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
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IN REPLY REFER TO

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OPERATIONAL REPORT LESSONS LEARNED

11TH ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENT



"LET'S GO"

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OPERATIONAL REPORT -
LESSONS LEARNED
11TH ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENT
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96257
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
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FOREWORD

This Operational Report - Lessons Learned is the first submitted by the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment since its arrival in the Republic of Vietnam.

It has been prepared in accordance with AR 1-19 and covers the period of 11 March 1966 thru 31 October 1966. Pertinent facts concerning the Regiment's alert, training, preparation, and deployment to the Republic of Vietnam are included in this report.



Wm W. COBB
Col, Armor
Commanding

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SECTION I

SIGNIFICANT ORGANIZATION ACTIVITIES

A. Preparation for and movement to the Republic of Vietnam.

1. (U) Introduction. On 11 March 1966, Department of the Army Message 754439 was received alerting this headquarters and its "package" units for deployment to Southeast Asia. Concurrently, Headquarters, Continental Army Command (CONARC) was directed to submit a Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTO&E) based on the guidance contained in this and other messages. CONARC in turn directed the regiment to prepare an MTO&E. Primary emphasis was placed on the planned utilization of a modified M-113 Armored Personnel Carrier in lieu of the main battle tanks found in the Armored Reconnaissance Platoons and Troop Headquarters.

Modifications to the M113 included the addition of two (2) M-60 machineguns with gunshields and hatch armor and gunshield around the Cal 50 machinegun located in the commanders hatch.

During the period prior to receiving notice of the impending move, elements of the regiment were training 988 Basic Combat Training (BCT) trainees in Advance Individual Training (AIT). This AIT started on 21 February 1966. Initial plans, based on information received from CONARC, called for training to start a week earlier but the late arrival of the last group necessitated a one week postponement.

In order to achieve maximum utilization of assigned cadre personnel, committees were organized in the 1st and 3d Squadrons to conduct MOS training while the recently activated 2d Squadron was responsible for cadre type subjects, such as physical training, drill and ceremonies, and troop information. Responsibility for specialist training was assigned to the regimental staff section with primary area of interest. This type of organization was necessary because of the lack of trained cadre personnel and the continual siphoning off of the limited available cadre for overseas levies. AIT training continued at Fort George G. Meade, Maryland, until the 1st Squadron departed on 28 March for Camp Pickett, Virginia. Accompanying the 1st Squadron were all the tankers, artillerymen and mortarmen of the regiment. On 13 April the regiment minus the 1st Squadron moved to Camp A.P. Hill, Virginia to conduct the last week of AIT and seven (7) weeks of Basic Unit Training (BUT). The 1st Squadron remained at Camp Pickett, Virginia while the tankers, artillerymen and mortarmen assigned to the other squadrons departed for Camp A.P. Hill. This arrangement was necessary because of the lack of maneuver space and training area required to conduct some AIT subjects and BUT training at Fort Meade.

Plans were finalized to conduct BUT training at squadron level with regiment providing initial guidance and staff supervision. Each squadron in turn planned, prepared and presented its unit training. The first several weeks of BUT were confined to squad, platoon and troop/company/battery level training. During the last week of BUT, squadron ATT's and FTX's were conducted. The last week at Camps Pickett and A.P. Hill were devoted to the preparation and movement of equipment and men back to Fort George G. Meade, starting with the 3d Squadron and ending on the 28th of June with the 1st Squadron. The staggering of the squadron's return dates enabled the maximum utilization of range facilities, post inspection teams, and maintenance facilities at Fort George G. Meade.

While the regiment was undergoing tactical training several significant events took place. On 7 April, a Department of the Army message was received establishing a final readiness date for the regiment and attached units. The personnel on Station Date (POSD) - 7 May; Equipment Readiness Date (ERD) - 1 August; Personnel Readiness Date (PRD) - 15 August. The Air Cavalry Troop was not included as one of the units deploying; however, for planning and requisitioning purposes readiness

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dates for the Air Cavalry Troop in the time frame of November - December were established.

In addition to readiness dates, plans and studies were made in conjunction with the Ford Machinery Corporation's (FMC) program to modify the M113 Armored Personnel Carrier based on a request by MACV. The final decision to modify the M113 was made late in March with the following plan being developed: One set of vehicles would be modified by FMC and join the regiment in Vietnam. Vehicles already assigned to the regiment would be used for training and would not accompany the unit. Twenty-four kits were provided by FMC to Fort Meade for installation on presently assigned M113's to be used while training at Camps A.P. Hill and Pickett as well as at Fort Meade. Additionally, a machine gun mount was designed for the M577A1 Command Post Vehicle. This special M577A1 armament was necessary since provision had not been made in the TO&E for any type of armament.

On 18 April COMARAC assigned the regiment and attached units their Unit Movement Indicator (UMI) code with one exception. The 522nd Armored Engineer Company at Fort Knox was deleted and replaced by a newly activated company. The change was necessitated by the 522nd mission to support the Armor School. Consequently, the 919th Armored Engineer Company was activated at Fort Hood, Texas.

During the later half of April it became apparent that the 7 May POSD would not be met since the regiment was still short over 1100 personnel. Enlisted fillers (AIT trained) arrived 3 to 14 days late. Their late arrival permitted some fillers only three weeks participation in company level training prior to the squadron ATT's.

With less than three months before the ERD of 1 August the final TO&E had not been approved. Meanwhile aircraft began to arrive and wheeled vehicles were being processed for exchange. Few problems were encountered except that considerable difficulty was experienced with organizational equipment and clothing. Many of the fillers on station at the beginning of May were not completely equipped and only minimal input of clothing was received for the latter part of May.

On 3 May the Regimental S-4 and Maintenance Officer attended a two day deployment conference at Mac Mill Air Force Base. Based on the results of this conference, the Regimental Commander requested permission for a staff visit to Headquarters Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) as soon as possible to facilitate the regiment's movement and efficient integration into the combat operations in Vietnam. In reply to the request for theater clearance, an information copy of a DA message requesting theater clearance from MACV for a three man party (XO, S2, S4) was received on 2 June.

Prior to regimental headquarters departure for A.P. Hill, Virginia on 11 May a Department of the Army Readiness Team visited the regiment and received a briefing by the staff. Assurance was given to the regiment that every effort would be made to preclude any further slippage of the POSD particularly in the case of the 33 senior enlisted men due on or before June. Authorization was also given to publish Advance Movement Directives for the regiment and its attached units minus the Air Cavalry Troop. Plans to move dependents had to be delayed until the directive was declassified.

The squadron ATT's began on 13 June with the 3d Squadron and ended with the 1st Squadron on 27 June. Instructions were received by regiment on 10 June that all tanks and M113's would be returned to Fort Meade upon completion of field training. Shortly thereafter, instructions were given to ship the tanks directly from Camps Pickett and A.P. Hill, to Annapolis Depot (M113's) and Fort Knox (M48A3's). The last minute switch presented an immediate problem but the units benefited by not having to prepare vehicles for turn-in in July when priorities for manpower were critical.

Information received from USAF directed that fifteen (15) 5 ton trucks and fifteen (15) $\frac{1}{2}$ ton trucks be shipped for use by the advance party once they arrived in-country. Another USARV message was received requesting an advance planning

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group he sent to arrive in-country prior to 10 July. One officer and one NCO were dispatched immediately with seven additional personnel consisting of the regimental S-3, Liaison Officer and Assistant S-4; 1st and 3rd Sqdn S2's, and 2d Sqdn S-3 Air; three sqdn supply NCO's and one NCO from 1st Troop arrived by air on 18 July.

On 23 July 1966, General Creighton W. Abrams Jr., Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, visited the Blackhorse Regiment and talked to the assembled troopers. In his brief but pointed speech he emphasized the importance of the noncommissioned officer in the type of war the regiment would very shortly be engaged in; he further stressed the need for independent action by the small unit leader. He emphasized the tremendous responsibility the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment had as the first major armor command employed in Vietnam. Prior to his departure he received a briefing by the Regimental Commander outlining the activities and accomplishments of the regiment since the first of the year.

On 16 August the regimental advance party consisting of 68 officers/warrant officers and 221 enlisted men along with the 919th Armored Engineer Company arrived in-country by air. Initial accommodations were prepared in the Long Binh staging area by the host unit, the 1st Infantry Division.

On 18 August the first of three increments of the main body started movement to Oakland, California, the port of embarkation, by chartered aircraft from Baltimore International Airport. From Oakland Air Terminal units were transported by bus to the Oakland Army Base for loading on the USNS Sultan, Upshur and Barrett. By 24 August all three increments had departed Oakland for Vietnam leaving in CONUS only the Air Cavalry Troop (which is due in-country in December) and the Rear Detachment, which joined the regiment late in October.

2. (U) Reorganization of the Regiment: The regiment went through two reorganization periods before it arrived in-country. In October 1965 it was reorganized under the "Echo" series of TO&E 17-51. Prior to that time it was operating under the "Delta" series. The reorganization caused the reactivation of the 2nd Squadron previously carried at zero assigned strength.

The second reorganization occurred in March with minor changes being made in the ensuing months. The major change was the deletion of the three main-battle tanks and M14 Command/Reconnaissance vehicles in the Armored Cavalry Platoons and the substitution of a modified M13 Armored Cavalry Assault Vehicle (ACAV). The modified TO&E increased the overall personnel strength of the regiment by 323 while the number of tracked vehicles remained relatively the same. The most significant change in the types and number of tracked vehicles was the reduction in tanks from 132 to 51 and the substitution of ACAV's for tanks and M14's. The substitution of the ACAV for the tank was made for the purpose of increasing cross country mobility and tactical employment in Vietnam. The regiment still retains all of Armor's inherent capabilities "Move Shoot and Communicate".

3. (U-FOUO) Personnel Actions. A complete picture of the personnel situation as it existed in the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment prior to deployment must begin with 1 October 1965. At that time the regiment was reorganized under the "Echo" series of TO&E 17-51.

The increased authorization for personnel occasioned by the TO&E change had no beneficial effect upon unit strength as witnessed by an overall increase of only 74 persons in the following 60 day period. At the same time the draw down of regimental strength continued as it had since mid summer 1965. Levies to overseas commands and particularly to the CONUS training base were not balanced by input. One aspect of the strength posture not apparent in raw figures was the rank and experience imbalance these losses created. NCOs and skilled specialists being reassigned were replaced by less experienced personnel (i.e. E5 and E6 replaced by E2 and E3 frequently in secondary or additional MOS's).

With a strength of less than 33%, any action taken to reconstitute the 2nd Squadron would have resulted in three non functional squadrons, due to the resultant increase in housekeeping requirements.

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As the probability of receipt of BCT or AIT trainees increased (Jan 1966), the regimental commander directed that extraordinary efforts (other than readiness reports and telephonic communications) be made to appraise higher headquarters of the regiment's personnel picture. A request for relief from overseas levies was forwarded to Department of the Army on 12 January 1966. Final action on the request resulted in authorization to employ FSA Code 9 to specific stabilization positions. It should be noted that the time lag between the initiation of the request and final action was in excess of two months (i.e. 12 January to 22 March) being completed only after receipt of the alert for overseas movement made the action redundant. Telephonic approval of the use of FSA 9 designation was obtained in a little over one month from the date of request (12 Jan - 18 Feb):

In an effort to stem the outflow of enlisted personnel and the attendant turbulence from rendering the regiment incapable of satisfactorily training fillers Headquarters, Fort Meade was kept fully apprised of the situation.

As mentioned earlier, the TO&E change did materially effect the regiment's overall authorized strength but the input of officers did not begin until December. Office of Personnel Operations, Department of the Army Armor Branch, in anticipation of deployment, began the officer fill with the assignment of approximately forty (40) 2d Lieutenants during the period December through February 1966. This action had a salutary effect upon the regiment's capacity to train fillers. These lieutenants helped fill the void created by the constant outflow of NOCs and specialists.

The first group input to the regiment occurred in isolation during the last five days of December 1965. Sixty-nine BCT graduates were assigned to the regiment for on the job training in MOS's 63C, 71B, 94B and 11D. These on the job training personnel, though desirable in terms of strength and recurring details, added little to the regiment's capacity to train fillers.

CONARC message 50834 dated 14 January 1966, indicated the assignment of 1000 BCT graduates to arrive in increments of 400 on 15 January, 300 on 5 February and 300 on 12 February. Nine hundred and eighty-eight actually arrived with the last increment arriving on 19 February 1966.

With the exception of trainees, personnel turnover continued throughout February and March until receipt of the alert notification, albeit on a reduced scale. The following extract from a 21 February 1966, communication First Army provides an encapsulated summary of the personnel situation and its effect upon operations within the regiment:

"The requirements to reorganize under TO&E 17-54.2 and concurrently to modernize the wheel and track vehicle fleets have imposed a logistical task of considerable magnitude. Of the vehicles on hand at the time of reorganization (October 1965), 224 wheel vehicles and 82 track vehicles were programmed for turn-in. In return, the regiment was to receive 277 wheel vehicles and 353 track vehicles.

These transactions required experienced maintenance personnel to insure proper processing of equipment for turn-in and the performance of required maintenance services upon receipt of equipment. Likewise, experienced supply personnel were needed to insure accountability of this equipment and components. Shortages of trained personnel impeded the flow of equipment into the regiment to the extent that projected fill dates were not met.

The increase in the ratio of tracked vehicles to wheel vehicles was not accompanied by an increased assignment of track vehicle mechanics. Instead, the regiment received an input of untrained personnel to be trained as wheel vehicle mechanics, the training of which placed an additional workload on the already understrength maintenance sections.

In addition to the problems associated with the receipt of equipment, the regiment was dangerously understrength in areas other than maintenance technicians.

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// For example, the Regiment was equipped with 15 radio teletypewriter sets. Each set required a three-man team composed of a Team Chief and two radio teletype-writer operators. Current strength in MOS 05C is 20 of the authorized 48. Six of these 20 known losses within the next 30 days. The regiment did not have the capability to train personnel to fill positions. The continued reduction of support personnel will render unit training currently scheduled for the fourth quarter of FY 1966 farcical.

DA Message 754439 dated 11 March alerted the regiment (less Air Cavalry Troop) and various package units for movement to Southeast Asia. The message was received by this headquarters on 12 March.

On 17 March a requisition for 1813 enlisted personnel was submitted to Headquarters, Fort George G. Meade. This requisition included the needs of the 541st MI Detachment and the Air Cavalry Troop. An additional 390 personnel to meet the needs of the regiment's proposed TO&E and 86 augmentation personnel were included in the 1813 figure. Concurrently with the enlisted requisition a request for officers branch clearance and requisition for 33 officers were submitted. The requisition for the 17th Public Information (PI) Detachment was submitted on 24 March due to delay in acquiring a TO&E for the PI Detachment.

DA TWX 755732 dated 18 March 1966, informed this headquarters of the need to deploy the Regimental Headquarter's Aviation Platoon (-) as well as the Air Cavalry Troop in December 1966 due to the Army wide shortage of pilots. This point as well as the manpower needs of the regiment per se were discussed on 25 March with Headquarters USCONARC during the visit to Fort Monroe by CO, S3, S4, and S1 this headquarters.

Results of the CONARC meeting were essentially as follows: The POSD of 18 April originally requested by the regiment would not be met; maximum substitution would be necessary due to the shortage of E5's and E6's throughout the Army, much of the fill would consist of AIT graduates becoming available in May 1966.

The first reaction to the personnel requisition came on 1 April with the assignment of 30 EM from Fort Meade resources. Concurrently with this and subsequent arrivals, non-deployable personnel in the regiment were reassigned to Post and 1st Army units. This was not a simple one for one exchange being largely governed by the arrival of qualified replacements for non-deployables in critical positions.

In April it became apparent that the regiment's requirements for 11D were in excess of available resources and CONARC DCSPER was so advised on 19 April. This shortage was a contributing factor in the establishment of a 7 May POSD which was announced in CONARC Message 570731 dated 19 April 1966. The result of this 11D shortage was to employ substitutions of unusual proportions (i.e. 11E, F, B, C for 11Ds and as high as a 3 grade substitution).

On 15 April 137 EM were assigned to the regiment from 1st Army resources. In this and subsequent fills shortages were reported telephonically to Headquarters 1st Army. Remedial action was for the most part expeditious with replacements being identified the same day.

Throughout the months of April, May and June, individual enlisted fillers arrived from CONUS and overseas stations. Bulk fills occurred on the following dates in numbers indicated:

1 May - 200
7 May - 400
17 - 21 May - 1100

In order to meet the above dates it was necessary for several hundred AIT graduates to have their AIT curtailed by one week. Considering the limited training time available to the regiment any further delay in the arrival of personnel fill would have been dangerous. Readiness reports, briefings and conversations in which the regiment participated during the months of April and May stressed the undesirable effect further delay would have.

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Several problems attendant upon the personnel were become apparent prior to the completion of the fill. First was the inclusion of the bulk of the combat MOS NCO's in the last fill element (17-21 May) thereby reducing to the minimum the time available to them to train and know their men.

The short time lapse between receipt of orders and reporting date created undue personal hardship for many fillers. For example, several NCO's received orders on 17 May with reporting dates 30 May. Several NCO's on reserve component duty received orders with insufficient time to clear civilian communities.

In terms of personnel affected, the failure of losing unit personnel sections to forward individual finance records caused the greatest problem. Approximately 400 records were not forwarded until inquiries were made by this headquarters. The resultant turmoil surrounding efforts to pay newly arrived personnel for May had a predictably adverse effect upon morale.

The problem of non-deployable personnel being assigned as fillers created some difficulties. On 9 June a call was received from 1st Army reference fillers who had returned from Korea less than 9 months prior to PRD. Approximately 130 enlisted men in this category were identified of which 60 volunteered to remain with the unit and deploy. A list of those Korean returnees who did not volunteer with notation as to those for whom replacements would be required was forwarded to 1st Army on 14 June. Between 20 June and 5 July Korean returnees falling within this category were transferred in consonance with 1st Army instructions. Pilot input peaked in June with the arrival of thirty (30) officers and warrant officers. In March the regiment had requisitioned sixty (60) pilots to fill the TO&E vacancies.

The TO&E did not affect pilot strength or grade structure. In mid April Office of Personnel Operations, Department of the Army informed the regiment that 67 pilots would be assigned with some 17 of these being warrant officers. This figure was allegedly arrived at by considering the MAOV requirement for dual pilots in UH1 troop carrier aircraft and the DA policy of 90% pilot strength for deploying units. Although no ill effect was suffered as a result, the 67 figure was erroneous. In early June ACS/POR DA was apprised of this and in-gum authorized the assignment of an additional four pilots for a total of 71.

When it became evident that there would be a sufficient number of pilots to provide for the regimental aviation section, the regimental commander requested that this element be deployed with the main body in August rather than in December with the Air Cavalry Troop. Permission finalized per telecon Maj Eand JONARD Maj Vought (SI) Bq 11th CAV 8 June 1966.

A last minute change in Department of the Army policy was received on 8 August concerning assignment deferments of personnel having a member of their immediate family already serving in Vietnam. Thirty-seven individuals fell in this category primarily in the lower enlisted ranks of the thirty-seven effected, all elected to exercise their option and remain in CONUS. Replacements for the personnel concerned were not received until the regiment arrived in-country. Consequently the regiment deployed to Vietnam slightly understrength.

4. (U) Intelligence.

a. Intelligence training.

(1) AIT subjects (completed 17 April 66) included map reading, scouting and patrolling, camouflage and concealment, and general intelligence subjects.

(2) POR subjects (completed 30 July 66) included Code of Conduct training, Vietnamese area orientation, Viet Cong tactics, anti-ambush training, and lessons learned - enemy weaknesses.

(3) Shipboard training subjects included reporting procedure, radio and visual security, handling POWs and captured weapons and documents, and terrain briefings.

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b. Liaison Visits - In late April and early May the Regimental S-2 visited DA, CONARC, NSA, and 1st Army G-2 to collect any information that would assist in preparing for the mission. In June, the S-2 was a member of a group that visited Vietnam. He arranged for the regiment to receive several publications which served as a source for regimental intelligence publications.

c. Administration.

(1) Maps: Regiment recommended to CONARC the distribution of maps within the regiment. CONARC decided on area coverage, based on what was known of the mission. Maps were issued on 20 July 66, and consisted of 15 tons of scale 1/250,000, 1/50,000, and 1/25,000. Some town plans were included, but were of towns outside the area of interest.

(2) Security clearances: The regiment had a continuous clearance program, so no particular emphasis was needed for the majority of personnel. All aliens had background investigations initiated or completed prior to departure. Special Intelligence clearances for the CO, XO, S2 and S3 were initiated in May.

(3) Intelligence Publications - The following publications were prepared to assist in planning and training:

(a) Analysis of Area of Operations, which discussed the terrain, weather, sociology, economics and politics of the provinces of III CTZ.

(b) Intelligence Digest, Vol 1 and 2, which discussed VC organization and techniques, VC bombs, mines, and booby traps, climatic conditions in III CTZ, and counter intelligence.

(c) INTSUMs number 1-5 (Actual) which discussed current VC activity in Vietnam, to include conclusions based on available information.

5. (U) Training: The regiment engaged in training from 21 February to 30 August.

a. AIT - During the period of 21 February 1966 to 17 April 1966, 988 AIT trainees were trained to be retained in the regiment upon completion of their 8 weeks of individual instruction. The instruction presented is outlined in inclosure 11 of this report. As mentioned in the chronological summary, centralized instruction (committees) was the technique employed, primarily because of the lack of qualified cadre personnel. Emphasis was placed on physical conditioning, patrolling, night movements, development of individual MOS skills and area orientation (Vietnam). In addition to the normal trainee classes, officers and non commissioned officers received instruction at night on the capabilities, limitations and organization of the various units comprising an Armored Cavalry Regiment.

b. BUT - On 25 April 1966, the regiment moved into 8 weeks of BUT instruction. As previously mentioned this training was conducted at Camp A.P. Hill, Virginia, and Camp Pickett, Virginia. Classroom instruction and tactical exercises were oriented toward counter-insurgency - civic action type operations in under-developed areas. In addition, ambush and counter-ambush techniques were emphasized and practiced. See Inclosure 11 of this report for outline of BUT program. Acting on the direction of the COMUSMACV Commanding General a crew proficiency course for the ACAV's was developed by the regiment (see inclosure 10 for a detailed description and explanation of the course). It was developed with the thought of putting into practice through live fire exercises some of the concepts and theories presented in the classroom and depicted on the terrain board.

c. Specialist Training - During the AIT phase of training, specialist training was conducted by the headquarters with each staff section supervising the training in his area of interest. Much of it was on the job training which proved not to be the best method because of the lack of qualified specialists to support such arrangement. Arrangements were made with the Armor and Ordnance Schools to give instruction to the regiment's maintenance personnel. A special familiarization course on the AV1A was also conducted at Fort Knox. Special teams from the Signal School at Fort Monmouth conducted classes at Fort Meade on the ground surveillance equipment (PPS-4 and TFS-33) organic to the regiment and

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the new family of radios. Post marksmanship personnel at Fort Meade further assisted by presenting familiarization classes on the M-16 rifle. Concurrently with the specialized training normal school allocations were being received and utilized to the fullest, to include allocations for the Jungle School in the Panama Canal Zone.

d. POM/POR - Upon completion of their ATT's the squadrons moved into the POM/POR phase of training. Priorities were established by this headquarters with emphasis on POR qualification subjects. Range and gas chamber facilities were obtained for qualification of last minute replacements. Besides the normal POR subjects the troops received a 23 hour program of instruction on Vietnam and subjects associated with that area of operations; however, the major portion of the time was devoted to administrative and equipment processing. Special classes were given on new equipment (AVLB, M32A1 Flame Thrower) as they became available and on items to be issued once in-country such as the Starlight Device.

e. Shipboard Training - General guidance was provided by this headquarters allowing subordinate commanders sufficient latitude to cover subject areas they felt needed further explanation and discussion. Physical conditioning, language, weapons and medical training; tactics to include patrolling, ambush and counter-ambush techniques, intelligence training i.e. reporting of intelligence information, radio and visual security, handling of POWs and captured enemy documents and weapons; terrain and area briefing on the initial area operations were some of the areas of interest covered while on board ship. On the job training and practical experience were received by the mess personnel and medics in the daily performance of the with their duties with their counterparts on board ship. Most of the instruction was geared to the platoon since adequate space to conduct large classes was at a premium.

6. (U) Logistics: The 11 March warning order to the regiment was the spark that initiated a series of logistical actions. Representatives of all commands subordinate to US Army Materiel Command (USAMC) visited the regiment to determine status of equipment and needs applicable to their commands. Supply and Maintenance stationed a four man team at Fort George G. Meade (FGGM) to monitor and expedite supply and to assist the regiment in preparing Prescribed Load Lists (PLL) for new equipment and revise existing PLL's for increased densities.

Internally, all units of the regiment reviewed all outstanding requisitions. Requisitions for items no longer required by the regiment were cancelled. Requisitions for items having favorable estimated delivery dates (EDD) were allowed to stand. However, requisitions for which no EDD or EDD after 15 April 1966 were cancelled and priority A-02 requisitions were substituted. This review of outstanding requisitions was made in conjunction with the Consolidated Property Officer, FGGM, and served as a reconciliation of all outstanding requisitions.

In the period 11-31 March, FGGM, Materiel Readiness Division inspected selected items of equipment to determine as early as possible the equipment that would require replacement at the end of the BUT training period. These early inspections permitted early requisition of tentage, M60 machine guns, and several chemical items.

Another initial action was to survey equipment on hand with a view towards standardization of makes and models. The most significant change required was the exchange of twenty-two (22) generators to obtain the preferred models.

At a meeting 31 March 1966 at Headquarters, US Army Materiel Command it was resolved that two complete sets of Armored Personnel Carrier (APC), M113, and Tank, Medium, M48A3, would be provided to permit concurrent installation of the new family radios and armament modifications requested by MACV in one set of vehicles while the regiment continued to train with the other set. It was also resolved that the sidemounted machine guns would be the M60 and not the Caliber 30 stated in MACV Message 07208, 6 March 1966.

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The substitution of M48A1 for the main battle tanks in the reconnaissance platoon reduced the regimental tank strength by eighty-one (81) and increased the APC authorization by fifty-four. At this time fifty-six (56) tanks were on hand in the regiment. The five excess tanks were turned in at FGM while the remaining tanks were laterally transferred within the regiment to provide the squadrons seventeen each.

In early March the 2nd Squadron began to receive wheeled vehicles from Post and lateral transfers from other units. In mid-March the squadron began to receive tracked vehicles.

Throughout the period 11 March to 1 July, the response from the supply system was slow. The regiment could not obtain Organizational Clothing and Equipment at a pace to equip trainees and filler personnel. This problem was not resolved until late July.

To assist subordinate units in supply and maintenance activities during this critical period, a series of logistical instruction letters were published by the Regimental S4. These letters materially assisted the units in requisitioning the special items of supply and equipment authorized for units deploying to Southeast Asia. In addition the letters kept the units informed of status of selected items, the application and use of new equipment, and disposition of excess equipment.

Vehicles received at Fort Meade for the regiment were processed through the Post Maintenance shop prior to issue. This provided a service to the regiment since the vehicles were shipped to the off post training areas upon receipt. The fill of vehicles proceeded slowly. The regimental commander agreed to accept two hundred and thirty-three (233) APC, M113, a short fall of fifty-four (54) for training, provided that twenty-four (24) modified APC's were provided for training. The latter were provided late in May, but the former quantity was not attained prior to the completion of the off post training in June. Fort Meade made every possible effort to alleviate this problem by working overtime and by providing priority transportation to move the issued vehicles to the training area. Over one hundred tracked vehicles were shipped to the squadrons after they closed the training areas.

Other critical shortages that hampered training in the 2d Squadron included six (6) howitzers, six (6) water trailers, and seven (7) tank and pump units required for distribution of POL. These items were received prior to completion of training.

On 12 May 1966, a representative from Department of the Army, Assistant Chief of Staff, Force Development (ACSFOD), delivered the approved MTO&E to regiment. The format of the MTO&E required a considerable number of man-hours to recapitulate. The densities of eighty-five (85) line items were changed and several additions and deletions were included. The principal additions included: Nine (9) Flame-thrower, M132A1; nine (9) Service Unit, Truck Mounted, M44A2; and nine (9) Saw, Chain. The principal increases were fifteen (15) APC M113 to bring the total authorization to 302; ninety (90) Machine Gun, M60; ninety (90) Launcher Grenade; and an increase in vehicular mounted radios.

The decreases included six (6) 5-ton trucks, eight (8) 1-ton trucks, and WARTOG items not desired for deployment.

The MTO&E had a terrific impact on the supply system and programmed post and depot tasks. It required changes to radio configurations in vehicles being depot processed and the vehicles to receive radio installations at Fort Meade. Supply expeditors were confused by the changes in quantities of many requisitions that had been personally expedited and prescribed load lists had to be recomputed based on the new densities. This computation resulted in a large number of repair parts requisitions not being filled prior to deployment.

Support for the respective units at Camps Blanton and A.P. Hill was provided largely by 1st Army elements at Fort Lee and Fort Meade utilizing supply point

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distribution. Only limited direct support maintenance was provided on site by 2d Ordnance Company since it was grossly understrength. However, back-up maintenance support was provided by Fort Meade Post Maintenance Facility. On numerous occasions personnel from Fort Meade were dispatched to repair vehicles or calibrate fire control equipment. Calibration of radar sets could not be accomplished locally. Consequently, on six different occasions radar sets had to be evacuated to Tobyhanna Army Depot by regiment.

The decision not to return the tanks and armored personnel carriers to Fort Meade caused a last minute change in plans. Transportation programmed to return the vehicles to Fort Meade was cancelled pending information as to destination of these vehicles. A delay of over a month was experienced before these vehicles were shipped and cleared from the unit property accounts. This delay was caused by a low priority for railcars, and lack of proper types and amounts of tie-down equipment. Furthermore, the regiment had to maintain security elements at both Camp Pickett and A.P. Hill. The needs and requirements of these isolated elements and the maintaining and loading of the vehicles on flat cars, detracted from PCM/POR requirements for the personnel involved.

A total of 250 large boxes had to be fabricated and then transported to the loading sites to pack basic issue line items (BILI). This packaging project delayed box-making to pack sensitive items at Fort Meade for deployment.

Upon return of units to Fort Meade, the post maintenance facility made a technical inspection of all vehicles in the regiment scheduled for deployment. Vehicles found in need of 3rd echelon maintenance were scheduled into the maintenance shops. Concurrently, vehicles requiring the installation of radios were also scheduled into shops.

In the latter part of June 1966, the regiment received two thousand one hundred and forty-eight (2,148) Rifle 5.56mm XM16E1, to replace Rifle 7.62mm, M14. This late change caused another Prescribed Load List (PLL) problem. Print-outs of the PLL were received from Lexington Army Depot which facilitated the requisitioning of PLL items; however, the items were not received prior to deployment.

Early in July each troop sized unit, detachment, and squadron appointed Unit Movement Officers and Non Commissioned Officers to receive training in movement regulations, packing and loading techniques, shipping documents, and utilization of COMEX containers. Instruction was presented by personnel from the Fort Meade Transportation Office. Upon completion of the training, unit movement personnel returned to their units to instruct unit personnel on the techniques learned. Unit movement personnel were responsible for the packing of equipment, preparation of shipping documents, and the inspection of unit loads.

Experience with the modified APC, M113, indicated that intercommunication between the vehicle commander and M50 machinegunners was a necessity. On 1 June a request was submitted through channels that each APC M113 being prepared at Red River and Tooele Army Depots be equipped with two additional control boxes to satisfy this requirement. In coordination with representatives of Electronics Command, the desired locations of the control boxes were determined. The request was approved and work commenced late in June.

A June request for saving Command Post Vehicle, M577A1, resulted in Department of the Army approval of one M50 Machine Gun. Since funds were not made available, the task of mounting the machine gun was accomplished from local resources utilizing the Fort Meade Post Maintenance Facility. The mounts were fabricated in the machine shop and so constructed to permit two position mounting on the vehicle.

Department of the Army approved the requirement for eighteen (18) M113 launched bridges and twenty seven (27) Chpstan Kits. The basis of issue was two bridges per reconnaissance troop and one Chpstan Kit per reconnaissance platoon. Components for these items were requisitioned in June. Two squadrons received a partial fill on the components of the bridges, but there was no response to the other requisitions.

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Early in July the equipment for the advance party was port called to Baltimore, Maryland, for loading aboard the SS Branton Lykes. On 5 July 1966, the equipment to include thirty (30) trucks, two (2) helicopters, and approximately 400 short tons of cargo closed at the port. Although this shipment was only a token amount of the total equipment to be shipped it provided excellent experience for the task that lay ahead.

A great deal of coordination with Post, 1st Army Headquarters, Food Machinery Corporation and the depots processing equipment was required during the month of July. While telephone communications was the principal method used for coordination, staff visits were made to Letterkenny, Red River and Tooele Army Depots. Staff visits were also made to 37th Medical Company at Fort Knox, Kentucky and to 919th Armored Engineer Company, Fort Hood, Texas. These visits were valuable for coordination, however, time did not permit detailed inspections of units or equipment.

By mid-July maintenance and equipment processing were proceeding at a good rate. However, supply shortages including basic load of ammunition kept the regiment at REDCON 4. USAMC sent a project officer from the Office of Directorate of Supply to the regiment to assist and expedite supply items. With several exceptions, supply of major items improved. This project officer was able to get releases on watches, machine guns, fire direction sets and radiometers. He was also instrumental in getting the Flamethrower, M132A1, modified and released; he obtained task assignments to depots to prepare bridge and capstan packets rather than fill individual requisitions. Although the bridges and capstans were not shipped concurrently with the regiment, action was initiated to provide for the earliest possible arrival in-country.

Last minute problem cropped up as the equipment readiness date approached. Requisitions for packing material were not filled until local purchase procedures were utilized. The large quantities of material required by the regiment could not be obtained from a single source causing a shortage of pallets, conex inserts, components and 1 1/2" banding material.

In the maintenance area, repair parts shortages for Mortar, M107, and Howitzers S.P. M108, were the most serious problems areas. Messages were sent to all stations requesting specific repair parts be shipped to the regiment via priority transportation. The response resulted in a duplication of many parts with negative results on others. The mortars were rated as Green (Go) on readiness date, but four howitzers could not be put in a ready condition. Headquarters, 1st Army directed Fort Knox to ship four howitzers to Mobile, Alabama for trans-shipment (no DASA) to the regiment.

Basic loads for regimental units were approved in mid-July by United States Continental Army Command (USCONARC). This late date was caused by changes in weapon density in late June with receipt of the Rifle XM16E1. Requisitions for small arms ammunition were telephoned directly to the depots resulting in an immediate response by the support centers. Over 300 tons were moved overland by truck to Fort Meade, separated into unit lots and prepared for overseas shipment prior to the RED.

During the PCN period the regiment received Truck 1/2 ton, M51A1, to replace the remaining M58A1's; Truck cargo 5-ton, M54A2 to replace the M54's; and Truck Wrecker, M54JA2 to replace the M52. The M58A1's were turned in at three locations - Fort Lee, Camp A.P. Hill and Fort Meade - in response to the urgent request of the Deputy Chief of Staff Logistics (DCSLOG), 1st Army. Fort Meade permitted the regiment to retain the old 5 ton vehicles for essential supply thereby allowing the new vehicles to be prepared and loaded for deployment. Excess vehicles caused by the receipt of the replacement vehicles were turned in between RED and PED.

At RED the principal shortage of equipment included: mine (9) launcher, Bridge, M-60 series, mine (9) Tank and Pump Units, plus the vehicles, radio, bridge kits and capstan kits being processed for the regiment at depots.

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In order to clear installation property accounts and buildings a fifty-four man rear detachment was organized. The size of the group was in consonance with the number of supply accounts, amount of property, and the real estate for a unit of this type and size.

The Department of the Army Inspector General conducted a special inspection of the regiment and attached units during the period 1-4 August 1966, at Fort George G. Meade, Maryland to determine deployment readiness. The inspectors found all units READY or READY PROVIDED (provided that equipment being processed at depots for direct shipment was received in-country).

All vehicles and other equipment not scheduled to accompany the troops located at Fort George G. Meade were port called to arrive Baltimore (Dundalk), Maryland no earlier than 2 August and not later than 4 August 1966. One hundred and sixteen (116) tracked vehicles were moved by rail and three hundred fifty-three (353) wheeled vehicles were moved over highways to meet port call dates. An additional 450 short tons of miscellaneous cargo was transported to the port by the local transportation officer. Concurrently, forty-three (43) Tank, Combat Medium Gun, M48A3 were port called from Letterkenny Army Depot for the regiment. All equipment was administratively loaded on three ships during the period 3-6 August 1966: American Robin, Sea Train New Jersey, and US Pilot. Ten (10) Tank, Combat, Medium M48A3, and four (4) Howitzer, S.P., M108 were port called from Fort Knox, Kentucky, to Mobile, Alabama, where these vehicles were loaded aboard the Douglas Victory.

One hundred fifty-nine (159) Carrier, Personnel, M113, were port called from Red River Army Depot to Beaumont, Texas, and out-loaded on three ships: Muhlberg Victory, Del Alba, and Amadarko Victory. One hundred seventy (170), Carrier, Personnel, M113, were port called from Tooele Army Depot to Long Beach, California, and were outloaded aboard two ships: North Hills and the Muhlberg Victory. Nineteen (19) WABCO packets were port called from Sierra Army Depot to Long Beach, California, and outloaded aboard the Cornell Victory. Included in the packets were 1400 short tons of prefabricated tent kits, barrier material, and kitchen equipment.

Meanwhile the advance party from Fort Meade moved by air to Vietnam in three increments during the period 9-14 August and closed in Vietnam on 16 August. The advance party included 289 officers and men and approximately 48 tons of equipment. Concurrently, the 919th Armored Engineer Company was moved by air from Fort Hood, Texas, to join the advance party in Vietnam.

Red Circle TAT equipment was port called to arrive Oakland Army Terminal during the period of 15-17 August. Approximately 600 short tons of Red Circle TAT was rail loaded at Fort George G. Meade, 5-7 August 1966. The Red Circle TAT was in turn transloaded to the three troop ships at Oakland Army Terminal. All personnel departed Fort Meade via Friendship International Airport with the exception of the 37th Medical Company and the 33rd Chemical Detachment.

The 37th Medical Company flew from Fort Knox, Kentucky while the 33rd Chemical Detachment departed Fort Carson, Colorado by air arriving in Oakland on 15 and 19 August.

7. (U) Organization for Movement

a. General. The regiment deployed in five echelons: planning group, advance party, and four surface increments.

In June the Regimental Executive Officer, visited Vietnam with a liaison party consisting of the Regimental S2 and S4 to discuss the reception and location of the regiment and problems areas likely to be encountered. In July a planning group was organized for the reception and deployment of the advance party and main body of the regiment. One major aspect of the planning group's mission was to establish lines of communications with higher and adjacent headquarters; develop a working arrangement with the host unit, the 1st Infantry Division.

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The advance party deployed by air to Vietnam between 9 and 16 August and consisted of 289 officers and enlisted men and the 919th Engineer Company. This group was charged with the responsibility of preparing and organizing the staging area for occupancy by the main body in September. Plans were also finalized for all phases of combat service support for the regiment.

The main body of the Blackhorse Regiment moved from Fort George G. Meade, Maryland to Oakland, California by air from Baltimore (Friendship International Airport). All personnel embarked at Oakland, California except a few members of the primary staff who went by air. An average of 28 days was spent in movement during the reporting period.

The Regimental Commander and the Regimental Sergeant Major flew to Oakland, remained at Oakland until the three ships departed and then flew to Vietnam arriving about three weeks before the main body began to arrive.

The following organization was used for the move to port and subsequent movement to Vietnam:

b. Troop movement.

First Increment - USNA SULTAN

1st Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry
HHT 11th, Armored Cavalry
37th Medical Company
541st MI Detachment
409th BR Detachment
33rd Chemical Detachment
17th PI Detachment

Second Increment - USNS UPSHUR

2nd Squadron 11th Armored Cavalry
26th Military History Detachment

Third Increment - USNS BARRETT

3rd Squadron 11th Armored Cavalry

Fourth Increment - USNS KLITINGE

Rear Detachment

During the movement each of the units contributed members to the voyage staffs. These included troop commanders, executive officers and compartment commanders. From the NCO and enlisted ranks came personnel to carry on daily shipboard duties.

The rear detachment of 54 officers and enlisted men departed Fort George G. Meade by air and embarked on the USNS Klitinge at Oakland, California arriving in-country on 23 October and closing in the regimental staging area the next day.

c. Ship Schedule Cargo movement:

VESSEL	PORT OF EMBARKATION/ DISEMBARKATION	INCREMENT	ESTIMATED DATE OF DEPARTURE	DATE OF ARRIVAL	DATE UNLOADING COMPLETED
Sultan	Oakland/Vung Tau	I	19Aug66	68Sep66	78Sep66
Upshur	Oakland/Vung Tau	II	30Aug66	78Sep66	88Sep66
Barrett	Oakland/Vung Tau	III	23Aug66	118Sep66	128Sep66
Klitinge	Oakland/Vung Tau	IV	23Sep66	23Oct66	24Oct66
American Robin	Baltimore/Saigon		7Aug66	168Sep66	198Sep66

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VESSEL	PORT OF EMBARKATION/ DISBARKATION	ARRIVAL	DATE OF ARRIVAL	DATE UNLOADING COMPLETED
Seatrain New Jersey	Baltimore/Saigon	9Aug66	23Sep66	26Sep66
U.S. Pilot	Baltimore/Saigon	11Aug66	21Sep66	22Sep66
Douglas Victory	Mobile-Beaumont/Saigon	7Aug66	26Sep66	28Sep66
North Hills	Long Beach/Saigon	18Sep66	9Oct66	11Oct66
Cornell Victory	Oakland/Saigon	23Aug66	28Sep66	2Oct66
Del Alba	Beaumont/Saigon	20Aug66	29Sep66	30Sep66
Mihlenberg Victory	Long Beach/Saigon	15Aug66	28Sep66	29Sep66
Trans York	Norfolk/Saigon	11Aug66	27Oct66	31Oct66
Brinton Lykes	Baltimore/Beaumont/Saigon	8Jul66	18Aug66	20Aug66
Anadarko Victory	Beaumont/Saigon	24Sep66	23Oct66	

d. Aircraft Movement:

VESSEL	PORT OF EMBARKATION/ DISBARKATION	NO. AND TYPE OF AIRCRAFT	ESTIMATED DATE OF DEPARTURE	DATE OF ARRIVAL	DATE UNLOADING COMPLETED
Brittin	Oakland/Vung Tau	8-CH23C 8-UH1E 8 UH1D	12Aug66	5Sep66	6Sep66

6. (U) Major Problems Encountered During Deployment.

a. Operations and training.

(1) The late arrival (20 May) of many key NCO's and specialists i.e. tank commanders, gunners, squad leaders, section chiefs (artillery), detracted from the effectiveness of training. This was particularly true in the case of platoon training since the platoon AIT's were conducted from 16-24 May.

(2) A modification in the TO&E in the fifth week of AIT resulted in the transfer of tank crewmen to artillery NCO's since the regiment was short artillerymen and the number of tanks in the regiment had been reduced by 81.

(3) There was definite lack of planning and training guidance. The major guidance received was a message dated 18 January reference the arrival of 1,000 trainees from Ft. Hood for AIT instruction on a train and retain basis.

(4) A scarcity of reference material on armor operations in counterinsurgency and counter guerrilla operations particularly oriented to Vietnam existed. Information contained in reports on lessons learned, intelligence reports from Vietnam, a handbook for US Forces in Vietnam dated Dec 65, and letters received from Armor Officers in Vietnam proved invaluable.

(5) Training areas and facilities were somewhat restricted at Camp Pickett and A.P. Hill during a portion of the training period to provide for National Guard units undergoing their annual summer field training.

(6) Specialist personnel i.e. track and turret mechanics, cooks, and radio repairmen were assigned to the regiment without previous MOS training. Consequently, they were either trained by the regiment or were sent to one of the Service Schools for training.

b. Personnel.

(1) A change in criteria for deployment of Korea returnees was received by the regiment in June. It informed the regiment that no one could be deployed with less than 9 months from the date of discharge. Fortunately for the units of the 130 individuals falling in that category, 60 of them volunteered to ship with the regiment. This situation could have resulted in an extremely

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critical situation since many of the returnees were NCO's and experienced specialists already in short supply. In addition the squadrons were short to start their APT's.

(2) A continual problem was the lack of experienced specialists and NCO's. AIT graduates were substituted for E5's and E6's as they became available with the bulk arriving in May.

(3) A definite morale problem developed in the regiment when approximately 400 individual finance records were not forwarded by losing units until contacted by this headquarters.

(4) Another problem was the short notice given individuals of their assignment to the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment.

(5) The decision by Department of the Army to grant personnel with members of their immediate family already in Vietnam the option of deferring their deployment until such time as their relative returned created a last minute problem. Replacement personnel could not be obtained since the first increment of the main-body was departing Fort Meade on 18 August.

c. Logistics. The area of logistics prior to deployment was best described as one never ending problem. It ranged from shortages of organizational equipment to Class V Basic loads. The regiment eventually departed CMUS in excellent shape supply wise but it was a struggle up to the very last minute.

Late approval of the MTO&S and a last minute switch from M14's to M16 rifles resulted in delays in computing and requisitioning of the regiment's Basic load of Class V. This involved 300 tons of ammunition which had to be sorted and packed to accompany the troops (Red Circle TAT) on board ship.

B. In-Country Organization and Unit Activities.

1. (U) General. The Regimental Advance Party and the 919th Armored Engineer Company arrived by air starting on 11 August. Equipment for the advance party started to arrive on the 18th. Preparation of the staging area for occupancy by the main body in less than a month began immediately. Arrangements were made for tentage, kitchen equipment, cots and myriad items required to organize a staging area. Roads, latrines, mess tables and showers were constructed in addition to physical preparation of the ground. Valuable assistance was given by the 169th Engineer Battalion and the regiment's sponsoring unit, 1st Infantry Division. However, the major share of the work fell on the 209 officers and enlisted men in the advance party and the 919th Engineer Company. The first of three increments of the main body arrived at Trang Tan on 7 September with the last one closing into the staging area on the 11th. Initially, priority was given to improving mess and living areas, perimeter security, and construction firing positions prior to the arrival of the heavy equipment. One week after the first increment landed equipment started to arrive at Saigon Port. By 9 October 95% of the heavy equipment had been received and processed. The regiment received its initial operational commitment on 27 September furnishing convoy security from Long Binh to Nam Loc. On 4 October the 2nd Squadron conducted a route reconnaissance of Route 15 from Bien Hoa to Ba Gia and participated with the 1st Squadron in Operation Uniontown. During period 10-17 October the 1st Squadron under the operational control of the 173d Airborne Brigade participated in Operation Robin. Operation Hickory involving the 3d Squadron and elements of the 919th Engineer Company started on 7 October and terminated on 14 October. During this operation the 3d Squadron became the first unit in the regiment to make physical contact with the enemy and inflict positive casualties on him.

General Abrams, accompanied by Lieutenant General Secord, Commanding General II F FCB's V, made his second visit to the Blackhorse Regiment on 18 October. During his visit he received a briefing by the Regimental Commander covering the regiment's activities since his last visit in July at Fort Meade. Also covered were the mission and future operations of the regiment. Earlier that morning the

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1st Squadron initiated Operation Atlanta with the mission of securing the area in and around the permanent base camp site located to the north of Binh Loo (YS438966) on Inter-Provincial Route 2.

The Squadron, as part of Operation Atlanta, dispatched its advance party to secure and organize a combat base at Ong Que (YS3999) on 22 August. The following day the remaining squadron elements moved to the base camp. In conjunction with the 1st Squadron, search and destroy operations were conducted in the base camp area. Activities were confined to sniper fire, antitank mines, and harassment by local force units. Meanwhile site improvement continued by engineer work parties from the 27th Engineer Battalion; the 919th Armored Engineer Company continued to provide combat engineer support for the 1st and 2d Squadrons. During the reporting period the regiment was engaged in 35 days of tactical operations.

2. (U) Training and Organization.

a. Organization. The regiment and its attachments moved into a staging area NE of Bien Hoa in the Long Binh Sub Area YT062122. Approximately a month later the 551st Light Maintenance Company moved into the area bringing the troop population in excess of 4000.

b. Training. Once equipment started to arrive from the port precombat training commenced. Priority of work was devoted to achieving combat readiness in minimum time. Readiness checks were made on all individual and crew served weapons; operational maintenance was performed; communications nets were established and maintained. Range facilities were utilized at the ARVN Infantry School (Thu Duc) and the ARVN Armor School (Ho Nai) to test fire and zero weapons. Locally, ranges were constructed to test and familiarize personnel on the M-132 Flame Thrower. Orientation visits by commanders at all echelons and key staff personnel were made to armor and mechanized units in the 1st and 25th Infantry Divisions. Points of interest were techniques and methods successfully employed, organization for combat, and lessons learned. Aviators from the regiment conducted joint operations with division and separate aviation units thus gaining invaluable combat experience. Personnel from the squadrons also participated in patrols, ambushes, and search and clear operations with their counterparts in these units. Specialist personnel reviewed their technical procedures and received on the job training in the daily execution of their assigned tasks.

c. Problem areas: (1) As presently organized the M132A1 Flame Thrower sections organic to the squadrons of the regiment are equipped with three (3) M132A1 Flame Throwers and three (3) Service units mounted on 2½ ton trucks. Due to the cross-country limitations inherent in wheeled vehicles, it is frequently impossible for the service units to move to a location to satisfactorily support the tactical situations. Provisions for the substitution of tracked vehicles in place of the 2½ ton trucks are being made in the revised MTOEE.

3. (C) Intelligence.

a. VC Activity.

(1) Initial VC activity was confined to sniping at patrols, convoys, aircraft and the staging area perimeter. No serious attempts were made to interfere with regimental missions. Indications were that the VC often tried to draw fire into friendly villages.

(2) On other operational missions VC contact was with local guerrilla units of platoon size or smaller only. This was indicated by an absence of significant mortar fire and no recoilless rifle or anti-tank rocket fire.

(3) VC units in the regimental area of interest:

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Main Force

UNIT	STRENGTH	LOCATION	DATE	EVAL	CAT
5th VC Div HQ	100	YS 7580	23Oct	B-2	(D)
274th Regt	1850	YS 335825	21Oct	A-2	(C)
275th Regt	1600	YS 6680	29Oct	A-2	(C)
239 Arty Bn	500	YS 6781	22Aug	C-3	(C)
4th AA Bn	300	YS 6085	15Oct	C-3	(C)
225 Engr Bn	300	YS 020730	14Oct	B-3	(C)
Local Force					
Separate Bn					
DONG HAI Bn	450	YT 045273	23Oct	B-2	(C)
860 BN (AKA D445)	300	YS 577700	8Oct	C-3	(C)
602 Bn	400	ZT 108014	27Sep	B-2	(C)
320/FB.6	300	YT 447125	6Oct	C-3	(FO)
0303 Bn	unk	XT 999295	23Oct	B-2	(unk)

Separate Co

493/490 Co	110	Unlocated in BINH TUY Province			(C)
460 HAM TAN Co	50	Unlocated in BINH TUY Province			(C)
025 LONG DAS Co	60	Unlocated in PHUOC TUY Province			(C)
0303 Co	100	XT 930223	27Oct	F-3	(C)
0240 Co	100	YS 260933	23Oct	C-2	(C)

Separate Plat

012 VUNG TAU Plt	30	Unlocated in PHUOC TUY			(C)
023 TUYEN MOC Plt	50	Unlocated in PHUOC TUY			(C)
026 CHAU THANH Plt	30	Unlocated in PHUOC TUY			(C)
0407 CAU SU Plt	30	Unlocated in PHUOC TUY			(C)
0500 DONG HAI Plt	35	Unlocated in BIEN HOA			(C)
0502 TAN UYEN Plt	35	Unlocated in BIEN HOA			(C)
CHAU THANH Plt	30	Unlocated in BIEN HOA			(C)
033 THI XA Plt	30	Unlocated in BIEN HOA			(C)
0195 NHON TRACH Plt	40	Unlocated in BIEN HOA			(C)
0270 VINH GIU Plt	30	Unlocated in BIEN HOA			(C)
0500 DONG HAI Plt	35	Unlocated in BIEN HOA			(C)
0502 TAN UYEN Plt	35	Unlocated in BIEN HOA			(C)
CHAU THANH Plt	30	Unlocated in BIEN HOA			(C)
033 THI XA Plt	30	Unlocated in BIEN HOA			(C)
0195 NHON TRACH Plt	40	Unlocated in BIEN HOA			(C)
0270 VINH GIU Plt	30	Unlocated in BIEN HOA			(C)
0280 LONG THANH Plt	40	Unlocated in BIEN HOA			(C)
QAN GIO Plt	30	Unlocated in BIEN HOA			(C)
H.1 XUAN LOO Plt	30	YT 5027	27Oct	C-3	(C)
H.2 BINH QUAN Plt	30	Unlocated in LONG KHANH			(C)
H.3. CO MY Plt	20	Unlocated in LONG KHANH			(C)
H.4. Plt	50	YT 402045	4Oct	F-3	(C)
420 HOAI DUC Plt	25	Unlocated in BINH TUY			(C)
432 TAMH LINH Plt	25	Unlocated in BINH TUY			(C)

b. Establishing Information Sources.

(1) Contact was made with the following primary sources: II FFV, 1st ATF, 173rd Bde, 2nd Bde 1st Inf (later 3rd Bde 4th Inf), 10th ARVN Div, LONG KHANH Sector Advisor, PHUOC TUY Sector Advisor, and the LONG KHANH Police Advisor.

(2) Background material was obtained from II FFORCEV, combined Document Exploitation Center, USARV G-2 and MACV J-2.

c. Administration.

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(1) Maps. The updated 1/50,000 series L7104 was issued on 1 October to replace the initial issue of 1/50,000 maps.

(2) Aerial Photos. Basic coverage of areas of operations and planned operations was requested. As of 31 October, coverage was 85% complete.

(3) Security clearances. Clearances of all personnel accompanying the regiment were valid for Vietnam. Only replacement security clearances had to be revalidated.

4. (U) Combat Operations.

a. September. Initial combat operations were confined to patrolling and preparation of ambushes around the perimeter of the staging area. In the latter part of the month 1st Squadron provided convoy escort for engineer elements moving to Xuan Loc. Negative contact was made except for occasional sniping incidents. Meanwhile the 3rd Squadron participated in joint patrol operations with 4/503 Inf in the Uniontown TAOR.

There were no air sorties conducted during the month. Army Aviation participated in 121 combat sorties and 557 combat support sorties.

b. October. Elements of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment participated in five operations and several minor operations. Operations Hickory and Uniontown resulted in enemy contact. Operation Uniontown was a security operation in the Bien Hoa area during the period of 1 Oct thru 19 Oct 66. Initially the 1st Squadron received the Uniontown mission later to be relieved by the 2nd Squadron on 6 Oct 66. No significant action took place during the operation.

Operation Hickory was the first major operation for the regiment that achieved any significant results. Initiated by the 3rd Squadron (+) to conduct an area reconnaissance in the vicinity of PHU HOI YSO888 and provide security for the 517th Engr Det in conjunction with local RF and PF units. During the operation numerous tunnels and emplacements were discovered and destroyed. On 11 Oct two hundred fifteen (215) tons of rice were discovered and evacuated to government warehouses with local popular forces and regional force units assisting in the security and movement of the rice caches. Casualties from enemy action were light with the majority resulting from sniper fire. One patrol action accounted for the single most number of casualties when it was hit by an estimated VC squad YSO99893 at close range with hand grenades. Results: 1 US KIA, 10 US MIA, 1 ARVN KIA, 7 VC KIA (BC).

The 1st Squadron, Troop L of the 3rd Squadron and the 919th Engineer Company initiated Operation Atlanta on 20 Oct to secure the site of the permanent base camp for engineer work parties. Three days later the advance party and Troop L from the 2nd Squadron moved out to organize and secure a combat base in the vicinity of the Ong Que Rubber Plantation. The following day the remainder of the squadron moved to the combat base area.

The 3rd Squadron providing local security of the staging area and a STRATCOM Site. Troop L returned to 3rd Squadron control on 23 October.

The rear detachment of 54 officers and enlisted men closed in the regimental staging on 24 October leaving only the Air Cavalry Troop in COMUS.

5. (C) Psychological Operations and Civic Action.

a. Psychological Operations: Psychological operations have been confined to leaflet drops and loudspeaker operations. During the reporting period over 500,000 leaflets were dropped on friendly villages and possible VC locations in and around the Xuan Loc area. Several "No Dos" flights were planned but had to be cancelled either because of bad weather or mechanical troubles with the aircraft. See inclosure 4 for samples of leaflets dropped during the quarter. Significant results were achieved from the drops made

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during the regiment's initial move into the Xuan Loc area. While they were being made one of the regiment's helicopters with a portable loudspeaker mounted on it circled overhead telling the people about the Blackhorse Regiment. Reports later received from intelligence sources indicated the people were highly receptive and extremely pleased with the regiment's intended arrival and its future plans.

b. Civic Actions: Civic action activities during the quarter were characterized by projects involving troop labor assistance. In September the regiment moved 17 tons of corn in support of a hog breeding program in Long Khanh Province under the sponsorship of USAID. Perhaps the most noteworthy event was the securing and movement of over 200 tons of rice from Ben Sang Village (YSL22897) to government controlled warehouses. The rice was discovered during Operation Hickory while 3rd Squadron was operating in the NHON TRACH District. Local VC units prevented the movement of the rice to market resulting in a readily accessible supply point for their forces. Individuals found selling the rice were taxed 50,000 \$VN per family. Since most of the people were unable to pay the tax they had to keep the rice in their homes. Some of the homes had as much as 10 tons of rice in them.

Trucks from the regiment and sampans were utilized to move the rice. Regional Force and Local Force personnel were not used to move the rice since it is a favorite propaganda technique of the VC to tell the people that the soldiers are stealing their rice. To counteract this tactic local people were utilized to bag and move the rice to the warehouses, as well as having the owner accompany his rice and receive credit for it.

Rural construction work involved repairs to local areas damaged during combat operations i.e., bridge and culvert repairs, road construction, and water supply reconstruction.

6. (U) Aviation.

a. General: The Regimental Aviation Platoon and the Squadron Aviation Platoon moved from Fort Meade, Maryland to Long Binh, RVN during the period 9 July 1966 to 8 September 1966, with the Air Cavalry Troop remaining at Fort Meade for further training.

b. Movement of Aircraft and Personnel:

(1) Aircraft: Two UH-1D helicopters were shipped on 9 July 1966, for use by the regimental advance party on its arrival in Vietnam. They were off loaded at Saigon on 16 August 1966. The remaining eight OH-230, eight UH-1B, and four UH-1D helicopters shipped on 23 July 1966, and arrived at Vung Tau on 7 September 1966.

(2) Personnel: Twenty-two aviators departed Fort Meade with the regimental advance party 9-14 August for the purpose of receiving in-country combat training with operational units and establishing maintenance support procedures.

c. Operations: The two UH-1D helicopters shipped for the advance party were utilized for command liaison, reconnaissance, and selection of a base camp area. The remaining helicopters began support of the regiment on 9 September 1966. During the period 16 August to 31 October 1966, the above aircraft flew a total of 2,055 sorties, 1,800 combat flying hours, carrying 2,286 passengers, and 35 tons of supply. The unit lost no aircraft to enemy action, although four aircraft received hits and one aircraft sustained combat incident damage during low level evasive maneuvers to avoid being hit while receiving enemy ground fire.

d. Problem areas:

(1) The TO&E does not provide for helicopter gunners in the aviation section located in regiment and the three squadrons. Experience has

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indicated that the gunners are necessary to temporarily solve the problem overage personnel are being utilized while an MTO&E is being prepared for submission to higher headquarters.

(2) Provisions were not made for the regiment to receive on-site support. Instead, aircraft would be sent to higher echelon maintenance facilities. Experience has indicated a need for the attachment of a maintenance Detachment (TO&E 55-500R w/c9) and an Avionics Detachment (TO&E 11-500D w/c7). A letter was submitted on 10 October through command channels to secure these supporting units.

7. (U) Logistics:

a. Arrival of Main Body Personnel. Personnel and Yellow Dist TAT from the three ships disembarked on 7, 9 and 12 September at Vung Tau, Vietnam and were flown in US Air Force C-130 aircraft to Bien Hoa. Personnel were then off-loaded on to waiting buses, provided by the 48th Transportation Group, for movement to the Long Binh staging area.

b. Arrival of Equipment.

(1) The advance party's equipment consisting of thirty (30) trucks, two (2) helicopters and 300 short tons of equipment arrived in Saigon 18 August 1966, aboard the SS Brinton Lykes which had sailed from Baltimore, Maryland, on 7 July 1966. The heavy equipment proved invaluable to the advance party in the preparation of the staging area performing reconnaissance and liaison, and transporting supplies.

(2) The remaining eight (8) cargo ships arrived at Saigon Port between 16 September and 9 October. These arrivals represented about two weeks slippage from the original estimated time of arrival. The total shipping brought the unit equipment which included, in terms of hardware, four hundred and ninety-nine (499) wheeled vehicles, four hundred and eighty-three (483) combat full tracked vehicles, and twenty-two (22) helicopters.

(3) Of the four hundred and eighty-three tracked vehicles, three hundred and fifty-four were received direct from COMUS depots, as well as thirty-six (36) float vehicles. Of the vehicles authorized by TO&E forty-eight (48) Tank, M48A3, and four (4) Howitzer, SP, M108, were received short many basic issue line items (BILL). Of these shortages the most critical was the missing fire control items. By the end of this reporting period, these shortages had been greatly alleviated through normal and Red Ball requisition channels.

(4) Although each cargo ship had been administratively loaded to make the most efficient use of available space, the off loading of vehicles at Saigon Port was complicated by the requirement to clear the port area rapidly and continuously. Clearing of the port was further complicated by equipment of several units being off loaded into the same dock area. In some instances, unloading was hampered by the lack of suitable integral or crane lift facilities.

(5) Since all vehicles shipped from depots were shipped under one Unit Identification Code, it was necessary to assign the 352 vehicles to the appropriate unit at the dock and to obtain crews to prepare the vehicles for movement to the staging area.

c. In-Country Logistical Operations.

(1) The regiment was supported by the 29th General Support Group, 34th Transportation General Support Group, and 44th Medical Brigade at Long Binh for OPERATIONS HEDON/LARK, ROBIN, HICKORY and UNIONWOMAN.

(2) On 31 October 1966, 1st Logistical Command opened a Forward Support Area at the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment base camp (XUAN LOC) to support Operation ATLANTA and units in the base camp area. Initial support was limited to Class I and Class III, repair parts supply and direct support main-

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tenance. Units remaining in the staging area received supply point distribution at Long Binh for all classes of supply. Maintenance support for the staging area passed from 551st Light Maintenance Company to its parent unit, 185th Maintenance Battalion.

8. (U-FOUO) Personnel and Administration:

a. General. Of the 100% figure on hand at the time of deployment 84 EM were left in CONUS attached to Headquarters Fort Meade pending final determination of various personnel actions, i.e., hardship discharges, compassionate reassignment, and deferments. Therefore, a shortage of 84 EM was created in the present for duty strength versus the authorized strength.

Upon arrival in-country, this shortage was brought to the attention of USARV, who took immediate action to fill the vacancies created by the absence of personnel left in CONUS. To date, the regiment has received 245 replacements, raising the present for duty strength above the authorized strength.

At this time, the personnel picture is excellent and there are no significant problems areas except for the officer and enlisted infusion programs both of which are in the planning stage.

The morale of the troops continues to remain high in spite of the many long hours spent in improving the staging area, i.e. sandbagging bunkers, tents and establishing perimeter defenses.

Congressional and Special Interest Inquiries and Inspector General complaints remained at a low level during the in-country period. Three such inquiries were processed during September and 16 were processed during October 1966. Most of the inquiries were precipitated by personnel problems and physical problems which were first brought to light at Fort Meade, Maryland.

A total of 20 Special and Summary Court-martials and 195 Article 15's have been processed during the in-country period. The regiment has also had 34 Congressional Inquiries since arrival in-country.

Although the administrative headquarters for the regiment remained at Fort Meade until the departure of the main body, an advance party headquarters containing representatives from all staff sections was organized in-country.

Initial S-1 operations were set up by the advance party and were directed toward the establishment of lines of communications to II Field Force Vietnam and USARV. Much research and coordination was needed to switch operations from procedures used in CONUS to those outlined by USARV. The location of the regimental staging area at Long Binh posed a transportation problem due to the distance between the regimental area and USARV, and the decided lack of vehicles.

Most of the administrative difficulties experienced were caused by the fact that all other units under USARV control are organized under the division concept with AG sections. A regiment is not designed to operate as an administrative headquarters, consequently, to meet higher headquarters requirements it has been necessary to utilize over strength personnel in the regimental headquarters.

Attendance at religious services has averaged 714 persons weekly since the unit arrived in Vietnam. Initially, chapel services were held outdoors in field locations until a suitable covered area was provided. The chaplains have participated in various civic action projects in the Long Binh area to include conducting Catholic Masses at a local village, participating in Vietnamese language classes, and numerous visits to the surrounding villages.

The Chaplains have conducted memorial services for deceased members of the unit and made visits to personnel admitted to the hospital in the local area.

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There were several requirements for functions to be performed which were not required in stateside operations such as the Personnel Daily Summary (PDS), Casualty Reports, Prisoner of War Operations, Postal Services, and Exchange Services.

Postal Services were set up in the Long Binh area with a two man postal financial section to handle money orders and parcel post for the regiment. The Regimental S-1 has coordinated the airlift of this team to outlying units for service upon request. In addition to the Postal Financial Team the regimental mail room sorts mail for the regimental units and is responsible for the delivery of this mail by air or convoy to each squadron's area.

Post exchange service was initiated by the Regimental S-1 upon arrival of the advance party in-country. Two mobile semi-trailers were obtained and connected by a large general purpose tent making one complete facility. The PX offers toilet articles, snacks, magazines, books, electronics equipment, and Class VI. Two concessions were obtained to set up a gift shop and tailor shop.

Imprest fund accounts have been set up for the squadrons so that they can provide minimum PX service during tactical operations. These funds have a limit of \$3,000 including inventory and cash. Imprest funds accounts can draw supplies from other large PX installations.

Public Information activities were conducted for the regiment by the 17th Public Information Detachment upon arrival in-country. The 17th PID has released 2,201 hometown news releases, 5 stories and 31 general news and photo releases. The 17th PID was host to 28 news media representatives who visited the regimental area during the quarterly period. The 17th PID personnel makes frequent trips to the units to photograph troopson operations and to maintain a pictorial log of the regiment.

Special Services accounts were opened at 1st Logistical Command in Saigon for films, day room furniture, recreational equipment, and books. Movies were set-up in the staging area to be shown four or more times a week.

Rest and Recuperation (R&R) trips are also a Special Services responsibility in Vietnam. Special Services has the responsibility for the unit allocations, personnel processing and flight bookings. Sufficient R&R allocations are being received now so persons having been in country for ninety (90) days or over can expeditiously receive their R&R. Special Services offers in-country R&R at the Vung Tau R&R Center. The regiment sends two persons at a time to Vung Tau on a revolving basis.

The casualty section experienced difficulties in setting up operations due to in-experience in casualty reporting. Coordination was made to send the team from regiment to the 1st Infantry Division and USARV-AG for on the job training. For this quarter the regiment has had 3 killed in action, 28 wounded in action and 2 killed in non-hostile action.

The awards and decorations section was faced with the same inexperience factor as the casualty section upon arrival in-country. This team was also sent to 1st Infantry Division and USARV-AG for on the job training. For this quarter the regiment has had 19 Air Medals and 26 Purple Hearts awarded and an additional 10 Air Medals are awaiting the approval of USARV.

The regiment was one of the first tactical units below division level to have a Red Cross worker assigned to it. During the period of 7 September to 31 October 194 cases have been referred to the Red Cross assistant field director. Of these cases they include 22 emergency leaves, 6 hardship discharges, 93 reporting family problems, 3 personal problems, 23 family problems and 15 miscellaneous. In addition to these services arrangements were made for the recreation aides (Red Cross girls) to visit the units in the regiment. On the five different occasions they visited the area they were well received and very much appreciated by the troopers of the Blackhorse. When the main body moved to

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the staging area from Vung Tau the girls were on hand to help the troopers send off over 4000 "MARS grams". Special kits containing comfort supplies and paperback books were distributed to the squadrons on board ship. Attached units received their supplies once in the staging area. Future services should be expanded greatly with the anticipated arrival of another field director in November.

A Regimental Prisoner of War holding area has been constructed to secure POW's while being interrogated by the 541st MI Detachment. Upon completion of interrogation, POW's are turned over to ARVN through available Military Police supporting units.

b. Problem areas. There have been personnel problems created due to an insufficient number of TO&E positions to perform the many needed functions of an administrative headquarters. Additional men were needed to staff personnel sections, S-1 administrative sections, mail room, message center and publication sections. The problem became more acute when 24 hour operations became a necessity.

An MFOSE is being drafted to provide authorization for these needed positions within the Regimental Headquarters. An additional authorization is being drafted to include personnel to perform all post, camp, and station activities which now must be pulled from the combat strength of the regiment.

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OPERATIONAL REPORT FOR QUARTERLY PERIOD ENDING 31 OCTOBER 1966

SECTION II
COMMANDERS OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. OBSERVATIONS (Lessons Learned)

1. (C) Operations.

a. Item: Land navigation is difficult in terrain lacking distinguishable landmarks.

Discussion: When operating in areas with heavy canopies or flat terrain devoid of landmarks it is extremely difficult to maintain direction. This is particularly true when conducting mounted operations. A possible solution may be the Compass Magnetic Pilot - FSN 6601-551-5167. A requisition (USARV form 47) ordering this item was submitted by the 3d Squadron on 5 October 1966. Field evaluations will be conducted upon receipt and installation of the compass.

Observations: A vehicular mounted land navigation instrument is essential for conducting mounted operations in dense or flat terrain.

b. Item: Tracking vehicles in wet marshy areas.

Discussion: Vehicles moving through wet soggy areas should not follow in the tracks of other vehicles. In most cases the ground will have a thin crust which will carry the first vehicle but not the subsequent ones. Unnecessary turning of the tracks will aggravate the situation.

Observation: Tracking vehicles in wet soft terrain may result in a mired vehicle.

c. Item: The use of another vehicle to recover a bogged-down vehicle often results in two vehicles requiring recovery assistance.

Discussion: When a vehicle is stuck, make a close inspection of the ground looking for a firm place to locate the pulling vehicle; then attach a cable to the mired vehicle and pull it out. This is particularly true in wet areas where a crust that may shatter leaving a soft area twenty (20) to forty (40) meters around the vehicle. This situation makes close-in recovery practically an impossibility.

Observation: Caution should be exercised and a thorough ground reconnaissance made prior to attempting to recover a mired vehicle with another one. Insure that sufficient equipment is available to recover from a distance.

d. Item: Obstacles possessing a nearby bypass are frequently mined or covered by fire.

Discussion: Whenever a destroyed bridge or culvert is encountered look for the least obvious bypass. Tracked vehicles can be utilized to make a bypass. The obvious bypasses may be covered by fire or mines.

Observation: Tracked vehicles can often effect their own bypasses when least obvious ones are not available.

e. Item: Command and control of an armored unit from the ground in jungle terrain is extremely difficult.

Discussion: The lack of vantage points and fields of observation make it difficult to control an armored unit from the ground. Troop commanders on the ground are unable to guide themselves, consequently, they must rely on guidance from the air. Control from the air is facilitated by a system of aerial recognition symbols for each troop/company/battery size unit.

Observation: Command and control from the air of an armored unit is one of the most feasible systems when operating in jungle terrain.

f. Item: Adjusting artillery in jungle terrain.

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Discussion: Artillery fire cannot be observed for the most part in dense undergrowth; as a result effective fire can not be brought to bear on the target area. A forward observer in a light observation aircraft or a helicopter can provide effective adjustment. If the forward observer is operating out of the forward air controller's aircraft he should be equipped with a PRC-25 insuring uninterrupted communications with the Fire Support Coordination Center.

Observation: In jungle terrain effective control of observed fire requires an airborne FO.

g. Item: Bridging.

Discussion: Each cavalry squadron must have bridging capabilities before participating in long range operations. Armored vehicles cannot rely on native bridges or fords as suitable crossing points.

Observation: Organic or attached bridging capabilities are a necessity for armored units conducting operations in Vietnam.

h. Item: Protection against leeches.

Discussion: Patrol members should permeate all openings in clothing with insect repellent to prevent entrance of leeches. Wrapping plastic material around the lower part of each leg offers additional protection against leeches. Repellent should be applied at least one hour prior to the patrol's departure to dissipate the odor.

Observation: Insect repellent and plastic wrappings are effective protection against leeches.

i. Item: Warning devices for anti-personnel mines.

Discussion: Trip flares attached to claymore mines have provided adequate protection against enemy tampering.

Observation: Trip flares attached to claymore mines aid in preventing enemy tampering.

j. Item: CS agent protective barrier.

Discussion: In checking killing zones after friendly ambushes, and in search and clear operations, a protective barrier can be placed around the area to prevent enemy infiltration by using CS gas. The gas is held in place by the dense jungle foliage. The best means of dispersing the gas is by tying the bomb to a long stick and spreading it over the desired periphery in a band 5 meters wide and 10 meters high.

Observation: CS will make an effective barrier for patrols and units on combat missions.

k. Item: Initiating ambushes.

Discussion: Trip flares have not proven successful in initiating ambushes as falling limbs and wild game often trigger the wires. An individual observing at the far end of the killing zone with a telescope or sniper scope can signal more effectively for the start of the ambush.

Observation: Night detection devices are more accurate than trip flares for initiating ambushes.

l. Item: Position of mounted reserve.

Discussion: Mounted reserves should travel 1000 meters behind the main body. Closer distances preclude adequate maneuver room. Further distances invite ambush and lack of support from the main body.

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Observation: Grenades must be placed 100 meters from the main body to be tactically effective.

m. Item: Marking locations with smoke.

Discussion: Heavy jungle canopies prevent observation of smoke thrown on the ground. To have the smoke penetrate the foliage, the bomb must be attached to a long piece of wire or rope and thrown over the highest possible limb. The rope will secure the smoke bomb to the limb allowing the smoke to filter through the foliage into the air.

Observation: Smoke grenades must be placed high enough above the ground to permit the penetration of the jungle canopy.

n. Item: Hand grenades secured to body armor (flak jackets).

Discussion: Securing of hand grenades to the flak jacket during mounted or dismounted action presents a safety hazard which overrides tactical necessity. During mounted operations, the grenades fall free each time the individual bends over to pick up ammunition. During dismounted operations, the grenades become snagged by brush and fall loose.

Observation: Hand grenades should not be carried on the flak jacket but in the ammunition pouch or in the flak jacket pocket.

o. Item: Recovery vehicle M578.

Discussion: The M578 does not possess the same flotation as the M113. This is due to the fact that the track locks on the M578 when it turns rather than slowing down. More attention must be given to areas of employment for the M578 versus the M113.

Observation: A careful ground reconnaissance must be made before moving M578's over questionable terrain.

2. (U) Intelligence.

Item: Training interpreters.

Discussion: Commanders should become acquainted with their interpreters through frequent conversations and chalk talks. This will facilitate translations during operations and will insure correct information is being transmitted to native personnel.

Observation: Commanders must train interpreters to relay correct information to native personnel.

3. (U) Logistics.

a. Item: Immediately available tentage is needed to get the troops out of the rain and mud as soon as possible after arrival in-country.

Discussion: Units are authorized tent, G.P. Mating, on the basis of one tent per sixteen men. The tents are issued in OCSUS to serve with unit equipment. Inadequate stocks of tents are maintained in-country for issue to advance parties of incoming units. Tentage shipped as IAT normally arrives in-country after the personnel. The need for tents exists prior to the arrival of the main body.

Observation: Tentage to house troops should be shipped to arrive in-country with advance parties.

b. Item: Transportation requirements for the advance party.

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Discussion: Plans had not been formulated for transportation prior to the arrival of the advance planning group. Authorization was secured from USARV to ship fifteen (15) 1/2-ton trucks, fifteen (15) 5-ton trucks and 2 UH-1D helicopters with the advance party for the use of the advance party personnel in preparation for the arrival of the main body. Prior to the arrival of their equipment the advance party was limited in the amount of work it could effectively accomplish. The sponsoring unit assisted by loaning vehicles, but could not afford to loan the quantities required to perform reconnaissance and liaison activities and to transport necessary supplies and equipment to the staging area. This problem was alleviated with the arrival of the equipment for the advance party.

Observation: Units of brigade and regiment size should ship vehicles for advance parties to arrive concurrently with the advance party.

4. (C) Pay/Ops.

Item: Leaflet drop and loudspeaker technique.

Discussion: In the past there has been great deal of confusion in the minds of local hamlets and villages when a US unit moves into their area, therefore, in an effort to establish good rapport at the earliest possible time, the regiment formulated the following plan:

A special leaflet was printed for the 11th Cav's move to Xuan Loc. One message told the people the reason for the regiment's presence there. It also stressed the point that we were here to stay and that this was not just another operation where US troops were here today and gone tomorrow.

These leaflets were dropped over each village just ahead of the troops. At the same time a loudspeaker helicopter flew over the village further explaining our presence.

Observation: The impact and reaction of the local villagers was excellent. They were overjoyed with the idea that we had told them exactly why we were there and the fact that we were going to settle in their area. Small damage done by the tracked vehicles was completely overlooked. The local VC infrastructure was so taken by surprise that they had no defense psychologically, thus losing much face within the villages and hamlets. The final results and effects of this technique will not be felt for some months.

2. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. (U) Personnel.

a. Observation:

In excess of eighty percent (80%) of the enlisted personnel and eighty-six percent (86%) of the officers of the regiment are scheduled for rotation to CONUS in August 1967.

b. Recommendations:

(1) That a program be initiated at Department of the Army level and implemented by units scheduled for deployment to Vietnam prior to their departure from CONUS to offset or minimize the mass exodus of personnel from units a year after arrival in-country.

(2) That a program of replacement be devised for the filling of key officer positions prior to a unit departing CONUS, thus providing for a smooth transition between key personnel and precluding two key officers at the same level from departing at the same time.

c. Observation:

The location of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment Base Camp south of Xuan Loc is such that it is not readily accessible to normal administrative distribution channels and mail delivery service. Consequently, a resulting time lag in the receipt and distribution is affected.

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d. Recommendations:

That provisions be made to automatically provide services to units located in areas away from the principal routes of communication.

e. Observation:

Sixty-four (64) enlisted personnel remained at Fort Meade, Maryland when the regiment departed that station for deployment to Vietnam resulting in the regiment arriving in-country understrength. These individuals were pending administrative action such as hardship discharges, compassionate reassignments, and reassignments due to the presence of a brother in Vietnam.

f. Recommendations:

That units deploying to Vietnam be relieved of their administrative holdovers early enough so that replacements can be received and processed prior to the unit's departure from CONUS.

2. (U) Intelligence.

a. Observation: Since the preponderance of fighting in Vietnam is at the small unit level requirements for the individual soldier to be proficient in his basic skill assumes great importance.

b. Recommendation: It is recommended that the following subjects receive greater emphasis in combat and advance individual training particularly in the case of replacements being trained for Vietnam:

- (1) Scouting and patrolling.
- (2) Reporting.
- (3) Camouflage and concealment.
- (4) Observing to include the use of optical aids.

3. (U) Training and Organization.

a. Observation: An enemy technique encountered by the regiment of special interest is his (Viet Cong) attempt to draw US fire into densely populated areas by placing snipers between US units and Vietnamese villages.

b. Recommendation: Fire discipline should be emphasized in Basic and Advanced Unit Training for units deploying to Vietnam. It is a point that should be further stressed during shipboard training.

c. Observation: Operations of the 11th Cavalry to date have demonstrated the ability of the tanks and personnel carriers (M113) to smash through heavy vegetation allowing the armored units to move at a faster rate than dismounted troops in many areas, and to arrive at a destination with a greater amount of firepower and supplies. Elements of the regiment have successfully operated in six (6) provinces of III CTZ, both on and off the road. Heavy rains made operation more difficult, and increased the danger of bogging, however, no regimental operations have been canceled due to weather.

d. Recommendation: It is recommended that armor crewmen deploying to Vietnam receive extensive cross-country driver training over terrain similar to that found in Vietnam. Most large military posts have areas suitable for this type of training.

4. (U) Logistics.

a. Observation. Replacement personnel are arriving from the replacement centers with only their individual clothing.

b. Recommendation: That replacement personnel reporting to their permanent duty station in Vietnam be equipped with their complete issue of TA 901 (Zone I). This could be accomplished at either the port of embarkation or at in-country replacement centers.

OPERATIONAL REPORT FOR QUARTERLY PERIOD ENDING 31 OCTOBER 1966

SECTION III

INCLOSURES

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INCLOSURE 1
TASK ORGANIZATION

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Incl 1 Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment

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Task Organization and Station Listing

Hq 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (LONG BINH)

Organic Units:

Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment

1st Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment

2nd Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment

3rd Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment

* Air Cavalry Troop

Attached Units:

37th Medical Company

919th Engineer Company (Armored)

17th Public Information Detachment

28th Military History Detachment

33rd Chemical Detachment

409th Radio Research Unit

541st Military Intelligence Detachment

* Expected in country in December. Currently undergoing training in COMUS (A.P. Hill, Virginia).

45

INCLOSURE 2
ROSTER OF KEY OFFICER AND NON
COMMISSIONED OFFICER PERSONNEL, 31 OCTOBER 1966

47

1. The following is a roster of key officer personnel / currently assigned to the regiment:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>POSITION</u>	<u>NAME, GRADE, SN, BRANCH</u>
Hq, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment	G0	COBB, William W. Col, 045651, Armor
Hq, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment	X0	PERLITZER, Dewey T. LtC, 038031, Armor
Hq, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment	S1	BULL, Frederick B. Jr. Maj, 079337, Armor
Hq, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment	S2	BROOKSHIRE, Gwail L. Maj, 070133, Armor
Hq, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment	S3	COAD, William F. Maj, 073303, Armor
Hq, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment	S4	KEELER, Edward F. Maj, 02266258, Armor
Hq, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment	S5	WILLER, Allen S Jr. Maj, 083670, Armor
Hq, 1/11th Armored Cavalry Regiment	G0	HOWELL, Martin D. LtC, 059181, Armor
Hq, 2/11th Armored Cavalry Regiment	G0	HORNE, Kibbey M. LtC, 028057, Armor
Hq, 3/11th Armored Cavalry Regiment	G0	PETERSON, Palmer A. LtC, 081133, Armor
37th Med Co	G0	BLAIS, Denis J. Opt, -05240622 MC
919th Engr Co (Arm)	G0	CROCKER, Donald J. Opt, 089449, CE

2. The following is a roster of key non commissioned officer personnel currently assigned to the regiment:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>POSITION</u>	<u>NAME, GRADE, SN</u>
Hq, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment	Sergeant Major	HAWTHORNE, Arthur W. SMG RA 6297069
Hq, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment	Sergeant Major Operations	KOTKE, Lawrence D. SMG RA 16231134
Hq, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment	Master Sergeant Intelligence	SPOLINSKY, Joseph T. MSG RA 12330654
Hq, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment	1st Sergeant	RAGSDALE, John MSG RA 14261539
1st Sqdn, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment	Sergeant Major	CAMIDGE, Malcolm B. SMG RA 12283476
Hq, 1st Sqdn, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment	1st Sergeant	BOLAN, Robert L. MSG RA 14316813
Hq, 1st Sqdn, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment	Master Sergeant Operations	KIMORE, John MSG RA 13321400

UNIT	POSITION	NAME GRADE, SN
Hq, 1st Sqdn, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment	Master Sergeant Intelligence	POWELL, Lloyd A. MSG RA 18340032
Hq, 1st Sqdn, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment	Master Sergeant Motor/Maintenance	HAMPTON, Leroyal MSG RA 18329446
A Trp, 1st Sqdn, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment	1st Sergeant	EILSWORTH, Edmund L. Jr MSG RA 11197034
B Trp, 1st Sqdn, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment	1st Sergeant	DUNHAM, Lowell L. MSG RA 24595734
C Trp, 1st Sqdn, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment	1st Sergeant	BOWE, Benjamin C. MSG RA 13415140
D Co., 1st Sqdn, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment	1st Sergeant	CROWLEY, Russell R. Jr MSG RA 13363306
How Battery, 1st Sqdn 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment	1st Sergeant	BELEZ, Ramon MSG RA 30451715
Hq, 2d Sqdn, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment	Sergeant Major	HARRISON, Hirm, T. MSG RA 19380336
Hq, 2d Sqdn, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment	1st Sergeant	JACKSON, Liston A. MSG RA 10407263
Hq, 2d Sqdn, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment	Master Sergeant Operation	FOSTER, Paul R. MSG RA 17321718
Hq, 2d Sqdn, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment	Master Sergeant Intelligence	LASKOWSKI, John J. MSG RA 16275603
E Trp, 2d Sqdn, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment	1st Sergeant	LONG, James L. MSG RA 19379556
F Trp, 2d Sqdn, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment	1st Sergeant	GOSSITT, Darryl E. MSG RA 13305317
G Trp, 2d Sqdn, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment	1st Sergeant	REBBENY, James L. MSG RA 13463607
H Co., 2d Sqdn, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment	1st Sergeant	KEDO, James K. MSG RA 30114823
How Battery, 2d Sqdn, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment	1st Sergeant	DUNPHY, James L. MSG RA 13244580
Hq, 3d Sqdn, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment	Sergeant Major	MCRAVITE, Bernard L. MSG RA 37031578
Hq, 3d Sqdn, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment	Master Sergeant Operations	AUSBORN, Gene O. MSG RA 13288811
Hq, 3d Sqdn, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment	Master Sergeant Intelligence	JENKINS, Francis MSG RA 21906877
Hq, 3d Sqdn, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment	1st Sergeant	SWIPES, John H. MSG RA 13203854
I Trp, 3d Sqdn, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment	1st Sergeant	MULLINS, Avery E. MSG RA 13321785
K Trp, 3d Sqdn, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment	1st Sergeant	SMITH, Sherman L. MSG RA 14290903

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>POSITION</u>	<u>NAME, GRADE, SN</u>
L Troop, 3d Sqdn, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment	1st Sergeant	SEWELL, Harold E. MSG RA 35526253
M Co., 3d Sqdn, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment	1st Sergeant	MILLER, Robert C. MSG RA 30751755
How Battery, 3d Sqdn, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment	1st Sergeant	BOYD, Marion Jr. MSG RA 14267230

INCLOSURE 3

BIOGRAPHIES

Name and Assignment

Colonel William Warren Cobb, Armor, 045 651, Commanding Officer, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment

Born

15 August 1917, Dallas Texas

EducationMilitary

Advance Course, Armor School	1947-1948
Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas	1951-1952
Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania	1958-1959

Civilian

University of Kansas, AB

Duty Assignments

1941-44 503rd Parachute Inf, MDE - Southwest Pacific Theater
Platoon Leader
Company Commander

1944-45 The Parachute School, Ft. Benning Ga.
Supervisor of Parachute Jump Training
Director of Parachute Training

1950-51 Hq I Corps - Korea
Operations Officer, G-3 Section

1952-53 1st Armored Div, Fort Hood, Texas
S-3, 81st Reconnaissance Bn
Asst G-3

1954-55 4th Armored Reconnaissance Bn (Separate) - Austria
Battalion Commander

1955-58 Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas
Staff and Faculty

1959-60 Army Missile Command, Redstone Arsenal, Alabama
Project Manager

1962-65 US Army Ryukyu Island Command
Special Asst to the High Commissioner
Deputy Civil Administrator

6 Oct 1965 Assumed Command, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment

Awards and Decorations

Legion of Merit
Bronze Star Medal (OLO)
Army Commendation Medal
Army of Occupation Medal (Germany)
National Defense Service Medal (OLO)
Korean Service Medal (4 Battle Stars)
American Defense Service Medal
United Nations Service Medal
World War II Victory Medal
American Theater Medal
Vietnamese Service Medal
Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal (3 Battle Stars)
Presidential Unit Citation (ROK)
Combat Infantry Badge
Master Parachutist Badge
Air Medal

54

Name and Assignment

Lieutenant Colonel Dewey T. Pfeiffer, Armor, 038 031, Executive Officer,
11th Armored Cavalry Regiment

Born

3 April 1921, Lakewood, Ohio

Education

Military	Basic Course, Armor School	1943
	Basic Course, The Infantry School	1947
	Advanced Course, Armor School	1951
	Command and General Staff College	1958
Civilian	Valley Forge Military Academy	1943
	University of Omaha, BA	1966

Principal Assignments

1943	Enlisted Man U.S. Army
1944-45	Platoon Leader, 13th Armored Division, Europe
1945-47	Assistant Professor Military Science and Tactics, Valley Forge Military Academy
1948-50	Instructor, 7899th School Student Detachment, Austria
1951-53	S-3 15th Armor Group, Camp Polk, La.
1953-54	Tank Company Commander, 279th Infantry Regiment, 45th Infantry Division, Korea
1954-57	Instructor, Tank Gunnery, The Armor School, Ft Knox, Ky.
1958-62	M-2 (Intelligence Officer) ComPhibGru TWO U.S. Atlantic Fleet, U.S. Navy
1962	Executive Officer, Combat Command A, 3rd Armored Division, Europe
1962	Commanding Officer, Combat Command A, 3rd Armored Division, Europe
1963-65	Commanding Officer, 3rd Squadron, 12th Cavalry, 3rd Armored Division
11 April 1966	Assumed duties as Executive Officer, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment

Awards and Decorations

Bronze Star Medal
Europe-Africa-Middle Eastern Campaign Medal
Army Commendation Medal
Army of Occupation Medal
WWII Victory Medal
Korean Service Medal
United Nations Service Medal
National Defense Service Medal (NDS)
Republic of Korea Presidential Unit Citation
Vietnamese Service Medal

55

Name and Assignment

Lieutenant Colonel Martin D. Howell, Armor, 059 181, Commanding Officer
1st Squadron 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment

Born

13 December 1926, Jacksonville, Florida

Education

Military	US Military Academy, BS	1949
	Basic Course, Armor School	1950
	Advance Course, Armor School	1954
	CGSC, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas	1963
Civilian	University of Mississippi, MA	1959
	New York University, PhD	1962

Principal Assignments

1944-45	Enlisted Man, US Navy
1952	Company Cmdr, 14th Armored Cavalry, EUCCM
1953-54	Instructor, US Military Academy
1955-56	Aide to CG, I Corps, Korea
1957	S-3, 6th Tank Bn, 24th Inf, Div., Korea
1959-62	Instructor, USA Information School
1964	Maison Officer, I German Army Corps
1965-66	Asst Director for NATO Affairs, OASD (ISA)
5 May 1966	Assumed Command, 1st Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment

Awards and Decorations

American Campaign Medal
National Defense Service Medal (NDSM)
World War II Victory Medal
Army of Occupation Medal (Germany)
Joint Service Commendation Medal
Vietnam Service Medal

Name and Assignment

Lieutenant Colonel Kibbey M. Horne, Armor, 028 057, Commanding Officer,
2nd Squadron 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment

Born

17 July 1924, Tucson, Arizona

Education

Military	US Military Academy, BS	1946
	Armored Officer Basic Course	1947
	Armored Officer Advanced Course	1952
	AGOSC, Regular Course	1961
Civilian	Harvard University	1943
	Heidelberg University, Dolmetscher	
	Diplom	1953
	Georgetown University, PhD	1966

Principal Assignments

1947-50	Plt Ldr, 45th Mech Cav Recon Sqdn, Panama
1950	Company Cmdr, 73rd Tank Bn, Korea
1951	Asst G-3, Hq ASUSC, Ft. Knox Ky.
1952 - 53	Student Officer, USMA w/sta Univ. of Heidelberg, Germany
1953 - 56	Instructor (German), USMA
1956 - 58	G-2 Sec, VII Corps, Germany
1958 - 60	Intel Div, SHAPE, France
1961 - 62	Exec Off, 35th Tank Bn, 2nd Armored Div, Texas
1962 - 66	Tng Div, DA
21 February 1966	Assumed Command, 2nd Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment

Awards and Decorations

Army Commendation Ribbon (OLC)
 ROK Distinguished Unit Citation (3 awards)
 Army General Staff Identification Badge
 Korean Service Medal (2 battle stars)
 Occupational Medal (Japan and Germany Clasp)
 American Service Medal
 WW II Victory Medal
 National Defense Service Medal (OLC)
 United Nations Service Medal
 Vietnamese Service Medal

Name and Assignment

Lieutenant Colonel Palmer A. Peterson, Armor, OGI 133, Commanding Officer
3rd Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment

Born

29 June 1922, Canton, South Dakota

Education

Military	Officer Candidate School, Ft Knox, Kentucky	1943
	Advanced Course, Armor School	1957
	Associate Course, CGSC	1961
	USA Management School	1963
Civilian	Omaha University, BGE	1965

Principal Assignments

1942-43	Enlisted Man, 502nd Air Corps
1943-45	Tk Plt Ldr, 35th Tank Bn, 4th Arm Div, Europe
1950-53	Storage Officer, Tomiono Ammo Depot, Japan
1953-57	Asst PMST, III RCTC Instr Cp, Chicago, Ill.
1957-61	Bn S-3, Exec Off, 68th Armor, Ft Benning Ga.
1962-63	Exec Off, Tng Div, G-3 Office, Hq USAMHC, Ft. Knox, Ky.
1964	Project Officer, Ground Combat Div, Army Concept Team, RVN
29 August 1965	Assumed Command, 3rd Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment

Awards and Decorations

Silver Star
Bronze Star Medal
Air Medal
Army Commendation Medal (2 OLC)
Purple Heart Medal (4 OLC)
Croix de Guerre
Fourragers
Vietnamese Service Medal

59

Name and Assignment

Sergeant Major Arthur W. Hawthorne, RA 6297069, Regimental Sergeant Major,
11th Armored Cavalry Regiment

Born

18 Nov 1921 Provencal, Louisiana

Education

Military

MA

Civilian

HS GED Compl - 1949

Principal Assignments

21 Aug 52 - 23 Sep 54 First Sgt 4032 A SurO' Clin Trp 6 Shreveport, Louisiana
27 Oct 58 - 11 Apr 60 First Set Trp A & C 3rd Sqdn 7th Cav Ft Benning,
Georgia
17 Apr 63 - 1 Oct 63 Sgt Major HH Trp 11th ACR USARV
4 Aug 64 to present. Sgt Major HH Trp 11th ACR, USARV

Awards and Decorations

Bronze Star Medal
European-African-Middle Eastern Campaign Medal
American Defense Service Medal
Army of Occupation Medal
Purple Heart
Korean Service Medal
Good Conduct Medal w/5 lps
National Defense Service Medal (OLC)
Vietnamese Service Medal

Name and Assignment

Sergeant Major Lawrence D. Kotke, RA 16231134, Regimental Operations
Sergeant Major, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment

Born

30 Sept 1929, Ladysmith, Wisconsin

EducationMilitary

Army Clerk Typist 71B20 KBC Clk Type 8 Wks
Radio Operation 05B20 7th InfDivRdo 6 Wks 1947
Armor NCO General USAARMS 13 Wks 1959
Aerial Observer Crec 11th A/C 4 Wks 1961
CBR School Ft Knox Ky 2 Wks 1959

Civilian

Wakefield, Michigan HS Dipl 1946

Principal Assignments

2 Oct 50 - 25 Nov 52	9301 TSU Aberdeen, Prov Sqd, Md (Admin Clk)
25 Nov 52 - 16 Mar 57	HHCo 6th Cav USAREUR (1st Sgt & Plans NCO)
16 Mar 52 - 13 Nov 59	HHCo 6th Cav Ft Knox (Asst Opns NCO)
13 Nov 59 - 30 Jun 64	HHTrp 11th Cav USAREUR (Opns NCO)
30 Jun 64 - 18 Jan 66	HHTrp 11th Cav FGG, Md (1st Sgt)
18 Jan 66 - Present	HHTrp 11th Cav USARV (Plans NCO)

Awards and Decorations

Army Commendation Medal
WW II Victory Medal
Army Occupation Medal
National Defense Service Medal (OCL)
Vietnamese Service Medal

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Name and Assignment

Sergeant Major Malcolm B. Camidge, RA 12283476, 1st Squadron 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment.

Born

8 Jul 28, Carthage, New York

Education

Military

Ammo Supply Spec, USAREUR, 4 Weeks 1951
Adv Armored NCO Armd Sch 16 Weeks 1955

Civilian

HS-GED 1953

Principal Assignments

Feb 46 - Dec 47 US Navy, Firemen First Class
Dec 48 - Jun 52 Inf Plt Sgt
18 Jun 52 - 28 Feb 59 Scout Section Leader, Trp C 2d Recon Sq 7th Cav, Ft Benning, Georgia
1 Mar 60 - 25 Jan 63 Platoon Sgt, Trp L 3d Recon Sq USAREUR
26 Jan 63 - 6 Aug 64 1st Sgt How Btry 1st Recon Sqdn 11th ACR USAREUR
7 Aug 64 - 5 Oct 65 1st Sgt How Btry 1st Recon Sqdn 11th ACR Ft Geo G. Meade, Md.
6 Oct 65 - Sergeant Major, Hq Trp 1st Sqdn 11th ACR Ft Geo. G. Meade, Md.
7 Sep 66 - Present Sergeant Major, 1st Sqdn 11th ACR, USARV.

Awards and Decorations

World War II Victory Medal
Army of Occupation Medal (Germany)
Expert Infantryman's Badge
National Defense Service Medal (OLC)
Good Conduct Medal w/5 lps
Vietnamese Service Medal

Name and Assignment

Sergeant Major Hiram T. Harrison, RA 1938033 2nd Squadron 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment.

Born

21 Nov 28 Anaconda, Montana

Education

Military

Spec M60 AAC A Comb Arms School 2 weeks 1961

Civilian

HS GED

Principal Assignments

18 Feb 53 - 11 Nov 55	18th Inf USAREUR (Plt Sgt)
12 Nov 55 - 23 Jan 59	Plt Sgt 69th Armored Ft, Riley, Kansas
24 Jan 59 - 6 Jul 59	Plt Sgt 1st Cav USAREUR
7 Jul 59 - 29 Jun 62	1st Sgt 3AD USAREUR
30 Jun 62 - 27 Nov 63	1st Sgt 34th Armor Ft Lewis, Washington
28 Nov 63 - 20 Jun 66	Sgt Maj 22d Inf Ft Lewis, Washington
21 Jun 66 - Present	Sgt Maj 2d Sqdn 11th ACR, USARV

Awards & Decorations

Combat Infantryman's Badge
 Korean Service Medal
 Army of Occupation Medal
 National Defense Service Medal (NDSM)
 Good Conduct Medal w/4 lps
 United Nations Service Medal
 Republic of Korea Presidential Unit Citation Badge
 Presidential Unit Citation (Navy)
 Bronze Star Medal
 Army Commendation Medal
 Vietnamese Service Medal

63

Name and Assignment

Sergeant Major Bernard D. Mbravits, RA 37031579, 2nd Squadron 11th Armored
Cavalry Regiment

Born

27 Nov 17, Biwabik, Minnesota

Education-Military

Language Course, AIS, 46 Weeks, 1956
Leadership Course, USARCARIB. 4 weeks, 1949

Civilian

High School Diploma, Horace Mann High School,
Biwabik, Minnesota

Principal Assignments

28 Mar 50	Adm NCO 33d Inf Regt, Co
7 Oct 50	Bn SGM 8th Inf Regt, Ft Benning, Georgia
15 Dec 51	Regt SGM 8th Inf Regt, For Benning, Georgia
13 Dec 51	Bn SGM 8th Inf Regt, Ft Benning, Georgia
30 Jul 54	BN SGM 271st Inf Regt, Ft Dix, New Jersey
3 Aug 54	BN SGM 880th FA Bn, Ft Dix, New Jersey
4 Feb 55	Regt SGM 271st Inf Regt, Ft Dix, New Jersey
19 Mar 55	Bn SGM 880th FA Bn, Ft Dix, New Jersey
25 Sep 56	Bn SGM 43d AIBn, USAREUR
15 Jul 57	BN SGM 58th Inf, USAREUR
30 Jan 58	BN SGM 58th Inf, Ft Hood
14 Mar 58	Pers SGM 502d Admin Co. Ft Hood, Texas
3 Dec 58	Div Org 2d Armd Div, Ft Hood, Texas
19 Mar 62	Div SGM 2d Armd Div, USAREUR
2 Sep 62	Div Org 2d Armd Div, Ft Hood, Texas
23 Oct 62	Sqdn SGM 2d Sqdn, 11th ACR Ft Meade, Md. /land
7 Oct 64	Sqdn SGM 3d Sqdn 11th ACR Ft Meade, Maryland
20 Aug 66	Sqdn SGM 3d Sqdn, 11th ACR USARV

Awards and Decorations

Good Conduct Medal (First through Fifth Awards)
Army of Occupation Medal (Germany)
Expert Infantryman's Badge
National Defense Service Medal (OLC)
Bronze Star
Army of Occupation Medal (Japan)
European-African Middle Eastern Campaign Medal
Vietnamese Service Medal


65

INCLOSURE 4
PSY/OPS LEAFLETS AND SAFE
CONDUCT PASS

CÙNG CÁC BẠN TRONG HÃNG NGƯỜI VIỆT CỘNG

- * 24^h tiền cơm mỗi ngày
- * 24^h mỗi ngày cho vợ bạn
- * 12^h cho mỗi đứa con của bạn
- * Sẽ thêm các khoản khác

Những KHÍ GIỚI bạn mang về
sẽ được thưởng tùy theo loại.



The GVN will reward and help you when you return (RALLY). 24\$ VN Day Rations, 24\$ for your wife, 12\$ VN for each child you have. All weapons which are returned will be awarded, on the following weapons.



CÙNG CÁC BAN TRONG HÀNG NGŨ VIỆT CỘNG

- 1/ Hãy lấy một tờ thông hành của Chính-Phủ Quốc-Gia và giữ cẩn-thận để chờ cơ-hội trở về.
- 2/ Trong lúc kiên nhẫn chờ một cơ-hội tốt, cứ tỏ ra trung thành với bọn Việt Cộng để tránh mọi sự nghi ngờ của bọn chúng.
- 3/ Khi cơ dịp là trốn ngay trở về với gia-đình.
- 4/ Nếu bạn chỉ có thể trốn đi ban đêm, hãy tìm một nơi để ẩn mình. Hãy đến trình diện với Chính-quyền vào ban ngày. Đầu voi-khi một chỗ

6/ Bất luận trong trường hợp nào, ngày cũng như đêm nếu có tờ thông hành là có thể được tiếp đón như một người bạn.

SP-951A

- (1) Take a safe conduct pass with you when you are returning to the GVN.
- (2) While waiting for an occasion to return to the GVN you must remain true to the V.C. without letting him know you are going to rally.
- (3) If you have a chance return to your family immediately.
- (4) If you travel by night find a place to hide, camouflage your weapons if you are traveling by daylight. After you have rallied you can show the weapons to the GVN and you will be rewarded.
- (5) Keep the safe conduct passes in case you decide to return or you are captured by the ARVN. The safe conduct passes will show you intended on returning to your family and GVN.
- (6) You will always be welcome, night or day, as a friend.

SAFE-CONDUCT PASS TO BE HONORED BY ALL VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND ALLIED FORCES



Đây là một tấm Giấy
Thông Hành có giá trị
với tất cả cơ quan Quân
Chính Việt - Nam Cộng-
Hòa và lực lượng Đồng-
Minh.

Nº 258024 EA

이 안전보장패스는 월남정부와 모든 연합군에 의해 인정된 것입니다.

ĐÂY TẤM GIẤY THÔNG HÀNH CÓ GIÁ TRỊ VỚI TẤT CẢ CƠ - QUAN
QUÂN CHÍNH VIỆT - NAM CỘNG - HÒA VÀ LỰC - LƯỢNG ĐỒNG - MINH.

SAFE-CONDUCT PASS TO BE HONORED BY ALL VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND ALLIED FORCES

이 안전보장패스는 월남정부와 모든 연합군에 의해 인정된 것입니다.



No place to run! No Place to hide!
It is too late now! The tanks of the mighty
11th Armored Cavalry Regiment will seek you
out and destroy you. Your only chance to
live is to rally to the National Chinese Hoi
programme. Rally to live or hide and die.

CÁC BẠN VIỆT CỘNG HÃY COI CHÚNG!

CÒN ĐƯỜNG ĐAU MÀ CHẠY! CÒN CHỖ NÀO ĐỂ TRỐN! ĐÃ

TRỄ LẮM RỒI CÁC BẠN! ĐOÀN CHIẾN XA CỦA TRUNG ĐOÀN

11 KỸ BÍNH HOA KỲ SẮP ĐẾN NƠI ĐỂ LỪNG KIỂM VÀ TIÊU

DIỆT NHỮNG KẼ CHỐNG LẠI HỌ. CÒN ĐAU THÍ GIỜ ĐỂ SỬA

SOẠN CHIẾN ĐẤU HỒ CÁC BẠN? HÃY COI CHÚNG. CHÚNG TÔI


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DUY NHẤT ĐỂ SỐNG SÓT LÀ RA QUIL CHÁNH VỚI CHÁNH NGHĨA

QUỐC GIA DƯỚI CHÁNH SÁCH CHIỀU HỒI CỦA CHÁNH PHỦ.


QUI CHÁNH ĐỂ SỐNG HAY LẮN TRỐN ĐỂ CHIẾT.

276-111-67



**VIỆT-CỘNG
HÃY COI CHÚNG!!**

Viet Cong Demre!



VIỆT CỘNG THU THUẾ BẤT HỢP PHÁP

Bọn Việt Cộng rêu rao chúng thu thuế vì chúng cần để bảo vệ gia đình đồng bào. Nhưng thử hỏi chúng có bảo vệ được gì cho đồng bào không hay chỉ gây thêm khổ đau cho đồng bào và chạy trốn như vịt mỗi khi Quân Lực


Việt Nam Cộng Hòa và Đồng Minh mở cuộc hành quân tiêu diệt chúng. Chúng chỉ biết ăn cướp của đồng bào trong khi Quân Lực Việt Nam Cộng Hòa và Đồng Minh luôn sẵn sàng đến thúc ăn, quần áo, thuốc men cho đồng bào và giúp đồng bào xây dựng lại nhà cửa do bọn chúng phá hoại. Lúc lòng phía chánh phủ rất hùng mạnh, thóc trang bị đầy đủ và nhờ sự tiếp tay của đồng bào sẽ sớm diệt hết bọn Việt Cộng tham tàn cố bảo vệ cho đồng bào, để bảo vệ mình và gia đình mình đồng bào hãy chống lại việc thu thuế bất hợp pháp của Việt Cộng và giúp chánh phủ và quân đội Đồng Minh sớm đem lại cho đồng bào và gia đình một đời sống tươi đẹp hơn khi cần bị áp bức và đau khổ.

296-50-67

UNJUST TAXATION: The V.C. tells you that their tax is for protection of your family, but they do not protect you. They run and hide like frightened chickens. They know that the Allied Forces are invincible. The Allied Forces do not take from you, they only give to you. Your GVN and its Allies have been ravaged by the V.C. we can and will protect you against the V.C. It is only good sense to protect yourself and your family by supporting your true Government and its Allied Forces. Resist the unjust taxation by the V.C. and help your GVN provide you and your family with a good life free from fear and V.C. injustice.

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The US Armored Cavalry has arrived in Vietnam. They have mighty tanks that will seek out and destroy the Viet Cong. When not fighting the Viet Cong Bandits who rebel against their own people, the US 11th Armored Cavalry will be helping to build schools, treat the sick and injured and distribute food to the people of Vietnam. But they can only help you if you help them. When you see the American Soldiers wearing the big black horse on their shoulder, remember we are your friends.



11th Armored Cavalry Regiment
"Black Horse" Patch.

LỰC LƯỢNG 11 Kừ BÌNH THIẾT GIÁP CỦA
HOA-Kừ ĐÃ ĐẾN VIỆT-NAM. NHỮNG XE TĂNG
HẠNG NẶNG CỦA HỌ SẼ TÌM KIẾM VÀ TIÊU DIỆT
BỘN VIỆT CỘNG DỄ DÀNG. KHI NÀO HỌ KHÔNG
CHIẾN ĐẤU CHUNG BỘN VIỆT-CỘNG PHÁ HOẠI
ĐỒNG BÀO, THÌ CÁC CHIẾN SĨ Kừ BÌNH THIẾT
GIÁP HOA-Kừ SẼ GIÚP ĐỖ XÂY CẤT TRƯỜNG HỌC,
SẴN SỐC BỆNH HOAN VÀ PHÂN PHÁT THỰC- PHẨM
CHO ĐỒNG BÀO VIỆT NAM.

NHÚNG HỌ CHỈ CÓ THỂ GIÚP ĐỖ ĐỒNG BÀO
KHI ĐỒNG BÀO GIÚP ĐỖ HỌ. KHI NÀO ĐỒNG BÀO
THẤY NHỮNG BÌNH SĨ HOA-Kừ MANG HUY HIỆU
CON NGỰA ĐEN TRÊN VAI HỌ, HÃY NHỚ RẰNG
CHÚNG TÔI LÀ BẠN CỦA ĐỒNG BÀO.

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
INCLOSURE 5
REFERENCE NOTES

1. CONARC Msg 50834, 18 January 1966, Subject: Assignment of BCT graduates for AIT.
2. DA Msg 758932, 7 April 1966, Subject: Final Readiness Dates (C)
3. MACV Msg 07209, 6 March 1966, Subject: Modification of Organic M-113's.
4. 11 ACR Msg 7302, 21 April 1966, Subject: Request for Armament for M577A1.
5. C NARC Msg 55025, 18 April 1966, Subject: Assignment of UMI Codes.
6. DA Msg 766997, 27 May 1966, Subject: Request for Theater Clearance.
7. DA Msg 764645, 12 May 1966, Subject: Authorization to 11th ACR to Publish Advance Movement Directives.
8. 1st Army Msg 21485, 10 June 1966, Subject: Shipment of M113's and M113A's to Ft Meade from Camps A.P. Hill and Lickett.
9. USARV Msg 52482, 14 June 1966, Subject: Equipment Needed by the Advance Party.
10. USARV Msg 52483, 14 June 1966, Subject: Advance Planning Group.
11. Ft Meade GO43, 1 October 1965, Subject: Reorganization 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment under TOE 17-51E.
12. (S) OPORD 05-66 September 1966, Subject: Road Runner Operation involving 1/11 Cav and C/27th Engr Bn.
13. (C) OPORD 07-66 October 1966, Subject: Operation Lunar - 2/11 route reconnaissance.
14. (C) OPORD 08-66 September 1966, Subject: Operation Uniontown - 1/11 & 2/11 Security of Bien Hoa area.
15. (C) OPORD 06-66 October 1966, Subject: Operation Hickory - 3/11 search and destroy and security of engineer elements.
16. (C) OROD 09-66 October 1966, Subject: Search and destroy and security of the base camp area.
17. (S) OPLRD 03-66 31 July 1966, Subject: Receive, process and prepare 11th Arm Cav Regt to a state of combat ready status.

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INCLOSURE 6
MEDCAP LEAFLET

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Các bạn Việt Nam thân mến


Lực lượng Hoa-Kỳ đến đây để
tiếp tay với chánh phủ Việt Nam
trong việc cải-thiện đời sống
của các bạn. Hành-động cụ thể
là để gửi các toán Y-Tế Dân-Sự
Vệ, Bác sĩ, Y-Tá vào các làng
mọc trong toàn lãnh thổ miền
Nam để khám sức khỏe và điều
trị cho nhiều bạn. Đó là ví dụ
điển hình về sự quan tâm của
chánh phủ đến sức khỏe và hạnh
phúc của các bạn.

Một cuộc sống hạnh phúc
phải cần có sức khỏe. 246-279
Medical instructions entered in
this space.



Các bạn vừa mới được trị liệu
do toán Y-Tế Dân-Sự-Vệ Đồng
Minn. Trong gói này là thuốc
của các bạn do Bác-sĩ cho toa.
Hãy theo đúng lời dặn của Bác
sĩ trong toa.

INCLOSURE 7
ORGANIZATIONAL CHART 11TH
ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENT




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INCLOSURE 8.
COMBAT OPERATIONS AFTER ACTION REPORT:
OPERATION HICKORY

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COMBAT OPERATIONS AFTER ACTION REPORT
OPERATION HICKORY



3D SQUADRON
11TH ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENT
"WORKHORSE OF THE BLACKHORSE"

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS
3D SQUADRON 11TH ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENT
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96257

AVIC-ZR

26 October 1966

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RVC: MAVOJ 3-32)

THRU: Commanding Officer
11th Armored Cavalry Regiment
ATTN: S3
APO US Forces 96257

TO: Commander
U.S. Military Assistance Command, VIETNAM
ATTN: J343
APO US Forces 96243

References:

- a. OPORD 06-66 (Operation HICKORY), Headquarters, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, 1 Oct 66.
- b. OPORD 03-66 (Operation HICKORY), Headquarters, 3-11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, 2 Oct 66.

1. NAMES OR IDENTITY AND/OR TYPE OF OPERATION
 - a. Operation HICKORY
 - b. Search and Destroy/Route and Area Reconnaissance.
2. DATES OF OPERATION. 070518 October through 152130 October 1966.
3. LOCATION. NHON TRACH District in area designated by Annex B (OPORD Overlay). References: Map, VIETNAM, 1:50,000, Sheets, 6330 I, 6330 II (Series L7014).
4. CONTROL HEADQUARTERS. 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment.
5. REPORTING OFFICER. LTC Palmer A. Peterson.
6. TASK ORGANIZATION. See Annex A.
7. SUPPORTING FORCES.
 - a. Air Support
 - (1) Preplanned air strikes: None.
 - (2) Immediate air strikes: One immediate air strike was requested on known VC positions Vio YSO770'9, but request was refused by the District Chief to proximity of populated area. The objective was a clearly defined hill which could have been identified and easily hit by a low performance aircraft.

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GROUP 4
DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVAL
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

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SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RVC: MACVJ: 3-32) (Cont)

The FAC was in the air over the Area of Operation by 0800 hours each day of operation.

b. Squadron and Regimental Aviation.

(1) A total of 101 hours of air time was recorded by helicopter pilots flying in support of the ground action. Of that, 49 hours were flown in UH-1B aircraft and 52 hours flown in OH-23G aircraft.

(2) A total of 5 strikes from light fire teams were flown. Specific results of the strikes could not be determined, but they contributed in at least two cases in neutralizing VC fire. The following ordnance was expended.

2.75 Inch Rockets - 140 rds.

7.62 Linked - 12,000 rds.

(3) Helicopter support was also used for Forward Observer missions (total of 3 hours) and for aerial resupply. The major item resupplied by air was gasoline. Six-Hundred gallons were brought in by helicopter in barrels and five gallon containers. Other items such as repair parts, radio batteries, artillery ammunition (60 rounds), and mortar ammunition (35 rounds) were also flown in by helicopter.

c. Artillery.

(1) General: Several artillery units were available to provide fire support for the operation as indicated below. However, the major artillery fires utilized came from the Squadron's Howitzer Battery.

(2) Units:

(a) A/C-27 Artillery (8"/175mm) (CS): Provided on call fires in objective area. Fires not employed.

(b) 1/B/115 Artillery (105mm) (ARVN) (CS): Provided on call fires in objective area. Fires not employed.

(c) Howitzer Battery 1-11 Armored Cavalry Regiment (CS Rein): provided on call fires in objective area. Fired effective illumination when command post came under attack on 080045 October 1966.

(d) Howitzer Battery 3-11 Armored Cavalry Regiment (ATCHO): Fired a total of 957 rounds of ammunition during the operation, 637 HE, 146 illumination, and 174 AP. The battery was used primarily to fire H & I fires on suspected or possible VC base camps, supply pts, etc; to provide illumination for the fighting units; and to give close support, protective, and destructive fire as required. In addition, the location of the Howitzer Battery in the CP complex added greatly to CP security.

Results:

1. H & I Fires: One secondary explosion resulted from a mission fired on coord 15C5850 on the evening of 14 Oct. On this mission HE was fired with fuze delay which would have a mine effect and could explode ordnance either on the surface of the ground or buried slightly beneath. The explosion lasted for 10 seconds. Other results were indeterminate.

2. Illumination: Illumination missions were fired nightly during the operation. Diamond formations were fired with great success using four howitzers; pentagon formations w/five howitzers were also very effective (the sixth howitzer was deadlined). The battery found that it was possible to illuminate its own position by using the following data: Chg 1, Fuze time, Time 7.3 - 7.5 sec, QE 1150 - 1350M. In adjusting this fire, it was found to be more effective to give lateral shifts in terms of number of turns of the handwheel rather than in terms of deflection changes. Also, illumination was used to light the way for Armored Vehicles moving through the jungle and for protection of isolated elements.

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SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RVC: MACVJ 3-32) (Cont)

3. Close-Support: Close support fire was found to be very effective; however, there were many occasions when it could not be utilized due to the proximity of villages that had been designated as a no-fire area by the District Chief. Air observation was practically the only means for registering or adjusting fire due to the heavily vegetated terrain. Close support was utilized within 100 meters of troops without inflicting any U.S. casualties. The Squadron's Battery responded with exceptional speed, accuracy, and care when notified that close support was required. Despite the nearness of heavily populated areas, only one civilian casualty was reported as result of artillery fire.

4. Ammunition: Low ASR of illumination rounds was the only deficiency in ammunition resupply; however, this had no effect on missions.

5. Survey: Accurate data was difficult to obtain. The azimuth gyroscopes was not used because of the constant vibrations caused by the helicopter traffic in and out of the CP. Sun shots were not particularly useful, as the movement of the sun near the equator is not conducive to good survey.

(e) Mortar Battery (Provisional) 3-11 Armd Cav Regt (ATCHO):

For this operation fires of the Troop mortar sections were under control of the Squadron FSCC, which was headed by the How Btry Commander. In addition, when the situation and terrain made it advantageous, at least two troop mortar sections were combined into one battery known as Mortar Battery (Provisional). More details on the functioning, advantages, and disadvantages of this system are discussed in paragraph 14c under "Special Equipment and Techniques". During the operation the provisional battery fired 371 rounds of ammunition: 9 Illumination, 28 WP, and 252 HE. The battery was particularly effective in illuminating the CP area, isolated positions, etc. It fired several H & I missions but had few missions in a close support role.

8. INTELLIGENCE:

a. Prior to Operation: Information on the enemy and the area of operations was obtained from the following sources. US advisors from the LONG THANH and NHON TRACH sub-sectors and the BIEN HOA Sector, HQ III Corps (ARVN), Regional Force units in the area to include Reconno Teams, and current INTSUMS and area studies from II Field Force V. Detailed information on routes, bridges, etc., was furnished by the 517th Engr. Bn. The information gathered indicated that the 3d Sqdn, 11th Armd Cav Regt would be opposed by one local force company, consisting of four identified local force platoons and by several other guerrilla platoons and squads. Information from Reconno Teams further indicated that the main VC strong points were in the PHU HOI area (YS080878) which led the Squadron to concentrate its power in that sector of the Area of Operations. The VC would also have a reinforcing capability from the 4th Bn, 165 A Regt (Capital District) loc Vic YS9893 and the C240 local force company located Vic YS1789. It was further reported that the VC controlled LTL Route 25 from Vic YS110895 to YS040875 and Provincial Route 319 from Vic YS148850 to YS080798. The VC control all villages between the coordinates of the routes mentioned above. In addition intelligence indicated a major VC supply route from the area to the north of the Area of Operation, then south along the routes listed above, and then east to the HAT DICH area Vic YS3086. VC activity in the past 30 days had been limited to harassing attacks on small outposts. Tunnelling and building of trenches and fortifications had been reported increasing in the area, with the brunt of the work being levied on the non-combatants in the area.

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SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RVC: MACVJ 3-32) (Cont)

Reports of enemy capabilities did not list any mortar or AT strength. It was surmised that the enemy would attempt to flee the area or go into hiding when the Squadron and RF forces arrived.

b. Value of Prior Intelligence: The intelligence prior to the operation was both accurate and valuable. The following describes what was generally encountered. The VC encountered in the Area of Operations operated primarily in squad size units. The main weapons employed by the VC were rifles, AW, grenades, claymore mines, and booby traps. In no case did the VC employ mortars, AT weapons, or large command detonated mines. The VC employment of the claymore mine was quite effective and inflicted casualties on some key personnel. The VC engaged

US Forces only from ambush, secure sniper positions, or when surprised. In all cases, the VC chose the tactical withdrawal in preference to staying and fighting. His favorite technique was to plan his escape into a populated area where fires could not be placed. In no case did the VC intentionally engage (other than by sniper fire or claymore mines) a mounted armored force. He rather chose to attack dismounted patrols, CP's and CP's. As the accuracy of the previous intelligence became apparent, the Squadron was able to adjust its tactics to moving more rapidly and into some heavily wooded terrain. With the possibility of a major ambush somewhat remote, the Squadron was able to risk moving through the close terrain. The report of the roads in the area being part of a major supply route proved to be quite accurate when a patrol located over 200 tons of rice in the village of BEN SAN (YS115900).

c. Intelligence During the Operations: The employment of the ARVN Reconno Teams in Phase I of the operation was quite successful in confirming disposition and size of VC forces in the area. Complete details of this reconnaissance are recounted in the events of 6 Oct under paragraph 11, "EXECUTION". The other major source of intelligence during the operation was patrolling. Through this method routes, tunnels, trenches, caches, VC positions were located and destroyed. No ASA units, SLAR or RED HAZE missions, SPAN, or friendly agents were used during the operation. MI personnel were used to question civilians and VCS with no significant results. One VCS who had been released previously was later confirmed when he was killed in a fire fight and his body recognized by US personnel. One weakness of intelligence was interrogation of prisoners and suspects. In order to get timely information from interrogation on a joint operation it is necessary to combine the efforts of the US and ARVN interrogation teams. If either of the two forces assumes the whole burden, the result is limited value of the interrogation to the other force.

9. MISSION: TF 3-11 Armored Cavalry conducts search and destroy Opn Vio PHU HOI (YSC80800) and secures 517th Engineer area and route recon teams 070518 October 1966.

10. CONCEPT OF OPERATION:

a. Manuever: Opn conducted in 3 phases.

(1) Phase I (4-6 Oct): TF employs RVN Reconno Teams in AO to isolate enemy activity.

(2) Phase II (7 Oct):

a. TF conducts night-march from staging area to PHOU THEN (YS128897).

b. Upon release at RP, TF deploys to seal areas DAKOTA and VIRGINIA from South. TF M clears ROUTE RAB to PHU HOI. RF units attack from North to secure PHU HOI. TF O initiates route and area recon of ROUTE GOLD and areas J, Z.

(3) Phase III:

(a) Upon completion of Phase II, TF secures areas BRAVO, YANKEE, and TANGO in that order.

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SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RVC: MACVJ 3-32) (Cont)

(b) Tm O conducts area recon as areas are secured. One Tm secures Tm O route recon element during route recon of ROUTES RED and GRAY.

b. Fires:

- (1) Arty and TAC Air: Pri init Tm L.
- (2) Lt fire Tm: Pri init Tm N. Seal movmt North from area

TEXAS.

- (3) No fires auth in restricted areas unless in contact with

enemy.

c. Tasks:

- (1) Tm I: Seal sector of area DAKOTA. Prep to atk West to link-up with Tm N. Spt Tm L on order.
- (2) Tm K: Seal South and West sector of area VIRGINIA. Prep to link-up with Tm N. Spt Tm L on order.
- (3) Tm L: Seal West then South of area DAKOTA. Link-up with Tm N. Prep to spt Tm K, I or M on order.
- (4) Tm M: Clear ROUTE RED to PHU HOI. Prep to clear ROUTE RED to YSO34872.
- (5) Tm O: On order initiated route and area recon of ROUTE GOLD and areas J, Z.
- (6) How Btry:
- (7) Avn Sec:
 - (a) Phase I: Spt drop and pick up of RVN Recoonda Tms.
 - (b) Phase II: Seal movmt North from area TEXAS.
 - (c) Phase III: GS.

d. Coordinating Instructions:

- (1) No recon flights of AO after 021200 Oct 66.
- (2) Troops restricted to staging area 03 and 6 Oct 66.
- (3) SP: YTO60121. SP Time: 070518 Oct 66.
- (4) Route of March: ROUTE GREEN.
- (5) Rate of March: 40 KPH (25 MPH).
- (6) Order of March: L, M, K, I, How/CP.
- (7) RP: YS128898.
- (8) National Policemen employed on all search missions in populated areas.

(9) Crews for ACAV's that have not been processed remain in staging area. Upon arrival of vehicles, ACAV's processed and moved to AO on order.

(10) Any questions on identification or location of RF/PF Furnos refer to TOC (just prior to the operation all RF Force secured a piece of white cloth on breast pocket).

- (11) SI, Base Camp Commander for period of Opn.

11. EXECUTION.

General: Headquarters 11th Armd Cav Regt issued OPORD 06-66 (Operation HICKORY) on 2 Oct 66 assigning 3-11 Armd Cav Regt the mission as stated in paragraph 9 above. 3-11 Armd Cav Regt then issued OPORD 03-66 (Operation HICKORY) on 3 Oct 66 and conducted a briefing on 4 Oct 66 for all US Forces to be involved. On 5 Oct 66 the 3-11 Armd Cav Regt briefed the RF Commanders and the US advisors who would be involved in the operation.

At the time of the operation the units of the 3-11 Armd Cav Regt were not completely equipped, 32 ACAV's (M113 Modified) not having arrived in country. This being the first operation, extensive time had been spent in prior weeks preparing equipment, test firing and zeroing of weapons, and conducting patrols outside the perimeter. During the operation, the Squadron continued to man its share of the Regimental perimeter in the staging area at LONG BINH.

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SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RVC: MACVJ 3-32) (Cont)

The rear detachment was commanded by the S1 and consisted of 270 personnel from the Squadron. The figure 270 consisted of 55 men from Troops I, K, and L, and 105 men which came primarily from Hq Troop with small numbers from Co M and How Btry. The availability of personnel in the line units was due to the non-arrival of approximately 30 AGLV's. It is significant that the first casualty (One KIA sniper fire) in the Staging Area occurred during the Squadron's absence. This may be due to the curtailment of active patrolling outside the perimeter which gave VC snipers greater opportunity to approach the perimeter. It also points out the necessity to train personnel who normally perform administrative work to conduct patrols. Such a program will be initiated during the later part of October 1966.

6 October 1966:

Phase I of the operation was initiated by dropping three ARVN Reconno Teams of four men each in the AO. Purpose was to gain definitive intelligence on the enemy before moving into the area and to check out a report that 1000 VC had moved from the HLT DICH area to NHON TRACH District.

TM 1. Debarked helicopter at YS096867 and moved to YS106857 where they heard voices (40 VC). The Tn then moved West and saw 3 VC guards at YS093857. Tn continued West to a rubber plantation where it spotted 3 more VC guards at YS087863. Tn moved on to YS081867 where it spotted 100 armed VC taking shelter in the people's houses at YS080863. Tn then started East when it received B&R and rifle fire from (1) VC platoon at YS089867. Tn was picked up by helicopter at YS105670 at 1830 hrs.

TM 2. After landing at YS143800, the Tn moved NW where it was chased by (1) VC squad at YS136883. Tn ran North and spotted 80 VC armed mostly with M-1 rifles relaxing at 139834. The Tn moved West where it met one (1) VC platoon at YS139834. Due to heavy VC fire the Reconno Team had to withdraw to PHOUC THO outpost (YS142828) at 1230 hrs.

TM 3. After landing at YS143800, the Tn moved South where it encountered (4) VC who gave the alarm at YS142790. Tn then moved on and crossed a road at AP BA TROUNG. There the Tn received heavy fire from three machine guns and one (1) mortar (60 VC sited) from a VC company Vic YS142780. Tn withdrew and then moved West to YS123786. At this point the Tn spotted (6) VC coming from YS121785; Tn then took shelter at a forest hedge Vic YS107792. There the Tn spotted (3) VC (1 woman) moving West along the road. The Tn was forced to open fire and killed 1 VC and wounded another. Tn moved on and encountered (1) VC platoon at YS095787. Tn received heavy fire from this platoon. Tn then withdrew into VONG CAM outpost (YS088795) at 1300 hrs the same day.

Results: From the Reconno Tn's observations it was determined that there was at least (1) VC Battalion in the PHOUC-THO, PHOUC AN areas, and (2) VC Companies in the PHU HOI area. Although the VC were not encountered in this strength during the operation, it was apparent that there had been a large size VC force in the area shortly before the operation was executed.

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SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RVC: MACVJ 3-32) (Cont)

7 October 1966:

At 0518 hrs the Squadron moved from the Staging area to begin execution of Phase II of the operation, which envisioned a sealing of the areas indicated in the concept. The plan was not to physically occupy all the terrain along the area boundaries, but to seal the areas by use of strong points and patrols while a search and destroy operation was being conducted by Tn N in PHU HOI.

Tm L led the march and after passing the RT experienced some problems in finding its turn off. Although the route was clearly apparent from the air, the point of entrance into the route was grown over with vegetation and not visible on the ground. To correct the situation smoke was thrown from a helicopter to direct Tm L to the point where it should turn. With tanks in the lead Tm L moved through the jungle creating a road as it moved.

Once Tm L was redirected, the Squadron sealed the areas as planned at 0715 hrs. Air observers at about 0900 hrs reported large numbers of personnel moving SW from the direction of the sealed area. Some of these personnel were later reported as woodcutters; however, there is no doubt that many of them were VC who had escaped the trap. A request to engage was directed to the District Chief, but it was refused.

While the Squadron teams were marching to the RT, Tm N (two RF companies) moved by assault boats from C.T L.I (YS960895) up the DONG NAI River and down a tributary where it disembarked at YS075893. Tm N as well as the Squadron Tm's from the South encountered sporadic sniper fire while moving into the area. While moving across the rice paddies toward PHU HOI, the RF companies had to stay on the paddy dikes. The paddy itself was bottomless and foot movement was impossible. This seemed to be true of the rice paddies on river banks. No enemy was reported escaping to the North by the 1st fire team flying over the area. Tm N occupied a portion of the PHU HOI area at 0932 hrs, but due to a misunderstanding of instructions did not conduct any sizeable search and destroy missions the rest of the day. Throughout the rest of the day Squadron Tm's attempted to constrict their sectors toward PHU HOI. Tm K and Tm I found unoccupied tunnel complexes which they destroyed with demolitions.

Tm M: Tm M was engaged in a route clearance mission Vic BEN CM (YS095890) and encountered a section of road which was nothing but guagnire. Since there was no by-pass available, Tm M attempted to repair the route by using tank dozers to fill an approach and subsequently use an AVLB to gap the worst part. This failed when the AVLB (Modified M48A1 chassis) continually got stuck in the mud. It is felt that an AVLB with a more powerful chassis (M60) could have successfully brought the bridge into place. At 1455, elements of Tm M requested a dustoff for one man wounded by a sniper. The wounded man had been conducting mine sweeping operations near PHU HOI. Dustoff arrived 20 minutes later. At 2355 hours the Squadron CP came under attack by the VC who emplaced command detonated claymore mines around the CP. The best estimate of what occurred is that approximately four VC, infiltrated to within fifty meters of the CP perimeter (YS114923) and emplaced four claymore mines 25 meters apart. The intended direction of the blast would carry fragments between the outer perimeter elements into the command and control vehicles. However, one VC tripped a flare illuminating his position and alerting the perimeter. The VC fired one claymore after being brought under fire by the perimeter. One US casualty was sustained from the blast of the claymore, while one VC was believed hit by perimeter fire. The following morning revealed three remaining claymores in position but incomplete for detonation.

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SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RVC: MACVJ 3-32) (Cont)

Major problems encountered during the first day were difficulties in land navigation; lack of adequate road nets in the area; and impassable terrain. Some of the problems with the terrain resulted from inexperience with the area and inability to adequately judge the trafficability of the ground. In soft terrain, drivers must be cautioned not to follow in the tracks of another vehicle. Also many tanks got stuck because they were sent into areas which could not support a tank. Problems also arose when Tn N failed to understand that it was to push South into area TEXAS. Occasional thunder showers during the day added to the problems of extracting mired vehicles. The Squadron began making its own roads with bulldozers, tanks and ACHV's to increase its access to certain areas.

At 2200 hrs BRG O 9-66 was issued giving missions for the following day.

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SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RVC: MACVJ 3-32) (Cont)

8 October 1966:

No major change to task organization. Tm's move to execute JBRAG O 9-66 which ordered continuation of search and destroy operations in sector, recons of areas Y, Z and J and ROUTE GOLD. Tm I supported the recon of area Y by searching the area with elements from one platoon. Tm K supported the recon of ROUTE GOLD and areas Z & J by detaching one platoon to Tm O. The rest of Tm K blocked in sector. Tm O moved to recon ROUTE GOLD and areas Z & J. Tm N began a search of area TEXAS. Tm M assumed security of portions of area VIRGINIA and blocked in sector. The light fire team conducted air recon missions Vic YS0686 - YS1479 - YS1486 - YS0680. Howitzer Battery/CP moved location to YS125895.

The missions assigned for the day were all successfully completed. In general the area recons were accomplished by securing the area and then flying in the Engineer elements. At this time the necessary photographs, soil samples, and probe readings were made by the Engineers for further analysis later on.

No major enemy activity was encountered throughout the day. Tm N encountered sniper fire at 1050 hrs while searching houses in area TEXAS. Fire came from a small hill Vic YS078878. When fire continued a lt fire team was called, and it saturated the hill with rockets and MG fire. Results of the helicopter attack could not be determined due to the dense foliage on the hill. The RF companies, in the meantime, had been ordered by their commander to stay where they were. Finally in the afternoon, the Squadron Liaison Officer with the two companies was able to get an order from the RF command for them to attack the hill which was probably heavily entrenched and booby trapped. The order was obtained through the other liaison officer who was with the RF CP group and the US advisors. The problem here was getting the RF forces to execute our missions as quickly as possible; however, there is no pat solution except to be completely familiar with their command structure. The attack was made by moving generally NW to YS072878 and then following the road to the hill. When the two RF companies reached coord YS077879 they were taken under AW fire. The fire was returned, the VC fled (2 or 3), and the RF forces left the area. The hill was never attacked, and probably still contains many VC positions.

Squadron teams encountered sniper fire and continued to find tunnels and booby traps. Particular discomfiture during the day was the mining of 3 M48's, 1 VCR, and several ACAV's mostly in Tm I. This occurred as Tm I was attempting to link up with blocking positions established by Tm M in Vic of BEN CAM. Tm I had successfully moved through dense jungle terrain never before traversed, winding NW down a ridge line from YS091881 to YS090886 where it joined LTL 25. However, after moving a short distance East along this route it encountered a thin crusted, bottomless section of road at YS096890 which engulfed the 3 M48's, the M88 and several ACAV's.

CIVIL AFFAIRS: One MACAV team was flown into PHU HOI during the day and treated 200 people for various illnesses. The people had never experienced this service and seemed quite grateful.

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SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RVC: 12-GVJ 3-32) (Cont)

9 October 1966:

Squadron issued FRAG O 10-66 which ordered continuation of search and destroy operations in the PHU HOI area and blocking of VC escape routes to the South. Instructions in the FRAG O specifically mentioned using the National Policemen in the questioning of VC suspects. There were two major changes to the task organization. The RF CO's reverted to RF control 090400 October 66 for Opn Vio YS082917 for suspected VC locations. Tm K detached one platoon for convoy escort and CP security. The CP was not moved. Resupply was to be effected at 1030 hours at YS110895. Units would move in total to the resupply point as ordered, while an adjacent Tm would screen their sector. Assigned tasks for the day were accomplished.

There was one major enemy encounter during the day's operation which occurred at the resupply point. Located near the supply point (Vic of BEN CAM) was the Provisional Mortar Battery consisting of Tm I and Tm L's mortars. While vehicles were refueling in the area, the VC apparently were laying an ambush. At 1155 hours PFC PIERCE from I Troop moved toward an CP located outside the perimeter. This may have caused the VC to believe they were about to be detected, so they opened fire. PFC PIERCE was shot in the chest and later died of his wounds. The tanks attached to I Troop immediately returned the fire with cannister volleys. In the meantime, M Co who was enroute to Refuel, arrived in the area and also took the VC under heavy cannister fire.

Tm M had an Armored Cavalry Platoon (3 Platoon, K Troop) attached to it and committed it here to make a dismounted sweep of BEN CAM. At the same time Provisional Mortar Battery, as an armored force, moved to block from the East. The cannister fire from the tanks and the dismounted element accounted for 5 VC KIA (BC) and one house destroyed with secondary explosions. These were the first VC KIA's by the Regiment.

There were no major problems on 9 October except in learning how to set up resupply points on firm ground to facilitate rapid resupply. It is significant to note here that the Squadron effected its first resupply on the third day out.

CIVIL AFFAIRS: One MEDCAP mission was accomplished in the PHU HOI Village which treated 70 civilians. It is noteworthy that PHU HOI has been a VC dominated village for several years.

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SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RVC: MACVJ 3-32) (Cont)

10 October 1966:

Squadron issued FRAG O 11-66 which directed further search and destroy operations for 1000 hours in PHU HOI with Tms I & L. Tm N would rejoin the Squadron at 1000 hours and would link up with Tm L to the West of PHU HOI. In addition, Tms M & K would attack BEN CAM (YS103897) at 1000 hours. Upon completion of these missions, Tm's would lager and marry up with Tm N for an attack on area BRAVO the next day. The FRAG O was implemented with the exception that Tm N did not marry up with the other Tms and BEN CAM was not subjected to attack. This was due to the time required by the Squadron to recover vehicles for Tm N which were mired in the mud. Additionally, resupply was late which post-poned the time of the attack to late in the day, which was unacceptable.

Enemy activity was very light with sniper fire being the primary VC activity. Several vacant tunnels and trench systems were discovered in the search and destroy mission in the PHU HOI area (YS091889).

An attempt to employ AVLB (YS091889) failed when the vehicle got badly stuck approaching a gap that was to be bridged. Balk bridging could not be used due to nonavailability of bolts and stringers used in its assembly.

CIVIL AFFAIRS: One MEDCAP mission was employed in the village of LONG THEIN (YS125895). 140 people were treated.

11 October 1966:

No major change in task organization except that 1 platoon from Tm K still secured the CP and all three RF companies reverted to Tm N control. Squadron issued FRAG O 12-66 which committed Tms I and L to continue securing the PHU HOI area to block VC movement South. Tms K & M were to conduct recon of ROUTE GREY and areas TANGO and BRAVO. Tm N was to conduct operations to the North (YS082917) in pursuit of VC political cadre.

As Tms M and K moved down ROUTE GREY to the South they began to encounter several cuts in the road dug by the VC. Finally, when the TF reached coordinates (YS148846) it could move no further. The road was badly cut with no apparent by-pass. At about 1000 hours the S3 flew into the area by helicopter to check out the situation. After surveying the situation the S3 organized a recon party to check out the condition of the road further South. The recon party moved down the road with security to the flanks, front and rear to protect itself from ambush. Nevertheless, a VC in hiding detonated a claymore mine which had not been detected by the security elements. Five men were wounded by the blast, but thanks to their armored vests no one was killed. The Tm N Commander quickly organized a defense around the wounded and had them evacuated. The mission of reconnoitering ROUTE GREY had to be abandoned for the rest of the operation, and a different route found to area BRAVO. The Engineers decided that the recon of area BRAVO could be permanently abandoned.

While the above activities were taking place Tm N began operations further North where ARVN intelligence indicated political cadre were in hiding. Departing CLT LAI (YS960895) by boat at 0400 hours the Tm moved up the DONG Nai River. Approximately four miles up the river from CLT LAI Tm N shot and killed one VC who fell into the river after he was shot. Recovered on the bank were two full magazines (banana type), a small amount of AK50 Czech rounds, a gas mask, an oil lamp, and some medical supplies. Tm N then continued its move up the river and later disembarked at 0700 hours at YS077918. At 0830 hrs Tm N launched an assault toward LONG DIEN (YS079914) on two axes.

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SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RVC: MACVJ 3-32) (Cont)

During the assault there were two light encounters with no VC confirmed kills. Also, during the assault the Tm found a claymore mine factory which had been in full production until the Tm's arrival. Several mines and tools were recovered.

About 1200 hours on the 11th, a patrol, 3d platoon, K Troop, reported ~~that~~ it found a large cache of rice in the village of BEN SAN (YS115900). Tremendous stores of rice were located in every hut for no apparent reason except that it was to be used by the VC. One old man in the village had whispered to MI personnel, who later checked out the report, that the rice belonged to the VC. The rice was estimated to be 150 tons or more. The next problem arose when a decision could not be made within US channels on what to do with the rice. A meeting between the Regimental S5 and the NHON TRACH District Chief was planned for tomorrow to solve the problem. In the meantime, Squadron issued FRAG O 13-66 which was designed to block any VC attempts to extract the rice. A flare ship was called in to assist in this operation. The task organization changed by assigning K Troop (with two platoons) to lager under TF Com and perform CO security and attaching the remaining platoon of K Troop to Tm N.

Other activity during the day included the following: An ambush patrol from L Troop took a VC squad under fire Vic YS086880 at approximately 0330 hours. L Troop reported shooting two VC located on a pagoda. The CP moved to YS114907 toward dusk.

12 October 1966:

Squadron continued to secure PHU HOI and the rice cache. Regimental S5 and an MI team checked out the amount of rice (confirmed 150 to 200 tons) and coordinated with the NHON TRACH District Chief, Captain TROUNG, for removal of the rice. Results were that the rice would be moved the next morning to government warehouses. US trucks would be made available if required. A flare ship was used to illuminate the area. The CP was not moved.

13 October 1966:

Squadron continued to secure PHU HOI area and the rice cache. The Vietnamese have bagged most of the rice for transport to government warehouses.

Enemy activity was light. M Company was hit by AW fire at approximately 1600 hours. Heavy canister and AW fire was returned with no known VC casualties. There were no US casualties, but at least two civilians were injured in the fire fight and had to be evacuated.

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SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RVC: M.CVJ- 3-32) (Cont)

14 October 1966:

Squadron continued security of the HU HOI area and the rice cache. By end of the day all rice should be removed. I Troop which had several vehicles mired in the mud was mobile again, which meant that the Squadron would be able to complete the mission by reconnoitering Area BRAVO tomorrow.

At 1505 the CP arrived at its new location which was in I Troop's area (YS106887). K Troop was still under TF control, but was left in place to secure extraction of the rice.

At 1600 a dismounted patrol from Tm M which consisted primarily of the 3d Platoon of K Troop attached to Tm M was ambushed. The patrol had used the same route of return in patrolling the BEN CM area (YS099873), and at least a squad of VC was waiting when the patrol approached. The attack was made with claymore mines and a hail of hand grenades. Four men were immediately wounded and members of the patrol moved up to cover them and aid in their extraction. LTC J. CKSON, who had come from the rear of the patrol to cover the wounded was killed by a grenade. While the fire fight was going on the XO from Tm M and the Squadron Interpreter rushed to aid the patrol. Both received fragmentation wounds in the leg. In addition, Sgt Corbin, Platoon Sgt from 2d Platoon, K Troop which was securing the rice in the area took 12 men to help cover the wounded. The fire fight lasted no more than ten minutes with the following US casualties: 1 KIA, 9 wounded (plus one ARVN Interpreter). Seven VC were killed (RC). From examination of armored vests and steel helmets, it was apparent that several lives had been saved by this equipment. The VC again chose their escape into the village of BEN CM where pursuit was not plausible, nor where fires could be placed.

15 October 1966:

FRAG O 14-66 which was issued on the 14th but which was to be implemented on the 15th changed the task organization to the following:

TM I
I/3-11 (-)
Sec/M/3-11
1/3/919 Engr
Mort Btry (Prov)

TM N
N/3-11 (-)
1/K/3-11
1 M132A1
1/I/3-11

TM L
L/3-11
Sec/M/3-11
2/3/919 Engr
1 M132A1
1 RF Co.

TF CON
K/3-11 (-)
How Btry 3-11

The mission was to search and clear area BRAVO and to secure the area for Engineer reconnaissance. The concept was to move over multiple routes to secure areas DOG, CAT, and RAT (See Overlay Annex E). Upon securing these areas the attached RF Companies would conduct a more thorough search of the area and secure it for the Engineer teams which would come in by helicopter. Once the Engineers had made their necessary soil studies, etc., the TF would withdraw along ROUTE RED with heavy artillery preparations all along the route.

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SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RVC: MACVJ 3-32) (cont.)

At 0800 hours the TF consisting of Tm L and Tm M moved out to accomplish the assigned mission. Tm L moved on a route through the rubber between ROUTE BLACK and ROUTE GREEN while Tm M moved along ROUTE GREEN. The other routes were abandoned since they had been interdicted by the VC in several places. Moving generally South along the directions of attack indicated, the task force moved with little difficulty toward area BRAVO. At times it was able to move on line through the rubber plantation in the area. Area BRAVO was then secured as planned with no enemy resistance and the required reconnaissance accomplished.

Due to the late hour, 1600 hours, (some time had been spent extracting a stuck M48), the plan to come back on ROUTE RED was abandoned. ROUTE RED passes through some very dense terrain which would be extremely prone to ambush when darkness fell. Withdrawal was made along the direction of attack.

After issuing a movement order over the radio, the Squadron began a return march to the Staging Area (1730 hours). At 2000 hours all elements had returned to the Staging Area, ending OPERATION HICKORY.

CIVIL AFFAIRS:

One MEDCAP mission was employed in the village of BEN SAN (YS115900); 70 persons were treated.

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SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RVC: MACVJ 3-32) (Cont)

12. RESULTS:

a. Friendly:

U.S. - 2 KIA, 20 WIA

ARVN - 1 WIA

See Annex C (Casualty List)

b. Enemy:

(1) Personnel

- (a) 13 VC KIA (BC)
- (b) 2 VC KIA (POSS)
- (c) 0 VC KBA
- (d) 17 VCS Captured
- (e) 0 Detainees

(2) Fortifications destroyed:

- (a) 2 tunnels at YS076865 and YS086876.
- (b) 1 trench at YS067867,
- (c) 3 bunkers at YS067867.

(3) Fortifications not destroyed:

- (a) Communication trench from YS1038878 straight line to YS095889.
- (b) Trench system along ridge from YS094882 NW to YS090886.
- (c) Trenches and positions along both sides of the trail from YS113883 SW to YS097876.
- (d) Trenches and tunnels South of PHU HOI at YS077876.
- (e) Trench systems from YS059879 to YS057876, YS125795 to YS067874, and YS100878 to YS120889.
- (f) Tunnels at YS087877, and YS065872.

NOTE: The above communication, and tunnels (Items (a) thru (f)) would have required a major engineering effort to destroy for which there was no time available.

(4) Captured:

- 210 tons of rice
- 1 Box of used medical supplies
- 6 claymore mines
- 11 AP mines
- 15 blocks of TNT
- 3 - 81mm shells for booby traps.
- 75 Lbs of assorted tools used to make mines
- 1 acetylene torch used to make mines
- 2 full banana magazines
- 15 rounds Czech AK50
- 1 gas mask

(5) Equipment destroyed:

- 2 claymore mines

(6) Barriers:

- (a) Highway 319 at YS134783 as of 120945 Oct 66.
- (b) Highway 319 at YS147870 as of 11 050 Oct 66.
- (c) Highway 25 at PHU HOI (YS078876) and BEN C.M (YS091889).

(7) Enemy supply caches (Probable)

- (1) Hill tops YS092884 & YS097887.
- (2) Forest and Jungle areas at YS105860.

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SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RVC: MACVJ 3-32) (Cont)

13. ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS:

a. Supply: Logistical planning for Operation HICKORY was based upon research of after action reports of other Armored Cavalry units, conversations with other Armored Cavalry Squadron Staffs, and a logistical estimate of our own requirements. As a result it was felt the Squadron could sustain itself as long as 3 days without resupply. Based on this, it was determined that the Squadron would not organize combat and field trains nor have any unit trains elements accompany the combat elements during the operation. Instead resupply convoys would be fed to the Squadron as required. Not only would this action decrease the security requirement of the Squadron and thus enable it to maximize its combat power, but it would also enable the Squadron to move cross-country and free itself of the existing road net.

When Operation HICKORY was initiated, a specific time when the first resupply convoy would be mounted was not planned. Instead the S4 relied on the daily status reports submitted by the troops as a basis for when the first resupply convoy would be mounted. The first resupply convoy went quite well except for a few problems in organization of the resupply area. Instead of establishing separate refueling points (gas station concept), ammunition points, etc., the Transportation Platoon leader attempted to disperse his elements over a wide area as a security measure. This detracted from the speed required for such an operation. Additionally, it should be noted that for this environment, night resupply, dispersion of resupply elements, and all other factors demanded in conventional or nuclear operations are not required here. Security and speed are the primary prerequisites in Vietnam. Consequently, the demand for gas station type resupply points and decreased dispersion for maximum efficiency and security.

One other important factor is that wheeled resupply vehicles were extremely limited in cross-country movement. As a result, resupply was effected from the roads. In some cases this meant that teams had to travel up to 6 KM for resupply since the resupply elements could not traverse the terrain leading to their positions. This was not only wasteful of time, but from a tactical point of view it was quite detrimental to the effectiveness of the Squadron, because one Tm had to cover another Tm's area of responsibility during resupply. This should illustrate once again Armor's demand for tracked resupply vehicles.

In the future the Squadron intends to resupply every two days. Although it can operate for three days without resupply when necessary, the draw-down on the basic load requires a major resupply effort.

Aerial resupply was used on at least five occasions; three for 105mm Class V and two for Class III when units could not get to the resupply point because of poor trafficability. These missions placed a great strain on the Regimental Aviation Section which does not have the capability to provide on call aerial resupply to one Squadron, let alone three Squadrons. Two requests for CH-47 missions were requested, but both were denied due to non-availability of aircraft. Requests for non organic aerial support must be programmed at least 24 hours in advance and for maximum utilization should be included as part of the tactical planning for an operation. Aerial resupply should only be planned for areas and missions for which no other means of resupply exist. The following is a list of items expended during the operation.

- (1) Class I
 - A Rations - None
 - C Rations - 1463 cases
 - Water - 10,000 gal.

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SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RVC: MACVJ 3-32) (Cont)

- (2) Class III:
MOGAS - 14,200 Gals.
DIESEL - 12,200 Gals.
- (3) Class II & IV - See paragraph 13 b (2) below.
- (4) Class V: See Annex D, Ammunition expenditure.

b. Maintenance.

(1) Recovery Operations: Recovery of vehicles bogged in the mud constituted a major effort during the operation. In one case it took three days to recover a tank which had sunk up to the turret. The terrain, particularly in the Eastern portion of the PHU HOI Area, had a light crust which permitted some trafficability but which prevented tracking. The composition of the terrain caused build up on sprocket hubs resulting in some thrown tracks on tanks and M-88's. Dense vegetation hampered recovery and made it necessary in some cases to use bulldozers and tanks to cut new roads to stuck vehicles. The major cause of buried vehicles can be attributed to tracking, inexperience of track commanders with the terrain, and the thin crust which was prevalent only in the area noted above. In other areas the terrain was good and problems were not nearly as great.

(2) Repair Parts: With a density of 17 tanks, 64 M113 (ACAV), 10 M577A1, 9 M106A1 Mortar Carriers, 5 M108 Howitzers, 3 M132A1 Flamethrowers, 1 M48 AVLB, 4 M578 Recovery Vehicle, and 2 M88 Recovery Vehicles, the Squadron used the following parts during the operation:

- Rectifiers (100 Amp) - 4 ea.
- Alternators (100 Amp) - 1 ea.
- Regulators (100 Amp) - 6 ea.
- Distributors (M113) - 1 ea.
- Starters (M113) - 1 ea.
- Fuel Pumps (M113) - 2 ea.
- Alternator Bolts (M113) - 4 sets.
- Transfer Case Assy (M113) - 1 ea.
- Hub covers (M113) - 2 ea.
- Sprocket Bolts (M113) - 16 ea.
- Oil Buffer Assy (Cal 50) 1 ea.
- Spark Plugs (M113) - 8 ea.
- Front Cartridge Stop (Cal 50) - 4 ea.
- Centrifugal Pump (M48A3) - 1 ea.

Some 80% of these replacement parts were procured through the 218th CSS by cannibalization, 18% through PLL, 2% through direct support maintenance. Although many of the parts were delivered by air within a few hours after request, units complained that even that short delay caused them to hold up missions for a significant period of time or risk security of vehicles and crews. Units indicated that they would like to carry more high demand type parts in their maintenance elements. In any event, the tremendous reliance which the Squadron had to place on cannibalization for procurement of parts, is an indication of problems ahead when salvage yards are not available. Stockage levels of PLL must improve.

(3) Special Maintenance items:

(a) Fuel filters must be periodically drained of condensation to prevent water getting into the fuel systems.

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(b) Trim vanes were an unexpected maintenance problem. Fourteen (14) trim vanes had to be replaced by cannibalizing unserviceable M113's at the 218th CSS. The reason for the damage to this item was because it was used in the extended position to increase stand-off distance of HEAT rounds from AT weapons. Movement through heavy brush caused cracking, warping, and breaking of the plywood item. Personnel should be instructed not to use the trim vane except in river crossings for which it was designed.

c. Treatment of Casualties, Evacuation and Hospitalization: At no time during the operation was it necessary to move the Squadron aid station from the CP to a forward location. Troop medics on the scene were able to handle casualties adequately and prepare them for timely air evacuation. Average time for Dustoff was twenty minutes.

14. SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES.

a. ACAV (M113): The ACAV vehicle proved highly maneuverable in very difficult terrain. Its armored protection suffered minor damage from claymore mines and was not penetrated. There is no doubt that the tremendous fire power and armor protection of the ACAV discouraged major VC ambush.

b. Flame Thrower Carrier: The M132 proved highly maneuverable but adequate evaluation could not be made since its main armament was never employed.

c. Mortar Battery (Provisional): When situations permitted (i.e. when troops were all disposed within supporting range) the troop mortar sections were consolidated into a Squadron Mortar Battery. This system effected greater control and more efficient use of fires. All fire requests were channelled over the Howitzer Battery FDC net. The Howitzer Battery Commander, as the Squadron Fire Support Coordinator, then assigned the fire mission as appropriate. Since TOE does not provide personnel for mortar FDC's, personnel had to be taken from gun crews to run a mortar FDC. Whether the mortars are employed in section or battery, there remains the necessity for an FDC. With all three sections employed in battery one FDC can operate twenty-four hours with less fatigue and strain to personnel, thus decreasing human error. TOE also does not provide any type of vehicle to be used as an FDC. Temporarily a 1 1/2 ton trailer is serving this purpose, but it is totally inadequate. In all cases of employing the mortars, security, control and the ability to provide the fire support required were the prime factors to be considered. In many cases, as with K Troop on this operation, the balance of the advantages will tip in favor of the troops retaining control.

d. Airmobile Contact Teams: A four man airmobile contact team consisting of one senior track mechanic, one turret mechanic, and two track mechanics, was organized for this operation. Their purpose was to fly in and install major components such as transmissions, transfer cases, etc., which could be heli-lifted to disabled vehicles. The one attempt at using this system, which was the installing of a transfer case in an M113, was not successful. The reason for the failure was the inability to get proper sling arrangements to install the part. The idea of bringing in the major component by helicopter is sound. In addition it is necessary to get the skilled personnel to the scene as soon as possible to quickly install the item.

e. Organization for Combat: One of the objectives of the Squadron prior to reaching Vietnam was to organize itself in a full track configuration for combat. The purpose was to eliminate the reduced mobility which would no doubt result with wheeled vehicles in the organization, and to give maximum armor protection and fire power, throughout the Squadron. Another objective of the Squadron was to minimize the "frittering" away of combat power for security of the combat trains and CP. The following results were obtained.

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SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RVC: MACVJ 3-32) (Cont)

(1) Full track organization: All wheeled vehicles were eliminated from the fighting forces, to include the CP, with no major problems encountered. In addition the mobility and armor capabilities of the Squadron could be capitalized to the maximum. (See Annex F: Squadron Organization for Combat)

(2) CP Security: A Howitzer Battery/CP complex gave the CP an inherent self-protective capability. In certain situations and terrain, however, it was still necessary to use an Armored Cavalry Platoon in night security.

(3) Cutting of the Logistical Tail: As indicated in par 13 b above, the Squadron was not tied down by the security requirements of a long logistical column, but was free to utilize its full mobility and combat power. The major logistical problems occurred when resupply convoys could not go to the user, but had to have using elements come to them.

f. Ground Surveillance Radar: No effective use of GSR was made during the operation due to lack of batteries. Future operations will be needed to determine the full capability of GSR.

g. Basic Load: The basic load as developed and adopted by the Squadron is still being evaluated. There was not enough ammunition expended on this particular operation to obtain any meaningful conclusions.

h. Armored Vest: Wearing of the armored vest proved to be a life saver on several occasions. Although it will not stop a direct round, the armored vest does stop shrapnel from grenades and claymore mines. The vest does however, cause some heat sickness problems.

15. COMMANDER'S ANALYSIS: Overall the operation was a complete success both in completion of assigned mission and in the mutual cooperation achieved in working with the Regional Force units. As this report indicates there were many lessons learned and a tremendous amount of personal experience gained as a result of the operation. The chance to evaluate our operating techniques and smooth out normal internal problems before operating against a hard core VC Force will no doubt prove invaluable. In addition to these intangible results, the physical damage inflicted upon the enemy, plus the civil action, MEDCAP missions, etc., which were accomplished have begun to turn the VC out of an important resupply area. Also, the mutual respect and cooperation gained in working with the ARVN forces will open the doors to future successful operations of a joint nature. Although the Squadron spent a great deal of time and effort extracting mined vehicles, I do not believe it should reflect adversely on the capabilities of Armor in Vietnam. Most of our problems with the terrain were confined to small areas and tend to overshadow the actual cross country mobility that was achieved. Not to be ignored are experience factors which will no doubt cause an improvement in future operations, and the fact that much of the terrain is still soft from the monsoon rains.

The modified TOE which deleted the tanks from the Armored Cavalry Troops did not hamper the operations. Although the tanks were cross attached to Armored Cavalry Troops, in many cases by section, it is not necessary to tie the Troop to the lesser mobility of the tank.

Two major points are to be gained from the operation. The first is the merit of having an attached Infantry force to perform missions not appropriate to the Armored Cavalry. Such missions include searching dense terrain, pursuit of enemy forces into terrain inaccessible to armor, blocking enemy escape routes which are inaccessible to armor, or driving the enemy into an armored blocking force. In many cases a quick reacting Infantry force,

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SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RVC: MACVJ 3-32) (Cont)

such as a heliborne company, could have accounted for considerable VC casualties. The second point is the frustration which must be endured when fighting a local VC force. His tactic of using the local population as cover places a definite need for restraint on the part of the unit commander. More thought should be given to immediate evacuation of the population in such VC controlled areas to remove the VC cover.

16. RECOMMENDATIONS:

- a. Evacuate the villages of PHU HOI (YS082880) and BEN CAM (YS095890). Both the villages are VC controlled and serve as cover for the VC.
- b. Continue US and ARVN operations in the NHON TRACH district to destroy the VC supply link to the East.
- c. Continue to increase the Psy War and MEDCAP activities in the NHON TRACH district in conjunction with joint operation.
- d. Initiate a study on aerial resupply of Class III and V for the Regiment.
- e. Strive for Infantry/Armored Cavalry combined operations, preferably with a heliborne Infantry Force.
- f. Replace wheeled resupply vehicles with tracked resupply vehicles.

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Annex A to Combat Operations After Action Report to Op HICKORY

TASK ORGANIZATION (Initially):

TM I
 Trp K/3-11 Armd Cav (-1 Plat)
 1 Sec/M/3-11 Armd Cav
 1 FO/How/3-11 Armd Cav
 2 RVN National Policemen (OPCON)

TM L
 Trp L/3-11 Armd Cav (-1 Plat)
 1 Plat/M/3-11 Armd Cav
 1 Sqd/3/919 Engr
 1 FO/How/3-11 Armd Cav
 1 M132A1
 2 RVN National Policemen (OPCON)

TM N
 2 RVN RF Co's (OPCON)
 1 RVN Boat Co (OPCON)
 1 Sqd/Trp K/3-11 Armd Cav
 1 Sqdn LNO Tm/3-11 Armd Cav
 2 RVN National Policemen (OPCON)

TM O
 1 Plat/Trp L/3-11 Armd Cav
 Area & Route Recon Tm's
 517th Engr (OPCON)

TM K
 Trp K/3-11 Armd Cav (-Int Sqd)
 1 Sec/M/3-11 Armd Cav
 1 Sqd/3/919 Engr
 1 FO/How/3-11 Armd Cav
 1 M132A1
 2 RVN National Policemen (OPCON)


TM M
 Co M/3-11 Armd Cav (-2 Plat)
 1 RF Co (OPCON)
 1 Plat/I Trp/3-11 Armd Cav
 3/919 Engr (-)
 1 M132A1
 2 RVN National Policemen (OPCON)

TF CON
 RVN Sec/3-11 Armd Cav
 1 UH-1D/Trans Ssg/11 Armd Cav (OPCON)
 2 1st Firo Tms/11 Armd Cav (OPCON)
 How Btry (-)
 3 RVN Recon Sqd's (OPCON)

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Annex B (Gun Overlay) to Combat Operations after Action
Report (CH HICKORY)
Reference: Map, VIETNAM, 1:50,000, 6330 I, 6330 II (Series L7014)



Annex B (Ops Overlay) to Combat Ops After Action Report
(Ops CMRY)
Reference: Map, VIETNAM, 1:50,000 63301, 633011, (Series L7014)

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SP

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ROUTE GREEN


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Annex C to Combat Operations After Action Report to Op HICKORY.

Casualty List:

<u>NAMES</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>DATE & TIME OF INJURY</u>	<u>TYPE AND EXTENT OF WOUNDS</u>
NUNGESTER, Roy A	PFC E3	071505 Oct 66	GSW rt shoulder
JONES, Harold E.	SFC E7	072355 Oct 66	Frag Wound Left Arm
PIERCE, John R.	PFC E3	091215 Oct 66	Perf wds of abdomen & chest (DOW)
DOYLE, David K.	Maj O4	111050 Oct 66	Frag butt & rt leg
HALSTEAD, Wayne P.	Capt O3	111050 Oct 66	Frag rt leg, arm, scrotum
EVANS, Peter H.	1/Lt O2	111050 Oct 66	Superficial wmd lower rt leg
WHITE, Roger D.	PFC E3	111050 Oct 66	Frag in groin
AUSSERESSES, Robert B.	SGT E5	141600 Oct 66	Frag rt arm & rt leg
CHO, Benedict S.K. Jr.	SGT E5	141600 Oct 66	Frag rt knee
HARRISON, Robert L.	SP/4 E4	141600 Oct 66	Frag rt leg & rt arm
JACKSON, Darrell A.	PFC E3	141600 Oct 66	Frag face, stomach, chest (KIA)
JOYCE, Dennis L.	SSG E6	141600 Oct 66	Frag, legs, arm, face
MAZCOTTE, Gregory C.	PFC E3	141600 Oct 66	Frag head
McNEAL, Thomas L.	PFC E3	141600 Oct 66	Frag rt leg
MILLER, Karl M.	SP/5 E5	141600 Oct 66	Frag in butt
PENNINGTON, James F.	SSG E6	141600 Oct 66	Frag face, lt arm, lt leg
STAPLETON, Jerry L.	1/Lt O2	141600 Oct 66	Frag rt leg
WOOD, Vance C.	PFC E3	141600 Oct 66	Frag arms & legs
FREDRICK, James W.	SSG E6	111050 Oct 66	Frag wd, back
BURNEY, John D.	PFC E3	110040 Oct 66	Frag wd, lt arm
SANH, Nguyen Van	SSG E6	141600 Oct 66	Frag wd, lt calf

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Annex D to Combat Operations After Action Report to Op HICKORY.

AMMUNITION EXPENDITURE:


1. CTG, 5.56 Ball	5,760
2. CTG, 7.62 Ball	2,400
3. CTG, 7.62 LKD 4 & 1	12,000
4. CTG, Cal 50 LKD 4 & 1	11,000
5. CTG, 40mm HE	224
6. CTG, 4.2" HE	252
7. CTG, 4.2" Illum	91
8. CTG, 4.2" WP	28
9. CTG, 105mm HE	637
10. CTG, 105mm Illum	146
11. CTG, 105mm WP	174
12. CTG, 90mm Cannonister	25
13. CTG, 90mm WP	1
14. Gren, Hand Frag	10
15. Gren, Hand CS	4
16. Gren, Hand Smoke (Red, Green, Violet)	96
17. Flare, Surface Trip M49	104
18. RKT, 2.75"	140
19. Thickner M-1	400 lbs

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Annex E to Combat Operations After Action Report (COW HUCKORY)
Reference: Map, VIETNAM, 1:50,000 63301, 633011, (Series 1701)




X Following Personnel ride in Howitzers

- Following Personnel ride in
1 E-5 (Strack veh mech)R

2 E-3(Wireman)PXXXX
Carries TCE 3.5 inch Rocket Launcher
2 TOE 7.62mm MG each
Carries 1 TOE M-79 each
1 PO Section employed with each Arm
Cav Troop.

C

Btry Coaddr will generally operate from (3-5 Air) vehicle. When with the Btry on a road march he will ride in either 5-3(Air) track or PDC track.



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COMPANY HEADQUARTERS

HEADQUARTERS SECTION

AN/VRC-12

AN/VRC-12

1 Capt (Co Comdr) P
1 E-6 (Tk Comdr) P
1 E-5 (Gnr) P
1 E-5 (Tk Dvr) P, S
1 E-5 (Tk Dvr) P, S

NOTES: 1 Hq Tk is equipped with bulldozer earth moving tank mounted. GROUND SURVEILLANCE SECTION

AN/PSS-4
AN/CRC-125

AN/VRC-47

AN/PSS-4
AN/CRC-125

2-AN/VRC-46

AN/VRC-46

1 Lt (XO) R
1 E-5 (Sr Track Veh Mech) P
1 E-4 (Hdo Mech) P
1 E-4 (Track Veh Mech)
(Para Gnr Dvr) P
2 E-4 (Track Veh Mech) P
1 E-4 (Turret Mech) P

1 E-6 (Motor Sgc) P
1 E-5 (Sr Recov Mech) P, S
1 E-4 (Recov Mech) (Recov
Veh Dvr) P, S
1 E-4 (Turret Mech) P
1 E-4 (Track Veh Mech) P
1 E-4 (Track Veh Mech) P

1 E-6 (Sec Ldr) R
1 E-5 (Sr Radar Op) P M-79
1 E-4 (Radar Op) (Dvr) R
1 E-5 (Sr Radar Op) P, M-79
1 E-4 (Radar Op) (Dvr) R
1 E-4 (Aidman) P
1 E-8 (1st Sgt) P
1 E-5 (Comm Chief)
3 E-5 (Dvr) R
1 E-3 (Loader) P, S
1 E-4 (Aidman) P

AN/VRC-12

AN/VRC-53

AN/VRC-53

AN/VRC-12

AN/VRC-53

1 Lt (Plat Ldr) P
1 E-5 (Asst Tk Comdr) (Gnr) P
1 E-5 (Tk Dvr) P, S
1 E-5 (Tk Dvr) P, S
1 E-3 (Loader) P, S

1 E-6 (Tk Comdr) P
1 E-5 (Gnr) P
1 E-5 (Tk Dvr) P, S
1 E-5 (Tk Dvr) P, S
1 E-3 (Loader) P, S

1 E-6 (Tk Comdr) P
1 E-5 (Gnr) P
1 E-5 (Tk Dvr) P, S
1 E-5 (Tk Dvr) P, S
1 E-3 (Loader) P, S

1 E-7 (Plat Sgt) P
1 E-5 (Asst Tk Comdr) (Gnr) P
1 E-5 (Tk Dvr) P, S
1 E-5 (Tk Dvr) P, S
1 E-3 (Loader) P, S

1 E-6 (Tk Comdr) P
1 E-5 (Gnr) P
1 E-5 (Tk Dvr) P, S
1 E-5 (Tk Dvr) P, S
1 E-3 (Loader) P, S

2) TANK PLATOON

SAME AS 1st TANK PLATOON

3) TANK PLATOON

SAME AS 1st TANK PLATOON

* Used as Company CP
** Add 1 M88 from Squadron Maintenance

TANK COMPANY - ORGANIZATION FOR COMBAT (ALL TRACK)
(MODIFIED) ORGANIZATION FOR COMBAT



INCLOSURE 9
ARMORED CAVALRY ASSAULT VEHICLE
(ACAV) CREW PROFICIENCY COURSE

ARMORED CAVALRY ASSAULT VEHICLE (ACAV)
CREW PROFICIENCY COURSE

1. General. a. The purpose of the course is to develop the crew's ability to engage point and area targets from the moving vehicle with individual and vehicular-mounted weapons. It is designed for use by all ACAVs including Mortar Carriers.

b. Each crew moves over a specified route to engage a series of combat-type targets at varying ranges with specified individual and vehicular-mounted weapons. Emphasis is placed on the crew's ability to identify and engage targets, immediate action drills, and counter-ambush techniques. Additional emphasis is placed upon the crew's pre-combat checks and squad leader's troop leading procedures, ability to properly employ the ACAV, control and distribute fire and request/adjust organic fire support.

2. Course Outline.

a. Pre-combat checks. The crews are required to conduct all pre-combat checks. Crews will be allowed approximately 30 minutes to make their checks and will complete them prior to initial briefing by the Chief Controller. All weapons used in the course will have been test fired on other ranges, if possible, prior to running the course.

b. Briefing. All firing crews will receive a detailed briefing by the Chief Controller on the conduct of the course. This briefing will include:

- (1) Purpose of the course.
- (2) Explanation of range operations.
- (3) Briefing on situation.
- (4) Detailed briefing on each firing exercise.
- (5) General explanation of scoring procedures.
- (6) Safety precautions.

c. Conduct of exercises. See Annex A.

d. Scoring.

(1) The Examiner/Controller scores the crew from the ACAV using a binocular, where necessary, to determine accuracy, distribution, and/or area coverage. He will also grade the firing procedures of the crew.

(2) Both the Examiner/Controller and Safety NCO will grade and score Exercise 7.

(3) The Examiner/Controller will grade the squad leader's observed fire procedures.

(4) The Scorer will score Target 1 based on the number of target hits.

(5) Scoring procedures. See Annex B.

e. Debriefing. The Examiner/Controller will debrief the tested crew upon completion of the course. This debriefing will include:

- (1) Review of the purpose of the course.
- (2) Critique of the crew's performance during each exercise.
- (3) Individual exercise scores and overall course score.
- (4) Answers to questions on the course and crew performance.

3. Course construction.

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a. Design. The course will include those exercises contained in Annex A. The sequence and firing positions for these exercises may be altered to meet terrain and range fan requirements. The course must, however, conform with the indicated target description, rapid succession of engagements, and masking, insofar as possible, of targets from view until time to engage them.

b. Targets. Throughout the course enemy forces are represented by silhouette targets. They represent a one-for-one ratio relative to enemy strength. Silhouettes will be grouped as in Annex A to provide target width and depth.

(1) Ambush targets will be masked from the crew's view until time to engage them. Manual or electrical pop-up target devices will be used. Appendix V, FM 23-12, contains samples and construction of target devices which may be used.

(2) Other silhouette targets should be masked from the crew's view by terrain features, vegetation, or target cloth screens, as a minimum. This masking should be arranged in such manner that the silhouettes are visible only when the ACV is in the proper firing position.

(3) A simulated antitank gun position is constructed for exercise 7 along with pop-up target device. The antitank gun position may be constructed out of any material available. The construction should, however, resemble as nearly as possible an actual antitank gun position.

c. Enemy action. Enemy action will be represented by using 1/2 lb blocks of TNT and simulators. When setting up the course care must be exercised in laying the demolition lines. These lines should be protected in such a manner that the ACV's fire will not accidentally cut them. Demolition pits will be prepared as per AK 385-63.

d. Course layout. The course length should be approximately 1500 meters. It should include provisions for a return route other than the course road. The end of the course should provide a vantage point for observation of an established mortar impact area. If an impact area is not available, then demolitions may be used to simulate mortar fire in exercise B.

e. Course design, layout, and organization will conform to applicable portions of AK 385-63.

4. Course operation.

a. Control group. A Control Group will be established for the operation of the course.

b. See paragraph 7 and 8 below, for composition and duties of the Control Group.

5. Personnel, supplies, and equipment. The Control Group will require following personnel and equipment:

a. Control Group.

- (1) One Chief Controller (Officer in Charge).
- (2) One Noncommissioned Officer in Charge.
- (3) Two Examiner/Controllers (Officers).
- (4) Four Safety NCOs.
- (5) One Recorder.

b. Administrative Personnel. Following is a recommended list of personnel:

- (1) Four ambush target operators.
- (2) Four demolition men including one NCO/IC.
- (3) One aidman.

- (4) Two-man target detail.
- (5) Necessary administrative personnel for ammunition detail, range maintenance, and fire fighters.
- (6) Road guards as required.
- (7) 4.2" mortar squad (if live mortar fire is to be used).

c. Vehicle requirements.

- (1) One ambulance.
- (2) Two $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton trucks with radios; one for the Chief Controller and one for the scorer.
- (3) Two $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton or $\frac{3}{4}$ -ton trucks; one for demolition men and one for target detail.
- (4) One 4.2" mortar carrier (if live fire is to be used).
- (5) Necessary administrative vehicles for ammunition, personnel transportation, fire fighters, mess, maintenance, and POL.

d. Equipment requirements.

- (1) Range flags as required.
- (2) Fire fighting equipment.
- (3) Blasting machines or batteries.
- (4) Radio for Control Headquarters.
- (5) Field telephone (one per target operator and demolition man, and one for Control Headquarters).
- (6) Two stopwatches (for each Examiner/Controller).
- (7) Three binoculars (for Examiner/Controllers and tested ACaV Commander).
- (8) Map of the area and compass (for ACaV Commander).
- (9) Four acetate-covered clip boards with grease pencils (for Examiner/Controllers and Safety ECOs).
- (10) Necessary score sheets.
- (11) 3x5' target cloth panels (one for Target 1 and necessary spares).
- (12) Thirty pop-up target devices (Targets 4, 5, 6, and 7).
- (13) E-type silhouette targets (60 for initial course set up for live fire mortars, 70 for for demolition-simulated mortar fire).
- (14) Hull or other "hard" targets to use as an adjusting point for Target 8 (omit if demolitions are to be used instead of mortar fire).
- (15) Necessary tools for repair and maintenance of course and targets.
- (16) Three locally fabricated devices to indicate when each MG is clear. The device will resemble a "T-block" for the Cal .50 MG. The device for the 7.62mm MG will have a flange to fit into the feedway of the weapon when the cover is closed. Each device will have an 18 inch long towel or rod attached to it surmounted by a green pennant.

(d) Assists the Examiner/Controller in controlling the firing and enforcing prescribed safety procedures.

(e) Verifies that all weapons are clear.

(5) Scorer. During Exercise 8, proceeds downrange and scores Target 1.

(6) Target operators. Operate ambush targets on command of Control Headquarters.

(7) Demolition personnel. Prepare and detonate demolitions on command of Control Headquarters.

(8) Target detail. Repair and replace targets as directed by the Chief Controller.

b. Preparation of course.

(1) Range setup. The NCCIC will supervise the setting up of the range. Communications checks among the Control Group will be accomplished.

(2) Mortar registration. Registration will be accomplished, under the direction of the Chief Controller, or his representative, prior to the beginning of the course. This will be omitted if demolitions are used.

1. Purpose. This Annex contains specific information on the conduct of exercises contained in the ACAV Proficiency Course.

2. Dry run. Each crew will dry run the course prior to its record run. A safety NCO will accompany the ACAV during its dry run. He will point out the targets for each exercise and identify the target's right and left limits of fire. Dry run ACAVs may follow firing ACAVs, but will begin only when the firing ACAV has finished Exercise 7. Dry run ACAV will not be shown Targets 8 and will complete its run prior to the firing ACAV beginning Exercise 9.

3. Scenario.

a. Situation. — Troop, — of the 11th Arm Cav conducts route reconnaissance. — Platoon is the lead platoon initially. Your ACAV is the lead ACAV of the second platoon in Troop column.

b. Sequence of action.

(1) Exercise 1 through 3 and 9 represent enemy personnel and position engaged by the lead ACAV in the course of its reconnaissance. The crew takes them under fire and continues its move.

(2) Exercise 4 through 6 represent the ACAV caught in an ambush that has gone undetected by the lead platoon. The crew returns fire and continues to move through the ambush area.

(3) Exercise 7. The Examiner/Controller, acting as the Platoon Leader, directs the crew to assault the flank of an ambush position that has the leading platoon pinned down.

(4) Exercise 8. The crew/squad locates an enemy rallying point while on the assaulted ambush position. The squad leader calls for and adjusts mortar fire on the rallying point.

4. Target Sequence:

TARGET	WEAPON	NO. OF RDS	TARGET DESCRIPTION
1	Cal .50 MG	105	Antitank gun (3x5' panel)
2	R 7.62mm MG	100	Troops (10 silhouettes-2 groups of 5)
3	*M79 Gren Lohr	2	Troops (10 silhouettes-2 groups of 5)
	Cal .50 MG	105	
	L 7.62mm MG	100	
4	R 7.62mm MG	100	Ambush (6 silhouettes, pop-up, 2 groups of 3)
	Prac Band Gren	1	
5	L 7.62mm MG	100	Ambush (6 silhouettes, pop-up, 2 groups of 3)
	Prac Band Gren	1	
6	Cal .50 MG	105	Ambush (6 silhouettes, pop-up, 2 groups of 3)
	*M79 Gren Lohr	2	
	Prac Band Gren	1	
7	Cal .50 MG	105	Assault of Ambush (12 silhouettes 3 groups of 4, & a simulated antitank gun position)
	L 7.62mm MG	100	
	R 7.62mm MG	2	
	M79 Gren Lohr	3	
8	4.2" Mortar or Demolition Charges	4	Enemy Rallying Point (adjusting point - hull or similar "hard" target for 4.2" mortar fire; 10 Silhouettes in triangular pattern for demolitions)
9	7.62mm MG (fire to rear)	100	Troops (10 silhouettes - 2 groups of 5)

*The squads engage with one M79 at Target 2 and the other at Target 6. Both will fire during Exercise 7; one firing one round, the other firing two.

ANNEX 1 to ACAV Crew Proficiency Course

5. Start point procedures. After receiving notification from Control Headquarters that the range is clear, the gunners place ammunition in the feedway of 7.62mm MGs and half-load Cal .50 MG. Other weapons remain clear and are loaded only on order. The ACAC commander signals the Examiner/Controller when the crew is ready.

6. Conduct of the firing run.

a. Target 1 (Antitank). The ACAV is given instruction to move out. A demolition blast goes off near Target 1. The ACAV halts and engages with 105 rounds from the Cal .50 MG. Time starts at the blast. Examiner/Controller grades the firing procedure. Upon completion, the ACAV moves out at 10-12 mph.

b. Target 2 (Troops). The AVAC proceeds down the course road. Silhouettes are engaged while on the move with 100 rounds from the Right 7.62mm MG and 2 rounds from the M79 Grenade Launcher. Time starts when the target is identified by the ACAV commander. The Examiner/Controller scores the target by area coverage (MG), accuracy and distribution (M79), and grades the firing procedures.

c. Target 3 (Troops). As the ACAV continues along the course road at 10-15 mph, another group of silhouettes is engaged. They are engaged by the Left 7.62mm MG with 100 rounds and the Cal .50 MG with 105 rounds while the ACAV is moving. Time starts when the target is identified by the ACAV commander. The Examiner/Controller scores the target by area coverage and grades firing procedures.

d. Target 4 (Ambush). As the ACAV is moving, a demolition blast goes off near Target 4. The Safety NCO detonates a simulator in the same direction. Silhouette targets are exposed immediately after the demolition blast and time starts. The target is engaged while on the move with one continuous 100-round burst from the right 7.62mm MG and one practice grenade. Examiner/Controller scores the target by area coverage and grades firing procedures.

e. Target 5 (Ambush). The ACAV continues to move through the ambush. Upon completion of Exercise 4, or when the firing point for Target 5 is reached, whichever is first, a demolition blast goes off near Target 5 and time starts. The Safety NCO detonates another simulator in the Target direction. Immediately after the demolition blast, silhouettes are exposed and are engaged while on the move with 100 rounds from the Left 7.62mm MG and one practice hand grenade. The Examiner/Controller grades firing procedures and scores the target by area coverage.

f. Target 6 (Ambush). The ACAV continues to move through the ambush area. Upon completion of Exercise 5, or when the firing point for Target 6 is reached, whichever is first, a demolition blast goes off near Target 6 and time starts. The Safety NCO detonates another simulator in the target direction. Immediately after the demolition blast, silhouettes are exposed and are engaged while on the move with 2 rounds from the M79 Grenade Launcher and 105 rounds from the Cal .50 MG. One practice hand grenade is thrown in the target area. The Examiner/Controller scores the target by area coverage (MG) and accuracy and distribution of fire (M79), and grades firing procedures.

g. Target 7 (Assault of Ambush). After completion of Exercise 6, a demolition blast goes off near Target 7. The Examiner/Controller, acting as the Platoon Leader, instructs the ACAV commander that the lead platoon is pinned down by an ambush. The ACAV assaults the rear flank of the ambush position. The ACAV assaults the position by fire from the moving vehicle with 100 rounds from each 7.62mm MG, 105 rounds from the Cal .50 MG, 3 rounds from the M79 Grenade Launcher, and one practice hand grenade. The Examiner/Controller and Safety NCO evaluate crew performance, score targets based on area coverage, accuracy and distribution of fire, and enforce safety regulations.

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h. Target 8 (Enemy Rallying Point). While on the objective, the Examiner/Controller and Safety NCO will insure that all weapons are clear upon completion of the exercise. When this is accomplished, Target 8 is pointed out to the ACAV commander. The ACAV commander locates the target on his map and radios a fire mission to supporting mortars (simulated transmission when demolitions are used instead of live mortar fire). The first round in adjustment (demolition charge) will land off target. The ACAV commander radios the required subsequent fire request. The second round (demolition charge) lands in the target area. The ACAV commander calls for Fire for Effect. A total of four rounds (demolition charges) will be fired (detonated) in adjustment and Fire for Effect. The Examiner/Controller grades the ACAV commander on his observed fire procedure.

i. Target 9 (Troops). The ACAV continues its mission. Once moving, the Safety NCO detonates two simulators. The ACAV commander is informed that he is receiving mortar fire. The crew is required to button-up. As the ACAV nears firing point for Target 9, the ACAV commander is informed that mortar fire has ceased and they are receiving small arms fire from their rear. The crew unbuttons and engages silhouette targets with 100 rounds from a 7.62mm MG firing to the rear of the moving ACAV. The Examiner/Controller scores the target by area coverage and grades firing procedures.


j. Upon completion of Exercise 9, all weapons are properly cleared by the Examiner/Controller and checked by the Safety NCO who will insert the "T-blocks". The ACAV then proceeds uprange on the return route.

2 APPENDIXES


- 1-Course Layout
- 2-ACAV Layout

COURSE LAYOUT

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ACAV LAYOUT



*Rifle Squads man both positions. Other ACAV crews man one or the other depending on target location.

SCORING PROCEDURES

1. The purpose of this Annex is to prescribe certain scoring procedures and provide a basis for critique of the ACAV crew. However, this course is a training vehicle and not a test.

2. General. Scores should be used to develop interest, enthusiasm, and a competitive spirit. After the crew finishes the course, the Examiner/Controller will total his cores for each exercise. The Scorer will provide information relative to the number of hits in Target 1. This information will be used by the Examiner/Controller in his critique.

3. Scoring. The Examiner/Controller will base his scores upon area coverage, while the Scorer upon the number of target hits. Firing procedures will be graded by the Examiner/Controller. The Safety NCO will assist the Examiner/Controller in scoring Exercise 7.

a. Area coverage. When the firer prepares to engage a target, the Examiner/Controller will check to see that the weapons(s) is laid on the target area. He will then observe the target area, using a binocular where necessary. He will mentally divide the target area into the appropriate number of sections (see Appendix 1). As the weapon fires he observes the strike or burst. If all sections of the target area were hit, the maximum score is given. If portion or portions were not hit, the score is lessened accordingly.

b. Fire procedures. The Examiner/Controller will grade the firing procedures of the crew and individual firers. This involves the use of fire commands and control/distribution of fire by the ACAV commanders, technique of fire (long bursts), crew target acquisition and designation, and immediate action in case of weapon stoppage or malfunction.

c. Times. Commence fire times are based on either demolition blasts or target identification. If targets must be visible to the crew, time will be based upon designation of these targets to the ACAV commander by the Examiner/Controller: TROOPS, DIRECT FRONT, OR TROOPS, LEFT FRONT, for example. Completion time is based upon when the ACAV commander calls for CEASE FIRE or the firer expends his ammunition, whichever is first. If the ACAV overruns the cease fire point for the exercise, the Examiner/Controller will call "CEASE FIRE" and the crew will lose completion time.

d. Alibies. Alibies will be granted by the Examiner/Controller if the cause of the alibi was a range malfunction or weapon/vehicle malfunction that is not directly related to crew negligence. An exercise for which an alibi is requested will be re-run by the ACAV.

e. Five points will be deducted from applicable exercise if ACAV failed to maintain the prescribed minimum 10 mph speed.

4. Critique. When all scores have been totaled, the Examiner/Controller will critique the ACAV crew on its performance. He will use as a guide the format contained in paragraph 4e, of this regulation. It is important that the crew is aware of not only the mistakes they made, but also things they did correctly.

APPENDIX 1-Score Sheet

ANNEX B to ACAV Crew Proficiency Course

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SCORE SHEET

UNIT _____ ACAV COMMANDER _____
 (ACAV #/Sqd/Plt/Trp/Sqdn)
 DATE _____ LOCATION _____

EXERCISE	WPN/RDS	ITEMS AND POSSIBLE PTS	SCORE
Were the ACAV and crew fully prepared for combat?			50 _____
1. Antitank (ACAV stationary, fire to front)	Cal .50/105	Open fire in 5 sec: 20 _____ Complete in 45 sec: 20 _____ Procedure & command: 10 _____ Target hits (5 pts/hit, max 10 hits): 50 _____ Total possible: 100 _____	
2. Troops (ACAV moving, fire to right)	R 7.62mm MG/100 M79/2	<u>MG M79</u> Open fire in 5 sec: 20 15 _____ Complete in 45 sec: 10 5 _____ Procedure and control: 20 20 _____ Area coverage (MG 10 pts/fifth; M79 accuracy and distribution): 50 30 _____ Total possible each weapon: 100 70 _____ Total possible for exercise: 170 _____	
3. Troops (ACAV moving, fire to left)	L 7.62mm MG/100 Cal .50/105	<u>M60 Cal .50</u> Open fire in 5 sec: 20 20 _____ Complete in 45 sec: 15 15 _____ Procedure and control: 20 20 _____ Area coverage (10 pts/fifth covered): 50 50 _____ Total possible per weapons: 105 105 _____ Total possible for exercise: 210 _____	
4. Ambush (ACAV moving, fire to right)	R 7.62mm MG/100 Prac Hand Gren/1	Open fire in 5 sec: 40 _____ Procedure and control: 30 _____ Area coverage (10 pts/sixth covered): 60 _____ Total possible: 130 _____	
5. Ambush (ACAV moving, fire to left)	L 7.62mm MG/100 Prac Hand Gren/1	Open fire in 5 sec: 40 _____ Procedure and control: 30 _____ Area coverage (10 pts/sixth covered): 60 _____ Total possible: 130 _____	
6. Ambush (ACAV moving, fire to right front)	Cal .50 MG/105 M79/2 Prac Hand Gren/1	<u>CAL .50 M79</u> Open fire in 5 sec: 40 30 _____ Procedure and control: 30 20 _____ Area coverage (MG 10 pts/sixth covered; M79 accuracy & distribution): 60 30 _____	

APPENDIX 1 to ANNEX B to ACAV Crew Proficiency Course

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7. Assault of Ambush (ACAV moving, Rifle Squads dismounted)	Cal .50/105 2-7.62mm MG/200 1-M79/3 Prac Hard Gran/1	Rapidly respond to situation: 30 _____ Command and control: 70 _____ Area coverage (100 pts/ third covered): 300 _____ Total possible: 400 _____
8. Enemy Rallying Point (commander as obser- ver)	4.2" Mortar/4	Proper initial fire request: 40 _____ Proper security: 30 _____ Proper subsequent fire request: 30 _____ Total Possible: 100 _____
9. Troops (ACAV moving, fire to rear)	7.62mm MG/100	Open fire within 10 sec: 20 _____ Complete in 45 sec: 10 _____ Procedure and control: 20 _____ Area coverage (10 pts/ fifth covered): 50 _____ Total possible: 100 _____
		TOTAL POSSIBLE SCORE: 1550
		TOTAL SCORE: _____

REMARKS:

Minimum satisfactory score - 1085

Examiner

CREW CLASSIFICATION	SCORE
Total possible	1550
Expert	1395
Sharpshooter	1240
Marksmen	1085
Unqualified.	Below 1085

1. Purpose. The purpose of this Annex is to prescribe control procedures for conducting the ACAV Crew Proficiency Course.

2. General. Overall control responsibility lies with the Chief Controller. His principal assistants are the Examiner/Controllers and the NCOIC.

a. Control personnel will wear some type of identifying markings.

b. Control personnel will conform to the tactical situation in their personal actions so as not to detract from the realism of the firing run.

c. All control personnel will be familiar with course safety requirements and will be continually alert for acts or actions which constitute a hazard to troop or range safety. At the same time, they must allow tested leaders to demonstrate initiative, leadership, and knowledge. In cases which constitute an immediate hazard to troop or range safety, the Examiner/Controller or Chief Controller will take charge, make on the spot corrections, and then permit the crew to proceed with the exercise. At no time will control personnel assume the duties and responsibilities of unit leaders insofar as the tactical aspect of the course is concerned.

3. Communications.

a. Control net. The control net is used to control the firing ACAV and the course. Only the Chief Controller (CONTROL6), Examiner/Controllers (CONTROL), Control Headquarters (CONTROL1), and the mortar squad (MORTAR) will be on the control frequency.

4. Conduct of firing run.

a. After communications are established with the ACAV on the firing line, and when the course is clear, the Examiner/Controller informs the ACAV commander to "Place Ammo in Feedway of M60. Half - Load Cal .50. Move Out When Ready".

b. The Examiner/Controller and Safety NCO ride the firing ACAV and exercise control over the movement and firing in order to conform with course and safety requirements. The Examiner/Controller seats himself behind the cupola. The Safety NCO sits on the reardeck.

c. When the Examiner/Controller is observing the target area, the Safety NCO will closely observe the firing weapons to insure that they remain trained within the safety limits of the target.

d. Target 1. As the ACAV approaches the firing position, the Examiner/Controller calls for demolition blast (through CONTROL 1) by stating "ANTITANK NOW". Demolition men detonate the charge. The target is engaged with 105 rounds from the Cal .50 ME while halted. Examiner/Controller grades firing procedures. The scorer will score Target 1 when the ACAV is engaged in Exercise 8. When the ACAV has completed the exercise it moves out. It will continue moving throughout the course until Exercise 8.

e. Targets 2 and 3. Control procedures for these targets are the same. As the ACAV passes the proper firing point (identified by a green disc on a pole), the target is engaged with the proper weapons. The exercises are scored and graded by the Examiner/Controller. The exercises cease when the cease fire point is reached (identified by a red disc on a pole), or all ammunition is expended whichever is first.

(1) When cease fire points are reached all firing stops. Unexpended ammunition is removed from the weapon.

(2) Machinegunners will reload the proper number of rounds immediately after firing. Cal .50 ME will half-load. 7.62mm ME will place ammunition in the feedway. Neither ME will be fully loaded.

(3) The M79 Grenade Launcher will be loaded on order of the Examiner/Controller. / 48

f. Targets 4 through 6. Essentially control procedures for these exercises are the same. As the ACAV passes the proper firing point, the Examiner/Controller calls for target demolition (Target 4 - AMBUSH 1 NOW; Target 5 - AMBUSH 2 NOW; Target 6 - AMBUSH 3 NOW). As the demolition goes off, ambush target operators activate the pop-up target device for the respective target. When the targets appear, the Safety NCO detonates a simulator in the target direction. The exercises are scored and graded by the Examiner/Controller. Each exercise ceases when the cease fire point is reached.

(1) The procedures for machineguns and M79 in paragraph d (1) - (3), above, will pertain. Practice hand grenades will be thrown (one per target). Target 4 will be engaged with a continuous 100-round burst.

(2) It is desirable that firing points overlap, i.e. Target 4 cease fire point be a little after Target 5 firing point. This permits weapons for each exercise to fire simultaneously for several seconds, while not necessitating prohibitive range fans.

g. Target 7. As the ACAV approaches the firing position, the Examiner/Controller calls for demolition (through CONTROL 1) "DEMO 7 NOW" Demolition men detonate the charges, and ambush target operators are instructed by CONTROL 1 to standby to activate pop-up target devices on Target 7. As soon as the blast occurs, the Examiner/Controller, acting as the ACAV's platoon leader, states that "GUERRILLA AMBUSH HAS LEAD PLATOON PINED DOWN. OUR PLATOON WILL ASSAULT THE REAR FLANK OF THE AMBUSH POSITION. AMBUSH POSITION VICINITY DEMOLITION BLAST. EXECUTE". As the ACAV begins its maneuver against the objective, the Examiner/Controller calls for the pop-up targets to be activated (Target 7). The targets are engaged with the appropriate weapons. Firing begins (and the targets are called for) as the ACAV crosses the firing line (identified by green disc on poles at the lateral limits). The Examiner/Controller and Safety NCO score and grade the exercise. Exercise terminates when the cease fire line (identified by red discs on poles at its lateral limits) is reached, or when ammunition is expended, whichever is first.

(1) Upon termination of the exercise, all weapons will be properly cleared by the Examiner/Controller and verified by the Safety NCO.

(2) Machineguns will not be reloaded, but will have "T-Flocks" inserted after they have been cleared. No further action takes place until weapons have been cleared and checked. Unexpended ammunition will be properly stowed.

h. Target 8. While on the objective, the Examiner/Controller points out Target 8 to the ACAV commander. He is instructed to call for and adjust mortar fire on the target. The Examiner/Controller calls the mortars on the ACAV radio and tells them to standby. If demolitions are used in lieu of mortar fire, he radios CONTROL 1 and tells him to standby. The ACAV commander locates the target and, using his map and compass, radios his initial fire request over the Control Net to the mortars (or CONTROL 1 who will simulate the FDC if demolitions are used). Proper security will be established by the ACAV crew while the exercise is taking place.

(1) The mortar will fire from predetermined data so that the first round will land off the target area. The data given by the ACAV commander will not be used by the FDC, but will be used only by the Examiner/Controller to grade his ability to properly prepare an initial fire request.

(2) The observer senses the first round in adjustment, and radios his subsequent fire request. The procedure is repeated for the second round in adjustment.

(3) The second round will land in the target area. The observer radios his subsequent fire request and calls for repeat. When the fire lands, the observer terminates his mission.

(4) The Examiner/Controller will radio necessary corrections to the mortars for the next run if rounds are too erratic. Regardless of results only four rounds will be fired in the exercise.

(5) When demolitions must be substituted for live mortar fire, the procedures in paragraphs (1) through (3) above will be followed with the exception that demolition charges will replace the mortar rounds. Fire requests will be received by CONTROL 1 and, after an appropriate length of time, the proper demolition charge will be detonated.

(6) Upon termination of the exercise, the ACAV will move out.

1. Target 9. As the ACAV is moving from Exercise 8, the Safety NCO will detonate two simulators. The Examiner/Controller will inform the ACAV commander that they are under mortar fire. The crew buttons-up. When the ACAV approaches the firing point for Target 9, the ACAV commander is informed by the Examiner/Controller that the mortar fire has ceased and the vehicle is being fired upon with small arms fire from the rear. The crew unbuttons and a 7.62mm MG is placed to the rear of the ACAV. Target 9 silhouettes are engaged with 100 rounds while the ACAV is moving. The exercise ceases when the cease fire point is reached, or ammunition expended, whichever first. The exercise is scored and graded by the Examiner/Controller.

(1) Upon completion, the Examiner/Controller will properly clear the 7.62mm MG. The safety NCO will verify that the weapon is cleared and insert a "T-Block" in the weapon.

(2) The Examiner/Controller informs CONTROL 1 when the ACAV is clear and again when the ACAV has moved out of the course range fan.

SAFETY PROCEDURES

1. Purpose. To prescribe safety procedures for the ACAV crew Proficiency Course.

2. General. a. Flag signals. Standard flag signals will be used:

- (1) Green. Ammunition aboard, weapons clear.
- (2) Red. Displayed by firing ACAV indicating weapons loaded. Red flag will be displayed as soon as weapons(s) is/are loaded

(3) Green and orange. Malfunction, weapons clear.

(4) Red and orange. Malfunction, weapons loaded,

b. Targets and limits of fire for each target will be clearly identified to the crew during the dry run. Fire and cease fire points will also be identified. The fact that weapons will not be fired outside these limits will be strongly stressed.

c. Weapons will be loaded only on order.

d. If communications go out, the ACAV will be directed by the Examiner/Controller to stop immediately, clear all weapons, and attempt to remedy the situation.

e. Personnel not engaged in firing will leave their weapons alone and not play or toy with them.

f. Personnel will not fire at targets that they cannot clearly identify, nor will they fire at targets when the firing limits are not clear to them. No penalties will be given for failure to fire under these circumstances.

g. If any personnel observe a safety hazard or a possible safety hazard, they will shout "CEASE FIRE, CEASE FIRE, CEASE FIRE."

h. On the command "CEASE FIRE", all personnel will cease firing, clear and lock all weapons.

i. The emergency signal for cease fire will be a red smoke grenade, supplemented with the shouted command "CEASE FIRE, CEASE FIRE, CEASE FIRE". Personnel upon hearing or observing this will take action as above.

J. Before a wet run, CONTROL 1 will ensure that the range is clear.

K. Two nylon cords will be attached to the 7.62mm MG bipod. One will be fastened to the front and the other to the rear of the ACAV. The cords are long enough to permit adequate target traverse but will not permit the gun to be swung more than 180 degrees. The cord on the guns will be detached after Exercise 8.

L. Three locally fabricated devices will be made to indicate when each MG is clear. The device for the 7.62mm MG will have a flange to fit into the feedway of the weapon when the cover is closed. Each device will have an 18 inch long dowel or rod attached to surmounted by a green pennant.

M. The use of the above devices is not a substitute for proper clearing procedures. MG's will be properly cleared by the Examiner/Controller and verified by the Safety NCO. Once this is accomplished, the devices will be reported.

3. Safety personnel. a. Chief Controller. The Chief Controller is responsible for overall safety on the course.

b. Examiner/Controller will be the safety officer on the firing ACAV. He will properly clear all weapons at the appropriate time.

c. Safety NCO will assist the Examiner/Controller in enforcing safety procedures on the firing ACAV with particular attention to the direction of fire of firing weapons. He will verify that weapons are clear.

APPENDIX to ACAV Crew Proficiency Course

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INCLOSURE 10
AIT/BUT PROGRAMS OF
INSTRUCTION

AIT/BUT TRAINING PROGRAM

1. Advanced Individual Training.

a. General. AIT was accomplished by a combination of centralized and decentralized training. Basic MOS personnel were assigned to the second squadron conducting the training. Specialist personnel were assigned to the squadrons and trained under the direction of the appropriate Regimental Staff/Special Staff Officer, i.e., S1-clerical, S4-maintenance and supply, Surgeon-medics. Upon completion of the seventh week of training, the basic combat MOS trainees were reassigned equitably among the three squadrons according to existing TOE vacancies. Training was based on 5½ day week (44 hours).

b. Master Training Program Schedules.

GENERAL (BRANCH) TRAINING

SUBJECT:	REQUIRED HOURS	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
General	64								
a. Character Guidance	2				1			1	
b. Drill and Ceremonies	8	3	2	1	2				
c. First Aid	4	2					2		
d. Inspections	8	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	
e. Map Reading	26	3	7	4	3	6*		3	
f. Physical Training	8	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	
g. Organization, Mission and Traditions of Armored Cavalry	1	1							
h. Command Information	7	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
Combat Skills:	26								
a. Camouflage and Concealment	4	4							
b. Field Fortifications	4		4						
c. Landmine Warfare	4			4					
d. Tank-Infantry Indoctrination	4			4					
e. Counter guerrilla Operations	4					4			
f. Individual CBR	4			4					
g. Intelligence Training	2				2				
Driver's Training	77								
a. Preliminary Driver Training	24	16				4(PM)		4(PM)	
b. Basic Driver Training	28		15			5(PM)		8(PM)	
c. Advanced Driver Training	25			18				7	
Communications:	20								
a. Introduction to Armor Communications	1			1					
b. Radio Operation and Maintenance	4				4				
c. Radio Telephone Procedure	12				12				
d. Supplementary Means of Commo	1					1			
e. Wire Communications	2					2			
Weapons:	20								
a. Machine Gun Cal .50 Familiarization	4		4						
b. Grenade Launcher, 40mm Familiarization	8	4	4						
c. Submachine Gun Cal .45 Familiarization	8						8		
Commander's Time **	39	**	**	**	**	**	**	**	**
Specialist (MOS) Training	106	(Hours vary by MOS)							
TOTAL HOURS PER WEEK	392	44	44	44	44	44	44	44	44

- 150
- (*) Delete 6 hours from scouts and infantry; add 8 hours pioneering and demolitions. Scouts and infantry receive more map reading in scouting and patrolling. (18 hours).
- (**) Commander's time varies each week for each troop due to 6 different MOS number of instructors available and facilities available etc. All troops will receive 39 hours commander's time during the eight week AIT cycle.

RIFLEMEN (MOS TRAINING)

SUBJECT	REQUIRED HOURS	WEEK							
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Specialist MOS Training	94								
a. Advance Rifle Marksmanship	(20)				4	16			
b. Machine Gun M-60 Qualification	(20)							8	12
c. Machine Gun Cal .50 Qualification	(12)								12
d. Pioneering, Demolitions and Explosives	(16)					16			
e. Bayonet and Hand to Hand Combat	(4)							4	
f. Crew Drill	(12)							8	4
g. Intelligence Training	(2)				2				
h. Proficiency Tests	(8)							4	4
General Subjects Training		44	44	44	38	12	28	28	20
TOTAL		44	44	44	44	44	44	44	44

SCOUTS (MOS TRAINING)

SUBJECT	REQUIRED HOURS	WEEK							
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Specialist MOS Training	112								
a. Machine Gun M-60 Qualification	(20)							8	12
b. Machine gun Cal .50	(12)								12
c. Advanced Rifle Marksmanship	(20)				4	16			
d. Range Determination	(2)				2				
e. Scouting and Patrolling	(18)						18		
f. Radiological Survey Trg	(4)							4	
g. Pioneering Demolitions and Explosives	(14)					14			
h. Bayonet and Hand to Hand Combat	(4)							4	
i. Intelligence Training	(2)				2				
j. Adjustment of Artillery and Mortar Fire	(8)				4				4
k. Proficiency Tests	(8)				1			4	3
General Subjects Training		44	44	44	31	14	18	25	20
TOTAL		44	44	44	44	44	44	44	44

TANKERS (MOS TRAINING)

SUBJECT	REQUIRED HOURS	WEEK							
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Specialist MOS Training	107								
a. Turret Familiarization	(14)								
b. Functioning and Servicing of Main Gun	(2)								

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SUBJECT	REQUIRED HOURS	WEEK							
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
c. Tank Gun Ammunition	(2)					2			
d. Preventive Maintenance	(4)					4			
e. Fire Control System	(4)					4			
f. Range Determination	(2)					2			
g. Conduct of Direct Fire	(8)					8			
h. Range Cards	(3)						3		
i. Searchlight Familiarization	(2)					2			
j. Crew Drill	(10)						10		
k. Preliminary Non-firing Ex	(8)						8		
l. Preliminary Gunners Exam	(8)							8	
m. Sub Cal Firing Tables I-III	(12)							12	
n. Service Firing Tables IV-V	(12)								12
o. Pistol Qualification	(16)						4		12

General Subject Training 44 44 44 28 22 19 16 20

TOTAL 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44

ARTILLERYMEN (MOS TRAINING)

SUBJECT	REQUIRED	WEEK							
	HOURS	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Specialist MOS Training (MOS 13A10)106									
a. General Artillery									
(1) Materiel and Mechanisms	(9)				3	3	3		
(2) Howitzer Battery Orientation	(3)				3				
(3) Artillery Communications	(4)					2	2		
(4) Artillery Ammunition	(3)					3			
b. Firing Battery									
(1) Maintenance	(18)				3	3	4	4	4
(2) Technical Instruction	(33)				2	10	9	8	4
(3) Crew Drill	(36)						12	10	14
General Subjects Training	256	44	44	44	33	23	14	22	22
TOTAL		44	44	44	44	44	44	44	44

Specialist MOS Training (MOS 13E10)106

a. General Artillery									
(1) Materiel and Mechanisms	(9)				3	3	3		
(2) Howitzer Battery Orientation	(3)				3				
(3) Artillery Communications	(4)					2	2		
(4) Artillery Ammunition	(3)					3			
b. Fire Direction Center									
Technical Instruction and application	(87)				5	13	25	22	22
General Subjects Training	246	44	44	44	33	23	14	22	22
TOTAL		44	44	44	44	44	44	44	44

MORTAR (MOS TRAINING)

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SUBJECT	REQUIRED HOURS	WEEK							
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Specialist MOS Training	106								
a. Materiel and Mechanisms	(13)				5		4		6
b. Fire Direction Techniques	(46)				8	14	6	10	8
c. Communication and Fire Mission									
Radio Telephone Procedures	(4)					2	2		
d. Crew Drill and Maintenance	(40)					1	13	16	10
e. Ammunition	(3)					3			
General Subjects Training		44	44	44	33	24	19	18	20
TOTAL		44	44	44	44	44	44	44	44

2. Basic Unit Training.

a. General. All units followed a modified BUT schedule in which seven weeks of training up through troop/company/battery level and one week squadron level FTK and ATT were conducted. The Air Cavalry Troop continued to provide support for training and conducted OJT until enough personnel and equipment arrived to initiate BUT. BUT was conducted on a 6 day week (48 hours).

b. Master Training Program.

Headquarters Troops and Ordnance Company (D/S)

a. General Training

(1) Character Guidance	2
(2) Troop Information	8
(3) Maintenance	92
(4) Commander's Time	32 (1)

SUBTOTAL (134)

b. OJT (210)

c. Sqdn Training (40)

(1) Sqdn FTK	16 (2)
(2) Sqdn ATT	24 (3)

TOTAL

1. Additional Commander's Time may be withdrawn from OJT to insure POR qualification.

2. Actually requires 48 hours in overnight exercise, 16 hours shown for Master Schedule purposes.

3. Actually requires 72 hours in overnight exercise, 24 hours shown for Master Schedule purposes.

Armored Cavalry Troopa. General Training Rifle Sqd Spt Sqd Sot Sec TK Sec Trp Hqs

(1) Character Guidance	2	2	2	2	2
(2) Troop Information	8	8	8	8	8

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(3) Maintenance	92	92	92	92	92
(4) Commander's Time	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>
SUBTOTAL	(104)	(104)	(104)	(104)	(104)

b. Team Training

(1) Attack Exercises	12				
(2) Defense Exercise	12				
(3) Retrograde Opns	4	8	8		
(4) Scouting and Patrolling	16		8		
(5) Combat Firing Exers	8	24	8		
(6) Tank Infantry Opns	8		8	8	
(7) Heliborne Opns	4		4		
(8) Squad Test*	*8	*4	*8		
(9) Mortar Firing Exer		16			
(10) Recon Operations		12	12		
(11) Security Operations		8	8		
(12) Observation Posts			8		
(13) TCQC				56	
(14) Section Tactical Tng				<u>8</u>	
SUBTOTAL	(72)	(72)	(72)	(72)	(72) (OJT)

c. Platoon Training Rifle Sqd Spt Sqd Sot Sec TK Sec Tro Hqs

(1) Attack Exercises	16	16	16	16	
(2) Defense Exercise	8	8	8	8	
(3) Retrograde Exercises	8	8	8	8	
(4) Recon Exercise	16	16	16	16	
(5) Security Exercises	16	16	16	16	
(6) Combat Firing Exercises	8	8	8	8	
(7) Platoon Test**	<u>8**</u>	<u>8**</u>	<u>8**</u>	<u>8**</u>	
SUBTOTAL	(80)	(80)	(80)	(80)	(80) (OJT)

d. Troop Training

(1) Attack Exercises	8	8	8	8	8
(2) Defense Exercises	8	8	8	8	8
(3) Retrograde Exercises	8	8	8	8	8
(4) Recon Exercises	24	24	24	24	24
(5) Security Exercises	24	24	24	24	24

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(6) Troop Tests	(1) <u>16</u>	(1) <u>16</u>	(1) <u>16</u>	(1) <u>16</u>	(1) <u>16</u>
SUBTOTAL	(88)	(88)	(88)	(88)	(88)
c. Sqdn Training					
(1) Sqdn FTX	(2) 16	(2) 16	(2) 16	(2) 16	(2) 16
(2) Sqdn ATT	(3) <u>24</u>	(3) <u>24</u>	(3) <u>24</u>	(3) <u>24</u>	(3) <u>24</u>
SUBTOTAL	(40)	(40)	(40)	(40)	(40)
TOTAL	<u>384</u>	<u>384</u>	<u>384</u>	<u>384</u>	<u>384</u>

*Conducted at Troop Level

**Conducted at Squadron Level

- (1) Tested Concurrently with Squadron ATT.
- (2) Actually requires 48 hours in overnight exercise. Only 16 shown for Master Schedule purposes.
- (3) Actually requires 72 hours; 24 hours, 3 training days shown for Master Schedule purposes; COFGM Post responsible for conduct of test.

Tank Company

a. General Training

(1) Character Guidance	2
(2) Troop Information	8
(3) Maintenance	92
(4) Commander's Time	<u>36</u>
SUBTOTAL	(138)

b. Team Training: Crew, Platoon, and Company

(1) Tank Crew Qualification Course	(56)*
(2) Tank Platoon Tactical Exercises	(56)
(a) Battle Drill	8
(b) Attack	16
(c) Defense	8
(d) Retrograde	8
(e) Tank-Infantry	8
(f) Platoon Test	8**
(3) Tank Company Tactical Exercise	(94)
(a) Battle Drill	6
(b) Attack	8
(c) Defense	8
(d) Retrograde	8

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(e) Tank-Infantry Operations	48
(f) Company Test	16 (1)
c. Squadron Training	(40)
(1) Squadron FTX	16 (1)
(2) Squadron ATT	24 (3)
TOTAL	<u>394</u>

NOTES: ATP authorized 48 hours
 *Additional 18 hrs provided from commander's Time
 **Conducted at Sqdn ATT

- (1) Concurrent w/Sqdn ATT
- (2) Actually requires 48 hours; shown as 16 hrs, 2 Training Days for Master Schedule Purposes.
- (3) Actually requires 72 hours; shown as 24 hrs, 3 Training Days for Master Schedule Purposes.

Bowitzer Battery

a. General Training

(1) Character Guidance	2
(2) Troop Information	8
(3) Concealment and Camouflage	4
(4) Combat Intelligence	4
(5) Defense of the Position Area	8
(6) Marches, Bivouacs, FTX, and Service Firing	40
(7) Proficiency Testing	44
(8) Maintenance	92
(9) Commander's Time	<u>13</u> (Gun Sections-21) (FO/Ln Section-17)

SUBTOTAL

(215)

b. Section Training

	<u>Gun Sec</u>	<u>FDC</u>	<u>Survey</u>	<u>FO/Ln Sec</u>
(1) Cannoneer Instruction	46			
(2) Care, Handling of Ammunition	15			
(3) Duties of Instrument Operators	8			
(4) Duties of Artillery Recorder	6			
(5) Motor Vehicle Driving, Care & Maintenance	12			
(6) Field Expedients	16			
(7) Communications	8			1
(8) Operation of the FDC	10	73	10	10
(9) Instruments		8	8	6

	<u>Gun Sec</u>	<u>FDC</u>	<u>Survey</u>	<u>FO/In Sec</u>	162
(10) Maps		8	8	6	
(11) Survey		16	50		
(12) CPX		24	24	24	
(13) Astronomic Observations			29		
(14) Adjustment of Artillery Fire				20	
(15) Fire Support Coordination				4	
(16) Liaison				28	
(17) Combat Intelligence	—	—	—	9	
	121	129	129	125	
*Commander's Time	6	—	—	4	
	(129)	(129)	(129)	(129)	

o. Squadron Training

(1) FTX	16	16	16	16 (1)
(2) ATT	24	24	24	24 (2)
SUBTOTAL	<u>(40)</u>	<u>(40)</u>	<u>(40)</u>	<u>(40)</u>
TOTAL	<u>384</u>	<u>384</u>	<u>384</u>	<u>384</u>

- NOTES: (1) Actually requires 48 hours in overnight exercise, 16 hours shown for Master Schedule purposes.
- (2) Actually requires 72 hours; 24 hours, 3 Training days shown for Master Schedule purposes.

MANDATORY TRAINING REQUIREMENTS

1. All Units

- Character Guidance (Once a month).
- Command Information (Once each week).
- Physical Training (Integrate).
- Tactical Marches (Integrate).
- Inspections (As required/Comdr's Time).
- Enemy tactics and techniques: Emphasis on but not limited to those encountered and anticipated in RVN. (Integrate in all training).
- Material Readiness: Although equal time need not be allowed to it, material readiness is equal in importance to personnel training readiness. (Constant throughout training).
- Examinations. (As prescribed by ASubJ50d).

2. Combat Elements

a. Squad Level

- (1) Organisation of the platoon.

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- (2) Formations
- (3) Battle Drills
- (4) Live Fire Exercises

b. Platoon Level

- (1) Organisation of the Company
- (2) Formations
- (3) Battle Drills
- (4) Patrols
- (5) Attack
- (6) Ambush
- (7) Security
- (8) Platoon Test

c. Company/Troop/Battery Level

- (1) Organisation of the Squadron
- (2) Tactical Marches
- (3) Defense
- (4) Attack
- (5) Delay
- (6) Night Withdrawal
- (7) Heliborne Operations
- (8) Search and Hold Operations
- (9) Live Fire Exercises
- (10) ATT (In conjunction w/Sqdn ATT)

d. Squadron Level

- (1) FTX
- (2) ATT

e. Regimental Level - CP in conjunction with Squadron ATT's

3. Support Units.


- a. Tactical Mortar March (1hr)
- b. Occupation of Assembly Areas (2hr Day/2 hr Night)
- c. Squad/Platoon Tactics (2 hrs)
- d. Patrolling (1 hr day/1 hr night)
- e. Area Damage Control (1 hr)
- f. Communications procedures (1 hr)
- g. Night Adaptation (1 hr)

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ENCLOSURE 11
PHOTOGRAPHS OF TRACKED VEHICLES AND AIRCRAFT

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Nomenclature
 Total Number in the Regiment
 Crew
 Armament
 Cruising Range

ACAV (M11 Modified)
 302 (27 utilized by the Inf Sqis)
 5 (11 when utilized to carry Inf)
 (1) M3 Cal 50 M2, (2) MG 7.62 mm
 M-60
 200 miles



Nomenclature
 Total Number in the Regiment
 Crew
 Armament
 Cruising Range

Tank (M48A3)
 48
 4
 (1) Gun 90mm, (1) MG Cal 50 M2,
 (1) MG 7.62mm M-73
 300 miles

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Nomenclature

Total Number in the Regiment
Crew
Armament
Cruising Range

Armored Vehicle Launch Bridge (AVLB)
Launcher M60 Series

9
2
None
300 miles




Nomenclature

Total Number in the Regiment
Crew
Armament
Cruising Range

Tank w/Bulldozer (M48A3)

3
4
(1) Gun 90mm (1) MG Cal 50 M2,
(1) MG 7.62mm M-73
300 miles



Nomenclature	Heavy Recovery Vehicle (MB0)
Total Number in the Regiment	6
Crew	4
Armament	(1) MG Cal 50M2
Cruising Range	222 miles



Nomenclature
 Total Number in the Regiment
 Crew
 Armament
 Cruising Range

Light Recovery Vehicle (M67A)
 12
 3
 (1) M2 Cal 50 M2
 450 miles



Nomenclature	Utility Helicopter (UH1B)
Total Number in the Regiment	19
Capacity	
Passenger	None
Cargo	None
* Armament	(4) MG 7.62mm (Flexible), (2) MG 12.62mm MEO (2.75mm) Rkt Pods 2.75mm (1- 16 wps system/ 260 nautical miles (4) UH1B's equipped with M-5 wps system (40mm GL's)

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INCLOSURE 12
SQUADRON ACTUAL TRAINING TEST (ATT)

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GUIDELINES - PREPARATION OF SQUADRON ATT

1. General. The information incorporated in this inclosure in addition to ATT 17-105 (for format only) provides sufficient guidance and reference material for the preparation of training tests for Armored Cavalry Squadrons deploying to Vietnam.

2. Concept of the Test. The test should encompass those missions normally given an Armored Cavalry Squadron in counterinsurgency operations. The phases of the test, as indicated below, are not to indicate that one phase must be conducted before the next is initiated. Phases should overlap and be concurrent in some cases. The test consists of four parts as follows:

a. PART I - Movement to, and Occupation of, a Combat Base: The test begins with the Armored Cavalry Squadron being assigned the mission of combating guerrilla forces within a specified area. The squadron is ordered to move from its assembly area to its assigned sector, select and establish a combat base, and conduct harassment operations. Guerrilla forces conduct ambushes of the squadron enroute and probing attacks of the combat base after it is established. Part I will be characterized by measures taken with respect to:

- (1) Staff Planning.
- (2) Route reconnaissance.
- (3) March discipline.
- (4) Alertness of unit and vehicle commanders to ground attack.
- (5) Action upon enemy contact.
- (6) Reporting.
- (7) Selection, occupation and organization of combat base.

b. PART II - Harassment Operation: The squadron conducts harassment operations to locate and keep pressure on the guerrilla force. Maximum effort will be made to clear guerrilla forces from the squadron's sector and establish friendly control. Once the guerrilla force is located, offensive reaction will be initiated without delay to destroy the guerrilla force. Part II of the test will be characterized by:

- (1) Staff Planning and control.
- (2) Conduct of reconnaissance and harassment operations.
- (3) Action on enemy contact.
- (4) Terrain appreciation.
- (5) Reporting of intelligence information.

c. PART III - Police Operations: The squadron is assigned the additional mission of conducting police operations within its assigned sector. This part includes the planning and conduct of route security, convoy escort, and search and seizure operations. Part III will be characterized by those actions regarding:

- (1) Staff planning and control.
- (2) Security of routes of communications.
- (3) Search and seizure of areas.
- (4) Action on contact.
- (5) Timely reporting of information.

2. PART IV - Offensive Operations: The squadron is relieved of its responsibilities in its assigned sector and required to counterattack to relieve an encircled unit. The squadron pursues withdrawing guerrilla forces, encircles and destroys them. Part IV of the test will be characterized by:

- (1) Staff Planning.
- (2) Overall control.
- (3) Rapid movement of units.
- (4) Conduct of conventional attack.
- (5) Conduct of the pursuit and encirclement operations.
- (6) Terrain appreciation.
- (7) Aggressive action on the part of all personnel.

3. Conduct of Test.

a. PART I - Movement - Movement to and occupation of combat base.

<u>Sequence of events</u>	<u>Umpires</u>	<u>Aggressor</u>
Sqdn receives warning order to move to assigned sector, establish combat base, and conduct harassment operations. Planning and preparation begin.	H-5 hrs to H hr Issue warning order. Become familiar with unit SOP. Check Sqdn movement order for rate and order of march, distances between vehicles, communications, location of commander in column, fire support plan, prearranged plans for guerrilla attack, and security requirements. Check area surveillance order for use of patrols, routes, and control; designation of combat base and of responsibility; reaction forces, use of air cavalry for reconnaissance and air mobile operations. Check that all personnel are thoroughly briefed.	
Sqdn receives order to move. Sqdn crosses SP, conducts tactical road march to combat base.	H hr to H + 6 hrs Order Sqdn to move. Check SP time, control measures, reporting, communication, conduct of march, use of ground and air elements to provide security. Check actions on enemy contact, counter ambush techniques and immediate action.	Ambush column enroute to combat base. Withdraw after ambush and avoid detection.
Sqdn occupies combat base and establishes security.	Check disposition of units; local security; cover and concealment; dispersion of vehicles, troops, and equipment; sound and light discipline; varying of security routine; suitability of combat base.	

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Sequence of events

Duties

Aggressor

Sqdn begins harassment operations.

H-6 hrs to H-48 hrs Check conduct of mission; use and conduct of patrols (areas, routes, communication, reporting, terrain appreciation, and action on contact) use of ambushes; air cavalry reaction forces.

Avoid contact. Locate Sqdn combat base. Watch for patterns of security measures which can be used to your advantage. Attack or ambush individuals or small units only when certain of success.

Sqdn combat base subjected to mortar attack. Sqdn takes action to locate guerrilla mortar.

Check conduct of defense; action to locate and neutralize snipers and mortars; develop situation; locate and maintain contact with guerrilla forces; reporting employment of supporting fires; actions and orders; evacuation of casualties and damaged equipment.

Use snipers to determine location of crew served weapons. Mortar fire directed at base to destroy or damage communication and command complexes. Withdraw after attack, disperse and evade detection.

Sqdn continues harassment operations. Receives warning order to secure routes in sector and provide convoy escort on order. Planning and preparation begin.

H-12 hrs to H-48 hrs Issue warning order for route security missions. Check continued conduct of surveillance mission. Check plans for route security; actions to discover and eliminate mines, roadblocks, ambushes; communications; security of critical points along routes; delineation of route responsibility; establishment of traffic control stations and security posts.

Sqdn begins route security mission.

Check conduct of security mission; occupation of security posts; coordination; control measures; techniques of passing through danger areas, actions to prevent guerrilla interdiction of route.

Make every attempt to interdict the routes.

Sqdn performs convoy escort missions.

Check organization of convoy security elements; briefing of personnel; use of air cavalry; coordination with route security forces; control of convoy; communication; pre-arranged plans in case of attack.

Sqdn receives aerial resupply. Secures and defends landing zone.

Check preparation and security of landing zone; rapid, efficient off-loading of supplies; actions on enemy contact.

Ambush landing zone during offloading operations.

Sequence of events

Umpires

Aggressor

Convoy-escort attacked by guerrilla force

Check action on contact; conduct of convoy-escort with regard to prearranged plans, counterambush techniques; evacuation of disabled vehicle and casualties. Use of security forces and reaction forces to destroy guerrilla forces. Use of air cavalry to canalize, block and destroy withdrawing guerrilla forces. Techniques of air mobile operation.

Attack convoy. Withdraw after attack and avoid detection.

Sqdn continues harassment and route security mission. Guerrilla forces to be cleared from sector. Captures POW's.

Check conduct of assigned missions; control, thoroughness of clearance procedures; actions on contact; elimination of guerrilla forces through quick reaction, fire support and air actions. Handling of POW's.

Maintain light harassing operation. Attack only when certain of success. Avoid detection and do not become engaged in actions where encirclement or destruction is possible. Allow POW's to be captured.

Sqdn order to conduct search and seizure operation of suspected guerrilla base at first light.

Check preparation for search and seizure operation; assignment of zones, search parties, security elements, and reserve elements. Thorough briefing of personnel.

Sqdn conducts search and seizure operation. Captures POW and supplies.

Check conduct and thoroughness of search; handling of civilian's and POW's actions on resistance; action regarding captured supplies; actions to clear booby traps; use of riot control agents.

Defend base initially, attempt escape. If impossible pose as civilian to avoid detection.

d. PART IV - Offensive Operations

Sequence of events

Umpires

Aggressor

Sqdn receives warning order to counterattack and relieve encircled friendly unit. Relief of responsibility of sector. Planning and preparation begins.

Check counterattack plans; action, orders and supervision; coordination.

Sqdn relieved of sector responsibility. Crosses line of departure and moves to relief of encircled unit. Sqdn ambushed enroute.

Check timeliness of move and rapid reaction of units; control; action and orders upon encountering enemy; aggressive action of all leaders; rapid neutralizing of guerrilla ambushing forces.

Sqdn counterattacks and relieves encircled unit.

Check action and orders, conduct attack and relieve encircled unit; reporting; consolidation.

Defend against attacking force. Disrupt and withdraw.

Sequence of events

Sqdn ordered to assume responsibility for new sector. Locate, pursue, and harass guerrilla force. Relocate combat base.

Sqdn ordered to establish blocking force at night. Conduct encirclement operation and destroy or capture guerrilla force at first light.

Sqdn completes encirclement. Begins elimination operation.

Problem terminates. An inspection of at least 10% of Sqdn's equipment.

Umpires

Check conduct of pursuit; actions of leaders; maintenance of pressure on guerrilla force; use of reaction forces; thoroughness of sweep; use of air cavalry, patrols, ambushes, raids to locate guerrilla force and harass it.

Check planning for encirclement; establishment of blocking forces; timely movement of units selection of positions; control; fire plans; use of air cavalry; and handling of POW's.

Check for completeness of encirclement, control, and conduct of elimination operation.

Terminate problem. Inspection of sqdn equipment. Assemble umpire reports. Critique selected personnel.

Aggressor

Maintain light contact initially. Make every effort to avoid detection and encirclement. Attempt to infiltrate back through pursuing force.

Continue light contact. Infiltrate through encircling forces if possible. Allow capture of POW's.

Attempt bypass of attacking force. Attempt infiltration through blocking force. Violent reaction to encirclement with concerted effort to break out.

4. References:

- a. FM 17-1
- b. FM 17-36
- c. FM 31-16
- d. Department of the Army Training Test 17-105, dated 20 Dec 61.
- e. Handbook for US Forces in Viet Nam, dated Dec 65 (FOUO).
- f. USCOMARC Pamphlet 350-16, dated Aug 65
- g. USCOMARC Pamphlet 350-30-1, dated Oct 65 (FOUO).
- h. USCOMARC Pamphlet 350-30-2, dated Dec 65 (FOUO).