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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 4TH TRANSPORTATION COMMAND (U) (S)
APO San Francisco 96307

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23 MAY '66

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SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned, for the Period 1 January 1966 to 30 April 1966

9 Operational rept. 1 Jan-30 Apr 66.

THRU: Commanding General
1st Logistical Command
ATTN: AVLC GO-H
APO US Forces 96307

11 23 May 66

18 OACS FOR 19 OT-RD-660085 12 13 p.

Commanding General
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ATTN: AVC
APO US Forces 96307

Commanding General
United States Army Pacific Area Command
ATTN: GPO P-MH
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TO: Department of the Army
Assistant Chief of Staff
for Force Development
Washington, D.C. 20310

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SECTION I - Significant Organizational Activities:

1. The major U.S. Army logistical commands in Vietnam underwent a series of organizational and command changes in the first few months of 1966. The 4th Transportation Command transferred the operational and command control of three transportation battalions, numbering over 5,200 men, to the Support Commands at Qui Nhon and Cam Ranh Bay. Under General Order 11, Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command, dated 17 January 1966, the 27th Transportation Battalion (Truck) and the 394th Transportation Battalion (Tnl) with their attached units were assigned to the United States Army Support Command at Qui Nhon. (Ref Incl #1). General Order 21, dated 8 February 1966 and General Order 23 dated 9 February 1966, Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command, reassigned the 10th Transportation

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Battalion (Tml) with assigned units to the Cam Ranh Bay Logistical Area effective 10 February 1966 (Ref Incl #2 & 3). This reassignment of the transportation battalions in the II Corps area changed the mission of the 4th Transportation Command to command the U.S. Army port at Saigon, sub-ports at Vung Tau and Nha Be with six (6) ammunition discharge sites, also through the 11th Transportation Battalion (Tml) to direct port and beach clearance to include delivery of cargo and personnel to depots, staging areas, and provide line of communications motor transport as incident to terminal operations or as tactical situations require. The intersectional transportation command was eliminated leaving the 4th Transportation Command directing transportation operations in the III Corps area.

2. A second major change effected the organization of the 4th Transportation Command during this period. In February a Table of Distribution (TD) augmentation was authorized for the 4th Transportation Command Headquarters by General Order 1050, Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, dated 14 February 1966 (Ref Incl #4). This augmentation added forty (40) officers, nine (9) warrant officers and 311 enlisted men to the Headquarters, 4th Transportation Command in order to more properly staff and direct the huge port at Saigon. Also, on 11 February Colonel Aronson, Commanding Officer, 4th Transportation Command, was appointed by Major General Eifler, Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command, as Director of Transportation for the 1st Logistical Command as an additional duty. In this capacity Colonel Aronson provided technical direction for all transportation units under the 1st Logistical Command including the ports at Cam Ranh Bay and Qui Nhon as well as normal staff functions. The existing Transportation Office of the 1st Logistical Command, under the direction of Lt Colonel Joseph Dolan, was merged with elements of Headquarters, 4th Transportation Command to form a Directorate of Transportation. Twelve (12) officers and twenty-one (21) enlisted personnel from the 4th Transportation Command were required to fully staff the new Directorate. The 4th Transportation Command headquarters changed from an S-staff to a functional type staff with two deputies, one Deputy Director of Transportation and one Deputy Commander for the 4th Transportation Command. Lt Colonel Thomas Emery, former Deputy Commanding Officer, 4th Transportation Command, held the interim position as Executive Officer from 25 February until 31 March in order to facilitate the reorganization. The organization chart of the 4th Transportation Command as it existed from 15 February to 30 April is attached (Ref Incl #5). Major personnel additions to the 4th Transportation Command during the period were:

a. 20 January - Chaplain (Major) William R. Gentry became Command Chaplain replacing Chaplain (Major) William H. Mertz who trans-

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ferred to the Saigon Logistics Area.

b. 28 January - Major Cleo C. Garrett arrived from CONUS and became Chief Administrative Division and Command Adjutant with Major Leo A. O'Connell becoming Assistant Adjutant.

c. 14 February - Lt Colonel Robert E. Adams arrived from CONUS and filled a Saigon Port TD position as Chief Port Transportation Division; Major Paul W. Bossert arrived from CONUS and filled a Saigon Port TD position as Chief Port Plans Division.

d. 17 February - Major Harry L. McGinn arrived from CONUS and filled a Saigon Port TD position as Chief of the Management Division.

e. 25 February - Lt Colonel Tillman C. Oliver, former Commanding Officer of the 11th Transportation Battalion, became Deputy Commanding Officer, 4th Transportation Command. He replaced Lt Colonel Thomas D. Emery who became Executive Officer of the 4th Transportation Command until 31 March and then Colonel Emery became Chief Port Operations Division at Saigon Port. Major James M. Fleming became Commanding Officer, 11th Transportation Battalion.

f. The primary staff of the 4th Transportation Command on 30 April 1966 were:

Commanding Officer
Deputy Commanding Officer
Administration Division
Port Operations Division
Port Transportation Division
Port Plans Division
Support, Services and Maintenance
Staff Judge Advocate
Chaplain
Headquarters Commandant
Security
Information Officer

Colonel Richard W Aronson
Lt Colonel Tillman C Oliver
Major Cleo C Garrett
Lt Colonel Thomas D Emery
Lt Colonel Robert E Adams
Major Paul W Bossert
Major Cornelius W Willemse
Lt Colonel Russell A Burnett
Major William R Gentry
Captain Henry A Pridgen
Captain Edward J Brady
Lt Patrick E Rea

3. During the reporting period the marine casualty investigative and reporting function for all U.S. Army Ports in Vietnam continued as a major responsibility of the 4th Transportation Command. A marine casualty may be defined as an incident where there is damage to an Army vessel or Army property or cargo from any cause other than combat; damage to a vessel, property, or cargo belonging to another agency of the United States Government, or to a foreign government or private owner caused by

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an Army vessel or stevedores in other than a combat situation; or death or personal injury of any person caused by maritime operations of the Army other than combat. During this period fifty (50) incidents reportable as marine casualties were logged and fourteen (14) completed.

4. On 19 February the responsibility for direct operational control of Saigon Port and Vung Tau sub-port was transferred from the 11th Transportation Battalion (Tml) to the 4th Transportation Command. The 11th Transportation Battalion remained under the 4th Transportation Command with the primary mission of providing personnel and terminal equipment in support of the 4th Transportation Command, provide highway truck capability for port and beach clearance and highway truck support for combat units as the tactical situation required. The 11th Transportation Battalion had nine (9) companies and eleven (11) detachments with over 1,800 men. The 4th Transportation Command remained a major subordinate command under the 1st Logistical Command.

5. Although this command exercised command control over transportation units up country for only a short period of the time covered by this report, their equipment is included in reporting figures through 19 February 1966. After this point several items of equipment no longer belonged to this command and are not reported. Prior to 19 February, items shown as "not reported" are reflected in this manner due to a difference in reporting formats. (Ref Incl #6). A note worthy item on this report is the relatively high deadline rate experienced by rough terrain forklifts due to a shortage of repair parts. A noticeable drop occurs in early March which is due to a replenishment of parts as well as the effect on the reporting system of the change in command responsibility. Conditions in Saigon are not as hard on this equipment as up country. Shortage of repair parts continues to aggravate the deadline rate in spite of the "Red Ball" source of supply. This is particularly true with respect to marine craft which have reflected rates up to 100% (tugs-9/April 1966) due to an unavailability of parts.

6. The 4th Transportation Command began a program to process all personnel security actions for all transportation units assigned or attached. This program had begun to meet its goals of providing faster service to using units with increased accuracy, when as a result of organizational changes within 1st Logistical Command, the program became a closed issue as up country units were detached and reassigned to Support Commands. The 4th Transportation Command continued to process personnel security actions and assist up country units until the Support Commands were able to assume this function. In the document security field the 4th Transportation Command continued its program to screen and

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reduce this Commands holding of secret material. During the period, 1 January 1966 to 30 April 1966, approximately 550 secret documents were destroyed and another 200 downgraded, reducing this headquarters holdings of secret material to a more easily manageable number. In April a semi-annual inventory of secret documents were made and custodianship of classified documents was transferred from Security Branch to the Administration Division.

7. Driving in and around Saigon has proven an extremely difficult task. Heavy traffic, congested streets and totally new traffic regulations for the drivers have all contributed to higher than normal accident rates (Ref Incl #7). A vigorous command safety program has been instituted and the accident rate is showing a regular decline.

8. The Beach Discharge Lighter John D. Page was operational during the majority of the reporting period. It was used in coastal movement of cargo, being stationed and sailing primarily from Cam Ranh Bay. During the reporting period the BDL carried 9,756 S/T and 25,207 M/T of cargo. In mid-February, for the first time in 3 months, Cam Ranh Bay was cleared of all cargo for Phan Rang due to the BDL Page. The long ramp with gradual slope speeded discharge and loading from the BDL.

9. The 4th Transportation Command was required to submit a projected budget for FY 1967 for port operations at Saigon and Nha Be. The budget which was based on the best data compiled to date was submitted to the 1st Logistical Command on 19 February 1966 for a total of \$39,483,278.

10. The Army Air Cargo Branch of the 4th Transportation Command located at Tan Son Nhut Air Base loaded and transshipped 12,753 S/T of air cargo during the reporting period. Of this cargo, 2,160 S/T were Red Ball Express Cargo. Refinements have been made in the physical handling of cargo by increasing the amount of MHE and segregating cargo on receipt by consignee. The responsibility of operating the Air Branch was transferred from the 11th Transportation Battalion to the 4th Transportation Command on 19 February 1966. Methods of receiving and transshipping cargo have been defined and areas of responsibility have been outlined and affixed between the 8th Aerial Port and the Air Branch.

11. The new Rail Branch of the 4th Transportation Command was formally organized at Saigon Army Terminal on 4 March 1966 and was established to move cargo from the port to the large U.S. Air Force Base at Bien Hoa and move supplies to 1st Division rear at Di An. The total amount of cargo moved by rail during the period was 7,416 S/T with 1,407 S/T (January), 1,814 S/T (February), 2,409 S/T (March) and 1,786 (April).

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12. The truck support for Saigon Army Terminal, the Vung Tau sub-port and in support of the tactical units is Inclosure #8. Total tonnage discharged at 4th Transportation Command ports for the period is Inclosure #9.

13. A totally new program in terminal operation was inaugurated in Vietnam during this period. It is a Roll-on/Roll-off (Ro-Ro) service utilizing fully loaded trailers at both ends of the supply net. In Okinawa a vessel is loaded with trailers that are themselves filled with cargo for consignees in Vietnam. When the specially equipped ship arrives the truck tractors roll aboard and drive away with the cargo. This greatly reduces handling and expedites the shipment. The service was introduced in Saigon Port on 19 March and at present utilizes two ships, the SS Transglobe and the USNS Comet.

Roll-on/Roll-off Statistics:

<u>DATE</u>	<u>VESSEL</u>	<u>TONNAGE</u>	<u>TIME ON BERTH</u>
19-20 March 66	Transglobe	2,160 S/T	48 hours
2-3 April 66	Transglobe	2,015 S/T	44 hours
5-6 April 66	USNS Comet	1,523 S/T	48 hours
13-14 April 66	Transglobe	1,501 S/T	44 hours
25-27 April 66	Transglobe	1,383 S/T	51 hours

14. Additional harbor craft has been requisitioned throughout the last four months to meet additional requirements within the ports under the control of this headquarters. Inclosure #10 lists the current requirements for Army harbor craft in Vietnam with the totals on hand or due in. Significant difficulty has been experienced in obtaining the required equipment in the time frame required. Much of the Army harbor craft presently on hand arrived during the last two months of the period. The addition of numerous cargo barges has had a positive effect on port capability, however, Saigon Port is still hampered by the almost complete lack of tugs to move these barges from point to point. Recent information received at this headquarters indicates that a large portion of the required tugs will be on station by mid-summer.

15. The distances TOE truck companies are operating are beyond range of assigned unit radios. Several times units on the Long Binh - Saigon routes and on the Qui Nhon - Pleiku routes were unable to contact base or relay stations. By a lateral transfer schedule developed by the 4th Transportation Command and the 1st Logistical Command, and expediting new series radios, tactical requirements were met.

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16. The 25th Infantry Division arrived in Vietnam throughout this reporting period. The Division arrived in three separate increments at two different locations about two hundred miles apart. On 27 December 1965 the first C-141 with the headquarters detachment of the 3rd Brigade landed at the new Pleiku Airfield near Pleiku. The After Action Report for "Operation Bluelight" is Inclosure #11. "Operation Greenlight" began on 18 January 1966 and was the landing of the 2nd Brigade at Vung Tau with their airlift to Bien Hoa and deployment to Cu Chi. The After Action Report is Inclosure #12. The final increment of the 25th Infantry Division the 1st Brigade and supporting elements arrived at Vung Tau and Saigon in a three phase operation called "Moonlight". The operation, which was still in process as of 30 April 1966, covered the following phases:

a. Phase I: 7 March 1966 thru 25 March 1966. During this phase six (6) LST's and two (2) deep draft cargo vessels were discharged at Saigon and one (1) troop ship was discharged at Vung Tau.

b. Phase II: Started 31 March 1966 and into May. One deep draft cargo vessel carrying phase II equipment was awaiting discharge on 30 April. By 30 April six (6) deep draft vessels have been discharged at Saigon and two (2) troop ships at Vung Tau.

c. Phase III: Started 28 April and will run into early May. By 30 April one (1) troop ship had been discharged at Vung Tau.

17. In January of 1966 the military ports in the Republic of Vietnam faced one of their most critical periods. From late November 1965 until January 1966 several major ports in CONUS and a number of leading ports throughout the world fed the vital supplies of war into the four unimproved primary ports in Vietnam. In early January 1966 as many as 192 vessels were in Vietnamese ports, enroute from ports of embarkation, or in holding for discharge in Vietnam. This figure was extremely high and constituted a dangerous backlog. The 4th Transportation Command with the terminal battalions at Saigon, Cam Ranh Bay and Qui Nhon succeeded in eliminating the backlog by early February. The total discharge for January was 270,641 S/T of cargo with 303,322 S/T handled in all United States Army ports and sub-ports that were under the 4th Transportation Command. These figures when compared against December 1965, show a thirty-eight percent (38%) increase in short tons discharged and a thirty percent (30%) increase in short tons handled. This undertaking was one of the major accomplishments of the terminal commands (4th Transportation Command with the terminal battalions) during the huge allied buildup.

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SECTION II - Lessons Learned:

Requisitioning Procedures

1. ITEM: Many items of equipment which were requisitioned on an "A" and "B" priority cannot be issued even though they are on hand in the Republic of Vietnam depot stocks.

DISCUSSION: All priority "A" and "B" requisitions submitted to Supply Division, Saigon Support Command are passed to 2nd Logistical Command in Okinawa for Supply action and no due-out is recorded in Supply Division, Saigon Support Command records. If items become available in Supply Division stocks, they will be issued to units which have submitted lower priority "C" and "D" requisitions or held as depot stocks.

OBSERVATION: Each item for which there is a priority requirement must be studied to determine which channel is likely to result in quicker supply action and appropriate priority applied.

Rations for Local Nationals

2. ITEM: There are no provisions for issuing rations to local national employees assigned duties on U.S. Army vessels.

DISCUSSION: AR 30-40 gives the authority for establishment of a ration scale for indigenous personnel and provides for issuance of rations when authorized by the theater commander.

OBSERVATION: Request has been initiated to have the theater commander authorize issue of rations to indigenous personnel assigned duties on U.S. Army vessels in Vietnam.

Battery Chargers for Electric Forklifts

3. ITEM: The newly arrived electric forklifts sent to Vietnam for use in discharging ammunition ships arrived without battery chargers.

DISCUSSION: Electric forklifts are the only type of forklifts that can be used within ammunition ships by regulation. Standard gasoline forklifts are considered too great a fire hazard and are not acceptable. The lack of electric forklifts until mid-March 1966 had hindered the discharge of ammunition ships in all Republic of Vietnam ports. When the forklifts arrived, no battery chargers to recharge the battery cells accompanied the shipment which has severely reduced the continued use of the forklifts.

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OBSERVATION: Any type of mission peculiar equipment sent into a combat situation should be shipped with all necessary support items that are unique to the equipment. All electric forklifts sent to Vietnam should be accompanied with an appropriate battery charger with which to recharge the battery cells.

Control of Marine Craft Requisitions

4. ITEM: The requisitions for U.S. Army marine craft required in Vietnam did not always agree with those recorded at command levels outside this theater.

DISCUSSION: Following a series of studies by the 4th Transportation Command in late 1965 concerning marine craft requirements in Vietnam a number of different types of craft were requisitioned for use throughout the theater. Because these items were extremely critical to terminal operations in Vietnam, this headquarters in cooperation with United States Army Vietnam (USARV) maintained a constant monitor on the requisitions. In many cases, reconciliations received from various headquarters outside of Vietnam were not in complete agreement with known requisitions. A representative from this headquarters and USARV made a liaison visit to the 2nd Logistical Command in Okinawa and United States Army Pacific Headquarters in Hawaii to effect a reconciliation of the requisitions and requirements.

OBSERVATION: Because it is impossible to carry on routine business communications with all terminals in Vietnam and all marine craft suppliers in CONUS, it was decided that a central authority in Vietnam would inform all interested agencies concerning new equipment that arrived in-country and also future requirements. Further, a complete inventory of craft presently on hand was prepared and shipping status of items enroute was obtained. Close communication and coordination by all parties concerned was developed and a system was established to assume its maintenance.

Billeting and Docking Areas for Boat Units

5. ITEM: The 1099th Transportation Company (Medium Boat), which is presently located about one mile down the river from the main Saigon Port area, is experiencing difficulty in accomplishing their mission because their temporarily assigned billeting and work area is inadequate.

DISCUSSION: The rapid buildup of allied troops in the Saigon area has severely limited facilities for all types of units stationed in and around the city. The 1099th Transportation Company's difficulties

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stem from the fact that their area is a temporary assignment which does not adequately provide for docking area, mooring space, maintenance facilities, and ramps for dry docking boats. The maintenance area, which is very limited, is not located near the dock area where it should be in order to have an effective operation. Unit administrative and living areas are all within a six (6) GP tent complex. Many new sites have been considered, but are usually rejected for several reasons including costs and the availability on dredging equipment. Areas near Cat Lai and just north of the additional port complex being constructed called Newport are being considered.

OBSERVATION: When planning the deployment of boat units, definite consideration must be given to providing mooring areas and adequate maintenance areas and facilities. Well planned locations for boat units will greatly increase their effectiveness.

Radio Communications for Marine Craft

6. ITEM: Marine craft and boat units are arriving in Vietnam without FM radios.

DISCUSSION: Over the past year only the 1099th Transportation Company (Medium Boat), LARC units and BARC platoons have arrived in Vietnam equipped with FM radios. The FM radio is required to contact air cover and ground security forces when the craft operates in hostile waters. The problem seems to resolve around the current program of converting to a new family of FM radios. A great demand has been placed on AN/VRC-12 series radios which is part of the conversion program. During this reporting period a program is being conducted by the 1st Logistical Command to rehabilitate and install AN/GRC-5 through 8 series radios that have been removed from combat unit vehicles in marine craft.

OBSERVATION: Marine craft and boat units programed for service in Vietnam should be equipped with FM radios as part of their TO&E equipment. Good radio communications is a basis requirement in combat boat operations.

Control of Assistance-in-Kind Funds

7. ITEM: Estimates for stevedore service for the period 15 November to 31 December 1965 were provided to 1st Logistical Command Comptroller in order to receive AIK (Assistance-In-Kind) funds to pay for such services.

DISCUSSION: As a result of these estimates, 26,000,000 \$VN was provided by USARV Comptroller to pay for stevedore services rendered during

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the above period. However, during the course of making payments, it was evident that the original estimates were approximately 50% below actual cost. When expenditures approached the 26,000,000 \$VN allocation, additional funds were provided by obligating the amounts on the remaining invoices as they were paid. As a result, total costs for this period approached 66,000,000 \$VN.

OBSERVATION: After the original allocation was expended, additional funds were provided only after each new invoice was received and verified. Payment was made on an individual basis rather than by bulk allocations of funds which greatly increased managerial control of the funds.

Continuous Operation of Saigon Port

8. ITEM: The U.S. Army Terminal at Saigon could be almost closed by the absence of local nationals working as stevedores.

DISCUSSION: During the TET or Lunar New Year a strong possibility existed that no local nationals would work during the holiday period. As normally organized, no tonnages would move through Saigon - Nha Be if Vietnamese stevedores failed to work. A plan was put into effect early in January to have military personnel available at the port, organized into an operating cadre. Combat units in the area were requested to furnish men to fill out hatch gangs. The MSTS Office in Saigon was requested to have ships crews assist in actual discharge if necessary. Additional operating cadre were brought in from the terminal battalions up country. On 10 January an organization was assembled in Saigon Port capable of continuing the operation. The bulk of the local labor force did work through the holiday.

OBSERVATION: In military operations that depend heavily upon local nationals as workers, an extensive contingency plan is required to assure military augmentation if local nationals fail to work. Thorough plans have been developed at Saigon Army Terminal to substitute American military personnel in all operational jobs in order to fully operate the Port.

Commercial Contractor Response

9. ITEM: Commercial contractors have not always been able to meet contractual requirements.

DISCUSSION: During the reporting period it has been noted that some commercial contractors have been unable to meet the requirements of

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the contract. In most cases the failure has dealt with the inability for the contractor to move barges due to the lack of tugs or the contractors inability to provide the amount of barge capacity contracted. The working condition of some of the equipment has also been less than that considered adequate by the contract.

OBSERVATION: Specific methods should be provided in all Army contracts in order to penalize contractors for failure to meet their obligations. Alternatives should be planned to maintain operational effectiveness if commercial contracts are not able to meet contractual requirements.

Arrival of Lighterage

10. ITEM: During the reporting period an increased quantity of barges arrived for use in the Saigon-Vung Tau area.

DISCUSSION: This lighterage programed for the Saigon Port arrived in-country prior to U.S. Army tugs which greatly reduced the use and mobility of the lighterage.

OBSERVATION: For maximum effectiveness, utilization of lighterage is essential that tugs arrive prior to or with the lighterage.

Required Equipment for Roll-on/Roll-off Operations

11. ITEM: If Roll-on/Roll-off operations are to be conducted, the vessels involved must have special equipment.

DISCUSSION: RO/RO vessels are supposed to be equipped with special handling equipment. This equipment consists of a spotting dolly, Coleman Tractor, and two (2) Walters Tractors. To date the full complement of equipment has not been available and in all cases where the equipment has been available, there have been mechanical problems. In addition, the Walters Tractors have not had enough power to pull loaded trailers up the ramps. A tandem tow utilizing an M-52 tractor attached to the Walters Tractor was necessary. An M-52 tractor raises vans to a height that will not clear the overhead on exit from the lower hold.

OBSERVATION: The amount of time on berth for RO/RO vessels could be reduced if adequate special equipment is placed aboard each vessel to assist in the discharging and loading of trailers.

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Alaska Barge and Transport Contract

12. ITEM: During this period the Alaska Barge and Transport Company (AB&T) contract became effective at Vung Tau. The contract called for ship discharge with AB&T lighterage and port clearance.

DISCUSSION: AB&T was negotiated by Military and Sea Transport Service (MSTS) and control is through MSTS, but the U.S. Army will retain responsibility for supervision of terminal services and cargo accountability. To date, personnel and some equipment have arrived, and a barge discharge site is being readied for use.

OBSERVATION: Alaska Barge and Transport has used their own floating equipment that is available, in the movement of cargo to Saigon. However, at present, Alaska Barge and Transport is dependent upon the U.S. Military for berthing arrangements and the discharge of cargo. When Alaska Barge and Transport becomes self sufficient the cargo handling capability of the port at Vung Tau will increase. At that time, military operating personnel and equipment will be withdrawn from Vung Tau, but the U.S. Army will retain responsibility for the port.

13. This document is regraded unclassified when separated from the classified Inclosures.



R. W. ARONSON
Colonel, TC
Commanding

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