POWER, STRATEGY, AND THE FORMATION OF COALITIONS IN TRIADS UNDER FOUR INCENTIVE CONDITIONS
Abstract
A simple competitive board game was used to determine the characteristics of strategy manifested by three-person groups. Intra-member relationships in relative power were varied by the drawing of weights to establish conditions in which the three players were all-equal, one or two members were stronger but when any two exceeded the third in strength, and one member was all-powerful. Six of these patterns were adopted, in three successive series, making 18 games for each group. Data were collected from 30 groups of each sex, playing under one of four incentives, namely, game-by-game scoring, cumulative scoring, delayed payoff monetary reward, and immediate payoff monetary reward. Inter-sex and inter-incentive comparisons were made in terms of kind and incidence of coalitions, deals reached, amount and character of bargaining, and a number of manifestations of strategy. Results indicate that the general style of play is similar under all incentives, with certain specific variations produced by the special problems posed by the incentive condition. The most striking behavior is associated with differences between exploitative (masculine) and accommodative (feminine) strategy. (Author)
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Oct 12, 1962
- Accession Number
- AD0292105
Entities
People
- W. Edgar Vinacke
Organizations
- University of Hawaiʻi System