions regarding cultural and educational policy. It stipulates:

The culture and education of the People's Republic of China shall be New Democratic-national, scientific and popular. The main tasks of the People's Government in cultural and educational work shall be the raising of the


³⁵The three committees are: Committee of Political and Legal Affairs, Committee of Financial and Economic Affairs, and Committee of Cultural and Educational Affairs.

cultural level of the people, the training of personnel for national construction work, the eradication of feudal, compradore, and fascist ideology and the promotion of the ideology of service to the people.

"The eradication of feudal, compradore, and fascist ideology and the promotion of the ideology of service to the people" apparently fall within the province of propaganda. In fact, almost every task or program undertaken by the Committee of Cultural and Educational Affairs is heavily seasoned with propaganda flavor.

Under the Committee of Cultural and Educational Affairs are the Ministry of Cultural Affairs, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Public Health, the Academy of Sciences, the Press Administration, and the Publications Administration. With the possible exception of the Ministry of Public Health and the Academy of Sciences, all these agencies have to do with "mass persuasion." They have under their control the schools, the press, theaters, posters, radio, mass meetings, motion pictures, various forms of literature and art, and all other media of communication that are able to shape the minds of men.

In the present study, we deal only with the Ministry of Cultural Affairs, the Press Administration, and the Publications Administration. The organization of these institutions is shown on the following chart.³⁶



³⁶This chart is based on information in the *Jen Min Shou Ts'e (People's Handbook, 1950)* published by the pro-Communist Ta Kung Bookstore in Hong Kong.

The power of the Communist Party over these governmental agencies becomes more evident when one examines the personnel involved in the program of cultural and educational control. The chairman of the committee is Vice-Premier Kuo Mo-jo, who, although declaring himself to be a non-Party liberal, is perhaps more outspokenly anti-American and pro-Russian than many of the most faithful and loyal Party leaders. He is concurrently director of the Academy of Sciences and national chairman of the "Chinese People's Committee to Protect World Peace and Oppose American Aggression" (generally known as the Resist-America Aid-Korea Association), which is supposed to lead in all anti-American activities in Communist China today. Apparently well-liked by Moscow, Kuo was awarded in December 1951, the Stalin International Peace Prize, which Kuo himself declared to be the "highest international honor today." In accepting the prize, Kuo made a statement on December 23, 1951 at Peking and praised Stalin and the Soviet Union in the strongest possible terms. He said in part:

It is the people of Soviet Russia—the greatest in the world—who have made the greatest contribution to the 'strengthening of world peace.' Under the direct leadership of Generalissimo Stalin, the greatest teacher of all laboring people in the world and the greatest leader in the defense of world peace, the people in the Soviet Union have thoroughly maintained their policy of peace, developed the unparalleled superior spirit of creativeness, and made the Soviet Union the strongest fortress of world peace and the brightest lighthouse of world culture. All good-hearted people have gained and increased their confidence in winning world peace because of the existence of the Soviet Union. They all thank the Soviet people and learn from them. The superior sons and daughters in the Soviet Union, indeed, are more qualified (than myself) to receive this supreme prize bearing the name of great Stalin. I only hope that hereafter I can recommend Soviet friends for the prize. I believe that this is not only my personal hope but the hope of all the Chinese people and the common hope of all peace-loving people in the world...³⁷

Kuo is assisted by four vice-chairmen. One of them is Lu Ting-yi, the director of the Department of Propaganda of the Party's Central Committee. Another vice-chairman is Chen Po-ta, who is concurrently assistant director of the Party's Department of Propaganda and assistant dean of the Marx-Lenin Institute, the highest center of ideological studies. The other two vice-chairmen are Ma Hsu-lun, Minister of Education, and Shen Yen-ping, Minister of Cultural Affairs. The secretary-general, who probably has the greatest power in the execution of policies and management of day-to-day affairs, is Hu Chiao-mo, * director of the Press Administration and a long-time Communist Party member. He was formerly director of the New China News Agency (equivalent to Tass in the Soviet Union) and publisher of the Party's mouthpiece, the *People's Daily*, in Peking. He is also one of the vice-directors of the Party's Department of Propaganda. The chief of the Office of General Affairs of the Committee is another Party member. He is Ho Chen-hsiang, who was formerly an important official of the Party's Department of the United Front. Then, there are 42 members on the committee and among them are such prominent Party members as Hsu Teh-li, another assistant director of the Party's Department of Propaganda; Ai Ssu-ch'i, the Party's most prolific theoretician on Marxism-Leninism; Chien Chun-ju, Vice-Minister of Education; Chou Yang, Vice-Minister of Cultural Affairs, and other influential Communists. With the director and assistant director of the Party's Department of Propaganda acting as vice-chairmen of the Committee and with other Party members either holding important administrative posts or occupying seats in the committee, the Party has no difficulty in insuring that the formulation and execution of "cultural-educational" policies follow the orthodox Party line in the name of the "People's Government."

³⁷ *Ch'ang Chiang Jih Pao (Yangtze Daily News, Hankow)*, December 25, 1951.

* Sometimes written Hu Ch'iao-mu.—Editors.

3. The Party's Propaganda Networks

Although propaganda has always played an important role in the Communist system, until 1951 the Party lacked a permanent, well-planned machinery and program to carry out nationwide propaganda activities. The various kinds of campaigns and movements such as campaigns for signatures to the Stockholm Peace Appeal, for the glorification of the "model workers," etc., as many Communist newspapers admittedly state, were temporary movements, suddenly popping up and quickly dying out, creating only a temporary fever of enthusiasm among the Party rank and file, and among the people.

In order to "tighten its unity with the masses," the Party in January 1951 launched a gigantic project of setting up a permanent stable propaganda system within the Party which would radiate into the masses and guide them along the line of orthodox policy. This project is what is now widely known as "nationwide propaganda networks." The establishment of such networks opened a new page in the history of Communist propaganda in China, and enabled the Party to spread new propaganda personnel over the whole country and to advance from theoretical to more practical goals.

The Central Committee of the Party issued on January 1, 1951 an official order under the title: "Decisions on the Establishment of Propaganda Networks for the Whole Party among the Masses of the People."³⁸ This basic document was presented for study to all Party branches in the country and was followed by a flurry of reports and criticisms in newspapers and magazines, as well as group discussions. The first paragraph of the document described the necessity and urgency for more propaganda work among the people. Stating that propaganda had fallen off in many parts of the country or had ceased completely, it charged that many Party organizations of various levels had overlooked the importance of carrying on propaganda on a permanent basis. The result, according to the document, was the rise of reactionary propaganda and harmful rumors constantly prevailing among the people. It further criticized Party members for excessive use of administrative orders or commands in their work and failure to deal with the masses through methods of persuasion and explanation. In order to rectify such errors, the Party decided to install "propagandists" in every Party branch and "reporters" in directing organs of the Party at various levels, and thus establish a definite nationwide propaganda network.

Under this new arrangement, a "propagandist" is not just an ordinary or regular worker in the Party's Propaganda Department or the Army's propaganda troupe, who puts up posters, prepares wall newspapers, gives street corner shows, or shouts slogans at mass meetings. A "propagandist" of a "network" is one who is supposed, by simple popular means, to be constantly carrying on propaganda and agitation among the people in his environment.

According to the above-mentioned official decisions of the Party's Central Committee, the duties of a propagandist are as follows:

- (1) to use simple and popular forms to propagate and explain to the people in his surroundings current national and international affairs, policies of the Party and government, tasks of the people (especially the direct and urgent tasks of those whom he is addressing), and "model experiences" of the masses of people in production and other works;
- (2) to refute current reactionary rumors and erroneous ideas prevailing among the people;
- (3) to stimulate or agitate people to obtain "model experience" in order to accomplish their tasks in an aggressive manner; and
- (4) to report conditions among the people regularly to higher Party organs, so that they may decide on adequate content and methods of propaganda in different periods.

Forming the propaganda networks are members of the Party and the New Democratic Youth Corps and those model workers or revolutionary activists who volunteer their service under the guidance of the Party. Selection of propaganda material is made by Party branches, which are the basic units of the Party. All appointments of propagandists must be passed by the committee

³⁸Hsin Hua Yüeh Pao (New China Monthly), Vol. III, No. 3, January 1951, pp. 507-9.

of Party branches and approved by a higher Party organ. Secretaries and committee members of Party branches and members of the Party and Youth Corps who have constant connection with the masses of people are also expected to be propagandists. Among these would be cadres in unions, cooperatives, districts (*ch'ü*, subdivision of a county) or villages; school teachers; staff members of mass education centers; and editors of wall newspapers.

The daily tasks of a propagandist are not specifically prescribed by Party authorities; they vary in different places and at different times. The main principle to be followed by all propagandists is that all propaganda activities must be closely related to the tasks of people who form the audience of the propagandist. However, the main forms or types of propaganda include: interviewing, passing on information, reading newspapers (in newspaper reading groups), listening to broadcasts and rebroadcasting to the people, preparing propaganda posters or other materials, and editing wall newspapers. All propagandists are encouraged to find their own methods of propaganda so long as they can achieve the goals prescribed by the Party. In a book entitled *How to be a Propagandist*, edited and published by the People's Publishing Company, more than 50 propagandists tell of their own experiences in propaganda and recommend new methods with which they have experimented successfully. For instance, a 51-year-old propagandist who is an old-timer in a railroad factory at Dairen suggests the use of daily conversation for propaganda purposes. He relates that when he was first asked to be a propagandist he often called meetings and addressed the people, informing them of what he had learned from the Party. He soon sensed an indifference on the part of the people and noticed a drop in attendance. Then he changed his method of propaganda. He began to plant propaganda in his daily conversation with co-workers, and found himself to be very successful. The following story is one of the many which this propagandist relates to illustrate his method of propaganda.

*One Foot in the Puddle*³⁹

It was early dawn after rain and still dark. Workers on their way to the factory were walking on a narrow street. Without paying too much attention, one worker stepped with one foot into a puddle of muddy water. He was very angry after he pulled his foot out of the mud.

I (the propagandist himself) hurried to him and asked: 'What happened?'

'Damn it! I fell in the puddle!' he replied with anger.

'I just had a fall, too, and I surely cursed well!'

'Whom did you curse?'

'I cursed the American devils.'

'Why do you curse the American devils for your fall?'

'If the American devils had not invaded us and bombed our Northeast, would we have to have protection from air raids and always be in a black-out? We would have our street lights lit until morning and then we wouldn't fall or step into puddles. Whom do you think I should curse besides those damn American devils?'

I immediately added: 'If I could curse them to death, I would surely curse them all day long in my home. But cursing alone won't help. This means that we should put more effort into production.'

At this point, the muddy factory worker said: 'You're right.'

³⁹ Editorial Department of the People's Publishing Co. (ed.), *Tsen Yang Tso Hsien Ch'uan Yuan (How to be a Propagandist)* (Peking: People's Publishing Co., 1951), pp. 11-12.

Tales of this nature and other stories of how propagandists used different methods or means of carrying out their agitation work practically flooded the Communist newspapers during the first few months after the program of propaganda networks was inaugurated. All propagandists are under the direct supervision of the Party branches. It has been repeatedly emphasized in many official directives from propaganda departments under the various bureaus of the Party, that the success of propaganda depends upon the assistance and guidance of Party branches. For instance, in North China and Central-South China, all Party members and cadres in factories, schools, mines, and government agencies are instructed to assist the Party branches in their localities in directing the work of the propagandists. The tasks of Party branches in propaganda include issuing working directives, preparing propaganda materials, calling meetings of propagandists, and other activities such as planning, reviewing, and criticizing the work of propagandists.⁴⁰

As an illustration of the pattern of operation of the propagandists, the following "propaganda plan," prepared and put into practice jointly by two of them for a one-month period, is fairly representative of their work in small villages, factories, and farms. The two operatives in this case were T'su Ch'ang-cheng and T'su Pi-ch'eng of a small village in North Kiangsu. Apparently approved by Party authorities, their plans have been given considerable publicity. They have been published in the *Shanghai Liberation Daily* (May 7, 1951) and also in the *Current Affairs Handbook* (No. 19, July 20, 1951), published in Peking. The outline of their plan is as follows:

A. *Objectives and Requirements of Propaganda:*

1. There are 16 families in the section. Each of us will take care of 8 families. We both guarantee that every member of the 16 families will receive constantly the education of the Resist-America Aid-Korea Movement. At the end of half a month, we will compare notes to see which one of us is doing a better job of propaganda.
2. In addition to the fixed objects of propaganda (the 16 families), we will talk to anyone whom we meet. The motto is not to waste one single minute or ignore one single individual. We should change the 'conversation on personal affairs' into a 'conversation on current affairs' and thus develop the habit of carrying on propaganda at all times and places.
3. The general task of the propaganda in the Resist-America Aid-Korea campaign should be united with the propaganda of the actual tasks carried on in the community. In the patriotic movement of increasing production, we will not only set up our own plans of production but will also mobilize all the people in the community to do the same. We will aim at mobilizing people to plant 40 acres of cotton and 60 trees and to invest in 30 shares of the local co-op; persuading 55 people to sign the Peace Appeal (Stockholm) and vote in the movement for solving the problem of Japan by a united effort (as opposed to the Peace Treaty signed with Japan by the United States and most of the other belligerents at San Francisco); organizing 30 people to participate in the demonstration parade in celebration of May 1; and directing the masses to do a good job in suppressing the counter-revolutionaries.

B. *Content of Propaganda:*

1. To make every one in the community understand that to oppose America and aid Korea is the only way to protect his home and defend the country;

⁴⁰ *Jen Min Jih Pao* (Peking), February 11, 1951.

that the actual task of the Resist-America Aid-Korea Movement is to increase production and do a good job in one's own field; that the Chinese and Korean armies will definitely win the war, and that the American devils will eventually be defeated. Meanwhile we should point out the possible difficulties that may be encountered, explain the experiences in China's War of Liberation, and enable the masses to understand correctly the victorious situation at present and not to be disturbed by temporary setbacks.

2. To propagate the 10 principles in the speed-up movement in production and organize the masses of the people to participate in the movement through these principles.
3. To propagate current information on the suppression of counter-revolutionaries on the basis of the "Law on the Punishment of Counter-revolutionaries" recently made public by the government.
4. To propagate the advantages of a close relation between co-ops and the people and thus encourage people to purchase shares.
5. To propagate the meaning of signing the World Peace Appeal and voting on the Japanese question, and to explain the reasons for participating in the demonstration parade on May 1.

C. *Source of Material for Propaganda:*

1. To attend the meetings for propagandists punctually, listen carefully to the lectures, and study the propaganda materials.
2. To read newspapers, propaganda handbooks, and any other material handed down from the higher Party organization and to keep constantly in touch with the secretary of the Party branch.
3. To gather reactions from the masses.
4. To maintain constant contact with the *ch'ü* committee of the Party through letters and in person.

D. *Forms and Methods of Propaganda:*

1. To organize four group discussions during this month. At least one of them should be a discussion meeting of women.
2. To conduct individual propaganda or informal conversation at least twice a day and make it a habit to do so.
3. To organize a newspaper-reading group, and read the *Ta Chung Pao* (*The Daily of the Masses*, published in North Kiangsu) every three days. We will take turns in reading newspapers.
4. To put out a "propaganda bulletin board" on current affairs and local news. The board is to be supplied with new material every three days.
5. To grasp every opportunity for propaganda such as working, walking, etc.
6. To make use of the aggressive activists in the masses. It is our plan to make use of Tsu Chang-yu (name of a child) to carry on propaganda among the 18 children in the community. We are planning to educate and use Siao Chi-yuan (name of a woman) to carry on propaganda among the 12 women in the section.

How successful such propagandists may be in winning the people to the cause of the Party cannot be ascertained in this paper. However, one thing is certain: The Chinese people have

absolutely no escape from propaganda wherever they go or whatever they do. According to figures released by the Party in December 1951, there were more than 1,550,000 propagandists in the whole country in October 1951.⁴¹ At present, the average number of propagandists in every factory, farm, and production unit is about 10 per cent of the total people in the unit. In the Northeast area alone, there were 117,823 propagandists in 1950; it was the plan of the area Party authorities that the number should increase to 200,000 in 1951.⁴² In an electric power plant at Dairen, for example, the number of propagandists is 10 per cent of the total working people; in a mine at Anshan, 6 per cent; in another chemical plant at Mukden, 13 per cent.⁴³ There is hardly any place in China today where a person can be free from the persistent persuasion of these propagandists.

The introduction of the system of propaganda networks changes considerably the social life of the peasants, factory workers, and other people of the lower social levels. Perhaps never before in their lives have these people been so persistently persuaded to do things, attend so many meetings, and sign so many pacts, and to do so "voluntarily." According to one official report, in a period of two weeks in the city of Peng Chi (in the Northeast), the Party secretary of the City Committee made 18 reports; the Communist high-ranking cadres in factories and mines made 625 reports to a total audience of 70,000; there were 270 group discussions in which 25,000 people participated; 30 accusation meetings and 15 oral contests were held. In addition, there were story-telling evening meetings, memory meetings, and farewell meetings to the people joining the armed forces. Then, cadres were organized to conduct interviews in every family in the city.⁴⁴ In a 10-day period from July 10 to July 20, 1951 in Chaoan, a *hsien* in Kwangtung, there were 8,085 grievance-telling accusation meetings, including 1,347 mass meetings and 6,738 small-group meetings. On the average, every inhabitant was exposed to at least three such meetings.⁴⁵ This degree of intensity of propaganda coverage is probably unparalleled in the history of the modern world, with the possible exception of the Soviet Union.

The general content of the material used by these propagandists is fairly summarized in the following statement which appears in the official report made by the Department of Propaganda of the Party's Northeast Bureau:

Content of mass propaganda varies with the tasks or responsibilities prescribed by the Party at special times and with the different stages of historical development. At present, our mass propaganda efforts are mainly as follows: to develop continuously the Resist-America Aid-Korea Protect-Home Defend-Nation Movement; to elevate the consciousness of the masses of people in anti-imperialism, patriotism and internationalism; to hate, condemn and despise American imperialism and eliminate all the poisonous elements of befriending America, respecting America and fearing America, spread by the running dogs of American imperialists; to ascertain the self-confidence and self-respect of the masses in their love for the fatherland and people; and to develop further the aggressiveness and creativeness of the masses of people in high-speed labor production in order to increase constantly the production rate for the consolidation of national defense, development of the national economy, and struggle for the defense of world peace.⁴⁶

⁴¹ *Jen Min Jih Pao* (Peking), December 21, 1951. (For a later figure, see page 30.—Project Officer).

⁴² Editorial Department of the People's Publishing Co., *op. cit.*, p. 180. [As stated on page 3, the plan was initiated in that one region in 1950, and established on a countrywide basis only, January 1951.—Project Officer.]

⁴³ Fu Cheng-sheng, *op. cit.*, pp. 13-14.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 19.

⁴⁵ *Nan Fang Jih Pao* (Southern Daily, Canton), September 10, 1951.

⁴⁶ Fu Cheng-sheng, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

In more definite terms, the content of the mass propaganda carried out by these operational propagandists falls into the following three categories: (1) national and international current affairs; (2) policies and decisions of the Party and government and, particularly, tasks or responsibilities specially prescribed by the Party at specific periods; and (3) teachings and lessons in production.

Instruction relay posts. The decision of the Party's Central Committee on propaganda networks stipulates that the propagandists of Party organs shall meet at least once a month, and at most once a week, to discuss their instructions and the work accomplished. On a higher level, the *hsien* or city Party organ shall convene the meeting of propagandists and their representatives monthly. On behalf of the Party's city or *hsien* committees, the Party's committees at the district (*ch'ü*) level are required constantly to direct the propaganda work of the Party branches and decide the scope, aims, and methods of propaganda for each Party branch according to its own conditions. In rural areas where transportation conditions are poor, the Party's district committees follow a system of setting up "instruction relay posts." Selected propagandists representing the propaganda departments of Party branches are summoned by the Party's *ch'ü* committees to receive instructions on propaganda with regard to content, methods, and approaches.

Today, these "instruction relay posts" are spread all over the country. The Department of Propaganda of the the Party's committee in the province of Hopei reported that, according to incomplete statistics, there are 710 such posts in an area of 29 *hsien*. These units, besides passing on instructions to Party branches, also serve the function of educating and training propagandists. In the case of Hopei Province, all heads of such posts are members of the Party's *ch'ü* committees who are charged with educational responsibilities. There, as elsewhere, these heads of posts not only give instructions on propaganda to Party branches, but also supervise the "political study" of the Party members at a lower level and in turn report their progress to their superiors.⁴⁷

"Reporters." Realizing that members of the Party branches as well as the *ch'ü* committees are of low cultural levels, the Party's Central Committee decided that propagandists alone would not be enough to enable the masses of people to understand fully the Party's policies, especially in the case of policies designed for special occasions. The Party believed that the directing personnel of the Party's organs at various levels should be constantly available to make systematic reports or lectures to people on current affairs, policies, tasks, and experiences. For this reason, "reporters" or "reporting personnel" are installed in all committees of the Party in every province, city, administrative district, *hsien*, or *ch'ü*.

"Reporters," as regulated by the Party's Central Committee, "are propagandists of a higher rank and therefore are directing personnel of propagandists."⁴⁸ Forming the large army of reporters are secretaries and responsible members of the Party's committee at all levels from the *ch'ü* to the province, and Party members holding responsible positions in government agencies at corresponding levels. In some cases, Party members can be assigned by Party committees to serve as reporters.

Every "reporter" is required to make a political report at least once every two months before a large gathering of representatives of the masses of people (the workers and peasants). Subjects and major points of content must be approved in advance by the secretary of the Party's committee to which the reporter belongs. After delivering a speech or completing a speaking tour, the reporter is expected to submit a report about his talks and the reactions of the audience to the secretary of his committee, who is responsible for going through all such reports and offering any assistance or guidance necessary to guarantee that the work of reporters is always of an approved nature. In this connection, Party committees at various levels are encouraged to recommend good reports of reporters to be published in newspapers.

Since reporters are mostly Party leaders of their own localities with considerable authority, they command more respect among the people than the ordinary propagandists who work among the

⁴⁷ *Jen Min Jih Pao* (Peking), August 20, 1951.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, July 13, 1951.

masses. In Shanghai, for instance, Mayor Chen Yi, Deputy Mayor Pan Han-nien, Liu Chang-sheng, chairman of the Union, and many other Party and government leaders are all reporters. In Taiyuan, a city of medium size, there are more than 200 reporters, covering about 13 fields, including education, culture, religion, and public health. In an eight-day period from November 8 to November 15, 1950, these reporters made 625 reports to a total audience of 70,963. Group discussions were also organized after every report, and it was estimated that 74,522 people participated in such meetings.⁴⁹ In the Central-South area, there are 8,566 reporters covering six provinces.⁵⁰

On the surface, at least, it would appear that the elaborate system of reporters and propagandists is well calculated to promote the close and mutually beneficial connection between the Party and the people which Communist leaders profess to desire. In the first place, propagandists are constantly at work with the masses of people. They are supposed to carry on propaganda, not at any special period of time but at all times and in all places. Much of their work is done simply by engaging in conversation with people in their own surroundings. The weaving of this fine-meshed propaganda web means an important step forward in the field of propaganda, from the standpoint of the Party. Before the installation of propagandists, only members of the Party's propaganda departments were engaged in this work; and unless they forced the people to carry on meetings, demonstrations, and discussions, as they often did, people could still escape contact with propaganda media to a considerable extent.

There is unquestionably a spark of genius in the Party's use of "reporters" and "propagandists." It recognizes that since most of the propagandists are ordinary Party members, whose words might not be accepted as authoritative by the people, their work must be reinforced by Party leaders who are more likely to command the respect of the common people. This function is served by reporters. On the other hand, since the propagandists work among the people day in and day out, they are expected to create a climate among the masses which will make it easier for the reporters to consummate the conquest of people's minds. Furthermore, since both reporters and propagandists are under the supervision of the Party's committees at various levels, the Department of Propaganda of the Central Committee is, on paper at least, in a good position to control and direct all propaganda activities.

A word on the principles and procedures generally followed by the Party in this field may be useful here. The first principle is that in setting up a propaganda network in any area, all members of the Party's committee in the area, especially the Party secretary, must be thoroughly indoctrinated about the significance of the project before they are presented with definite plans and instructions for carrying out the program. It is a theme frequently repeated in the Communist press and the propagandists' handbooks that propaganda networks can be established successfully only in those areas where the members of the Party's local committee are convinced of the urgency and importance of the system. This is an important point because all responsible leaders of the Party's committees are authorized to appoint propagandists as well as reporters. It has been admitted by the Party that in many areas its leaders assume an indifferent attitude and simply pick up enough propagandists to fill the quota set by their superiors. In other areas, the Party leaders simply pass the job on to unions, mass education centers, youth corps, or even entertainment places. This is a situation which the Party cannot afford to allow because it aims at a centralized control of all propaganda activities, to be conducted on a permanent basis.

A second principle followed in setting up propaganda networks is that they should be closely connected with production and the political movements of the people. There are two main reasons why propaganda work should be closely associated with production. In the first place, the Party wants to follow the policy that "we do what we propagate" and thus make propaganda more timely and stimulating. Secondly, from the viewpoint of propaganda, it is among producers that the Party can best find "activists" who can be trained as propagandists.

⁴⁹*Ibid.*, February 16, 1951.

⁵⁰*Ibid.*, September 21, 1951.

According to the Party, "activists" discovered through mass movements often turn out to be effective propagandists after they receive adequate training and enough indoctrination. There is an additional advantage in having "activists" serving as propagandists. The "activists" who are themselves workers know the people in their own labor groups and are most familiar with the sentiment and conditions of their audiences. They can also talk the people's language and therefore are accepted more readily than if they were outsiders. This also explains why Party branches are given the authority of direct supervision over all propagandists. Mainly, of course, it is because these branches are the basic units of the Party and are most closely in contact with the people. Furthermore, members of the Party branches are in most cases workers in factories, on farms, or in other local organizations. It is therefore comparatively easy for these Party members to discover "activists" and supervise their activities.

Although the establishment of propaganda networks is considered a highly urgent task, and perhaps for this very reason, the Party is careful not to carry out this program on a hurried and unprepared basis. It realizes that this is a comparatively new task for all Party members and recommends that all Party organizations work on a steady, though slow, basis. To use Communist terminology, the building of networks should proceed "from point to area and then unite points with areas." In other words, each Party organ should first select a few places for experiment. Only when the Party organs are sure of their accomplishments and have been improved greatly by their experiences can they develop the project further. In actual practice, the departments of propaganda of the Party's large bureaus often use professional propagandists who begin their work in a few factories or farms and develop a system and technique from actual experience. Then they draw up a plan which is turned over to Party organs of lower levels for actual execution. This plan is again carried out on an experimental basis, subject to revision and changes. It is the policy of the Party that the system of propaganda networks must be "developed on the basis of consolidation and consolidated in the process of development."

In the January 1, 1952 issue of Peking's *Jen Min Jih Pao* there appears an article entitled "The Condition of the Party's Propaganda Networks after One Year of Development and Objectives of Further Consolidation and Development in the Future." This 2,000-word article, which is probably the most recent official statement on the networks, reviews the accomplishments and failures of this gigantic project since it was inaugurated in January 1950,* and reveals also the strength of the huge army of propagandists and reporters in Communist China today.

According to this article, there were already in December 1950** more than 1,920,000 propagandists in the country. The estimated figures for the number of propagandists in each of the six regional administrative areas are approximately as follows:

North China	606,000
Northeast	300,000
East China	650,000
Central-South	236,000
Southwest	85,000
Northwest	30,000

To judge by provinces, Hopei and Shantung have the largest number of propagandists. Each has more than 330,000. In two provinces, Hopei and Chahar, the number of propagandists is more than 1 per cent of the total population in each province. In Shantung and Shansi the number is also close to 1 per cent.

It is also revealed in the above-mentioned article that there are now more than 50,000 "reporters" in the country, and that the majority of them are able to report to the masses at specified times. In the Northeast alone, more than 30,000,000 people have listened to such reports. In East China, reporters have spoken to more than 19,790,000 people.

In the judgment of the Party, the majority of the reporters and propagandists can produce good effects on the people. Hopei and Shanghai are especially cited in the article for the comparatively

*Unless this refers to the Northeast area alone, it is a typographical error for 1951. See p. 27—Project officer.

**Judging by the figures on p. 27, this should be 1951.—Project Officer.

large number of "effective propagandists." In Hopei, for instance, 67 per cent of the propagandists "can constantly produce effects among the people," 27 per cent "can produce effects but not constantly," and 6 per cent "cannot produce any effect." In Shanghai, 52 per cent "constantly produce effects," 42 per cent "produce some effects," and 6 per cent have produced no effect at all.

How much truth there is in such statistical information cannot be easily ascertained here. Since these statistics are all official figures, one can only accept them and at the same time assume that they may be exaggerative.*

There is little doubt, however, that the Party is well satisfied with this system of propaganda networks and that it is planning for further consolidation and development. It is the plan of the Party to increase the number of propagandists to 4,000,000 or 5,000,000 by the end of 1952. This figure is revealed in an editorial in *Jen Min Jih Pao* which states in part:

In addition to consolidating the present system of propaganda networks, we should aim in the future at further developing our army of propagandists... Firstly, our national development of propaganda networks is still not sufficiently extensive. In many areas today no propagandist is yet installed; in other areas where propagandists exist, the development is far from being sufficient. Secondly, to judge by the scope of the Party's propaganda work and the task to be taken care of in the future, the number of our existing propagandists is comparatively small and far from satisfying our demand. China is a big country of more than 500,000,000 population and the set-up of the Party's propaganda machinery must necessarily be an unusually enormous one. In order to have our propaganda work constantly penetrated to the broad masses, we must have an army of organized propagandists, much larger than the size we have today. Therefore, we cannot be satisfied with the present force of our propagandists but must continuously do our utmost to further recruit and organize propagandists. We have now more than 5,800,000 members of the Party and 5,500,000 members of the New Democratic Youth Corps. In addition, we have a large number of revolutionary activists among the masses. Thus it is completely possible to systematically develop our army of propagandists. By the end of 1952 we should work for the completion of the installing of propagandists in all Party branches.... Our goal is to have 4,000,000 to 5,000,000 propagandists who will form the foundation on which further consolidated development is to be made.⁵¹

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, editorial, December 19, 1951.

* It should be observed that, in spite of this assumption, and of the first of the two principles stated a little above, the author, in his SUMMARY, asserts that the propaganda networks "extend to almost every individual in China and affect the words and thoughts of them all." And these networks, it should be noted, are the devices calculated to overcome the Chinese handicaps of illiteracy and of too great poverty to buy even picture booklets.—Project Officer.

THE PRESS ADMINISTRATION

The Press Administration of the Central People's Government is perhaps one of the most important agencies placed under the Committee of Cultural and Educational Affairs because it has under its control and supervision all the newspapers and broadcasting stations in China and, above all, the *Hsin Hua News Agency* (or *New China News Agency*), which is the major pipeline of information for all the Chinese press. The Administration is also in charge of foreign propaganda, which is directed toward the shaping of public opinion abroad.

Formally established in February 1950, the Press Administration has the following main responsibilities:

- (1) to supervise the newspapers;
- (2) to direct the editorial policy of the press in tune with the Party line;
- (3) to manage the *New China News Agency* and its branches throughout China and abroad;
- (4) to manage broadcasting stations in the country;
- (5) to direct propaganda to foreign countries;
- (6) to supply the press with news photos, graphic and other reference materials; and
- (7) to train journalists.

1. *Supervision of Newspapers in China*

According to an official report released by the research department of the Press Administration, all newspapers in China submit a monthly report to the Administration.⁵² Most of these reports deal with accomplishments and problems in carrying out decisions or directives of the Administration. It is therefore reasonable to assume that the Administration not only gives orders to the newspapers but also takes measures to insure that the newspapers meet the requirements prescribed by the government.

It is the Press Administration which decides what kind of stories should be "played up" or "played down" and in what way. However, its instructions are not limited to the direction of editorial policies alone. The Administration even makes suggestions regarding the organizational structures of newspapers.

In 1950 the Administration convened a National Press Meeting from March 29 to April 16 to discuss the press situation and other important problems. After the meeting, the Administration issued a number of directions or decisions with regard to newspapers, news agencies, broadcasting stations, and many other aspects of the press. The following four-point directive was sent to all newspapers:⁵³

- (1) Newspapers should devote more space and give prominence to reports on the progress of the people's labor and production, publicizing the experiences of success as well as the lessons of error derived from the work of production and financial and economic tasks, and discussing methods of overcoming difficulties in such tasks.

⁵²*Hsin Hua Yüeh Pao (New China Monthly)*, Vol. II, No. 4; August 1950, p. 901.

⁵³*Ta Kung Pao* (daily newspaper in Shanghai), April 24, 1950.

(2) Newspapers should reorganize their functional structure in such a way that direction and management would be centralized in the hands of the editors.

(3) Newspapers should consider the establishment and direction of "correspondent networks" and "newspaper-reading groups" as their major political tasks.

(4) Newspapers should assume responsibility for criticism of the weaknesses or mistakes of the governmental agencies, economic organizations, and government personnel; but such criticisms should be truthful and constructive. They should also pay the greatest attention to the handling of letters to the editor.

It is significant that in the issuance of such decisions, which are now reported to be faithfully followed by all newspapers at all levels, the Press Administration directs the Chinese press exactly after the Soviet pattern. The Chinese newspapers, in the hands of the Administration, are to perform the threefold role which is prescribed by Lenin as "a collective propagandist, a collective agitator, and a collective organizer."⁵⁴

Agitation for production is, at present, one of the most important characteristics of the Chinese Communist newspapers. Actually, this is a practice which the Chinese Communists have learned from the Soviet Union.

In the earliest days of the Soviet regime, Lenin declared that it was a fundamental necessity 'to transform the press from an organ which primarily reports the political news of the day into a serious organ for the economic education of the mass of the population.' ... Lenin offered the Soviet newspapers the slogan of 'less politics and more economics,' and he made it clear that when he spoke of economics he did not mean theoretical arguments, learned reviews, and high-brow plans, which he labeled 'twaddle.' Instead, he demanded that more attention be paid to the workaday aspects of factory, village, and military life. The principal task of the press in the period of transition from capitalism to communism, Lenin asserted, was to train the masses for the tasks of building the new society, and this meant that the newspapers must give first place to labor problems and to their immediate practical resolution.⁵⁵

A quick glance at the Communist newspapers in China reveals that news stories and feature articles about the production activities and economic life of the workers in field and farm practically flood the columns. To follow Lenin's formula of propaganda and agitation, the Press Administration is using the newspapers to explain and justify to the men and women in field and factory the economic policies of the Party and government, to glorify the economic achievements of the country, and to exhort the population to ever greater effort. This feature of the Chinese press is especially noticeable in the provincial and local newspapers in which news, as it is understood in the Western world, is kept to a minimum.

In an article entitled "The Press in New China," Liu Tseng-chi explains that the emphasis on production activities serves as a "link with the masses." Liu is vice-director of the China Information Bureau, which is an important section under the Press Administration, handling foreign propaganda. Liu writes:

Following the liberation of many urban centres during 1949, the people's press faced an entirely new situation. In the past, in the old Liberated Areas, the bulk of newspaper readers had been the revolutionary cadres working in the countryside. During those years, production was relatively low and communication and transportation facilities were restricted, for the background was war, often guerilla warfare. Never-

⁵⁴The basic slogan provided by Lenin and quoted unflinchingly in almost all Communist discussions of the press, states: "A newspaper is not only a collective propagandist and collective agitator; it is also a collective organizer." (Lenin, *Collected Works*, IV (1), p. 114.) For a detailed discussion of the Soviet press, see Alex Inkeles, *op. cit.*, pp. 135-222.

⁵⁵Alex Inkeles, *op. cit.*, pp. 161-2.

theless, in spite of these obstacles, by utilizing the then existing conditions to the best advantage, the newspapers achieved some success in establishing direct contact with the masses.

The press has replaced tedious reports on meetings, trifling items about personal activities and academic discussions which have no bearing on actual conditions, with a new type of news. Now, there are stories on new records set by workers in factories, on how railways and bridges demolished by the KMT have been rebuilt ahead of schedule, on the new measures taken by peasants to exterminate pests in the cotton fields, on how the peasants have carried out a dramatic water conservancy plan to control the Yi River, how illiteracy has been wiped out in a village after land reform, what methods the mother of a PLA (People's Liberation Army) fighter used to collect 3,000 signatures for the Stockholm Peace Appeal within a single week....

Once publicized in the newspapers, an achievement in any branch of production serves to educate all those working in the same field in similar enterprises. Rationalization proposals for production and the experiences of model workers when written up as newspaper stories, serve as subjects for national study. For instance, the press gave wide publicity to the achievement of the now famous machine worker Chao Kuo-ya, as he worked to improve machine-making methods. When he first reduced the time for making a cone pulley from 16 hours--till then the usual time in the best machine-making factories in China--to 2 hours 20 minutes, a countrywide emulation movement was set off, with the press playing an important part in stimulating and developing the movement. And as he further reduced the time for his operation, the whole country was kept informed step by step.⁵⁶

The second decision of the Administration--to put the editor of each newspaper in a position of central control--also follows an important practice in the Soviet Union, where the Party controls the appointment and confirmation of all editors of almost all newspapers. The editors of all Party and government newspapers are, of course, appointed by the Party and the Press Administration. (Such newspapers are also the biggest and most influential ones in the various areas.) It is obvious that this practice greatly facilitates the control of the Party and government over the newspapers. By planting reliable persons as editors, the Party and government can resolve what would otherwise be a most difficult if not insuperable problem of censorship. It is the editor who reads the proofs of articles before they appear in the newspaper to verify their ideological content and to make such changes as are necessary to bring them into conformity with the resolutions and directives of the Party and the government. In so doing, the Communist regime also declares that it enjoys the real kind of freedom of press which is legally guaranteed.⁵⁷

In order to guarantee the political reliability of Communist editors and to systematize the training and retraining of journalists, the Press Administration operates the Peking Journalism School and directs several other professional journalism schools or academies which are maintained in other cities by provincial or local authorities. It also cooperates with the Party's Department of Propaganda in training editors either on the job or in special short courses. In several places, the Party's Department of Propaganda rather than the Press Administration takes charge of the training program of journalists. For instance, the Department of Propaganda of the

⁵⁶ Liu Tseng-chi, "The Press in New China," in *Culture and Education in New China*, (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, undated), pp. 37-48.

⁵⁷ In an article on Red China's press controls in the well-known *American Journalism Quarterly*, (Vol. 28, No. 1) Winter, 1951 (pp. 74-80), by Milton Shieh, publisher-editor of the *Hsin Sheng Pao* (a daily newspaper in Taipei, Formosa), it is stated that the Communist Press Administration has also a Bureau of Censorship. It is hardly possible that a censorship organization actually exists under the very name, although it is a well-known fact that censorship is strictly enforced in the Communist state. The *People's Yearbook*, published by the pro-Communist *Ta Kung Publishing Co.* in Hong Kong, in a section on governmental organizations, does not list a bureau of censorship under the Press Administration. In fact, editors of newspapers also act as censors.

Tungpei (Northeast) Bureau of the Party started the first class of its Journalists' Training Academy in April 1951 by summoning the first-class press cadres (mostly members of editorial committees of newspapers) for three months' training.⁵⁸ In many places the Press Administration and the Department of Propaganda at provincial and local levels work hand in hand in the training of journalistic personnel.

The establishment of "correspondent networks," an important political task required of all newspapers by the Press Administration, is similar to the Soviet *Rabsei 'kor* or the Worker and Peasant Correspondent Movement. Another task required of all newspapers is the development of "newspaper-reading groups." Both measures of the Administration are in keeping with Lenin's dictum that newspapers should secure close ties with their mass public. These two movements are still in their initial stages but there are indications that they will soon be fully developed. In an official report released by the Press Administration it is stated: "... since our organization of correspondents is yet to be developed, the number of correspondents of newspapers in the future shall not be a few hundred or a few thousand but shall be thousands and thousands."⁵⁹ The *Ho Pei Jih Pao* (*Hopei Daily*), for instance, has more than 1,600 correspondents; the *Su Pei Jih Pao* (*North Kiangsu Daily*), more than 1,200; and the *Fu Kien Jih Pao* (*Fukien Daily*) in Foochow, more than 5,000 regular correspondents. Workers' newspapers have even a larger number of correspondents. The *Lao Tung Pao* (*Labor Daily*) has more than 7,000 correspondents spread through shops and factories of various sizes.⁶⁰

Strictly speaking, a "correspondent" is any man or woman in factory or field who writes to newspapers about his work, his economic life, his experiences in the political study movement, and his impressions. Writing ability and educational standards are matters of secondary importance to newspapers. The *Tungpei Jih Pao*, the Party's most authoritative mouthpiece in Northeast China, reports that 73 persons recently joined the paper as "correspondents." In terms of educational standards, 4 of them are of college level, 4 of senior high school level, 27 of junior high school level, and 38 of elementary or grade school standard. In terms of their occupations, there are 41 factory workers, 5 technicians, 1 apprentice, 9 union cadres, 14 Party committee members, and 3 office workers.⁶¹

It should be noted that the effort of the Party and government to establish "correspondent networks" through newspapers is not an attempt to make the papers more informative or to add more local color by asking their farmer and worker readers to contribute stories and articles. Nor is it because there is any demand from the people for more information about men and women in farms and factories. The newspaper correspondent movement is but another technique of the Communist propaganda to secure a closer tie with the masses of people. This is evidenced in an official report of the Press Administration in which the following statement from *Nung Ming Pao* (the *Farmer's Daily*) in Shensi is quoted:

It has been verified by our experiences that only by depending upon correct propaganda policies can our task of uniting closely with the masses be lively, and that only by tying together the actual life and work of the masses with propaganda can our policies be convincing and effective. We have come to understand that peasants have the following habit in comprehension and understanding: they will not accept a theory or principle if it is not coupled with 'facts'; but they cannot see through the facts if no 'reason' or 'theory' is given and therefore cannot raise their level of consciousness. To make newspaper articles appealing and convincing and to strengthen the effect of newspaper propaganda, there must be actual examples together with convincing

⁵⁸ *Jen Min Jih Pao* (Peking), August 11, 1951.

⁵⁹ *Hsin Hua Yüeh Pao*, Vol. II, No. 4, August 1950, p. 901.

⁶⁰ Liu Tseng-chi, *op. cit.*, p. 43.

⁶¹ *Hsin Hua Yüeh Pao*, *op. cit.*, p. 902.

arguments. Therefore, we will not merely deal with vague reasons or arguments or simply present isolated facts that are not well organized.⁶²

This movement is also regarded as a means of training journalists for the Communist press. Above all, the worker and peasant correspondents are supposed to serve as the eyes and ears of the press in every area of the nation's life. It is also this latter aspect of their work which integrates the correspondents with the institution of self-criticism which is another important task imposed upon newspapers by the Party and government.

Parallel to the movement of establishing "correspondent networks" is the system of "newspaper-reading groups," which the Press Administration assigns as one of the "major political tasks" of all newspapers in the country. In these groups, the news is read aloud and discussed. Today, in factories and in villages, this reading of newspapers has become a major "cultural" and "educational" activity. It is also one of the most popular forms of propaganda used by the "propagandists."

According to the reports of propagandists published in the propaganda handbooks or newspapers, there are three major reasons why newspaper reading is considered an effective method of propaganda. Firstly, most if not all of the peasants and factory workers are illiterates and cannot read newspapers themselves. Secondly, by reading newspapers to the masses at regular periods, the cadres and propagandists themselves are informed of current affairs and important decisions of the Party and government. Thirdly, newspapers supply the propagandists with up-to-date information for their oral agitation, because with the information in newspapers as a basis, the people and propagandists can have something substantial to discuss.

In reading newspapers to people, cadres and propagandists generally select the items that are either of interest to the listeners or of great importance, such as major policies of the government. For instance, workers in a shoe-making factory are probably interested in knowing how workers in another shoe-making factory increase their production by some new methods.

The intensive practice of self-criticism by the Chinese Communists is obviously another technique which they have learned from their Soviet "big brothers." In the Soviet Union this is known as *samokritika*, which is translated as self- or auto-criticism. In Communist China this public criticism has been formalized and elaborated into a major social institution, and a detailed discussion of it would have to be several times the length of the present study. It should suffice to point out here that the assignment of responsibility for self-criticism to the press is a very significant fact. In 1950, the Central Committee of the Party even issued a special directive specifying principles and methods of developing self-criticism in the press. The press is thus expected to serve as an important force in social control, to expose inadequacies or mistakes on the part of the Party and government and of persons who are lax in their duties and responsibilities. Since the practice of self-criticism is supposed to work from top to bottom and from bottom to top, it is but natural that the press ideally fits the role as a transmission belt between the Party and government on the one hand and the masses of the people on the other.

In carrying out self-criticism in the press, editors of newspapers work very closely with government officials who are charged with press affairs. These officials are supposed "to help newspapers and publications to distinguish constructive from malicious or destructive criticisms."⁶³ These officials usually belong to the Party and government agencies at provincial and local levels; nevertheless, they are also under the supervision and guidance of the Press Administration. Therefore, the control of newspapers by the Press Administration is complete, from its central body in Peking to the lowest levels.

⁶² *Loc. cit.*

⁶³ "Directive from the Shanghai People's Municipal Government on Development of Self-Criticism in Newspapers," *Ta Kung Pao* (Shanghai), May 16, 1950.

2. Management of New China News Agency

In the hands of the Press Administration, this state-owned news agency is a powerful weapon for shaping public opinion in Communist China. With the possible exception of a few items of local news gathered by the reporting staff of individual newspapers, almost all news stories and articles appearing in the Communist press today come from the New China News Agency.

Before its reorganization in 1950, this agency had its head office, 12 branches, 57 sub-branches, and 8 branches abroad, which were directly controlled by the head office. Most of the branches and sub-branches had many local responsibilities other than news releases. Furthermore, all branches and sub-branches had autonomy in their editorial policies. Realizing that this was a situation made possible by the war and other difficult conditions, the Press Administration in 1950 reorganized the agency and ruled that all branches and sub-branches should be placed under the centralized control of the head office at Peking and that they were not to make any local release to newspapers.⁶⁴ This means that the branches and sub-branches only gather information and report it to the Peking office, which screens and edits all the news stories and then sends them to the branches and sub-branches again for publication.

Today, there are only six branches of the news agency existing in the six main administrative areas: Northeast China, North China, East China, Central China, Southwest China, and Northwest China. All branches formerly belonging to different armies are now responsible to the civilian branches in their respective areas. The only exceptional case is the branch belonging to the Third Field Force of the People's Liberation Army which still remains in the status of a branch. Under these branches, there are now 46 sub-branches throughout the nation. There are also three overseas branches.

Reorganization of the New China News Agency is an important step taken by the Press Administration to create a "Tass-like" agency in China. With the branches and sub-branches serving only as reporters whose stories must go through the Peking office, the Press Administration is assured of the kind of information which will appear in all Chinese newspapers. This arrangement also eliminates any mistake or deviation on the part of branch offices. It is true, of course, that this practice involves delay, and makes it difficult for newspapers to exploit news stories which have a fixed time value. However, in the Communist concept of news, timeliness is a matter of little importance. The Party wants newspapers to get only "correct" information as it sees fit. For instance, speeches made by Mao Tse-tung in 1927 and the early 'thirties still occupy the front pages of many newspapers in China.

Nevertheless, the New China News Agency is not without its difficulties in the field of control and management. In a letter to all branches and sub-branches, the Peking office admits that the news stories and articles it receives from the branches are not all useful for nationwide publication. Only one-third of the materials can be used for national release and the other two-thirds are good only for reference. The letter charges that people in the branches and sub-branches do not quite understand that "the main function and duty of the New China News Agency is to engage in propaganda to the whole nation,"⁶⁵ and that they consequently fail to write their stories in such a way that they can be effectively used by all newspapers in the country. The letter explicitly states that local news agencies are required only to investigate and study the life, work, and conditions of the people in their own territory and to make such information available as propaganda materials for all papers throughout the nation. Local propaganda and agitation, according to the letter, are the responsibility of local newspapers.

⁶⁴*Ta Kung Pao* (Shanghai), April 24, 1950, p. 2.

⁶⁵New China News Agency, "Two Main Problems in News Agencies," (a letter to all branches and sub-branches), *Hsin Hua Yüeh Pao*, Vol. II, No. 4, August 1950, p. 965.

3. Supervision of Broadcasting Stations

Under the Press Administration, the broadcasting system is assuming an increasingly important role in the life of the Chinese people. It is considered by the government as a powerful propaganda weapon because it minimizes the handicaps of illiteracy, poor communications, and insufficient press activities.

At the present time the Press Administration controls, through its Broadcasting Bureau, 58 stations and more than 108 long-wave, medium-wave, and short-wave transmitters. The combined power employed in these stations, according to an official report, is more than 200 times as great as that used in 1947. The number of staff members steadily increased from 1947 to 1950 until in the latter year it exceeded 4,000. These 58 state-owned stations are scattered all over the country: 1 with the Central People's Government at Peking, 10 in North China, 15 in the Northeast, 15 in East China, 7 in Central-South China, 5 in the Southwest and 5 in the Northwest.⁶⁶

In addition to these state-owned stations, there are now 32 privately-run stations, of which 22 are in Shanghai and the remainder in other big cities. It should be noted, however, that the state-owned stations are far superior to the privately-run stations, so far as transmitting power is concerned.

The Central People's Broadcasting Station, in its national programs, gives great importance to national news and information bulletins, social education, and cultural and recreational activities. It operates Radio Peking, which offers daily foreign language programs of news and commentary. Since April 10, 1950, Radio Peking has offered programs in Korean, Japanese, Indonesian, Viet-Nameese, English, Siamese and Burmese, as well as such Chinese dialects as Amoy, Ke Chia, Cantonese, and Chao Chou, and the Mongolian and Tibetan languages.⁶⁷ (See Appendix I.)

The other publicly-run stations are operated by governments of administrative areas, provinces, or major municipalities. Municipal stations place particular stress upon social educational programs.

In an effort to build up close relations between the stations and the public, the Press Administration instructs all stations to recruit "activists," individually and in groups, to give speeches, accounts of experiences, or amateur performances. The Shanghai People's Broadcasting Station, for instance, has, in a half-year's time, organized 1,100 persons as its correspondents and invited more than 15,000 persons to take part in its programs.⁶⁸

At the present time one of the most important tasks of the Press Administration's Bureau of Broadcasting is to establish a radio-receiving network throughout the whole nation. This project was started in April 1950, when the Press Administration issued the "Decisions Regarding the Establishment of Radio-Receiving Networks." Already thousands of radio monitors have been trained and more are being trained by both Party and government organizations. The main duty of these monitors is to mobilize listeners in factories, villages, schools, institutions, or even streets. It is their job to pick up the daily news, comments, and central and local government directives and distribute them to the local institutions or groups in the form of small-size newspapers, mimeographed sheets, blackboard newspapers, wall newspapers, or group meetings in which the monitors make their reports. This movement is now in full swing. Take the receiving network in the Southwest, for instance. This is an area where communications and press facilities are poor and the rate of illiteracy is comparatively high. According to an official release, in the five provinces in this area, there are 259 receiving stations (not including the stations in Chengtu and Kweiyang, two big cities in the area). Many of these stations have very adequate facilities for the transmission of messages. In the district of North-Szechuan alone, there are 40

⁶⁶ Mei T'so, "The Chinese People's Broadcasting System," in *Culture and Education in New China*, (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, undated), pp. 49-53.

⁶⁷ *Loc. cit.*

⁶⁸ *Loc. cit.*

such stations, of which 12 publish mimeographed newspapers and 23 operate blackboard newspapers. It is estimated that there is in this area a daily audience of more than 1,200,000 persons, who are mobilized by these monitors.⁶⁹

On September 12, 1951, the "Decisions Regarding the Establishment of Radio Broadcasting and Receiving Networks"⁷⁰ in all Factories, Mines and Enterprises in the Country," were promulgated by the Press Administration and the All-China Federation of Labor. The decisions were published in the September 13, 1951 issue of the Peking *Jen Min Jih Pao*. The major points are as follows:

(1) In all publicly-run factories, mines, and enterprises where there are 300 or more workers or staff members and where no wired speakers have been set up, the labor unions in the unit should cooperate with related administrative units to plan for the setting up of such a system. In those units where radio equipment is available (such as loud-speakers, radio, etc.), effort should be made for further development to make the full use of the service.

(2) In the dormitories in all factories, mines, and enterprises, the administrative staff members, union officers, and representatives of workers' families should work together to organize radio-receiving groups so that all workers and their families can constantly receive political and cultural education. If conditions permit, wired speakers must be provided.

(3) In those organizations where wired speakers are available, the main tasks are as follows: to organize various kinds of programs in harmony with the production, learning, and cultural-recreational activities of the organization; to complete the especially assigned tasks of the higher administrative authorities; and to relay programs concerning working people from the People's Broadcasting Station.

(4) All radio-receiving set-ups in factories, mines, and enterprises must make periodic reports on their present situations (such as the organizational structure of wired broadcasts and radio-receiving stations, responsible personnel, equipment, size of audience, etc.), and plans to the All-China Federation of Labor, Radio Broadcasting Bureau of the Press Administration, and the local People's Broadcasting Station.

(5) All labor unions in factories, mines, and enterprises must consider radio-receiving and broadcasting as the major task of the departments handling cultural and educational affairs. They should constantly direct such activities and make full use of broadcasts to push forward the programs of production, to organize current affairs study groups, and to develop all political, educational, and cultural activities.

(6) All local People's Broadcasting Stations should pay heed to the broadcasting works of the working masses and offer assistance or suggestions whenever possible. They should also listen to the suggestions of the working people and improve their programs to meet the interests and demands of the working people.

4. Important Personnel in the Press Administration

The importance of the Press Administration as a propaganda-controlling agency is evidenced by the fact that it is headed by a very influential Communist. Director Hu Chiao-mo is a member of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and also deputy director of the Party's

⁶⁹ *Jen Min Jih Pao* (Peking), September 12, 1951.

⁷⁰ The Communist system of broadcasting and reception in factories, mines, villages, and enterprises is not a system of aerial broadcasting, but a system of wired loudspeakers or a system of wired diffusion of radio programs. Listeners of this system hear their programs over loudspeakers, which are similar to those of a public-address system. The loudspeakers are located in dormitories, communal dwellings, and in public places such as newspaper-reading rooms, recreation halls, and so forth. The monitor can connect this electronic system with a radio receiver, broadcasting either local or national programs. At any time, he may interrupt either type of broadcasting-relay to make direct statements, in the form of announcements or recreational and "educational" material designed especially for his audience. This system consists primarily of a transformer, a loudspeaker, a switch, and a volume control. In a way, this system is a make-shift of the popular system of "radio diffusion exchange" in the Soviet Union. For a full discussion on the Soviet system of "radio-diffusion exchange," see Alex Inkeles, *Public Opinion in Soviet Russia*, pp. 225-86.

Department of Propaganda. He is concurrently secretary-general of the Committee of Culture and Education of the People's Government. He is the former director of the New China News Agency and also director of the Peking *Jen Min Jih Pao* (*People's Daily*), which is regarded as the *Pravda* of China. Besides holding all these important positions, Hu is also influential in many of the so-called "mass organizations," through which the weight of the Party is felt upon the broad masses of the Chinese people. For instance, he is chairman of the All-China Federation of Journalists, a member of the Executive Committee of the China New Democratic Youth Corps, a member of the National Committee of the All-China Federation of Democratic Youth, a member of the Executive Council of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association, and a member of the National Committee of the Resist-America Aid-Korea Association.

A graduate of the Tsing Hua University, Hu was very active in literary circles when he was a young writer. His early contribution to the Party was mainly in the ideological training of youth. He was at one time dean of studies in the Mao Tse-tung Young Cadres School and also editor of the *China Youth*, now the official organ of the New Democratic Youth Corps. He also served for some time as Mao Tse-tung's political secretary, and it is said that he still writes the most important editorials for the New China News Agency.

Hu is assisted by another well-known Communist journalist, Fan Chang-chiang, who is the vice-director of the Press Administration. Fan was formerly director of the Shanghai *Chieh Fang Jih Pao* (*Liberation Daily* or *Emancipation Daily*), which is perhaps the most important Party paper besides the *Jen Min Jih Pao*. He is also dean of the Peking Journalism School of the Administration. Like Hu Chiao-mo, Fan holds important positions in many of the mass organizations. A native of Szechuan, he studied in the National Peking University and became a journalist in his college days. He later joined the staff of the *Ta Kung Pao*, the most influential Chinese newspaper before the Communists took over the mainland, and became known by his reports on his trip to the border region in Northwest China.

The present director of the New China News Agency, Chen Ko-han, is a former deputy director of the Party's Department of Propaganda. He was assistant director and chief editor of the agency before he was offered the directorship.

The responsibility for foreign propaganda is in the hands of Chiao Kuan-hua, who served as adviser to the Chinese Communist delegation to the United Nations at Lake Success late in 1950. He directs the China Information Service, which handles propaganda for consumption abroad. He is also editor of *People's China*, the most authoritative English-language magazine published in Peking. Born in Kiangsu and graduated from the Tsing Hua University, Chiao studied for some years in Germany. He returned to China after the Sino-Japanese War broke out in 1937 and joined the *Hsin Hua Jih Pao* (*New China Daily*), the official organ of the Chinese Communist Party then published in Chungking, the wartime capital of the Nationalist Government. Later he went to Hong Kong to direct the branch of the New China News Agency there and engaged in international propaganda work.

Chiao's deputy in the Press Administration is a man who is familiar with the United States. He is Liu Tseng-ch'i, who was chief of the translation department of the China Division of the U.S. Office of War Information in Chungking during World War II. He visited America shortly after the war ended.

It can be readily seen that there is a very close relationship between the Party's Department of Propaganda and the Press Administration of the government, and most of these important Administration officials are not only politically reliable but also professionally capable, since they are almost all well-known journalists of long standing.

5. Major Newspapers in Communist China

A discussion of the press control in Communist China would indeed be incomplete without reference to the major newspapers in the country. At present the most important newspapers in Communist China are the Party newspapers, which are under the control of the Commission on

Party Press of the Party's Central Committee. There are also mouthpieces of such special organs as the labor unions, New Democratic Youth Corps, and other so-called mass organizations.

The Party newspapers deserve special attention here because they form the major channels through which the Party transmits its daily messages to the people. These papers, to borrow a Communist expression, "contribute to widening the ideological, political, cultural and educational horizon of the masses." They provide the masses with not only the "correct" interpretation of Marxism-Leninism and Mao's thought but also "facilitate their study of current affairs, politics and economics, their problems of today and their hopes of tomorrow."

First on the list of the important Party newspapers is the Peking *Jen Min Jih Pao*, which is the official organ of the Party's Central Committee. This four-page daily (sometimes six or eight pages) is especially important for its editorials, which speak on behalf of the Party on major issues. Whenever the Party or government initiates a movement or campaign, the *Jen Min Jih Pao* is generally the first paper to elucidate the significance of the issue from the Marxist-Leninist viewpoint and to map out plans to push forward the movement. It is also this paper which constantly keeps alert on the development of the movement and points out its accomplishments and weaknesses. Editorials in this paper are frequently reprinted in other papers in the country. Another important column in this paper is the "Life in the Party," which deals with the important issues taken up by the Party and comments on members of the Party. Whenever a call to action is made in this paper, it is immediately echoed by papers all over the country. The authority of this paper is evidenced by the fact that it is supposed to be read by members of all Party organs in different areas and officials in the government. The Department of Propaganda of the Party's East China Bureau even issued an official directive to all propaganda departments in the area that the *Jen Min Jih Pao* should be circulated and read in all Party organs and government administrations in East China.⁷¹

Next on the list of important Party newspapers are the ones put out by the bureaus and sub-bureaus of the Party's Central Committee in special administrative districts. Managed by the Party's Department of Propaganda in the same area, these papers, in turn, serve as "examples" for other Party newspapers published by lower Party organs. The important ones are: *Chieh Fang Jih Pao* (*Liberation Daily*, Shanghai); *Ch'ang Chiang Jih Pao* (*Yangtze Daily*, Hankow); *Nan Fang Jih Pao* (*Southern Daily*, Canton); *Tung Pei Jih Pao* (*Northeast Daily*, Mukden); *Ch'ün Chung Jih Pao* (*Daily of the Masses*, Sian); *Lu Ta Jen Min Jih Pao* (*People's Daily*, Port Arthur and Dairen); *Fukien Jih Pao* (*Fukien Daily*, Foochow); and *Tientsin Jih Pao* (*Tientsin Daily*, Tientsin).

In addition to these important Party dailies, there are other dailies for special groups of people. For instance, the New Democratic Youth Corps has its own official organs in various areas. There are: *Ch'ing Nien Pao* (*Youth's Newspaper*) in both Peking and Shanghai, and the *Hsin Ch'ing Nien Pao* (*New Youth's Paper*, Shanghai). It is also said that the *Wen Hui Pao* of Shanghai is another daily published by youth organizations. For the laboring class, there are such papers as *Kung Jen Jih Pao* (*Worker's Daily*, Peking); *Kung Jen Pao* (*Worker's Newspaper*, Mukden); *Lao Tung Pao* (*Labor Daily*, Shanghai); and many other newspapers under the name of "worker" or "labor" in big cities such as Hankow, Tsinan, Harbin, Anshan, Canton, and Tsingtao.

How much popularity these papers enjoy among the Chinese people is a problem not to be dealt with in this paper. It should suffice to state here that there are evidences indicating the Party's difficulties in gaining a large audience. In an official directive issued by the Party's Department of Propaganda in East China, it is pointed out that the Communists are far behind their 1951 schedule of circulating important Party publications such as the Peking *Jen Min Jih Pao*, the Shanghai *Chieh Fang Jih Pao*, and *For a Lasting Peace For a People's Democracy*, the official organ of the Cominform. It was originally planned by the department that 17,320 copies of the *Jen Min Jih Pao* were to be circulated, which is less than 37 per cent of

⁷¹ *Chieh Fang Jih Pao* (Shanghai), December 28, 1951.

the expected figure. The Cominform journal *For a Lasting Peace For a People's Democracy* is even less popular than the *Jen Min Jih Pao*. The expected figure of circulation of the official organ of the Cominform in 1951 was set at 17,845; but only 2,864 copies were circulated in December 1951. In other words, only 16 per cent of the original plan was achieved. It is also pointed out in the directive that subscription to the *Jen Min Jih Pao* was decreased in 1951 and that newspaper boys were reluctant to sell newspapers published in other cities. The directive quotes one worker in a cotton factory in Shanghai as having said that he "never heard of the *Jen Min Jih Pao*." In many Party organs in *hsien* and *ch'ü* (subdivision of a county), *Jen Min Jih Pao* was sometimes read by clerks, because the responsible cadres said that they had no time to read newspapers. Alarmed by such happenings, the Party's Department of Propaganda in East China considered this as "the tendency of neglecting politics on the part of Party members" and that such an "unhealthy situation must be immediately corrected."⁷²

That the Party newspapers could be very monotonous to the average Chinese readers is apparent, because they employ the technical language of Marxism-Leninism which is not easy for non-Communists to read. Furthermore, government decisions, lectures on Marxism-Leninism, long speeches and stories about model workers and heroes form the major content of a newspaper. It is not unusual for a newspaper to fill its entire front page with a long speech by Mao Tse-tung delivered as early as 1925 or 1931. Probably realizing the indifference of the newspaper readers, the Party during the last few months of 1951 frequently charged that many newspapers "fail to enrich the political content of newspapers." The Party's Department of Propaganda in the Central-South Area even issued a special directive on the "strengthening of propaganda of Marxism-Leninism and Mao's Thought in newspapers."⁷³

There are, of course, some non-Party or non-government papers published in Communist China today. Among them, there are the *Ta Kung Pao* and *Hsin Min Pao*, both in Shanghai. But they follow strictly the "Party line" just as do all Party newspapers.

⁷² *Loc. cit.*

⁷³ *Nan Fang Jih Pao* (Canton), October 7, 1951.

MINISTRY OF CULTURAL AFFAIRS

Early in 1942, when the Chinese Communist Party was still a small minority group at Yen-an, Mao Tse-tung said:

The literature and art of the proletariat are part of the revolutionary program of the proletariat. As Lenin pointed out, they are 'a screw in the machine.' ... Although literature and art are subordinate to politics, they in turn exert a tremendous influence upon politics.... They are like the aforementioned screws. They may be of greater or lesser importance, of primary and secondary value when compared with other parts of the machine; but they are nevertheless indispensable to the machine; they are indispensable parts of the revolutionary movement. If we had no literature and art, even of the most general kind, we should not be able to carry on the revolution or to achieve victory. It would be a mistake not to recognize this fact.⁷⁴

Echoed Lu Ting-yi, the Party's propaganda chief, in 1950: "Literature and art have always occupied an extremely important position in the revolutionary work of the Chinese people. The Chinese people consider art and literature as a major weapon for use in ideological education and struggle."⁷⁵

These two questions emphasizing the important role of literature and art in Communist society serve to explain the importance that the Communists attach to the establishment of a special agency of the government to give "constant direction and correct guidance" to all literary and art activities in the country. Today this agency is the Ministry of Cultural Affairs of the Central People's Government. Headed by Shen Yen-ping, a famous novelist who is better known by his pen-name, Mao Tun, the Ministry has a vast variety of responsibilities including such duties as the preservation of ancient cultural matters and the popularization of science. However, it is chiefly concerned with popular literature and art such as movies, opera, drama, songs, novels, comic literature, and various kinds of literature and art that are in popular form or have popular appeal. The most important bureaus or agencies under the Ministry are: the Bureau of Art, headed by Vice-Minister of Cultural Affairs Chou Yang, a literary critic and loyal Communist of long standing; the Bureau of Cinematographic Art; the Bureau of Drama Reformation; the Bureau of Public Cultural Relations; and several others. The Ministry also has direct control and supervision of the Central Drama College, Central Music Conservatory, and the Central Art College, all headed by prominent figures.

Without a careful investigation one might think that the Ministry of Cultural Affairs is a comparatively unimportant propaganda organ because its activities are not widely publicized and its influences can be detected mostly in the background. To many, it may even seem that the All-China Federation of Writers and Artists has the real leadership in the field of literature and art, because its activities are widespread among the people and many important nationwide literary, art, or even educational movements are under its sponsorship or direction. However,

⁷⁴ Mao Tse-tung, *Problems of Art and Literature*, (New York: International Publishers, 1950), p. 33.

⁷⁵ Lu Ting-yi, "New China's Education and Culture," *Hsin Hua Yüeh Pao*, Vol. II, No. 1, May 1950, pp. 159-62.

it would be a mistake to believe that the federation is by any means an independent organization or an institution more powerful than the Ministry of Cultural Affairs.

It is not hard to understand why the Ministry of Cultural Affairs leaves most of its operational activities to the federation, which is actually a "front" for the government. Unlike the Press Administration or Publications Administration, which have actual control of the mass media, the Ministry of Cultural Affairs deals more with mass communicators and ideas for mass communication than with the mass media themselves. The only major mass medium directly under the control of the Ministry is the motion picture. The Ministry has, of course, supervision over theaters and stages but, in general, its main responsibility is to see to it that various forms of literature and art follow the principle laid down by Mao Tse-tung that "literature and art should serve the people, especially the workers, peasants and soldiers."⁷⁶ It keeps a watchful eye on writers and artists, and guides and directs them so that their works or productions may best help the people achieve the objectives prescribed by the Party and government. It has responsibility for "educating" all artists and writers to make them realize that "there is no such thing as art for art's sake," and to teach them how to "enrich the political content" of their writings and works. It also tries to "re-educate" many actors and actresses of the old-style opera and other forms of drama, and to rewrite old plays and operas so that they may be useful to the masses of people in "ideological education and struggle." It even determines the themes or images for all literary and art workers to follow. For instance, the Ministry recently sponsored a nationwide "New Year Painting Movement" and asked all artists to use realistic and political themes in their paintings for the occasion.⁷⁷

Since the Ministry of Cultural Affairs is a comparatively new organization, it has to make use of the All-China Federation of Writers and Artists, which is not only an institution with a longer history than the Ministry but has branches and departmental societies spread out all over the country. Furthermore, it is apparently hoped that, with the federation seemingly taking the initiative in the sponsorship and promotion of various movements, it will seem to the masses that such activities are not commanded by the government but are created "at the people's will." Actually the federation only carries out the orders of the Ministry, which has the real control of all art and literary activities in Communist China. This can be easily noted when one observes the important personalities in both the federation and Ministry. The chairman of the federation is none but Kuo Mo-jo, vice-premier and chairman of the Committee on Cultural and Educational Affairs. The vice-chairmen are Shen Yen-ping (or Mao Tun), who is concurrently Minister of Cultural Affairs, and Chou Yang, vice-minister of Cultural Affairs. Sa K'o-fu, secretary-general of the federation, is chief of the Ministry's Department of General Affairs. Therefore, it is no wonder that the operations of the federation are exactly in line with the decisions of the Ministry.

There are many organizations under the federation, such as the All-China Association of Literary Workers, All-China Association of Dramatic Workers, All-China Association of Music Workers, All-China Association of Cinema Workers, All-China Association for Reform of Old-Style Operas, etc. All these associations are set up in the same manner as the various branches of the All-China Federation of Labor. There are local chapters or divisions of each of these associations in virtually every province and big city in the country and all these organizations are quite active in pushing forward campaigns or movements outlined by the Ministry of Cultural Affairs or the Secretariat of the Standing Committee of the All-China Federation of Writers and Artists.

⁷⁶ *Jen Min Jih Pao* (Peking), October 26, 1951.

⁷⁷ It is a custom in China, particularly in the rural areas, to hang panels of painting or scrolls of calligraphy on doors and inside houses. For instance, gods of the gate and of wealth are popular figures appearing on doors in the country. Many homes hang scrolls of writings about fortune, wealth, or good luck for the year. The Chinese Communists, apparently trying to take advantage of this old custom, replace all such themes, which they call "superstitious" or "feudalistic," with such realistic and political themes as "Happiness after Land Reform," "Chairman Mao Talks to Peasants," or "Peasants Use Tractors," etc. In cooperation with the Publications Administration, the Ministry of Cultural Affairs in October 1951 published more than 580 kinds of such paintings and circulated more than 15,000,000 copies. See *Jen Min Jih Pao* (Peking), October 26, 1951.

At the first All-China Conference of Writers and Artists in July 1949, the policy for the literary and art movement was discussed and decided upon, in the same direction as pointed out by Mao Tse-tung in his address to the Yen-an Literary Meeting on May 2, 1942. The guiding principle is that literature and art should serve the interests of the workers, peasants, and soldiers. Mao explicitly emphasized that "our literature and art... are intended primarily for the workers, peasants and soldiers, and only secondarily for the petty bourgeoisie,"⁷⁸ and that, therefore, "we must propagandize only the ideology of workers, peasants and soldiers."⁷⁹ About the content of literature and art, Mao said:

All culture and all present-day literature and art belong to a certain class, to a certain party or to a certain party line. There is no such thing as art for art's sake, or literature and art that lie above class distinction or above partisan interests. There is no such thing as literature and art running parallel to politics or being independent of politics.⁸⁰

We demand unity between politics and art; we demand harmony between content and form --- the perfect blending of revolutionary political content with the highest possible level of artistic form....⁸¹

1. Bureau of Cinematographic Art

As pointed out previously, the motion picture is the only major mass medium formally under the control of the Ministry of Cultural Affairs. The Ministry's Bureau of Cinematographic Art supervises all film industries in the Northeast, Peking, and Shanghai as well as the 55 mobile documentary film units, and is responsible for the distribution of all films throughout the country. All film workers, including stars, directors, script writers, photographers, and many others, work under its leadership. Private film companies which the government claims to have encouraged and helped also receive directions from the bureau.⁸²

The bureau has nationalized all the studios formerly controlled by the Nationalist Government and has reorganized their technical facilities in the three main state studios of Changchun (in the Northeast), Peking, and Shanghai. In reorganizing these studios, the bureau retained most of the experienced film workers and added in many fields of art a large number of veteran cadres who had served during "the liberation war" in various organizations and armies. The bureau reasons that the majority of the former experienced film workers, mostly from the middle classes, have never lived among workers, peasants, and the People's Liberation Army, and therefore have had relatively little opportunity to get to know the everyday life of the masses, which the government has chosen as the main subject matter. By planting veteran cadres in the film industry the bureau claims to have brought to film-making "a rich fund of revolutionary experience and knowledge of the people." It is these cadres who also organize political study groups in the studios and educate the former film workers who are considered "politically immature."

In a restatement of Mao's art and literary policy in the above-mentioned Yen-an Conference in 1942, the bureau has decreed that the film industry must "concentrate all its energies on producing films of significance to all the masses of the people, dealing with their life, thoughts, and age-long strivings, with the insight of a developed revolutionary artistic vision."⁸³ In other

⁷⁸ Mao Tse-tung, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 23.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 32.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p. 38.

⁸² *Culture and Education in New China* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, undated), pp. 73-82.

⁸³ Yao Hua, "New China's Films," *People's China*, Vol. III, No. 8, April 16, 1951, p. 12.

words, the film is expected to demonstrate the unique character of life under the new "people's democracy" and its superiority over the "feudalistic" or capitalistic system.

A brief review of the most important pictures released by the major studios reveals that in content the policy of the bureau is strictly observed. In an article on Communist films published in the English-language *People's China*, almost all the major films mentioned in the article deal with one of the following themes: (1) the leading role of the Chinese Communist Party; (2) the glorious accomplishments of the guerrillas in wartime and of the People's Liberation Army; (3) model workers in production; and (4) the struggle against "feudalism" and "reactionary oppression."

"The Bridge," the first film produced by the Northeast Film Studio after the establishment of the Communist regime in 1949, tells how a group of workers, aiding the People's Liberation Army, in record time repair a bridge destroyed by the Nationalist army. The Communist government claims that this film marks the first time that the Chinese worker hero appears on the screens of China.⁸⁴ This film is followed by "Daughters of China," which won an international prize in the "Fight for Freedom" contest at the Fifth International Film Festival held in Czechoslovakia.⁸⁵ It tells of the brave deeds of the people and guerrillas during the Sino-Japanese war. Another film which the Communist government is proud of and which is shown all over China is "Song of the Red Flag," which reflects the attitudes of two different kinds of female workers in their competition for increasing production and the varying working attitudes of two different kinds of factory office managers. The backward worker, as a result of the patient teaching and regard for her by the progressive manager, corrects her former attitude toward her work, and becomes an ardent participant in production. "The White-Haired Girl," an opera which the Communist regime claims to be "a landmark in China's theatrical history," was also filmed. Other important films produced by the major studios under the Ministry's control are: "The Shangjiao Concentration Camps," which treats of the heroism and staunchness of a group of guerrillas against Japanese invasion; "New Heroes and Heroines," which exposes the crimes of the Japanese invaders and their puppets when the Kuomintang army fled; "The Shepherd's Song of North Shensi," which deals with the formation of the famous Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia (Yenan) Border Region in 1933; "The People Fighters," an adventurous story of the "liberation war" based on a scenario of Liu Pai-yu, a prominent Communist reporter; "Red Flag on the Green Cliff," which tells of the creation of the Soviet base in Kiangsi; and "Light Comes Back to the Earth," the history of a guerrilla base. There are also the "Woman Locomotive Driver," based on the life history of T'ien Kuei-ying, China's first woman engine driver; "Sing Aloud and Advance," based on the story of Chao Kuo-yu, the worker initiator of the new record movement and now deputy director of the Production Department of the All-China Federation of Labor, and "Unite! Fight for the New Day!," the story of a textile mill strike which is said to have led the "liberation" of the Yangtze Valley. There are also such important documentary films as "The Great National Unity of China," showing the art of the national minorities; "The Visit of the WFDY (World Federation of Democratic Youth) Delegation to China"; "The People's Liberation in Production"; and "The Road to Victory."

Recently the Peking Film Studio, under the management of the Bureau of Cinematographic Art, released the first part of a documentary film entitled "Resist America and Aid Korea." It is claimed that this film was shot on the Korean front by a "Corps of Volunteer Photographers" led by Hsu Hsiao-ping, who was recently awarded a Stalin Prize. Beginning on December 28, 1951, the picture was shown simultaneously in 265 theaters in 40 major cities. Tremendous publicity was given to this film and a special committee was organized in every major city in order to "mobilize and organize audiences."⁸⁶ According to the official New China News

⁸⁴ *Loc. cit.*

⁸⁵ *Loc. cit.*

⁸⁶ *Ta Kung Pao* (Hong Kong), December 29, 1951.

Agency, by December 27, 1951, the day before the opening night of the show, 512,000 people in Hankow had already ordered their tickets to the show; in Canton, 19 theaters had sold out tickets to 250 shows to the full capacity of the theaters; in Chungking, 190,000 people had made their reservations.⁸⁷ Whether these figures are true or exaggerative is not an important matter. It is true, however, that the Party did its utmost to mobilize the masses of people to show this special picture, which is the first important anti-American film produced by the bureau.

Under the bureau, the state studios completed 26 story pictures, 54 documentary films, 3 educational films, 3 art films, 43 translated Soviet films, 42 translated Soviet educational pictures, and 60 news reels.⁸⁸ In addition, private companies in Shanghai and Hong Kong also produced news films as well as a number of Chinese reprints of Soviet films.

To the Chinese Communists, the motion picture is an educational weapon and not a medium of entertainment. As such it is treated with seriousness. Even some of the screen announcements in advertisement sections of newspapers that use any commercial clichés in order to attract a bigger audience are severely criticized by the Party as "vulgar" and "incorrect." In the September 11, 1951 issue of the *Jen Min Jih Pao*, there appears the following statement:

The motion picture is one of the most important propaganda weapons in art and literature. In order that it may perform its propaganda function effectively and educate the largest possible mass of people, it is necessary, of course, to advertise good pictures with photos and explanations.... However, we should not start our advertisement from the 'commercial viewpoint'.... If we cast aside the ideological and political content of the film and emphasize only one aspect of the picture (such as its daring, romantic, or hair-raising character), that is very vulgar and incorrect....

Another fundamental policy of the government is to eliminate all British and American films or any "poisonous films of imperialism." One leader in a state film studio charged that the amount of money earned by American film merchants in China in a period of five years is sufficient for China to produce nearly 2,800 films.⁸⁹ Kuo Mo-jo also testified that under Chiang's regime, American and British films controlled more than 70 per cent of the market.⁹⁰ Charged another Communist leader:

Over 75% of the films shown in Chinese big cities were Hollywood products: the familiar conveyer-made models, gangsters, golden-hearted business tycoons, poor little girls, the 'eternal triangle' with still a new twist to it and the lone American who won the war in the Pacific.... They were pretty intolerable before the people's victory. They were insufferable after it.

China's film workers pledged to create a new film industry that would fully serve the people, speak out truthfully and eloquently on the burning questions of the day, and whose products by sheer merit would drive away Hollywood's imperialist garbage from the screen of the country....⁹¹

In October 1950, when some American films were still being shown in China, Hsia Yen, the director of art and literary affairs in Shanghai, reported that the number of people attending British and American films dropped from 39.7 per cent in the first five months in 1950 to 14.2

⁸⁷ *Nan Fang Jih Pao* (Canton), December 28, 1951.

⁸⁸ *Hsin Hua Yueh Pao*, Vol. III, No. 4, February 1951, p. 940.

⁸⁹ *Ta Kung Pao* (Shanghai), November 18, 1950.

⁹⁰ Committee on Cultural and Educational Affairs, Government Administration Council, *Wen Chiao Ts'an K'ao Tzu Liao* (Reference Materials on Culture and Education), No. 10, pp. 19-20.

⁹¹ Yao Hua, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

per cent in September of the same year. He proudly pointed out that the year 1950 saw a steady increase in audiences for new Chinese films. According to Hsia, the average increase of the number of people attending the new Chinese films amounted to 6 per cent in the first five months of 1950, and to 10.2 per cent by September 1950. The corresponding figures of audiences for Soviet films were given as 11.7 per cent in the first five months of 1950 and 12.5 per cent by September 1950.⁹² It is significant to note that the number of people attending Soviet films remained almost constant after a substantial increase during the first five months in 1950. The above report, which is undoubtedly official, shows only an average increase of less than 1 per cent in audience attendance to Soviet films in Shanghai in September 1950.

To introduce Soviet films to the Chinese public is listed by the Ministry of Cultural Affairs as one of its major objectives. Many of them are dubbed with Chinese dialogue, in the voices of some of China's famous actors. A special publicity committee has been established to popularize the best Soviet films, by bringing the Chinese people first to understand and then to like these productions.⁹³

In an article entitled "The Motion Picture is the Best Educational Weapon," Kuo Mo-jo wrote:

Soviet Russia has already had a history of 32 years in national construction and its socialist construction has almost reached the stage of completion. They have had numerous, precious experiences which we should absorb. There are many ways through which we can absorb these experiences. But the easiest and most convenient way is through the motion picture.

You don't have to understand Russian. Nor do you have to go to Russia. You simply sit quietly for 2 or 3 hours in a theater and all the works of construction in Soviet Russia, mostly classic patterns after careful selection and organization, will appear before your eyes and teach you correct lessons.⁹⁴

Lu Ting-yi, the Party's propaganda chief, publicly declared that "we should open our arms and welcome the coming of Soviet films in large quantities."⁹⁵ He also expressed the hope that the introduction of Soviet films to the Chinese would be considered the most important responsibility of China's new film industry, and that a large number of such films would be shown to workers, farmers, and soldiers as well as to the masses in the cities.

In the promotion of Soviet films in China, the Ministry of Cultural Affairs works hand in hand with the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association, which is chiefly concerned with propaganda for Soviet Russia. This association, as one among its many activities, organized 140 mobile units showing Soviet films and lantern slides. In one official report, the association claims that in the two-year period from October 1949 to October 1951, 48 mobile units gave 7,400 shows to a bulk audience of 16,097,000.⁹⁶ In addition to these mobile units, there are hundreds of lantern-slide projectors used by local chapters of the association to show slides on the accomplishments of Soviet Russia and its assistance to China. It is to be noted that in October 1951, the association already had 1,260 branches and 44,778 sub-branches throughout the nation, with a total membership of 17,300,456.⁹⁷

Apparently realizing the importance of the film as a powerful weapon of propaganda, the Ministry of Cultural Affairs is at present trying its best to expand its service of showing movies in rural areas, army units, factories, and farms. Vice-Premier Kuo Mo-jo reported in 1950 that

⁹² *Ta Kung Pao* (Shanghai), October 19, 1950.

⁹³ Committee on Cultural and Educational Affairs, *op. cit.*, p. 74.

⁹⁴ *Jen Min Jih Pao* (Peking), October 30, 1949.

⁹⁵ *Loc. cit.*

⁹⁶ *Kuang Ming Jih Pao* (Peking), October 5, 1951.

⁹⁷ *Loc. cit.*

the Ministry was planning to increase its mobile projection units to 700 in 1951, with an average of 20 mobile units in each province, apart from those catering to factories, army units, and public institutions.⁹⁸ This is an important measure taken by the Ministry because without such mobile projection units, new Chinese films and Soviet films would have to be confined to a very small minority of the Chinese people, most of whom are probably in the category of "city bourgeoisie." It should be noted that movies, though quite popular in China today, are still considered modern equipment only available in large cities. According to Kuo Mo-jo, there were in 1950 only 467 cinema theaters in China, of which 206 were publicly owned, 10 jointly owned, and 251 privately owned.⁹⁹ It is no exaggeration to say that to a large number of Chinese peasants in distant rural areas, a movie is a novelty which many have never seen. It is therefore easy to understand that such mobile units, as claimed by the government, often attract huge crowds of people. It may be true too that the masses in the rural areas respond much more favorably to such films than city audiences. For one reason, to the people in cities the movie is no curiosity. For an even more important reason, the city folks are more accustomed to, or—as charged by the Communists—more "paralyzed" by, American and British pictures and do not think very highly of the new Chinese films. Furthermore, the ordinary movie-goers in cities, although better educated on the average than the people in rural areas, constitute only a minority in terms of the populace of China and come chiefly from the middle class. In the eyes of the Communists, these people are not important, because, according to Mao, art and literature are mainly for the workers, farmers, and soldiers who constitute more than 80 per cent of China's population.

In addition to these several hundred mobile projection units which deal mainly with story and documentary films, the Ministry's Bureau of Cinematographic Art also supervises the making and production of lantern slides to be used by local libraries, cooperatives, newspaper-reading groups, unions, and local organizations of various other kinds at different levels. This task is important because the production of film is an expensive enterprise in which China is still handicapped, both technically and financially. The bureau not only makes a lot of slides for wide distribution but also supplies materials to local groups for their own making. For instance, local groups are supplied with books of line drawings of persons or scenes which they can use for drawing their own lantern slides. If a local artist wants to draw an anti-American lantern slide, he can simply trace the pictures from the book which contains Truman, MacArthur, Acheson, round-bellied Wall Street "war-mongers," "hungry Negroes," and underprivileged unemployed workers or even half-nude American girls in Bikini bathing suits to show the obscene character of the "sex-crazy" Yankees. Many of these character drawings are accompanied by captions. Such reference materials, as they are called, facilitate the propaganda works of artists or Party members in rural areas where good artists are not easily available.

In many districts where electricity is not available and electric generators are hard to get, a special kind of lantern slide called *Tu Tien Yien* (country-type movie) is shown. The source of light is a gas or kerosene pressure lamp or even candles. In view of the extensive publicity given to this type of "movie" in the newspapers and in handbooks for propagandists, it is possible that this type of propaganda has been quite popular in rural areas.

2. Bureau of Drama Reformation

A form of entertainment or popular "culture" much more popular than the film in China is the drama or old-style opera. This is perhaps the only form of entertainment commonly liked in rural areas and almost the only point at which ordinary illiterate peasants participate in the higher form of traditional culture. Over large parts of China every village of any size has a space

⁹⁸Committee on Cultural and Educational Affairs, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

⁹⁹*Ibid.*, p. 8.

which can be used as its village theater (sometimes located in a temple or an ancestral shrine, or on the local fair grounds), where performances are given by local talent or by traveling drama troupes. It is estimated that there are no less than 350,000 professional performers of nearly 90 different forms of theatrical art in various parts of China.¹⁰⁰ As a well-established form of traditional art, drama is manipulated by the Chinese Communists as a very powerful means of political propaganda.

In charge of this type of propaganda is the Bureau of Drama Reformation of the Ministry of Cultural Affairs. This is the organization which decides the reform of content and form of dramatic works, taking into consideration the thought of artists as well as theatrical practices. It is also the sole authorized agency of the government for determining what plays are to be banned; a government directive specifies that no local authority should ban a play from performance without approval from this bureau. Headed by Tien Han, a veteran playwright, this bureau directs all theatrical activities in China through its local branches and the local chapters of the All-China Association of Dramatic Workers of the All-China Federation of Writers and Artists, which exist in almost all cities in China.

The Ministry of Cultural Affairs has also organized a 43-member Central Committee on Reformation of Drama and Opera, which is charged with two main tasks: (a) to approve plays or scripts or revised copies submitted by the Bureau of Drama Reformation, and (b) to make recommendations to the Ministry with regard to plans, policies, and related questions affecting the "reformation of the drama and opera."¹⁰¹ Headed by Vice-Minister Chou Yang, this committee is composed of famous professional artists of various kinds of theatrical art such as Mei Lan-fang and Chou Hsin-fang, playwrights, government officials, and many others. Most of the revised plays now performed in China are published under the name of this committee. There is little doubt that the bureau has almost absolute authority in the revision of plays, but by letting the committee have the nominal authority the Communist regime can shift the blame of censorship from a government agency to a seemingly independent institution composed largely of "liberal" artists rather than Party members or government officials.

The major tasks of the bureau can be discussed under the following headings: (a) reform of the artists, and (b) reform of plays.

Reform of the Artists. The first step in drama reformation carried out by the government is a drastic change of attitude toward personnel of the stage. In the Manchu dynasty and even under the Nationalist regime, theater workers stood very low in the social scale along with prostitutes. Even famous actors like Mei Lan-fang, who was awarded a doctorate in the United States, were not respected, though they were very well liked. Under the Communist regime the actors and actresses are accorded the same respect as writers, scientists, painters, or any other kind of intellectual workers. Said Peng Chen, mayor of Peking, to a group of cultural cadres:

Actors and actresses are also part of our laboring people. We must sympathize with them, respect their personality and social standing and pay attention to their living. In the reform of drama, their cooperation must be solicited. We should carry out the movement through their initiative and guide them in reform. This is what we mean by mass line. Only in this way can we do a good job in drama reform.¹⁰²

To show that the government respects theater workers, four leading artists of the old-style opera, including Mei Lan-fang and Chou Hsin-fang, were elected members of the People's Political Consultative Conference and participated in the organization of the government.

¹⁰⁰P. C. Yu, "The Reform of the Classical Chinese Theater," *People's China*, Vol. III, No. 1, January 1, 1951, p. 12.

¹⁰¹*Hsin Hua Yüeh Pao*, Vol. IV, No. 5, September 1951, p. 1191.

¹⁰²*Ibid.*, Vol. I, No. 5, March 1950, pp. 1283-4.

However, the government is careful to see that all personnel of the stage follow the Party line without deviation. With the aid of local branches of the All-China Federation of Artists and Writers, the Ministry organizes special study courses for the theater workers. Besides, there are cultural cadres in virtually every theatrical group to direct political studies. A government official describes the process of the political re-education of theater workers as follows:

They became better acquainted with the political literature and with the place of art in society. They were helped to realize their own position and role in the new society, their new rights and responsibilities. The theater in China has always played a didactic role, frankly realizing that 'art is propaganda.' Now the actors understand this in the modern Marxist sense. As 'engineers of the human soul,' they realize that their entertainment should inspire the people with the ideals of progressive mankind, with faith in the revolutionary cause, and in the creative genius of the people; that it should move forward in step with the progressive social forces and at the same time preserve the best of the cultural heritage of the past.¹⁰³

Reform of Plays. The Ministry of Cultural Affairs establishes the general principle that no play should be banned unless it is of a "hopelessly reactionary nature," but that wherever revision is necessary it should be carefully undertaken.

In a six-point directive concerning drama reformation issued by the Central People's Government under the name of Premier Chou En-lai, it is stated:

Drama and opera should consider it their first and most important task to inflame the spirit of new patriotism and to stimulate the heroism of the people in revolutionary struggle and productive labor. To be encouraged and developed are plays that are anti-aggression or anti-oppression, plays that propagate love of fatherland, freedom and labor, and plays that glorify the righteousness and kind character of the Chinese people. On the contrary, to be banned are plays that laud the idea of feudalistic morality of slavery and behavior of barbarism, terrorism or sexual obscenity, and plays that vulgarize or insult laboring people.¹⁰⁴

In reforming the plays, the government is careful to preserve as far as possible the original style, and only to add desirable elements or cut out passages or scenes that are "harmful to the people." For instance, in the *Fisherman's Revenge* (*Ta Yu Sha Chia*), the old fisherman's hatred for the landlord was previously relegated to the background by the comic character of the landlord's bodyguard. The fisherman's killing of the landlord, which the Communists consider to be the proper climax, was usually left out of the performances. The Communist version of the play especially emphasizes this act. In the famous *Lady Precious Stream* (*Wang Pao-chuan*), the usual emphasis was on the patient 18-year-long waiting of a faithful wife. In the Communist-revised version, the moral censure is directed against the "profligate husband who deserts his wife." Many of the characters who used to be considered as bandits or rascals, such as Li Tzu-ch'eng in the *Assassination of the Tiger General* and many figures in *All Within the Four Seas Are Brothers*, are now respected as "heroic rebels against corrupt autocracy."

Of all classical old-style operas, the Peking Opera (*Ching Chu*) is the best known and most popular kind. This is where most of the revision work is done. However, the government is equally preoccupied with local dramas, comic dialogues, folk songs, "big drums" or "hand drums," or any kind of theatrical art of local origin. As specified by an official directive:

¹⁰³P. C. Yu, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

¹⁰⁴Government Administration Council, "Directives Concerning Tasks of Drama Reform," *Hsin Hua Yüeh Pao*, Vol. IV, No. 2, June 1951, p. 447.

"Local dramas, especially the small-scale plays in villages, which are simple but vivid in form, can be most easily used to reflect realistic life and will be most readily accepted by the masses. Therefore, special attention should be given to such dramas."¹⁰⁵

Most of such dramas are handed down orally from one generation to another, and written scripts are not easily available. One research section of the bureau is especially charged with the task of collecting, analyzing, and revising such plays. The bureau, in turn, widely publishes such plays, either written or revised by the government, throughout the villages; and such plays have been credited by the Communists with having great effect on the people.

With the Korean war in full swing, the government's work of writing and revising plays is accelerated. The authorities feel that plays and especially playlets are needed not only in theaters for professional performances, but for dramatic clubs, students, amateur players, traveling troupes or other "cultural workers," who perform at street corners, farms, factories, or any public place where there is an audience. Such plays or playlets are referred to in the Communist literature as "living newspapers." The following statement from the official *People's China* testifies to the significant role of such plays:

Every day during the last few days (late in 1950) in Peking alone, more than 5,000 players from schools, institutions, and dramatic clubs have given various street corner shows. Among the most effective 'living newspaper' plays are *Truman Dreams of Hitler*, and the *Dance of the Devils*, the devils being Truman, MacArthur, Chiang Kai-shek and many others. All these troupes are amateur groups organized by the people with the help of the drama workers.

Through the countryside of Hopei province, 2,000 locally organized amateur troupes are traveling from village to village to give performances for the peasants in the long winter evenings. Around the theme of 'protect the homeland,' their plays are woven out of the stuff of their own experiences. Their true life stories impress the audiences profoundly and often at the end of the shows, the onlookers themselves join the players in shouting slogans. Many enroll immediately as volunteers for Korea on the spot.

An extraordinarily large number of new dramatic works has been written on Korean themes. The editor of the *People's Drama* has just announced that with less than 100 magazine pages in one issue at his disposal, he has often received more than twenty plays in a single day.¹⁰⁶

For propaganda purposes, these street corner shows or performances on farms and in factories may be more useful to the government than theater plays. In the first place, such plays are easily staged, both financially and technically. In the second place, players for such shows are controlled more directly by the government. They are unlike the professional players, not all of whom have been ideologically converted. Furthermore, the audiences of such shows, composed largely of peasants, workers, and people with comparatively little education, tend to be less critical toward new plays than city folk and are more likely to be influenced.

There are indications that the government, in introducing new plays and revising old ones, has encountered opposition from theatrical circles in the cities. This is evidenced in many of the literary or dramatic criticisms in magazines and newspapers. Most of these complaints center around the themes that theater owners and players are not "courageous" and "farsighted" enough to put on new plays for fear of possible apathy on the part of the people, and that they cannot rid themselves of the "erroneous belief" that drama is mainly for entertainment rather than for education.

¹⁰⁵ *Loc. cit.*

¹⁰⁶ "Art Fights for Korea," *People's China*, Vol. III, No. 1, January 1, 1951, p. 26.

In a recent issue of the *Shanghai Ta Kung Pao*, two articles especially attack the Shanghai opera circles for producing more "classical plays"¹⁰⁷ than modern plays. The articles charge that since the autumn of 1951, more than half of the Shanghai operas have been "classical plays, which do not contain positive educational significance." This phenomenon is explained as follows:

Many city folks still remember and dream of 'grandeur and magnificence' on the stage and want to see gorgeous costumes worn by the players. These people judge the quality of a show mainly by its sumptuousness and showiness. Therefore, classical plays satisfy such city folks. The Shanghai opera circles are stimulated by the classical plays of Yüeh-chu (a kind of local opera in Chekiang province), which draw practically a 'full house' every night, with their plays about palaces, courts, and other pompous scenes.

Furthermore, many modern drama troupes who are willing to put on new plays are handicapped by producers or financiers. For instance, when a drama troupe moved to a newly built theater and announced that its first show would be 'Wang Shiao-lang' (story of the poor girl), the operator of the theater shook his head and said: 'I built the new theater and I don't want you to put on such beggar and rascal shows.' Many of the theater owners ask the troupes to put on old shows and even threaten them with cancellation of contract.¹⁰⁸

It is to be noted that this case of the Shanghai opera, which usually deals with stories of common people rather than tales of emperors and nobles, is an indication either of the people's apathy toward new Communist plays or of an escape of artists from realism. This same phenomenon existed in the art circles in Shanghai during the occupation by the Japanese in World War II, when producers developed classical plays merely to avoid political commitments and still satisfy entertainment purposes.

Reform of Theaters. The Ministry of Cultural Affairs, owning many big theaters and controlling almost all the others, of course has power to "correct such unhealthy symptoms." At present, the Bureau of Drama Reformation tries very hard to help all theatrical workers and artists to "free themselves from the cage of the bourgeoisie, to enrich their new social life and do better and more work on stages for workers, peasants and soldiers." This leads to another aspect of the bureau's reform work—reform of theaters. This kind of reform includes change of the traditional master-tutor relationship of artists and apprentices, of the system of agents, and even of customs in theaters. The result is that artists are given a much greater voice in negotiations with producers, theater owners, and financiers. Since there are "cultural cadres" planted in all theaters, dramatic clubs, or institutions, they constantly direct artists in learning and are able to carry out all policies of the government through the "initiative" of artists or dramatic workers.

3. Bureau of Art

Exactly how this section of the Ministry of Cultural Affairs functions is not fully discussed in the available Communist literature. But in view of the fact that it is headed by Vice-Minister Chou Yang, who speaks more often and perhaps with more authority than Minister Shen Yen-ping, it is apparent that this is an important institution. It is probably safe to assume that this bureau is in charge of almost all aspects of art except those that are placed under specified jurisdictions, such as motion pictures and the drama. From the number of speeches and articles by Chou Yang

¹⁰⁷ "Classical plays" deal mostly with historical anecdotes and romance.

¹⁰⁸ *Ta Kung Pao* (Shanghai), October 27, 1951.

on philosophy and policy with respect to art, there is some ground for concluding that this bureau acts as the highest art critic, outlining general principles for painters, sculptors, photographers, and other artists to follow, and deciding what types of art or what ideas in art are to be followed or discarded.

For the Red masters, popular art is an indispensable tool of propaganda. The following paragraph from an article in *People's China* testifies to the great extent of the use of art in the Communist society:

Today, wherever you go in China, you will see on the walls of city buildings, villages, and factories, thousands of colorful cartoons that attract the eyes of the millions. Now cartoon exhibitions and displays of photographers, drawings and paintings have been held in more than ten big cities. Many famous artists are giving lectures to workers' clubs and schools on how to draw cartoons and posters. In Tientsin, 15,000 posters drawn by professionals and amateurs have already appeared on the streets, in addition to printed sheets. In Antung, artists are printing their lithograph posters on a hand press in a studio ruined by an American bomb. There is not a wall newspaper in the country that does not have a picture comment on these historic events.

The central theme of this graphic art is hatred of American imperialism, the exposure of its essential weakness, desperation, and bestiality and the expression of confidence in the might of the people's cause.¹⁰⁹

In appraising the effectiveness of graphic art as a tool of propaganda, one has to take into consideration the fact that many, if not most, of the peasants and workers are illiterate, and therefore to use a picture is a much better approach than to use words.

The Bureau of Art, in addition to its decisions on art policies, puts out large quantities of lithographed posters and other graphic materials in cooperation with the Publications Administration, the All-China Federation of Writers and Artists, and other related institutions.

Music is another field where the bureau is hard at work. It is conducting intensive research into folk music, dramatic music, music dialogues, and the Chinese national instrumental music. It also studies and develops dances of the various minority nationalities. Underlying all such activities is the teaching of Mao, who says that China has a rich legacy in literature and art and that the new national literature and art should be created out of the old forms.

Another important task of the bureau is the production and supervision of comic books, which have become very popular for peasants and others of little education. It is admitted in the Communist press that the government now has at its disposal a large army of artists whose special job is to produce comic books for the masses.

4. Other Bureaus

Since the ancient or traditional literature and art are so highly valued by the Communists in China, preservation of the old culture* is undoubtedly an important task of the government. This job is mainly in the hands of the Bureau of Preservation of Cultural Matters. For instance, the government recently has been giving much publicity to the Tung Hua cave paintings in Northwest China. This is a type of work in which the above-mentioned bureau is expected to take the initiative.

Another section of the Ministry worth mentioning here is the Bureau of Popularization of Science. This organization appears to be an educational institution rather than a propaganda

¹⁰⁹*People's China*, Vol. III, No. 1, January 1, 1951, p. 26.

* In spite of the illustration given in this paragraph, the term "culture" refers more to form and style than to experience-content, and of course is used here and *in re* the Ministry of Cultural Affairs, chiefly in the popular (not anthropological) sense, excluding political, economic, and many other spheres.—Project Officer.

agency. At present, it is busy preparing film strips, graphic materials, and exhibitions on public health and agriculture. It also prepares booklets, pamphlets, and other publications on scientific subjects presented in an easy-to-understand way. For instance, when there is a plague of some disease threatening a city, this bureau will put up posters, contribute articles to newspapers and magazines, and use other mass media to teach people to prevent the disease, or take care of its victims. During planting seasons, the bureau, in addition to using the visual materials on seed-sowing, sends out materials to Party cadres or other government workers, who in turn speak to peasants on seeding problems.

However, it is to be noted that the work of this bureau is heavily seasoned with propaganda. Since services of this bureau are beneficial to the people and therefore well accepted, the Party and government cadres, in offering these services, use them as illustrations to convince people that the new government is different from the old Nationalist regime and that it is always at the service of the people. Heading this bureau is Yüan Han-ch'ing, a professor at Peking University, one of the famous universities of China.

The fact that the Ministry of Cultural Affairs, rather than the Ministry of Education, also runs three important academies in the fields of music, drama, and art seems to indicate that the former wants a unique control over the training of artists and supervision of research, particularly in traditional literary and art forms. All these academies are headed by prominent artists. They sponsor short-course training classes for artists and writers, as well as "cultural cadres." This arrangement greatly facilitates the Ministry's program of planning, operation, and training, and undoubtedly assures a high degree of unanimity and conformity in the execution of policies decided by the hierarchy.

PUBLICATIONS ADMINISTRATION

In charge of all publications of books and journals, the Publications Administration directs and controls all publishers, circulation agencies, printing houses, and bookstores throughout the nation. It decides general policies in the publishing field and issues periodic or special directives or orders to all companies or enterprises engaging in publication. Recognizing its authority, all publishing companies, whether state-owned or privately-run, submit periodic reports to the Administration about their existing conditions and plans for the future.

That the Publications Administration is just another propaganda organ of the Party and government is shown by the following statement of principle released by the Administration in its "Plans for Publications" in 1951. It reads:

In all works of publication and circulation, the central political task should be the development of the propaganda-education which is patriotic, internationalist anti-Imperialism and anti-aggression in nature. At present, propaganda opposing American aggression, and propaganda defending world peace should especially be intensified in order to meet the actual need of national defense and economic construction.¹¹⁰

One of the main agencies or divisions under the Publications Administration is its Bureau of Publications, which is headed by an important Communist, Huang Le-fang, who is concurrently chairman of the Publications Commission under the Party's Department of Propaganda. One of his deputy-directors is Hua Ying-Kan, a former deputy director of the Party's Publications Commission, which is responsible for the publication of important political and state documents, and authorized translations of the classical works of Marxism-Leninism. Here again one can notice the close hand-in-glove relationship between the Party and the so-called People's Government.

The Publications Administration owns and controls a large number of publishing companies and bookstores, among which the Hsin Hua Book Company is the largest and most important. The Chinese Communists claim it is the second largest bookstore in the world. Formerly under the ownership of the Party's Publications Commission, this company came under the jurisdiction of the Publications Administration early in 1950. At that time it had 1,143 branches, 20 printing houses, and 10 journals with a nationwide circulation. It was reorganized and made the central distributing and circulating agency in the country. Today the Hsin Hua publishing enterprises have been handed over to the central and local People's Publishing Associations (the *Jen Min Ch'u Pan She*), and its printing houses are under separate management. For the year 1951, according to a government release, the Hsin Hua Book Company set as its target the sale of 347,900,000 volumes of books* to the people, of which 100,000,000 were to deal with campaigns for peace, resisting America and aiding Korea.¹¹¹

It should be noted that the main task of the Administration is not merely to accelerate and increase the speed and quantity of publication. An equally important task is to attract a huge reading

¹¹⁰ *Jen Min Jih Pao* (Peking), February 25, 1951.

¹¹¹ *People's China*, Vol. III, No. 7, April 1, 1951, p. 25.

*"Books," as used here without reference to booklets, may include a very considerable proportion of fragile paper-backed booklets of a few score of pages or less, and of a format even smaller than our Pocket Books and similar series.—Project Officer.

public. This is done by establishing numerous Hsin Hua branches, bookstores, and libraries all over the country. For instance, there are 352 Hsin Hua branches and sub-branches in the 354 counties in East China, and 197 branches in the 198 counties of the Northeast. There are also the so-called "follow-the-Army bookstores" which are mobile shops set up in army units. Furthermore, by means of their mailing service, the Hsin Hua Bookstore and other big bookstores are selling books in localities where they have no agents. Books are also on sale in cooperatives in small towns and rural districts.¹¹²

The Shanghai branch of the Hsin Hua Bookstore even designed special cars, pedi-cabs, and cycles as mobile bookstores. In three months, they supplied books to 150 factories, 23 schools, 15 institutions, 4 exhibitions, and 9 cadres' conferences, and helped establish 48 libraries in the city. In the rural areas, the bookstores do their business through village cadres, winter study schools, and even entertainment troupes. In one winter, the Northeast Hsin Hua Bookstores helped organize and stock 4,000 village libraries.¹¹³

Another important unit under the Publications Administration is the Bureau of Translation, which is charged with the responsibility for making authorized translations of the classical works of Marxism-Leninism and other materials from the Soviet Union. Hu Yu-chi, director of the Publications Administration, reports:

A considerable part of the New China's publications are books dealing with the Soviet Union, translations of Russian books on the experiences in national construction of the Soviet Union, and on the accomplishments of Soviet culture and sciences. . . . Important criticisms of philosophy, literature, and art that have appeared in Soviet publications are immediately translated into Chinese and published in book form, rendering great assistance to our cultural and educational workers. Lysenko's treatise has appeared in many Chinese editions. His accomplishments exert a great and positive influence on Chinese scientists. . . . In the field of literature and the arts, Soviet books enjoy a very large Chinese reading public. Fadeyev's *Young Guard* and Simonov's *Days and Nights* and *The Russian Question* are among our most popular books.¹¹⁴

The Kuo Chi (International) Book Company, a wholesale agency set up by the Administration to serve the Hsin Hua Bookstores as well as other publicly- or privately-operated book firms, imports and sells foreign language books, chiefly books from the Soviet Union. It was founded on December 1, 1949, and in a few months it made a record sale of 772,446 books and 601,252 periodicals printed in the USSR. Its stocks came from the Soviet International Book Company, which supplies a wide variety of publications in Chinese, Russian, English, German, and French. It also handles such newspapers and periodicals as *For a Lasting Peace For a People's Democracy*, *Pravda*, *Izvestia*, *New Times*, and *USSR In Construction*.¹¹⁵

Working closely in cooperation with the Ministry of Education is the Administration's Bureau of Editing and Examination which has, among its major responsibilities, the duty of editing and examining school textbooks. Heading the bureau is one of the Administration's deputy directors, Yeh Sheng-tao, a prominent writer and former chairman of the Commission of Examination of Textbooks of the Department of Education of the Northeast People's Government. A review of the table of textbooks used by all elementary and high schools in China reveals that, with the exception of some science textbooks on such subjects as physics and chemistry, all textbooks have been rewritten or revised. Almost all these books are distributed by the Hsin Hua Bookstores; some of the science books are published by such big private companies as the Commercial Press, Chung Hua, and Kaiming.¹¹⁶

¹¹² *Culture and Education in New China*, pp. 55-61.

¹¹³ *People's China*, Vol. III, No. 7, April 1, 1951, p. 25.

¹¹⁴ *Culture and Education in New China*, pp. 58-59.

¹¹⁵ *People's China*, Vol. I, No. 7, April 1, 1950, p. 25.

¹¹⁶ For a complete list of all textbooks used by elementary and high schools, see the list released by the Ministry of Education and the Publications Administration, in *Hsin Hua Yüeh Pao*, Vol. II, No. 4, August 1950, pp. 897-9.

In order to facilitate the supervision and control of publications, the Administration adopts a general policy of specialization through a division of labor among various publishing companies. In other words, every publishing company is to engage in a specialized type of publications. For instance, the Jen Min (People's) Publishing Company, which is composed mainly of the former staff of the Hsin Hua Bookstores' department of publication but includes also members of the Administration's Bureau of Editing and Examination, deals chiefly with the political theories, policies, and official documents of the Party and government and with current affairs. At present it is also engaged in the publication of popular reading materials. However, it is the plan of the Administration to develop it into a specialized organization for political publications only.

The Commercial Press and the Chung Hua Book Company, which were the two largest private publishing companies under the Nationalist regime, are to concentrate on publications in the fields of natural science, engineering, agriculture, medicine, and hygiene. The San Lien (or Triple Union) Bookstore and Kaiming Bookstore are to specialize in applied social science, culture and history, and reading materials on the high school level. The Tung Lien (or Popular Union, an abbreviated title of Union Bookstore under Popular Books Publishing Company) and Lien Lien (or Series Union, an abbreviated title of the Union Bookstore of the Comic Series and Picture Publishing Company) are assigned to publish popular reading materials. Publications for youths and children are in the hands of Ta Tung Bookstore, Children's Publishing House, and Tung Lien (Children's Union) Book Company. Under the leadership of the All-China Federation of Labor, the Workers' Publishing House takes care of reading materials for all factory and union workers. Especially responsible for the readings of young people is the Youth Publishing Association under the leadership of the New Democratic Youth Corps. Publication of all textbooks for elementary and high schools is the specialty of the People's Educational Publishing Association, which is an organization composed of the former Lien Ho (or Co-op) Publishing companies in the Northeast and Shanghai. Plans are being made to have separate publishing companies handle books on literature and art; such companies may be state-owned or under the joint management of state and private companies.¹¹⁷

To promote circulation, the Administration has helped organize a national circulation or distribution network by uniting all state and private circulation companies, including small bookstands, book peddlers, post offices, and co-ops, under the leadership of the Hsin Hua Bookstores. Another major task is to stimulate a nationwide "reading movement." In farms, factories, armies, institutions, and schools, especially in distant areas, "circulation stations" of various forms are set up in order to organize readers and to push forward the reading movement.

Even the postmen are mobilized to increase the circulation of newspapers, magazines, and books. According to our official source, about 2,200,000 newspapers now reach their readers in various parts of the country through postmen who collect subscriptions and make deliveries. Reports *People's China*:

The postmen are enthusiastic about their new job and compete with each other in obtaining new subscriptions. Subscriptions to the Peking *People's Daily* have in this way gone up by 150% during the last year, while those to the *Peasant Masses*, a Chekiang provincial daily newspaper, have increased 19 times.

There is another advantage. The postmen see their subscribers every day, and can discuss the merits of the various publications and take care of subscription renewals. They have also, in many cases, organized newspaper-reading groups among the peasants so that those who are illiterate can keep in touch with events. One postman in Changsha, Hunan Province, has organized 1,250 such groups during the last year. In Shensi Province, 23,000 reading groups have been organized with a membership of 320,000.¹¹⁸

¹¹⁷ Hu Yu-chi, "A Comprehensive Report Delivered in the First National Publication Conference on October 13, 1950," *Hsin Hua Yieh Pao*, Vol. III, No. 1, November 1950, pp. 170-1.

¹¹⁸ "Postmen Help Spread News," *People's China*, Vol. IV, No. 7, October 1, 1951, p. 18.

On January 1, 1951, the Publications Administration made public a directive formulating the objectives to be achieved in 1951.¹¹⁹ Some of the major objectives were:

(1) to increase the publication of new books in 1951 by 50 per cent over 1950, and the circulation of new books by 100 per cent over 1950. The ultimate goal for the publication of all books, journals, and textbooks is 530,000,000 copies.

(2) To complete the publication of *Collected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, to be printed in various kinds of editions.

(3) To edit and publish systematically books on Chinese history and geography, modern science, classical literature, and literary works since "May the Fourth" and to edit *The Complete Works of Lu Hsun* with footnotes.

(4) To publish important translations of the works of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin and to edit and publish popular explanatory texts of Marxism-Leninism and useful books for political study classes.

(5) To publish, in great quantity, propaganda reading materials on patriotism, internationalism, anti-imperialism, and anti-aggression, as well as current affairs booklets, graphic materials, comic books, and picture magazines.

(6) To organize translation personnel to translate systematically famous works of the world, particularly those of the Soviet Union.

(7) To develop the People's Publishing Company into a state political publication company and to cooperate with all local branches of the company to insure a nationwide supply of the main items of reading materials on politics and current affairs.

(8) To see that the People's Educational Association rewrites all textbooks for elementary and high schools and to establish the foundation for state control of all school textbooks.

(9) To consolidate and further develop all state-owned publishing companies, particularly the Workers' Publishing Company and the Youth Publishing Company; to establish a Literature Publishing Company, either state-owned or jointly owned; to establish also an Art Publishing Company; to plan to establish a publishing company for languages and literature for minority groups.

Although no official announcement has yet been made concerning the achievements in publication in 1951, there are indications that most of the above-mentioned objectives have been reached. For example, most of the textbooks advertised in newspapers are published under the editorship of the People's Educational Association; the *Complete Works of Mao Tse-tung* is now widely distributed in the country; many branches of the People's Publishing Company have been established; and comic books, booklets, and other popular reading materials are reported to have flooded the market. According to a news story in the Shanghai *Ta Kung Pao*, the publication of popular reading materials had been increased, by May 1951, by 1,000 per cent over 1950. The publication of comic books, as revealed in the same news story, is especially booming. In Shanghai, there were 60 stores putting out comic books before the Chinese Communists took over the mainland; in June 1951, more than 140 bookstores engaged in such publications.¹²⁰

According to Director Hu Yu-chi, most of the publications in China today deal with politics, current affairs, literature, and popular topics.¹²¹ Soon after its establishment, the Administration asked all publishers in the country to submit samples of their publications. In July 1950, about 4,960 samples were received by the Administration, among which 2,088 were submitted by state-owned or jointly owned publishing companies and 2,872 by private companies. In content, these samples were classified by the Administration as follows:¹²²

119. *Hsin Hua Yüeh Pao*, Vol. III, No. 5, March 1951, p. 1150.

120. *Ta Kung Pao* (Shanghai), September 11, 1951.

121. Committee on Cultural and Educational Affairs, Government Administration Council, *op. cit.*, pp. 126-43.

122. *Ibid.*, p. 131.

<i>Classification</i>	<i>Percentage</i>
Political theories and current affairs	20.7
Philosophy, language, history, and geography	11.6
Natural and applied science	17.1
Literature	18.9
School textbooks	6.5
Popular reading materials	18.1
Children's reading materials	5.3
Others	1.8

How representative these samples are is hard to decide. Judging from the advertisements of books in newspapers and catalogues of bookstores, it seems that the year 1951 saw a great increase of output in literature of popular forms and comic booklets.

To say that the number of Communist publications has been greatly increased does not necessarily mean that the Administration does not have problems or difficulties on its hands. Director Hu Yu-chi openly admits:

Judging from what has been achieved, our publication work still lags behind the progress of the many other activities of the state and people. Our publishers are still unable to meet the people's demand for more and better books. Our nationwide, state-operated publication enterprises have been inaugurated only recently. They need consolidation and further development. Many of the privately operated publication enterprises must reorganize themselves so as to be better able to serve the people. Our public finance and national economy have not yet recovered from the destruction wrought by protracted wars and the misrule of the reactionaries, and in consequence the price of our books is still rather high, in many cases beyond the purchasing power of our readers. . . .¹²³

This statement, which is full of Communist clichés, requires a careful examination for a thorough understanding of the publication works in Communist China. There is no doubt that, in spite of its unremitting exertions in turning out a tremendous amount of publications, the Publications Administration still has a long way to go in order to expose the broad masses of people to Communist literature. In his report to the first National Conference on Publications on September 16, 1950, Hu Yu-chi listed five points which he considered "unsatisfactory" in the supply of books to the masses:

- (1) Publications of the people have not yet penetrated into the people. Until now, our readers are still limited to the city bourgeoisie, intelligentsia, and middle-class cadres. Books that are suitable for workers, peasants and soldiers constitute a very small number. The suitable ones that are being published are not yet widely circulated among these people.
- (2) Most of our bookstores and publishing enterprises are concentrated in big cities or in coastal areas. In Shanghai and Peking, there are often dozens of bookstores in one street; but in Sinkiang, people have to walk thousands of miles in order to purchase a book. Except in part of the 'old liberated areas,' the supply of books in rural areas is very poor.
- (3) Prices of books are too high and the common people cannot afford to buy.
- (4) Libraries and public education centers have not yet been established on a popular scale. Therefore, people who do not have the financial purchasing power have no way of having access to books.

¹²³ *Culture and Education in New China*, p. 60.

(5) The relationship between circulation agencies and readers is not yet satisfactory. In other words, much remains to be done to improve the services to readers.¹²⁴

Although the state-operated publishing companies share the major responsibility in publication, they constitute a comparatively small number. This means that the Publications Administration, at present at least, has to depend upon the private publishing companies. It is true, of course, that the Publications Administration has the power to prevent any undesirable books or journals from being published by private companies. It is equally true, however, that all private companies are naturally interested in financial profits, and that they do not always fulfill their "political mission" in publication. One article in the Shanghai *Ta Kung Pao* charges that "in Shanghai, there exists a serious situation of ideological confusion, carelessness, and waste."¹²⁵ According to this article, many private publishing companies still take the purely money-making viewpoint and ignore the "political significance" of publication. They want to publish only the books that have a good market, and compete in doing so. Many of the books which the Administration considers "unsuitable" are still available in the market, although they are under different titles. The article further points out that there are many mistakes, particularly ideological mistakes, in such publications. For instance, in many comic books published by the Hu Chiang Bookstore in Shanghai for children, the artists or writers simply fill in the pages with a lot of political slogans and make the books look "ridiculous" and "meaningless."¹²⁶ *The Funny Stories of Hsu Wen-chang*, which the Communists consider to be "stories of the ruling class insulting the laboring people," are published by some companies as "stories of the people."

Another problem confronting the Publications Administration is to stir up the interests among people to accept the Communist publications. There are indications of the fact that publications are not yet too enthusiastically received by the average Chinese people. Take the popular comic books, for instance. In an article printed in the Peking *Jen Min Jih Pao*, the author reports his findings of a readership study which he conducted in more than 60 "bookstands"¹²⁷ in two special areas in Peking and Mukden. There are altogether 12,000 copies of books in these 60 stands. The bigger bookstands have a daily reading public of more than 200 people; the smallest ones are visited by 40 or more people every day. Youngsters and children form about 80 per cent of the total reading group. The author classifies the 12,000 copies of books (about 360 kinds) into two main categories. The first category is composed of books which deal with revolutions, wars, and model heroes. Only 10 per cent of the books in the 60 bookstands fall into this category. The second category consists of what the author calls "backward" and "reactionary" comic books. Most of these books deal with sex, mysteries, murders, and other "stupid and ridiculous subjects," such as the exaggerations of the power of atomic bombs, and tales of wild fantasies such as the "flying swords," "scientific flying clocks," etc. However, more than 80 per cent of the books covered in this special survey are of this nature. Furthermore, the author reports that readers are still greatly interested in such "backward and reactionary" comic books, and shy away from the "new and progressive" ones about heroes and model workers. The author cites a few reasons given by readers who comment on the Communist comic books. Firstly, there are not enough pictures in the new Communist comic books. Secondly, the pictures are monotonous and have too few characters. Thirdly, stories in new comic books are weak in climax and suspense. Fourthly, dialogues in new comic books are often too long and difficult to understand. For instance, in the *Kang T'ieh Ti Ma Ma (Mother of Iron and Steel)* words occupy half of the volume of the book.¹²⁸ In the explanatory note of this special

¹²⁴Committee on Cultural and Educational Affairs, Government Administration Council, *op. cit.*, pp. 134-5. [Such admissions as these become important as checks upon future claims, especially when interpreted in the light of the current aggravated poverty and the longer range illiteracy of the "broad masses."—Project Officer.]

¹²⁵*Ta Kung Pao* (Shanghai), September 11, 1951.

¹²⁶*Loc. cit.*

¹²⁷Bookstands referred to here are different from the ones in the United States. They are the street corner stands or small book shops where popular novels, plays, comic books, etc., are rented and sold. One can pay a small amount of money and read any book that is available on the shelves. Books can also be taken out for a special charge. Such stands are frequently visited by children and people of low cultural standards.

¹²⁸*Jen Min Jih Pao* (Peking), April 1, 1951.

article, the editor of the *Jen Min Jih Pao* "warns" that "old, feudalistic and backward" comic books are still published in great quantities by private companies and are still available in some of the bookstands in Peking.¹²⁹

The above illustrations should suffice to indicate that the Publications Administration still has a long way to go to overcome the difficulties in the field of publication. What measures the Administration is to take in the future to settle its problems is hard to predict. One thing is certain, however. The state-operated publication enterprises, after they are further developed and consolidated, will probably take over most of the works of private companies that are already under very close scrutiny of the government. It is to be remembered that Director Hu Yu-chi has already explicitly said: "State-operated publication enterprises need consolidation and further development. Many of the privately operated publication enterprises must reorganize themselves so as to be better able to serve the people."¹³⁰

¹²⁹*Loc. cit.*

¹³⁰*Culture and Education in New China*, p. 60.

SPECIAL ORGANIZATIONS

In addition to the Party's Department of Propaganda and the various ministries and administrations of the government handling educational and cultural affairs, there are many other agencies which form an essential part of the Communist propaganda machine in China. Most of them are generally referred to as the "mass organizations," or "people's organizations," such as the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association, the Resist-America Aid-Korea Association, the Democratic Women's Federation, the New Democratic Youth Corps, the All-China Federation of Writers and Artists, Peasant Associations, and hundreds of others. Supposed to be independent organizations, these associations or societies are actually affiliates or subsidiary organs of the Party, which exerts strict, though not obvious, control over them. These are the principal agencies through which the weight of the Party makes itself felt upon the average Chinese people; they are also the means through which the Communist Party has its widest reach.

One important function of these organizations is to serve as a link between the Party and government on the one hand and the masses on the other. It must be remembered that the Party has a membership of less than 6,000,000, which is slightly over 1 per cent of the total Chinese population. Granted that all Party members and government workers are efficient and capable, they comprise only a numerical minority in a large country like China and therefore it is hard for them to keep close contact with the people. Through the mass organizations, however, the Party is able to bring the largest number of people into direct organizational contact with the regime. Today every Chinese "citizen" belongs to at least several organizations. There are the occupational organizations such as the teachers' union, factory labor union, milkmen's union, merchants' association, and many others. If a person is not employed he should belong at least to a "citizens' group," which is the smallest unit in society and very important. All the residents of a certain area, or street, or block, form one group—usually from 20 to 30 families. These groups have meetings every few days. Then there are special organizations like the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association, which has branches and sub-branches all over the country. In the English-language *China Monthly Review* of Shanghai, it is reported:

That the people are united in their determination to defend the country against any foreign aggression is seen in the enthusiastic response to the campaign for contributions toward airplanes and artillery and to the call to youth to join the armed forces.

All the various people's organizations are collecting from their members and giving toward the defense fund for airplanes. If they have enough for one plane, they can suggest a name for it: the name of their town, or organization, or some special name of significance. I have noticed: 'The Reform of Christianity' (the Protestant Church throughout China), 'The Shanghai Railroad Workers,' 'The Anhwei Students,' 'The White Uniformed Soldier' (given by nurses), etc.¹³¹

An extremely important feature of these organizations is the principle of activism. The Party is not primarily interested in the size of the membership of the organizations but in what

¹³¹Earl Willmott, "Notes from Szechuan," in *China Monthly Review* (Shanghai), December 1951, p. 306.

it can get out of them. It is not enough for a person to join an organization; he must play an active role in carrying out the organization's functions and achieving its aims because, according to the Communist reasoning, good faith has to be proved by actual deeds. For instance, members of the local branches of the Resist-America Aid-Korea Association are not supposed just to listen to lectures or attend meetings but are also expected to contribute money to buy airplanes and tanks, to produce more food on farms, to speed up production in factories, to educate more people in the "education of patriotism," or to engage in any work that is encouraged and desired by the regime.

It can be readily seen that these organizations serve a very useful purpose of the Party in propaganda. Through them the Party is able to carry out its programs in the name of the "people" and at the same time to impress on the world that the Chinese people voluntarily stand behind whatever programs are prescribed by the Party. This point can be illustrated by the anti-American propaganda in Communist China today. Shortly after the "Chinese volunteers" entered the Korean front, all the "democratic parties" joined the Chinese Communist Party in a declaration on November 4, 1951, swearing to "give full support to the righteous demands of all the people in China (to volunteer their service in the Korean war) and struggle for the sacred duty of resisting America, aiding Korea, protecting the home and defending the country."¹³² The "democratic parties" were: the Revolutionary Committee of the Kuomintang of China, the China Democratic League, the Democratic National Construction Association, non-Party members of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, the China Association for Promoting Democracy, the China Peasants' and Workers' Democratic Party, the China Chih Kung Tang, the Chiu San Society, the Taiwan Democratic Self-Government League, and the China New Democratic Youth League. This declaration was followed by hundreds and thousands of telegrams, declarations, appeals, or letters from different mass organizations echoing the same tune. In December 1950, about two months after the "Chinese volunteers" went to the Korean front, the *Jen Min Jih Pao* of Peking reported in an editorial:

The patriotic mass movement of resisting America and aiding Korea has flamed up in China like a conflagration.... People of all walks and different professions, including workers, peasants, intellectuals, industrialists, merchants, women, medical circles, dramatic circles, religious circles and those engaging in social relief work also actively participate in the movement. Many people who usually pay no attention to politics are also stimulated by the patriotism of anti-imperialism and join the struggle. People of different circles not only use words to express their patriotic enthusiasm but also support the call of the fatherland through actions. Factory workers have already developed the production competition of patriotism. In Mukden alone, 900,000 workers took part in this kind of competition.... Peasants worked harder on farms and contributed their best food products to the government, joined the public security guards, and maintained security in society. All students in big cities eagerly studied current affairs, organized parades and meetings, developed propaganda activities and enlisted in the schools for military cadres....¹³³

How much truth there is in this statement is relatively unimportant for our purpose here because it is quite typical of Communist propaganda writings in China. But it shows fairly well how the mass organizations were used to mobilize "people of all walks and professions" for the Korean war in a comparatively short period. Today all anti-American propaganda

¹³² Chinese People's Committee to Protect World Peace and Oppose American Invasion, *Wei K'ang Mei Yüan Ch'ao Pao Chia Wei Kuo Ti Shen Sheng Jen Wu Erh Fan Tou (The Sacred Duty of Struggling for the Sake of Resisting America, Aiding Korea, Protecting the Home and Defending the Country)* (Peking: People's Publishing Co., 1951), pp. 1-5.

¹³³ *Jen Min Jih Pao* (Peking), editorial, December 28, 1950.

activities appear to have been directed by the Resist-America Aid-Korea Association, instead of the Party's Department of Propaganda or other government agencies. Under the auspices of this "mass organization," thousands of books have been printed, pamphlets distributed, meetings and demonstration parades organized, accusation meetings held, and contributions made. It is this association that sends gifts to the "Chinese volunteers" on the Korean front; it is this association that appeals to the people to contribute airplanes, guns, and tanks to the "volunteers" in Korea; it is this association that mobilizes the workers to speed up their production in factories; it is this association that sends telegrams to congratulate Kim Il-sung and the North Korean government on victorious occasions. There is a branch or sub-branch of this association in virtually every town or village in Communist China, and it is often proudly pointed out by the Chinese Communists that more than 70 to 80 per cent of the Chinese people have received "the anti-American and aid-Korean education in patriotism" in a one-year period.¹³⁴

In its control over the mass organizations, the Party is very shrewd. It employs an extensive system of interlocking directorates, in which Communist leaders hold concurrent positions in the executive committees of most of the mass organizations as well as in the Party and the government. For instance, the chairman of the National Committee of the Resist-America Aid-Korea Association is Kuo Mo-jo, who is concurrently vice-premier and also chairman of the Committee of Cultural and Educational Affairs of the Government Administration Council. The vice-chairmen are P'eng Chen and Ch'en Shu-t'ung, both senior Communist leaders and cabinet-rank government officials. The chairman of the association's Shanghai branch is Liu Ch'ang-sheng, who is at the same time chairman of the Federation of the Worker's Union in Shanghai. Assisting Liu are several vice-chairmen, among whom are Hsia Yen, vice-director of the Department of Propaganda of the Party's East China Bureau; Shen Pi-hua, deputy mayor of Shanghai, and Wang Yun-sheng, editor of the *Ta Kung Pao*. At a local level, the Party secretaries or responsible cadres often hold most of the important seats in the executive committees of the local branches.

Before the establishment of the Party propaganda networks, these mass organizations were the major channels through which the Party transmitted its messages to the people. It is true that the large army of "propagandists" and "reporters" help establish a close link between the Party and the masses. But the propaganda networks actually supplement, and do not take over, the propaganda functions of the mass organizations. In the first place, the number of propagandists is still comparatively small, in view of the vast populace of China. Secondly, the mass organizations serving as an organizational link between the Party and the masses reach different categories of the population. Through these organizations, the Party has control of the highly intellectual groups as well as the illiterate peasants, while the "propagandists" are mostly active among the less educated class. Furthermore, with the mass organizations in the hands of the Party, the Chinese Communists can always feel justified in their claim that they have the people's consent and support in whatever program they carry out.

A really exhaustive study of the hundreds of mass organizations in Communist China today would have to be several times the length of the present work. For the purpose of this paper, only the important organizations which especially engage in propaganda activities will be discussed. Special emphasis will be given to the following agencies: The Sino-Soviet Friendship Association, the New Democratic Youth Corps, and the Resist-America Aid-Korea Association.

1. *The Sino-Soviet Friendship Association*

A few days after the founding of the People's Republic of China in October 1949, the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association was established. From its headquarters in Peking, this

¹³⁴ *Chieh Fang Jih Pao* (Shanghai), October 26, 1951.

nationwide organization has undertaken a tremendous propaganda project through many channels to make the Chinese "lean on the Soviet Union."

The objectives of the association, as formally written in the by-laws of the SSFA, are:

...to develop and consolidate the friendly relations between China and the Soviet Union, to increase cultural, economic and other forms of cooperation between the two countries, to introduce to China the Soviet Union's experiences in political, economic, and cultural construction and accomplishments in science, and thus to strengthen the close unity between China and the Soviet Union in their common struggle for lasting peace in the world.¹³⁵

In October 1951, the SSFA had its first national conference at Peking and it was then decided that

...hereafter the main tasks of the SSFA shall be: to infuse the Marxist-Leninist ideology and Mao's Thought into every facet of the daily life of the masses; to use concrete examples of the Soviet Union to engage in the ideological, educational work in internationalism and Communism among the masses of people.¹³⁶

Actually the main task of the SSFA is to carry on propaganda in internationalism, which, according to the Chinese Communists, aims at eliminating the "erroneous elements of nationalism among the average Chinese people." Specifically, it is propaganda to woo the Chinese people to "lean one-sidedly on the Soviet Union." This is an idea explicitly expressed by Kao Kang, chairman of the People's Government in the Northeast, at a meeting of the representatives of the SSFA in that region. Kao said:

In order to learn the experiences of the Soviet Union, we have to oppose narrow nationalism and develop internationalism. Nationalism is the major content of the ideology of the capitalist class. It is reactionary and is against the interests of the Chinese people. In order to consolidate the victory of the people and crush all the evil plots of the imperialists and reactionaries to damage the friendly relationship between the Chinese and Russian people, we must thoroughly eliminate the narrow concept of nationalism. Interests of the Chinese people and those of the people in the Soviet Union and other countries are exactly identical. The new patriotism of the people must at the same time be internationalism. New patriotism is actually realization of internationalism in one country.¹³⁷

The association is headed by Liu Shao-ch'i, often said to be the No. 2 or No. 3 man in Communist China as remarked earlier, and the leader of the pro-Soviet clique in the Party. The seven vice-chairmen are: Mme. Soong Ching-ling (widow of Dr. Sun Yat-sen), recently awarded the international Stalin Peace Prize; Wu Yu-chang, member of the Party's Central Committee; Shen Chun-yu, president of the People's Supreme Court; Li Chi-sen and Chang Lan, both vice-chairmen of the People's Government, and Kuo Mo-jo and Huang Yen-p'ei, both vice-premiers. The board of directors is composed of 197 members, including almost all the important Party leaders and government officials. The executive-general of the National Committee is Chien Chun-jui, vice-minister of education. He is assisted by seven deputy executives and 27 executives or secretaries.

¹³⁵Committee on Political Learning of the Tientsin Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, *Kung Ku Chung Su Yu I (To Secure Sino-Soviet Friendship)*, Tientsin, 1949, p. 23.

¹³⁶*Kuang Ming Jih Pao* (Peking), October 20, 1951.

¹³⁷Committee on Political Learning of the Tientsin Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, *op. cit.*, p. 30.

That the association is just another subsidiary organ of the Party is obvious when one observes the personnel in charge of the branches and sub-branches at different levels. Take the East China branch of the association, for instance. The chairman is Jao Shu-shih, who is concurrently chairman of the East China Military and Political Committee, which has jurisdiction over six provinces. One of his deputies is Hsu T'ung, director of the Department of Propaganda of the Party's East China Bureau and political commissar of the People's Liberation Army in East China areas. Another deputy is Chen Wang-tao, chief of the Department of Cultural Affairs in the East China Area.

According to an official report made in October 1951 by Chien Chun-jui, executive-general of the national SSFA, the association has at present a membership of 17,300,456. Since its membership was reported as 3,040,000 in 1950, the association has apparently accomplished a remarkable expansion. In total, there are 1,260 branches and 44,778 sub-branches all over China.¹³⁸

A significant organizational feature of the SSFA is its systematic expansion from big cities to small *hsien* and rural areas. For instance, out of 160 *hsien* in Northeast China, there are 151 *hsien* where SSFA branches or sub-branches are established. Of the 334 *hsien* in North China, 331 have SSFA branches or sub-branches. It is also reported that more peasants have "voluntarily joined" the SSFA! In such provinces as Heilungkiang, Kirin, Liaotung, Hopei, and Jehol, more than 50 per cent of the membership is composed of peasants. In Szechuan and Hupeh, more than 70 per cent of the SSFA members are of the peasant class.¹³⁹ An obvious objective of the association in expanding its activities in rural areas is, of course, to win the friendship of the largest number of people in China toward Russia, because peasants represent a large percentage of the Chinese population. Another possible implication of the expansion is the realization of the Party that most of the peasants are less educated and less "contaminated by the poisonous influences of American imperialism" than the city folks and therefore can more easily be made friendly toward the Soviet Union.

According to an official report, the general routine tasks of propaganda undertaken by the SSFA are mainly as follows:¹⁴⁰

Publications. In a two-year period since October 1949, the association has published 74 kinds of periodicals, in addition to the special supplements in newspapers. Thirty-seven of these periodicals have a total circulation of 4,859,900 copies. In the same period, the association has published nearly 500 kinds of booklets on learning from the Soviet Union.

The most important publication of the Association is *Chung Su Yu Hao (Sino-Soviet Friendship)*, a fortnightly edited by the Peking headquarters of the association and published by the People's Company. Contributors to this monthly are well-known Chinese Communist leaders or theoreticians, correspondents of the association in different areas and also some Soviet cultural workers.

Films. The association has at its disposal 140 movie projection teams showing Soviet films or lantern slides on Russia to the broad masses in China. It is often discussed in the Chinese Communist literature that the film has proved to be the most effective means of propaganda in rural areas, because the motion picture seems to be a novelty to many of the peasants. Furthermore, it overcomes the difficult problem of low literacy among peasants and workers. It is reported that in a two-year period, 48 projection teams have given 7,466 shows to an aggregate audience of 16,097,000. One projection team reported that in the spring of 1951 it gave shows to nearly 880,000 people in the areas where the Huai River Conservancy Project was in progress. Some branches of the SSFA, especially those in big cities, managed their own theaters to show Soviet films which are supplied with Chinese dialogues or written sub-titles.

¹³⁸*Kuang Ming Jih Pao* (Peking), October 5, 1951.

¹³⁹*Loc. cit.*

¹⁴⁰Chien Chun-jui, "What Has the SSFA Done in Two Years?" (official report of the executive-general at the first national conference of the SSFA) in *Kuang Ming Jih Pao* (Peking), October 5, 1951.

In addition to the projection teams, the SSFA has 444 lantern-slide projection stations. These slides are used to supplement lectures or meetings on the Soviet Union. Then there are thousands of those self-made projectors which use kerosene lamps or even candles as a source of light, and the slides are also locally made.

Picture Exhibitions. Since October 1949, the Peking headquarters of the SSFA has sponsored 93 picture exhibitions in 53 big cities. In every branch or sub-branch, picture exhibitions are given periodically. In order to be assured that the Chinese people "take advantage of such education," schools, political study classes, newspaper-reading circles, and other groups are often taken in a body to visit the picture exhibitions, and each person is required to submit a report or comment on such exhibitions at subsequent group discussion meetings. This practice is also often applied to Soviet films. Sometimes, discussion groups are also assigned to read newspaper reviews or articles on the picture exhibitions or films and then discuss them in group meetings.

Lectures and Entertainments. Periodic lectures and entertainments such as plays, musical soirées, or dances form a regular part of the association's work. In a two-year period, there have been 73,550 lectures in 35 cities. Famous writers such as Emi Hsiao conduct regular lecture tours in the country. There are also Soviet specialists in various fields invited to give speeches in different big cities. When the Soviet cultural workers' delegation headed by A. Fadeyev and K. Simonov arrived in China for the occasion of the proclamation of the People's Republic, they were given the greatest publicity in the country. The delegation traveled to almost all the major cities on the mainland and mass meetings were held wherever they went. Among other Soviet lecturers invited by the SSFA in the past two years, were Nushdin, Kisselev, Makarova, Boldyrev, Chesnokov, Askerev, and Yudin.

Russian Language Study Movement. Under the auspices of the association, many Russian language schools have been established, in addition to numerous short-course Russian language classes. Russian language is now on the curriculum of all high schools, and departments of Russian language have been added in most universities. The association is especially interested in training translators for Russian language material. Most of the radio stations give Russian lessons both in the morning and in the evening.

In addition to these regular routine tasks, the SSFA branches and sub-branches seize every possible opportunity to engage in propaganda among the people. The major principle of their pro-Soviet propaganda, as expressed by Chien Chun-jui, is "to unite all tasks of the Association with the central tasks of the people at special periods." For instance, during the period when the Chinese Communists were soliciting signatures for the Stockholm Peace Appeal, all association members were asked to urge the people to sign. Two elderly women of the SSFA's Peking branch were reported to have mobilized 8,234 people to sign the appeal in a period of five days. They received the biggest publicity for many days in the Chinese newspapers and magazines.

Another "model example" of the work of the SSFA is a small village in the province of Liaohsi (in Manchuria) called Ho-Chia-Tung. Members of the local SSFA branch comprise more than 50 per cent of the whole population in the village. During the spring of 1951, when there was a drought, the SSFA seized the opportunity to propagandize the way the Soviet peasants fought drought and to encourage the Chinese peasants to study the experiences and spirit of the Soviet peasants in their struggle against nature. The propaganda was designed partly to correct the traditional tendency of the peasants to depend upon Heaven. In addition to all kinds of propaganda activities such as plays, lectures, meetings, movies, etc., members of the SSFA branch took the initiative in irrigating 47 acres of cotton, 68 acres of peanuts, 38 acres of kaoliang, and 14 acres of beans. Later, when the government issued the appeal to kill insects, the SSFA branch led the peasants in the village in killing more than 36,000 of them. Such services naturally were well received in the village. With these successes in fighting the drought and pests, the SSFA conducted intensive propaganda among the people to convince the

peasants that "every trouble can be eliminated if one follows the example of the Soviet Union" and that "there is nothing to be afraid of, not even Nature."¹⁴¹

Following the general principle that propaganda has to be closely united with the life and actual tasks of the people, the SSFA is careful to see to it that it applies appropriate methods and uses adequate approaches to various kinds of people. An article printed in *Chung Su Yu Hao* (*Sino-Soviet Friendship*), official organ of the association, illustrates how different approaches are used in carrying out the pro-Soviet propaganda in the province of Liaohsi (in Manchuria). The following is a translated résumé of the long article:¹⁴²

We conduct different kinds of propaganda among different classes of people.

- (1) *Toward the factory-worker's class.* Generally speaking, we can remove any problems there may be in the minds of the working people by propagandizing to them the bright future of socialism. Our propaganda method is to use concrete examples from which we can draw generalizations. This method is used particularly in the factories, mines or enterprises which use Russian machinery, have Russian experts or apply the production methods of the Soviet Union.... For instance, in a certain mine many workers were killed in the frequent fires caused by gas in the shafts under the management of the Japanese and later the Nationalist government. After the coming of the Russian experts and advisers, they studied the problem, went down to the shafts themselves to establish a ventilation system and prevented fire hazards. Seizing this special opportunity, the SSFA members began their propaganda to the workers: 'For the sake of our security and life, the Soviet experts risk their lives to complete the ventilation system for us. This kind of service can be done only by people who are educated by Stalin....'

From this example we then draw some generalizations. We first asked the workers: 'Why should the Soviet Union have such new equipment and know-how? Why do the Soviet experts have such a great spirit of internationalism?' Then we showed the workers some picture magazines of the Soviet Union and asked them: 'Why do the Soviet people all live so happily and comfortably in freedom?' Then we explained to them the superior social system in the Soviet Union, pointed out that China in the future will also walk the same road as the Soviet Union, and that the Chinese people will also live the same happy life as the people in the Soviet Union. Thus we led the workers from an emotional understanding to a rational understanding of the Soviet Union....

- (2) *Toward the peasants.* Our propaganda to the peasants is designed mainly to give them a correct understanding of agricultural socialism. The peasants generally know that we are going to put into practice the system of socialism but they know nothing about the system. To them socialism means messing things together, equalizing all properties and something to eat for all people. Therefore, many of them ask with concern: 'Would there be a great loss if my property and land were equalized?' Many lazy loafers even believe that they can have food without working after socialization. In order to correct these attitudes, our propaganda centers mainly around the system of collective farming in the Soviet Union...

From our experiences in doing propaganda work in the farms we are convinced that we could achieve very effective results if we could educate the peasants

¹⁴¹ *Kuang Ming Jih Pao* (Peking), October 20, 1951.

¹⁴² Hsieh Tung-ping, "Propaganda Works of the SSFA Must be United With the Actual Life of the Masses," *Chung Su Yu Hao* (*Sino-Soviet Friendship*), Vol. III, No. 17, October 10, 1951, p. 9.

to accelerate their speed of production and to improve their techniques and methods, and could organize them to seek happiness in the future.

- (3) *Toward the citizens in big cities.* Our propaganda to the people in cities emphasizes two points: love of fatherland and defense of peace. Generally speaking, there exist such notions as these among the people: 'Sino-Soviet friendship is the business of the Communist Party members,' 'The Nationalists are friendly to America and the Communists are friendly to Russia and no foreigners are well-intentioned.'... They say: 'We will contribute to whoever is the boss.' They are not concerned with national affairs. Our propaganda is to correct these erroneous notions of the people. (Then the author goes on to say that the merchants as well as people in the cities also play a part in the Communist revolution, that their security depends upon the maintenance of peace, that the Soviet Union is always peace-loving and that only by leaning on Russia can world peace be secured.)

2. *The Chinese New Democratic Youth Corps*¹⁴³

The Chinese New Democratic Youth Corps, one of the most popular and influential youth organizations in Communist China, is today assuming an increasingly important role in propaganda. The Youth Corps generates a tremendous amount of activity, much of which takes the form of collective study or work. Members of the corps sponsor endless meetings, organize numerous parades, lead countless group discussions or political study classes, take the initiative in all kinds of work prescribed by the Party and carry on political agitation on all kinds of occasions.

Directly under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, members of the Youth Corps form a powerful force of the Party's "propaganda networks." According to Fu Cheng-sheng, the Party's propaganda chief in Northeast China, "The majority of the propagandists is composed of the members of the Chinese Communist Party and the Youth Corps." For instance, in a mine in Manchuria, there are 98 propagandists, including 53 Party members, 23 Corps members, and 22 activists. Of the "propaganda networks" established in the railroad systems in the Northeast, 70 per cent of the propagandists are Party members, 22 per cent are Youth Corps members, 2 per cent are model workers, and 6 per cent are revolutionary activists. In the city of Dairen, there are 1,824 propagandists, including 818 Party members, 360 Youth Corps members, and 545 activists. In the city of Antung, the majority of the propagandists are members of the Youth Corps. There are in this city 479 propagandists, of whom 104 are Party members (21.7 per cent), 203 are Youth Corps members (42.3 per cent), and 172 are activists (36 per cent).¹⁴⁴

It must be remembered that, in the process of the Chinese Communists' struggle for power, young men and women have always played a leading role. Mainly perhaps because they are particularly susceptible to radical ideas and more eager for social changes than their elders, youths always come to the forefront of the Chinese Communist revolution. Undoubtedly recognizing this fact, the Chinese Communist Party from its early beginning has made every effort to influence and win over the young people, particularly the students. Jen Pi-shih, a member of the Party's Politburo and organizer of youth groups until his death a few years ago, had the following to say about the young people in the course of the Communist revolution.

Young people are earnest, eager and full of spirit. They are ready to accept new ideas. Once the most active elements of youths are organized, we can educate, organize and unite the intermediate and backward elements of youths through the

¹⁴³The Chinese New Democratic Youth Corps is sometimes translated as the China New Democratic Youth League. Both translations appear in official Communist publications in China. However, "corps" seems to be more popularly used than "league."

¹⁴⁴Fu Cheng-sheng, *op. cit.*, pp. 14-5.

active elements. We can then enable the intermediate and backward elements to participate in all activities, join the Liberation Army and help in fighting, and take part in industrial and agricultural production. All these can greatly increase our strength and power.¹⁴⁵

A few examples cited in an official publication on the Chinese youths may well illustrate what an important responsibility is assumed by young people, particularly members of the corps, in aiding the propaganda and organizational tasks of the Chinese Communist Party:

In factories: -

In the cities liberated by the People's Liberation Army almost complete industrial chaos reigned.... This situation was clearly one which called for a tremendous single-minded effort on the part of everybody able to help.

The Chinese youth proudly play their part in this all-out effort. From the industrial centres of China reports show that in their keenness the young workers are adopting all sorts of new methods in order to increase production in response to the call of the Government. These methods include the organization of the New Record Movement, awarding of red flags and pennants to outstanding champions of production, the encouragement of 'shock-brigade' methods of work and the widespread movement to learn from the most efficient and skilled workers. For example, in the Tahsin Textile Mill at Shihchiachuang, Hopei, the China New Democratic Youth League (same as Corps) members popularized the slogan 'No leaving the looms and no idling.' They even made observance of this rule one of the conditions required for young workers applying to join the League. This campaign created great interest in the mill and there soon developed a friendly competition to raise production....

At Factory No. 3 in Shansi, operated by the Department of Industry, a 'meritorious service' drive was launched. Of the 72 workers who later earned merit for their outstanding work, 32 joined the Youth League.

Where 'shock' work is called for, the young workers are always in the forefront. A typical example of this happened in the Sze-fang Locomotive Works which turned out locomotives for the Chiaochi Railroad.

When they learnt from the press that railroad workers at Tsinan and Hsueh had, by voluntary work in their free time, repaired two old and discarded engines which were proudly named 'New China' and 'International Youth,' the young workers of Sze-fang decided to follow suit. They remembered an abandoned locomotive in their yard. But they lacked the necessary experience and technical skill to carry out their project.... They drew up a plan and invited a number of workers of high standing to become sponsors of the project. Then each Youth League member entered into the task of persuading 10 non-League young workers to give their help. As to the League members themselves, they spared no effort in doing all the heavy, dirty work of dismantling and cleaning and worked harder and longer than the others.... Amidst mounting excitement the locomotive was completely overhauled and repaired in 18 days....¹⁴⁶

145. 'Political Report of Comrade Jen Pi-shih on April 12, 1949,' *Wei T'uan Chieh Chia Yü Ch'ing Nien I Tai Erh Tou Cheng (To Struggle for the Unity and Education of the Young Generation)* (Peking: Youth Publishing Company, 1949, first edition), p. 27.

146. *China's Youth March Forward* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1950), pp. 10-13.

In rural areas: -

In the rural areas the young peasants are playing a tremendous part in the great struggle that is being waged to end feudal exploitation.

Often they have greater understanding of the need to fight against the feudal land system and of uprooting the power of the landlords—a power long used in a most brutal way to maintain the peasants in a state of subjection. The peasant youth are to the fore in showing the most effective ways to organize the peasants to take part in the struggle to throw off the shackles of feudalism. They often show more courage in dealing with the landlords who have for so long wielded sole power in the villages....

In the course of this struggle (land reform) the peasants learn to organize into powerful peasant associations and their class consciousness is raised.... It (elimination of landlord class) calls for the systematic and patient work of explanation amongst the peasants, the village women, and youths; the organization of peasant association conferences and setting up of peasant committees and peasant women's associations; and the organization of widespread publicity to make known to every peasant family the very detailed government directives for the gradual carrying out of the division of the land.

The peasant youth in general, and the Youth League members in particular, are very active in this step-by-step explanatory and organizational work.¹⁴⁷

In schools: -

The China New Democratic Youth League has branches in nearly all the secondary schools and colleges, playing an important role in stimulating the desire to learn. Members of the League are pledged to become model students.

The League makes use of every chance of encouraging study....

The students of today strive hard to deepen their understanding of Marxism-Leninism and the teachings of Mao Tse-tung in order to get a correct understanding of current political, economic and social trends and events. No small part in this political education is played by the gaily decorated wall newspapers that one finds in every school. These are edited by the students' self-governing associations or by elected groups in the various classes.... A vastly widened prospect today stretches before China's young people. They are eager as never before to know more and experience more. Their eagerness to learn is reflected by the huge audiences that are attracted to every lecture or discussion sponsored by the New Democratic Youth League....¹⁴⁸

All the above statements are obviously typical propaganda writings of the Chinese Communist Party. Whether there is much truth in the claims of these statements is of secondary importance in this connection. Their significance lies in showing that young people take initiative spontaneously, or are educated to take the initiative, in almost all programs prescribed by the Party. By making themselves models, members of the Youth Corps help push the programs of the regime by setting the pace for competition and thus spur the development of activity and creative initiative in all productive enterprises.

The Chinese New Democratic Youth Corps, as it is known by its present name, was formed in April 1949, following a decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party the previous January. Actually, the corps has a long history beginning in the early 'twenties and its name has been changed many times. The previous names were: the Communist Youth League, 1927-37; the

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 21-29.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 31-42.

National Salvation Youth Association and the Anti-Japanese Youth Vanguards, 1937-45; the League of Democratic Youth and the New Democratic Youth Alliance from 1946 to 1949, when the Party's Central Committee decided to consolidate it into a large-scale organization.

The political significance of this Youth Corps in Communist China is perhaps next only to that of the Chinese Communist Party. In the first place, it demands unswerving loyalty to the Marxist-Leninist cause. Secondly, it requires absolute obedience to the Chinese Communist Party. Under Article III of the constitution of the corps

...all boys and girls from the age of 14 to 25 who support the program of the Communist Party of China and are willing to fight actively for the cause of the New Democratic Revolution and to serve devotedly the working people, and who recognize the constitution of the League, abide by the resolutions and join in the work of the League, shall be qualified for membership.

The fundamental tasks of the Youth Corps, as proposed by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in an official directive authorizing the establishment of the youth organization, are as follows: "To study systematically Marxism-Leninism; to constantly educate its members and the mass of youth by means of revolutionary practice; and to organize, in the spirit of Marxism-Leninism, the broad mass of youth to take part in the various movements called for by the Party or the People's Government."¹⁴⁹ Recently two special tasks have kept the corps busy. One was the organization and training of propagandists. Training was directed specifically toward public speaking, but at the same time it provided a means of selecting those members who would specialize in propaganda work. Part of their instructions stipulated that if the trainees could not answer a question, they should not try to answer, but postpone it to the next meeting so that they might have time to study the problem. The other task of the corps is the correction of "erroneous tendencies" inside the organization itself.¹⁵⁰

Now a few words about the organizational aspects of the corps. In every farm, factory, school, or street where there are five or more corps members, a branch may be formed. Where there are 100 members, a general branch is formed, with sub-branches. Where there are 500 members, a corps committee is formed. The creation of more than three branches in a district qualifies it for the formation of a district committee; three or more district committees form a county or city committee. At higher levels there are regional committees, provincial committees, and Greater Administrative Area or District (*Ch'ü*) committees. The National Congress is the supreme organ of the corps and between sessions of congress the Central Committee elected by it (the National Congress) is the highest body. According to these regulations, five young men or women may therefore set up a corps branch through which they can become an integral part of the nationwide youth movement.

Every Youth Corps organization holds a "Corps Day," either every week or every other week. On this special day, there are all sorts of collective activities, such as reports on special topics, discussions, debates, relaying the instructions of the leadership, initiation ceremonies, recommending the model deeds of members, helping one another in studies, lectures on league work, story-telling, all kinds of contests and competitions, singing, and recreational evening parties. It seems to be the policy of the corps that all kinds of approaches should be utilized to attract youths to participate in the corps programs. Therefore, it often sponsors recreational programs or gives shows. But these activities are not to be confused with the real objectives of the corps—to educate and organize the broad mass of youth and to disseminate the propaganda of Marxism-Leninism. The corps, as explicitly declared in one official directive of the Party's Central Committee, is "the nucleus of the Party to unite and lead the broad mass of youth and the school of the Party to educate youths in Marxism-Leninism."¹⁵¹

¹⁴⁹ *Chung Kuo Ch'ing Nien She, Tsen Yeng Chien Li Hsin Min Chu Chu I Ch'ing Nien T'uan, (How to Establish the New Democratic Youth Corps)* (Shanghai: China Youth Publishing Company, 1950), pp. 3-4.

¹⁵⁰ *China Missionary Bulletin*, No. 10, November 1950, p. 947.

¹⁵¹ *Chung Kuo Ch'ing Nien She, op. cit.*, p. 2.

By June 1950, according to one official figure, the Youth Corps had a membership throughout the country of over 3,000,000. There are indications that the corps is continually growing. There is hardly any factory, farm, school, or university in Communist China today that does not have a branch of the youth organization.

The present leader of the Youth Corps is Feng Wen-ping, who is secretary-general of its Central Committee. He worked as a lad in a Shanghai match factory and at 21 was already a member of the Communist Party. He was one of those who participated in the "Long March" from Kiangsi to Yenan. The Central Committee of the corps has 60 members, all of whom have long records in the Party. One of the members of the Central Committee is Hu Chiao-mo, who is concurrently deputy director of the Party's Department of Propaganda and director of the Press Administration of the Government.

Under the Youth Corps is the separate Young Pioneer Corps, which was formed for the purpose of organizing juveniles of from 9 to 14 and younger children and helping them in their studies. These youngsters are also used to participate in the propaganda work of the Youth Corps, such as soliciting signatures on the World Peace Appeal (Stockholm), or taking part in demonstration parades. They are also sent out to teach peasants or illiterate workers to recognize Chinese ideographs, or written characters. They are popularly known as "little teachers." It is reported in the Communist press in China that the "system of little teachers" has proved to be an effective way of pushing forward the literacy movement, which is heavily seasoned with propaganda flavor.

The Central Committee of the Youth Corps publishes, among many other things, a fortnightly magazine called *Chung Kuo Ch'ing Nien* (*China Youth*), which is designed to direct the work of the corps organization. Since January 1951, when the project of establishing "propaganda networks" got into full swing, every issue of the magazine has devoted considerable space to propaganda materials. There is every reason to believe that the major tasks of the corps at present lie in the propaganda field.

As pointed out previously, the Youth Corps is one of the many youth organizations in Communist China today. In addition, there is the All-China Federation of Democratic Youth, founded in May 1949. It is an association of all youth organizations in Communist China. The highest governing body of the federation is the All-China Youth Congress. During the interval between congresses, the National Committee elected by the congress is its highest governing body. The chairman of the National Committee of the Federation is Liao Cheng-chi. The membership of the federation, as represented by its affiliated youth organizations, has increased from 4,420,000 in September 1949 to 7,000,000 in July 1950.¹⁵²

3. Resist-America Aid-Korea Association

The Resist-America Aid-Korea Association, also known as "The Chinese People's Committee to Protect World Peace and Oppose American Aggression," is perhaps the most popular mass organization in Communist China today, so far as publicity of its activities is concerned.¹⁵³ Its purpose is widely claimed to be that of helping people "to resist American aggression, aid the Korean people, protect our homes and defend our country."

As pointed out earlier in this chapter, this association is supposed to take the leadership in all anti-American activities. It decides on the slogans to be shouted for nation-wide anti-American demonstration parades, the materials to be used for propaganda activities, and the amount of contributions to be made by people for the buying of airplanes, tanks, and munitions,

¹⁵² *China's Youth March Forward*, pp. 61-62.

¹⁵³ For a fuller discussion of the confusing terminology and mixture of contradictory slogans used by the Communists in this connection, see Wen-hui C. Chen's *Chinese Communist Anti-Americanism and the Resist-America Aid-Korea Campaign* (Air Force Personnel and Training Research Center, Lackland A.F. Base, San Antonio, 1955), section on "Modes of Promoting Anti-Americanism" in the Summary and Conclusion, and corresponding sections in the body of the study.

and other purposes. When the Third Session of the People's Political Consultative Council met in Peking in October 1951, it was Peng Chen, as vice-chairman of the National Committee of the association, who reported on the nationwide campaign to resist America and aid Korea.

Although this organization is generally referred to as the highest governing body of all anti-American activities, it is hard to decide how much authority it really has in the planning and execution of propaganda activities. It is quite likely that the association is granted only nominal leadership and carries out propaganda plans that are reached by the regular Party propaganda organizations. As stated previously, it has been the traditional policy of the Chinese Communist Party to control from behind the scenes and leave the nominal leadership to some "people's organization" whenever it is required. Since the anti-American campaign is one of the three biggest movements in Communist China today, the Party undoubtedly needs an organization of this nature to act as a front. By creating this special organization, the Party is able to group all anti-American activities under one organ and at the same time impress the world that it is a "people's association" rather than a Party or government agency which leads the people to "hate, despise and scorn" America.

Today there is a branch or committee of the association in almost every factory, farm, school, or street. Each of these branches receives periodic orders from a higher organ as to what members of the branch should accomplish in a given period. All these orders are issued in the name of the association's headquarters at Peking through the main branches in different administrative districts and provinces. There is no doubt that the association's headquarters at Peking receives its instructions from the Party, because all the leaders of the association are concurrently influential Party members or important government officials.

The following memorandum from the association's headquarters at Peking to all branches in the country may illustrate how the association conducts its nationwide anti-American activities. It was issued on March 14, 1951, in response to the Resolutions of the First Session of the World Peace Congress:

In order to popularize and penetrate the Resist-America Aid-Korea Movement and to respond to the call of the World Peace Congress, we recommend the following suggestions to all people's organizations and all our fellow-countrymen:

- (1) All labor unions, peasant associations, New Democratic Youth Corps, All-China Federation of Democratic Youth, democratic women's organizations, student unions, joint Associations of the Industrial and Commercial circles, religious groups and other mass organizations should within one month draft a plan for the current year to popularize and penetrate the Resist-America Aid-Korea Movement. These plans should aim at popularization before May 1 and emphasize penetration after May 1. In carrying out the movement, propaganda should be closely related to the Resolutions of the World Peace Congress, opposition to rearming of Japan, defense of peace and other actual tasks of the people in various areas.
- (2) The All-Circle People's Representative Conferences in different areas should within the current month discuss and pass on the plans for the Resist-America Aid-Korea Movement for the current year in the areas that are under their jurisdiction.
- (3) Late in April, the people in cities and villages should try their best to have small group discussions to accuse the aggression of Japan and America and the crimes of the running-dogs of Japan and America and secret agents of the bandit groups under Chiang Kai-shek, and to sign the Peace Pact and vote on the Japan question. Those who have not written their Patriotic Pact should use this opportunity to finish their Pacts....

- (4) On May 1, all people in cities and villages in the country should participate in demonstration parades....
- (5) All propaganda, educational and cultural agencies, including schools, evening schools, cultural centers, libraries, literary groups, newspaper-reading groups, newspapers, radio stations, picture magazines, publishing companies, book-stores, literary groups, music organizations, artists' groups, dramatic groups, art and literature workers' groups, movie houses, motion picture projection units, theaters, amusement centers and all public places such as factories, stores, markets, hotels, stations, trains, business intersections, parks, scenic areas, temples, etc., should all draw up their propaganda plans for the current year, in order to popularize and penetrate the Resist-America Aid-Korea Movement, to oppose the arming of Japan and to defend world peace.¹⁵⁴

It is no exaggeration to say that the theme of resisting America and aiding Korea is present in virtually every mass movement in Communist China today. Since the Resist-America Aid-Korea Movement is fully covered in another report in this research project, the present study does not attempt to deal with the programs and activities of this movement. It is sufficient to say here that through the Resist-America Aid-Korea Association, the Party is engaging in anti-American propaganda on a scale probably unparalleled in the history of the world.

Besides the above-mentioned three mass organizations which serve special propaganda functions on behalf of the Party, there are thousands of others that are effective in arousing and mobilizing, as well as controlling and intimidating, the broad masses of the Chinese people. For instance, there are the labor unions, which have always assumed an important leading role in the course of the Communist revolution in China. Before the Communists' rise to power in China, labor unions were generally the major areas infiltrated by Communists to achieve propaganda and organizational purposes. Today, they are still the leading organs for the "education" of the people belonging to the working class, who are supposed to form the backbone of the Party. So far as propaganda is concerned, labor unions usually take the lead in such activities as demonstration parades, accusation meetings, and political study. Whenever there is a call from the Party or government for higher production speed, members of labor unions are generally instructed to take the initiative to raise the level of production and set the pace for fellow workers to follow. It is the responsibility of union members to work constantly among fellow workers to "set up a correct attitude toward labor and labor discipline," and to engage in propaganda and agitation.

Take, for instance, the role played by labor unions in the Resist-America Aid-Korea Movement. In February 1951, just a few months after the anti-American movement was inaugurated, Liu Ch'ang-sheng, chief of the Labor Union in Shanghai and concurrently chairman of the Shanghai branch of the Resist-America Aid-Korea Association, reported that workers in Shanghai helped to lay the foundation for further development of the movement. Liu reported that immediately after the movement was started, the Federation of Labor in Shanghai, in a conference to which more were invited than usual, passed a "Ten-Point Program of Action to Resist America, Aid Korea, Protect Home and Defend the Country." Under the stimulus of the federation, different occupational groups made their own plans to push forward the movement. For instance, elementary school teachers took advantage of December 17, 1950 (a holiday) to organize 600 propaganda teams to engage in the Resist-America Aid-Korea propaganda among the people in Shanghai in a great variety of ways; college professors, perhaps for the first time in their lives, led a demonstration parade; medical doctors "volunteered" to organize medical corps to go to the Korean front; factories in Shanghai all made plans to increase their production; thousands of young workers "volunteered" to enroll in the Schools for Military Cadres; accusation meetings were conducted

¹⁵⁴ The Chinese People's Committee to Protect World Peace and Oppose American Aggression, *Pa K'ang Mei Yuan Ch'ao Yun Tung T'ui Chin Tao Hsin Ti Chieh Tuan (To Push Forward the Resist-America Aid-Korea Movement to a New Era)* (Peking: People's Publishing Company, 1951), pp. 6-9.

in all units of the Union.¹⁵⁵ It is apparent that all these activities were the direct results of the propaganda and agitation work of the union members under the direction of the Federation of Labor in Shanghai.

As pointed out earlier in this chapter, the so-called mass organizations act as affiliates or subsidiary organs of the Party and no Chinese "citizen" can possibly escape from the grasp of these organizations, of which there are hundreds and thousands. It must be pointed out here that the system of mass organizations is not altogether new in China. Such organizations existed in Nationalist China too. But what gives the Communist mass organizations a distinct character is that they penetrate more deeply into the population and maintain more contacts with the common people. The Communist mass organizations are designed in such a way that they keep in close touch with *all* the Chinese people, regardless of who or what they are. There are occupational organizations (such as teachers' unions, shoemakers' unions, shoe-polishers' unions, etc.); professional organizations (such as the All-China Federation of Writers and Artists, All-China Federation of Journalists, etc.) and geographical organizations (such as a village or a city street). There are also mass organizations on an arbitrary class basis such as the social groups within a geographical district (urban workers, poor peasants, middle peasants, etc.). Therefore, every Chinese has to belong to some kind of mass organization, unless he is a "reactionary" or "secret agent," who is barred from the Communist society anyway. All the mass organizations are interwoven into a complicated network of relationships designed to insure firm support of the Party, whose control over these organizations is absolute.¹⁵⁶

A few special illustrations may be helpful here to show how different mass organizations cooperate in carrying out programs of the Party or government. Take, for example, an incident in the anti-American propaganda. In December 1951, the Peking Film Studio of the Ministry of Cultural Affairs, as described in an earlier chapter, released the first part of a documentary film called "Resist-America Aid-Korea." That the Communist regime was strong in its desire to have a huge audience for this film is apparent. But the Communists did not go about winning a big audience simply by placing attractive advertisements in newspapers or colorful posters on streets. Instead, a special committee was formed in every major city to see to it that the film was shown to the largest number of people. Take the case of Canton, for instance. In this big city in South China, the "Committee for Showing the Documentary Film, 'Resist-America Aid-Korea,'" was formed by representatives of the following 12 government and mass organizations: (a) The Kwangtung Provincial Branch of the Resist-America Aid-Korea Association; (b) Canton Municipal Branch of the Resist-America Aid-Korea Association; (c) Commission of Cultural and Educational Affairs of the Kwangtung People's Government; (d) Bureau of Civic Affairs of the Canton Municipal People's Government; (e) Bureau of Cultural and Educational Affairs of the Canton Municipal People's Government; (f) Preparatory Committee of the Federation of Labor in Canton; (g) Canton Branch of the New Democratic Youth Corps; (h) Preparatory Committee of the Canton Democratic Women's Federation; (i) Canton Federation of Students; (j) Preparatory Committee of the Canton Educational Workers' Union; (k) Canton Branch of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association; and (l) South China Branch Office of the China Film Company. Shortly after its establishment, this committee issued a joint directive to all government and mass organizations in Canton. The directive reads:¹⁵⁷

In accordance with the directive of the Central-South District Branch of the Resist-America Aid-Korea Association, we should do our best to assist

¹⁵⁵ Lin Ch'ang-sheng, *K'ang Mai Yuan Ch'ao Pao Chia Wei Kuo Yün Tung Chung Ti Shanghai Jen Min (Shanghai Citizens in the Resist-America, Aid-Korea, Protect-Home, Defend-Country Movement)* (Shanghai: Lao Tung Publishing Co., 1951), pp. 19-27.

¹⁵⁶ Article 60 of the Constitution of the Chinese Communist Party reads: "In the leading body of a government agency, trade union, peasant association, cooperative society or any other mass organization, where there are three or more Party members holding responsible positions, a Party fraction shall be formed. The task of a Party fraction shall be to guide the Party members in the leading body of the said organization, to strengthen the influence of the Party and to carry out the policy of the Party."

¹⁵⁷ *Nan Fang Jih Pao* (Canton), December 26, 1951.

the South China Branch of the China Film Company in showing Part I of the documentary film, 'Resist-America Aid-Korea,' and to fight for the completion of the task of mobilizing an audience of 450,000 in Canton. This film is the best picture to educate the people with vivid and actual examples of resisting America and aiding Korea. Meanwhile, all the income brought in by this film will be donated to the government for patriotic uses.

The film is to be shown in all theaters in the city beginning the 28th of this month. It is expected that all related organizations, immediately after receiving this directive, will start informing the masses of people of their jurisdiction to organize and mobilize group audiences. It is also expected that all organizations will report the size of audiences to be mobilized and other related comments to this office and keep in touch with this office by phone every day so as to guarantee that this task of propaganda and donation will be achieved.

According to the official *Nan Fang Jih Pao*, by December 25, 1951, an estimated audience of 525,000 was already reported by many mass organizations to the committee. For instance, the labor union groups reported mobilizing 180,000; the youth and student groups, 40,000; the educational workers' groups, 30,000; many district (*ch'ü*) organizations of the Canton Municipal People's Government also reported their estimated audiences, ranging from 10,000 to 55,000 from one district.¹⁵⁸ One can readily see that the quota of 450,000 decided upon in the above-quoted directive of the committee was easily met in a few days with almost no difficulty.

Regardless of the accuracy or inaccuracy of the figures reported by different mass groups, one thing is certain. This special anti-American film was probably seen, if not necessarily enjoyed, by the majority of the populace in Canton. There is no question that through the 12 organizations, which jointly formed the above-mentioned committee, practically every Chinese could be reached and mobilized. For instance, the trade unions could easily mobilize all the workers of different occupations; the student and youth groups had no difficulty in rounding up college and high school students; the educational workers' groups, to which all elementary school teachers also belong, were able to organize all school children to see the film in groups; the government groups undoubtedly could reach a vast number of people in different categories; the common people, who might not be contacted by any professional or occupational mass organizations, had absolutely no escape from the district (*ch'ü*) organizations of the Canton Municipal People's Government. This explains why 19 theaters in Canton were able to sell out 250 full-house shows before the film had its opening day on December 28, 1951.¹⁵⁹

To bring this special documentary film to the largest number of Chinese people is, of course, a comparatively unimportant incident in the entire scheme of the Party's anti-American propaganda. But it serves to illustrate how the mass organizations can be used by the Party to mobilize and intimidate the broad masses of the Chinese people into submissive action.

¹⁵⁸ *Loc. cit.*

¹⁵⁹ *Ta Kung Pao* (Hong Kong), December 29, 1951.

APPENDIX I

RADIO PEKING'S FOREIGN BROADCASTS

On October 1, 1951, the Central People's Broadcasting Station gave publicity to the following schedule of Radio Peking's foreign broadcasting which later appeared in the December 14, 1951 issue of the *Ta Kung Pao* in Hong Kong.

LANGUAGE	TIME (Peking Time)	WAVE LENGTH AND FREQUENCY			
		WAVE LENGTH (m.)	FREQUENCY (k.c.)	WAVE LENGTH (m.)	FREQUENCY (k.c.)
Japanese	5:00- 5:30	468.7 m.	640k.c.	416.6 m.	720k.c.
	19:00-19:30	49.1 m.	6100k.c.	29.24m.	10260k.c.
Korean	5:30- 6:00	25.66m.	11690k.c.	19.92m.	15060k.c.
	16:30-17:00	468.7 m.	640k.c.	416.6 m.	720k.c.
English	6:00- 6:30	49.1 m.	6100k.c.	29.24m.	10260k.c.
		468.7 m.	640k.c.	428.57m.	700k.c.
	17:00-17:25	416.6 m.	720k.c.	49.1 m.	6100k.c.
		29.24m.	10260k.c.	25.66m.	11690k.c.
21:30-22:00	19.92m.	10560k.c.	19.97m.	15170k.c.	
Cantonese	6:30- 6:45	423.57m.	700k.c.	25.66m.	11690k.c.
		19.29m.	15060k.c.		
Ke Chia*	6:30- 6:45	428.57m.	700k.c.	25.66m.	11690k.c.
	19:30-20:00	19.92m.	15060k.c.		
Indonesian	6:45- 7:00	428.57m.	700k.c.	25.66m.	11690k.c.
	17:30-18:00	19.92m.	15060k.c.		
Viet-Nameese	7:00- 7:30	428.57m.	700k.c.	25.66m.	11690k.c.
	18:30-19:00	19.92m.	15060k.c.		
Amoy**	7:30- 8:00	428.57m.	700k.c.	25.66m.	11690k.c.
		19.92m.	15060k.c.		
Chao Chow*	8:00- 8:15	428.57m.	700k.c.	25.66m.	11690k.c.
		19.92m.	15060k.c.		
Siamese	8:15- 8:30	428.57m.	700k.c.	25.66m.	11690k.c.
		19.92m.	15060k.c.		
Burmese	8:30- 9:00	428.57m.	700k.c.	25.66m.	11690k.c.
	22:00-22:30	19.92m.	15060k.c.		
Mongolian	9:00- 9:30	428.57m.	700k.c.	25.66m.	11690k.c.
	23:00-23:30	19.92m.	15060k.c.		
Mandarin	16:00-16:30	40.0 m.	7500k.c.	29.24m.	10260k.c.
		19.77m.	15170k.c.		
		468.7 m.	640k.c.	428.57m.	700k.c.
		416.6 m.	720k.c.	49.1 m.	6100k.c.
		40.0 m.	7500k.c.	33.1 m.	9040k.c.
		29.24m.	10260k.c.	25.66m.	11690k.c.
Mandarin	20:00-20:30	19.92m.	15060k.c.	19.77m.	15170k.c.

* A dialect in the province of Kwangtung.

** A dialect in the province of Fukien.

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