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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

IN REPLY REFER TO

AGAM-P (M) (22 Sep 67) FOR OT RD-670285

2 October 1967

**SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters,
145th Combat Aviation Battalion**

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation by USACDC in accordance with paragraph 6f, AR 1-19 and by USCONARC in accordance with paragraph 6c and d, AR 1-19. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from Lessons Learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

Kenneth G. Wickham

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

1 Incl
as

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
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 145TH COMBAT AVIATION BATTALION
APO San Francisco, 96227

AVGC-CC

10 May 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967,
Reports Control Symbol CSFOR-65 (U)


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Under provisions of AR 1-19, dated 26 May 1966, USARV Reg 1-19, dated 8 February 1967, USARV Reg 870-2, dated 19 July 1966 and 12th Combat Aviation Group Letter, Subject: Operational Report of Lessons Learned, dated 27 September 1966, the Quarterly Operational Report of Lessons Learned is hereby submitted.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl

Lawrence A. Bell
LAWRENCE A. BELL
Major, Infantry
Adjutant



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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 145TH COMBAT AVIATION BATTALION
APO San Francisco, 96227

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10 May 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967
Reports Control Symbol CSFOR-65 (U)

TO: See Distribution

SECTION I SIGNIFICANT UNIT ACTIVITIES

A. (U) GENERAL: The 145th Combat Aviation Battalion has been fully committed to combat assault and direct combat support operations throughout the period of this report.

B. (U) MISSION: To augment the aviation support capability available to II FFORCEV and the Republic of Vietnam Forces operating within the III Corps ARVN Tactical Zone.

C. (C) ORGANIZATION:

1. The 184th Reconnaissance Airplane Company was reassigned to the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion on 19 March 1967, by 12th Combat Aviation Group GO Number 7, paragraph 1, dated 12 March 1967.

2. The 774th Medical Detachment (OA) was reassigned to the 13th Combat Aviation Battalion on 25 April 1967, by 1st Aviation Brigade GO Number 1353, paragraph 1, dated 19 April 1967.

3. Organization of the 145th Combat Aviation Battalion during the reporting period included the following units, headquarters located as indicated:

a. 145th Combat Aviation Battalion Headquarters, Bien Hoa.

b. Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, Bien Hoa.

(1) Pathfinder Detachment.

(2) Security Detachment.

(3) 87th Quartermaster Detachment.

c. 68th Assault Helicopter Company, Bien Hoa.

(1) 391st Transportation Detachment.

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- (2) 282d Signal Detachment.
- (3) 430th Medical Detachment.
- d. 71st Assault Helicopter Company, Bien Hoa.
 - (1) 151st Transportation Detachment.
 - (2) 94th Signal Detachment.
- e. 74th Reconnaissance Airplane Company, Phu Loi.
 - (1) 563d Transportation Detachment.
 - (2) 320th Signal Detachment.
- f. 118th Assault Helicopter Company, Bien Hoa.
 - (1) 573d Transportation Detachment.
 - (2) 198th Signal Detachment.
 - (3) 93d Medical Detachment.
- g. 334th Armed Helicopter Company, Bien Hoa.
 - 571st Transportation Detachment.
- h. 335th Assault Helicopter Company, Bien Hoa.
 - (1) 166th Transportation Detachment.
 - (2) 234th Signal Detachment.
 - (3) 25th Medical Detachment.

4. In addition, the 74th Reconnaissance Airplane Company has elements located at Duc Hoa, Xuan Loc, and Lam Son.

D. (U) COMMAND: Significant changes of command in the 145th Combat Aviation Battalion during this period were:

1. Major William J. Arink assumed command of the 71st Assault Helicopter Company from Major Arnold C. Morris on 19 March 1967.

2. Major Howard K. Hostler assumed command of the 118th Assault Helicopter Company from Major Joseph C. Boggs on 2 April 1967.

E. (C) PERSONNEL:

1. A continuing problem is late receipt of assignment instructions for lower grade enlisted personnel. Present policy is that personnel for whom no assignment has been received are reported approximately one month in advance of DEROS and that USARV will either obtain an assignment

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5 from Department of the Army or grant authority to return these individuals to an appropriate post for further assignment not later than ten days prior to DEROS. However, instances occur whereby authority to ship rotatees without assignments is not being received until just prior to DEROS and in some cases until DEROS or after. This delay creates a morale problem. It places an additional burden upon individual rotatees in that they are prevented from receiving entitled advance pay and from shipping hold baggage. Also of growing concern is the difficulty in scheduling transportation for those individuals who are entitled to special leaves. This headquarters is currently experiencing numerous delays in obtaining transportation for approved requested special leaves.

2. AWARDS AND DECORATIONS: During this quarter, the battalion received 3,462 awards.

3. SPECIAL SERVICES:

a. Special services emphasis this quarter was placed on the establishment of a battalion-wide program of athletic competition on an inter-company basis. This program was undertaken, with strong command emphasis, to provide athletic competition for both officers and enlisted men. Leagues have been formed on both levels in volleyball and softball, with eventual expansion to include flag football and basketball for the enlisted men. 145th Combat Aviation Battalion Regulation 28-20 was written to provide command guidance for the program.

b. The planned battalion recreational area has been eliminated from the base construction plans. It is assumed at this time that the only hope for eventual realization of these facilities will be through the self help program. Additional construction has been started on a new concrete volleyball court in the Honour-Smith Compound.

c. The theater program has been expanded. Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment is now able to show motion pictures to its enlisted personnel.

d. Experience has again demonstrated that a successful program in athletics and recreations can only be run when strong command emphasis and guidance is provided.

4. CIVIC ACTION: The receptiveness of the Vietnamese people has been good in most areas covered by this battalion's civic action program. We have been particularly successful in our support programs with the orphanages in the Bien Hoa and Phu Loi areas. However, in February, the 334th Armed Helicopter Company experienced a significant setback in their program at An Hoa Hung village. Upon arrival of the 334th Armed Helicopter Company's MEDCAP Team on 3 February 1967, the team members immediately noticed that none of the villagers came to meet them as had been the normal practice. A few minutes later, mortar rounds began falling in close proximity to the village, followed by small arms fire from the east side of the village. The civic action team departed to the west and proceeded to the Duc Tu Subsector Headquarters, where the incident was reported. The 334th Armed Helicopter Company's civic action

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support program to the village of An Hoa Hung has been suspended on the advice of the US senior subsector advisor.

5. INFORMATION PROGRAM:

a. The battalion information program has been supplemented by daily operations summaries that are telephoned to the USARV Information Officer each evening. The emphasis is on hard news, rather than feature-type stories. These summaries have accounted for a significant increase in Army aviation news releases on Armed Forces Radio and Television Networks and other media.

b. During this quarter, the following news items were dispatched:

- (1) Feature photographs: 17.
- (2) Feature stories: 20.
- (3) Hometown news releases: 106.
- (4) Hometown news photos: 18.

6. EDUCATION: The battalion education program is meeting with continued success. The significant change in administering the program was the shifting of emphasis from battalion to the companies. The company education officers now have USAFI literature and can assist in applying for courses and examinations, so that the men do not have to arrange for time and transportation to battalion headquarters. During this quarter, eight men applied for GED examinations and three men applied for USAFI courses. The slight drop in applications is attributed to the loss of one company and preparation for the Annual General Inspection.

7. PERSONNEL LOSSES AND GAINS:

a. Officers	Gain	Loss
February	30	13
March	34	33
April	19	10
b. Enlisted	Gain	Loss
February	158	59
March	184	116
April	140	137

F. (C) OPERATIONS:

1. Combat Operations:

a. This battalion is committed daily to tasks varying from combat support supply missions to reinforced battalion size combat

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assault operations. Battalion daily requirements for aircraft have been 10 UH-1D lift helicopters, one command and control helicopter, and one maintenance helicopter from each assault helicopter company; four UH-1D lift helicopters and 12 armed helicopters from the 334th Armed Helicopter Company; and 19 O-1 airplanes from the 74th Reconnaissance Airplane Company. Battalion and company controlled combat assaults, extractions and re-positionings employ a command and control helicopter that carries the airmobile force commander, air mission commander, artillery representative, and a representative for control of close air support. In addition, an alternate command and control helicopter is employed on battalion size operations in order to insure an airborne command post throughout the operation. The battalion smoke screen ship is employed on a mission requirement basis.

b. The 145th Combat Aviation Battalion was placed in direct support of the 25th Infantry Division during the initial phase of Operation JUNCTION CITY. During the latter portion of this reporting period, primary battalion support was shifted to the 9th Infantry Division. The battalion is making a concentrated effort to assist this new in-country division in its airmobile operations planning.

2. Physical Security.

a. Phu Loi Airfield: This battalion has the 74th Reconnaissance Airplane Company stationed at Phu Loi. The security requirements of this company, in addition to normal internal security, are to furnish personnel to man one 24 hour perimeter post and one 12 hour perimeter post. Passive defense bunkers have been constructed to accommodate each man of the company.

b. Bien Hoa Airbase: The 335th Assault Helicopter Company is stationed in the 173d Airborne Brigade area of the airbase. In addition to the normal internal security, this company furnishes personnel to man one 24 hour perimeter post and one 12 hour perimeter post. The remaining companies stationed at Bien Hoa Airbase are concerned with internal security, which is decentralized to company level. A new VNAF inner perimeter defense plan has been received. A new battalion defense plan was written to support this plan. The USAF physical security officer has indicated that canine patrols would be placed in the battalion area in the near future. The new helipad has now been built and with the subsequent movement of two companies into this area, two guard posts will be added for aircraft security.

c. Honour-Smith Compound: The 145th Combat Aviation Battalion continues to man four 24 hour guard posts and three 12 hour guard posts on the Honour-Smith Compound. Should defense of Honour-Smith Compound become necessary, the 145th Combat Aviation Battalion assumes operational control of the military tenants of the compound.

d. Anti-mortar revetments for 94 helicopters have been completed. Revetments for the new helipad are planned.

e. A Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) has been prepared and submitted for the 145th Security Platoon. This TDA action is part

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of the NAADS conversion program stimulated at Department of the Army.

3. Troop Movements.

a. The battalion headquarters moved a forward command post to Tay Ninh on 19 February 1967 and returned on 14 March 1967. The battalion experienced no difficulties on the move to or the return from Tay Ninh. The move was made to support Operation JUNCTION CITY.

b. Four companies of the battalion made unit movements during the reporting period with no difficulties. Units and dates are as indicated:

(1) 118th Assault Helicopter Company moved to Tay Ninh on 26 January 1967 and returned on 2 February 1967.

(2) The 71st Assault Helicopter Company moved to Tay Ninh on 26 February 1967 and returned on 5 March 1967.

(3) The 68th Assault Helicopter Company moved to Tay Ninh on 5 March 1967 and returned on 19 March 1967.

(4) The 335th Assault Helicopter Company moved to Tay Ninh on 19 March 1967 and returned on 2 April 1967.

G. (U) TRAINING:

1. Mandatory Training. Mandatory training as outlined in USARV Regulation 350-1 and 145th Combat Aviation Battalion Training Memorandum 66-5 is being conducted between breaks in daily missions and at night. Continuous aviator training, e.g., Decca training, instrument flight training, and aerial gunnery training is conducted concurrently with mission commitments, when the mission allows.

2. Assigned Training Tasks.

a. Three VNAF aviators completed flight training and were graduated on 6 February 1967. An additional three VNAF aviators began training on 15 February 1967 with a completion date set for 14 May 1967. The new group was given a written examination on TM 55-1520-210-10, Operator's Manual for the UH-1D Helicopter, upon completion of a one week ground school. The examination was translated into Vietnamese which greatly facilitated the administering of the examination.

b. Selected members of the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion were trained in the tactics and techniques employed in the conduct of firefly missions. Personnel receiving the instruction were then available as cadre to instruct the remaining units of the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion.

c. Gun platoons of the 145th Combat Aviation Battalion received training in tactical employment of the XM-47 Mine Dispersing System. Personnel from the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment and the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion also received this instruction, presented at Bien Hoa.

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9 d. Thirty-seven aviators and crew members of the newly arrived 187th Assault Helicopter Company were given two weeks of flight training within the battalion. Individuals were attached to companies and participated in both combat assaults and direct combat support missions.

e. The S-2 expanded the Escape and Evasion program. Recently, quotas have been obtained to send unit Escape and Evasion Officers to the Navy's Jungle Survival School located at Subic Bay, Phillipine Islands. A great wealth of experience is being brought back from the school and incorporated into the existing training programs.

3. Recently Published Training Memorandums.

a. Classes on character guidance were emphasized. The 145th Combat Aviation Battalion Training Memorandum 67-1, Character Guidance, was published to implement the program. The memorandum establishes a class and make-up class per month for each unit.

b. A new driver education program was established, which centralizes training at battalion level. 145th Combat Aviation Battalion Training Memorandum 67-2, Driver Education, outlines the structure of the program and the instruction to be presented.

c. Guidance to commanders for establishing a training and orientation program for newly arrived personnel is outlined in 145th Combat Aviation Battalion Training Memorandum 67-3, Replacement Training for Newly Arrived Personnel. This memorandum is an implementation of change 1 to USARV Regulation 350-1.

4. Training Time.

a. Companies of this battalion allot one day each week to training in those mandatory subjects listed in USARV Regulation 350-1. Steadily increasing tactical commitments make scheduling of these classes during reasonable hours of the day extremely difficult and subject to frequent change.

b. Aviator and crew member training is accomplished daily with aircraft commanders and instructor pilots presenting the instruction. All newly assigned aviators are given orientation and extensive proficiency training prior to being released to operational missions.

H. (C) INTELLIGENCE:

1. Mining of Landing Zones. On 19 March 1967, a mined landing zone was encountered by the 68th Assault Helicopter Company and the 118th Assault Helicopter Company in War Zone C. The types of mines used were command detonated 105mm rounds, wooden box mines and one 500 pound bomb. Several unexploded mines were found in the landing zone by ground units. These found were wired for command detonation.

2. Aerial Reconnaissance.

a. Viet Cong positions along the seacoast have been successfully

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located by O-1 airplane pilots observing the beaches for accumulations of clam shells. Clams appear to be a source of food for Viet Cong near the sea.

b. Inland Viet Cong positions are normally camouflaged and extremely difficult to locate; however, close attention to the ground has revealed rubbish under trees near the perimeter of enemy base camps.

3. Rocket Positions. The increased possibility of rocket attacks in the III Corps area has emphasized that aviators of this battalion continue to conduct a visual reconnaissance each time they fly.

I. (C) LOGISTICS:

1. Summary of S-4 Activities.

a. For a period of eight weeks during Operation GADSDEN and Operation JUNCTION CITY, the battalion was required to provide a twelve point refueling site and prestock ammunition point at Trai Bi in support of airmobile operations. The 145th Combat Aviation Battalion also provided support in POL and ammunition through prestock points at Duc Hoa and Song Be.

b. Refueling and Prestock Operations:

(1) On 9 March 1967, III Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ) prestock points were redesignated Army Aircraft Logistical Areas (AALA). The change in designation was accompanied by a reassignment of responsibility to units in each area.

(2) The 145th Combat Aviation Battalion laterally transferred POL handling equipment to gaining units as indicated:

(a) Ham Tan:

- 1 One miniport.
- 2 Two 50 GPM KENCO pumps.

(b) Xuan Loc:

- 1 One 10,000 gallon bladder.
- 2 Two 1,200 gallon M-49C tankers.
- 3 Two 50 GPM KENCO pumps.

(3) Battalion POL dispensing equipment was withdrawn from Tan An. Two 1,200 gallon M-49C tankers are still in Hon Quan awaiting movement to either Bien Hoa or Song Be.

(4) The 145th Combat Aviation Battalion continues to provide the following personnel and equipment at Duc Hoa:

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- (a) Two POL specialists.
- (b) Two 1,200 gallon M-49C tankers.
- (c) One miniport.
- (d) One 10,000 gallon bladder.

(5) On 21 April 1967, the 145th Combat Aviation Battalion expanded its operations in Song Be to include the responsibility for the transport, maintenance, and dispensing of aircraft ammunition and POL products. On 24 April 1967, the following personnel and equipment were located at Song Be:

- (a) Five POL specialists (three cross-trained in ammunition handling).
- (b) One miniport.
- (c) Three 50 GPM KENCO pumps.
- (d) One 10,000 gallon bladder.
- (e) One 1,200 gallon M-49C tanker.

(6) The 87th Quartermaster Detachment, augmented by personnel from the 12th Combat Aviation Group, provided POL and ammunition resupply for numerous battalion size operations at Song Be, Trai Bi, Tan An, Dong Tam, Xuan Loc, Duc Hoa, and Bien Hoa. These operations required the displacement of POL personnel and equipment for periods ranging from over night to eight weeks.

c. Construction:

(1) Vertical construction of four barracks under project 78 (self help) was completed during the period. Electrical wiring of two of the buildings was completed 2 April 1967. Wiring of the other two barracks should be completed shortly.

(2) A change in responsibility for support of the Bien Hoa area caused the 79th Engineer Group and subsequently D Co, 86th Engineer Battalion to cease their support of the 145th Combat Aviation Battalion on 2 March 1967. The 159th Engineer Group assumed the responsibility for this support. Construction temporarily ceased on the self help projects due to lack of support and materials.

(3) On 17 April 1967, requisitions for construction materials were approved by the S-4, 159th Engineer Group. Vertical construction for enlisted barracks for the 71st Assault Helicopter Company will resume on or about 1 May 1967.

(4) During March 1967, Double Bituminous Surface Treatment (DBST) roads were completed in the battalion area.

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(5) RMK-BRJ stopped work on construction of Project 521. Engineer command has assured this battalion that construction will be completed. Due to present delays, it is unknown at present on what date the project will be completed.

(6) Improvement of the heliport facilities at the 335th Assault Helicopter Company was requested during this quarter. The project is approved, but funds are as yet not available. It is anticipated that construction will commence prior to the end of the next quarter.

(7) Completion of heliport lighting and tower facilities at the new helipad at Bien Hoa Airbase is anticipated during the next quarter. This project is also awaiting funds.

(8) Vertical construction for the 74th Reconnaissance Airplane Company at Phu Loi continues. Completion is anticipated during the next quarter.

(9) Layout plans for an airmobile light company to be housed at Long Binh were completed. It is anticipated that construction will be completed by October 1967.

2. Supply. On 27 February 1967, the 145th Combat Aviation Battalion received 187 ballistic helmets. These helmets provided additional protection to the aviators of this battalion from shrapnel and small arms fire. On 27 March 1967, 135 additional ballistic helmets were received and on 22 April 1967, the battalion received 75 additional helmets.

J. (U) AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE:

1. Flying Hours. During this quarter, the battalion flew 49,286 hours. The average flight time per aircraft was 82 hours. The aircraft availability averaged 82%.

a. Problem Areas. Significant problems encountered during this period were shorter engine life, over 100 hours less than the previous quarter, leakage of main rotor hub blade grip seals, locking and shorter life for hydraulic components (60% of life).

b. The UH-1B, C, and D helicopters continue to require more replacement parts than the supply systems have been able to support. Cause factors are flying hour rates, combat damage, and accidents.

2. Consolidation of Maintenance Support. The complete consolidation of the maintenance support detachment and service platoons has resulted in better utilization of available personnel and skills, which in turn has resulted in a higher aircraft availability rate.

K. (C) SIGNAL:

1. Land Line Communications.

a. Toward the end of this reporting period, a sole-user telephone

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circuit was installed between Rotor switchboard, 145th Combat Aviation Battalion, and Blackjack switchboard, 12th Combat Aviation Group. Prior to the installation of this point-to-point circuit, it was necessary to go through three switchboards to reach higher headquarters. With a direct line, much time will be saved and better service enjoyed.

b. In addition to this circuit, another point-to-point line was installed between the Battalion Operations Center, and the 335th Assault Helicopter Company operations.

2. Avionics Retrofit. The avionics retrofit program is now in progress, in which in-country aircraft are undergoing ZYR modification for secure voice equipment. Work on the fixed wing aircraft assigned to this battalion has been completed. As of this date, there have been 16 UH-1D, 1965 models, retrofitted. Adequate wiring kits are available for three more months of work. In addition, installation of ARC-54 radios for 1964 UH-1B helicopters is being accomplished.

3. Airborne Command Console. A new 1966 model UH-1D helicopter was recently retrofitted and equipped with Decca and a command console. This aircraft is a replacement for the 1965 command and control UH-1D helicopter. The console was constructed as a temporary substitute for the new ARC-10 console, which should arrive in-country shortly. The temporary console has two VRC-46 and one ARC-51 radio installed. This arrangement has proven to be satisfactory.

4. Remote Radio Control. Accomplished during this reporting period was the installation of a GRA-39 remote radio control in the battalion headquarters. This device enables the battalion commander to operate the battalion FM command net from his location and also gives him inter-communication with the signal section.

L. (U) SAFETY:

1. Accidents, Incidents, and Losses. During the reporting period, the battalion Safety Officer reviewed, analyzed and recorded 18 accidents, 26 incidents, six forced landings and 12 precautionary landings. The major accidents included six fatal accidents, in which 22 persons were killed.

2. Significant Events During the Quarter.

a. Two battalion regulations, 385-5, Aviation Accident Plan, and 385-10, Aviation Safety Program, were published on 1 April 1967.

b. An accident occurred during the reporting period when the tail boom of a UH-1D failed. The crash was fatal to six persons. The findings of the board indicated that the battery shelf chafed the lower left longeron which caused failure of the longeron and subsequent separation of the tail boom from the aircraft. Two MWOs were initiated, which called for immediate inspection of the battery shelf and supporting longerons, and a modification of the battery shelf and right and left longerons.

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M. (U) FLIGHT STANDARDIZATION:

1. During this reporting period, a campaign to assure compliance with the requirements of USARV Regulation 385-30, Subject: Go-No-Go placards, was initiated. With the assistance of the aircraft maintenance officer, unit personnel are being educated in proper engine fuel control adjustments, so that the Go-No-Go system can be properly utilized.

2. Ninety day standardization rides are being given on other than operational flights. This procedure insures that an aviator will be given a complete review of emergency procedures, to include autorotations. Unit instructor pilots are directed to fly with as many personnel as possible on operational missions; however, these flights are not used as substitutes for the standardization ride.

3. Unit personnel are being encouraged to use single ship missions for practice instrument flights in order to be prepared for the coming monsoon season.

N. (U) MEDICAL:

1. Flexibility of support resulting from consolidation of medical detachments has enabled the battalion medical personnel to provide forward aid stations in support of field operations without compromising base dispensary medical care.

2. Early in March 1967, the dental detachment moved from the consolidated dispensary to an adjacent tent. This provided additional space in the dispensary building for the battalion surgeon and his staff. At the same time, the dental tent was air conditioned which greatly facilitates dental treatment.

3. Potable water for the lavatories and showers in the Honour-Smith Compound villas has not been provided. A portion of this water comes from the Bien Hoa City water supply which is not treated. However, this battalion has had in effect for over a month, a program of hyper-chlorination which gives a greater margin of safety.

SECTION II OBSERVATIONS (LESSONS LEARNED) PART I

A. (FOUO) PERSONNEL:

Late Receipt of Assignment Instructions.

a. ITEM: Late receipt of assignment instructions for lower grade enlisted personnel is having an adverse effect on morale.

b. DISCUSSION: Revision of the present USARV policy of waiting until 10 days prior to DEROS before requesting authority to ship an individual to a POE for further assignment appears to be warranted in view of the impact the existing policy is having on morale. It is believed

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15 that a policy of requesting authority to ship to a POE at thirty days before DEROS would be more appropriate and would alleviate some of the difficulties service members are encountering in shipping hold baggage, relocating dependents and processing pay actions.

c. OBSERVATION: It is recommended that the present policy be revised to authorize issuance of PCS orders on a service member to a POE when he reaches thirty days prior to DEROS. Issuance of orders at this time would allow shipment of hold baggage, processing of pay actions and confirmation of departure date. In the event assignment instructions are received after issuance of such orders, it would present no serious administrative problem to either amend the existing orders or to rescind them and issue new orders.

B. (C) OPERATIONS:

1. Fire Support in the Landing Zone:

a. ITEM: Preparation of landing zones (open paddy areas).

b. DISCUSSION: In most cases when only an artillery preparation of a landing zone is used, the element of surprise is lost without gaining commensurate tactical advantage. A certain amount of time is required for fire adjustment and often only a battery of artillery is used to fire a five or ten minute preparation.

c. OBSERVATION: In most cases, artillery preparation of a five or ten minute duration is not as effective as the element of surprise that is gained by the shock action of an assault helicopter company landing with full direct fire support. This technique allows the helicopter company to land, unload the troops, and depart before the enemy has time to react. This tactic also leaves the enemy in a state of confusion and assists in the accomplishment of the ground assault. This method of employment is not considered practical in an area that is fortified, where there are few suitable landing areas, or where mines are suspected in the landing zone. These areas should be thoroughly prepared with all available fires to include air strikes with bombs and napalm.

2. Compromising Operational Areas.

a. ITEM: Compromising landing zone locations prior to an airmobile assault.

b. DISCUSSION: The practice of reconnoitering prospective landing zones is justified and in most cases essential to the success of an airmobile operation. However, consideration should be given to reconnaissance only to the extent necessary to familiarize commanders and key planners with the proposed operational area. Orbiting of one location and intensification of air activity over a specific area tends to compromise the forthcoming operation.

c. OBSERVATION: To avoid excessive air activity over a proposed landing zone, representatives from the airmobile element, ground unit, artillery observer, and tactical air coordinator should make the reconnaissance from a single aircraft. A linear rather than orbital flight

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pattern should be used with a minimum of loiter time in the area.

3. Camouflage.

a. ITEM: Sanitizing the battle area.

b. DISCUSSION:

(1) In recent weeks, several Viet Cong base camps and fortified areas have been discovered by aviators of this unit in the Rung Sat Special Zone because of the existence of piles of shells of the various crustaceans which make up a large part of the diet of the Viet Cong in this area. The white interior of the various mussels, clams, and oysters is easily spotted from the air and is a good indicator of the presence of Viet Cong in an otherwise apparently deserted area.

(2) This weakness of improper police of bivouac areas is by no means limited to the enemy. US units which have recently moved from the area have left large quantities of refuse and have failed to fill in their foxholes and to destroy other evidence of having occupied these areas. This failure provides the Viet Cong with intelligence as to friendly movements. The ingenious enemy can make many expedients from what the soldier decides is of no value. In addition, these piles of ammunition boxes, C-ration boxes, and other trash create an unnatural appearance which the aerial observer must check out when making a visual reconnaissance of the area. The foxholes which are not filled can later be used by the Viet Cong, as their design is obviously that of our army and therefore may not be subjected to as close surveillance as would the carefully camouflaged spider holes of the Viet Cong.

c. OBSERVATION: Adherence to the basic principles of camouflage discipline and police of friendly battle areas will deny much information and material to the enemy as well as make the job of the aviator/observer much easier and more effective.

4. Mined Landing Zones.

a. ITEM: Fire support in suspected mined landing zones.

b. DISCUSSION: This battalion has conducted several operations in which mined landing zones were encountered. Both command and pressure activated mines have been used. These mines have ranged from home made devices, command detonated artillery rounds, to sophisticated claymore mines placed along tree lines in the landing zones. Experience has proven that the greatest threat of mined landing zones exists in jungle areas where available landing sites are at a minimum.

c. OBSERVATION: To insure that helicopters can safely land in a suspected mined landing zone, a concentrated volume of fire must be brought upon the suspected area. Tactical air support using large size bombs with quick fuzes, and napalm, and large caliber artillery pieces can be used to detonate the mines. In addition the UH-1C helicopter equipped with the XM-3 rocket system can be used in the LZ prestrike to detonate these mines and to cut wiring to control bunkers. It must be

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17 emphasized that a heavy volume of fire is necessary to saturate the proposed landing zones. In addition, tree lines adjacent to the landing zone should also be brought under fire to destroy emplaced claymore mines.

5. Protection While in the Landing Zone.

a. ITEM: Landing of lead and trail helicopters.

b. DISCUSSION: When landing in a combat assault, helicopter companies have maximum fire power to the flanks by virtue of the installation location of machine guns. However, the front and rear of the formation are vulnerable to enemy fire because gunners are unable to bring their machine guns to bear in those directions.

c. OBSERVATION: When landing, the lead and trail helicopter(s) should land at an angle to the direction of flight. In this manner, the gunners on these aircraft can readily suppress enemy fire that may come from the front or rear of the formation. It may be necessary to land two or possibly three aircraft on either end of the formation at an oblique to provide all around protection.

6. Alternate Command and Control Helicopter.

a. ITEM: Utilization of an alternate command and control helicopter.

b. DISCUSSION: In battalion or larger size airmobile operations, it is important to maintain a continuous command and control helicopter on station throughout the operation.

c. OBSERVATION: The use of an alternate command and control helicopter provides the air mission commander with:

(1) Continuity of control in case of maintenance difficulties or enemy damage to the command and control helicopter.

(2) An alternate control team to coordinate PZ loading, refueling, and downed helicopter evacuations when the command and control helicopter is involved in conducting the operation.

(3) The capability to control two operations simultaneously.

7. Additional Personnel at Rearming Locations.

a. ITEM: Requirement for additional personnel at rearming facilities.

b. DISCUSSION: During extended airmobile operations, it is necessary for escort gunships to return to rearming facilities to replenish expended ordnance. This rearming process is time consuming.

c. OBSERVATION: Additional personnel should be prepositioned at rearming points when extended airmobile operations are conducted. These personnel will significantly reduce the turn around time of the armed helicopters supporting the operation.

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C. (C) TRAINING AND ORGANIZATION:

1. Individual Training Records.

- a. ITEM: Training records.
- b. DISCUSSION: A revised training record, 145th Combat Aviation Battalion Form 31, was printed and distributed to units of the battalion.
- c. OBSERVATION: This individual training record provides the commander with an immediate training status of personnel within his unit. Form 31 lists mandatory subjects required in the battalion and provides a space to indicate when the instruction was received.

2. Escape and Evasion Training.

- a. ITEM: Jungle survival school.
- b. DISCUSSION: Flying single aircraft missions over the vast expanses of jungle found in some parts of Vietnam lends to the probability of aviators finding themselves in a survival situation.
- c. OBSERVATION: In order to acquaint aviators and crew members with the peculiarities of survival in jungle areas, quotas were obtained to send company Escape and Evasion Officers to the Navy Jungle Survival School in the Phillipine Islands. The techniques learned in the school are now being taught to crew members of the command.

3. Change to MTOE.

- a. ITEM: Conversion to NAADS.
- b. DISCUSSION: The New Army Authorization Document System requires that any change in organization, personnel, or equipment be reflected in an appropriate MTOE or MTDA. The MTOE or MTDA would then become the sole authorization document for changes in organization and retention or authorization for personnel and equipment. Department of the Army has placed a moratorium on all MTOE and MTDA action until all units in Vietnam have converted to NAADS. However, this battalion consistently receives instructions to turn in equipment in excess of the TOE or MTOE unless an MTOE is submitted to reflect the addition of this equipment. This directed supply action is in direct conflict with the Department of the Army imposed moratorium. Additionally, personnel and equipment increases, dictated by the changing tactical situation in the Vietnam counter-insurgency environment, are extremely difficult to justify since these changes in authorized allowances must be accompanied by submission of an MTOE. Once again, this is in direct conflict with the Department of the Army imposed moratorium.
- c. OBSERVATION: Recommend that the Department of the Army moratorium on MTOE actions be terminated so as to allow TOE units to tailor their organization and equipment to provide better support for combat operations in Vietnam.

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D. (C) INTELLIGENCE:

1. Firefly.

a. ITEM: Infrared light for firefly.

b. DISCUSSION: Current firefly results are affected by tactics now employed by the Viet Cong to counter this system. Once the light ship is seen, the Viet Cong take cover and remain hidden until the light ship has passed. The employment of infrared searchlights would, along with currently available viewer devices, increase the surprise element and the overall effectiveness of the system.

c. OBSERVATION: Flexible searchlights similar to those found on tanks could be used for this purpose. A removable filter would allow the standard white light to be employed once the enemy has been located by infrared means.

2. Blood Chit Control.

a. ITEM: Loss of blood chits.

b. DISCUSSION: Blood chits are controlled items similar to ration cards and morphine; however, pilots are inclined to consider them as personal souvenirs. The loss of a blood chit requires a report through channels as to the circumstances surrounding the loss. The purpose of the report is to prevent unauthorized personnel from taking advantage of the chit number and possibly setting ambushes for rescue personnel.

c. OBSERVATION: The problem of the vanishing blood chit may be solved by issuing it along with the SOI just prior to a flight. This method allows maximum use of the available chits and insures its prompt return to the unit.

3. Polaroid Cameras.

a. ITEM: Polaroid aerial photos.

b. DISCUSSION: Standard polaroid photographs from above 1500 feet are of little or no value. This deficiency can be corrected through the use of a telephoto adapter lens on the model 100 polaroid camera. The approximate magnification is a factor of three. Resulting pictures have good resolution. The quality of the picture is acceptable for use in terrain studies of landing and pick-up zones. The price of the kit, which includes both telephoto and wide angle lens, is \$32.00.

c. OBSERVATION: The inclusion of a lens accessory kit would considerably increase versatility of the camera, particularly in the area of aerial photography.

4. Subversion and Espionage Directed Against U.S. Army (SAEDA).

a. ITEM: Rest and Recuperation (R&R) briefing.

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b. DISCUSSION: Personnel are required to receive a SAEDA briefing prior to departing for R&R. A record of this briefing must be maintained on file at the individual's unit.

c. OBSERVATION: A simple method of completing this requirement is to prepare a stencil of the briefing, attach a copy of the briefing to the R&R orders, and require the individual to read and initial it prior to his departure. The forms then serve as evidence of completed briefings.

E. (C) LOGISTICS:

Army Aviation Logistics Areas (AALA).

a. ITEM: AALA operations.

b. DISCUSSION:

(1) During this period, in accordance with a II Field Forces, Vietnam, plan to assign responsibility for the operation of AALA to major ground units, the battalion was relieved of the responsibility of providing POL equipment to three III Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ) locations; however, added responsibilities in other AALA negated any appreciable gain in the capabilities of the battalion to improve its organic rapid reaction refueling posture.

(2) The increase of Army aviation elements in the III CTZ during the last two years has not been complemented by a corresponding increase in aircraft refueling capacity.

(3) Major US units have been assigned POL responsibilities in specified areas; however, a change in unit location can cause the operation of known refueling points to be curtailed or altered without notice.

(4) III Corps Advisory Teams are not presently staffed with personnel, materials handling equipment, and POL dispensing equipment to support the expanded aviation requirements.

(5) There is no criteria established for the number of refueling points to be maintained at an AALA. Notification of impending operations often does not allow time for proper liaison visits to the AALA by units that plan to use the facilities. The result is valuable time lost in refueling operations.

c. OBSERVATION:

(1) Organic and attached aviation battalion POL personnel and equipment should be available at the battalion headquarters area to maintain the instant flexibility required for rapid reaction operations.

(2) AALA should be assigned quartermaster KD teams, such as the 87th Quartermaster Detachment, who remain on location to maintain and rapidly dispense aviation fuel. These teams should be assigned to the 1st Logistical Command as a wholesale distributor. These teams should be augmented by three ammunition storage specialists to properly maintain

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21 the large amounts of prestocked ammunition required at the AALA. The AALA should be given the mission of providing simultaneous rapid refueling for 16 aircraft upon two hours notice.

F. (U) MAINTENANCE:

1. Aircraft Maintenance and the Dry Season.

- a. ITEM: Shorter engine life.
- b. DISCUSSION: Dry season operations have shortened the T53 engine life.
- c. OBSERVATION: Dust drawn into the engine inlet causes the compressor blades to become eroded.
 - (1) Barrier filters are extremely helpful, but must be cleaned daily.
 - (2) An improved particle separator is in the test stage at the present time. Its use should decrease engine wear significantly.

2. Main Rotor Blade Grip Seals.

- a. ITEM: Main rotor blade grip seal leakage.
- b. DISCUSSION: Although leaking blade grip seals are a problem throughout the year, more trouble is encountered during the dry season.
- c. OBSERVATION: Dirt and sand become imbedded under the blade grip seals and O-rings, allowing oil to seep. Cleaning by air pressure and a smooth, small object under the seal will occasionally stop the leak. Good preventive maintenance including frequent and careful cleaning of the blade grip seals has proven to be very effective.

3. Aircraft Technical Supply Operations.

- a. ITEM: Low priority requisitions.
- b. DISCUSSION: Filling of requisitions for replenishment items to achieve authorized stockage levels is very slow.
- c. OBSERVATION: A Department of the Army supply team, now at the 56th Transportation Company, is in the process of assisting this company in implementing the NCR 500 punch card system, which is expected to alleviate this problem.

G. (C) SIGNAL:

1. Avionics Test Equipment.

- a. ITEM: Avionics test equipment.
- b. DISCUSSION: As of this date, there are still no in-country

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facilities for repair of avionics test equipment. Each avionics detachment assigned to this battalion has experienced the same problem of turning in test equipment through proper maintenance channels only to have it evacuated out of country. In some cases, after waiting several months for return of the equipment, tracer action has been initiated with no results. In those instances where equipment was returned, the work order reflected Not Repairable This Station (NRTS) and recommended the item be salvaged and a like item requisitioned. This system is inadequate and represents an unnecessary loss when equipment has only minor defects.

c. OBSERVATION: To prevent further critical loss of avionics test equipment, an in-country capability for the repair of this equipment should be established. Planning for the expansion of Army aviation in Vietnam should consider the requirement for this repair capability.

2. Command Communications Package.

a. ITEM: Command communications package.

b. DISCUSSION: As the air mobility tactical concept expands in Vietnam, so does the requirement for specially tailored radios to support this type of warfare.

c. OBSERVATION: There is a need for a command communications package of versatile FM and single side-band light-weight radios for use at forward area CPs. Such a package should be transportable in the UH-1D helicopter. A small, light-weight power supply should also be included in this compact package.

3. ARN-82 and ARN-83 Radio.

a. ITEM: Maintenance support for ARN-82 and ARN-83 radios.

b. DISCUSSION: For the past four months, the new 1966 model UH-1D and UH-1C helicopters have been arriving in Vietnam with ARN-82 Omni and ARN-83 ADF installed. To date there are no repair parts or test equipment to support these radios. Several of the ARN-83s are now inoperative. As the monsoon season approaches, these radios will be essential for navigation in this area.

c. OBSERVATION: Maintenance planning should provide for a repair and replacement capability that keeps pace with the issue of equipment.

H. (U) SAFETY:

1. Uncontrolled Airfields.

a. ITEM: Use of UHF frequency 329.1.

b. DISCUSSION: Numerous near misses and one fatal accident have occurred at airfields without air to ground control. An uncontrolled airfield frequency, 329.1, has been established for Army and Air Force use.

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c. OBSERVATION: Aviators must be made aware of this frequency and its proper use. In-country orientations of newly assigned aviators should include a briefing on the proper use of this frequency. When operating in and around uncontrolled airfields, aviators should make a call in the blind stating their intentions.

2. RPM Control.

a. ITEM: Accidents involving loss of RPM.

b. DISCUSSION: Accidents due to loss of RPM continue to be excessively high.

c. OBSERVATION: The use of the Go-No-Go placard still remains the best indicator of the power available for a safe take off. The indications from this chart, combined with good pilot technique can reduce these RPM accidents.

3. Dust.

a. ITEM: Dust during the dry season.

b. DISCUSSION: During the month of February, March and April, dust has caused considerable problems on landings and take offs.

c. OBSERVATION: Pilots must insure that in dusty conditions, approaches are made to the ground. Hovering in dusty conditions is extremely dangerous and can cause loss of visual reference to the ground. Formation take offs from dusty areas are not feasible. Individual take offs must be made, with each aircraft calling when clear of the dust.

I. (FOUO) FLIGHT STANDARDIZATION:

a. ITEM: Value of the Go-No-Go placard.

b. DISCUSSION: It is the opinion of many flight personnel that the Go-No-Go system used to forecast performance of the UH-1 aircraft is of no value because it provides too large a margin of safety. The facts are that this system is an extremely accurate and valuable tool if properly used with an aircraft that is properly maintained. The largest variable involved in this system is type of engine maintenance and fuel control adjustment. Engine performance of an engine that is overtrimmed or improperly maintained cannot be accurately forecast.

c. OBSERVATION: Engine maintenance is a most important factor in the use of the Go-No-Go placard system of forecasting the performance of UH-1 type helicopters.

J. (U) MEDICAL:

Medical Support.

a. ITEM: Consolidation of medical support.

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b. DISCUSSION: Consolidation of the medical support units has continued to prove effective, and it has resulted in a much higher standard of medical support. Although still lacking adequate space and an X-ray machine, the flight surgeons have been able to reduce the backlog of flight physicals and to accomplish these physicals in a much shorter time. Also, flexibility of support resulting from consolidation has enabled us to provide forward aid stations in support of field operations without compromising base dispensary medical care.

c. OBSERVATION: Consolidation of medical facilities has continued to show merit and has allowed for a higher quality of medical support with greater flexibility.

SECTION II PART II RECOMMENDATIONS

A. (U) PERSONNEL: That reassignment orders be published far enough in advance to provide sufficient time for individuals to ship hold baggage and make necessary arrangements for movement to his next unit of assignment.

B. (U) OPERATIONS: That an air delivered, bangalore-type munition be developed which is designed to detonate mines placed in landing zones.

C. (U) TRAINING AND ORGANIZATION: That a centralized VNAF helicopter training facility be established in Vietnam.

D. (U) INTELLIGENCE: None.

E. (U) LOGISTICS: None.

F. (U) MAINTENANCE: None.

G. (U) SIGNAL:

1. There is a need for a light-weight command communications package of versatile FM and single side-band radios for use at forward area command posts.


2. An in-country facility should be established to repair avionics test equipment.

H. (U) SAFETY: None.

I. (U) FLIGHT STANDARDIZATION: None.

J. (U) MEDICAL: None.

"FIRST IN VIETNAM"


HOWARD M. MOORE
LTC, Arty
Commanding

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AVGC-SC (10 May 67) 1st Ind (FOUO)
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (ORLL) for Period Ending
30 April 1967 (RCS CSFOR-65)

HEADQUARTERS, 12TH COMBAT AVIATION GROUP, APO 96491 3 June 1967

THRU: Commanding General, II Field Force Vietnam, APO 96266

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20310

1. One copy of the 145th Combat Aviation Battalion's Operational Report - Lessons Learned (ORLL) (RCS CSFOR-65) for period ending 30 April 1967, is forwarded in compliance with USARV Regulation 1-19, dated 8 February 1967.

2. Comments are included on observations and recommendations made by the battalion commander:

a. Personnel: The observation in Section II, Part I of Personnel that a problem exists due to late receipt of assignment instructions is correct. The proposed solution would negate effect of the problem. However, the proper solution is expediting assignment instructions to insure that all individuals receive them at least 15 days prior to DEROS.

b. Operations: None

c. Training and Organization: None

d. Intelligence: None

e. Logistics: None

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl
as


WILLIAM N. WALKER
CPT, INF
Asst Adjutant

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AVFBC-H (10 May 1967) 2d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Period Ending 30 April
1967, 145th Combat Aviation Battalion

DA, HQ II FFORCEV, APO San Francisco 96266 7 JUN 1967

THRU: Commanding General, 1st Avn Bde, ATTN: AVBA-C, APO 96307


Commanding General, USARV, ATTN: AVHGC-DH, APO 96307

Commander in Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-MH, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Dept of the
Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

The enclosed Operational Report on Lessons Learned submitted by
the 145th Combat Aviation Battalion has been reviewed by this head-
quarters for information and is forwarded to your headquarters for
comment.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


JAMES A. ULVENIUS
Capt. AGC
Asst. AG

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AVBA-C (10 May 1967) 3rd Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned Period Ending 30 April 1967
(RCS-CSFOR 67) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, 1ST AVIATION BRIGADE, APO 96307 26 JUN 1967

THRU: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DH,
APO 96307
Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-MH,
APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff Force Development, Department of the Army,
(ACSFOR DA), Washington D. C. 20310

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed subject report of the 145th Combat Aviation Battalion as indorsed and considers it to be adequate and concurs with the contents except as noted.

2. (C) The following additional comments are considered pertinent:

a. Section I, para E1, page 2: Reference port calls for special leaves. USARV msg 39755, dated 1 Dec 66, gives special leave personnel travel priority Nr 2 and PCS personnel Nr 3. Special leave personnel would bump PCS personnel. Perhaps not enough prior planning is being given to forecasting special leave personnel. Personnel should be given transportation as close to date requested as possible, but must be made to understand the problems in obtaining transportation. Recommend that personnel be advised to apply for transportation at least 30 days prior to desired date.

b. Section II, part I, para A, page 12: Receipt of assignment instructions is a problem USARV wide, however there has been a vast improvement in the last 60 days. A large portion of the problem is created by the units in failing to report personnel for reassignment and incorrect morning report information data which DPU depends on in the preparation of rotatee rosters. Shipment of baggage and payment of advance pay cannot be accomplished until receipt of assignment instructions, therefore the solution to this problem is to solve the assignment instruction problem.

c. Section II, part I para B1 and B4, page 14: This headquarters is reviewing the problems of LZ preparation in an effort to counter the effect of command and rotor wash activated enemy mines. Several possibilities are being investigated. The MK 1 Fuze Extender, which is adaptable to the General Purpose Bomb, appears to be the most expeditious solution to provide a graze burst for LZ preparation by TAC air. Variable time fuzes, depth charges and fuel air explosives are being studied as optimum weapons for application in the future.

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AVBA-C

26 JUN 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned Period Ending 30 April 1967
(RCS-CSFOR 67) (U)

d. Section II, part I para G, page 19:

(1) Avionics Test Equipment: The 34th General Support Group and USARV are aware of this problem and action is being taken to alleviate this situation by requesting facilities be authorized by USARPAC.

(2) Command Communications package: The command communication packages presently are enroute to RVN, the AN/MRC 119 provides for HF SSB communications for use by companies in FWD CP's. This equipment is $\frac{1}{4}$ ton mounted, which supplies the necessary power, and can be moved by CH-47 helicopter. The AN/ASC-10 command console presently being issued contains provisions for FM and HF SSB radios.

(3) AN/ARN-82 and AN/ARN-83 radio: Test equipment and support parts for these radios are now arriving in country. Two avionics detachments in the 145th Combat Aviation Battalion have been issued the test equipment for the AN/ARN-83.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

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LEWIS T. TURNER
Captain, AGC
Asst Adjutant General

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AVHGC-DST (10 May 67) 4th Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending
30 April 1967 (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 29 JUL 1967

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-OT,
APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the period ending 30 April 1967 from Headquarters, 145th Combat Aviation Battalion as indorsed.

2. (C) Pertinent comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning assignment instructions, Section II, Part I, paragraph A, page 12 and Section II, Part II, paragraph A, page 22, inclosure 2: Non-Concur. The proposed solution of changing the current policy from 10 days to 30 days for returning individuals to CONUS without assignment instructions does not appear to be warranted. It is recognized that the late receipt of assignment instructions poses problems for other out processing actions; however, the additional workload imposed by the proposed policy change to amend orders and provide adequate control at the unit, POD and DA would be excessive. This headquarters has instituted procedures to provide each major commander with machine prepared listings of assignment instructions for individuals assigned this command. This method is faster and more effective than the previous procedure using manually prepared rosters which contained assignment instructions for individuals in all commands. Procedures are also being implemented to provide each command with a listing of those individuals for whom assignment instructions have not been received. These listings will provide for closer control of those personnel, and identify individuals on whom special attention should be focused by DA, this headquarters and the major commander. Further improvement of the assignment procedures can be made by Department of the Army Office of Personnel Operations providing more timely notification to this headquarters of individuals' assignments. Special attention by the 145th Aviation Battalion to insure that individuals are reported for re-assignment at the proper time will also assist in solving this problem.

b. Reference item concerning development of munition to detonate mines emplaced in landing zones, paragraph 4, page 14; paragraph b, page 22 and paragraph 2c, 3d Indorsement: Concur. As a result of an increase in the mining of helicopter landing zones by the VC, COMUSMACV requested a review of existing and programmed munitions to determine the most effective manner to defeat LZ mines. The Joint Chiefs of Staff assigned this task to the Joint Technical Coordinating Group-Munitions Effectiveness (JTCC-ME). In a memorandum published by the JTCC-ME on 2 May 67, it was stated that the best immediate solution is the use of general purpose bombs in LZ

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AVHGC-DST (10 May 67)

4th Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending
30 April 1967 (RCS CSFCR-65) (U)

preparation to detonate or destroy enemy mines. This technique is presently being employed. The JTCG-ME further stated that developments of the FMU 57/B VT Fuze, giving the desired height of burst for LZ preparation, fuel-air explosives (FAE) and the helicopter trap weapon (HTW) are being expedited in a further effort for achieving the defeat of VC mines emplaced in LZs.

c. Reference item concerning avionics test equipment paragraph G1, page 19 and paragraph 2d, 3d Indorsement: Concur. This headquarters has requested that a maintenance team capable of repairing this test equipment be assigned to 34th General Support Group. Three AN/TSM-55 maintenance calibration facilities have been requested and one has been received to date. Receipt of the two additional facilities will further alleviate the current problem.

d. Reference item concerning centralized VNAF helicopter training facility, paragraph 2a, page 6 and paragraph c, page 22: Nonconcur. The current program involves UH-1D qualification of rotary wing qualified VNAF aviators. This program will eventually facilitate VNAF transition into the UH-1 helicopter when received and presently provides some relief in U.S. crew requirements during combat support operations. No major problems have been encountered.

e. Reference item concerning control of blood chit, Section II, Part I, paragraph D2: Concur. The solution to the problem of controlling blood chits is sound and there is no further action necessary at this or higher headquarters.

f. Reference item concerning transportation for personnel on special leave, paragraph E1, page 2 and paragraph 2a, 3d Indorsement: Procedures for programming for CONUS Special Leaves and submission of requests to other areas are contained in USARV Regulation 630-2. A message will be dispatched to Army Commanders specifying the above regulation and establishing a requirement for submission of requests 30 days prior to desired travel.

g. Reference item concerning command communications package, paragraph g2, page 20 and paragraph 2d(2), 3d Indorsement: Concur with 3d Indorsement. In addition, the AN/PRC-70 radio will provide an AM/SSB and FM capability in an extremely lightweight portable package.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

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E. E. KENNEDY
Cpt. AGC
Asst Adjutant General

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31
GPOP-DT(10 May 67)

5th Ind (U)

SUBJECT: Operational Report for the Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967
from HQ, 145th Cbt Avn Bn (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558

15 SEP 1967

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has reviewed subject report and concurs in the
report as indorsed. Pertinent comments are as follows:

a. In reference to paragraph 3, page 16, DA did not impose
a moratorium on submission of MTOE/TDA's reflecting emergency require-
ments in direct support of Southeast Asia. Processing of MTOE/MTDA's
reflecting personnel or equipment increases, if considered as emergency
requirements, would therefore not be affected by the moratorium. Like-
wise submission of MTOE/TDA's to reflect equipment authorized temporarily
by emergency request procedures should be processed.

b. Final DA approval of MTOE/TDA's submitted under the
Acceleration of NAADS Program is expected shortly at which time the
moratorium on all MTOE/TDA submissions will be lifted.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:



HEAVRIN SNYDER
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

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