THE CORE OF AN ECONOMY WITH NONCONVEX PREFERENCES

Abstract

A model of a pure exchange economy is investigated without the usual assumption of convex preference sets for the participating traders. The concept of core, taken from the theory of games, is applied to show that if there are sufficiently many participants, the economy as a whole will possess a solution that is sociologically stable--i.e., that cannot be upset by any coalition of traders.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Feb 01, 1963
Accession Number
AD0297030

Entities

People

  • Lloyd Shapley
  • Martin Shubik

Organizations

  • RAND Corporation

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Materials and Manufacturing Processes

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Air Force
  • Commerce
  • Commodities
  • Contracts
  • Convex Sets
  • Cooperative Games
  • Corporations
  • Game Theory
  • Government Procurement
  • Governments
  • Inequalities
  • Money
  • Numbers
  • Square Roots
  • Step Functions
  • Theorems
  • United States

Fields of Study

  • Economics

Readers

  • Game Theory.