OPTIMAL ALTITUDE FOR ANTIMISSILE DETONATIONS. A GAME THEORY ANALYSIS
Abstract
This memorandum treats a situation where an ICBM plunges toward a target defended by one or more AICBM missiles. It is assumed that if the defender identifies the ICBM and scores a hit within the lethal radius of the AICBM before the ICBM detonates, the ICBM does no damage. If the ICBM detonates first, however, it does an amount of damage that depends on the height of the detonation. The defender has a dilemma. If he tries to knock out the ICBM at a great height, he is less likely to identify and kill it than if he waits until it is lower. On the other hand, if he waits until it is low, it may explode before he attacks it, at an altitude low enough to produce severe damage. The attacker must decide at what altitude he will detonate the ICBM. The defender does not pick the same altitude to detonate his weapons everytime, since then the attacker would detonate the ICBM always just a little above that altitude. Thus the strategies involve random selection of altitudes for both the attacker and the defender. The best strategies for both the attacker and the defender are found, first for the case where there is just one defense missile, and then for the case of multiple defense missiles. (Author)
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Nov 01, 1962
- Accession Number
- AD0289508
Entities
People
- J.w. Jr. Kitchen
Organizations
- RAND Corporation