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**COMBAT OPERATIONS
AFTER ACTION REPORT**

**OPERATION
GATLING I & GATLING II**

**1st BRIGADE
101st**

AIRBORNE DIVISION




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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 1ST BRIGADE 101ST AIRBORNE DIVISION
APO 96347

AVBD-C

March 1967

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation GATLING I and II
(MACV/RCS/J3/32)

THRU: Commanding General
I Field Force Vietnam
APO 96350

1. (U) Name of Operation: Operation GATLING I/GATLING II.
2. (U) Dates of Operation: GATLING I: 1 February - 5 February 1967.
GATLING II: 5 February - 15 February 1967.
3. (U) Location: GATLING I: LAM DONG Province

GATLING II: BINH TUY and BINH THUAN Province.

4. (U) Command Headquarters: 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division.
5. (U) Reporting Officer: Brigadier General S. H. Matheson, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division.

6. (C) Task Organization: The task organization of the Brigade minus at the initiation of Operation GATLING I is shown below. Significant changes to this organization for the conduct of GATLING II were the loss of OPCON of Company B, 5th Special Forces Group on 4 February and the addition of 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry, minus, which came under the operational control of the Brigade from 5 February to 15 February 1967.

1/327 Inf	Bde HHC (-)
1 Engr Plat	LRRP Plat (-)
	MP Plat (-)
2/502 Inf	42d Inf Plat, Sec Dog (-)
1 Engr Plat	20th Chem Det (-)
	181 MI Det (-)
2/320 Arty (-)	HB-1, 2d 5th Psy Ops Co (-)
	1/101 Avn Sec (-)
Bl/30 Arty (-)	406 RRD (-)
	A/326 Engr (-)
Co B, 5th SFG	
5 Co's, Mike Force	
2 Co's, CIDG	

7. (C) Supporting Forces:
 - a. 2/320 Arty (-): Employed in a direct support role.
 - b. Bl/30 Arty (-): Provided general support reinforcing fires.
 - c. 17th Avn Gp: Provided four light airmobile companies in general support. These helicopters flew troop lift, combat support, and resupply missions.
 - d. 179th and 180th Assault Support Helicopter Company: Provided

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SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation GATLING I and II
(MACV/RCS/J3/32) (U)

CH-47 aircraft on a mission support basis for use in displacing and resupplying artillery batteries.

e. 5th Air Commando Squadron: Provided airlift support for Psy War operations.

f. 7th US Air Force: Flew 12 tactical air missions totaling 30 sorties. Seven of these missions were preplanned and five were immediate. The immediate strikes were requested through the Air Force Direct Air Request Net and the average response time from the initiation of the requests until time-over target was 25 minutes. All targets were suspected VC base areas and airstrikes resulted in 95% ordnance on target, and 55% target area coverage. Twenty structures and two bunkers were destroyed and one secondary fire was reported. In addition the Air Force flew 102 transport sorties, and 7 reconnaissance missions in direct support of the Brigade. 88 sorties were flown by FAC's in forward air control, artillery fire and visual reconnaissance missions.

g. 14th Fngt Bn: Provided general support and maintained BAO LOC Airfield.

h. 54th Sig Bn: Provided general support.

i. 498th Med Det (Airmobile): Provided responsive, rapid evacuation support to the Brigade throughout the operation.

8. (U) Intelligence: See Inclosure 1, Intelligence.

9. (C) Mission: Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam directed the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division to conduct a raid type operation against a suspected high level political meeting of Headquarters Military Region VI; vic TAN DIEM, YT990865 to capture key personnel, documents and equipment, and to be prepared for subsequent offensive operations against the suspected location of Headquarters, Military Region VI vic ZT240430.

10. (C) Concept of Operation: GATLING I consisted of a raid by the Brigade minus one battalion, reinforced with five Mike Force and two CIDG companies, against the suspected meeting place of Headquarters Military Region VI vic TAN DIEM, YT990865. Following a B-52 strike against the objective area, the Mike Force and CIDG companies, under the control of B Co, 5th Special Forces Group, blocked routes of egress to the north and west while the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry and 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry conducted an airmobile assault to exploit the B-52 strike from the south and east. GATLING II consisted of a planned two battalion raid following B-52 strikes against the suspected location of Headquarters Military Region VI vic ZT240430. 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry conducted an airmobile assault north and west of suspected enemy locations and 2d Squadron, 7th Cavalry (-) assaulted by helicopter and overland movement from the south and southeast. 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry was kept on airstrip alert at BAO LOC to exploit the situation as it developed.

11. (C) Execution:

a. Operations GATLING I and GATLING II were characterized by the large scale employment of helicopters to initially position maneuver elements so as to rapidly exploit B-52 strikes. Detailed search operations were conducted in and adjacent to B-52 strike areas and although contact throughout both operations was relatively light, several large caches and base area complexes were discovered and destroyed. The terrain in the Area of Operations was characterized by moderately thick hardwood forest and relatively light undergrowth.

b. On 30 and 31 July, only six days after the initiation of Operation

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(MACV/RCS/J3/32) (U)

FARRAGUT, 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry and 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry extracted from field locations in the FARRAGUT AO and began preparations in PHAN RANG for deployment on Operation GATLING I. In an attempt to deceive the enemy as to the Brigade's true intentions a cover plan was published indicating that the Brigade was to reinforce the BVRD AO by deploying assault elements of two infantry battalions to PHAN THIET. To further enhance deception no advance preparation was made at BAO LOC to receive or supply the Brigade and all planning and coordination for operations in the GATLING I AO was accomplished under a Top Secret security classification. Personal liaison was substituted whenever possible for written messages. On 31 January assault elements of 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry and 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry deployed by C-130 aircraft to PHAN THIET. This move served to position units of the Brigade for the raid and to enhance the credibility of the deception plan.

c. On 1 February, the Brigade minus 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry commenced Operation GATLING I in LAM DONG Province northwest of BAO LOC by conducting an airmobile raid following a B-52 strike on a suspected high level enemy conference near TAN DJIRAN, YT990865. B Company, 5th Special Forces Group became OPCON to the Brigade at that time. At 010900H, Company B, 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry conducted airmobile assault from PHAN THIET into LZ MARY (a distance of approximately 90 km) while the battalion minus closed BAO LOC via C-130 aircraft from PHAN RANG and conducted airmobile assault into LZ MARY. (see Inclosure 2, Tab A) All elements of the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry closed into the AO by 011300H and had begun movement north on multiple axes to block routes of egress out of the objective area. 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry initiated airmobile assaults from PHAN THIET at 010919H with a task force consisting of Company A, Company B and HHC (-). Company C and the remainder of HHC, arriving by C-130, conducted an airmobile assault from BAO LOC and by 011400H the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry had completed the block and had begun moving west on multiple axes. The Mike Force controlled by Company B, 5th Special Forces Group completed its airmobile assault from TAN RAI to LZ's PEG, LIZ and SHIRLEY at 011120H and blocked routes of egress to the north and west. The Brigade TAC CP assumed control of the operation from BAO LOC at 011100H Feb. The operation of the CP was complicated by the temporary loss of a C-130 load of personnel and equipment. One company, 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry became OPCON to the Brigade at 011600H Feb. It arrived in BAO LOC by C-130 aircraft and assumed the mission of Bde Immediate Action Force. To preclude compromise of the Brigade's plan, logistics build-up in the BAO LOC area was prohibited prior to initiation of the assault. All elements assaulted with sufficient Class I, III, and V supplies for a three day period. A complicating feature of the operation was the necessity of flying in helicopter fuel after the air assault phase had begun. C-123 aircraft landed with bladders of fuel at the old BAO LOC dirt strip while less than 2,000 meters away C-130's were bringing in troops and equipment and helicopters were being loaded for the assault. Despite stringent security measures imposed on the Brigade; engineer, airfield control, and logistics personnel at BAO LOC appeared generally well informed. The massive air move into the BAO LOC area was apparent from the amount of traffic broadcast in the clear on the Coastal Center Flight Following Net starting approximately 010730 hrs. During the period 1-3 February 1/327 Infantry, 2/502 Infantry and attached units conducted a thorough search of the objective area with negative results. No evidence was found that would substantiate the presence of an enemy headquarters in the area. 1/327 Infantry began extraction from the GATLING I AO 031130H Feb and by 031525H the battalion closed at new BAO LOC airstrip. On 3 Feb a Mike Force Company tripped a booby-trapped artillery round resulting in 4 US KIA (Arty LNO party), 2 CIDG KIA, and 10 CIDG WIA. US Special Forces and Mike Force elements incurred additional casualties when one or two snipers fired at helicopters taking off from LZ PEG. 2/502 Infantry extracted from the AO and closed new BAO LOC airstrip 041000H Feb 67. Mike Force and CIDG terminated operations and OPCON status 041150H Feb 67.

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SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation GATLING I and II
(MACV/RCS/J3/32) (U)

d. Operation GATLING II commenced in BINH TUY Province, NW of PHAN THIET on 050645H Feb 67 with 2/502 Inf and 2/7 Cav (-) following B-52 strikes on suspected locations of Headquarters, Military Region VI. 2/502 Inf conducted airmobile assault from BAO LOC to selected LZ's in zone, closing at 050945H Feb and commenced search and destroy operations in zone. 2/7 Cav (-) became OPCON to 1st Brigade, 101st Abn Div 050645H Feb 67 and conducted airmobile assaults from BAO LOC and PHAN THIET to LZ LUCKY STRIKE with two companies closing 050945H (Inclosure 2, Tab B). B Co, 2/7 Cav moved overland from the BYRD AO to block enemy withdrawal to the east. On 6 Feb 67, 1/327 Infantry was committed into the AO and conducted airmobile assaults from BAO LOC to selected LZ's, closing at 061450H Feb 67. The Brigade Main CP displaced from PHAN RANG to PHAN THIET and assumed control of the operation at 060845H Feb. During the period 5 Feb - 8 Feb all units conducted thorough search and destroy operations in zone. While contact in the AO was light, several large rice caches, base camp areas, and communications equipment and documents were discovered and destroyed, or evacuated for intelligence exploitation. At 080700H the Brigade terminated offensive operations in observance of the TET cease fire. All units assumed a defensive posture astride known or suspected enemy lines of communications and conducted vigorous reconnaissance/defensive patrolling to minimize VC/NVA military exploitation of the TET stand-down. During the TET stand-down period which lasted through 120700H Feb 67, 16 separate VC/NVA initiated contacts were made within the GATLING AO. One such contact on 10 Feb resulted in the discovery of a POW camp and the liberation of 16 POW's. Aggressive search and destroy operations were resumed on 12 Feb by all elements and continued through 15 Feb. On 15 Feb search and destroy operations were terminated and all elements were extracted from the AO to PHAN THIET. 2/7 Cav (-) was released from OPCON and effective 152400H Feb 67 Operation GATLING II was terminated.

12. (C) Results:

a. The 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division accomplished its mission of conducting raids on suspected high level meeting sites and locations of Headquarters, Military Region VI.

b. The following losses were inflicted on the enemy during the operations:

(1) GATLING I: 2 VC KIA (BC), 2 SA captured and 1 ton of rice destroyed.

(2) GATLING II: 25 VC KIA (BC); 6 VCC; 19 detainees; 17 SA, 4 tons rice captured; 392 tons rice destroyed.

c. Friendly losses during the operation were as follows:

(1) GATLING I: 4 US KIA, 2 GVN KIA, 3 US WIA, 11 GVN WIA.

(2) GATLING II: 1 US KIA, 18 US WIA.

NOTE: All friendly losses during GATLING I were sustained by units OPCON to the Brigade.

13. (U) Administrative Matters:

a. Personnel and Administration: See Inclosure 3, Personnel and Administration.

b. Logistics: See Inclosure 4, Logistics.

c. Civic Action: See Inclosure 6, Civil Affairs.

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SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation GATLING I and II
(MACV/RCS/J3/32) (U)

14. (C) Special Equipment and Techniques: Timely receipt of the B-52 strike "bombs complete" signal was delayed in Operation GATLING I due to the lack of adequate communications facilities at BAO LOC. During Operation GATLING II adequate communication facilities were established at BAO LOC, PHAN THIET and PHAN RANG and all stations were in contact with a relay aircraft observing the B-52 strike. Utilizing this technique, the "bombs complete" signal was received and disseminated with minimum delay. Timely receipt of the "bombs complete" signal during GATLING II permitted successful employment of several close air support sorties immediately following the B-52 strike.

15. (C) Commanders Analysis:a. Lessons Learned:

(1) Exploitation of B-52 strikes should be made as soon as possible to seal the area and fix the enemy. Whenever possible, the area should be sealed prior to the air strike and a reaction force utilized to enter the target area immediately after receipt of "bombs complete".

(2) A low-level LZ reconnaissance should be accomplished by the mission commander prior to the arrival of the troop lift to determine the exact characteristics of the LZ. Should it be found that the helicopters cannot land and that troops must exit from a "hover" position, troops should be forewarned in order to preclude injury or unnecessary delays.

(3) Villages marked "destroyed" or "abandoned" on maps should be entered carefully and searched methodically. Many such villages still support habitation and several large caches were found adjacent to or in these villages during GATLING II.

(4) A continuing training program is essential to keep up with the turn-over in personnel as well as to retrain the veteran trooper. In particular, constant training emphasis must be placed on marksmanship and the techniques of identifying, avoiding, and destroying booby traps.

b. Commanders Notes:

(1) Stringent security requirements in the operations field are not being matched in the logistics and air traffic control field. Every effort must be made to preclude providing the enemy with evidence of our intentions.

(2) The role of the sniper in search and destroy operations must receive greater emphasis. Numerous reports are received of enemy sightings at ranges of 300-500 meters with negative results. A well-trained sniper with the proper equipment should consistently score kills at that range. Units should habitually employ snipers.

(3) A security classification of Top Secret on an operation of this type with a short time for planning, unduly restricts the unit and creates administrative problems. Secret NOFORN should be adequate classification for this type operation.

16. (C) Recommendations: That during the assault phase of operations requiring exploitation of B-52 strikes or when a tactical advantage can be gained by placing maximum troops on the ground as rapidly as possible, the Brigade's

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
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SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation GATLING I and II
(MACV/RCS/J3/32) (U)

normal aviation support of two light airmobile companies be supplemented by
at least one additional light airmobile company.



Inclosures:

- 1 - Intelligence
- 2 - Operation Schematics
- 3 - Personnel and Administration
- 4 - Logistics
- 5 - Communications
- 6 - Civil Affairs
- 7 - Psy War
- 6 - Artillery

S. H. MATHESON
Brigadier General, USA
Commanding

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Inclosure 1 (Intelligence) to Combat After Action Report, Operation Gatling 1 & 11.

1. (C) Terrain:

a. Gatling 1: Terrain was characterized by moderately thick hardwood forest with light undergrowth. Fields of fire were good to excellent in most areas. Key terrain was most of the high ground in the area which offered good observation over avenues of approach. Some cover and concealment were provided by thin undergrowth and trees in the forested areas. Obstacles in the AO were of no significance. In general, terrain favored the enemy troops in ground operations. It favored the enemy by providing limited aerial observation. Long range observation favored the enemy by giving him an early warning capability.

b. Gatling 11: See para 1a.

2. (U) Weather:

a. Gatling 1: In general, weather favored both air and ground operations. Severe cold during the nights (temperatures in low 40's hampered ground operations (both enemy and friendly) to some extent. US troops deployed under a cover plan for Phan Thiet and adequate protective clothing for mountainous terrain was not carried.

b. Gatling 11: Weather in this AO generally favored both air and ground operations.

3. (C) Analysis:

a. Gatling 1: A thorough search of the AO with no significant contact indicated that no VC/NAV units had operated in the area for a considerable length of time. This was further substantiated by the lack of campsites, trails, caches, or any other items reportable during VR flights. The few enemy contacts made, indicate the presence of local VC guerrillas. Nothing indicated the presence of VC/LF, VC/NF, or NVA units operating in the AO.

b. Photo Imagery:

(1) Gatling 1 - in spite of the extremely short planning time, photography of the area of interest was available from the film library at IFFORCEV. The rapid reproduction response by D Detachment 1st MIBARS enabled the 181st MID to prepare a photo mosaic of the area for each battalion involved in the operation. The mosaics were annotated to detect the trails and defenses in the area.

(2) Gatling 11 - Due to the rapid reaction time necessary and secrecy employed in this operation, no aerial photography was available however the area was well covered with pictorial maps which provided a partial substitute.

c. Infra-Red:

(1) Gatling 1 - Due to the limited success experienced with this sensor in the past, it was not employed during this operation since its use might have prematurely indicated our interest in the area.

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Inclosure 1 (Intelligence) to Combat After Action Report, Operation Gatling 1 & 11.

(2) Gatling 11 - Red Haze was employed over the operational area with negative results.

d. Visual Recon:

(1) Gatling 1 - Visual Recon was conducted daily during the operation with negative results.

(2) Gatling 11 - Daily flights which were flown over the operational area partially compensated for the lack of aerial photography. Unlike other areas in which the Brigade has been employed, it was reported that the enemy had, with some success, actively engaged reconnaissance aircraft. One G1-E aircraft flying visual reconnaissance was lost during this period. The cause as yet has been undetermined.

e. Gatling 11:

(1) Although no significant enemy contact was made, numerous incidents of light contact with small enemy units and individuals indicate that VC district forces, local guerrillas, and possibly a VC headquarters was located in the AC. This headquarters may have been that of the MR-6.

(2) Indications are that Hq MR-6 evaded US forces but it is believed that contact was made with small elements of that Hq and some of its security forces.

(3) Enemy forces in the area had cached over 390 tons of rice. It is possible either that this rice was stored to support a future buildup of enemy forces in the area or the area was a logistical base used to support units subordinate to MR-6.

(4) A significant amount of communications equipment was captured during the operation. This added substance to the reports of MR-6 being in the area and further emphasized the fact that perhaps the enemy is increasing his radio communications capability and ability to intercept our radio nets.

2. COMSEC: During Operation Gatling 1 & 11, 1325 radio transmissions were monitored with no violations.

4. (C) Lessons Learned:

Enemy units encountered in this area have a greater radio communications capability than previously encountered in other areas. This capability has allowed the enemy to monitor, intercept, and jam radio nets. In one case an airborne FAC was asked to repeat the coordinates of a target. When challenged, the unidentified station could not authenticate. It is essential that maximum security measures be practiced when using any types of communications.

5. (U) The following is a breakout of the enemy weapons and material losses during Operation Gatling 1 and 11:

a. Gatling 1:

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Enclosure 1 (intelligence) to Combat After Action Report, Operation
Gatling 1 & 11.

- (1) Weapons captured: two US rifles, Garand, M-1
 - (2) Other: two tons rice destroyed.
- b. Gatling 11:
- (1) Weapons captured:
 - 1 - Mosin Nagant, M1944 Carbine
 - 1 - RISH SIG
 - 2 - French machine guns
 - 1 - Enfield rifle
 - 1 - M.S-36
 - 2 - US Carbines
 - 1 - 9mm Pistol
 - 2 - U/I weapons
 - (2) Ammunition: 400 rounds of small arms ammunition.
 - (3) Other: 1 Transmitter w/CW key (Type RT-3)
 - 1 Receiver (Type RR-2)
 - 1 Adapter cord unit w/power cards (type RA-2)
which is used with GN-58 hand generator.
 - 1 Set of earphones
 - 2 Manual Morse keys
 - 1 French transceiver FFV 1002n
 - 9 Transistor radios w/modifications
 - 1 AC/DC volt - ohms meter
 - 1 Hand generator (type unknown)
 - 1 Transistor radio w/speaker and CW key attached
 - 1 Typewriter
 - 1 Signal PLL kit w/repair parts and instruments.
 - 1 US Radio receiver BC 1306
 - 2 Cases batteries
 - 1 sewing machine
 - 1 AN/GRC 9
 - 295 Bags of Rice
 - 250 lbs of salt
 - 1.5 tons of potatoes

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Appendix A to Inclosure 1 (Intelligence) to Combat After Action Report, Operation Gatling I & II.

1. (C) VC/NVA Initial Order of Battle Operation on Gatling I

a. Generally the Lam Dong Province Committee, with a cover number of E-300 has an estimated strength of 95 personnel and was believed to be in the vicinity of ZT 098965. The committee is composed of many sections: Economics and Finance (Cover number D-113), Signal (Cover number C-22), Intelligence Engineer, logistics, Security, Propaganda and Medical. The Province of Lam Dong is under the operational control of Lam Dong Province Committee. The Lam Dong Provincial Committee is subordinate to the inter-vincial Committee (code number T-6), reported to have been in Lam Dong. T-6 is reported to have six companies in Lam Dong under the operational control of Lam Dong Provincial Committee.

b. The province has been divided into two districts, Bao Loc District and Di Linh District. Bao Loc District Committee has an infantry company, strength 85, for use in the district. The district is subdivided into five intervillage committee, each committee having an infantry platoon, strength 15-20. Di Linh District has one infantry company, strength 75. This district is divided into 8 intervillage committees, each having an infantry platoon. Total strength in the province is est from 1700-1800.

c. VC activity in Lam Dong Province, consisting mostly of harassment of GVN troops and hostile fire against secure hamlets showed a marked increase during Dec and Jan.

d. The following VC units are carried in Lam Dong Province:

(Referenced Intelligence estimate for Lam Dong Province dtd 30 Jan 67)


<u>UNIT</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>UNIT COMMANDER</u>
145 Hvy Wpns BN	130	YU 5254(2 Jan 66)	CPT Ngo Tan Tai
186 MF BN	330	ZT 1476(21 Jan 66)	Maj Cong Hai
840th MF BN	300	YU 3337(25 May 66)	Bud Thien Nhan
C-3 Co	80	YT 7462	Chau
105th Co	65	ZT 0692	Anh Chi
106th Co	75	ZT 0692	Tri
C-410th Co	95	ZT 1871	Brick
210th Co	60	ZT 2291	Tran Van Cong
C-420th Co	150	AN 8692	Duong

e. There were no NVA units reported to be in Lam Dong Province.

f. Order of Battle findings: During the period of 1 Feb to 5 Feb (Gatling I) there were no significant contacts made. Activity consisted of small contacts resulting in 2 VC KIA (BC), 2 weapons captured (M-1) and two (2) tons of rice destroyed. No unit identifications were made.


2. (C) VC/NVA Initial Order of Battle Operation Gatling II. Intelligence reports indicated that military Region VI was located in Binh Tuy Province with security elements of possible battalion size. It was also feasible that VC units based in Lam Dong and Binh Thuan Provinces might periodically operate in Binh Tuy Province. During the period of 10 Feb to 15 Feb 67 (Gatling II) there were 25 VC KIA (BC), 6 VCC, 17 individual weapons and misc com o equipment captured. Captured documents indicated that MR-6 was located in Binh Tuy Province, but no definite location was obtained. There were no large contacts during the operation and no unit identification were made.

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Inclosure 3 (Personnel and Administration to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation GATLING I (1 Feb - 5 Feb 67) and GATLING-II (5 Feb 67 - 15 Feb 67)

1. (C) UNIT STRENGTHS:

a. Beginning of Operation GATLING.

(1) The Brigade personnel strengths at the beginning of Operation GATLING were as follows:

Authorized Augmented (MTOE)	1490
Assigned	1894
Present for Duty	4532
Airhead - Bao Loc	1773
Base Camp - Phan Rang	2039
<u>PARRAGUT AO</u>	<u>726</u>
Not Present for Duty	362

(2) The assigned strength was 109% of the augmented authorized strength. The present for duty strength was 101% of the augmented authorized strength.

(3) Of the not present for duty strength; 9 were hospitalized, 115 were intransit, 141 were on TDY/SD status, 73 on leave, 22 in confinement, and 2 AWOL.

b. Conclusion of Operation GATLING.

(1) The Brigade personnel strengths at the conclusion of Operation GATLING were as follows:

Authorized Augmented (MTOE)	1490
Assigned	1776
Present for Duty	1443
Airhead - Phan Thiet	2577
Base Camp - Phan Rang	1087
<u>PARRAGUT AO</u>	<u>779</u>
Not Present for Duty	333

(2) The assigned strength was 106% of the augmented authorized strength. The present for duty strength was 101% of the augmented authorized strength.

(3) Of the not present for duty strength; 28 were hospitalized, 101 were intransit, 105 were on TDY/SD status, 77 on leave, 14 in confinement, and 8 AWOL.

(4) The 16th Army Postal Unit, attached to the Brigade, has 9 personnel present for duty of 11 authorized.

c. Replacements received during the operation were assigned to subordinate units as follows:

	OFF	EM		OFF	EM
1/327	0	31	2/320	2	9
2/327	1	2	Spt Bn		4
2/502	1	25	Separate Co		23

2. (C) CASUALTIES:

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Inclosure 3 (Personnel and Administration to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation GATLING I (1 Feb - 5 Feb 67) and GATLING II (5 Feb 67 - 15 Feb 67))

a. Casualties for the operation were as follows:

(1) Phase I (1-5 Feb 67) Operation GATLING. No casualties were sustained during this period.

(2) Phase II (5-15 Feb 67) Operation GATLING:

UNIT	KIA	WIA
1/327	1	11
2/502	0	11
TOTAL	1	22

b. Total casualties to date:

KIA	WIA	MIA
363	1954	2

3. (U) PERSONNEL PROGRAMS:

a. The Red Cross Recreational Unit continued its visits to forward units during the operation.

b. Beer, soda and limited sensitive items were provided to the units in the forward area during the operation.

c. Beach facilities were provided in phase II (5-15 Feb 67) Operation GATLING for the units in the forward area of operation.

4. (C) PERSONNEL PLANNING: A recent directive by DA disallowing involuntary officer extensions caused our rotational "hump" in May and June to increase; however, by continued emphasis on voluntary extensions, the Brigade is attempting to alleviate this problem.

5. (C) MEDICAL:

a. The crash of a CH-47 helicopter at Bao Loc airfield on D-Day of Operation GATLING I appropriately underscores the importance of opening the Brigade Clearing Station in a new AO at the earliest possible time. The 38 casualties resulting from that crash required a medical facility of clearing station size.

b. Patients treated

	PHASE I	PHASE II
(1) WIA	0	22
(2) Non Hostile Injury	38	14
(3) Disease	25	99
(4) Returned to Duty	21	33
(5) Evacuated to Hospital	42	81
(6) Remaining in Holding	0	21
(7) Total Patients Treated	63	135

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Inclosure 3 (Personnel and Administration to Combat Operations After
Action Report, Operation GATLING I (1 Feb - 5 Feb 67) and
GATLING II (5 Feb 67 - 15 Feb 67)

c. Hospitalized personnel categorized by wounds:

(1) Head	0	1
(2) Chest	0	1
(3) Abdomen	0	0
(4) Upper Extremities	0	6
(5) Lower Extremities	0	14

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Inclosure 4 (Logistics) to Combat After Action Report, Operation GATLING I & II

(2) Class II and IV supplies were required only in small amounts due to the relatively short duration of the operation. All such items were requested through the FSE and brought forward by air from Phan Rang base camp. A total of 9 short tons were required.

(3) Class III. Units initially deployed with an absolute minimum of vehicles, since the tactical requirement was for a foot mobile force. Consequently, consumption of MOGAS and DIESEL was relatively low. JP-4 fuel for supporting aviation units was delivered almost exclusively in 500 gallon bladders. A total of 94.8 short tons of fuel was expended during the operation by organic and attached vehicles. This does not include expenditure by supporting aviation units.

(4) Class V. Expenditure of Class V was relatively low due to the light contact experienced. No difficulty was encountered with expenditure of ASR items. The low ASR of some ammunition items had no adverse effect on combat operations. A total of 95.9 short tons of Class V was issued during the operation. This figure is deceptive since only a fraction of this amount was expended and units completed the operation with a major portion of this amount on hand.

(5) Water. Due to the fact that the operation was launched during the dry season, water resupply was a greater problem than is normally the case. Numerous streams were dried up, thus eliminating one of the readiest sources of water for tactically deployed personnel. As a result, more water had to be supplied from a central source. Company A, 326th Engineer Battalion operated a 4500 gallon per hour water purification unit near Bao Loc initially, and later at Phan Thiet. Water at Phan Thiet was drawn principally from the city reservoir and had a distinctively unpleasant odor and taste which some personnel found unpalatable. Water resupply to committed companies and platoons was effected with 5 gallon water cans and 3 gallon free drop plastic water bags.

b. Maintenance: No major maintenance problems evolved as a result of the operation.

c. Transportation:

(1) Ground Transportation: An average of 10 - 2 1/2 ton trucks were committed daily to support operations in the forward area.

(2) Air Transportation:

(a) C7A aircraft were primarily used for routine resupply of Class II & IV, spare parts and transport of relatively small number of personnel.

(b) C-130 aircraft were the primary means of transporting Brigade personnel and equipment from base camp to Bao Loc and from there to Phan Thiet. Additionally, they were utilized almost exclusively during the initial phase of the logistical buildup at Bao Loc.

d. Other Services:

(1) Graves Registration Services were provided by the Phan Thiet FSA with personnel and equipment drawn from USAFC, Cam Ranh Bay.

(2) Bath and Laundry facilities were provided by the Phan Thiet FSA.

3. (D) Summary. The only major logistical difficulty was encountered during the phase of the operation near Bao Loc. The tactical requirements for secrecy eliminated any possibility of an early logistical buildup. This required an intensive effort during the first three days of the operation to obtain stockage levels. The recovery of empty 500 gallon bladders

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Inclosure 4 (Logistics) to Combat After Action Report, Operation GATLING I & II

1. (C) Organization of Support

a. General. Due to tactical demands for secrecy, it was impossible to initiate a logistical buildup in the Bao Loc area until after ground operations had begun. Consequently, units were instructed to deploy with sufficient Class I, III, V and water to forego resupply for three days. Supporting Army aviation units consumed over 18,000 gallons of JP-4 fuel daily. As a result, intense efforts were required to resupply sufficient JP-4 by C-130 aircraft from Cam Ranh Bay. The subsequent retrieval and return of empty bladders also caused considerable difficulty. The Brigade's supporting combat aviation battalion remained at Bao Loc only for five days. Tactical considerations caused all Brigade personnel to depart that area for Phan Thiet on 6 February. As a result large numbers of empty fuel bladders were left behind in the vicinity of Bao Loc airfield to await recovery after the Brigade's departure. Since there were no American logistical units or personnel in the area, the empty bladders were not secured sufficiently to prevent damage by indigenous personnel. Consequently, a large number were damaged or destroyed by natives who cut them open attempting to extract the small fuel residue in each container. It is recommended that sufficient personnel of the 1st Logistical Command organized into recovery teams, be dispatched in future operations of this nature for the purpose of securing and recovering empty bladders during and immediately after the operation. This is necessary because the using unit is unable to leave security personnel without detracting from its tactical mission. This points the problems inherent in delaying the logistical buildup until tactical units are committed.

b. Support Battalion. Support Battalion established a Forward Support Element (FSE) in the forward area to provide flexible and responsive Combat Service Support to combat elements. Initially the FSE located adjacent to Bao Loc airfield, but a change in tactical mission necessitated a change in location of the FSE which subsequently moved to the vicinity of Phan Thiet airfield. Major components of the FSE included a medical clearing company, a maintenance section, ammunition section, an operations section, and an AG section.

c. Supporting Forces:

(1) USASOC, Cam Ranh Bay provided overall logistical support and control of assets.

(2) Phan Thiet FSA acted as executive agent for USASOC Cam Ranh Bay and provided Class I, III, IIIA, and V supplies, as well as barrier material.

(3) 10th Combat Aviation Battalion helicopters provided logistical as well as tactical support.

(4) USAF C7A aircraft carried the bulk of Class II and IV supplies and repair parts from Phan Rang base camp to Phan Thiet.

(5) 179th and 180th Aviation Companies provided CH-47 helicopter support.

2. (C) Materiel and Services.

a. Supply.

(1) Class I supplies were provided initially by the FSE during the short period of operation at Bao Loc. While at Phan Thiet, Class I support was provided by the Phan Thiet FSA. Two 7 1/2 ton reefer vans provided adequate portions of fresh meat, fruit, vegetables, ice cream, and ice. A total of 70.3 short tons of supplies were issued. This included 28 meals of "A" rations, 15,120 "B" rations, 9,304 "C" rations and 424 IRRP rations.

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Inclosure 4 (Logistics) to Combat After Action Report, Operation GATLING I & II

presented another problem. The failure to evacuate this equipment promptly or to plan for its security resulted in damage to many bladders by indigenous personnel. Operation GATLING placed no other exceptional demands upon the logistical system and the system remained fully capable of supporting tactical requirements.

4. (U) Conclusions. A logistical buildup initiated on a crash basis as units are tactically deployed is an expensive effort that necessitates very careful planning. Logistics planning must include plans for phasing out supplies and equipment and for securing those left behind during rapid operational shifts.

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Inclosure 5 (Signal) to Combat After Action Report, Operation GATLING I and GATLING II

1. (U) Background:

The 1st Brigade Headquarters and Headquarters Company and the 1st FASCP, 501st Signal, had the joint mission of supporting Operation FARRAGUT by maintaining installed systems at Phan Rang, establishing and maintaining a Tactical CP at Bao Loc during GATLING I and displacing to Phan Thiet for GATLING II. During GATLING II the Brigade CP closed at Phan Rang and joined the Tactical CP at Phan Thiet, reestablishing all Brigade systems at that location for the completion of GATLING II and the continuation of FARRAGUT.

2. (C) Operations:

a. VHF Section was not committed during this operation.

b. Communications Center Section terminated secure teletype circuits at Bao Loc utilizing 54th Signal Battalion equipment during GATLING I. During GATLING II the system was reestablished at Phan Thiet releasing 54th Signal Battalion equipment.

c. Switchboard/Wire Section established the TAC CP at Bao Loc terminating 25 circuits and laying 10 miles of wire. At Phan Thiet 68 circuits were terminated and approximately 20 miles of wire were laid.

d. FM Radio Section provided FM Radio stations at Phan Rang, Bao Loc and Phan Thiet. Automatic retransmission and relay stations were employed at LZ's Lucky Strike and Pall Mall.

e. AM Radio Section operated secure teletype circuits between Bao Loc and Phan Rang during GATLING I and from Phan Thiet to Phan Rang during GATLING II.

f. Maintenance Section continued to provide maintenance support for Brigade HHC and attachments.

g. Field Forces Signal Support - 54th Signal continued to provide circuits into the in-country system, secure teletype between IFFORCEV, Brigade Forward and Brigade Rear and a single sideband phone patch net paralleling the radio teletype net.

Inclosure 6 (Civil Affairs) to Combat Operations After Action Report
Operation GATLING, Phase I and II.

1. Phase I.

a. Due to the short duration of the first phase of Operation Gatling (5 days) a civil affairs team of three personnel accompanied the brigade rather than the entire section. The team consisting of an officer, a medic and an interpreter was primarily concerned with civil affairs activities and conducted no civic action during the period. Cooperation received from the Province officials and US military representatives in Lam Dong was excellent. This Province had one of the best refugee resettlement programs encountered thus far by the brigade.

b. Civil Affairs activities during Phase I of Operation Gatling consisted of the following activities:

(1) Seven Montagnard refugees freed from VC control were resettled in a secure area.

(2) The home of an ARVN noncommissioned officer that had been damaged by a crashing helicopter was repaired and items destroyed within the house were replaced. Repair was accomplished with materials provided by USAID and the labor was performed by members of the brigade.

(3) The cutting down of several trees on a local tea plantation caused the plantation owner to lodge a complaint. The situation became aggravated when the owner was ignored. On learning of the incident an S5 representative visited the owner, apologized and explained the necessity for felling the trees. This and a later visit by the Commanding General placated the plantation owner.

(4) Four tons of captured rice were extracted through US/VN efforts and turned over to Province officials.

(5) Although daily hire laborers were not readily available in the Bao Loc area, the brigade managed to hire approximately 30 laborers per day for a four day period.

c. Lessons Learned:

(1) Regardless of the duration of an operation or the size of the S5 element employed, it is imperative that organic transportation accompany S5 personnel on an operation. During Phase I of Operation Gatling the civil affairs team was directed to deploy without a vehicle. This situation seriously hampered the S5 mission and forced the team to rely on other staff sections for transportation.

(2) In order to effect the necessary action in a prompt manner, organic units as well as those attached and in direct support must notify the S5 immediately when an incident involving the civilian population occurs.

2. Phase II.

a. During Phase II of Operation Gatling the Brigade relocated in Binh Thuan Province basing in the Phan Thiet area. As the move was classified and sudden in nature, contacts with the local GVN officials, their counterparts and the S5 officers in the area were not made until after the brigade's arrival. Upon closing liaison was immediately effected to secure labor and to obtain an official price list. A meeting was arranged by the Province OCO representative with local labor officials, a fair wage was agreed upon and a source of labor provided. As there was an abundant supply of labor in the area, the brigade decided to draw its labor force from a refugee village and the local Chieu Hoi center thereby providing jobs to people with the greatest need for income. In cooperation with local businessmen the Province Chief provided an official price list for the area which was distributed

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Inclosure 6 (Civil Affairs) to Combat Operations After Action Report
Operation GATLING, Phase I and II.

throughout the brigade and posted in local business establishments. The cooperation given by the Province Chief, his staff and the US military and civilian representatives in the area was outstanding and greatly assisted the brigade in getting settled in its new location.

b. Civic Action during Phase II of Operation Gatling was nil as the period of the operation coincided with the Tet holiday period and most official activities in the Province came to a standstill. Liaison was made however and projects were lined up for action after the holiday period. A total of 54 Montagnard refugees who had been liberated from VC dominated areas were resettled during the period. As requested by the refugees they were taken to Phan Loc in Lam Dong Province to be resettled among other Montagnards. On the occasion of Tet, 86 families in a refugee village near Phan Rang were presented with food, clothing, soap and toys for the children.

c. Lessons Learned:

(1) When units operating in VC controlled areas encounter refugees who desire to escape from VC domination it is imperative that the exact location where refugees were picked up be reported. Very often there are many more people in the immediate vicinity also desiring to escape VC domination, however they have fled the battle area and are in hiding. By knowing the location of refugee pick up it is possible to go back, locate and extract additional refugees.

(2) Plans to erect emergency facilities to accommodate large numbers of refugees must be kept current as it is often necessary to hold refugees at brigade before they can be moved to resettlement areas.

(3) Despite written directions to the contrary, troops continue to give out candy and other items to children while in town. In one instance a soldier threw a handful of candy bars from a moving truck. The candy fell into the road and children dove to retrieve it. A following truck, also US, barely missed running over several of the children. In another instance, a Vietnamese girl was struck in the breast by an apple thrown by a US soldier. Although the motives of the soldiers involved were probably well meaning, the results were harmful as evidenced by these two examples. Commanders must continue to emphasize the brigade policy of not giving handouts to children. The unit S5's are more than willing to see that anything the troops want to give away gets distributed properly.

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Inclosure 7 (Psychological Operations) to Combat Operations After Action Report Operation GATLING I & II

1. (U) Psychological Objective: To induce as many VC personnel in the area of operations to avail themselves of the GVN Chieu Hoi Program.
2. (C) Leaflets: 2 missions covering 5 target areas were flown delivering 140,000 leaflets into the Brigade Area of Operations.
3. (C) Loudspeaker: 2 missions (aerial) against 5 target areas broadcasting a standard Chieu Hoi appeal were flown for a total of 2½ hours broadcast time.
4. (U) Due to the short time frame from receipt of the message ordering this operation to the time ground combat operations were launched and the fact that this operation was highly classified during the planning phase, advance Psychological Operations planning could not be accomplished. As a result, planning was accomplished after arrival in the objective area decreasing the amount of time available to physically conduct Psychological Operations in the AO.

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Inclosure 8 (Artillery) to Combat Operations After Action Report,
Operation GATLING

1. (C) Mission: 2d Battalion (Airborne), 320th Artillery direct support of 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division. Platoon Battery "B", 1st Battalion (Towed), 320th Artillery provides general support to the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division.

2. (C) Summary of Operations:

a. GATLING I

(1) Batteries A and C, 2/320th Artillery and B/1/30th (-) Artillery were moved by C-130 from PHAN RANG base camp to provide support for maneuver elements in the GATLING AO. B/2/320th Artillery and one platoon B/1/30th Artillery remained in FARRAGUT AO to support maneuver elements operating in that AO. The battalion headquarters element remained at PHAN RANG base camp. Battalion Headquarters (-) displaced to BAO LOC on D-Day.

(2) Additional liaison and forward observer requirements were imposed when a provisional CIDG battalion (-) was placed under operational control of the Brigade. Organic personnel were employed in normal support association roles. The added requirements exceeded the organic liaison and forward observation capabilities of the battalion were fulfilled by using personnel with associated training and experience. A significant degree of cross-training was achieved; however, battalion resources were strained.

b. GATLING II: HHB/2/320th displaced by air (C-130) to PHAN THIEP. Organic and attached artillery continued to provide support as outlined in subparagraph a above. The mission of B(-)/1/30th Artillery was changed to reinforcing B/1/21st Artillery.

c. During both phases of the GATLING operation the same techniques of fire support coordination and artillery employment which have proven successful on previous operations were employed. No new techniques were developed. The maneuver concept dictated independent operations by the batteries.

3. (C) Executions:

a. GATLING I:

(1) At 010700 February, A/2/320th displaced to ZT015825. Unit closed at 1420 hours. Direct support of 1/327th Infantry.

(2) At 010700 February, C/2/320th Displaced to ZT065790. Unit closed at 1740 hours. Direct support of 2/502d Infantry.

(3) At 010700 February, Platoon B/1/30th displaced to ZT009926. Unit closed at 1740 hours. Reinforcing the fires of A/2/320th.

b. GATLING II:

(1) At 050830 February, A/2/320th displaced to ZT265377. Unit closed at 1215 hours. Direct support of 1/327th Infantry.

(2) At 050900 February, C/2/320th displaced to ZT243437. Unit closed at 1245 hours. Direct support of 2/502d Infantry.

(3) At 050930 February, Platoon B/1/30th displaced to PHAN THIEP AN807072. Unit closed at 1500 hours and reinforced the fires of 1/21st Artillery, 1st Cavalry Division.

(4) At 110730 February, A/2/320th displaced one platoon to AN753574. Unit closed at 1830 hours. Direct support of 1/327th Infantry.

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Inclosure 8 (Artillery) to Combat Operations After Action Report,
Operation GATLING

(5) At 130730 February, A/2/320th (-), displaced to join
platoon at AN753574. Unit closed at 1700 hours. Direct support of 1/327th
Infantry.

(6) At 120700 February, C/2/320th displaced to ZT145451. Unit
closed at 1415 hours. Direct support of 2/502d Infantry.

4. (C) Results: 1 VC (KBA) Phase II.

5. (U) Administration Matters: N/A

6. (U) Special Equipment and Techniques: N/A

7. (U) Commanders Analysis: That the 2d Battalion, 320th Artillery,
Battery "B", 1st Battalion, 30th Artillery, and tactical air continue to pro-
vide adequate fire support. The 180th Aviation Company (CH-47) initiated the
policy of providing this battalion with a liaison officer. This officer added
immensely to the smooth and rapid displacements made by the batteries. During
one displacement, forty-one members of B Battery loaded onto a CH-47. Even
though the pilot knew this number was on board he attempted to take off result-
ing in the loss of his aircraft and the injury of twenty-nine persons. This
battalion, as policy, now stations a responsible individual at the rear of
the aircraft to insure that no more than the correct number of personnel load
the aircraft.

8. (U) Recommendations: That six (6) CH-47's be provided this Brigade
at all times and that the aviation company assigned the support continue to
provide a liaison officer.