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STRATEGIC DIVISION

# Civil Affairs: The Future Prospects of a Military Responsibility

CAMG Paper No. 3.

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The conclusions and recommendations of this paper are those of the authors and not necessarily of the Operations Research Office. No official approval of the Department of the Army, express or implied, should be inferred.

## NOTE

This is a further paper in a series intended to stake out pertinent boundaries for the ORO study concerned with the optimum organization and functions of CAMG after 1960. Two previous papers in this series already have been published.\*

The present study deals with the future prospects of a military responsibility. The author, as he points out in his introduction, has had considerable experience in this field, both in terms of operations and theory. More recently he has been concerned with what has been called "the great debate," namely, the impact of nuclear weapons on national policy. It is natural, therefore, that some of this concern is reflected in his discussion of the political frame of reference of CAMG. His position in the debate, and his convictions, are not necessarily subscribed to, either by ORO or by his former colleagues on the Project.

This paper is a personal testament -- not a research analysis. As such it both gains and loses in emphasis and vigor. It gains because of the insights, thoughtfulness, and depth of understanding so evidently brought to the problem of CAMG as it concerns the U. S.

Whatever may be the reader's viewpoint, however, is outweighed by the skill, deftness and knowledge with which the author makes a convincing

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\*Operations Research Office, "An Examination of MAP," ORO-SP-52.  
\_\_\_\_\_, "Martial Rule and Civil Government After a Nuclear Attack," ORO-SP-54.

case for re-thinking Civil Affairs and Military Government. From this re-thinking there is much to be learned, and some important conclusions are advanced, which the resulting ORO study on this subject either must knock down or support. They are far too significant and critical to be ignored.

## Author's Preface

The reader should be warned that this paper is more a personal testament than a research memorandum such as he had come to expect from the Operations Research Office. The reason for this is as follows.

When I announced my intention of leaving ORO after an association of five years, I was asked to write one final paper that would summarize my major conclusions regarding the Army's future civil affairs and military government responsibilities. The justification for this request was the fact that I had spent five and a half years with the Military Governor and the US High Commissioner in Germany (Jan. 1947 - June 1952), followed by five years in ORO during which I was more or less continuously concerned with study of the problems of occupation and of civil affairs. What I have written also reflects the research and the thinking I did during this latter period about the basic problems of national strategy and national military policy, and about continental and civil defense in a great nuclear war.

I am not happy about the form in which this paper appears. The first draft was written rather hurriedly during the weeks before I left ORO in September, 1957, and, while I have subsequently revised and added to it, I have not been able to give it the thorough rewriting I should have liked. I do not apologize for the ideas expressed, but I should have liked to develop the arguments in a more orderly fashion, and to provide the reader with the minimum of documentation to which he must feel entitled.

J. E. K.

March 1958

## Table of Contents

	Page
Note	i
Author's Preface	iii
Table of Contents	v
RETROSPECT	1
I. A Problem Recognized	1
II. The Army's Milieu	3
III. The Forms of the Problem	5
PROSPECT	14
I. The Impossible Choice	14
II. The Alternative	16
III. The Army's Role	20
IV. The Nation's Objective	27
V. The Army's Role and the Nation's Objective	31
VI. The Army's Role and Civil Affairs	37
CONCEPT	40
I. The Nature of a Need	40
II. A Problem of Communication	44
III. The Communications Need: Civil Affairs	48
IV. Civil Affairs in Cold War	54
V. Civil Affairs in Situations Short of War	58
VI. Civil Affairs in Limited War	72
VII. Civil Affairs and Civil Defense	75
VIII. Civil Affairs a Part of Operations	83
IX. Civil Affairs versus Military Government	92
X. What "the Law" Allows	98
XI. Conclusion	106

## RETROSPECT

### I. A Problem Recognized

The history of American "military government" is an example of unanticipated challenge and reluctant response. The very thought of government by the military was uncongenial to the American tradition, and early military planning made no place for such a creature. It was only when the Army found itself in possession of former enemy territory after the termination of active hostilities that the absence or unacceptability of local government called the function of military government into existence.

The first instance of this military response to the need for government in the absence of government in our history came during the Mexican War, when Gen. Winfield Scott established military government over the areas of Mexico occupied by his forces. The lessons of that experience would have been extremely valuable for the future, had it been recognized that military government had a future. In fact, however, they were largely forgotten.

Military government was next occasioned by the fracture of our homeland, when Northern idealism, prudence, and retributive sentiments combined to forbid the immediate re-establishment of local government in the States that had seceded to form the Confederacy. This experience was marked by so much error and abuse, and feelings ran so high in the atmosphere in which "Beast" Butler became the symbol of military government, that its value for the future was again lost with the passage of time.

Following the termination of hostilities in World War I the US Army was once again called upon to control former enemy territory, this time in the Allied occupation of Germany's Rhineland. The benefits of this experience were not wholly lost, though it was largely an accident that they were not. One officer concerned was inspired to prepare an account and a critique of the occupation, and though this report dropped from view during the intervening years it turned up in time to contribute to the planning for military government in World War II.\*

The experience of World War I when viewed in the light of the objectives of World War II, focused attention upon the problems of military occupation. Tremendous effort was devoted to planning, training, organization, and eventually to actual operations, some of which miscarried for lack of sound initial guidance, and for lack of firm and enlightened policy determinations during the operations phase. In the aftermath of the war, despite the extent of experience with military government in various forms, its lessons were again about to be lost, as the CIVIL AFFAIRS DIVISION in the Department of the Army, along with so much else, was demobilized. The Korean Crisis reversed this trend and made it possible to put the planning of "civil affairs and military government" operations on a reasonably sound basis in terms of past experience.

It is possible, however, to over-emphasize the element of neglect, or whatever it was, that caused the military so promptly to lose interest in this peculiar function at war's end. It is at least equally important to note that oscillating interest in "military government" or in "civil affairs and military government" has, in fact, paralleled the ups and downs of our military preparations generally. A people with strong anti-militarist currents in their national origins, and a rich and favored natural position, who for long years enjoyed the protecting

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\*Col. I. L. Hunt, "American Military Government of Occupied Germany, 1918-1920." Report of officer in charge of Civil Affairs, Third Army and American Forces in Germany, commonly called The Hunt Report.

shield of a great power's national interest in preserving the peace in the New World and preventing the expansion of other powers into it, felt no great need for a large military establishment, and easily assumed that determined preparation for war was a departure from the peaceful norm. This comforting illusion died hard, even surviving two world wars in which our interests impelled us to intervene massively to influence the course of events in directions favorable to us. Only the awakening we call the Cold War, and at that only when it assumed the form of military aggression against the South Koreans, whose defense we chose to associate with our strategic interest, led us finally to accept the hard facts of the situation: our position, still favored, was no longer secure unless we made it so. It was this realization that impelled us to assume a position of leadership and responsibility in the world commensurate with our industrial power and our potential military resources. It likewise persuaded us that our "defense" problem was a continuing one, whose burdens we must learn to bear. Included in that continuing burden is the special problem area that will be called Civil Affairs in this paper. Based upon experience, the value of which came to be acknowledged only with the realization that it might have to be repeated, this problem area was assigned as a primary responsibility to the Army for study, and for the organization, planning, and training that would find us better prepared in the next emergency.

## II. The Army's Milieu

While it is probably going too far to say, as has nevertheless often been said, that the other services are machine-oriented, in contrast with the Army, which is man-oriented, there is a valid distinction between them in this regard. In all three services men are central, and the most general problems are human problems. The Navy and Air Force, however, are geared to special

means of locomotion — by sea and by air — and much that they do must be directed towards the mastery and control of the machines that make such locomotion possible. They are understandably more influenced by this circumstance than is the Army, whose concern for the feet of its infantrymen and the wheels of its vehicles has never become equally a preoccupation. But the legitimate source of the distinction between the services is not so much the means by which they move as the milieu through which they move. The Navy and Air Force, in effect, normally operate in a wasteland of sea and air, in which even the enemy is depersonalized by distance, while the Army, except in rare instances of desert or jungle warfare, moves in an environment that is peopled, and the enemy is immediate, individual, and personal.

The Army's human problems, then, are not so exclusively the problems of its own members, nor can it so easily reduce the enemy to geographic locations and physical characteristics, with a few high-level commanders and perhaps a few individual warriors to provide a minimum personal element. Not only are its internal human problems more demanding, because its operating teams are less conveniently ordered by the machines with which they are concerned, but also the sea within which it swims, the atmosphere within which it flies, is a human sea, a human atmosphere.

The fact that the ground forces must exist and perform their mission within a non-military human environment, which imposes special requirements upon their operations, is inherent in their nature. It may even be said that the original function of ground forces was to maintain internal order, and to meet internal challenges to the authority of the state. But our tradition, with its anti-military roots, has led us to depreciate this function of the federal forces. We have tried to leave it to the states, with their peacetime control of the National Guard, and their special militias (which are, however, also ground forces) "to ensure domestic tranquility." The provisions of the Constitution

that allow the President to assume this responsibility, which were reluctantly accepted in the first place, we have been most reluctant to employ. It may be said that we have tried to divorce the national Army from its human environment as much as possible. Until World War II at least, we sent the Army into combat with no more training, and no more inclination to undertake responsibilities related to the control of the civilian populations abroad, than at home. It was as though we assumed that the Army — like the Navy and Air Force — when it goes into combat, can take leave of its human base and perform its duties in an unpeopled wasteland.

### III. The Forms of the Problem

The experience of World War I, and the clear prospect of liberation of enemy-occupied friendly territory, not to say the occupation of enemy territory itself, at the outset of our participation in World War II, caused us to modify our traditional attitude towards the Army's relations with the civilian population. The preparations we made to meet the problems we expected to arise when our armies encountered the civilian populations of foreign lands, we called "military government." And it was military government that we prepared for. We distinguished between "liberated" and "occupied" territory, and assumed that in the liberated territory the local allied governments would promptly resume control of the local population and the responsibility for organizing its relief. In the case of occupied territory, while we recognized the possibility of a considerable burden of civilian relief, basically we conceived the problem to be the forcible control of hostile people, to prevent them from interfering with our military operations, and, when the cessation of hostilities permitted, to revise their institutions and reduce their resources so as to prevent their ever again becoming a threat to the peace of the world.

But what happened in fact? In North Africa we did little or nothing, because the fighting was so largely confined to the hinterland that local authorities were able to function. On Sicily and Italy we imposed allied military government, jointly with the British — even though the Italian government fell apart and an element of it made peace for the parts of Italy under Allied control. We devised the term "co-belligerent" and went on with military government, because it was the only means we had of dealing with the problems of a war-disrupted society threatened with chaos and starvation. In France, Belgium, and Austria (which latter we included among the "liberated" areas), our terminology caught up with us and we found ourselves conducting "civil affairs" operations, under the coordination of a "civil affairs division" — with "military government" units. We found also that the problems of refugee control and relief, of sanitation and local police, of clearing the roads and organizing labor parties to assist the advancing armies, were not confined to enemy territory. In Germany, and in Germany alone, did we ever conduct military government as conceived at Charlottesville.\*

In Germany we deliberately rooted out the local government, upon plea of its National Socialist taint — except the labor exchanges, which we found too useful to liquidate. And we did this in a second phase, following an initial phase that proved the existing local authorities invaluable aids in the pacification and ordering of the territory our forces occupied. We then set about the slow process of rebuilding governmental structures from the bottom up, purged — we hoped — of their Nazi infection.

Japan was quite different. There, too, reform was the order of the day, but though the term used was "military government," as we had worked it out in our schools and our plans, our administration was not. For there a Supreme

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\*The School of Military Government, Charlottesville, Virginia; established May, 1942.

Commander, aided by a special staff that called itself "military government," ruled the country through native institutions that still existed, up to the Emperor himself. The military government teams and units trained for Japan, for which the Supreme Commander felt no need so long as the Emperor obeyed him and the Japanese people obeyed the Emperor, were sent to Korea, for which they had not been trained — a "liberated" country according to our own principles. In Korea military government was established, again because of the gravity of local disorder and want, but even more because of the lack of any viable local government authorities after the Japanese had been expelled from office.

In each and every experience the degree of control we exercised was determined, not by the status of the territory — whether it was "liberated" or "occupied" — but by the existence or absence of an acceptable and effective local government. In Germany, with local government institutions whose origins were deep in the Middle Ages, and which never ceased to function until we told them to cease, we found the government unacceptable and liquidated it. Elsewhere, whether in ex-enemy and co-belligerent Italy, in prostrate France, our ally, or in inexperienced Korea, we engaged in "military government" wherever it was necessary, though in France we deemed it expedient to employ another term for it.

The lesson of all this experience is that the distinction between "military government" and something else that is "military" but not "government," is not one that can be made solely as between friend and enemy. We proved we could use military government as a tool of reform — some would say retribution — in those occupied areas where local authorities did not measure up to our standards. But we also found we had to use it in other areas for whose people we had only the most compassionate feelings.

After the war, and following extended periods of occupation in Germany and Japan — and of something that looked very much like an occupation in

Korea too — we found ourselves with a new problem. The territories we occupied were approaching rehabilitation. They had so far advanced that the relatively gross and cumbersome methods of military government were no longer adequate to guide the complex operations of a civilian society. We accordingly began to relinquish our authority and to turn responsibility back to the purged and rehabilitated (or in the case of Korea, the selected and trained) local governments. But the Cold War had descended upon us and our forces were required to remain in those countries. What was to be their relation to the local authorities we were re-establishing, and by what means was this relation to be maintained?

The record on this issue is perhaps not quite so conclusive. Again the German and Japanese patterns diverged, with Korea sui generis. In Japan, for the most part, we continued to ignore the fact of immediate local relations, and to count upon the resolution of all differences at the top. In Germany, however, where military government had left the High Commissioner, under State Department administration, a legacy of local resident officers, the military forces undertook to re-establish its "civil affairs" function, this time for purposes of liaison with the local authorities. In France, where we established the logistics base of our forces as the Cold War grew more and more threatening, we eschewed any suggestion of a function that was tainted by association with the occupation of German territory. Our local commanders in France, therefore, found themselves without the assistance of staffs trained and practiced in the arts of local relations, and were forced to improvise.

The record of our forces in France has not yet been examined with this problem in mind. It may be that such an examination will disclose that the burdens of "civil affairs" never became so great, and are not so great today, that our military commanders needed special civil affairs assistance. But the examination also may show that many a disturbing problem assigned some

other cause, and many a lost opportunity to achieve more effective operations, are traceable to our reluctance to raise the ghost of military government. It is true that the unprecedented NATO relationship, with its structure of commands and committees, created in France a situation that may have, in some substantial degree, ameliorated the conditions that normally give rise to liaison problems between troops and the people among whom they are stationed.

Nevertheless, some very difficult problems can be recalled from the early days, including procurement and labor difficulties, disagreements about taxes, and notable cases of delay and apparent uncooperativeness on the part of the local authorities and population. One may suspect that not all these problems were the result of French cantankerousness, nor even of local crisis conditions, but that some, perhaps many, resulted from failure of the French to understand what was expected of them, or from the failure of our commanders and their staffs to comprehend French ways of doing things, and were thus in part the result of our failure to establish anywhere a competent agency charged with the task of coordinating joint US-French efforts aimed at the consolidation of the defense of that part of the free world.

Later still, with extension around the world of our military assistance programs, still another form of the old problem arose. Because it is impossible simply to hand out what military machines we are asked for, and unsatisfactory to supply good equipment to our friends without helping them to learn to maintain and use it, these programs resulted in the proliferation of military aid staffs in all the countries that were our beneficiaries. And so the problem of comprehension, of coordination, of liaison arose in another form. But again, the military assistance advisory groups were provided with no officers specifically trained or experienced for this function.

It is true, of course, that there were US embassy staffs in all the countries concerned, and usually overseas teams from the economic aid administrations.

These might have been expected to prepare the way for the military aid teams, and to keep them on the track on questions such as the capacity of the local economies to absorb and support given amounts of military equipment, and given number of troops. But in fact there exists a communications problem between the home offices of these agencies in Washington, and this problem appeared overseas.

In its most acute forms — the embarrassing lack of coordination of various agencies in direct relations with the local government — the problem was alleviated by the formulation of the "country team" concept and the firm establishment by the President of the Ambassador's leadership in each country. But this went only part way towards the solution. It did not remove the difficulty of the military's dependence for critical information upon agencies of its own government with which its communications were inadequate. It did not place on the MAAG leader's staff one or more individuals whose job it was to understand the political and economic systems of the country, so that the facts as received from the Embassy, and from the ICA country mission, could be interpreted for, and communicated to, the military aid advisory group.

In addition, the guess may be hazarded that in all these countries there is a special problem. The military aid groups work closely with the local military authorities. They are accordingly treated by the representatives of other US agencies as experts on local military capability and requirements, and there is a general tendency to accept their estimates as reliable. Thus, as defense is conceived to be the priority problem (otherwise there would be no US military aid mission), the other members of the country team find themselves in the position of advocates — vis-à-vis their home offices — of the programs devised by the aid missions. Moreover, this position of support, sometimes amounting almost to subordination, is reinforced by the fact that information is often more readily available to the military aid group, whose presence is unprecedented

and upon whom the local military staffs are increasingly dependent, than to the embassy, which must depend upon more traditional forms of communication, or even the economic aid mission, whose complex responsibilities are more likely to involve lack of candor and even friction in relations with the departments of the local government.

Thus, not only is its program likely to be granted general priority, but also the military aid mission gains authority by its more intimate relations with local authorities. Particularly in underdeveloped countries, but even in developed countries that have strong military traditions and a secure military caste, this may result in a situation that resembles the blind leading the blind. The local military authorities are no more likely to be authoritative on the subject of local political, economic, and financial conditions than are the military authorities in this country when these conditions are not their responsibility. If, then, the military aid mission gains a favored position by virtue of its better relations with the local military authorities, it may be able to impose its views upon other US local agencies even though the latter are, or should be, much more aware of the realities.

One way to control this situation is to place the military aid mission in a position of general subordination to the embassy. But this expedient could throw away the advantages of the close relation the military aid mission has been able to establish with the local military authorities, and is likely to cause friction in the country team. A better way might well be to place on the staff of the military aid mission "experts" in politics, economics, and finance — in short, civil affairs officers, — who can interpret the information received from local military sources and reconcile it with information available to the political and economic aid mission from other sources. A military team leader, on the whole, is inclined to pay more attention to a member of his own staff, properly qualified, in whom, he has confidence, than to an

outsider. Moreover, the team member enjoys the tremendous advantage of day-to-day familiarity with the military and their problems, even though it is his special experience that makes it possible for him to communicate more effectively with other agencies of the US dealing with the same country.

This brief survey indicates the various forms in which the Army has encountered the civil affairs problem. About the last of these, the military aid missions, there will be debate. Granted that there is need of special competence and understanding, it will be argued that this can and must be acquired by the regular members of military aid teams. A later section will return to this point. Likewise, in the case of US troops stationed on allied soil, there is no question of the existence of the local liaison problem, but again it may be said that the problem can be solved by the military commands, in their various capacities, by the exercise of elementary public relations techniques, assuming that their larger problems are handled for them by US diplomatic and economic agents, and that the various US agencies are successful in coordinating their activities. Of the remaining cases, there is now no doubt on either score: the requirement exists, and it is proper to fill it with specially selected and trained and sometimes specially organized military personnel. But even when it is decided not to provide staff officers specifically to discharge the civil affairs responsibility in either MAAG operations or operations involving local liaison it is important to see the common character that runs through all these problem areas. In essence the common denominator is the problem of communication.

This works both ways. It is not just a matter of telling the local population what our forces desire them to do, or what the needs of our forces are. It is also the problem of comprehension, on the part of our forces, of local interests, local desires, and local capabilities. The volume and urgency of the communications, of course, varies from military government in the almost

total absence of local government, as in Germany and Korea during the early phases of our occupations of those countries, to questions that arise out of local troop relations with the citizenry, as in Germany today, or to the more abstruse policy questions inherent in the impact of military aid programs upon the local economy. Variety in the content of the communications problem gives rise to variety in the requirements, operational and organizational, placed upon the military service concerned. Neither the personnel, nor the procedures, nor the organization which successfully meets one requirement will necessarily meet another. But the communications common denominator is the starting point from which to appraise and prepare for all of them.

## PROSPECT

The future of the civil affairs function, cannot usefully be forecast unless we are willing to speculate about the circumstances in which the need for it is likely to arise. The need that arises from the stationing of US troops abroad, and from the activities of military aid missions abroad, may continue indefinitely. But in addition armies must be prepared to fight. It is necessary, therefore, to consider the future hostilities in which the civil affairs function may arise.

### I. The Impossible Choice

Though a great deal of what will be touched upon in this section is highly speculative, one fact surely is not. The future war in today's headlines and for which our forces are mainly preparing, even though they are reserving some capacity to deal with other contingencies, is a war without limit between the US and the USSR (and any allies and satellites that are unfortunate enough to become involved). This must be a thermonuclear war, marked by the delivery in large numbers of the most destructive explosive packages that science and engineering can design and build and the military forces can deliver.

In such a war, by general agreement among those who have studied the problem and hazarded prediction of the results, fewer than a hundred thermonuclear bombs successfully exploded on either the US or the USSR could kill as many as one fourth of the total population, leaving the remainder of the population widely scattered and probably incapable of effective communication.

Whether either country could survive such a cataclysm is a highly controversial question. It is certainly not a foregone conclusion that they would survive, in the sense that their historical identities would survive. It seems

not-unlikely, even if these losses were the end of the war, that the social fabric would dissolve and new political and social forms emerge after a long and disturbed period of reconstruction. But while it is an interesting and vital question just what degree of damage a modern industrial nation can survive, too much time need not be spent at this point asking in specific terms whether the US or the USSR could survive the destruction of 25% of its people. This is because we have no more assurance that the damage would be limited to this level than we have knowledge whether these nations would survive any particular degree of destruction. It could of course happen that all-out attacks on both sides would prove less destructive. It is also possible that not less than a hundred but actually thousands of thermonuclear bombs would land on target and both nations would be changed into wastelands, with perhaps only a few corners remaining habitable.

Thus actual results cannot be predicted, but there is a high probability of the destruction exceeding what the nation could endure, and it cannot be reasonably disputed that it must be a prime national objective to avoid such a showdown.

The way we go about avoiding the showdown is, of course, of decisive importance. There seem to be three broad possibilities. We could give up. We could allow our armaments to diminish until they were no longer an effective threat to the Soviet bloc, and then retreat step by step as the Communists became bolder in exploiting their military advantage. How long the process would take is difficult to say, but it is hardly open to doubt that this course would eventually result in an effective Communist world hegemony.

At the other extreme we can concentrate our efforts upon preparation for the big thermonuclear war, relying on the threat of such a war to "deter" our opponent's aggression. Whenever a conflict arises over a specific issue, however limited or remote that issue maybe from our ultimate security, we

can remind the other side that the question at stake is their survival, even though it may involve ours too. Sometimes they will believe us and be deterred. Sometimes, however, they may not believe us because we shall not believe ourselves. But if we do take this position, we cannot give way in many such cases without conveying to the other side the impression that our threat of retaliation is not to be taken seriously. Thus, when our deterrence in this form fails we shall be confronted with two uncomfortable alternatives: either to take the probably suicidal action we have threatened, on an issue that is not worth it, in order to prove the seriousness of our intentions and our threats; or to concede defeat on each minor and contributory issue until eventually we withdraw to the one issue that is unquestionably worth such a defense — namely, the defense of our homeland itself against direct attack.

Either of these alternatives, it cannot too much be emphasized, is a defeat for our purposes. The desperate choice of thermonuclear war presents such risks to our survival as a nation that any strategy that forces us to it is a strategy of defeat. On the other hand, retreat to Fortress America really only differs from the first choice — of abject surrender — in that it postpones the ultimate choice between submission and thermonuclear war.

## II. The Alternative

The first two choices, then, are defeatist, and are to be avoided. But there is a third choice. Our adversaries are no more eager than we are for an ultimate showdown involving the high probability of mutual destruction. This is a fact well worth remembering when they try to blackmail us into concessions by exploiting our reluctance to resort to thermonuclear war. We must not be more anxious to avoid such a showdown than they are. But we are quite likely to be if they have made provision for an alternative and we have not. If they are capable of military action short of a thermonuclear

holocaust and we are not, then we must meet every challenge with which they present us with the threat of "massive retaliation" that we recognize as a defeat for our purposes, while they need not be concerned about the absurdity of their own intentions, and can concentrate upon the likelihood that we shall carry out our "deterrent" threat. But if we are equally capable of military action short of a thermonuclear showdown our strategy will not be so rigid; they cannot then blackmail us with the threat of a holocaust in order to gain political objectives that are of marginal value to them as well as to us. If they move in Thailand, for example, our threat to attack Red China or the USSR in retaliation may well prove unconvincing. For they can read in our own newspapers the evidence that we do not consider Bangkok a fair exchange for New York. But if we can meet their aggression in the waters around Thailand, in the air over it, and, above all, on the ground in Thailand, and they know it, they will be less likely in the long run to make an aggressive move. The same goes, of course, for the Middle East and other troubled areas of the world.

The third course, then, recognizes our own prudent unwillingness to stake our very survival on each and every conflict of strategic interest that may arise between East and West. It requires that our defense be flexible, tailored to each threat, applicable and usable in appropriate measure. It recognizes that if our defense is not flexible, if it exhibits a fatal tendency to exceed in cost and risk the value of our stake in the immediate issue of the conflict, the aggressor need not be deterred from making his minor aggressive moves. It recognizes, further, that when an aggressive move is made, because our "deterrence" has failed to deter, if we have allowed our verbal commitment to general war to influence our preparations, we may well find ourselves at a decided disadvantage in any limited defense or counter-action that we may then desire to undertake.

This third course, at which we have arrived by means of a strategic diagnosis, is in accord with the common observation that the free world must prepare itself for "an era of limited wars." It does not, however, rest entirely upon theory, for recent history gives abundant evidence that we are, in fact, already in such an era.

Since the end of World War II there have been many limited conflicts, actual and threatened, — though we have preferred to see in each of these conflict, if they affected our interests, the threat of unlimited war. Some of the limited wars that might have occurred have not actually done so — for example, that which might have arisen during the Iranian crisis of 1946 — because the aggressor was not willing to take the risks even of limited conflict. Some have not occurred presumably because of fear that they might not remain limited — of this the Berlin crisis of 1948 is probably an example. Even so, several have actually broken out. Moreover, the fact that our forces have not been openly engaged in all of these does not alter the conclusion that the East-West conflict is already being fought piecemeal.

We think of Korea as the prime example of a limited war, because there we were directly involved and had thousands of casualties. And the Korean experience invokes uncomfortable memories that render it difficult for us to face the problem and prospect of limited war. But we were also directly involved in the Greek civil war, though we had few if any casualties. Both these conflicts were examples of one device available for limiting war between great powers: to make them agency wars, and let agents do the fighting for the major powers. In the Greek civil war we fought the Communist world through the agency of the Greeks. In Korea, the Russians fought us and the United Nations through the agency first of the North Koreans, then also of the Chinese. In addition, of course, the Korean War was an example of

unacknowledged participation in overt hostilities by a major power, for the Chinese armies were ostensibly individual "volunteers" — a fiction we never disputed officially, at least until we concluded a truce with the Chinese Communists.

The Greek civil war, thanks to the conflict that arose within the Communist bloc between Yugoslavia and the USSR, was a success for our policy of containment-by-limited war-if-necessary. The Korean War, owing perhaps to the error of the Russians in stirring up trouble in the one vicinity far from our shores where we had sizeable forces we could throw in, though less successful, was certainly no failure. The Indo-China conflict, in which we came near to replacing the French in responsibility, though not on the casualty lists, was another limited conflict, another "agency" war, and resulted in another stalemate and compromise settlement.

Nor do these exhaust the list, which, to be complete, would have to include other conflicts, including the guerrilla wars and civil strife in Malaya, the Philippines, and Algeria, and, of course, the Suez War of 1956, which, though not a direct clash of East and West, was a conflict in which both the Russian stakes and our own were substantial.

It will appear from the example cited that our problem is not confined to wars that are formally declared, and otherwise satisfy the traditional definition of armed conflict between "belligerents." In fact "war," in the forms to which we are accustomed, may actually be the least of our immediate concerns at any particular moment, though always a contingency for which we have to be prepared.

The kinds of war, then, towards which our thinking and planning for civil affairs in future hostilities should be directed may be listed as follows:

- a. general nuclear war
- b. limited wars in which US forces are actively engaged.
- c. agency defense and limited agency war

When it was said above that a thermonuclear showdown would not be a rational choice it was not meant that such a tragedy may not occur. Unhappily it is an ever-present possibility that might follow from our own or from the other side's miscalculation. It is, therefore, a problem that we must think seriously about. The term for it that will be used in this paper is simply "general war," by which should be understood a war between the US and USSR that is unrestricted by any consideration not related to immediate "military" necessity." Specifically, territorial and weapons limitations are ruled out, it being assumed that either side will attack where it hopes to gain and that either can win a temporary advantage by employing a weapon the other side has not employed. This includes CW and BW as well as nuclear weapons.

### III. The Army's Role

What part is the Army likely to play in a general war? There are those who see vast land battles — vast in area if not in manpower — in the initial phases with nuclear weapons, or in a post-nuclear "broken-backed" phase, after both sides have exhausted their nuclear stockpiles. There are others who can conceive of no such operations, but who do maintain that the Army will have two overseas assignments of considerable, though not primary, significance. In their view the Army must guard overseas establishments, the air fields, and bases, and perhaps ports, that contribute to the effectiveness of the primary combat forces. These guards presumably must be largely anti-air or anti-missile units, but may be ground defense units if the other

side depends more heavily upon ground attack than we do. The other function is that of "mopping up" after our nuclear forces have broken the enemy's resistance. Included in this mopping up are the familiar liberation and occupation duties of our troops in former wars, although the problems they encounter after the destruction of nuclear combat has been visited upon the areas in which they are operating must be quite novel.

Still others consider both these views unrealistic. They assert that it is impossible to believe that in a general war the US will retain either interest in, or capability for, overseas operations, and the only role remaining in the Army is the vital one of helping to preserve some kind of life in this country after it has been hit by a thermonuclear assault.

As between the three views of the Army's role in general war the last seems likely to be the correct one. It is inherently more probable, in the light of what we know and can guess about the future. But it is no more than a probability, and there is certainly some probability attached to each of the alternatives. Thus the Army must be prepared, in some measure, for all of them.

But this problem of choice between alternatives, the problem of deciding which of alternative possibilities merit priority of attention and preparation, is simple compared to the more complex choice between general war as such and those other contingencies that have been grouped under the term "limited war." It is on this choice that the issue of the Army's proper role really hinges. Must it accept the inevitability of general war and sacrifice capabilities for limited war in order to maximize its resources for general war? Or can it afford to reduce its general war capabilities if necessary to develop its means for limited operations?

In making decisions of this nature there is always a dilemma whether to emphasize preparation for the most likely contingency, or for the most dangerous

one. In terms of danger to US security, of course, one general war is the equivalent of many limited wars. But our estimate of the comparative probabilities based both upon a theoretical analysis and upon current history has indicated that many limited wars are likely to occur before there is a general war. Thus the more likely but less dangerous contingencies may outweigh the less likely but far more dangerous contingency by sheer weight of numbers. Also, it may well be the case that the ultimate risk of the most dangerous contingency depends upon our success or failure in preparing for, preventing, or concluding satisfactorily the less dangerous ones. This last is a point to which we shall return later in this section.

Now, in preparing for all these things, the Army can, in general, pursue any one of three alternative courses. It may try to be as well prepared as possible for all the possible contingencies, giving no priority to any one of them. Alternatively, the Army may try to be best prepared for one type of contingency, while reserving some effort and capability for the others. Finally, the Army may concentrate its preparations upon a single contingency and neglect all the others. Prudence wavers between the first and the second courses. The first implies that comparative values, whether of urgency or of importance, cannot be precisely determined, and therefore that every possible contingency should be provided for equally. But this turns out to be quite impossible, and failure to identify the contingency that deserves to be given priority usually results in one of them being given priority for some other reason. Almost no one would advocate the final course, because that implies certainty of knowledge and perfect assignment of value. A rational examination of the alternative courses clearly indicates that the second is the most desirable.

The various defense contingencies have been discussed in terms of their comparative likelihood and their comparative danger to the country. It has been concluded that general war is the least likely but most dangerous; that agency wars and limited wars taken together are far more likely but far less dangerous; and it has been suggested that the gravest risk of general war probably lies in a limited war or series of limited wars that gets out of hand. It does not follow, however, that the Army's priorities should be determined solely by the criteria of probability and danger. An additional consideration has to be introduced — the Army's ability to make a useful contribution to the defense of the country. In other words, it is not just what is most urgent or most dangerous that necessarily deserves the Army's first consideration; it is that to which the Army can make the most significant contribution, assuming of course that that to which the Army is best fitted to contribute is also of sufficient urgency and value to justify the effort and expense.

An analogy may serve to illustrate the point. Consider a police force that has the following departments: general law-enforcement, juvenile delinquency, homicide, traffic, narcotics, confidence, and vice. All departments exist for the purpose of suppressing crime and keeping the peace, but there is specialization in terms of particular "threats" to the peace. Suppose, now, that the city is hit by a crime wave and all departments are overworked. The chief of the traffic department is trying to determine how he can best employ his resources to assist in the general effort to meet the crime wave and suppress it. There has, incidentally, been no let-up in local traffic. Surely it is his part to do as well as possible the job he is best equipped to do — that is, traffic control — and let someone else determine whether the general shortage of police resources to meet the crime wave requires that he give up some of his men to other departments. It would make no sense for him to denude his traffic posts in order to pursue bank robbers and narcotics salesmen. At the

same time, if he were able to get away with it, he might be tempted to do so, because these other activities are what grab the headlines and the public credit in a crime wave.

This analogy isn't as simple-minded as it may seem. For example, the director of the traffic department will almost certainly be under pressure to give up men he feels he cannot spare, unless the city wants a traffic crisis to add to its crime wave. Therefore, he will probably have to defend his department openly and vigorously even though to do so may hurt his popularity. Moreover, someone in high authority may in fact have to make the difficult decision to run greater risks of the traffic situation getting out of hand in order to combat the increase in crime, or alternatively he may have to decide that the traffic problem, though enjoying less popular support, must in fact be given added attention, even at the expense of other departments. In addition, the whole operation will have to be conducted under waxing pressure of public interest and sense of grievance, and it would not be at all unusual if the crime wave and an economy wave coincided.

Of course the analogy isn't perfect. But it — and any one of a number of others that suggest themselves — does throw some light upon the dilemma with which we are all too familiar. We have a complex problem to guarantee the security of the US. We have a variety of military "threats" to that security, some of which appear more dangerous than others, while some appear more imminent than others, and the most dangerous and most imminent do not necessarily coincide. In addition we have three different Armed services — some would say the Marine Corps makes a fourth — pledged to maintain that security by performing the tasks for which they are fitted. Now impose upon this complex a revolutionary era of technological developments in the weapons they all employ. Add the factor of public concern, a quantity that varies from indifference to near panic depending on the morning's "threat"

headlines; add also the conflicting voices of strategists, amateur as well as professional. Add, finally, a popular economy wave and Congressmen who are torn between today's fears for the security of the country and yesterday's and tomorrow's fears of the continued inflation for which the Defense budget is held largely responsible. It is a receipt for confusion.

It may be possible to escape the confusion, however, if we return to the fundamentals: the nature of the threat or threats and the nature of the contribution that the Army is capable of making. (The same type of analysis can of course be applied to the roles of the other services, which are not in fact ignored here.) We have already noted the three types of wars for which the US must evidently be prepared, the three contingencies involving direct hostilities to which we must devote our resources. They can be set up in order of imminence as follows:

First: Agency (limited) wars

Second: Limited wars

Third: General war

They can also be ordered in terms of danger to our national security and ultimately our national survival, each conflict being considered as a unique event.

Most dangerous: General war

Dangerous but much less dangerous: Limited war

Least dangerous: Agency (limited) war

Finally, it should be possible to suggest an ordering of various more complex contingencies in terms of importance, this time reflecting the combined significance of imminence and danger and the interactions of dangers of various sorts. Let us take a cold look, then, at the alternative combination of circumstances that may occur.

First (the existing situation): So-called Cold War erupting periodically into open hostilities in which we are not directly involved.

Second: The first situation eventuates in an agency war in which we are directly involved (as backstop and support for our agent, as in Greece and Indo-China).

Third: The first or second situation eventuates in a limited war involving our forces.

Fourth: The second or third situation evolves into general war between East and West.

Fifth: East or West (the USSR or the US mainly) makes a surprise attack on the other.

We can complicate the analysis further still, to suggest trends of events extending beyond the limited conjunctions and sequences already suggested.

First: The sparring of East vs West goes in favor of the West until the Eastern threat recedes.

Second: The sparring goes in favor of the East until the West succumbs.

Third: The sparring comes to an end in general war.

As to the first and **second** of these trends, the "sparring" includes, of course, all the non-belligerent moves of the Cold War, as well as active hostilities. Thus political, economic, psychological and military moves, short of war, are essential parts. But war, when it comes, belongs in these trends only if it does not end in a general holocaust. If there is general war the trend will be the third. The second trend spells defeat for the Western cause; the third, defeat for both East and West. In fact, it is difficult to conceive of the second trend going through to any kind of conclusion without merging into the third. It may be asked whether the first trend can continue

indefinitely without an explosion resulting from the pent-up frustration of the Communist-world. The answer must be that though such an explosion is a possibility, it does seem less likely to occur, for two reasons: first, because as the West is less dynamic its success is not likely to generate such urgent pressures upon the East as the latter's successes would impose upon the free world; second, the Communist world, being more disciplined, is probably better able to accommodate itself to retreat. Whatever the risks may be, however, it is clear that only the first trend is acceptable in terms of our objectives.

Now, what is it that distinguishes between the trends aside from the presence or absence of general war? Clearly it is Western success or failure in the competitive moves short of general war, including the two forms of limited war. If the analysis is reasonable, it becomes clear that our policies can succeed, our objectives and purposes be achieved, only if we can deal successfully with the problems of limited war. We stand to lose if we become engaged in general war; we do not stand to gain (except negatively in the sense that we aren't immediately devastated) merely by avoiding general war. We stand to gain only if we are successful in the competition with International Communism short of the ultimate clash of general war. And, unless we can find some way of changing the existing situation and so governing the future that recent experience is not repeated, a principal measure of this success must be our ability to handle adequately the exacting requirements of limited conflicts, whether those in which we are engaged only by the agency of another people, or those in which our own troops are fighting.

#### IV. The Nation's Objective

If the foregoing discussion has become somewhat abstruse, it should come clear in the statement of the conclusion. This is that our national objective as regards war must be twofold: first, to avoid general war; second, to avoid

losing out in the cold war-limited war situation that seems the only alternative to general war. It probably does not need to be added that our general war avoidance must be compatible with the second objective; that is, we do not achieve our objective by giving up the struggle and quietly assuming the position of a Communist satellite.

The word "objective" suggests something positive. It is also a necessary purpose, inescapably, if we do become involved in general war, to win it if we can and to save as much of ourselves as we can. The discussion is not meant to ignore this. But it is impossible not to regard it as essentially a negative objective; it is not an end to our policies that we can possibly choose deliberately. Our choice has got to be positive, it has got to be winning, not merely eking out the best possible chance of survival in a conflict we probably cannot hope to win in any meaningful sense.

The statement of the national objective, in these simplified terms, then, suggests a pair of questions, which have important political, economic, and psychological aspects, but with the military aspects of which we are exclusively concerned at the moment:

First: What is the surest and safest way of avoiding general war?

Second: How do we avoid losing out in the cold war-limited war conflict situation that is the only visible alternative to general war?

To be logically comprehensive we need to add the supplementary questions:

First: If we cannot avoid general war, or do not avoid it, what can we do to maximize our chance of surviving or winning it?

Second: If we cannot avoid losing out in the cold war-limited war contest, how can we string our defeat out as long as possible?

This analysis, for what it is worth, suggests a method of approach to the vexing question of the "roles and missions of the services." Also it suggests how the dilemma considered earlier, of the comparative imminence and danger of various contingencies, and how they affect the role of the Army in particular (but of course the roles of the other services as well), might be dealt with.

In speaking of the "avoidance" of war, it is not "peace" as an "objective" of foreign policy that we are thinking of. Even though peace is an objective, and a legitimate one, it is false to consider it the objective. For this involves logical confusion. A fair general statement of our national objectives must always be formulated in such terms as "to achieve certain objective conditions, or certain specific objectives, peacefully if possible." Both history and current politics prove that while there are always objectives we shall abandon if they cannot be achieved peacefully, there are also always some objectives we shall not abandon, even if we have to fight for them. One difficulty with the prospect of general war in the nuclear age is that it sets the value of "peace" so high, if general war is the only alternative, that we should probably be compelled to abandon all our objectives save one, and that very narrowly conceived and unsatisfactory -- our last-ditch continental defense.

Therefore, when we conclude that the first half of the twofold objective of our foreign policy must now be to avoid general war, we mean that it is our purpose to obtain our objectives while conducting our affairs in such a way as to avoid having to choose between our positive objectives and general war. As for the other half, we shall certainly if possible maintain our position in the East-West competition without resorting to hostilities. But the record also indicates that we will not always yield merely because the alternative to yielding is involvement in war, provided the war in which we are to be involved is not a general war.

It should also be noted, by way of comment on the twofold objective, that both parts relate to the question of survival. If we conceive the US as a complex social system, for which the closest analogue is perhaps a biological organism, then its irreducible purpose, as against other national systems, is to survive. It of course has many other purposes, many far more complex, but no one would question the generality and simplicity of the objective of survival. We have fought great wars in the past, in fact the last two came near to satisfying anybody's concept of pre-nuclear "general" war, and always for purposes which, in the last analysis, reduced to the issue of survival. In fact, even before the entry on the scene of nuclear weapons, it was almost impossible, in terms of our values, to justify participation in general war except upon the ground that failing to do so would endanger our survival. It is precisely for the same reason now that we shall avoid general war if we can -- because the chance of survival in such a war is an unacceptable risk, unless the alternative is our certain destruction, which, of course, would be the case if we were defending ourselves against a direct nuclear attack upon our homeland.

But the other part of the twofold objective is equally, though less directly, related to survival. We cannot afford to allow our world position to be eroded away, because if we did we should eventually find ourselves in a position of having to choose between the certainty of destruction by domination or the high probability of destruction in a last-ditch defense in general war. Thus it is possible to look at our national objective, stated in these simple terms, from another angle. We can say that our purpose is to survive and prosper and that we realize that the great risk to our survival and prosperity is the cataclysm of general war. Therefore it must be our purpose to prevent the issue of general war from arising, and we propose to do this by establishing and seeking to maintain outworks before our citadel. We shall gain and hold these outworks if possible by establishing with their inhabitants a common ground of interest,

or perhaps by bargain and purchase, using our prestige, and our economic and psychological resources, as well as our ability to offer military aid and support to the local inhabitants. The process of gaining and holding is a competitive one, it is the stuff of the Cold War, and it is always possible that the competition will warm up into a hot war. But at least we shall have kept the conflict remote from our inner defenses. And we must recognize the necessity of conducting these remote operations, particularly when they involve actual war, in such a way as to keep the conflict remote.

Thus, though the national objective is twofold, the twofoldness is really only two ways of looking at the same thing. The unity in our objectives is the purpose of survival. The gravest threat to our survival is general war, which is certain to end our existence if we lose and highly likely to end it even if we do not. Therefore, while it is possible to say that our purpose is to prevent the erosion of our position without the necessity of resort to general war, it should be added that, in terms of our objective distilled to sheer survival, the reason for avoiding erosion is that if we do not avoid it we know that in the process of erosion the issue of general war is certain to arise. This is the reason why it was said earlier that the gravest risk of general war may well lie in a failure to deal with limited threats. It is true, of course, only so long as we do not lose interest in survival, as we might do if our system came to be controlled by domestic Communists, or if we became so terrified of general war that we came to believe that no alternative is worse than general war -- not even surrender.

#### V. The Army's Role and the Nation's Objective,

We may now return to the role of the Army. Let us ask how the Army, as a military arm of the state, can contribute to the twofold objective of avoiding general war, while maintaining our position in the international competition that includes limited wars of various kinds as inescapable ingredients.

And first let it be said without equivocation that the reason why the avoidance of general war is a national objective is the anticipated destructiveness of such a war. It is because no positive purpose can be served by resort to a war of such destructiveness, that resort to such a war can be considered rationally only in terms of the negative objective of avoidance. So long as we can have no confident hope of "winning" such a war, this attitude towards it must be our prime motivation.

Fortunately, we can be quite certain that the only possible enemies we have in the world must take precisely the same attitude. It is possible that circumstances may change. The avalanche of technological developments through which we are living could conceivably result in one side or the other gaining such a long lead that for that side a general war would no longer be an irrational resort. It is also possible that some technological development might occur that would drastically reduce the predictable destructiveness of general war, so that there would be many, and not just one, contingencies worse than resort to general war. In either case a drastic revision of our national strategies would be called for, because the frame of our national objectives would have been changed. Until such an unlikely development occurs, it remains true that the inevitable destructiveness of general war, and the large question it raises whether any belligerent in such a war could be said to have "survived," much less to have "won," is what makes its avoidance an imperative of national policy.

But if expected destructiveness has this consequence, what does it tell us about the service roles? The lesson seems clear enough. The most destructive arm of our defenses today, by all odds, is airpower, particularly if long-range missiles be included in air power as we enter the missile age. It just happens to be a fact, no matter how you look at it, that the cheapest way to accomplish sheer destruction is by means of planes and long-range

missiles. This is a reason, though not the only one, for viewing with skepticism proposals for the development of an offensive ground forces role in general war. It is possible, under favorable logistic circumstances, that a ground force's deep penetration of enemy territory in such a war might occur. But it is difficult to see what it could accomplish that could not be accomplished at least as well, and much more cheaply, by planes and long-range missiles.

Again, it may be well to introduce a reservation. It is conceivable that technological advance might render air or missile attack ineffective, while still allowing ground forces to operate effectively. But this seems highly unlikely in the context of general (which of course means unlimited) war. Meanwhile, in such a war both sides will be under press of desperate urgency to accomplish as much destruction as possible in the shortest possible time, that is, before the destruction received makes further offensive action impossible.

It is not suggested that the destruction would be deliberately indiscriminate. It is reasonable to suppose that the primary targets will be "military" — air bases and missile-launching sites, for example. But even so the time requirements are critical, and neither side is likely to find that it can meet the time limits by employing ground forces to do a job that air and missile forces can do far better.

It is true, in general, that ground forces are more discriminating than air and missile forces are — for example, there is likely to be little advantage to the ground forces in using thermonuclear weapons on targets at which their own organic weapons can be aimed with greater precision. Therefore, if limitations are imposed upon the action so that maximum destruction in minimum time is not the sovereign requirement, it is possible that wide-ranging ground forces might find a place. But this belongs to another part of the discussion. The imposition of the limitations necessary to make offensive

ground action more effective for some purposes than air or missile action, would also introduce limited war.

It hardly seems necessary to pursue the discussion further at this point. The conclusion is that in general war the primary offensive role belongs to the arm of the service that controls the air and long-range missiles. There is no question that the other arms would have roles to discharge, but though they would be of great important they would necessarily be supporting roles.

The Army is reluctant to accept this conclusion, because it is interpreted by many officers as being tantamount to admitting that the Army does not occupy a position of priority in the defense of the country against the gravest danger to its security. But the foregoing discussion has tried to show that this is not the way the issue should be looked at. The "gravest danger" is also the most remote, and it is the primary task set our national strategists to keep it that way; the role the issue plays in strategic planning is properly that of a desperate expedient to be avoided. This avoidance requires a twofold preparation, direct and indirect, corresponding to the twofold nature of the simplified national objective described earlier. Direct avoidance calls for ensuring that we maintain the capability of massive destructiveness, because it is the destructiveness of general war that makes it something to be avoided — not only by us, but also by any possible enemy. Indirect avoidance is, however, quite different. This relates to the cold and limited war aspect of the twofold national objective. It is here that the Army's role is primary.

Limited war requires measure and precision, just as do the diplomatic and other maneuvers of which it is the supplement. Moreover, limited war requires the employment of forces within a society that is not to be destroyed, but, on the contrary, a society the preservation of which is a major objective of the action. To this end, limited war not only requires that destructiveness be minimized, it also requires the ability to impose controls upon a disorganized

society, in order to protect it from self-destruction, and therefore the availability for prompt employment of the means necessary to bring about the relief and rehabilitation of that society.

It has already been noted that it is inherent in the historical and functional nature of ground forces that they move in a human environment. Navies may land forces from the sea, airmen may ground their planes, but neither group, with rare and brief exceptions, fights its battles within the ligaments of society. This is the Army's normal role; it is also the role most appropriate to limited war and the preparation for limited wars of various kinds -- including those agency wars we examined earlier. (Perhaps it should be said here, for the benefit of the Marine Corps, that in this discussion the criterion is the locale of battle, rather than the control of the force -- hence the Marines are here regarded as Army, not as Navy.) In these limited wars the other services have essential roles to perform, but for the most part these roles are supporting roles. The ground forces, which alone are capable of applying force with precision and discrimination to targets that are within the confines of a segment of the human society that we desire to liberate or control, but in either case to save, not destroy, are the stars of the action.

It will be recalled that as between the imminence and gravity of various threats, the required preparations for which could be conflicting, it was suggested that the Army has three choices: to be as well prepared as possible for all threats; to concentrate upon one threat, while reserving some effort and capability for the others; and to concentrate exclusively upon one. It was also remarked then that the Army had in fact made, in these terms, the logical choice: to concentrate upon one threat while reserving some effort and capability for the others. The ensuing discussion was intended to inquire which threat the Army ought to give priority, and what principles, if any, might serve to indicate the order of effort that should appropriately be devoted to the

alternatives. In fact, the alternatives have been reduced to two, general war and limited war (the latter comprehending both limited conflicts by agency and limited conflicts in which our forces are actual participants). It has also been pointed out that the Army is reluctant to make limited war the focus of its attention, for fear of finding itself in a secondary position among the services.

From the available evidence, it appears on balance that the Army may have made the right kind of choice but the wrong actual choice. It too often seems to have resolved to concentrate upon the most dangerous threat, rather than upon the threat which is both more imminent and for which its services are most appropriate.

In view of the failure of Congress and the public to comprehend the two-fold nature of our defense requirements, this error is understandable. But it has not saved the Army from the budget cuts it feared. Nor will persistence in the error ever do so. So long as the role of sheer destructiveness in general war is not disputed it will continue to be impossible to convince Congress and the people of the United States that the Army is the appropriate service to emphasize in preparation for general war.

In the field of limited war, in contrast, the Army has a good case. It is the only service that we, the people, can depend on, in the final analysis, to keep the intolerable risk of general war at a distance. This being a fact, there seems to be no alternative but for the Army to take the bit in its teeth and go to Congress and the public with the case for limited war, acknowledging this its primary role. Only by doing so can the Army with good conscience insist that the other services assume the full measure of responsibility for their supporting roles, offering in return whole-hearted attention to its supporting role in general war.

## VI. The Army's Role and Civil Affairs

No great elaboration is now required to show how the military prospect affects the role of Civil Affairs. There must, of course, be effort devoted to the planning for civil affairs activities in a general war of survival, as part of the Army's supporting role in such a war. This may well include civil affairs functions, even population control activities, overseas. But the odds are that the role that will emerge in this connection is in the area of domestic civil defense. In the event of all-out nuclear strikes upon the continental US the country will have to use its every resource for survival. This will be the subject of a latter section, for the moment it must suffice to point out that if the Army is equipped to discharge its Civil Affairs role in connection with its primary mission, then it will have an invaluable capability, along with its engineers, and its medical and other services, for which there is unlikely to be any alternative employment of value comparable to that it would have in the relief and rehabilitation of the country.

But remember that this is a contingency to be avoided. So long as it is successfully avoided (primarily because of positive action taken to ensure the destruction of any enemy in general war), the actual problem for the Army, and for the Army's civil affairs function, lies elsewhere. It lies precisely in the area of cold war and limited war activities which is the inescapable counterpart, in terms of national objectives, of the purpose to avoid general war. And primary contribution the Army can make both to the attainment of limited national objectives, and to the success of the national policy of avoiding a general showdown, is to discharge its responsibilities in this area with efficiency.

Thus the Army is presented with a mission and a challenge to which no other service is in a position to respond, but also with a rich opportunity for

service to the country. The social context of limited war is inescapable. Already the military aid missions, and the major efforts made to establish or rehabilitate and support the armies of Greece, S. Korea, and S. Vietnam, have shown how complex and challenging the requirements of the cold war and of agency wars may be. Like the diplomatic moves that play the leading role in this situation, military moves of various kinds must be timely and appropriate to the need. The battle is to hold a national position across a broad front, to resist isolated assaults by ensuring that local defenses are kept up, and to make specific offensive moves when an opportunity is offered to gain a position from the enemy. When there are no open hostilities, but even when hostilities break out in a particular locale, all moves must be made in conjunction with local interest and with local interests and requirements constantly in mind. There are, strictly speaking, no desert battlefields.

The real battle is for men's minds — to gain their support for values we can hold in common with them, and then to coordinate our joint efforts in defense of these values. We lack both the resources and the will to go about establishing outposts that must be held against the wishes of local society. We must gain our outposts with their free consent and to maintain them we need their help. In this struggle there is no point at which "peacetime" activities cease and "wartime" activities begin — no sharp dividing line between peace and war. It is required of our military authorities that their every move contribute usefully to the total campaign, and this means that they must work constantly and in full cooperation with the political, economic, and information agencies of our government. War may come in one place, but the battle goes on elsewhere as well. The struggle is unremitting so long as our opponents are implacable. And to win this struggle is the positive aspect of our twofold national objective. It is towards this winning — the only kind of war we can win — that the Army can make its primary contribution. And it should be

clear from this discussion that in the Army's discharge of their responsibility, the civil affairs function has a large part to play.

## CONCEPT

### I. The Nature of a Need

A mountain of experience, upon which there has been by this time mountainous evaluation and speculation, permits the formulation of certain conclusions about the civil affairs function of the Army. The first is that under familiar wartime circumstances it is inescapable. If the United States must be prepared for future wars, and if those wars are to resemble the wars we have fought in the past in some critical particulars, then "civil affairs and military government" must be regarded as an organization and planning requirement. But experience and speculation suggest more than this.

They suggest that the requirement should not be treated exclusively as the product of war but rather as inherent in the nature and mission of the ground forces. Recall the milieu in which the Army exists, and its inability to divorce itself from the human sea in which it swims, in war or in peace. Recall also the conditions that the contemporary world have imposed upon United States foreign purposes and objectives. The dynamics of modern civilization call for positive, even aggressive, action if we are to hold our own. Reluctant as we have been to assume the trappings of military power "in time of so-called peace," to use Churchill's phrase, our forces are stationed around the world and we have made security commitments to dozens of countries. Disinclined as we are to assume burdens on behalf of other peoples, our programs of economic and military aid to other countries are extensive, costly, and apparently unending. Suspicious as we are of "propaganda," the budget of our Information Agency, despite reverses, surprisingly holds its own against periodic onslaughts.

On the military plane, the Army's peculiar responsibility for the execution of these world-wide commitments is indisputable. It is the counterpart not alone of the Army's mission, but also of its competence -- though the latter derives from the former. The Army's responsibilities for ground defense require it to live in society, not aloof from it. Moreover, as was pointed out earlier, the Army's primary concern is with human organization, with a minimum of simplifying preoccupation with machines. For these reasons the Army's every move must be made in circumstances of political sensitivity. Does it take over farm lands for training its troops in France? Do its men cause disturbances that irritate the local population anywhere? Do its purchases from local economies disturb economic stability? Does its presence contribute to the strength of local political institutions, or is it used by critics and subversive opponents to produce disturbance and weakness? Many of the same questions can of course be asked regarding the activities of other services when they are present. But the effects are generally more localized, and, the construction of naval bases and airfields aside, less substantial. Moreover, as the Army starts with the larger burden of local requirements, it generally assumes responsibility for the supply of items of common use. For all these reasons, and others that might be adduced, the Army's "civil affairs" problems exist whenever an overseas mission is assigned.

Nor is the phenomenon confined to foreign territory. Though it has not been recognized as a problem giving rise to a special function and requiring a specially trained and organized staff, obviously many of the operations that occasion the need for special competence in the Army overseas are likewise performed domestically. It is customary for each service to assume the burdens of the social impact of its operations, and these impose responsibilities upon commanders beyond those that are directly connected with the unit's internal structure and the performance of its military mission.

Foreign operations are distinguished from domestic mainly by the unfamiliarity of the setting, including such complications as the language problem and the necessity of working with foreign representatives of other agencies of the United States government, notably with the US embassy in the country in question. For this reason the special training and skills that have proved to be indispensable in wartime have obvious peacetime application. The US military commander abroad, who is confronted with problems that arise from his relations with the local authorities and with problems that include large numbers of niggling and time-wasting minor issues as well as occasional quite critical ones, may readily concede the need for a staff with special competence to aid him in their solution.

At least two factors, however, have militated against the general acceptance of this function in peacetime military operations in friendly countries. The first is the simple human reluctance to change, regardless of the weight of the evidence that indicates the desirability of a change. Commanders who have spent their careers in good part in service in the United States, and who are accustomed to expect the Engineers, the Quartermaster, and other specialists to make their own peace with local authorities and people — and who are accustomed to dealing personally with problems of general application, or with those that threaten to become acute, assisted by their Chief of Staff and General Staffs, and perhaps their PIO — tend to regard this manner of operation as normal and desirable. They are resistant to change, particularly as the reasons for change are derived from wartime experience, which they regard as quite unique. And their resistance is reinforced by the second factor that militates against acceptance — the attitude of the local people, or rather an anticipation of their attitude.

This latter factor has, in part at least, semantic origins. The association of "civil affairs" with "military government" has caused the former,

despite all efforts at purification, to suggest the latter, hence to suggest occupation, which we naturally expect to be unacceptable to our allies. Actually, we have given our allies little if any occasion to express this lack of acceptance. We have assumed that a civil affairs function, say, in France, would be irritating to the French because they would note the title "Civil Affairs and Military Government," and not be convinced by the definitions that distinguish the one from the other. Only in countries where we once imposed military government have we felt free to maintain "civil affairs," being convinced, apparently, that the change in terminology in these cases would direct attention to the distinction and thereby tend to remove rather than suggest the taint of "occupation."

But what all our massive experience tells us is that the civil affairs requirement exists, not because the surrounding people are foreign, much less because they are hostile, but because they are people, exposed to the disturbing presence of military forces. It is the contact of military and social organization that gives rise to problems of adjustment, of communication, of friction. It is the human environment that imposes burdens upon the commander that he is not equipped by his specifically military training to bear without assistance.

It is true, as our experience also demonstrates, that in our own country, and even in some foreign countries, it is often possible for the commander to rise to this challenge without special assistance. He accumulates experience in dealing with local governors, mayors, public prosecutors, and police chiefs — also with chambers of commerce and civic clubs. The members of his staff also acquire experience, and for the most part are able to keep the problems their activities generate from harassing the commander. Generally, too, the commander finds someone, a chief of staff, executive or operations officer, a public information officer, or an aide-de-camp who can represent him in the local relations of his command, who can "trouble-shoot" when that

is required, who, in short develops the special competence for "civil affairs" not provided by organization and training.

The critical need for trained competence and for special organization arises when the issues are more pressing and when other demands upon the commander's time preclude any such makeshift approach or render it difficult. In wartime in hostile or "liberated" territory the need is most acute. Experience of the Cold War, requiring that our troops be stationed overseas for long periods, perhaps in underdeveloped or unstable territories, has richly supported the conclusion that there is a "peacetime" need for high priority for the civil affairs function. But to have the competence when it is needed requires an elaborate effort, comprising selection and training of personnel, and the organization for advance planning and for operations. It seems reasonable to suppose, then, that recognition of the generality of the function and the assignment to it of specially selected and trained people wherever it arises, will serve a dual purpose. First, it will ensure that our trained "civil affairs" people, when it is necessary to assign them in case of critical need, will be experienced. Second, it will greatly assist commanders everywhere, or at least anywhere that the "public relations" demands upon them are so time-consuming that they find it necessary to assign a special assistant to handle them. This is, however, not intended so much as a plea that civil affairs officers be assigned to the Commanding Generals of Fort Benning and Fort Ord, as an observation meant to emphasize the nature of the function with which we are concerned.

## II. A Problem of Communication

Military and civilian traditions have grown side-by-side for thousands of years, yet have been generally distinguishable. There have, of course, been historical instances when a whole society was militarized, to the point that nearly

the whole of the daily lives of the people was placed under military orders, discipline, and tradition. There have been other occasions, more frequent, in which the normal tenor of civilian existence has been subject to harassment, interruption, and subversion by intermittent and arbitrary military interference. There have even been situations in which the military profession and its way of life have been so subordinated to civilian authority as to be almost extinguished, as well as isolated societies in which the military role was virtually non-existent. These latter are of course notable exceptions, arising when unusual circumstances of internal stability and the unwonted absence of external pressures have rendered military discipline unnecessary — or almost unnecessary. But the normal situation, if in history any describable situation is normal, is one in which the military way of life must co-exist with the civilian, each being endured as a necessary evil by the other.

This co-existence gives rise to the problem of communication. Two separate and distinct modes of life cannot exist together within a single society unless they can make their peace one with the other. And always the first problem is to achieve a meeting of minds — not necessarily an agreement, but at least an understanding by the one of what the other wants or intends. Whether the issue is a civilian-military athletic contest on some American Army post, or the plea of a civilian organization to be supported by a military band, at the one extreme, or a proclamation imposing the death sentence for violation of curfew regulations during the military control of enemy territory at the other, this problem of communication is universal. Whether the problems generated can be handled by a subordinate specialist in one of the traditional military services as a part of his normal routines, or by the commander himself in a few minutes each day, or whether their complexity and urgency demand the ministrations of an elaborate and specially trained staff, so that the commander and his other assistants may have time for other concerns, is a matter of degree only. In principle the requirements are identical.

The structural separation of the civil and the military arms of government is a comparatively recent and by no means universal development. In earlier epochs civil and military authorities were generally one and the same, and the union of civil and military disciplines at the top of government, which is, indeed, the formal rule today, was not complicated by insistence upon their separation in the minds and habits of men. They were perhaps still separate in fact, but there was an identity at all stages between the military and authority, and strictly civilian life existed only in those areas of society in which there was no organized representation of the authority of the state. In part this quasi amalgam resulted from the fact that military discipline and the disciplines appropriate to civilian forms of society had not yet been so sharply distinguished. Probably nobody bothered to wonder, for example, whether the head of state, such as a Henry the Eighth, a Louis the Fourteenth, or a Charles the Fifth was a civilian or military ruler. But by the time of Frederick the Great, and certainly by the time of Napoleon, the military way of life had been so sharply separated that the question could be asked. Hence, the spectacle of crowned heads and royal princes undergoing military training and assuming military commands.

Public authority and the military ethos, then, tended to be identified. Royal governors were military commanders, whether or not their backgrounds were military (but when every gentleman — or at least nobleman — was recognized as potential military talent the actual fact of military training or experience could be neglected). Perhaps not until Robert Peel created the London Police was it easy anywhere to separate law enforcement clearly from military exercise of public authority.

It was the emergence of modern forms of popular government that completed the separation and the separate identification of the civilian and the military forms of authority, and for a simple reason. In all cases where its

roots are strong and deep in the vitals of society, popular government arose in good part as a revolt against forms of government in which the power of the state assumed a military guise. Armies owed their loyalties to kings and emperors and their officers were recruited from the privileged classes of society. A major problem for early parliamentary governments everywhere was to popularize the social affiliations of the military command group, and to subordinate the military arm to a form of public control that was born in revolution. Even today the problem has not everywhere been solved. Moreover, a later revolution has reversed the trend. Because the separation of military and civilian authority and the principle of the latter's primacy were creations of the "bourgeois" revolution and the middle class state, the Communists, in their revolt against that state, have again made the military arm an inherent and inseparable element of public authority. The "peoples' army" and the "peoples' police" are indistinguishable from the "peoples' republic", and without them the latter would dissolve for lack of the peoples' support. It may be noted also that during their brief existence the fascist systems of the West likewise re-married the military and civilian aspects of public authority.

It is only, then, in those political systems that are the creation of modern popular, constitutional, parliamentary, bourgeois — if you like, "capitalist" and "liberal" — social currents that the problem of "civilian-military relations" receives attention. And the same climate that gives rise to this problem is the legal and organic structure of society likewise creates the problem of "civil affairs" for the military. Having been displaced from its historical position of identity with public authority, and often of primacy in it, the military arm of the state finds itself confronted with the problem of making its peace, of achieving a modus vivendi for its activities under varied circumstances, with the bulk of society, which is differently organized and has different motives and values.

The social problem known as the "civil-military" relationship, and special part of the larger relationship that we call "civil affairs," exist not because there is a "military mind," a "civilian mind," or any other kind of "mind," but because of the necessary coexistence of two different systems and modes of organizing human activities. They arise because military ways of organizing and operating are different in important respects from the multiplicity of social orderings and actions that characterize society at large. Moreover, they arise because the military system, albeit subordinate to civil authority, is an arm of the authority of the modern state. They arise accordingly in the relations of the military with other arms of the state, whether of the same state, or a friendly state, or of an enemy, but also in the relations of the military with the vast and complex society that bears no formal relationship to the structure of authority in society.

### III. The Communications Need: Civil Affairs

It is the problem of communication at the contact points between the military and the civilian modes of society that needs to be expressed. It is here that the Civil Affairs requirement arises. Our concepts of this relationship must be general. Distinctions within it, as between "military government" and other forms that do not entail "government," are of course possible. But the basic formulation must encompass all possible forms of the relationship, from the military band at the civilian ceremony to the military government gibbet to which reference was made earlier.

Those who are interested in the official definitions will find them in FM 41-10. The problem here is different. It is to derive general concepts, from analysis and from past and current experience, that will enable us to determine whether the official definitions are apt and adequate.

Remembering, then, that the situation out of which the civil affairs problem arises is characterized by the need for communications of a special kind, the following statements may help to serve this purpose :

"Civil affairs" is a term that serves to identify the interaction of military and civilian modes of society.

Civil affairs, thus conceived, constitutes a problem area for the military commander and establishes a military functional requirement.

The Civil Affairs function is essentially one of communication, which may take a variety of forms, of which liaison, coordination, influence, and control are the principal ones.

The Civil Affairs function is inescapable for any military command regardless of its objective, the operations or location of which affect the surrounding civilian society and its institutions, and which are in turn affected by them.

In more positive terms, the Civil Affairs function may be regarded as inherent in all military operations of which the objective requires the establishment of liaison and the coordination of efforts with a civilian population or requires that a civilian population be influenced or controlled.

When the civil affairs function becomes more burdensome to the commander than is acceptable in terms of his other responsibilities, or when, as an aspect of his military objective it requires special competence of him, there arises a need to provide the commander with specialized assistance, in the form of a staff selected, organized, trained, and equipped to advise him or to discharge the Civil Affairs function on his behalf.

It should be noted that the problem area we have identified is and always must remain the commander's responsibility. It should likewise be noted that it cannot be conjured away; it exists, and can only be ignored at peril.

The question may be asked: "Who is the commander?" The answer is implicit in military organization. It is whatever commanding officer finds himself in a position in which the civil affairs function must be exercised if he is to discharge his responsibilities satisfactorily, unless he is relieved of the problem by the intercession of some higher command.

The generality of the statements suggests that the problem area identified must exist, and must have existed, always and everywhere that there is or has been contact between a military command and the human sea around it. This of course true, and its truth is not affected by the particular mode of operation that military commands have adopted. Even if the relationship is one of pure violence or parasitism, so that discharge of the duties incident to it can be left in the hands of the subordinate commanders equipped only for fighting an enemy, or can be delegated to the provost marshal with the support of the fighting units, the relationship exists nonetheless -- at least until the civilian population is exterminated, as the Mongols used to solve some of their civil affairs problems. But in fact, decided limits are imposed upon the mode of operations our military commanders are free to adopt, and, in one degree or another, all modern military commanders, from whatever country they may come, are similarly limited. This is because this relation, like other human relations, is in large measure determined and refined by the values of the existing culture. And within these general bounds there are more specific ones, appropriate to a particular form of government and a peculiar set of social values such as ours, the British, or the Russian.

In all military conflict, though the enemy is an organized hostile force, the objective, in general terms, is to influence a part of society itself. There is soundness in the claim that we fight not peoples but governments and armies. Yet in order to influence a people it is necessary to gain access to their minds. This may be done either by methods such as psychological warfare or, more quickly, by military action that may include the destruction of their military

forces and the removal of their government. In both cases the objective is to create the psychological conditions for a change of attitude on their part, unless it is our purpose to revert to the primitive and eliminate the problem by destroying the minds that must otherwise be changed.

So stated, the object of a country's foreign operations has changed little through the ages, and Machiavelli is a sound general guide to its techniques. But the increasing interdependence of modern political societies, and changed cultural values, as well as novel concepts of national purpose, have imposed upon us some quite special conditions. Ancient empires conquered all the known world that they could seize and hold. Peaceful coexistence was for them a difficult concept to grasp; where there was such a relation between distinct political entities it reflected the limits of their power to effect change. Modern empires likewise conquered territory, but the process of gradually assuming increasing responsibilities in support of the private interests of their nationals was perhaps more common than the deliberate and planned accumulation of territory. There were of course exceptions, mainly in the progressive assimilation of adjacent territories by the great continental powers such as the United States and Imperial Russia. Today's imperialisms, by contrast, are ideological. No nation, at the moment at least, is seeking territorial aggrandizement openly, but several competing groups are propagating mutually incompatible social philosophies and systems of human organization.

(It should perhaps be noted in passing that some people use the term "ideology" pejoratively, applicable only to social values they disapprove. This is not its use here. As employed above it refers to any motivating set of social values, generally but not always including preference for a particular form of government, of economic relations, and of the organized structure of human society at large.)

Our own national objectives are conceived, however unsystematically, within the ideological frame that is our heritage from the bourgeois and industrial revolutions. Implicit in this heritage are values that cause us to feel uncomfortable in the presence of the control of one people over another, and to regard both conquest and assimilation of territories and peoples as evil. There is likewise emphasis upon the universality of human values, notably the worth of individual freedom and the aspiration towards a generalized system of law within which human conflicts may be peacefully resolved. But equally in our heritage is a conviction of the rightness of our causes that justifies the use of violence, and even the subordination of other values, such as those noted above, to the security of our country. For the remainder of the world, considering our position and power, perhaps the happiest of our convictions is our belief in the persuasiveness of our ideology. If we ever had any enthusiasm for holy war we have lost it. We believe that mankind everywhere, once it has achieved a minimum standard of material welfare, can be persuaded to accept the world as we see it, and to work for its realization freely with us.

From this conviction comes our preference for the status quo, or what is said to be our preference for it. But we do not conceive the status quo as static, which may be a paradox. For us the processes of life, individual and social, are dynamic. The intellectual disillusionment with an idea of progress has not affected our social convictions. We believe that men the world over, if given the freedom from want and oppression that will permit them to do so, can be won over to our system of values and will work with us towards the achievement of the peaceable kingdom to which we aspire. At the same time we recognize the hostility of rival social systems; we appreciate that we are engaged in a battle for men's minds and that the battle may sometimes take violent form. We do not, like Mohammed, propagate our ideas by the word, but we know we must sometimes fight to give men the freedom to choose. Our

national posture, then, is defensive, -but is not a static defense. Our national policies in crises are often reactive to hostile initiatives, but we pursue at the same time a positive program, short of military aggression to be sure, to give our system the chance we believe it deserves.

As we have confidence both in the rightness and in the persuasiveness of our system of values, and perhaps also because we have all the space we need within which to develop our national potential, our foreign objectives call for a minimum of interference in the affairs of other peoples. We ask only that their actions not interfere with us, and that they hold themselves available to be persuaded.

The Communists, our principal rivals in the ideological struggle, have a rather different view of things. They profess to regard the status quo, which we contemplate so favorably, as an oppression that must be removed if necessary by force. They believe their system to be in the real interest of all peoples once liberated. Consequently they do interfere, and in such a way that we can no longer regard the objects of their interference as free men available to our persuasion. Moreover, it is their desire and intent to impose central control upon the world. Our preference, because we assume the universality of the most basic values, is for a pluralism of their social embodiments. The Communists profess, by contrast, to believe in the necessity of much more detailed organization and direction of the world. Ideally, for them, the peaceable kingdom is a monolith; actually, of course, they too have had to make pluralist concessions. Even so, the areas of society they now lead is far more closely integrated than the rest of the world, and their power center applies different and more positive sanctions than we feel are called for in the free world.

We are thus confronted with the requirement to develop and maintain an active system of defenses in all aspects of our foreign affairs, political,

economic, psychological, and military. If the posture required of us can be described as defensive because of our preference for and confidence in the status quo, it is also active, because we realize the ineffectiveness of mere passive defense. But the measures we adopt for these purposes of active defense must themselves be consistent with the projection of our societal values to the world at large. While the Communists in most cases have set out deliberately to disturb the status quo, it is our purpose to preserve it for its promise to humanity. Communism's chosen enemy, then, is our ally. But we do not regard the alliance as perfect. Indeed, one of the reasons our defense must be active is because we understand that the status quo in many countries is vulnerable to exploitation by our enemies. There is want, ignorance, and oppression. And where any of these constitutes an invitation to Communist penetration it becomes our enemy too, as surely as Communism itself.

The demands of an active defense have required us to station our armed forces around the world, and to engage in extensive programs of foreign aid in various forms. They have also caused us to put together an elaborate network of military commitments, each of which in one degree or another means that we have undertaken to associate our force with that of our allies to deter or if necessary to fight active aggression by the hostile camp. This complex of special foreign programs and relations, the product of the ideological clash, is both the occasion for, and the framework of, the present requirement on the Army for Civil Affairs.

#### IV. Civil Affairs in Cold War

The problem of communication that has been taken as the center of the civil affairs relationship assumes a special form in the Cold War. Even inside our home country the peacetime maintenance of unprecedented military

forces raises acute community relations problems. But our primary interest is with the communication problem as it emerges abroad.

What needs to be emphasized is that the same consideration of national interest that dictate that we should engage in military enterprises of various kinds in foreign lands, also dictate that our attitude towards the civil affairs relation should be a positive one. We became acquainted with this relation because of the extra burden it imposed upon our combat commanders in wartime. We broadened our knowledge in the rehabilitation and reconstruction programs carried out under military auspices after the end of hostilities. Later we saw it reduced to a liaison problem — communication stripped to its basic elements, as commanders and local authorities and people try to coexist in reasonable harmony for the common good. But almost simultaneously, the problem emerged again, in more complex form, for the military aid missions we were sending abroad. In all phases and in all forms it must have been evident that civil affairs can be regarded negatively or positively. It can be treated as a necessary evil, demanding that we do only as much as is necessary to enable commanders to get ahead with their jobs conceived in narrowly military terms. Or it can be accepted as a normal state of affairs, hence a part of the responsibility that the commander must expect to have imposed upon him, and actually an opportunity to make a positive contribution towards the attainment of national purposes. The presence of our forces abroad, whether a military assistance team of officers, or several divisions, by agreement and often at the request of the local government, is itself a major contribution. But its good effect can be nullified in part if local relations are bad, or it can be increased if advantage is taken of the civil affairs nexus to strengthen local institutions and local sentiments favorable to the free world. And in some particular circumstances the Civil Affairs relationship may be itself the epitome of the objective of our forces. We shall return

to this point later when we consider certain of the Cold War situations in more detail.

For the moment we are concerned primarily with Civil Affairs in friendly countries, where it is all too common to regard function as an additional burden imposed upon the commander. It is, in fact, not just a burden; it is also an opportunity. What can be done with civil affairs to achieve our national ends should be done. And obviously much can be done.

We have, as always, first the problem of communication. But the understanding for which we work can be a minimum intended to avoid crises and minimize friction, or it can be a good understanding that will solidify relations and help to strengthen our friends. The problem is one that calls for considerable nicety of solution. We can make our forces too evident as well as keep them excessively aloof. Over-emphasis on "public relations," constantly reminding the local population of their partial dependence on an alien force, may be quite as bad as neglect of the elements of good public relations. In general, what is done within the US in peacetime is probably a good starting point. But both attitudes and actions need to be adjusted to the peculiarities of each individual case. What is appropriate and may be required in Western Europe, where our cultural associations are strongest, may be quite different from what it required in the Near or Far East. Some people are quite sensitive to any suggestion of dependence, others are given confidence by being reminded of the presence of a friendly foreign military force.

This kind of problem arises every time a commander has to decide whether the officers and men under his command will wear their uniforms or civilian dress when off duty. Probably nothing the commander can do will contribute more than what he must try to do in any case, quite aside from the civil affairs relations; that is, to maintain his forces in the best possible state of readiness and discipline. But many other actions can be taken, from

emergency aid and rescue work in cases of local emergency, to the building of local schools and orphanages in appropriate circumstances, as in Korea. A gesture of local assistance, if the population is convinced that it is genuine and not just a publicity stunt, may prove invaluable. But the commander should not overlook the advantages of integrating his forces as much as possible into the normal life of the community. Where language is a barrier a program aimed at encouraging his troops to learn the local language probably yields the greatest payoff. And so on, the possibilities are endless.

The essentials probably can be summarized in two propositions: all forces should be impressed with the fact that the surrounding population is made up of human beings, in no way inferior in worth, most of whom want to be friendly and who will meet any individual attempt to achieve an understanding more than half way. Second, all forces should be inculcated with the conviction, if possible, that their presence is an opportunity to make a positive contribution towards the achievement of purposes for which the United States is expending its resources and assuming substantial risks.

These guides are no less important for the commander and his principal subordinates in the discharge of their official duties than for the troops as individuals. Of course additional guides are also necessary in these cases. Even when not controlled by international agreement or local regulation, commanders should be careful not to allow their operations to disturb the local economy or the local political situation, if it possibly can be helped. And when some dislocation, say, in the local labor market, is unavoidable, interested local leaders should be invited to talk the problem over — in advance if possible, not afterward — when there are local fires to be put out.

## V. Civil Affairs in Situations Short of War

The last section dealt with the cold war function of Civil Affairs mainly as a question of liaison between US military agencies and a friendly population abroad. This is the starting point for any study of the problem, but is only a start. The positive attitude towards the Civil Affairs function that was recommended applies with equal force to many relationships — other than liaison — that spring from US military commitments in the Cold War.

In an earlier section some attention was given to the communications problems of US military missions overseas, and it was concluded that these problems indicated the existence of a Civil Affairs requirement in these missions, whether or not it is recognized as such and special staff provision made for it. It is necessary now to examine this function in somewhat more detail.

Let us compare briefly two situations: that in Korea following the truce that terminated active hostilities in the Korean War, and that in South Vietnam since the truce was negotiated that ended the active civil war.

In South Korea we maintained "military government" for a period immediately after World War II. The North Korean invasion resulted in a revival of that function now called "civil affairs and military government." There was, in fact, a dual establishment, with a civil affairs division (G-5) in the Eighth Army for the combat zone, and a rear-area organization that eventually became a separate Civil Affairs command (KCAC). During the course of the hostilities these organizations performed the prescribed functions for forward and rear Civil Affairs operations, and, from the time of the truce, they assumed substantial responsibility for the relief and rehabilitation of South Korea. It is possible to criticize the performance of these organizations during both periods. Nevertheless, they provided most of the information Washington required in order that a national policy regarding the

South Korean government and people might be formulated, and in Korea itself they successfully conducted both war and peacetime operations of great complexity with remarkably little local friction. Following the truce agreement the Civil Affairs staffs were for a time largely responsible for the programming and execution of all US relief operations, though as the program grew into a major rehabilitation effort their responsibilities were progressively relinquished to civilian agencies of the US and the UN.

Major shortcomings that emerged during this extended Civil Affairs experience stemmed, in the main, from two causes. First, the 1950 emergency found the Department of the Army quite inadequately prepared to meet the Civil Affairs requirement. This made it necessary both for the Department and for the commands in the Far East to improvise organizations and programs, with the result that the operation never quite caught up with its problems until it was time for it to relinquish its major responsibilities. Second, the reluctance or inability of the US government to formulate broad policies to provide constructive guidance to the Civil Affairs agencies in Korea led to piecemeal attacks upon whatever happened to be most pressing of the moment's problems, with the result that expedient policy decisions were sometimes made that added greatly to the difficulty of solving subsequent problems. This is probably a fair criticism, for example, of the decision made during the early days of the North Korean invasion that UN forces would pay for all local labor and services with local currency provided by the Government of South Korea, which advances were later to be repaid in dollars. This decision resulted in a forced expansion of the monetized portion of the South Korean economy and a massive inflation of the South Korean currency, which, in turn greatly increased the difficulty of stabilizing the economy after the truce had been signed.

This decision, and some others like it, appear to have been made for political reasons, which may have been sound. But the fact that there were two US voices, not always harmonious, South Korea -- the military command speaking for the Department of Defense, and the Ambassador speaking for the Department of State -- plus the fact that policy coordination in Washington at the time left much to be desired, undoubtedly added to the difficulties of the Korean operation, and give rise to suspicion that some of these decisions were not soundly based. The Ambassador's concern for the independence of South Korea and for the integrity and dignity of the Rhee Government is easily understood, but it can be argued that the policies and operations of Defense agencies might have been more constructive in the long run had this concern been genuinely shared by Defense from the first rather than imposed upon it by another department, as appears to have been the case. Actually, however, even those policies that were fully and freely agreed between the two departments appear sometimes to have been ill-advised, because neither fully comprehended the special conditions imposed upon the operations of a modern military force in an underdeveloped country. The over-all result was the complete disruption of the South Korean economy, which is to this day dependent upon US aid for such solvency as it has.

It appears, then, that it would be unfair to assess the success of the Korean Civil Affairs operation in terms of the success or failure of the policies it was required to apply. Granted its initial shortcomings of organization and concept, one can only conclude that Civil Affairs in South Korea did a remarkably good job, and a job that probably could not have been done as well by any other kind of agency at the time. Moreover, the lessons of its operations are invaluable guides for future Civil Affairs operations under comparable conditions.

The conditions in South Vietnam, since the US government assumed the major burden of supporting the government of that country, seem in many respects to be comparable to those in Korea. Both are underdeveloped countries with their economies disrupted by war; both are threatened by Communist regimes in adjacent territories that used to be combined with them in one country; both are but recently liberated colonial areas under handicap of an inadequate supply of trained public servants; both are maintaining military forces beyond the capacity of their own economies to support and are thus dependent upon US military aid for their national solvency. In addition, of course, both have aspirations towards industrialization on the western pattern. But though there are substantial similarities, there are also major differences, particularly as regards the history of US interest and efforts in their behalf. Unlike South Korea, South Vietnam was not a "liberated" Japanese territory (even though the Japanese occupied it during World War II); it was a French colony which undertook to liberate itself. It was when the liberation movement split in two, with the more aggressive element falling increasingly under Communist domination, that the liberation movement gave place to civil war. And it was to enable the non-Communist regime in South Vietnam to gain the support of its people that the US persuaded the French to grant it independence. But this was only after the local war had lasted seven years and so drained France of its resources that before the hostilities terminated in a truce settlement the United States was already paying over half the cost of the war. Thus the United States inherited the burden of supporting the regime in South Vietnam.

During the civil war itself, despite the growing US contribution, we had only limited representation in South Vietnam, because the French still hoped to retain control of the country and insisted upon administering our aid for us. Consequently, when the French finally did withdraw, we were faced with the problem of building up an aid mission on short notice. Apparently it did not

occur to anyone at this point to utilize the massive experience we had had in comparable circumstances in Korea by establishing a Civil Affairs organization to handle the liaison aspects of our military aid program. Instead, we sent an ad hoc military mission to Saigon, where, in due course, the necessary organizational elements were improvised. Whether in fact the Korean experience was considered inappropriate to the circumstances in South Vietnam, whether it was believed that the experience could be applied without duplicating, even in part, the organizational apparatus that had accumulated from that experience in Korea, or whether, as seems more likely, there was a failure to recognize the Civil Affairs function simply because there was no "military government" predecessor for it, is not known. It is a subject worthy of study. Until the study is completed the comparison between South Korea and South Vietnam must be inconclusive. But even superficial contemplation of the similarities of the two suggests a few tentative conclusions.

In the first place, it seems quite illogical to make the organization of our activities overseas so largely dependent upon the manner in which the need for them arises. If there is a legitimate function for Civil Affairs in friendly Asian countries in peacetime, for example, we ought not to be precluded from making organizational provision for that function solely because there is no "military government" antecedent for it. Then too, if Civil Affairs is in fact, as argued that it is in this paper, a means of solving a special problem of communication that arises when a military organization impinges upon a civilian society, there would appear to be a particular need for it in connection with these massive programs of military aid in underdeveloped countries. Indeed, as suggested earlier in this paper, there would appear to be a need for it on the staff of the military aid chief if for no other reason than to assist him to establish meaningful communications with the civilian agencies of the United States government operating in the same area. It is not necessary to argue

that the military mission should administer all aspects of US aid to the country, much less that it should assume the diplomatic functions of the foreign service, in order to justify recognition of the Civil Affairs function and the desirability of making organizational provision for it. Whether the military mission has, or does not have, operational responsibility for an aid program certainly ought to determine the size and competence of the Civil Affairs establishment with which it is provided. But to maintain, as now seems implicitly to be the case, that there is no requirement for such an establishment in peacetime unless a military command has responsibility for a civilian aid program, is to mistake the essence of the function we are talking about.

Again it needs to be said that what is required is a positive attitude, a ~~disposition~~ to recognize the Civil Affairs function and to use it as a means of achieving national objectives. For when this function is not recognized and not exercised the military are all too likely to take a stiffly professional attitude towards local problems, while tending to resent efforts on the part of local US political and diplomatic personnel to instruct them in the correct methods of approach. In South Vietnam, with a functioning government that maintains diplomatic relations with the United States and with a large International Cooperation Administration country agency in residence, it is certainly not necessary for the military aid mission to maintain a large Civil Affairs establishment. There is also no need for an intermediary between the service officers on the mission and their counterpart in the South Vietnamese armed forces. There is, however, a need for an intermediary any time the officers of the mission find it necessary to communicate with South Vietnam civilian authorities, there is also need for an advisor to the mission chief on his relations with the Vietnamese government, and it can never be wholly satisfactory for the US Embassy to provide this intermediary service and this advice, partly because the Embassy's assistance is necessarily intermittent and likely

to be forthcoming only after an issue of some importance has arisen -- whereas it would be the function of the mission chief's own Civil Affairs officer to prevent such an issue from arising -- and partly because there needs to be a continuing liaison relationship between the mission and the Embassy which a civil affairs staff of the mission can best provide.

The considerations adduced here apply to all similar massive programs of military assistance, including Japan, Formosa, and Turkey, as well as the two instances mentioned. The considerations apply with particular cogency to programs in these countries just because (with the exception of Japan) they are underdeveloped countries. Their economies are basically agricultural, their industrial development in its infancy. In most cases they are harassed by an explosive population rise, while their aspirations for economic improvement far outrun their chances of realizing it. In most cases, though possibly not in quite all, their political systems are basically unstable, dependent in all too many instances upon the life of a particular man. All (Japan again excepted) suffer from an acute shortage of educated leaders and skilled technicians. Likewise, in all cases an ancient culture and a traditional social structure are being overlaid with modern and alien institutions. The stresses resulting from these anomalies render the masses of their populations particularly vulnerable to the appeals the Communist world can make to them through the agency of even a small number of their own intelligentsia. In this revolutionary situation any program the US is going to carry on in these countries must be carefully prepared in the light of all the facts that are available, and then must be executed with extreme circumspection if it is not to do more harm than good. When the major US program is a program of military assistance the problems do not diminish -- even though they may seem to do so. Unstable governments, of course, like to see their military support stiffened. But we find ourselves contributing the major share of the government's annual cash

income, and, correspondingly, setting the requirements for the expenditure of the major share of the nation's cash resources. Moreover, by supporting the forces that are the basis of the government's authority we make ourselves responsible to the people for the government's performance. We may end, if we are not careful, by becoming the target of popular hostility, the focus of all the frustrations inherent in domestic situations marked by social stress and economic backwardness. We are fortunate indeed that in most of these countries the Communists had been identified as enemies even before we entered on the scene. The future of South Vietnam, perhaps also of Formosa, where the pro-US and pro-Western elements are a small minority of the total population, is uncertain already. We may anticipate serious trouble any day if the currents of popular favor turn against the minority leadership we support.

From the examination of these "peacetime" military aid programs to an examination of our supporting role in actual civil war is but a step. When there is an overt military struggle for control of a small country between the "agency" forces of East and West, the complex of problems becomes simpler — because many of them can be postponed — but particular problems become more acute. Some day a study should be made of US assistance to the non-Communist forces in the Greek civil war with the object in view of identifying the Civil Affairs aspects of that program. Until that study is made the questions we should like to ask cannot be answered. Was the problem of communication recognized? Was our military mission aware of the obvious fact that they were engaged in a battle for access to Greek minds, as well as for military victory over a minority of Greek citizens in arms against their government? Would our operation have been more successful, less costly, both in human and in material terms, and would the aftermath have been more favorable to our cause, if the Civil Affairs aspects had been more explicitly recognized and provided for?

This line of inquiry calls for the inclusion of a final category of cases: those in which at least one of the forces struggling within a small country is too weak to engage in organized military operations, and resorts to guerrilla-type operations instead.

In the past it has probably been the case that too much of the Free World's attention has been directed to the problem of fighting Communist-led guerrillas. Certainly, the military authorities in Western nations such as Britain and France and the US have been too much inclined to treat guerrilla warfare as a problem primarily military in character. Sometimes, of course, there may be no real alternative. If the local population is implacably hostile to the forces on our side, there may be nothing much that those forces can do except try to crush the guerrillas by sheer weight of numbers. It is in operations of this sort that the ratios of guerrilla-fighters to guerrillas climb to the levels of 15 or 20 to one, and even then without guaranteeing success to the suppression operation.

The most striking thing about guerrilla warfare is the fact that it is a form of political protest, and consequently more typically political than military in character. As Mao Tse-tung has said, guerrillas are "fish that swim in a friendly sea." Normally, effective guerrilla operations are not feasible without substantial support by the local population. There may be exceptions, when guerrillas come into and are supported from outside of the area of guerrilla combat, as was sometimes the case with the Russian partisans in the German-held territories of the USSR during World War II. There may also be mixed cases in which the guerrillas depend heavily upon outside support but also enjoy the support of a minority of the local population, as in Malaya and Burma in recent years. It is of course generally the case that the guerrillas will seek to impose their interests upon those elements of the local population who do not support them. For this reason they may seem to enjoy

virtually unanimous support by the local population when actually much of their popular support is the product of coercion. But it remains true that a guerrilla operation that does not enjoy substantial local support, that is, the support of at least a sizable minority of the population, can only succeed if it is supported from outside the territory of conflict. And it is also generally true that the difficulty of suppressing a guerrilla operation varies inversely with the degree of local support it enjoys.

This is known to be the case, not only from the guerrilla-warfare theories of Mao and others, but also from a vast amount of practical experience. It was by directing his major effort at the population in the Huk areas of the Philippines — while of course maintaining his military pressure on the guerrilla bands — that Magsaysay succeeded finally in bringing to a close a long period of guerrilla warfare in the Islands. Similarly, it was by political initiative that the Burmese government managed to reduce guerrilla operations in that country to the present minor proportions. Moreover, for more developed areas, German experience in Russian territory during World War II is instructive. For so long as the German occupiers treated the local population with consideration they were actually able to recruit anti-partisan units from among them, but as German economic and political policies turned the Russian peasants against the invader the recruitment came to favor the partisans rather than the Germans.

Despite this evidence, however, the tendency to regard guerrilla warfare primarily as a military problem persists. Even when advanced techniques of psychological warfare were brought into play against the guerrillas by US and British forces in Korea, the Philippines, and Malaya the error was made of using the weapon as though it were being employed on a tactical front in organized warfare, with the consequence that the vast bulk of the propaganda was directed at the guerrillas themselves, rather than at the population

supporting them. The Communists make no such mistake. Their propaganda is directed at the people. Moreover, their agents go down and work among the people.

The problem of fighting guerrilla bands, then, seems to be mainly the problem of analyzing the political issues behind the protest, of designing proposals for alleviating these disruptive influences, and then communicating these proposals to the population upon whom the guerrillas are dependent. Drastic action may be required to convince the population of the seriousness of our intentions. Magsaysay was forced to move entire villages to new settlement areas in order that his determination to give them a better way of life could be demonstrated. Firm and even violent military action may be required to support these programs, if only to offset the guerrillas' own campaign of terror. But only in the most extreme and hopeless cases should this take the form of an attempt to balance terror with terror, for this may well produce a traumatic apathy among the civilian population that renders any constructive solution of the guerrilla problem remote.

Considering all that has been said about Civil Affairs up to this point, it should be unnecessary to demonstrate the part that it can play in counter-guerrilla actions. Admittedly there is justification for specialization in guerrilla-fighting, even among those whose weapons are political, economic, and psychological. But the basic preparation the specialists need to bring to their task is essentially the same as all Civil Affairs officers require. Above all they must understand the local population, its social structure, religion and culture. They must know how to deal with the local people on terms of mutual comprehension, in order that the issues and forces that are producing tensions and disturbances among the people can be discovered and this essential information passed along to the policy-makers in the rear, whose business it is to develop programs to remove these tensions and restore the stability of

the local society. Then when the ameliorative programs are formulated, the same officers are needed to put these programs into effect.

This is not to say that there is no requirement for special procedures for the violent suppression of guerrilla bands. Certainly there are organizational, supply, and weapons requirements, as well as tactical and even strategic planning requirements that must be met simultaneously. But these alone are not enough, they have been proved insufficient in the large majority of the historical cases with which we are familiar.

So much for counter-guerrilla actions. But in a world in which so large a part of the total population is basically friendly to the west, in which, indeed, there are numerous cases of local oppression by Communist overlords, we should surely not limit our attention to the problems of fighting guerrillas. Both the risks and the opportunities of the Cold War invite our attention to guerrilla action as a possible offensive means of combatting the expansion of Communism. To be sure, we are not likely to stir up guerrilla warfare, with all the misery it entails for the local population, just for the sake of making an anti-Communist gesture. But there well may be cases in which the disturbance is not of our making, though it may be exploited to our advantage.

As we know from rather extensive World War II experience with partisans and guerrillas, the initial problem in such cases is twofold. First, it is our interest to keep the guerrillas alive and vigorous, and this generally means providing them with supplies and weapons. Second, we should like to coordinate their activities in order to maximize the returns from their efforts. Often there is also an opportunity to improve the effectiveness of guerrilla operations. But this soon merges into the peculiarly political problems of effecting collaboration between various, and often rival, guerrilla leaders, of consolidating the areas in which they enjoy popular support, and eventually, when the time is ripe, of converting the guerrilla elements into organized military forces.

The Army's approach to this problem has been too largely marked by two features: over-emphasis upon the purely technical military aspects (special weapons, including demolitions, and special techniques adaptable to small unit operations in enemy territory), and over-insistence upon controlling the guerrillas — bringing them under our command. The former of these is important, but only if accompanied by an equally determined effort to understand the guerrillas, to establish communications with them, and to support them in other, less military, and even less material ways. The latter is probably mostly an illusion, because it is almost certainly the case that the more vigorous the guerrilla movement, the less likely it is to be willing to submit to outside command.

The first substantial forward step from a sporadic and isolated guerrilla situation is to provide it with some organized social base. It is thus not unlike the problem of "military government" in occupied territory during that stage of operations when local authorities are being re-established. The conditions must be right, of course, and this may require that guerrilla activity be built up with our military assistance beforehand. But someone on the spot must be able to inform the supporting commands when the time is right. It must be anticipated, also, that as the guerrilla operations grow in strength conflicts may arise between rival bands and leaders. This is because guerrilla forces usually represent political elements in the community, and these will be competing for the favored position after the territory is liberated. Thus there is an acute need for diplomacy of an especially sensitive kind during these preliminaries that come before a local political organization is restored. And afterwards, while the "government" or "governments" are operating underground, there will be further delicate diplomatic problems to be resolved.

Perhaps the most difficult of all the problems connected with guerrilla support operations are those that involve questions of timing. When is it

proper to expand operations? When is the situation ripe for effecting the unification of two or more independent elements in the guerrilla movement? When is the groundwork firmly laid for a beginning political organization? When should this organization make itself known or expand its activities? When should it emerge from underground? It is of course quite unlikely that our forces can decide these questions, or can act solely on their own readings of the situation. But they must certainly be constantly aware of the problems of timing, otherwise they may become responsible for making the guerrillas weaker, or more divided, rather than stronger and more united. If the guerrillas are persuaded to take on tasks they are not equipped to perform they may suffer such losses that our sponsorship comes to be regarded as a danger rather than a help. If the separate bands are pressed into cooperation before the ground has been prepared for it they may end by fighting each other rather than the enemy. These and many other possibilities suggest the intimate and complex nature of the relationship that must be established between our forces and the guerrillas they want to support, and consequently the special requirements, particularly for political understanding and skill, that are laid upon them.

For all these reasons, the "teams" that are organized by our forces to make contact with the guerrillas, to provide them with logistic support, and to attempt to coordinate their activities, have a pre-eminent requirement for the Civil Affairs function. In this there needs to be combined not only the best liaison approach that can be devised, but also much of what goes into "military government." Initially, the need is mainly for diplomatic skill and political comprehension. Later more specialized knowledge may be required. It should never be forgotten that the Polish underground during the German occupation in World War II managed to conduct a full-fledged government, including the collection of taxes and the issuance of currency. This precedent is a good

standard, a worth-while goal towards which our efforts may be directed. For even though circumstances may seldom permit the freedom fighters to progress that far before their territory is freed from foreign or oppressive rule, the fact that we have set our sights so high will have a salutary effect upon the roles our representatives play in the developing events, and upon the local patriots, who must recognize our desire to see them achieve their aims.

As in the other situations discussed earlier, the formal establishment of a Civil Affairs staff for guerrilla support operations is less important than recognition of the facts. What is indispensable is that we remember the essentially political basis for guerrilla forces and that we act accordingly. Once this threshold is crossed the organizational questions will fall into place, in accordance with the simple conceptual propositions suggested earlier. There is only one additional comment that needs to be made. It is that in a guerrilla support operation the Civil Affairs aspect is not incidental to the military mission, as it is, for example, in the usual combat. Neither, of course, is Civil Affairs itself the mission, as it is in a Military Government command in occupied territory. The Civil Affairs requirement of guerrilla support activities lies somewhere between these two. It demands a kind of sociological offense, the special and exacting conditions of which merit for more extensive study than they have yet received.

## VI. Civil Affairs in Limited War

It is implicit in the thesis developed in this paper that the major roles for Civil Affairs are in actual theaters of Cold War conflict, such as those discussed in the preceding section, and in hot but limited wars. If the latter are not discussed at length, it is not because they are considered unimportant — quite the contrary — but because the lessons learned about civil affairs problems and operations in past wars, and consequently the organization,

planning, and training actions taken in preparation for future emergencies to date are appropriate mainly to limited wars. In other words, as the Army is already best prepared for the most probable kind of war, the most important subject for discussion in a paper such as this actually requires less attention than other problems which may be less important but to which less study and attention has been directed.

It would not be possible to say this so confidently if it seemed likely that the limited wars that loom on the horizon were principally limited nuclear wars. It is, in fact, a conviction that nuclear weapons are unlikely to be employed in most of the limited hostilities in which the US may be indirectly or directly involved that makes the experience of the past and the preparations of the present so plainly relevant. And about the role of Civil Affairs in these conventional limited wars there need be no specific comment, beyond the points made elsewhere in this paper about the nature and function of Civil Affairs in the future.

Something must be said, however, about the Civil Affairs problems which which the armed services will be confronted during and after a limited nuclear war.

Of course, a great deal depends upon the degree of limitation and upon the use made of nuclear weapons. It is conceivable that nuclear weapons might be used in such small numbers, and in such small "sizes," and upon so limited a list of permissible targets, that there would be, in fact, little difference between such a war and a limited conventional war. Indeed, it is barely conceivable that the limits imposed upon such an operation might hold it to a level of destruction below that which must be expected in a limited conventional war of comparable magnitude and importance. In these cases it is unlikely that any special requirements or problems will be laid upon Civil

Affairs, unless they are psychological problems connected with the novelty of nuclear weapons and the terror they inspire among the local population.

But it is difficult to believe that such would be the course of a "normal" limited nuclear war. On the contrary, it seems necessary to assume that, while a limited nuclear war might well be concluded much more quickly than a conventional war of the same extent, nevertheless the destruction and the consequent social disruption that it would leave in its wake would be much greater. The conviction that this must be the consequence of a limited nuclear war is, to be sure, the main reason for believing that such wars are unlikely, or at least much less likely, than limited conventional conflicts.

In limited nuclear war, the main thing for which Civil Affairs must be prepared is a burden of relief and rehabilitation of quite unprecedented proportions. In addition, however, it may be assumed that there will be requirements for certain services to the civilian population during the course of actual hostilities that have seldom in the past been a major problem. For example, civil engineers for the purpose of keeping a bare minimum of the public utilities in functioning order in the urban areas attacked by nuclear weapons might prove indispensable, not only for the survival of the civil population, but also for the military operations themselves. Another example: medical supplies and assistance to the civil population. They may also prove indispensable, despite the fact that the Army's medical facilities may already be stretched to the breaking point with military casualties, simply for the sake of protecting the military forces from the pestilence that is supposed to follow widespread disaster to the civil population. In addition, of course, whatever hopes we may have of gaining the friendship and support of the surviving population may depend heavily on what we do for them

in those first critical hours of our contact with them. Finally, it is quite probable that the factor of radiation hazard will impose special requirements upon Civil Affairs.

In summary, then, it hardly seems necessary to explore this problem in detail. The next section will deal with Civil Affairs and Civil Defense in the continental US in the event of general war. What is said there may well serve to indicate the dimensions of the problem that will confront our Civil Affairs teams in a smaller area in a limited nuclear war overseas. This is because, unless the limitations are as rigid as was mentioned earlier as a bare possibility, the problem confronting our forces in a limited nuclear war is very likely to be the fact of virtual local annihilation of large areas of the civil population, with a vast dislocation of the remainder, and either widespread panic and disorder, or a deadening apathy. Nor will our forces, themselves hard pressed by nuclear attack, be in a strong position to deal with civil disaster of this dimension. The problem deserves close study, such as it has not yet received.

## VII. Civil Affairs and Civil Defense

This section might have been entitled, "Civil Affairs in General War." In a general war between nuclear powers, of which the distinguishing feature is an exchange of thermonuclear destruction, it is a good question whether the belligerents will be able to survive the effects of the initial actions in the war. The body-social and politic-will be gravely wounded, it must rally its surviving energies to save life itself. What happens to the state of hostilities in this circumstance is an interesting question. Do adversaries continue seeking to destroy each other when they are already threatened with death? Human gladiators sometimes did. We have little experience upon which to predict the action of states in these circumstances. It seems eminently reasonable,

however, to assume that even if the belligerents continue in a state of hostility, and even if they intend to resume the attack at the earliest possible moment, in the aftermath of a thermonuclear exchange they will lack the capacity to undertake important military action. It seems reasonable to suppose, then, that if Civil Affairs is used in a general war its first use will be to help its own country to stay alive.

It may be well to note the arguments of the "counter-force" strategists at this point. They claim that the initial nuclear attack will be aimed at military forces, with no excess military capability left to destroy the social structure of the state, and no reason for doing so anyway. It is even argued that "clean" weapons will be used in this counter-force attack so that indirect damage to the population will be deliberately minimized. They do not, of course, suppose that the civil population will escape unscathed, but they do claim that in the most likely cases damage to the country will not be such as to cause its paralysis and collapse. If this view is correct it might leave at least one of the belligerents free to conduct military operations beyond its borders.

As with all nuclear speculations, this one cannot be decisively disproved. But the case against it does seem convincing. Suppose a general war does start with a counter-force attack by one of the belligerents on the other. In order to make this assumption we have to assume also the existence of conditions that render it possible, either the war must start with an attempted surprise attack, or it must be expanded to general proportions by the decision of one side to launch a "first strike" without the other side being able to disrupt its plans. But, in any case, let us assume a counter-force "first" strike. Now, unless we assume that this first strike is overwhelmingly successful we next have to consider what the stricken power would do by way of retaliation. The chances are that its offensive force will have been reduced by the effects of the first strike, or that they will not be fully effective because of the necessity

of taking emergency action during the brief intervals between the identification of the strike and its effect. Consequently the retaliatory strike probably cannot hope to be effective against the enemy offensive force. Does it then commit a counter-force strike anyway, hoping at least to reduce the enemy strike capability sufficiently to prevent further strikes, or does it use its reduced capability to make a "strategic" retaliatory strike against the enemy population? The latter seems more probable. Not only will it be the emotionally satisfying thing to do, but also, on purely military grounds, it will probably be the rational thing to do. For whereas it would be necessary to destroy hundreds, perhaps thousands, of targets in order to render the enemy armed forces ineffective by direct attack, only a few dozens of thermonuclear bombs on the enemy urban centers can be expected to paralyze the country so that it cannot continue its military effort for long, even though most of its ready forces survive. Obviously it would be better to stop the enemy military offensive in its tracks, therefore the counter-population attack is a second-best choice. But if the enemy strikes first it may well be the only choice that promises any appreciable effect.

What then will the enemy do, if its counter-force first strike is riposted by such an attack upon its vitals? The answer is self-evident: it will use whatever strike force remains to it to make a second strike, this time aimed at the victim's vitals. By this time neither belligerent will have much hope of winning, and may be in doubt of surviving, but surely the side that made the first strike is not going to allow its initiative to be frustrated by leaving its victim in better shape to survive.

It should be added that the aggressor's second strike may in fact be quite unnecessary. It will be necessary only on the assumption that its initial strike is made accurately and precisely with "clean" weapons and consequently is not a lethal blow to the victim society.

This conclusion about the probable consequences of the counter-force strategy is clearly a prescription for a "stalemate." If the initiator believes that the events will turn out as here suggested, in other words, it is difficult to believe that he will make his first strike. But we have to get into the general war picture some way, and this seems as good as any. We shall simply have to assume that the aggressor "miscalculates" and goes ahead. Now what happens within the victim country (and in the aggressor's country too, after the retaliatory strike)? And what role is there for the ground forces to play?

Much has been said about the tremendous resources and the extraordinary skills that a modern industrial society can bring to bear in an emergency. But these resources and skills are the product of a highly specialized and tightly integrated social system. So long as the emergency is localized, such a society can mobilize its resources and skills rapidly and concentrate them promptly in the location affected by the emergency situation. But, by the same token, such a society would appear to be particularly vulnerable to the effects of a general disaster. With communications and transport disrupted, and with the managerial structures of the great industrial and social organizations — which are, after all, rather highly concentrated in a few centers — destroyed or badly damaged, the integration of the society will break down, and specialization become a liability. Moreover, to restore such a system to even a minimum level of operation will be a mammoth task for the surviving elements of government, and of the private organizations upon the operation of which its life depends. The contrast between the effects of a paralyzing nuclear strike upon a system such as this and upon a more backward system of largely self-sufficient agricultural communities is self-evident. Yet, at least during the early recovery stages, the industrial community must behave as though it were actually composed of largely self-sufficient local communities.

The question, then, whether a modern industrial state can survive a thermonuclear attack, in which it has suffered casualties amounting to between a quarter and three-fourths of its total population, and destruction of its fixed capital of comparable proportions, may very well depend for its answer upon the residual capacity for self-relief and self-support available to the local political units. Certainly coordinated action on a broad scale will be desperately important, and in the second phase of the recovery the success or failure of the effort may depend upon the speed with which first regional and later national coordination can be re-established. But the "damage control" and recovery operation may never reach this phase at all unless the local communities are able to survive the immediate aftermath of the disaster. For this reason local civil defense, up to the level of the States, seems to be the first critical problem.

It also seems highly probable that the specifically political problems of survival are far more important than is generally recognized. Assuming that there is not general annihilation of the civilian population, the most concrete evidence of social collapse will be the appearance of social disorder among the survivors. It is true that the absence of social disorder among the victims of localized disasters has been notable. But this may be accounted for in good part by realization that the disaster is local and that help is available from outside. Also there is seldom any strong feeling that someone is at fault, at least immediately following a local disaster. But in a national disaster, the situation may well be quite different. Probably it will be immediately recognized that the emergency is general and not local, if not it will be known as soon as it appears that help from the outside is not coming or will be much delayed. Further, there will be a government to blame for this frightful state of affairs. There will also be an enemy to blame, of course, but if the effects are bad enough the enemy may seem too remote and impersonal to

make a satisfactory scapegoat. For these reasons the survival of the entire nation may well hinge upon the speed and efficiency with which local political units can be made viable.

The first moves must be made by the urban organizations, the mayors and councilmen and local civil defense authorities, and, of course, the local police. If these can begin functioning soon enough, if their efforts and their authority can be supported, the worse consequences of the disaster may be averted. If they cannot achieve operational recovery fairly promptly, reestablish and maintain order, and start the organization of relief activities, the chances are that anti-social individuals and mob psychology will take over. Further, as no urban community in this country, aside from a few small farm trading centers, is self-sufficient these days, even in food supplies, a certain minimum of regional coordination and integration is probably an indispensable adjunct to the restoration of the local communities. This focuses attention on the State, and suggests that the State government, particularly the governor himself (or his successor) may well be the key to survival during the early phases.

Now, the armed forces in their peacetime garrisons (and even if they are in a wartime alert at the time of the attack) are fairly widely distributed across the country. If they survive the attack, which they can do much better than the civilian communities because of their more disciplined organization and their greater degree of self-sufficiency, there seems to be no doubt that their services will be needed as the country struggles to stay alive. But where will they be needed, or how can they best serve, and in what capacities?

On this point there seems to be considerable disagreement. Some maintain that only such things as the service engineers and medical facilities are important because they can be used to supplement the depleted resources of the local communities. Others suppose that the forces, particularly the Army,

will just have to "take over and run things." Some have suggested, rather, that the armed forces (again mainly the Army) will not have to take full responsibility but will be necessary to maintain the authority and the effectiveness of the federal government. There is something to be said for all these views, but none of them seems to be quite in tune with the problem.

Remember the need for local political survival. It is suggested that to this end the armed forces may make an invaluable contribution, so decisive in fact that the question whether a particular community will begin to recover, or will decline into utter chaos, may well turn upon the presence or absence of a military unit of sufficient size to give the local authorities the extra support they will be needing so desperately. The first duty the armed services can provide is probably organized participation in the rescue work. For this the engineers are best suited, but all surviving military units will have one indispensable character for such work, which is discipline. Together with this rescue work, and following it through the initial emergency period, until the civilian authorities become self-sustaining, the maintenance of public order is a chore the forces can perform.

It is not proposed that the military should take over and run either the local communities or the rescue and recovery operations. It is proposed that the higher military commanders should make officers and units available to the local authorities for whatever duties they can perform. As communications begin to be restored, and as it becomes possible to relieve the troops of their first phase tasks — perhaps because it has been possible to call out the National Guard or the State Militia in most cases, it would be reasonable to expect the military units to come under more centralized control, perhaps at first from the State capital. Only in later stages of the recovery would centralization of the planning and control of the troop activities at the national level begin to be practical and sensible.

Specifically, then, it would appear that the military units would be employed immediately upon emergency tasks in their own vicinity under their own unit commanders operating to assist the local authorities. Only in the complete absence of local authority would it be necessary or advisable for the military commanders to assume authority themselves. Meanwhile, the Army area commanders should have begun to try to establish communications with the State governments in their areas, in order to work out coordinated efforts, state-by-state, as soon as possible. Military units in areas not attacked -- if any such exist -- might well be moved to other areas where their services could be utilized, either by the Army commanders on their own responsibility in default of national coordination, or by the Federal Government, if still operating.

If this prescription is reasonable, then it is apparent that the Civil Affairs requirement upon the services will be made widely manifest. Everywhere there will be problems of liaison and coordination with the local authorities, certain types of control will be exercised on behalf of the civilian authorities, and in some cases the military may have to provide an emergency substitute for local authority. The military units, and particularly the officers engaged in emergency duties with the civilian governments, will find themselves dealing with a host of problems quite unfamiliar in terms of their traditional military routines, but, on the other hand, very familiar to those trained in Civil Affairs. Whatever skills the forces have developed, whatever organization they have created, whatever training they have done, in this area of Civil Affairs will be invaluable.

For example, it may be assumed that an Army area commander would want to place a liaison officer or team with every governor in the States where his troops are located. What kind of officer should he assign to this function? He does not want a military specialist, say an engineer, because such an officer

will generally be far more useful out where the work is being done. He will want an operations officer from his own staff, preferably one who speaks the language of the state and local officials, who knows something about the political and economic as well as the public health and police requirements of the emergency – in short a Civil Affairs officer. Also, at the local level, the same background, knowledge and skills will be sought in order to establish effective communication between the local authorities and the military who have come to their assistance.

It is not proposed that the Civil Affairs planning and operation of the Army should be built up solely or even principally with this emergency function in mind. But it is a point worth noting that whether specific provision is made for it or not, if such an emergency ever arises the Army will find itself immersed in Civil Affairs problems, and will be extremely grateful for any provision it has made for this function with other objectives in mind. It is also not amiss to remark that planning for emergencies such as this should be going on in the armed services at this moment, that assistance to and coordination with civil authorities should be inherent in such plans, and that the Civil Affairs staffs ought to prove invaluable in this planning.

#### VIII. Civil Affairs a Part of Operations

It is agreed that Civil Affairs is a military function, inherent in the responsibilities of the commander, whenever the unit he commands affects, or is affected by, the encompassing civilian society. But what is the nature of this function, and what relation does it bear to other military functions with which we are more familiar?

It is convenient to think of the typically military functions in terms of the familiar quadripartite division: personnel, intelligence, operations, logistics.

In combat these functional areas are commonly thought of in rather precise terms. The commander is responsible for all four areas, and at the lower levels of command, the platoon and the company commander often performs them without functional assistance -- though even the platoon leader has general assistance, and at the company level there are specialists of sorts in personnel and logistics. It is recognized that the commander has other responsibilities, but these have priority. Moreover, among them it is common to assign the highest priority to operations. But this matter of priority is time and place dependent. There are times when commanders at all levels must give priority to operations -- to the maneuver and employment of their forces -- but over any considerable period of time every good commander recognizes that it is a mistake to allow any one of his main problem areas priority over the others. He must attend to the morale and administration of his forces, to information bearing upon his mission, to training, planning and movement (or whatever form his current operations assume), and to his supply.

Within the four main divisions there are particular functions that require specialized competence and these have given rise to the technical services, with their representatives assigned as far down the ladder of command as is necessary for effective performance of military missions. Examples are, of course, such specialties as the engineer, signal, and ordnance functions. Among these specialties are some that require years of training, in fact such a high degree of specialization that in the more extreme cases the commander's authority comes to a halt at the bounds of technical competence. Examples are the medical services, and the religious functions of the chaplains. These are of course, subject to the commander's supervision, but his command authority does not authorize him to tell the specialists how to do their jobs. He may move the medics against their professional judgment if his estimate of the military situation requires that they move. He may not tell them how or when to perform certain types of operations, or what drugs to use.

There is no need to go farther. It should be clear that the military commander's responsibilities are segregated by functional areas and that within these there are degrees of specialization. It is also clear that the commander's need for assistance is not entirely the result of specialization. Every commander is an "expert" in operations, yet assistance in the operations functions extends down to the platoon.

We noted that civil affairs is a military function. The question then, is, what kind of function is it, which of the familiar functional areas is it related to or a part of, if any, and at what level or in what circumstances is it appropriate to assign functional specialists to assist the commander in its discharge?

One basis for distinction between functions is their dependence upon the mission. All are of course, in some degree dependent, because the specific requirements placed upon them result from the mission. But some are more specifically dependent than others. The medical service will have a far heavier burden of professional responsibility in combat than in garrison, and its strength may be increased or reduced accordingly. But its medical training and competence bears only minor relationship to the mission. It is more dependent upon the nature of the human body and what is known about the diseases and wounds to which it is subject than upon the locale and purpose of a military operation — though specialists in tropical medicine are unlikely to be found (or should be unlikely to be found) in, say, Iceland. Likewise, the ordnance service, though its responsibilities are heavier in combat than in garrison, and though they may differ somewhat depending upon the nature of the climate and terrain, are nonetheless more directly dependent upon the technology of the day than upon the military mission itself. Even within the charmed circle of the "G's," the G-1's responsibilities, and the functional responsibilities of the specialists whose activities he coordinates, vary more in burden than in kind from one operation to the next. But the function of G-3

is the operation, and that of G-2 is only less dependent for its nature and character upon the operation of the moment. Both operations and intelligence do have their basic requirements of competence and their sustaining responsibilities. But both, and operations even more than intelligence, build their current activities on the mission of the command.

Now, from what has been observed earlier, it is clear that civil affairs somehow relates to operations, because it depends on the mission to determine its functional requirements. "To seize and control territory" does not mean exclusively to take it away from enemy troops. It also means to establish control over the population. But suppose the mission of the unit is training and peacetime preparation for eventual defense, in an allied country such as France, or even in Kansas. It is still true that what suffers if the civil affairs function is not discharged is the unit's mission. It cannot train to best advantage if the commander's time is taken up in resolving problems of local relations, or if its training activities are restricted by failure of the local population to cooperate.

It is true that, like the operations function, the civil affairs function requires a certain basic competence. It is also true that, like medicine and ordnance, special requirements may be imposed by the mission that call for high specialization in the civil affairs function. The expert in tropical medicine who accompanies a jungle operation has his counterpart in the expert on monetary affairs who might be employed in the civil affairs function in any one of a number of places around the globe. But it is not the provision of these specialties when they are required that is so difficult, but rather their anticipation in advance of their requirement. This demands a certain basic awareness that ought to be inherent in any operation.

In fact, it is less difficult to procure specialists in case of urgent need than it is to use them properly once they have been procured, and this again demands of the commander, and his operations assistants, just such a broad comprehension of the use of civil affairs specialists as the medical service has of the value and limits of the specialist in tropical medicine. But whether the civil affairs specialist is needed or not is a function of the mission and the burdens it imposes on the commander. Long before it is necessary to call in a monetary specialist it will be evident that the commander requires general assistance in civil affairs. For example, the rehabilitation of occupied territory may well call for practitioners of quite esoteric specialities, such as Islamic law, but it is likely to call for more urgently for men who can deal full time, with the commander's confidence and on his behalf, with the problems of disorder, of want, and of population displacement that accompany every military operation in populated areas.

It is this varying requirement for general awareness and competence in the special problems that arise out of the coexistence of the military force and the society within which it finds itself, a requirement that varies both in intensity and in kind with the nature of the mission of the force and with the circumstances under which it must execute that mission, that defines the civil affairs function.

It is suggested, then, that the civil affairs function is wholly dependent for the determination of its requirements upon the mission itself, and therefore partakes of the nature of the operations function, which likewise depends upon the mission to determine the requirements placed upon it. When a commander is given an assignment for the unit he commands, the performance of the civil affairs function, that is to say, the solution of civil affairs problems as they arise, is an inherent part of the mission assigned, even when it is not explicitly stated — unless, of course, the civil affairs mission has been

explicitly assigned to some other command. If the commander fails to carry out his mission by reason of the civil affairs problems he encounters, he will be not excused on the ground that non-military forces have interfered to disrupt his aim. In extreme cases of military emergency he may for a time ignore the people around his command and what his operation is doing to them. In this extremity he may even for a time dispose of their effects upon his command with "purely military" measures. But not for long, because his mission imposes upon him not only the obligation of accomplishing a national purpose but also of accomplishing it in a certain way. It is expected of him that he will deal humanely with the civilian victims of war, and even in peacetime it is not to his credit if he fails to carry out his assignment on time because of local incomprehension and lack of cooperation. Thus the success of his operation often depends upon the recognition and solution of civil affairs problems as they arise, and it is his assistants in the operation function whose duty it is to appraise him of these problems and to help him to solve them until such time as their complexity demands the addition of a section to his staff to relieve his operations people of this burden.

There is, however, a difficulty about this. Of all military specialists, the operations specialists are the most specialized. That is to say, it is difficult for an operations officer to think in terms of peripheral considerations, because of the passion with which he concentrates on the "purely" military tasks before him, the planning, training, maneuver, and coordination of subordinate units that to him are the essence of the military art. Unless the mission itself is a civil affairs mission (which is quite possible, of course, because military government units have operations specialists), there is a tendency for the operations people to leave civil affairs to anyone else who wants the responsibility — at least, until it becomes obvious that the mission cannot be carried out because no one is taking the responsibility.

Thus, it was not uncommon in World War II for the Chief of Staff himself to take primary staff responsibility for civil affairs, or assign it to the G-1 or G-4, or even the G-2. And in peacetime it is not at all unusual for the commander to carry most of the load, utilizing the personal assistance of whatever staff officer is handiest, perhaps his own ADC. And when specialization first enters the picture, the specialist is likely to be the public relations officer, whether he bears that title or not, whose primary responsibility is to "get along" with the press.

None of these practical expedients affects the conclusion that civil affairs, as a function inherent in military operations and dependent for its nature and intensity upon the particular mission of the command, is an operational problem. But the reluctance of the operations section of the staff to encumber itself with this peculiar responsibility is historically established. Moreover, it is a fact that unless the civil affairs function is itself the mission of the command, and therefore the primary operational responsibility, civil affairs problems inherent in the performance of the mission may well prove too heavy a burden for the operations section of the staff, which as a different competence and other duties to perform.

When this is the case the time for a special civil affairs staff to be established has come (and of course any command that must anticipate civil affairs problems of this magnitude is better off if it is equipped to deal with them in advance of their appearance). But it should be clear that a commander who has a civil affairs (G-5) staff section really has two operations sections. G-5 is a specialization within the G-3 function, which may be organizationally separated but must always be closely coordinated. What G-3 is in terms of the military problems that must be overcome to execute the mission of the command, G-5 is in terms of the civil affairs problems

that must be overcome either to execute the mission, or to allow the mission to be executed.

Throughout the period since World War II, or at least since 1950, during which civil affairs has been achieving rehabilitation, there has been debate about the nature of the function and where it belongs in the military staff structure. In the Department of the Army the Chief of Civil Affairs and Military Government is now on a level with the Chief of Military History, the Chief of Special Warfare, and the Chief of Chaplains. Below the Department present doctrine prescribes that civil affairs (and "military government") is a general staff function, and it is envisaged that commands likely to encounter substantial civil affairs problems shall have a G-5.

This is in line with what has been suggested in this writing. It worked well before and should work again. What is needed now is better appreciation of what the function is that provision is being made for, so that it may be discharged appropriately at each stage, and in every circumstance, even when it is not necessary to make additional staff provision for it. Let us again try to see if the question can be sorted out in a series of propositions.

The requirement for a civil affairs function, when it exists at all, is inherent in the commander's or unit's mission — even if it is not specifically mentioned in the orders establishing the mission.

Because of its direct relation to the mission, civil affairs is best conceived as an operations responsibility.

When civil affairs problems are not burdensome — do not threaten to absorb an excessive part of the commander's time — they are taken by the commander in stride, with such help from his personal assistants as is desirable.

When civil affairs problems begin to be burdensome upon the commander, the logical place to look for staff assistance is to the operations division of the staff.

When civil affairs problems are of sufficient complexity and urgency that it becomes difficult for the operations division of the staff to do both them and its other responsibilities justice, the operations function may be divided, with a separate civil affairs staff division taking responsibility for the civil affairs aspects of operations.

When there are civil affairs operations (e. g. , when civil affairs units are placed at the disposal of the commander to enable him to perform his mission) their coordination is the responsibility either of the operations division of the staff, or of a civil affairs division of the staff, depending upon the burden of coordination and the relative importance of the function in comparison with other aspects of the commander's responsibilities.

When the civil affairs operation (e. g. , military government of occupied territory, or a substantial relief and rehabilitation operation in any war damaged area) becomes a separable mission of the command, or a preoccupation of such proportions that it becomes more than an aspect of the mission of the command and more like a separate mission, the best solution may be for the commander to divide himself; i. e. , 'appoint a deputy' to himself with over-all command and coordination responsibility for civil affairs.

In all cases in which civil affairs remains the commander's own responsibility, coordination is a general staff function, though civil affairs units may also have functional channels for their special purposes. When civil affairs becomes a mission in itself, with a commander or deputy commander over it, it then achieves its own command channels. In the first case the commander may specify that civil affairs below the level of his immediate staff should report through its own channels directly to his staff, or he may authorize subordinate commanders to exercise supervision at their levels, depending upon the circumstances. Thus civil affairs staff channels will be both vertical and horizontal. In the second case, of course, the subordinate commanders will be civil affairs commanders and all channels will be vertical.

The only thing about this that is not generally accepted is the principle that, in familiar military terms, civil affairs is an operations responsibility of the commander. Civil Affairs is, in fact, a special type of operations requirement. If this were kept clearly in mind the old controversy between those who argue that civil affairs is a general staff function and those who dispute this, saying that it is a special staff function, akin to Signal, Ordnance, Engineering, and Medicine, would be less likely to recur. In the present Department of the Army organization, in which the Chief of Civil Affairs and Military Government, though set up in a position that looks like a special staff position, reports to the Chief of Staff through the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, the principle is properly honored.

#### IX. Civil Affairs versus Military Government

The reader will remark that this paper has undertaken to develop a concept of civil affairs based entirely on relations with friendly populations. This has been done intentionally. The fact that both experience and inquiry in this field began with military government is unfortunate. Even though the occupation of enemy territory may have been the original occasion for the recognition of the function that is our subject, and even if it should turn out in the future that operations in enemy territory are the most critical, it remains a fact that preoccupation with military government has led to error in the approach to civil affairs problems. Military government is a special form of civil affairs upon which certain specific requirements are imposed. In military government, problems that arise primarily because of the need to achieve understanding between a military force and a civilian society must be solved in an atmosphere that actually militates against understanding. Communication is made difficult not only by whatever fears and resentments may move the conquered population, but at least equally by the crippling effects of our own war-induced predilections.

It is true that there is a form of civil affairs characterized by the problem of controlling rather than merely coexisting with the local population, and that this is more likely to arise in connection with an enemy population than with the people of a friendly country. But, as we have seen, it has happened in the past that technically friendly populations have had to be "controlled," and it could happen again. The relation of "control," as opposed to other forms of civil affairs, arises whenever local institutions are so disrupted that our national interests would be adversely affected by the resulting chaos if our forces did not assume this responsibility. This may happen because the local regime has been discredited by defeat in war against us, or it may result from our deliberate policy of destroying the local regime, but it may also occur to either enemy or friendly populations merely because of the destructive effects of hostilities that have taken place in the area, and it could happen in extreme cases merely because of the disturbing effect of the presence of our forces. Thus the terms "military government" and "civil affairs," as presently defined in official doctrine, do not accurately reflect the circumstances under which the different forms of the activity may be called for.

But there is an even more basic reason why "military government" is the wrong way to start and the wrong concept with which to end. It derives from our own concept of our national purposes and of the world in which they must be achieved. As we believe that the right is on our side, and as we are convinced that men everywhere, once freed of want and oppression, will share our basic values, we can well afford to assume, so long as the present situation exists, that there are no "enemy" peoples, and that every war is a liberation. So long as Communism nowhere enjoys majority support, but must everywhere be imposed upon the majority by a militant minority with aid from one of the established Communist power centers, this hypothesis

corresponds more closely to the fact than does a legalistic distinction between "friends" and "enemies." And even if the hypothesis should on some rare occasion not be borne out by the facts, it is still the best assumption upon which to plan for civil affairs.

This is because even if the people with whom we must deal are, in fact, hostile, the salient problem is still one of communication. We can apply force with no great difficulty. It takes no brilliance to use firing squads, and no special competence to impose military control by other forceful means. What does require special competence is the job of finding out what the people need and what can be expected of them that will lead to the reestablishment of their self-control and thus minimize both the burden and the onus on our forces. Beyond this a way must be found of returning them to a state of peace, to reconciliation with us and the rest of the world, of converting them, in short, from hostility to at least nominal friendship. Regardless of our feelings about them, unless we mean to exterminate them we must recognize that our future world will include them. It is well that we set about their re-entry into it in the most effective way, and our own principles tell us that the most effective way by far is to proceed upon the assumption that they belong, and only need help in finding their place in our world.

I do not mean to depreciate the forces' security requirements, which may include the necessity of self-protection from guerrilla attacks and of ferreting out saboteurs and other disturbing or hostile elements in the civilian population. But these become extremely difficult tasks, imposing enormous burdens upon military forces, if they must be done in the teeth of popular hostility. By far the best way to "fight" guerrillas, as all past experience tells us, is to win the support of the local population — without which guerrilla effectiveness usually diminishes to the point of extinction — away from them. And likewise it is the local authorities, with their unique knowledge

of the population and the territory, who are much the best equipped to combat subversive elements.

In nearly all cases the local population prefers order. Resistance rarely comes from the individual and spontaneous opposition of the ordinary citizen, unless he is provoked by military error and abuse. Most resistance is organized by a minority, and it is these minority organizations that must be combated. If they create disorder, as they generally must, in most cases the local population can be weaned away from their support by a military force that offers local order as the alternative. By and large, only "victory" is popular, barring perhaps some civil wars and popular wars of independence. Thus a defeated regime quickly loses the peoples' support, and the minority who seek to carry on the hostilities at the cost of local chaos are very likely to be regarded by the majority of the population as mischievous — patriotic perhaps — but misguided.

The proper procedure for the "liberator," then, appears to be to start with the smallest territorial unit, the town, village, or local rural unit, and pacify each separately, not by imposing order with force, but by offering order as an alternative to disorder. As rapidly as possible the job of keeping order should be turned over to local authorities — local police, local magistrates, and local administrative officers. These territorial units can then be combined into larger units, with the local population being given increasing responsibility for the maintenance of public order and for the coordination of local activities as the pacified area grows.

This prescription applies, curiously enough, in sharply contrasting circumstances. The local government of the pre-war period may still be intact, as in the liberation of French territory from German occupation in World War II; it may be intact but discredited in part by association with political doctrines

and actions unacceptable both to the local population and to the occupier, as in our occupation of German territory in that war; it may be largely dispersed and thoroughly discredited, as in German occupation of Soviet territory in the same war. Likewise, our Asian experience suggests that the prescription applies even though there may be marked cultural and institutional differences between occupier and occupied. There is always some form of local leadership, because without it there is no civilization (and even in jungles and other primitive territories there must be at least tribe and clan leaders). In highly centralized systems, such as that of France, local autonomy may have become unfamiliar, and the discrediting of local officials of the central government may have left no one experienced in the required arts, but it can be assumed that autonomous administration is always potentially available, and social leadership always present in latent even if not in actual form.

There may, of course, be exceptional circumstances in which the prescription will not serve. But the conditions necessary to the creation of such circumstances are uncommon. A community of dedicated Communists, or perhaps of fanatic Arab nationalists, might actually prefer chaos to order at the hands of the "liberator." But where would such a community be found? At worst there are two adverse possibilities: it could happen that all the leadership potential of a community were hostile, leaving only a passive and ineffective mass out of which local leadership must be created; it could also happen that the occupier somehow became identified with foreign oppression, and thus the object of popular hostility. The first situation would impose difficult requirements upon the liberator, needing more time for solution; the latter must almost certainly be in large part the result of mistakes on the liberator's part, at least if forces of the free world are the liberators. But in any case, and at all hazard, let us not deliberately embrace the wrong approach in the vast majority of cases merely because of the possible existence of such

exceptional cases. We can seriously jeopardize our ultimate objectives, and make our task quite unnecessarily difficult, by taking counsel of our fears.

Metropolitan or highly urbanized areas are a special problem, mainly because urban conditions increase the effectiveness of minority actions, including, of course, resistance. But again, the problem of "control" is nearly insoluble without local support. In default of the special local information and understanding essential to effective suppression of urban resistance organizations, the military have been known to resort to retributive measures against the population at large. This is rarely effective unless it is so thorough-going as to be quite unacceptable to our own people (we could "pacify" Stalingrad with an H-bomb!). But if limits are imposed on violence by our own mores and purposes, in the absence of effective cooperation with local elements forceful suppression only increases and solidifies local support of the resisters. The inept occupier, or in exceptional cases the occupier who inspires irreconcilable hostility, commonly resorts first to retributive violence, and only after thus greatly increasing the dimensions of his problem does he seek local cooperation. But by the time the switch in method is adopted hostility has been so exacerbated that the only local elements willing to cooperate are likely to be unpopular minorities, the occupier's support of which substitutes civil war for resistance. This process may be considered a "solution," if the urban area in question can be bypassed by the logistics and communications elements of the occupying forces, leaving the citizenry to stew in the juices of civil war. But again, it is not likely to make the people of the United States very happy. It is not the performance they properly expect of their armed forces. And it is a bad augury for the future. It is a "solution" only in the most limited military terms; in broader terms, which include civil affairs as a necessary part of the military mission, it is failure to achieve a solution.

## X. What "the Law" Allows

Considering the vigor of our legal tradition, and our habit of acting in terms of an accepted framework of legal rules, something must be said about the impact of legal concepts and systems upon the civil affairs relation. The problem is a complex one; what will be said here is only intended to suggest a possible line of approach.

The reason for the problem is the incompatibility, in general, of law and revolution. Revolution alters the content of law, though it does not necessarily alter the form of law, and does not abolish the necessity and utility of law. If we can agree that the social function of law is to provide a means of achieving peaceful and orderly resolutions of conflicts of interest between opposed parties, then law cannot disappear in revolution, though it may be temporarily suspended, and may emerge greatly altered. No form of society can dispense with the procedures that substitute orderly for disorderly relations between the individuals and groups that compose it. But the content of the rules, the form of the procedures, and particularly the role of public authority as regards both form and procedure, is subject to comprehensive revisions, which is one of the identifying marks of social revolution.

The world we inhabit is in revolution. Within the free world change, though rapid and far-ranging, is generally, though by no means always, orderly. The free world has, in fact, accomplished the redesign of its legal systems in order to accommodate them to change, so much so that they would probably be ill-adapted to a static world. Likewise, within the Communist world there is more order than disorder, though rather more of the latter than in the free world — despite appearances which sometimes suggest the contrary. But in the clash of these two, and in the outside world where neither has secured lodgment, the world revolution is more disorderly.

In the active theaters of the East-West conflict, as in France in 1947, and in Indonesia and the Middle East today, there is considerable disorder, and the existing legal structure of society is in chronic jeopardy. Moreover, throughout the "uncommitted" areas, where the free world and Communism are in competition, there is the Asian-African "revolution," combining a foreshortened social and political convulsion resulting from the precipitation of backward societies into the twentieth century, and a compressed version of the industrial revolution. In any particular country of this area the specifically revolutionary or independence movements are minority phenomena, but so are all revolutions. Underneath, the popular majority is disturbed, the degree of popular disturbance varying from a largely passive uneasiness to the extreme of open violence depending upon local circumstances.

It is not difficult for us to comprehend that traditional legal patterns, particularly if we regard them as backward and oppressive, must be changed in the processes of revolution. We applaud the outlawry of the scheduled castes in India. Likewise we can comprehend, even when we do not approve, the necessity of change in traditional western property relationships if Communism is to achieve its objectives. But it is more difficult to grasp the effects of these complex revolutionary currents upon those forms of law, such as international law and the law of war, that are supposed to govern when unsettled and divergent local situations come into contact.

International law presupposes the acceptance of a minimum set of norms of conduct and of concepts of justice as between individuals in different states and as between states themselves. This is the case within the free world today. But in the area of conflict between systems, and within the unsettled areas where the Asian-African emergence is taking place, the common acceptance is either totally lacking, or is weak.

Over a long period the "coexistence" of even substantially inimical social philosophies may eventually result in principles of common conduct being arrived at. Also, not all the old rules are cast aside. Communist powers sometimes do pay indemnities for the planes they shoot down, and international contracts are observed and enforced where commercial intercourse of mutual interest must be carried on. It is possible that international law may yet be expanded and adapted to incorporate the requirements of even widely divergent systems. But whether this will actually happen, and what form the final product will take, is yet in doubt.

We are principally concerned here with the laws of war. These are a special form of international law, and among the least stable of its forms. A cynic might observe that the laws of war at any one time are the rules that the victors of the most recent great war would like to see applied to the next war. More practically, the laws of war are compounded of the modes of conduct accepted by the major belligerents in the last great war, as expressed by the victors, with additions representing actions taken in the last war that the victors wish to prohibit in the future. Attempts to codify the laws of war, such as the various Hague and Geneva conventions, have served a useful purpose because they have given the belligerent powers common reference points to assist them in their determinations of acceptable conduct under the pressure of war. But no one would claim that the Conventions have prevented the major powers, even those that were most attuned to the social values represented, from doing anything those powers considered to be urgently required by the demands of their "security." Changing military operations and organization, and changing military technology have repeatedly altered the laws of war — as have, of course, changes in political objectives and in social and moral values.

In wartime, the laws of war have never caused this country any great difficulty. They did not, for example, prevent us from adopting unrestricted

submarine warfare in World War II, though Germany's adoption of the same tactic in World War I was ostensibly one of the reasons for our entry into that war. Nor did they prevent us from practicing indiscriminate "strategic" bombing of urban and industrial centers. But our own political system, with its separation of powers, which are enabled to work together effectively only by the common acceptance of a legal system within which the rights and powers of various elements are carefully defined, in peacetime inclines us to emphasize the binding nature of international law, including the law of war, probably more strongly than it deserves. This can have an unfortunate effect upon our peacetime planning and preparation for military situations which the existing laws do not fit.

The reason will be clear if we return for a moment to consider the legal implications of the prescription suggested earlier for the pacification of "liberated" areas in wartime. It can be argued that existing interpretations of the "law of land warfare" (see FM 27-10) specifically proscribe this approach. For example, neither by order nor by persuasion ("no pressure or propaganda") can natives of enemy territory occupied by the US Army in war be enlisted in quasi-military organizations to serve our purposes. (Art. 51, Geneva Convention relating to the protection of civilian persons in time of war.) If there is an existing government it may be allowed to enforce public order, even to the extent of combatting guerrilla activities. But if there is no existing local government it appears to be illegal to create one. In fact the creation of "a new state" in occupied territory before the end of hostilities is stated to be prohibited. (FM 27-10, para. 358) Moreover, it is said that actions prohibited the occupier cannot be accomplished by the device of using a puppet government, central or local, to carry them out. (FM 27-10, para. 366) These restrictions suggest that what appears to be the soundest method of approach to this critical problem is improper.

The Conventions, and our interpretations of them, stem from nineteenth century experience, with glosses introduced later, primarily to eliminate rules the victors had found it necessary or expedient to ignore in two world wars, or to proscribe actions taken by the losing side that the victors had not found it necessary or expedient to emulate. These essentially nineteenth century rules presuppose belligerent nations and national wars. They are not designed for revolutionary civil conflict and ideological wars. They are designed to minimize the incidental horror of war between nations that share a common background of values, and to preserve as far as possible the conditions on which peace might be restored. In addition, they are intended to inhibit purely military abuse of defenseless civilians. Only in this last respect are they still fully valid.

There may of course be exceptional circumstances in which this criticism is not entirely just. In the era of limited wars that we are now experiencing, there may be conflicts fought ostensibly between powers that recognize the validity and usefulness of the laws of land warfare, while the real instigators of the conflict remain in the background. But this is unlikely. Such conflicts-by-agency are more likely to be civil disturbances, to which the established rules have little if any application. Or they may be wars fought by underdeveloped countries or parts of countries, in parts of the world where western standards of conduct in warfare have never been comprehended, much less accepted. In the critical cases of direct military conflict between East and West, whether a general war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact powers, or in limited war in central or southern Europe or the Middle East, the rules just do not fit the circumstances.

This inappropriateness springs primarily, as indicated already, from the fact that "the law of land warfare" is not designed and ~~was~~ never intended to control the actions of conflicting parties in civil war produced by a

revolutionary upheaval of society. The difficulty is increased by the contrast between the free world's legal philosophy, which is grounded firmly on rules derived from natural or common law regarded as above or outside the state and thus immune to political whim, and the Communist view of law as the will of the Communist state. In this latter concept, the State, which is for all practical purposes identical with the Communist Party, is the exclusive source of law and justice. As applied to war, Communist rules are equally simple: Communist wars and all actions taken by the Communist powers in war are just; non-Communist military actions are unjust and illegal.

The matter does not end there, however. The Communist belligerent may very well observe the rule that prisoners of war are not to be executed merely as prisoners of war, if he desires to encourage his opponent not to execute prisoners of war. But if he feels that this particular form of terror is likely to be a useful means of encouraging his own soldiers to continue the fight (recall that the Russians lost between three and five million men in the first year of World War II, mostly by surrender), he may deliberately adopt the practice of shooting prisoners, regardless of any rule. Likewise, in the occupation of territory taken in war, he may ostentatiously observe the Geneva Convention if it serves his purpose, for example, in cases in which the area is already under Communist control, or in which the occupiers for one reason or another do not expect to remain or do not hope to be able to establish a Communist regime. But in other situations occupation is likely to be followed promptly by ruthless elimination of anti-Communist elements and the establishment of minority Communist regimes, based upon police terror supported by Communist military forces.

In short, though the Communist powers may be expected to make great propaganda play with the "laws of war," when it suits their purpose, just as they often endeavor to use our social values against us, and even though they

may on occasion actually observe them in practice, it means little. The common basis of mutual interest is lacking. The social values and objectives of the opposing worlds are so divergent that this has to be the case. Except for the propaganda advantage we can derive, particularly in presentation to the so-called neutrals of the superior attractiveness of our social philosophy, it is rather pointless for us to insist upon international law and the laws of war in these circumstances.

But, again, it is necessary to examine the situation closely. There is today no meaningful social philosophy, acceptable in terms of the values and aspirations of western civilization, that does not aim at a stable world order. We cannot abandon the hope of such a goal and remain true to our own principles. Therefore, we cannot simply throw rules of international conduct overboard because they do not fit circumstances we are morally compelled to regard as temporary. Moreover, it is not beyond the realm of possibility that even violently divergent social philosophies will be forced by circumstances to reach a modus vivendi, more stable than the present "coexistence," in which a minimum standard of international conduct might be recognized. Some, presumably, would insist that such a minimum already is recognized. They would adduce as evidence the participation of Communist bloc countries in the UN and its affiliated international organizations, and such acts as the payment of indemnities for shooting down planes of another power, and the performance of international contracts, mentioned earlier. This evidence is, however, quite unconvincing. All these means are too clearly justified by the end, which is the survival and triumph of the Communist system in a war that never relents, though it may blow hot or cold.

It takes a blind conviction of the inevitability of agreement upon basic rules of international comity and justice to lead to the conclusion that eventual agreement on common interests between the free and Communist worlds must

come. It is more reasonable to assume that either Communism or the free world must change under the influence of some preordained historical trend, until a common ground is reached. But neither conviction befits the pragmatic side of our Weltanschauung. We must make our moves one at a time, and somehow keep our ultimate hopes in hand, relying more upon the validity of our immediate decisions as determined by their consonance with a complex set of social values in which we believe because we have seen them work successfully, than upon grounds of decision derived from utopian absolutes.

This attitude, while it ensures that our decisions will be in keeping with our everyday frame of moral reference, protects us from the hazard that our means may come to be justified by ends we conceive too simply; it should also protect us from impractical application of our values where they do not fit. And so it does when the chips are down. There is no good reason to believe that in actual hostilities with the Communist world, if the creation of a free "puppet" state were the intelligent solution to the problems of occupied or liberated territory, such a state would not be created by us merely because our interpretation of the Geneva Convention had forbidden it in the past. We should doubtless point out instances in which the Communists had flouted the Convention, or its inapplicability to the circumstances. But such a decision would be made at the top of the Government, where it might entail such preparatory steps as "recognizing" the existence of a "free" regime in exile before the territory in question were actually entered. But if this is a reasonable expectation of what we should actually do, it is difficult to justify imposing upon the Army's planning for such a contingency a taboo that, despite its clear unreason, is the law of the land.

This then, is a problem that calls for careful study. The best intelligence and political brains in the government — and not just the legalists — should examine the applicability of existing rules of international conduct in

the circumstances in which it may be expected that they must be applied. Those that clearly do not fit should be suspended, with careful definition of the conditions of their suspension, in order to avoid doing violence to the principle that we adhere to acceptable standards of international conduct. Nor should such an examination conclude merely that we will observe those rules our enemy observes, and consider ourselves not bound by those he violates. This would be to restate what is already taken for granted, and would constitute no progress whatever. What is required is an appreciation of the special circumstances in which the conflict of opposing social systems must take place, and to recognize as comprehensively as possible just how these special circumstances alter the rules now in force, which have been derived from experience of conflicts of quite a different character. This appreciation is already implicit in some of the positions the US Government has taken in the Cold War, including some probably ill-considered suggestions that "liberation" of the satellites is our Cold War objective. What is needed is to bring this freedom of inquiry down from the Olympian heights where high policy is made to the level where it can yield practical benefit to the planner and organizer. Whether such a change of attitude should be announced is another question. The minimum requirement is to free the planner from restrictions that are anachronisms in his present environment.

## XI. Conclusion

It was not the purpose of this paper to develop the frame of civil affairs operations, nor the intent to explore civil affairs objectives in detail. This has already been done in other writings; the results are well represented in the latest official statements in the revised editions of the Civil Affairs and Military Government field manuals. The purpose here was to expose the foundations of civil affairs, and to try to state the basic essentials as clearly

as possible. The findings of this examination are summarized in the following propositions.

In retrospect, the reluctant acceptance of the civil affairs function as a necessary and inescapable requirement of our military services, and specifically of the Army, parallels our growing awareness of world responsibility and of what it takes to hold our own.

The lesson of experience is that there are simple and straightforward basic principles upon which civil affairs planning and operations can be grounded. These principles stem from our assumptions about the nature of man and from our experience that men respond favorably to considerate treatment that respects their dignity, allows scope for their constructive energies, and offers help towards the solution of their most critical immediate problems.

Looking ahead, we perceive rather more dimly conditions of conflict that are basically different from the great conflicts of the past. The strategic prospect suggests the unlikelihood of great global wars, and the unlikelihood that society as we know it can survive in the event that such a war should take place. It suggests also, however, that the current phase of limited conflict between the great opposing social philosophies of Communism and the Free World, with both sides suing for the support of those peoples who consider themselves still uncommitted, will continue indefinitely, and that the United States may at any time find itself engaged in open hostilities in such a limited conflict. This prospect requires that an effort be made to assess the appropriateness to the changed circumstances of the future of the conclusions drawn from past experience of civil affairs and military government.

The assessment, which has been undertaken here in summary fashion, does not show that the lessons of the past are no longer valid. It does suggest the need to adapt the lessons of the past to the needs of the future. In the main,

what is suggested is need for progress in two directions: first towards a conceptual refinement that will further rid civil affairs of false or needless assumptions and distinctions; second, towards recognition that civil affairs in the future must be adapted to a world setting in which war takes the form of civil conflict, incident to the world social resolution, rather than the form of national conflict, such as that which produced the experience upon which current civil affairs assumptions rest.

The suggested refinement sees the civil affairs problem in the difficulty of communication between military forces and the quite differently organized civilian environment in which they exist and operate. It recognizes that this relation exists wherever civilian-military coexistence is a fact, and justifies special preparation for performance of the civil affairs function, not by the appearance of a problem situation that is unfamiliar and different in kind from some base experience that can be considered purely or typically military, but rather by virtue of the inescapable coexistence of the military and civilian modes of society. It justifies the Army's peculiar responsibility in this area solely by the fact that all the Army's functions, including the most critical, are normally performed with the social environment.

Because the relation identified is general, the assessment suggests that the distinction between "civil affairs" and "military government" as currently defined, is wrong. The difference is not one of kind, nor yet of degree, but is the product entirely of a unique circumstance: the existence or non-existence of local government capable of discharging cooperatively the bulk of the functions of social control for which the military will be held responsible if they are not otherwise discharged.

In this, as in other cases, the root of the error appears to be the application of principles derived from a set of international rules of conduct that no

longer fit the actual circumstances, either current or in prospect. These rules were derived from the experience of armed conflict between national states, in which there was broad agreement upon the basic human values. They cannot be expected to apply with equal validity to civil war within the human society, in which the very essence of the conflict concerns these basic values.

There is a great deal more in what has gone before than can be reduced to concrete recommendations. Understanding precedes action. If this paper has helped to clarify thinking on civil affairs, the changes that may from time to time be appropriate to bring action into line with concept will be more readily apparent.

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