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HEADQUARTERS
3D SQUADRON 11TH ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENT
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96257

AVIC-ZR

26 October 1966

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RVC: MAVCJ 3-32)

AD382607

THRU: ~~Commanding Officer~~ 34
~~11th Armored Cavalry Regiment~~
~~ATTN: S3~~
~~APO US Forces 96257~~

TO: Commander
U.S. Military Assistance Command, VIETNAM
ATTN: J343
APO US Forces 96243



References:

- a. OPORD 06-66 (Operation HICKORY), Headquarters, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, 1 Oct 66.
- b. OPORD 03-66 (Operation HICKORY), Headquarters, 3-11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, 2 Oct 66.

1. NAMES OR IDENTITY AND/OR TYPE OF OPERATION
 - a. Operation HICKORY
 - b. Search and Destroy/Route and Area Reconnaissance.
2. DATES OF OPERATION. 070518 October through 152130 October 1966.
3. LOCATION. NHON TRACH District in area designated by Annex B (OPORD Overlay). References: Map, VIETNAM, 1:50,000, Sheets, 6330 I, 6330 II (Series L7014).
4. CONTROL HEADQUARTERS. 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment.
5. REPORTING OFFICER. LTC Palmer A. Peterson.
6. TASK ORGANIZATION. See Annex A.
7. SUPPORTING FORCES.
 - a. Air Support
 - (1) Preplanned air strikes: None.
 - (2) Immediate air strikes: One immediate air strike was requested on known VC positions via YS077879, but request was refused by the District Chief to proximity of populated area. The objective was a clearly defined hill which could have been identified and easily hit by a low performance aircraft.

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The FAC was in the air over the Area of Operation by 0800 hours each day of operation.

b. Squadron and Regimental Aviation.

(1) A total of 101 hours of air time was recorded by helicopter pilots flying in support of the ground action. Of that, 49 hours were flown in UH-1B aircraft and 52 hours flown in OH-23G aircraft.

(2) A total of 5 strikes from light fire teams were flown. Specific results of the strikes could not be determined, but they contributed in at least two cases in neutralizing VC fire. The following ordnance was expended.

2.75 Inch Rockets - 140 rds.

7.62 Linked - 12,000 rds.

(3) Helicopter support was also used for Forward Observer missions (total of 3 hours) and for aerial resupply. The major item resupplied by air was gasoline. Six-Hundred gallons were brought in by helicopter in barrels and five gallon containers. Other items such as repair parts, radio batteries, artillery ammunition (60 rounds), and mortar ammunition (35 rounds) were also flown in by helicopter.

c. Artillery.

(1) General: Several artillery units were available to provide fire support for the operation as indicated below. However, the major artillery fires utilized came from the Squadron's Howitzer Battery.

(2) Units:

(a) A/C-27 Artillery (8"/175mm) (GS): Provided on call fires in objective area. Fires not employed.

(b) 1/B/115 Artillery (105mm) (ARVN) (GS): Provided on call fires in objective area. Fires not employed.

(c) Howitzer Battery 1-11 Armored Cavalry Regiment (GS Rein): provided on call fires in objective area. Fired effective illumination when command post came under attack on 080045 October 1966.

(d) Howitzer Battery 3-11 Armored Cavalry Regiment (ATCHO): Fired a total of 957 rounds of ammunition during the operation, 637 HE, 146 Illumination, and 174 WP. The battery was used primarily to fire H & I fires on suspected or possible VC base camps, supply pts, etc; to provide illumination for the fighting units; and to give close support, protective, and destructive fire as required. In addition, the location of the Howitzer Battery in the CP complex added greatly to CP security.

Results:

1. H & I Fires: One secondary explosion resulted from a mission fired on coord YS105860 on the evening of 14 Oct. On this mission HE was fired with fuze delay which would have a mine effect and could explode ordnance either on the surface of the ground or buried slightly beneath. The explosion lasted for 10 seconds. Other results were indeterminate.

2. Illumination: Illumination missions were fired nightly during the operation. Diamond formations were fired with great success using four howitzers; pentagon formations w/five howitzers were also very effective (the sixth howitzer was deadlined). The battery found that it was possible to illuminate its own position by using the following data: Chg 1, Fuze time, Time 7.3 - 7.5 sec, QE 1150 - 1350M. In adjusting this fire, it was found to be more effective to give lateral shifts in terms of number of turns of the handwheel rather than in terms of deflection changes. Also, illumination was used to light the way for Armored Vehicles moving through the jungle and for protection of isolated elements.

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3. Close-Support: Close support fire was found to be very effective; however, there were many occasions when it could not be utilized due to the proximity of villages that had been designated as a no-fire area by the District Chief. Air observation was practically the only means for registering or adjusting fire due to the heavily vegetated terrain. Close support was utilized within 100 meters of troops without inflicting any U.S. casualties. The Squadron's Battery responded with exceptional speed, accuracy, and care when notified that close support was required. Despite the nearness of heavily populated areas, only one civilian casualty was reported as result of artillery fire.

4. Ammunition: Low ASR of illumination rounds was the only deficiency in ammunition resupply; however, this had no effect on missions.

5. Survey: Accurate data was difficult to obtain. The azimuth gyroscope was not used because of the constant vibrations caused by the helicopter traffic in and out of the CP. Sun shots were not particularly useful, as the movement of the sun near the equator is not conducive to good survey.

(e) Mortar Battery (Provisional) 3-11 Armd Cav Regt (ATCHO):

For this operation fires of the Troop mortar sections were under control of the Squadron FSCC, which was headed by the How Btry Commander. In addition, when the situation and terrain made it advantageous, at least two troop mortar sections were combined into one battery known as Mortar Battery (Provisional). More details on the functioning, advantages, and disadvantages of this system are discussed in paragraph 14c under "Special Equipment and Techniques". During the operation the provisional battery fired 371 rounds of ammunition: 9 Illumination, 28 WP, and 252 HE. The battery was particularly effective in illuminating the CP area, isolated positions, etc. It fired several H & I missions but had few missions in a close support role.

6. INTELLIGENCE:

a. Prior to Operation: Information on the enemy and the area of operations was obtained from the following sources. US advisors from the LONG THANH and NHON TRACH sub-sectors and the BIEN HOA Sector, HQ III Corps (ARVN), Regional Force units in the area to include Recondo Teams, and current INTSUMS and area studies from II Field Force V. Detailed information on routes, bridges, etc., was furnished by the 517th Engr. Bn. The information gathered indicated that the 3rd Sqn, 11th Armd Cav Regt would be opposed by one local force company, consisting of four identified local force platoons and by several other guerrilla platoons and squads. Information from Recondo Teams further indicated that the main VC strong points were in the PHU HOI area (YS080878) which led the Squadron to concentrate its power in that sector of the Area of Operations. The VC would also have a reinforcing capability from the 4th Bn, 165 A Regt (Capital District) loc Vic YS9893 and the C240 local force company located Vic Y-1789. It was further reported that the VC controlled LTL Route 25 from Vic YS110895 to YS040875 and Provincial Route 319 from Vic YS148850 to YS080798. The VC control all villages between the coordinates of the routes mentioned above. In addition intelligence indicated a major VC supply route from the area to the north of the Area of Operation, then south along the routes listed above, and then east to the HAT DICH area Vic YS3086. VC activity in the past 30 days had been limited to harrasing attacks on small outposts. Tunnelling and building of trenches and fortifications had been reported increasing in the area, with the brunt of the work being leyed on the non-combatants in the area.

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Reports of enemy capabilities did not list any mortar or AT strength. It was surmised that the enemy would attempt to flee the area or go into hiding when the Squadron and RF forces arrived.

b. Value of Prior Intelligence: The intelligence prior to the operation was both accurate and valuable. The following describes what was generally encountered. The VC encountered in the Area of Operations operated primarily in squad size units. The main weapons employed by the VC were rifles, AW, grenades, claymore mines, and booby traps. In no case did the VC employ mortars, AT weapons, or large command detonated mines. The VC employment of the claymore mine was quite effective and inflicted casualties on some key personnel. The VC engaged US Forces only from ambush, secure sniper positions, or when surprised. In all cases, the VC chose the tactical withdrawal in preference to staying and fighting. His favorite technique was to plan his escape into a populated area where fires could not be placed. In no case did the VC intentionally engage (other than by sniper fire or claymore mines) a mounted armored force. He rather chose to attack dismounted patrols, CP's and OP's. As the accuracy of the previous intelligence became apparent, the Squadron was able to adjust its tactics to moving more rapidly and into some heavily wooded terrain. With the possibility of a major ambush somewhat remote, the Squadron was able to risk moving through the close terrain. The report of the roads in the area being part of a major supply route proved to be quite accurate when a patrol located over 200 tons of rice in the village of BEN SAN (YS115900).

c. Intelligence During the Operation: The employment of the ARVN Reconno Teams in Phase I of the operation was quite successful in confirming disposition and size of VC forces in the area. Complete details of this reconnaissance are recounted in the events of 6 Oct under paragraph 11, "EXECUTION". The other major source of intelligence during the operation was patrolling. Through this method routes, tunnels, trenches, caches, VC positions were located and destroyed. No ASA units, SLAR or RED HAZE missions, SPAR, or friendly agents were used during the operation. MI personnel were used to question civilians and VCS with no significant results. One VCS who had been released previously was later confirmed when he was killed in a fire fight and his body recognized by US personnel. One weakness of intelligence was interrogation of prisoners and suspects. In order to get timely information from interrogation on a joint operation it is necessary to combine the efforts of the US and ARVN interrogation teams. If either of the two forces assumes the whole burden, the result is limited value of the interrogation to the other force.

9. MISSION: TF 3-11 Armored Cavalry conducts search and destroy Opn Vic PHU HOI (YS080800) and secures 517th Engineer area and route recon teams 070518 October 1966.

10. CONCEPT OF OPERATION:

a. Manuever: Opn conducted in 3 phases.

(1) Phase I (4-6 Oct): TF employs RVN Reconno Tms in AO to isolate enemy activity.

(2) Phase II (7 Oct):

a. TF conducts night-march from Staging Area to PHOUIC THIEN (YS128897).

b. Upon release at HP, TF deploys to seal areas DAKOTA and VIRGINIA from South. Tm M clears ROUTE RED to PHU HOI. RF-units attack from North to secure PHU HOI. Tm O initiates route and area recon of ROUTE GOLD and areas J,Z.

(3) Phase III:

(a) Upon completion of Phase II, TF secures areas BRAVO, YANKEE, and TANGO in that order.

Tm

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(b) Tm O conducts area recon as areas are secured. One Tm secures Tm O route recon element during route recon of ROUTES RED and GREY.

c. Fires:

- (1) Arty and TAC Air: Pri init Tm L.
- (2) Lt fire Tm: Pri init Tm N. Seal movmt North from area

TEXAS.

(3) No fires auth in restricted areas unless in contact with enemy.

d. Tasks:

(1) Tm I: Seal sector of area DAKOTA. Prep to atk West to link-up with Tm N. Spt Tm L on order.

(2) Tm K: Seal South and West sector of area VIRGINIA. Prop to link-up with Tm N. Spt Tm L on order.

(3) Tm L: Seal West then South of area DAKOTA. Link-up with Tm N. Prop to spt Tm K, I or M on order.

(4) Tm M: Clear ROUTE RED to PHU HOI. Prep to clear ROUTE RED to YSO34872.

(5) Tm O: On order initiated route and area recon of ROUTE GOLD and areas J, Z. Conducts area recon as areas are secured.

(6) How Btry:

(7) Avn Sec:

(a) Phase I: Spt drop and pick up of RVN Reconde Tms.

(b) Phase II: Seal movmt North from area TEXAS.

(c) Phase III: GS.

e. Coordinating Instructions:

(1) No recon flights of AO after 021200 Oct 66.

(2) Troops restricted to staging area 03 and 6 Oct 66.

(3) SP: YPO60121. SP Time: 070518 Oct 66.

(4) Route of March: ROUTE GREEN.

(5) Rate of March: 40 KPH (25 MPH).

(6) Order of March: L, M, K, I, How/CP.

(7) RP: YSL28898.

(8) National Policemen employed on all search missions in populated areas.

(9) Crews for ACAV's that have not been processed remain in staging area. Upon arrival of vehicles, ACAV's processed and moved to AO on order.

(10) Any questions on identification or location of RF/PF Forces refer to TOC (just prior to the operation all RF Force secured a piece of white cloth on breast pocket).

(11) S1, Base Camp Commander for period of Opn.

11. EXECUTION.

General: Headquarters 11th Armd Cav Regt issued OPORD 06-66 (Operation HICKORY) on 2 Oct 66 assigning 3-11 Armd Cav Regt the mission as stated in paragraph 9 above. 3-11 Armd Cav Regt then issued OPORD 03-66 (Operation HICKORY) on 3 Oct 66 and conducted a briefing on 4 Oct 66 for all US Forces to be involved. On 5 Oct 66 the 3-11 Armd Cav Regt briefed the RF Commanders and the US advisors who would be involved in the operation.

At the time of the operation the units of the 3-11 Armd Cav Regt were not completely equipped, 32 ACAV's (M113 Modified) not having arrived in country. This being the first operation, extensive time had been spent in prior weeks preparing equipment, test firing and zeroing of weapons, and conducting patrols outside the perimeter. During the operation, the Squadron continued to man its share of the Regimental perimeter in the staging area at LONG BINH.

(b)

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The rear detachment was commanded by the S1 and consisted of 270 personnel from the Squadron. The figure 270 consisted of 55 men from Troops I, K, and L, and 105 men which came primarily from Hq Troop with small numbers from Co M and How Btry. The availability of personnel in the line units was due to the non-arrival of approximately 30 ACHV's. It is significant that the first casualty (One KIA sniper fire) in the Staging Area occurred during the Squadron's absence. This may be due to the curtailment of active patrolling outside the perimeter which gave VC snipers greater opportunity to approach the perimeter. It also points out the necessity to train personnel who normally perform administrative work to conduct patrols. Such a program will be initiated during the later part of October 1966.

6 October 1966:

Phase I of the operation was initiated by dropping three ARVN Recondo Teams of four men each in the AO. Purpose was to gain definitive intelligence on the enemy before moving into the area and to check out a report that 1000 VC had moved from the HAT DICH area to NHON TRACH District.

TM 1. Debarked helicopter at YS096867 and moved to YS106857 where they heard voices (40 VC). The Tm then moved West and saw 3 VC guards at YS093857. Tm continued West to a rubber plantation where it spotted 3 more VC guards at YS087863. Tm moved on to YS081867 where it spotted 100 armed VC taking shelter in the people's houses at YS080863. Tm then started East when it received B.R and rifle fire from (1) VC platoon at YS089867. Tm was picked up by helicopter at YS105670 at 1830 hrs.

TM 2. After landing at YS143800, the Tm moved NW where it was chased by (1) VC squad at YS136883. Tm ran North and spotted 80 VC armed mostly with M-1 rifles relaxing at 139834. The Tm moved West where it met one (1) VC platoon at YS139834. Due to heavy VC fire the Recondo Team had to withdraw to PHOUC THO outpost (YS142828) at 1230 hrs.

TM 3. After landing at YS143800, the Tm moved South where it encountered (4) VC who gave the alarm at YS142790. Tm then moved on and crossed a road at AP BA TROUNG. There the Tm received heavy fire from three machine guns and one (1) mortar (60 VC sited) from a VC company Vic YS142780. Tm withdrew and then moved West to YS123786. At this point the Tm spotted (6) VC coming from YS121785; Tm then took shelter at a forest hedge Vic YS107792. There the Tm spotted (3) VC (1 woman) moving West along the road. The Tm was forced to open fire and killed 1 VC and wounded another. Tm moved on and encountered (1) VC platoon at YS095787. Tm received heavy fire from this platoon. Tm then withdrew into VONG C.M outpost (YS088795) at 1300 hrs the same day.

Results: From the Recondo Tm's observations it was determined that there was at least (1) VC Battalion in the PHOUC-THO, PHOUC AN areas, and (2) VC Companies in the PHU NOI area. Although the VC were not encountered in this strength during the operation, it was apparent that there had been a large size VC force in the area shortly before the operation was executed.

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7 October 1966:

At 0518 hrs the Squadron moved from the Staging area to begin execution of Phase II of the operation, which envisioned a sealing of the areas indicated in the concept. The plan was not to physically occupy all the terrain along the area boundaries, but to seal the areas by use of strong points and patrols while a search and destroy operation was being conducted by Tn N in PHU HOI.

Tn L led the march and after passing the RP experienced some problems in finding its turn off. Although the route was clearly apparent from the air, the point of entrance into the route was grown over with vegetation and not visible on the ground. To correct the situation smoke was thrown from a helicopter to direct Tn L to the point where it should turn. With tanks in the lead Tn L moved through the jungle creating a road as it moved.

Once Tn L was redirected, the Squadron sealed the areas as planned at 0715 hrs. Air observers at about 0900 hrs reported large numbers of personnel moving SW from the direction of the sealed area. Some of those personnel were later reported as woodcutters; however, there is no doubt that many of them were VC who had escaped the trap. A request to engage was directed to the District Chief, but it was refused.

While the Squadron teams were marching to the RP, Tn N (two RF companies) moved by assault boats from CAT LAI (YS960995) up the DONG NAI River and down a tributary where it disembarked at YS075893. Tn N as well as the Squadron Tn's from the South encountered sporadic sniper fire while moving into the area. While moving across the rice paddies toward PHU HOI, the RF companies had to stay on the paddy dikes. The paddy itself was bottomless and foot movement was impossible. This seemed to be true of the rice paddies on river banks. No enemy was reported escaping to the North by the lt fire team flying over the area. Tn N occupied a portion of the PHU HOI area at 0932 hrs, but due to a misunderstanding of instructions did not conduct any sizeable search and destroy missions the rest of the day. Throughout the rest of the day Squadron Tn's attempted to constrict their sectors toward PHU HOI. Tn K and Tn I found unoccupied tunnel complexes which they destroyed with demolitions.

Tn M: Tn M was engaged in a route clearance mission Vic BEN CIM (YS095890) and encountered a section of road which was nothing but quagmire. Since there was no by-pass available, Tn M attempted to repair the route by using tank dozers to fill an approach and subsequently use an AVLB to gap the worst part. This failed when the AVLB (Modified M48.11 chassis) continually got stuck in the mud. It is felt that an AVLB with a more powerful chassis (M60) could have successfully brought the bridge into place. At 1455, elements of Tn M requested a dustoff for one man wounded by a sniper. The wounded man had been conducting mine sweeping operations near PHU HOI. Dustoff arrived 20 minutes later. At 2355 hours the Squadron CP came under attack by the VC who emplaced command detonated claymore mines around the CP. The best estimate of what occurred is that approximately four VC, infiltrated to within fifty meters of the CP perimeter (YS114923) and emplaced four claymore mines 25 meters apart. The intended direction of the blast would carry fragments between the outer perimeter elements into the command and control vehicles. However, one VC tripped a flare illuminating his position and alerting the perimeter. The VC fired one claymore after being brought under fire by the perimeter. One US casualty was sustained from the blast of the claymore, while one VC was believed hit by perimeter fire. The following morning revealed three remaining claymores in position but incomplete for detonation.

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Major problems encountered during the first day were difficulties in land navigation; lack of adequate road nets in the area; and impassable terrain. Some of the problems with the terrain resulted from inexperience with the area and inability to adequately judge the trafficability of the ground. In soft terrain, drivers must be cautioned not to follow in the tracks of another vehicle. Also many tanks got stuck because they were sent into areas which could not support a tank. Problems also arose when Tm N failed to understand that it was to push South into area TEXAS. Occasional thunder showers during the day added to the problems of extracting mired vehicles. The Squadron began making its own roads with bulldozers, tanks and ACAV's to increase its access to certain areas.

At 2200 hrs FRAG O 9-66 was issued giving missions for the following day.

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8 October 1966:

No major change to task organization. Tm's move to execute TRAG O 9-66 which ordered continuation of search and destroy operations in sector, recons of areas Y, Z and J and ROUTE GOLD. Tm I supported the recon of area Y by searching the area with elements from one platoon. Tm K supported the recon of ROUTE GOLD and areas Z & J by detaching one platoon to Tm O. The rest of Tm K blocked in sector. Tm O moved to recon ROUTE GOLD and areas Z & J. Tm N began a search of area TEXAS. Tm M assumed security of portions of area VIRGINIA and blocked in sector. The light fire team conducted air recon missions Vic YSO686 - YS1479 - YS1486 - YSO680. Howitzer Battery/CP moved location to YS125895.

The missions assigned for the day were all successfully completed. In general the area recons were accomplished by securing the area and then flying in the Engineer elements. At this time the necessary photographs, soil samples, and probe readings were made by the Engineers for further analysis later on.

No major enemy activity was encountered throughout the day. Tm N encountered sniper fire at 1050 hrs while searching houses in area TEXAS. Fire came from a small hill Vic YSO78878. When fire continued a lt fire team was called, and it saturated the hill with rockets and MG fire. Results of the helicopter attack could not be determined due to the dense foliage on the hill. The RF companies, in the meantime, had been ordered by their commander to stay where they were. Finally in the afternoon, the Squadron Liaison Officer with the two companies was able to get an order from the RF command for them to attack the hill which was probably heavily entrenched and booby trapped. The order was obtained through the other liaison Officer who was with the RF CP group and the US advisors. The problem here was getting the RF forces to execute our missions as quickly as possible; however, there is no pat solution except to be completely familiar with their command structure. The attack was made by moving generally NW to YSO72878 and then following the road to the hill. When the two RF companies reached coord YSO77879 they were taken under AW fire. The fire was returned, the VC fled (2 Or 3), and the RF forces left the area. The hill was never attacked, and probably still contains many VC positions.

Squadron teams encountered sniper fire and continued to find tunnels and booby traps. Particular discomfiture during the day was the mining of 3 M48's, 1 VER, and several ACAV's mostly in Tm I. This occurred as Tm I was attempting to link up with blocking positions established by Tm M in Vic of BEN CAM. Tm I had successfully moved through dense jungle terrain never before traversed, winding NW down a ridge line from YSO94881 to YSO90886 where it joined LTL 25. However, after moving a short distance East along this route it encountered a thin crusted, bottomless section of road at YSO96890 which engulfed the 3 M48's, the M88 and several ACAV's.

CIVIL AFFAIRS: One MEDCAL team was flown into PHU HOI during the day and treated 200 people for various illnesses. The people had never experienced this service and seemed quite grateful.

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9 October 1966:

Squadron issued FRAG O 10-66 which ordered continuation of search and destroy operations in the PHU HOI area and blocking of VC escape routes to the South. Instructions in the FRAG O specifically mentioned using the National Policemen in the questioning of VC suspects. There were two major changes to the task organization. The RF CO's reverted to RF control 090400 October 66 for Opn Vic YSO62917 for suspected VC locations. Tm K detached one platoon for convoy escort and CP security. The CP was not moved. Resupply was to be effected at 1030 hours at YS110895. Units would move in total to the resupply point as ordered, while an adjacent Tm would screen their sector. Assigned tasks for the day were accomplished.

There was one major enemy encounter during the day's operation which occurred at the resupply point. Located near the supply point (Vic of BEN CAM) was the Provisional Mortar Battery consisting of Tm I and Tm L's mortars. While vehicles were refueling in the area, the VC apparently were laying an ambush. At 1155 hours PFC PIERCE from I Troop moved toward an OP located outside the perimeter. This may have caused the VC to believe they were about to be detected, so they opened fire. PFC PIERCE was shot in the chest and later died of his wounds. The tanks attached to I Troop immediately returned the fire with cannister volleys. In the meantime, M Co who was enroute to refuel, arrived in the area and also took the VC under heavy cannister fire.

Tm M had an Armored Cavalry Platoon (3 Platoon, K Troop) attached to it and committed it here to make a dismounted sweep of BEN CAM. At the same time Provisional Mortar Battery, as an armored force, moved to block from the East. The cannister fire from the tanks and the dismounted element accounted for 5 VC KIA (BC) and one house destroyed with secondary explosions. These were the first VC KIA's by the Regiment.

There were no major problems on 9 October except in learning how to set up resupply points on firm ground to facilitate rapid resupply. It is significant to note here that the Squadron effected its first resupply on the third day out.

CIVIL AFFAIRS: One MEDCAP mission was accomplished in the PHU HOI Village which treated 70 civilians. It is noteworthy that PHU HOI has been a VC dominated village for several years.

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10 October 1966:

Squadron issued FRAG O 11-66 which directed further search and destroy operations for 1000 hours in PHU HOI with Tms I & L. Tm N would rejoin the Squadron at 1000 hours and would link up with Tm L to the West of PHU HOI. In addition, Tms M & K would attack BEN CAM (YS103897) at 1000 hours. Upon completion of these missions, Tm's would lager and marry up with Tm N for an attack on area BRAVO the next day. The FRAG O was implemented with the exception that Tm N did not marry up with the other Tms and BEN CAM was not subjected to attack. This was due to the time required by the Squadron to recover vehicles for Tm N which were mired in the mud. Additionally, resupply was late which post-poned the time of the attack to late in the day, which was unacceptable.

Enemy activity was very light with sniper fire being the primary VC activity. Several vacant tunnels and trench systems were discovered in the search and destroy mission in the PHU HOI area (YS091889).

An attempt to employ AVLB (YS091889) failed when the vehicle got badly stuck approaching a gap that was to be bridged. Balk bridging could not be used due to nonavailability of bolts and stringers used in its assembly.

CIVIL AFFAIRS: One MEDCAP mission was employed in the village of LONG THEIN (YS125895). 140 people were treated.

11 October 1966:

No major change in task organization except that 1 platoon from Tm K still secured the CP and all three RF companies reverted to Tm N control. Squadron issued FRAG O 12-66 which committed Tm's I and L to continue securing the PHU HOI area to block VC movement South. Tm's K & M were to conduct reconns of ROUTE GREY and areas TANGO and BRAVO. Tm N was to conduct operations to the North (YS082917) in pursuit of VC political cadre.

As Tm's M and K moved down ROUTE GREY to the South they began to encounter several cuts in the road dug by the VC. Finally, when the TF reached coordinates (YS148846) it could move no further. The road was badly cut with no apparent by-pass. At about 1000 hours the S3 flew into the area by helicopter to check out the situation. After surveying the situation the S3 organized a recon party to check out the condition of the road further South. The recon party moved down the road with security to the flanks, front and rear to protect itself from ambush. Nevertheless, a VC in hiding detonated a claymore mine which had not been detected by the security elements. Five men were wounded by the blast, but thanks to their armored vests no one was killed. The Tm N Commander quickly organized a defense around the wounded and had them evacuated. The mission of reconnoitering ROUTE GREY had to be abandoned for the rest of the operation, and a different route found to area BRAVO. The Engineers decided that the recon of area TANGO could be permanently abandoned.

While the above activities were taking place Tm N began operations further North where ARVN intelligence indicated political cadre were in hiding. Departing CAT LAI (YS960895) by boat at 0400 hours the Tm moved up the DONG NAI River. Approximately four miles up the river from CAT LOI Tm N shot and killed one VC who fell into the river after he was shot. Recovered on the bank were two full magazines (banana type), a small amount of AK50 Czech rounds, a gas mask, an oil lamp, and some medical supplies. Tm N then continued its move up the river and later disembarked at 0700 hours at YS077918. At 0830 hrs Tm N launched an assault toward LONG DIEN (YS079914) on two axes.

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SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RVC: M:CVJ 3-32) (Cont)

During the assault there were two light encounters with no VC confirmed kills. Also, during the assault the Tm found a claymore mine factory which had been in full production until the Tm's arrival. Several mines and tools were recovered.

About 1200 hours on the 11th, a patrol, 3d platoon, K Troop, reported that it found a large cache of rice in the village of BEN SAN (YS115900). Tremendous stores of rice were located in every hut for no apparent reason except that it was to be used by the VC. One old man in the village had whispered to MI personnel, who later checked out the report, that the rice belonged to the VC. The rice was estimated to be 150 tons or more. The next problem arose when a decision could not be made within US channels on what to do with the rice. A meeting between the Regimental S5 and the NHON TRACH District Chief was planned for tomorrow to solve the problem. In the meantime, Squadron issued FRAG O 13-66 which was designed to block any VC attempts to extract the rice. A flare ship was called in to assist in this operation. The task organization changed by assigning K Troop (with two platoons) to lager under TF Con and perform CO security and attaching the remaining platoon of K Troop to Tm N.

Other activity during the day included the following: An ambush patrol from L Troop took a VC squad under fire Vic YS086880 at approximately 0330 hours. L Troop reported shooting two VC located on a pagoda. The CP moved to YS114907 toward dusk.

12 October 1966:

Squadron continued to secure PHU HOI and the rice cache. Regimental S5 and an MI team checked out the amount of rice (confirmed 150 to 200 tons) and coordinated with the NHON TRACH district Chief, Captain TRUONG, for removal of the rice. Results were that the rice would be moved the next morning to government warehouses. US trucks would be made available if required. A flare ship was used to illuminate the area. The CP was not moved.

13 October 1966:

Squadron continued to secure PHU HOI area and the rice cache. The Vietnamese have bagged most of the rice for transport to government warehouses.

Enemy activity was light. M Company was hit by AW fire at approximately 1600 hours. Heavy cannister and AW fire was returned with no known VC casualties. There were no US casualties, but at least two civilians were injured in the fire fight and had to be evacuated.

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SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RVC: M.CVJ- 3-32) (Cont)

14 October 1966:

Squadron continued security of the LHU HOI area and the rice cache. By end of the day all rice should be removed. I Troop which had several vehicles mired in the mud was mobile again, which meant that the Squadron would be able to complete the mission by reconnoitering Area BRAVO tomorrow.

At 1505 the CP arrived at its new location which was in I Troop's area (YS106887). K Troop was still under TF control, but was left in place to secure extraction of the rice.

At 1600 a dismounted patrol from Tm M which consisted primarily of the 3d Platoon of K Troop attached to Tm M was ambushed. The patrol had used the same route of return in patrolling the BEN CAM area (YS099873), and at least a squad of VC was waiting when the patrol approached. The attack was made with claymore mines and a hail of hand grenades. Four men were immediately wounded and members of the patrol moved up to cover them and aid in their extraction. PFC J. CKSON, who had come from the rear of the patrol to cover the wounded was killed by a grenade. While the fire fight was going on the XO from Tm M and the Squadron Interpreter rushed to aid the patrol. Both received fragmentation wounds in the leg. In addition, Sgt Corbin, Platoon Sgt from 2d Platoon, K Troop which was securing the rice in the area took 12 men to help cover the wounded. The fire fight lasted no more than ten minutes with the following US casualties: 1 KIA, 9 wounded (plus one ARVN Interpreter). Seven VC were killed (BC). From examination of armored vests and steel helmets, it was apparent that several lives had been saved by this equipment. The VC again chose their escape into the village of BEN CAM where pursuit was not plausible, nor where fires could be placed.

15 October 1966:

FRAG O 14-66 which was issued on the 14th but which was to be implemented on the 15th changed the task organization to the following:

TM I
I/3-11 (-)
Sec/M/3-11
1/3/919 Engr
Mort Btry (Prov)

TM L
L/3-11
Sec/M/3-11
2/3/919 Engr
1 M132A1
1 RF Co.

TM M
M/3-11 (-)
1/K/3-11
1 M132A1
1/I/3-11

TF CON
K/3-11 (-)
How Btry 3-11

The mission was to search and clear area BRAVO and to secure the area for Engineer reconnaissance. The concept was to move over multiple routes to secure areas DOG, CAT, and RAT (See Overlay Annex E). Upon securing these areas the attached RF Companies would conduct a more thorough search of the area and secure it for the Engineer teams which would come in by helicopter. Once the Engineers had made their necessary soil studies, etc., the TF would withdraw along ROUTE RED with heavy artillery preparations all along the route.

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SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RVC: MACVJ 3-32) (Cont)

At 0800 hours the TF consisting of Tm L and Tm M moved out to accomplish the assigned mission. Tm L moved on a route through the rubber between ROUTE BLACK and ROUTE GREEN while Tm M moved along ROUTE GREEN. The other routes were abandoned since they had been interdicted by the VC in several places. Moving generally South along the directions of attack indicated, the task force moved with little difficulty toward area BRAVO. At times it was able to move on line through the rubber plantation in the area. Area BRAVO was then secured as planned with no enemy resistance and the required reconnaissance accomplished.

Due to the late hour, 1600 hours, (some time had been spent extracting a stuck M48), the plan to come back on ROUTE RED was abandoned. ROUTE RED passes through some very dense terrain which would be extremely prone to ambush when darkness fell. Withdrawal was made along the direction of attack.

After issuing a movement order over the radio, the Squadron began a return march to the Staging Area (1730 hours). At 2000 hours all elements had returned to the Staging Area, ending OPERATION HICKORY.

CIVIL AFFAIRS:

One MEDCAP mission was employed in the village of BEN SAN (YS115900); 70 persons were treated.

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SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RVC: MACVJ 3-32) (Cont)

12. RESULTS:

a. Friendly:

U.S. - 2 KIA, 20 WIA

ARVN - 1 WIA

See Annex C (Casualty List)

b. Enemy:

(1) Personnel

- (a) 13 VC KIA (BC)
- (b) 2 VC KIA (POSS)
- (c) 0 VC KBA
- (d) 17 VCS Captured
- (e) 0 Detainees

(2) Fortifications destroyed:

- (a) 2 tunnels at YS076865 and YS086876.
- (b) 1 trench at YS067867,
- (c) 3 bunkers at YS067867.

(3) Fortifications not destroyed:

- (a) Communication trench from YS1038878 straight line to YS095889.
- (b) Trench system along ridge from YS094882 NW to YS090886.
- (c) Trenches and positions along both sides of the trail from YS113883 SW to YS097876.
- (d) Trenches and tunnels South of PHU HOI at YS077876.
- (e) Trench systems from YS059879 to YS057876, YS125795 to YS126794, and YS100878 to YS120889.
- (f) Tunnels at YS087877, and YS065872.

NOTE: The above trenches, and tunnels (Items (a) thru (f)) would have required a major engineering effort to destroy for which there was no time available.

(4) Captured:

- 210 tons of rice
- 1 Box of used medical supplies
- 6 claymore mines
- 11 AP mines
- 15 blocks of TNT
- 3 - 81mm shells for booby traps.
- 75 Lbs of assorted tools used to make mines
- 1 acetylene torch used to make mines
- 2 full banana magazines
- 15 rounds Czech AK50
- 1 gas mask

(5) Equipment destroyed:

- 2 claymore mines

(6) Barriers:

- (a) Highway 319 at YS134783 as of 120945 Oct 66.
- (b) Highway 319 at YS147850 as of 111030 Oct 66.
- (c) Highway 25 at PHU HOI (YS078876) and BEN C.M (YS091889).

(7) Enemy supply caches (Probable)

- (1) Hill tops YS092884 & YS097887.
- (2) Forest and Jungle areas at YS105860.

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SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RVC: MACVJ 3-32) (Cont)

13. ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS:

a. Supply: Logistical planning for Operation HICKORY was based upon research of after action reports of other Armored Cavalry units, conversations with other Armored Cavalry Squadron Staffs, and a logistical estimate of our own requirements. As a result it was felt the Squadron could sustain itself as long as 3 days without resupply. Based on this, it was determined that the Squadron would not organize combat and field trains nor have any unit trains elements accompany the combat elements during the operation. Instead resupply convoys would be fed to the Squadron as required. Not only would this action decrease the security requirement of the Squadron and thus enable it to maximize its combat power, but it would also enable the Squadron to move cross-country and free itself of the existing road net.

When Operation HICKORY was initiated, a specific time when the first resupply convoy would be mounted was not planned. Instead the S4 relied on the daily status reports submitted by the troops as a basis for when the first resupply convoy would be mounted. The first resupply convoy went quite well except for a few problems in organization of the resupply area. Instead of establishing separate refueling points (gas station concept), ammunition points, etc., the Transportation Platoon leader attempted to disperse his elements over a wide area as a security measure. This detracted from the speed required for such an operation. Additionally, it should be noted that for this environment, night resupply, dispersion of resupply elements, and all other factors demanded in conventional or nuclear operations are not required here. Security and speed are the primary prerequisites in Vietnam. Consequently, the demand for gas station type resupply points and decreased dispersion for maximum efficiency and security.

One other important factor is that wheeled resupply vehicles were extremely limited in cross-country movement. As a result, resupply was effected from the roads. In some cases this meant that teams had to travel up to 6 KM for resupply since the resupply elements could not traverse the terrain leading to their positions. This was not only wasteful of time, but from a tactical point of view it was quite detrimental to the effectiveness of the Squadron, because one Tm had to cover another Tm's area of responsibility during resupply. This should illustrate once again Armor's demand for tracked resupply vehicles.

In the future the Squadron intends to resupply every two days. Although it can operate for three days without resupply when necessary, the draw-down on the basic load requires a major resupply effort.

Aerial resupply was used on at least five occasions; three for 105mm Class V and two for Class III when units could not get to the resupply point because of poor trafficability. These missions placed a great strain on the Regimental Aviation Section which does not have the capability to provide on call aerial resupply to one Squadron, let alone three Squadrons. Two requests for CH-47 missions were requested, but both were denied due to non-availability of aircraft. Requests for non organic aerial support must be programmed at least 24 hours in advance and for maximum utilization should be included as part of the tactical planning for an operation. Aerial resupply should only be planned for areas and missions for which no other means of resupply exist. The following is a list of items expended during the operation.

- (1) Class I
 - A Rations - None
 - C Rations - 1463 cases
 - Water - 10,000 gal.

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SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RVC: MACVJ 3-32) (Cont)

- (2) Class III:
 - MOGAS - 14,200 Gals.
 - DIESEL - 12,200 Gals.
- (3) Class II & IV - See paragraph 13 b (2) below.
- (4) Class V: See Annex D, Ammunition expenditure.

b. Maintenance.

(1) Recovery Operations: Recovery of vehicles bogged in the mud constituted a major effort during the operation. In one case it took three days to recover a tank which had sunk up to the turret. The terrain, particularly in the Eastern portion of the PHU HOI Area, had a light crust which permitted some trafficability but which prevented tracking. The composition of the terrain caused build up on sprocket hubs resulting in some thrown tracks on tanks and M-88's. Dense vegetation hampered recovery and made it necessary in some cases to use bulldozers and tanks to cut new roads to stuck vehicles. The major cause of buried vehicles can be attributed to tracking, inexperience of track commanders with the terrain, and the thin crust which was prevalent only in the area noted above. In other areas the terrain was good and problems were not nearly as great.

(2) Repair Parts: With a density of 17 tanks, 64 M113 (ACAV), 10 M577A1, 9 M106A1 Mortar Carriers, 5 M108 Howitzers, 3 M132A1 Flamethrowers, 1 M48 AVLB, 4 M578 Recovery Vehicle, and 2 M88 Recovery Vehicles, the Squadron used the following parts during the operation:

- Rectifiers (100 Amp) - 4 ea.
- Alternators (100 Amp) - 1 ea.
- Regulators (100 Amp) - 6 ea.
- Distributors (M113) - 1 ea.
- Starters (M113) - 1 ea.
- Fuel Pumps (M113) - 2 ea.
- Alternator Bolts (M113) - 4 sets.
- Transfer Case Assy (M113) - 1 ea.
- Hub covers (M113) - 2 ea.
- Sprocket Bolts (M113) - 16 ea.
- Oil Buffer Assy (Cal 50) 1 ea.
- Spark Plugs (M113) - 8 ea.
- Front Cartridge Stop (Cal 50) - 4 ea.
- Centrifugal Pump (M48A3) - 1 ea.

Some 80% of these replacement parts were procured through the 218th CSS by cannibalization, 18% through PLL, 2% through direct support maintenance. Although many of the parts were delivered by air within a few hours after request, units complained that even that short delay caused them to hold up missions for a significant period of time or risk security of vehicles and crews. Units indicated that they would like to carry more high demand type parts in their maintenance elements. In any event, the tremendous reliance which the Squadron had to place on cannibalization for procurement of parts, is an indication of problems ahead when salvage yards are not available. Stockage levels of PLL must improve.

(3) Special Maintenance items:

(a) Fuel filters must be periodically drained of condensation to prevent water getting into the fuel systems.

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SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RVC: MACVJ 3-32) (Cont)

(b) Trim vanes were an unexpected maintenance problem. Fourteen (14) trim vanes had to be replaced by cannibalizing unserviceable M113's at the 218th CSS. The reason for the damage to this item was because it was used in the extended position to increase stand-off distance of HEAT rounds from AT weapons. Movement through heavy brush caused cracking, warping, and breaking of the plywood item. Personnel should be instructed not to use the trim vane except in river crossings for which it was designed.

c. Treatment of Casualties, Evacuation and Hospitalization: At no time during the operation was it necessary to move the Squadron aid station from the CP to a forward location. Troop medics on the scene were able to handle casualties adequately and prepare them for timely air evacuation. Average time for Dustoff was twenty minutes.

14. SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES.

a. ACAV (M113): The ACAV vehicle proved highly maneuverable in very difficult terrain. Its armored protection suffered minor damage from claymore mines and was not penetrated. There is no doubt that the tremendous fire power and armor protection of the ACAV discouraged major VC ambush.

b. Flame Thrower Carrier: The M132 proved highly maneuverable but adequate evaluation could not be made since its main armament was never employed.

c. Mortar Battery (Provisional): When situations permitted (i.e. when troops were all disposed within supporting range) the troop mortar sections were consolidated into a Squadron Mortar Battery. This system effected greater control and more efficient use of fires. All fire requests were channelled over the Howitzer Battery FDC net. The Howitzer Battery Commander, as the Squadron Fire Support Coordinator, then assigned the fire mission as appropriate. Since TOE does not provide personnel for mortar FDC's, personnel had to be taken from gun crews to run a mortar FDC. Whether the mortars are employed in section or battery, there remains the necessity for an FDC. With all three sections employed in battery one FDC can operate twenty-four hours with less fatigue and strain to personnel, thus decreasing human error. TOE also does not provide any type of vehicle to be used as an FDC. Temporarily a 1 1/2 ton trailer is serving this purpose, but it is totally inadequate. In all cases of employing the mortars, security, control and the ability to provide the fire support required were the prime factors to be considered. In many cases, as with K Troop on this operation, the balance of the advantages will tip in favor of the troops retaining control.

d. Airmobile Contact Teams: A four man airmobile contact team consisting of one senior track mechanic, one turret mechanic, and two track mechanics, was organized for this operation. Their purpose was to fly in and install major components such as transmissions, transfer cases, etc., which could be heli-lifted to disabled vehicles. The one attempt at using this system, which was the installing of a transfer case in an M113, was not successful. The reason for the failure was the inability to get proper sling arrangements to install the part. The idea of bringing in the major component by helicopter is sound. In addition it is necessary to get the skilled personnel to the scene as soon as possible to quickly install the item.

e. Organization for Combat: One of the objectives of the Squadron prior to reaching Vietnam was to organize itself in a full track configuration for combat. The purpose was to eliminate the reduced mobility which would no doubt result with wheeled vehicles in the organization, and to give maximum armor protection and fire power, throughout the Squadron. Another objective of the Squadron was to minimize the "frittering" away of combat power for security of the combat trains and CP. The following results were obtained.

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SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RVC: MACVJ 3-32) (Cont)

(1) Full track organization: All wheeled vehicles were eliminated from the fighting forces, to include the CP, with no major problems encountered. In addition the mobility and Armor capabilities of the Squadron could be capitalized to the maximum. (See Annex F: Squadron Organization for Combat)

(2) CP Security: A Howitzer Battery/CP complex gave the CP an inherent self-protective capability. In certain situations and terrain, however, it was still necessary to use an Armored Cavalry Platoon in night security.

(3) Cutting of the Logistical Tail: As indicated in par 13 b above, the Squadron was not tied down by the security requirements of a long logistical column, but was free to utilize its full mobility and combat power. The major logistical problems occurred when resupply convoys could not go to the user, but had to have using elements come to them.

f. Ground Surveillance Radar: No effective use of GSR was made during the operation due to lack of batteries. Future operations will be needed to determine the full capability of GSR.

g. Basic Load: The basic load as developed and adopted by the Squadron is still being evaluated. There was not enough ammunition expended on this particular operation to obtain any meaningful conclusions.

h. Armored Vest: Wearing of the armored vest proved to be a life saver on several occasions. Although it will not stop a direct round, the armored vest does stop shrapnel from grenades and claymore mines. The vest does however, cause some heat sickness problems.

15. COMMANDER'S ANALYSIS: Overall the operation was a complete success both in completion of assigned mission and in the mutual cooperation achieved in working with the Regional Force units. As this report indicates there were many lessons learned and a tremendous amount of personal experience gained as a result of the operation. The chance to evaluate our operating techniques and smooth out normal internal problems before operating against a hard core VC Force will no doubt prove invaluable. In addition to these intangible results, the physical damage inflicted upon the enemy, plus the civil action, MEDCAP missions, etc., which were accomplished have begun to turn the VC out of an important resupply area. Also, the mutual respect and cooperation gained in working with the ARVN forces will open the doors to future successful operations of a joint nature. Although the Squadron spent a great deal of time and effort extracting mired vehicles, I do not believe it should reflect adversely on the capabilities of Armor in Vietnam. Most of our problems with the terrain were confined to small areas and tend to overshadow the actual cross country mobility that was achieved. Not to be ignored are experience factors which will no doubt cause an improvement in future operations, and the fact that much of the terrain is still soft from the monsoon rains.

The modified TOE which delisted the tanks from the Armored Cavalry Troops did not hamper the operations. Although the tanks were cross attached to Armored Cavalry Troops, in many cases by section, it is not necessary to tie the Troop to the lesser mobility of the tank.

Two major points are to be gained from the operation. The first is the merit of having an attached Infantry force to perform missions not appropriate to the Armored Cavalry. Such missions include searching dense terrain, pursuit of enemy forces into terrain inaccessible to armor, blocking enemy escape routes which are inaccessible to armor, or driving the enemy into an armored blocking force. In many cases a quick reacting Infantry force,

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SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RVC: MACVJ 3-32) (Cont)

such as a heliborne company, could have accounted for considerable VC casualties. The second point is the frustration which must be endured when fighting a local VC force. His tactic of using the local population as cover places a definite need for restraint on the part of the unit commander. More thought should be given to immediate evacuation of the population in such VC controlled areas to remove the VC cover.

16. RECOMMENDATIONS:

- a. Evacuate the villages of PHU HOI (YS082880) and BEN CAM (YS095890). Both the villages are VC controlled and serve as cover for the VC.
- b. Continue US and ARVN operations in the NHON TRACH district to destroy the VC supply link to the East.
- c. Continue to increase the Psy War and MEDCAP activities in the NHON TRACH district in conjunction with joint operation.
- d. Initiate a study on aerial resupply of Class III and V for the Regiment.
- e. Strive for Infantry/Armored Cavalry combined operations, preferably with a heliborne Infantry Force.
- f. Replace wheeled resupply vehicles with tracked resupply vehicles.

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Annex A to Combat Operations After Action Report to Op HICKORY

TASK ORGANIZATION (Initially):

TM I
Trp I/3-11 Armd Cav (-1 Plat)
1 Sec/M/3-11 Armd Cav
1 FO/How/3-11 Armd Cav
2 RVN National Policemen (OPCON)

TM L
Trp L/3-11 Armd Cav (-1 Plat)
1 Plat/M/3-11 Armd Cav
1 Sqd/3/919 Engr
1 FO/How/3-11 Armd Cav
1 M132A1
2 RVN National Policemen (OPCON)

TM N
2 RVN RF Co's (OPCON)
1 RVN Boat Co (OPCON)
1 Sqd/Trp K/3-11 Armd Cav
1 Sqdn LNO Tm/3-11 Armd Cav
2 RVN National Policemen (OPCON)

TM O
1 Plat/Trp I/3-11 Armd Cav
Area & Route Recon Tm's
517th Engr (OPCON)

TM K
Trp K/3-11 Armd Cav (-Int Sqd)
1 Sec/M/3-11 Armd Cav
1 Sqd/3/919 Engr
1 FO/How/3-11 Armd Cav
1 M132A1
2 RVN National Policeman (OPCON)

TM M
Co M/3-11 Armd Cav (-2 Plat)
1 RF Co (OPCON)
1 Plat/I Trp/3-11 Armd Cav
3/919 Engr (-)
1 M132A1
2 RVN National Policemen (OPCON)


TF CON
AVN Sec/3-11 Armd Cav
1 UH-1D/Trans Sec/11 Armd Cav (OPCON)
2 1st Fire Tms/11 Armd Cav (OPCON)
How Btry (-)
3 RVN Reconno Sqd's (OPCON)

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
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Annex B (Com Overlay) to Combat Operations after Action
Report (CPT HICKORY)
Reference: Map, VIETNAM, 1:50,000, 6330 I, 6330 II (Series L7014)



Annex B (Opn Overlay) to Combat Opns After Action Report
(OPN HICKORY)
Reference: Map, VIETNAM, 1:50,000 6330I, 6330II, (Series L7014)


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Annex B (OPN Overlay) to Combat CPE After Action Report (CPN HICKORY)
Reference: Map, VIETNAM, 1:50,000 6330 I, 6330 II, (Series L7014)

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Annex C to Combat Operations After Action Report to Op HICKORY.

Casualty List:

<u>NAMES</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>DATE & TIME OF INJURY</u>	<u>TYPE AND EXTENT OF WOUNDS</u>
NUNGESTER, Roy A	PFC E3	071505 Oct 66	GSW rt shoulder
JONES, Harold E.	SFC E7	072355 Oct 66	Frag Wound Left Arm
PIERCE, John R.	PFC E3	091215 Oct 66	Perf wds of abdomen & chest (DOW)
DOYLE, David K.	Maj O4	111050 Oct 66	Frag butt & rt leg
HALSTEAD, Wayne P.	Capt O3	111050 Oct 66	Frag rt leg, arm, scrotum
EVANS, Peter H.	1/Lt O2	111050 Oct 66	Superficial wnd lower rt leg
WHITE, Roger D.	PFC E3	111050 Oct 66	Frag in groin
AUSSERESSES, Robert B.	SGT E5	141600 Oct 66	Frag rt arm & rt leg
CHO, Benedict S.K. Jr.	SGT E5	141600 Oct 66	Frag rt knee
HARRISON, Robert L.	SP/4 E4	141600 Oct 66	Frag rt leg & rt arm
JACKSON, Darrell A.	PFC E3	141600 Oct 66	Frag face, stomach, chest (KIA)
JOYCE, Dennis L.	SSG E6	141600 Oct 66	Frag, legs, arm, face
MAZZOTTE, Gregory C.	PFC E3	141600 Oct 66	Frag head
McNEAL, Thomas L.	PFC E3	141600 Oct 66	Frag rt leg
MILLER, Karl M.	SP/5 E5	141600 Oct 66	Frag in butt
PENNINGTON, James F.	SSG E6	141600 Oct 66	Frag face. lt arm, lt leg
STAPLETON, Jerry L.	1/Lt O2	141600 Oct 66	Frag rt leg
WOOD, Vance C.	PFC E3	141600 Oct 66	Frag arms & legs
FREDRICK, James W.	SSG E6	111050 Oct 66	Frag wd, back
BURNEY, John D.	PFC E3	110040 Oct 66	Frag wd, lt arm
SANE, Nguyen Van	SSG E6	141600 Oct 66	Frag wd, lt calf

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Annex D to Combat Operations After Action Report to Op HICKORY.

AMMUNITION EXPENDITURE:


1. CTG, 5.56 Ball	5,760
2. CTG, 7.62 Ball	2,400
3. CTG, 7.62 LKD 4 & 1	12,000
4. CTG, Cal 50 LKD 4 & 1	11,000
5. CTG, 40mm HE	224
6. CTG, 4.2" HE	252
7. CTG, 4.2" Illum	91
8. CTG, 4.2" WP	28
9. CTG, 105mm HE	637
10. CTG, 105mm Illum	146
11. CTG, 105mm WP	174
12. CTG, 90mm Cannon	25
13. CTG, 90mm WP	1
14. Gren, Hand Frag.	10
15. Gren, Hand CS	4
16. Gren, Hand Smoke (Red, Green, Violet)	96
17. Flare, Surface Trip M49	104
18. RKT, 2.75"	140
19. Thickner M-1	400 lbs

(27)

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Annex E to Combat Operations After Action Report (021 MEMORY)
Reference: Map, VIETNAM, 1:50,000 6330I, 6330II, (Series L7014)



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