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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 52D ARTILLERY GROUP (u) 8
APO 96295-

AD386111

(18) OACSFOR

(19) OT-RD-660141

(11)

AVFA - AT-52-CO

15 Aug 66

SUBJECT: (6) Operational Report For Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966,

(OACSFOR - 65) (u)

TO: See Distribution

(12) 7p.

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(c)
Section I: Significant Unit Activities

A. The 52d Artillery Group, minus the augmentation (aviation section and recruiting sergeant), was alerted for overseas movement on 8 April 1966 at Fort Sill, Oklahoma.

B. An intensive four-week training program was initiated on 11 April. Outstanding cooperation was received from several departments and agencies of the Artillery School during this instructional period.

C. The VRC 12 series of radios was received on 6 May 1966. The radios were inspected and repacked for shipment with the units' general cargo.

D. The equipment readiness date of 16 May 1966 and the personnel readiness date of 30 May 1966 were both met.

E. The general cargo was shipped from Fort Sill to the port of Beaumont, Texas on May 16, 1966.

F. On 23 May 1966 the red disk TAT was shipped to the port of Tacoma, Washington.

G. By 1200 hours on 30 May 1966 all personnel had returned from leave and final movement preparations were initiated.

H. At 0930 hours on 31 May 1966 a Farewell Formation was held at Ft Sill. Major General Harry H. Critz, the post commander, was the reviewing officer.

I. The unit departed Ft Sill by bus for Oklahoma City, Oklahoma where it boarded a commercial jet aircraft for flight to the port of Tacoma, Washington.

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RCS (CSFOR)

J. On 1 June 1966, the unit embarked at Tacoma aboard the USNS Gen. Nelson M. Walker. The unit debarked at Qui Nhon, RVN on 17 June 1966 and was airlifted from there to Pleiku, RVN.

K. The advance party consisting of three officers and three enlisted men departed Ft Sill by C130 aircraft on 8 June 1966 and arrived Pleiku, RVN 11 June 1966.

L. The Group was attached to I FFORCEV. The 6th Gun Battalion, 14th Artillery was assigned as host unit.

M. On 17 June 1966 the unit established its base camp on Artillery Hill. Construction continues on permanent installations and buildings.

N. On 16 July 1966 the general cargo arrived at Qui Nhon Harbor.

O. On 18 July 1966 the general cargo arrived at Pleiku.

P. On 20 July, the 3d Howitzer Battalion, 6th Artillery (105mm SP), the 6th Gun Battalion, 14th Artillery (175mm Gun SP), the 1st Howitzer Battalion, 30th Artillery (155mm Towed), the 1st Radar Detachment (Counter Mortar Radar) and the 235th Radar Detachment (Counter Mortar Radar) were attached.

Q. On 20 July 1966 the Group assumed the following missions:

1. Coordination of artillery fires in the Pleiku Defense Complex.
2. Coordination of artillery fires for road clearing and convoy operations in the area of influence.
3. Artillery support of Special Forces camps within the Pleiku Province.
4. Artillery support of advance elements of the 4th Infantry Division in the Pleiku area.

R. During the reporting period the unit was engaged in training for 36 days, POM and personnel leaves 16 days, Operations 43 days and troop movement 18 days.

S. Problems encountered during POM - see Section II.

(a)
Section 2: Commanders Observations and Recommendations.

Part I, Observations (Lessons Learned):

PERSONNEL:

Item: Personnel assigned to an alerted unit need to know they are assigned to a unit deploying to an overseas area.,

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15 August 1966

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RCS (CSFOR - 65)

Discussion: Some personnel assigned to this unit for POM fill from other stations had no indications they were being sent overseas. This could have resulted in needless expense and family inconvenience.

Observations: Personnel officers responsible for assigning personnel to alerted units should insure that subject personnel are aware of final destination (within consideration of national security). At least orders should state "for further assignment to a restricted area". Paragraph 61, AR 220-10 applies.

Item: Assignment of medical personnel to alerted units.

Discussion: Medical personnel assigned to this unit, in the most part joined the unit after POM training, thus were not thoroughly familiar with the unit, its capabilities and organization, nor were they able to supervise the type of medical supplies to be shipped with the unit.

Observation: Personnel fill should be made sufficiently in advance of deployment for personnel to be with the unit for POM training.

Operations

Item: Maps of area of operations are needed by units deploying into the Republic of Vietnam.

Discussion: Alerted units in the United States could use maps of specific areas of operations early in their POM training period to familiarize personnel (particularly observers and commanders) with topographical features of the area of operations.

Observation: Five copies of maps covering area of operations should be issued prior to start of POM training, remainder to sponsor unit.

Item: Notification to alerted unit of Area of Operations.

Discussion: Alerted unit needs to know general area of operations early in POM training to facilitate training, drawing of supplies and equipping of personnel. This applies in the fields of driver training, sanitation and type of supplies to ship into country (e.g. Highlands versus Coastal Areas).

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Encl 13

CONFIDENTIAL

15 August 1966

SUBJECT: Operational Report For Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966,
RCS (CSFok - 65)

Observation: Alert orders should specify general area of assignment (Highlands or coastal area).

Item: The current system for security of classified documents on an overseas move seems to be inadequate.

Discussion: AR 220-10 states that those documents requiring safe keeping should be turned over to the Port Intelligence Officer. When the Custodian contacted port officials at Seattle, he was told to carry the documents aboard where the purser would provide a place for safekeeping. This system proved unsatisfactory as all units' pouches, etc, were in the same compartment.

Observation: R & D should be given the mission of developing a lightweight portable container for the safe storage and transport of classified documents.

Training and Organization

Item: A Headquarters & Headquarters Battery Artillery Group has need of its aviation section and air observer augmentation.

Discussion: It is difficult to obtain general support aircraft with sufficient responsiveness for target acquisition or post strike analysis.

Observation: Headquarters and Headquarters Batteries of Groups and Artillery battalions should deploy with aviation sections and air observer sections.

Item: Defensive mine field.

Discussion: Removal of defensive mine fields is tedious and dangerous. One of the attached battalion was required to remove a mine field laid approximately nine months ago due to expansion of the camp. In addition to many man hours lost, two personnel were killed. It is believed normal barrier covered by automatic weapons and claymore mines is sufficient.

Observation: Normal barbed wire and Claymore mines covered by automatic weapons and defensive concentrations should be sufficient for base camp protection.

Intelligence

No specific comments.

Logistics

Item: Lack of adequate logistical planning for units deploying to Vietnam.

Discussion: The security classification for units deploying to Vietnam precludes proper individuals being informed. This is particularly true at the lower working levels with issue of Vietnam peculiar supplies and services.

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15 August 1966

SUBJECT: Operational Report For Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966,
RSC (CSFOR - 65)

Example: At Ft Sill, individuals from this unit experienced difficulty in drawing TA 50-901 equipment from Central Issue because the clerks were not informed. Example: Pleiku Repair and Utilities Contractor, Pacific Architects and Engineers, who are required to plan and provide utility service were not informed; therefore, no planning was done prior to our arrival and no services were available.

Observation: Specific regrading instructions should be issued to downgrade classified information at appropriate times so that individuals with a need to know will have access to the required information.

Item: Excess TAT "To Accompany Troops" cargo for units deploying to Vietnam.

Discussion: Instructions specified that a basic load of rations and small arms ammunition be carried by the unit. The advance party found that these items were in abundant supply at the port of debarkation. Further, that although this cargo was TAT, it was not immediately available and the far simpler solution was to draw these required items from the local Support Command. The Transportation Officer at Ft Sill desired to keep the gross weight and cube weight of TAT to the minimum. Further, the transporting of munitions in small quantities present additional problems.

Observation: The requirement for deploying units to carry basic loads of class I and V should be deleted from the instructions. Further, host units, should be directed to requisition and supply initial class I and V support.

Item: A and B bag composition.

Discussion: Sleeping bags and individual mess equipment should be carried in the A bag when deploying to the highland region of Vietnam. The B bag is with Red TAT and is not available to the owner for several days after arrival. Environmental conditions vary greatly and local post implementing instructions of AR 220-10 are not written specifically for Vietnam.

Observations: Units should be prepared for several days self sufficiency, less Class I and V.

Item: Wire Communications.

Discussion: Telephones are needed initially for command and perimeter communications. Units arriving in country seem to have an extreme shortage of wire equipment.

Observation: Units should bring with them as Red TAT sufficient telephones, switchboards and wire to establish these initial communications.

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CONFIDENTIAL 15 August 1966

SUBJECT: Operational Report For Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966,
RCS (CSFOR-65)

Item: Orientation of doublet antennas.

Discussion: When operating with a doublet antenna on an East-West axis there is a 6400 mil radiation pattern which insures communications in all directions.

Observation: Due to the radio wave propagation peculiar to the highland regions of Vietnam, doublet antennas should be oriented on an East-West axis.

Item: Jamming Reports.

Discussion: During late summer and early autumn the central highlands of Vietnam receive what is called "Sporadic E", from adjacent countries. This "Sporadic E" is "skip waves" from commercial stations and is not intentional jamming.

Observation: Prior to submitting a Jamming Report units should try to determine whether the jamming is intentional or accidental.

Part II - Recommendations


Paragraph B. (Operations)

(1) Recommend automatic issue of five copies of Maps, scale 1:50,000, of area of interest to deploying unit, as soon as possible after alert order.

(2) Recommend Research and Development develop a lightweight, durable, classified documents container for all combat type units.

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O..L. TOBIASON
Colonel, Artillery
Commanding

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AVFA-AT-D (15 August 1966) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966,
RCS CSFOR-65

HEADQUARTERS, I FIELD FORCE VIETNAM ARTILLERY, APO 96240, 1 September 1966

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army (ACSFOR, DA), Washington, D.C. 20310

1. Forwarded.
2. Attached report adequately portrays the significant activities of the unit.
3. The following comment amplifies cross referenced point of basic report:

Section 2, Part I Item: Maps - When a unit is alerted to deploy to Vietnam, and if the unit commander knows the area to which his unit will be assigned, this headquarters maintains that the acquisition of maps is a command responsibility. Asking for automatic issue of maps will not necessarily insure a unit has maps on the day of deployment.

1 Incl
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Ashley A. Blinn
ASHLEY A. BLINN
Colonel, Artillery
Commanding

7
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