ON THE CONVERGENCE OF THE LEARNING PROCESS IN A 2 X 2 NON-ZERO-SUM TWO-PERSON GAME

Abstract

A problem is presented as follows: Will a learning process give rise to an equilibrium point; that is, will a seque ce of mixed stra egies xk yk oci i a le rning process converge to equilibrium strategies x*, y*, of the game, when k increases infinitely. This is one of the open problems in game theory. (In the case of zero-sum two-person games, the affirmative answer is given.) The purpose in this discussion is to show that the answer to the abov question is affirm iv in he case of m equals n equals 2. (A UTHOR)

Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Oct 10, 1961
Accession Number
AD0267296

Entities

People

  • Koichi Miyasawa

Organizations

  • Princeton University

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Materials and Manufacturing Processes

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Convergence
  • Education
  • Game Theory
  • Learning
  • Military Tactics
  • Military Training
  • Recreation
  • Training
  • War Games

Readers

  • Game Theory.
  • Snow Cover Descriptors for Reptiles and Their Illustrations.
  • Theoretical Analysis.