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IN REPLY REFER TO

AGAM-P (M) (10 Mar 67) FOR OT

17 March 1967

SUBJECT: Combat Action Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, Operation Pickett,
1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division

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TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Forwarded as inclosure is a Combat After Action Report, Operation Pickett, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (6 December 1966 through 19 January 1967). Information contained in this report should be reviewed and evaluated by CDC in accordance with paragraph 6f of AR 1-19 and by CONARC in accordance with paragraph 6c and d of AR 1-19. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.
2. Information contained in this report is provided to the Commandants of the Service Schools to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

Kenneth G. Wickham

1 Incl
a/s

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
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AVRD-C

15 February 1967

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation PICKETT (RCS:
MACV 53-32) (U)

THRU: Commanding General
I Field Force Vietnam
APO 96350

TO: Commanding General
US Military Assistance Command Vietnam
ATTN: J3-3
APO 96243

1. (U) Name of Operation: Operation PICKETT.
2. (U) Dates of Operation: 6 December 1966 through 19 January 1967.
3. (U) Location: KONTUM Province.
4. (U) Command Headquarters: 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division.
5. (U) Reporting Officer: Brigadier General S.H. Matheson, Commanding General, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division.
6. (C) Task Organization: The task organization of the Brigade for Operation PICKETT is shown below.

Task Organization

1/327 Inf

1 platoon A/326 Engr

2/327 Inf

1 platoon A/326 Engr

2/502 Inf

1 platoon A/326 Engr

2/320 Arty

51/30 Arty

Spt Bn FSC

Bde Troops

Bde HHC (-)
A2/17 Cav
A/326 Engr (-)
LRRP
MP Platoon (-)
42d Inf Platoon, Sct Dog
20th Cml Det
1/101 Avn Sec, HB-1
245 Psy Ops Co
Tac Air Control Party
406 RRD
Am 9, 41st Civil Affairs
2 Sqds, 272 MP Co.

7. (C) Supporting Forces:

- a. 2/320 Arty: Employed in a direct support role.
- b. 51/30 Arty (OPCCN): Provides general support (reinforcing) fires during the operation.
- c. 10th Army Avn Bn: Provided two light airmobile companies in

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general support. These helicopters flew troop lift, combat support and re-supply missions.

d. 179th and 180th Assault Support Helicopter Companies: Provided four flyable CH-47 aircraft on a mission support basis for use in displacing and resupplying artillery units.

e. 183d Avn Co: Provided four O-1 aircraft for visual reconnaissance, artillery adjustment and radio relay.

f. 1st Cav Div (AM): Provided one flyable CH-54 on a mission support basis for use in displacing B1/30 Arty.

g. 5th Air Command Squadron: Provided airlift support for Psy War operations.

h. 7th US Air Force: Flew a total of 199 C-130 sorties in transporting the Brigade from TUY HOA to KONTUM. For the tactical operation 111 tactical fighter sorties were flown; of these 76 were air strikes and 35 were reconnaissance missions. The FAC's flew 230 sorties in forward air control/artillery fire reconnaissance missions. To support the Brigade's airborne training 50 C-130 sorties were flown while 190 C-130 and CV-2 sorties provided logistical support in bringing 544 tons of cargo into the airhead.

i. 299th Engr Bn: Provided general engineer support to the Brigade; maintained highways in the area; maintained airstrip at KONTUM; and provided a water point vicinity POLEI KLENG.

j. ARVN/Para-Military Support:

(1) 42d ARVN Infantry Regiment: Provided one bn on a continual basis by rotating units into the area of operation for search and destroy missions.

(2) 24th Special Tactical Zone: Provided two scout companies, two recon platoons and one intelligence platoon for search and destroy and screening missions at various times during Operation PICKETT.

(3) RF/PF Forces: Provided five RF companies, one RF engineer company, one Mechanized PF company and two PF platoons for search and destroy, screening, and security missions at various times during Operation PICKETT.

(4) FOB-2, 5th Special Forces Group KONTUM: Provided two companies from the Black Eagle CIDG Battalion for screening and security missions.

(5) CIDG Forces: CIDG companies were provided from DAK TO, MANG BUK, PLATEAU GI, DAK PEK, POLEI KLENG, and PLEI MRONG. These companies conducted search and destroy, screening and security missions in support of the Brigade.

8. (U) Intelligence: See Inclosure 1, Intelligence.

9. (C) Mission: Headquarters I Field Force Vietnam directed the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division to move by air from TUY HOA to KONTUM and conduct search and destroy operations adjacent to the CAMBODIAN border in the PICKETT area of operation. During the Christmas truce the mission was slightly altered and the Brigade was subsequently deployed in an expanded PICKETT area of operation to the north and east of KONTUM city. Concurrent with the tactical operations the Brigade was to conduct airborne refresher training.

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10. (C) Concept of Operation: The initial concept of PICKETT called for a rapid air move from TUY HOA to KONTUM. Upon closing KONTUM the Brigade was to deploy into the assigned area with two battalions and supporting forces; maintaining the third battalion as the Brigade Immediate Action Force. After the Christmas truce the Brigade clandestinely entered the expanded PICKETT area of operation with two battalions conducting night airmobile infiltrations. The two maneuver battalions with supporting forces conducted search and destroy operations utilizing semi-guerrilla tactics. The third maneuver battalion conducted airborne training and assumed the mission of Brigade Immediate Action Force. An airborne training program was established and all Brigade units were rotated through the cycle.

11. (C) Execution:

a. Operation PICKETT was conducted in three phases: the air move from TUY HOA to KONTUM; the search and destroy operation adjacent to the CAMBODIAN border; and the offensive operations in the DAK AKOI Valley north and east of KONTUM City. Airborne refresher training was conducted concurrently with Phase III of the tactical operation. Contact was relatively light throughout the operation with the preponderance of contacts being made with relatively small enemy units. ARVN and para-military forces in the area greatly supplemented the maneuver units of the Brigade permitting greater coverage of the area of operation. The Brigade made extensive use of aviation assets to include a two battalion night airmobile infiltration and displacements of the supporting 155mm Artillery battery, B1/30 Arty, by CH-54 flying crane. The Brigade continued to refine and employ semi-guerrilla tactics which are characterized by the use of stealth, deception, and surprise until contact with the enemy is made. Once contact is made, the guise of the guerrilla is lifted and all available firepower and reaction forces are utilized conventionally to capture or destroy the enemy force. The terrain in the area of operation included dense jungle, rugged mountains, rolling hills, and swift mountain streams and rivers. High winds and air turbulence delayed several airmobile operations.

b. Operation PICKETT was initiated on 6 December 1966, two days after the termination of Operation GERONIMO I. The operation commenced with an air move by C-130 aircraft from TUY HOA to KONTUM.

c. Phase I: The Brigade units were marshalling in their respective trains areas vicinity TUY HOA South and TUY HOA North airfields at the beginning of Operation PICKETT. The air move commenced 060630H December 1966 from TUY HOA South Airfield with the units departing in the following order: 1/327 Infantry, 2/320 Artillery, 2/327 Infantry, 2/502 Infantry, A2/17 Cavalry Troop. Elements of Brigade Headquarters and A Company 326 Engineers were interspersed throughout the airstream. The entire Brigade air movement consisted of 199 C-130 sorties and was completed in 49 hours. This move compared most favorably with the seven previous moves the Brigade had made in 1966 with an average of 7 days per move. Several factors contributed to the rapidity with which the move was made. The CG, 834th Air Wing, placed command emphasis on the move and established a 24 hour airstream. The Brigade's airlift requirement was reduced by allowing only mission essential equipment be taken into the airhead; the remaining equipment, personal belongings, and vehicles were conveyed to PHAM RANG Base Camp. The Brigade's turn-in of excess TOE equipment further reduced the airlift requirement with all of the above factors resulting in a total lift requirement of some 60-70 C-130 sorties less than previous moves.

d. Phase II: The second phase of Operation PICKETT began on 9 December with 1/327 Infantry and 2/327 Infantry conducting airmobile assaults into LZ's LEE and KEADE respectively. Due to the dense vegetation in the area and the complete lack of suitable LZ's a considerable amount of clearing had to be accomplished. (See Inclosure 9, Engineer Operations). Supporting

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artillery was lifted by CH-47 and CH-54 helicopters into LZ HUNT. This was the first instance of the Brigade displacing the 155mm howitzer battery by air. The CH-54 flying crane was required to accomplish this task. On 11 December 1/327 Infantry discovered a cache of 59 small arms and miscellaneous equipment. 3/42d ARVN Infantry joined the operation conducting an airmobile assault into LZ SHERIDAN and commenced search and destroy operations to the south. On 12 December a CIDG company from POLI KIENG joined the 2/327 Infantry in offensive operations adjacent to the CAMBODIAN border. 2/42 ARVN Infantry (-) conducted an airmobile assault into the northeast corner of the area of operations and commenced search and destroy operations in zone. On 13 December 2/502 Infantry with a CIDG company from POLI KIENG in direct support conducted an airmobile assault into LZ SHERMAN. The commitment of the 2/502 Infantry brought the total forces taking part in Operation PICKETT to three organic Infantry battalions and supporting artillery, one ARVN battalion, one ARVN battalion (-), two companies of the Black Eagle Battalion, and four CIDG companies. (See Inclosure 2, Tab A). Offensive operations continued in zone with relatively light contact. All units were deliberate, methodical and thorough in the search of primary, secondary, and tertiary trails, paths and stream beds. A complete trail study of the area was initiated and data collected by the Brigade S2 for future reference. On 18 December two organic battalions were reoriented in the area of operation with the 1/327 Infantry, followed by the 2/502 Infantry, conducting airmobile assaults into LZ GRANT and attacking to the south (See Inclosure 2, Tab B). On 21 December 1/327 Infantry located a Montagnard village with a population of 122. Of the 122 people, 16 were identified as VC. The remainder indicated they were tired of working for the VC and desired to return to GVN control. Helicopters were provided and the people were airlifted along with their personal belongings to KONTUM. On 24 December extraction of Brigade units from the area of operation was completed and defensive patrols were established vicinity KONTUM Airfield complex for the Christmas truce period. ARVN and para-military forces in direct support of the Brigade during Phase II of PICKETT furnished the equivalent in troop strength of three Maneuver battalions.

e. Phase III: The third phase of Operation PICKETT commenced in the expanded area of operation on 27 December at the close of the Christmas truce. A two battalion night airmobile infiltration into the DAK AROI Valley was conducted by 1/327 Infantry and 2/502 Infantry. The committed forces maintained a clandestine posture utilizing semi-guerrilla tactics. Search and destroy operations in zone encountered light contact with VC, as well as, NVN forces. Numerous sophisticated base camps and training areas were discovered. Some of the huts had opening and closing windows, water systems with bamboo pipes and latrines. The enemy had a well established trail watching system with well trained and disciplined troops. Booby traps were extensively used by the enemy and accounted for a large portion of friendly casualties. On 30 December 1/327 Infantry engaged an NVA force near an enemy campsite resulting in one NVA KIA and capturing one 30 cal MG, 3 SKS rifles, 5 Mauser rifles, 164 Chicom grenades, 136 quarter-pound blocks of TNT and miscellaneous equipment and ammunition. Later the same day 1/327 Infantry discovered 11 NVA that were killed the previous day with artillery and small arms fire in a counterambush attack. A2/17 Cavalry terminated a three day operation clearing Highway 5B northeast of KONTUM. The operation had been conducted with five RF Infantry companies and one RF Engineer company in direct support. On 2 January 1/327 Infantry returned to the KONTUM Airfield complex to assume the mission of Brigade Immediate Action Force and conduct airborne refresher training. 2/327 Infantry, having completed airborne training, conducted an airmobile assault into the area of operation vacated by 1/327 Infantry. Search and destroy operations continued in zone with relatively light contact. Enemy campsites and training facilities discovered in the DAK AROI Valley indicated the area was a major training and stop-over site for infiltrating NVA units. On 9 January 1/327 Infantry conducted an airmobile

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assault into the area of operation killing two NVA and capturing 5 SKS rifles and 2 Chicom grenades in the vicinity of the LZ. On 11 January friendly artillery wounded 9 troopers of the 1/327 Infantry. The accident was investigated and the cause was found to be due to the use of high angle fire being adversely affected by high winds prevalent in the DAK AKOI area. Throughout Phase III the enemy avoided contact when possible utilizing to the maximum the elaborate system of trail watchers (See Inclosure 2, Tab C for schematic of Phase III). On 19 January extraction of the Brigade's organic and supporting units was completed and at 2400 hours the operation terminated.

12. (C) Results:

a. The 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division accomplished its mission of conducting search and destroy operations to locate and destroy VC and NVA forces in the PICKETT area of operation and of conducting airborne refresher training for all organic units of the Brigade.

b. The following losses were inflicted on the enemy during the operation: 63 VC/NVA KIA (BC), 4 VC/NVA KIA (EST), 3 NVAC, 15 VCC, 14 detainees, and 4 ralliers. In addition, 109 individual and crew served weapons, 226 grenades, 140.6 pounds of TNT, 50.9 tons of rice, ammunition and other equipment were captured.

c. Friendly losses during the operation were as follows: 23 KIA and 104 WIA.

13. (U) Administrative Matters:

a. Personnel and administration: See Inclosure 3, Personnel and Administration.

b. Logistics: See Inclosure 4, Logistics.

c. Civic Action: See Inclosure 6, Civil Affairs.

14. (C) Special Equipment and Techniques:

a. In order to effectively employ CS agents and flamethrowers, airmobile teams were made available at Brigade level on a thirty minute "on call" basis.

b. Water bladders (3 gal capacity) were dropped from helicopters for emergency resupply of water and proved extremely effective.

c. The Magsack Personnel Detector and the Anti-Intrusion device were both used during a portion of the operation. Initial reaction is that both devices show promise, but further testing is needed before the Brigade can offer a complete evaluation.

15. (C) Summary Analysis/Lessons Learned:

a. Comparison of Operation PICKETT with previous operations regarding location of the enemy led to several conclusions:

(1) The enemy continues to live in draws and heavily vegetated terrain that are usually near a high speed trail with many smaller trails nearby.

(2) His living areas have easy access to water, but in areas where presence of water is not always indicated on the map. The larger living areas usually have smaller camp sites on the routes of approach.

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(3) After initial contact, the enemy generally disperses and avoids the living areas during daylight hours.

(4) It has been noted in the KONTUM area, the enemy quite often digs in on the military crest of the hill with a high speed escape route close by. The escape route does not run to the rear of his position, but invariably to the flanks.

(5) During Operation PICKETT enemy positions were generally oriented toward the mouths of the valleys and invariably along normal flow lines, i.e., trails, ravines and streambeds.

b. Several important points were brought to light regarding the friendly defensive posture during Operation PICKETT.

(1) The use of enemy prepared positions, while saving time and labor, is basically dangerous because the enemy is completely familiar with the terrain.

(2) Poncho shelters reflect enough light to betray the positions and outline the defensive perimeter and can be seen from a great distance.

(3) Encampment in an area cleared of trees and vegetation by artillery fire and airstrikes is dangerous because of the lack of concealment afforded the US troops. The enemy is given concealment by the trees that have been blown down on the perimeter.

(4) Trip flares are easily set off during high winds and cannot be relied on to expose the approaching enemy. In very few cases have trip flares actually alerted an element against the enemy's approach.

(5) When a friendly element re-enters a defensive perimeter the enemy will follow if possible.

(6) The construction of and use of dummy foxholes proved effective in deceiving the enemy as to the true location of a perimeter. On one occasion several grenades were thrown into the vicinity of dummy foxholes. Had it been the actual emplacement, casualties would undoubtedly have resulted.

(7) Camouflaging foxholes makes them extremely difficult for the enemy to find at night even though during daylight hours they may be recognizable.

c. When using white phosphorous or trip flares, consideration should be given to wind direction and to the possibility of fires.

d. White Phosphorous munitions proved very effective for locating positions in the jungle during daylight as well as at night.

e. Fire discipline and use of grenades in response to enemy probes proved useful in deceiving him as to the location of the perimeter.

f. The following observations were made from emplacing one or more battalions on one LZ during an airborne assault:

(1) The amount of terrain initially covered is small.

(2) Enemy observation is able to determine more exactly the personnel and equipment being brought into the LZ.

(3) This entry necessitates the movement of the elements on multiple axes, which pushes the enemy instead of blocking or containing him.

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9. g. The M-79, shotgun round may have less dispersion than was generally believed.

(1) One unit reported that the shot pattern for the M-79 rounds tested remain concentrated in a tight area until the pellets slow to below lethal velocity. Further, for the ammunition tested maximum dispersion at one hundred meters in an apparently normal pattern can be confined to an area seven inches by two inches vertically. At lesser ranges the shot area is considerably reduced.

(2) A technique was developed to overcome the lack of dispersion by deliberately firing the round into the ground so the ricochet would cause the dispersion pattern to fan in a 15 degree zone.

h. When descending Chinook ladders heavy packs and equipment must be lowered via rope. Men carrying heavy loads down these ladders are subject to fall.

i. There is a need to improve quick fire marksmanship. In a number of instances friendly troops surprised the enemy and were able to shoot first, however, the results were negligible. Training conducted along these lines verified this need.

j. When operating in the central-highlands, Montagnard interpreters should be attached to company size units to assist in interrogation of suspects.

k. Dog Teams again proved valuable. Two teams per rifle company should be the SOP assignment. A back up for dogs that are evacuated should be available at all times.

l. Friendly camp sites and LZ's should be ambushed the following day or night. The NVA utilize trail followers to dig up sumps after friendly forces have departed the area.

16. (C) Recommendations:

a. That the M-79, shotgun round, be subjected to further testing. That consideration be given to issuing the 12 gauge flechette loaded anti-personnel round.

b. That a minimum of four flyable CH-47 helicopters continue to be provided to the Brigade when supporting artillery and supplies are to be moved by an air LOC.

c. That ARVN, CIDG and other indigenous para-military forces (RF and PF units) continue to be used as much as possible to conserve and augment the forces available to a US commander, as well as to improve training, aggressiveness and confidence of the Vietnamese units.

d. This Brigade continues to recommend C-1 aircraft, equipped with

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spray tanks, be made available to province and sector for immediate and selective use in crop denial. This will eliminate long delays in obtaining approval and insure greater responsiveness.

S. H. Matheson

S. H. MATHESON
Brigadier General, USA
Commanding

9 Inclosures

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1. (C) Terrain:

a. Ploi Trap Valley: This area consisted of rugged mountainous terrain covered with dense forest and heavy undergrowth. Movement was slow and arduous except for the use of a few existing trails. The valley floor was heavily vegetated due to the abundance of water, and although the maps show large open areas - few exist. In both the mountains and valley areas airmobile operations were difficult because of limited LZ's. Observation and fields of fire were poor while cover and concealment were excellent. The Ploi Trap Valley provided a good M-S avenue of approach.

b. Dak Akoi Valley: This area also consisted of rugged mountains covered with dense forest and heavy undergrowth. Movement was assisted by the numerous trails in the area, which showed continual use. The area had some good LZ's, but in general the heavy vegetation limited airmobile operations. Observation and fields of fire were poor, while cover and concealment were excellent. The Dak Akoi Valley also provided a good M-S avenue of approach.

2. Weather

a. Ploi Trap Valley: This part of the operation fell within the "Dry Season" in Kontum Province, and the weather favored friendly offensive operations. Rainfall and winds were as predicted and had no adverse effect on operations. Visibility was less than two miles between 0700H and 1100H ten percent of the time, due to ground fog. There were no unfavorable days for low-level flying operations.

b. Dak Akoi Valley: This part of the operation also fell within the "Dry Season", and the weather generally favored friendly courses of action. However, the characteristics of weather that did have an adverse effect on operations were the severe air turbulence and low cloud ceiling; especially in the eastern and northeastern area of the DAK AKOI. Instead of wind speeds of seven knots as predicted, winds of 25-30 knots were common on a daily basis, often gusting higher. The mountain range running generally north and south on the eastern side of the Dak Akoi Valley was usually shrouded in clouds at higher elevations. This precluded resupply on several occasions, and would have adversely affected the deployment of reinforcements, if needed. The area around Kong Dak had favorable days for low level flying operations less than 50% of the time. The weather should be carefully considered during future planning of combat operations in this area. Light rain showers occurred on several days, but had no effect on operations. Early morning fog was prevalent in the valleys between 0600 and 1000 about 10% of the time.

3. (C) Analysis

a. Field units meticulously prepared trail overlays during the operation as new trails were discovered. They were compiled on a master trail study and provide valuable data for future operations in the Kontum area. More specifically, trails existed in the Ploi Trap area but were not recently used by sizeable enemy elements; trails in the Dak Akoi area showed signs of recent and considerable use.

b. The Dak Akoi area was conclusively proven to be a well established base area. Prior to deployment into that area intelligence estimates indicated the presence of the H-16 VC District Hq, the 304th VC Main Force battalion, the 103 and 204 VC local Force companies, approximately 200 VC guerillas and elements of the 24th NVN Regiment. After a complete search of the area, base camps within the area were found to be rather sophisticated and capable of accommodating an element of a regimental size unit; training areas were also discovered in this area, but nothing was found to substantiate the presence of the H-16 District Headquarters.

c. The enemy forces encountered in the Dak Akoi area were well

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(cont'd)

trained, disciplined, and terrain oriented, their marksmanship, trail watching ability and communications were of a high order. They had well established plans for the defense of the Dak Akoi area as was evidenced by captured documents, and, to a certain degree, employed these plans.

d. Experience gained during operation Pickett still supports the previous conclusions that NVA forces do not employ mines or booby traps. However, this type of activity encountered during the operation indicates that they are not only employed by VC and VC guerrillas, but by VC Main Force Units.

e. Many LZ's located in the Dak Akoi Valley were surrounded by enemy foxholes, bunkers, and trenches. In addition, many LZ's were interdicted by numerous punji stakes and anti-helicopter stakes. This supports the previous conclusion that the enemy was well prepared to defend this area. However, the secrecy, speed, and method of entering this area prevented employment of these defenses.

f. COMSEC: A total of 11,469 transmissions were monitored during operation Pickett with 3 violations reported over wire lines of communications.

g. The winds proved to be considerably in excess of predictions throughout the Dak Akoi area and as such, interfered with aerial transport, resupply and observation mission.

4. (C) LESSONS LEARNED:

a. Numerous campsites and base camps were discovered in bamboo thickets along stream beds. These were not discernable from the air. However, by comparing ground inspection with air observation of these areas, air observers were able to realize where potential base camps may exist. Since bamboo may be bent to provide overhead concealment, and streams provide a source of water, those areas where streams run through bamboo thickets should be considered as potential targets for troop deployment or H&I fires.

b. On the ground photography of base camps and tunnel complexes provide valuable assistance in future analysis of areas of this nature as well as in providing valuable historical data.

c. Photo Imagery: Due to good initial planning by the G-2 LFFV coupled with good weather and sufficient lead time, complete base photo coverage was available of the T&OR from the start of the operation. The intelligence obtained provided timely update to the trail, defense, and LZ studies of the area.

d. Red Haze: A ground check of several base camps located in the area indicates that as few as three cooking fires may be sufficient to provide cooking facilities for a battalion size camp. In order to facilitate identifications of possible enemy locations it is important that records of past red haze missions be furnished the brigade in the early planning stages of an operation. Three air strikes were initiated on the basis of reported emissions within 14 hours of the red haze mission. FAC reports results unknown.

e. Visual Reconnaissance: It was apparent that coordination must be made with the sector visual reconnaissance pilots so that initially they will continue to assist in the coverage of our assigned AO until our own pilots and observers have become familiar with the area. Although the dense jungle canopy restricted observation, the intelligence gained by visual reconnaissance plus the information furnished by the battalion from the ground enabled the brigade to produce an updated trail study of the area.

f. Enemy tactics and techniques:

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Inclosure 1 (Intelligence) to Combat After Action Report Operations Pickett
(cont'd)

(1) The enemy will make every effort to locate and evaluate the disposition and strength of friendly forces. On one occasion, two personnel were observed watching the tactical command post of one battalion using field glasses. A greater emphasis should be placed on taking advantage of available camouflage and concealment in order to deny the enemy access to this information.

(2) Numerous cases where the enemy has freshly employed booby traps, punji stakes, and mines as well as employing snipers along routes travelled by friendly troops indicate that he has an effective trail watching system which he uses just as effectively.

(3) On several occasions during Operation Pickett, the enemy attempted to follow a friendly element as it re-entered a defensive perimeter.

(4) Supporting previous findings in other operational areas, the enemy in Kontum Province also orients his defensive positions along natural lines of drift in trails, ravines, stream beds.

(5) In the PICKETT AO, it became evident that the enemy fled to high ground once friendly troops were introduced into the area. Base camps and campsites were left hastily. Equipment and documents found in them were packed in baskets indicating that the enemy intended to evacuate this area as soon as possible.

(6) It has been noted that in the Kontum area, the enemy digs in on the military crest of a hill with a high speed escape route close by. The escape route does not run to the rear of his position, but invariably to the flanks.

g. During Operation Pickett the following enemy base camps and campsites were located:

GRID	LOCATION	DATE LOCATED
Bn	AS 853347	14 Jan
Plat	AS 867353	13 Jan
Plat	AS 846105	11 Jan
Co	AS 916275	10 Jan
Co	AS 838171	10 Jan
Plat	AS 834074	10 Jan
Co	AS 845196	8 Jan
Plat	AS 855148	7 Jan
Co	AS 845196	7 Jan
NF Camp	AS 860063	6 Jan
7 Huts 15 Tunnels	AS 845203	5 Jan
20 Huts 30 Bunkers	AS 861093	5 Jan
Co	YA 728888	18 Dec
Bn	YA 730895	18 Dec
Montgnard Village	YA 835785	15 Dec
Co	YA 777797	14 Dec

5. (U) The following is a breakout of the enemy weapons and material losses during operation PICKETT:

a. WEAPONS CAPTURED:

Mauers	2
M16	5
M16 Carbine	16
M1 Carbine	9
Shotguns	20
Flare pistols	2
BAR Automatic Rifles	1
M1 Rifle	2
1903 Springfield Rifle	12

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Inclosure 1 (Intelligence) to Combat After Action Report Operations Pickett.
(cont'd)

M1891 Soviet Sniper Rifle	6
M-3 Sub-Machinegun	1
Chatellerault LMG	3
Type 56 SMG	3
USAF Survival Rifle	1
French MAS - 36	20
Soviet Carbine 1944	2
Chicom SMG Type 50	1
Tokerev Pistol	1
PPSN 1939	1
TOTAL INDIVIDUAL WEAPONS	108

R.D. LMG	1
TOTAL C/SERVED WEAPONS	1

b. AMMUNITION

Grenades	226
Small arms ammo	16,336
82mm Mort rds	57
60mm Mort rds	40
Rocket Launcher rds	13
2.75" Rockets	1
Claymore mines	2
AT mines	4
AF mines	8
Blasting caps	100
TNT (lbs)	140.6

c. OTHER

82mm Mort base plate	2
82mm Mort Bipods	2
60mm Mort Bipods	1
60mm Mort sight	1
Sniper Scopes	3
TA312	1
Transistor Radios	4
Rice (Tons)	50.9

1003	12
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TAB A to Inclosure 1 (Intelligence) to After Action Report,
Operation PUCKETT

1. (C) VC/NVA Initial Order of Battle

a. NVA Units

(1) Upon deployment of the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div into KONTUM Province for operation PUCKETT the following NVA units were believed to be located and operating in the vicinity of the Cambodia/Vietnam border, in the general area of southwest KONTUM and northwest PLEIKU Provinces.

(a) The 1st NVA Div (aka 630 and 304), consisting of 3 NVA Regts, was operating in the northwestern portion of PLEIKU Province. The 32nd NVA Regt, 1st NVA Div was located in the vicinity of YA6573 on 25 Nov 66. The 33rd NVA Regt, 1st NVA Div, after recently suffering approximately 40% casualties, was believed to have crossed the border into Cambodia and was probably located in vic YA5055. The 66th NVA Regt, 1st NVA Div was unlocated as of 03 Dec 66, as was the Divisional Support Elements.

(b) The 10th NVA Div (aka 325), possibly consisting of 3 NVA Regts (Appendix 2, to Annex A (CS) to FERINTREX 46, IFFORCEV) was believed to be located in the KONTUM/PLEIKU/CAMBODIA border area with the exact location unknown. The 88th NVA Regt and the 95B NVA Regt were confirmed as being subordinate to this division and the 101C NVA Regt was carried as probable. The 88th NVA Regt was believed to be located just across the Cambodian border in the vicinity of YA 5554 in late Nov 66. The 95B NVA Regt, after contact with elements of the 4th Inf Div (US), had withdrawn to the north, probably using a route just to the east of the border and was believed to be located in the vicinity of YA 7073 on 29 Nov 66. The 101C NVA Regt was unconfirmed and unlocated.

(c) The 200th NVA Arty Bn, possibly changed to a Transportation Battalion, was confirmed to be located in the northern portion of PLEIKU Province with the exact location unknown.

(2) The 24th NVA Regt, operating separately, was believed to be located in the northern portion of KONTUM Province with the exact location unknown. On 02 Nov 66 documents from two NVA KIA at vicinity of AS 8731 (Dak Akei Area) identified the 5th Bn, 24th NVA Regt.

(3) Estimated NVA strengths by Regt/Bn are indicated below:

UNIT	STRENGTH	DATE
1 NVA Div	5800	
Div Hq	200	
32nd NVA Regt	1500	25 Nov 66
33rd NVA Regt	950	02 Dec 66
66th NVA Regt	1800	11 Aug 66
Div Spt Units	1350	
10 NVA Div	3300	
Div Hq	200	
88th NVA Regt	1600	02 Dec 66
95B NVA Regt	1500	13 Nov 66
101C NVA Regt	unk (unconfirmed)	
Div Spt Units	unk	
24th NVA Regt	1800	10 Jun 66
200th NVA Arty Bn	200	04 Nov 66

b. VC Units

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TAD A to Inclosure 1 (Intelligence) to After Action Report,
Operation PICKETT

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(1) H-67 VC District Headquarters was believed to be located in vicinity of YA 8284. This district headquarters was located in the 1/101 initial area of operation and had the following VC Local Force (VMC) units as subordinates:

(a) 200th VC Co with an estimated strength of 120 personnel.

(b) 260th VC Co with an estimated strength of 100 personnel.

(2) H-16 VC District Headquarters was believed to be located in the general area of AS 8820 (Dak Akoi Valley Area) and had the following VC Local Force units as security and operational elements:

(a) 103rd VC Co with an estimated strength of 100 personnel.

(b) 204th VC Co (aka: 240) with an estimated strength of 80 personnel.

(3) The 304th VC Main Force Bn was believed to be located in the Dak Akoi Valley Area (AS 9330) but periodically operating in a triangular area extending from the Dak Akoi Valley (AS 9330) to Dak To (YD 0022) to Kontum (ZA 7890).

(4) The combined strength of the local guerrillas, VC porters, VC workers and political cadre was estimated at 200 personnel. (This does not include the H-16 and H-67 District Headquarters).

(5) Enumeration of estimated VC strengths by unit is indicated below:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>DATE</u>
304 VCMF Bn	350	Nov 66
H-67 VC Dist Hqs	50	Nov 66
200 VC Co	120	Nov 66
260 VC Co	100	Nov 66
H-16 VC Dist Hqs*	50	Nov 66
103 VC Co*	100	Nov 66
204 VC Co*	80	Nov 66
Miscellaneous VC Units	200	Nov 66

Note: Located in area of interest and not within initial 1/101 Abn Div AO.

2. (C) Order of Battle findings and Summary in the Operational Area.

a. NVA Units

(1) Elements of the 1st NVA Div (aka 630 & 304) were not contacted in force during this operation. Minor incidents, sightings and intelligence reports indicate units of the 1st NVA Div to include 32nd NVA Regt and 66th NVA Regt withdrew across the Cambodia border in order to recuperate, resupply and reorganize. Numerous reports from various sources indicated that the 33rd NVA Regt had suffered approximately 40% casualties in Nov 66 and there fore was disbanded with the remaining strength being assigned to the 32nd NVA Regt and the 66th NVA Regt as fillers. One source of information revealed that the 9th NVA Regt had recently replaced the 33rd NVA Regt.

(2) Elements of the 10th NVA Div (aka 308 & 325) were not contacted in force. However, interrogation reports received from the 4th Inf

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TAB A to Inclosure 1 (Intelligence) to After Action Report,
Operation PICKETT

Div as well as information obtained from two (2) Chieu Hoi NVA revealed that the 95th NVA Regt had recently moved across the Cambodian border. The 88th NVA Regt was also reported to be located in Cambodia. The 101C NVA Regt was not contacted and therefore remained unconfirmed and unlocated.

(3) The 200th NVA Arty Bn was not contacted during this operation.

(4) Elements of the 24th NVA Regt were contacted in the Dak Akoi Valley Area (AS 8731). The 5th Bn, 24th NVA Regt, operating separately was located in the Dak Akoi area as evidenced by the contact in late Dec 66 and early Jan 67, and interrogation reports and document translations. The unit appears to have fully recuperated from Operation HAWTHORNE (Jun 66). Information relative to the 4th and 6th Bns 24th NVA Regt was not obtained. C3 Factors located at Appendix 1.

b. VC Units

(1) Elements of the VC District Hqs H-67 to include its subordinate VCLF Cos, the 200th and the 260th, were not contacted in force. The activities of this organization appear to be passive in nature and their activities are well contained by the local CIDG Forces.

(2) Elements of the VC District Hqs H-16 with its subordinate units, the 103rd and 204th VCLF Co, were not contacted in force. Numerous installations, PW locations, caches (food, ammo, weapons and equipment) believed to be supplemental to the district Hqs operations were destroyed within the Dak Akoi area (AS 9330). A civil defendant detainee stated that the H16 Hqs was located in the area (here say).

(3) The 304th NVLF Bn was not contacted in force. Final locations and disposition of this unit is undetermined.

3. Conclusions: A continued lack of contact in the PICKETT AO in southwestern KONTUM Province indicates that the major portion of the NVA enemy force has probably exfiltrated into Cambodia or is deployed along the KONTUM/Cambodia border in small groups. It is possible that the NVA has chosen to enter Cambodia in order to regroup, recuperate and resupply as a result of heavy losses suffered during the month of Nov 66 by its units in contact; the 32nd, 33rd, 88th and 95th NVA Regts. The 66th NVA Regt and the 101C NVA Regt, if it continues to exist as a unit, remain out of contact and unlocated. Recent information indicated large groups (most likely elements of the 1st and 10th NVA Div) of NVA forces located in vicinity of YA 5550 - YA 5560 and vicinity YA 7012.

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APPENDIX 1 to TAB A to Inclosure 1 (Intelligence) to After Action Report, OPERATION RICKET.

1. Composition

- a. 24th NVA Regt
- b. See attached line and block chart for organization.
- c. Possible new cover name: CONG TRUONG SON HA.

2. Disposition:

The 5th NVA Regt, with some elements of the Regimental Combat Support units, was located in the Dak Akci Valley area (AS9255) in early Jan 67. The location of the 4th and 6th BN's, 24th NVA Regt are unknown.

3. Strength:

a. Personnel

- (1) 24th NVA Regt - unknown
- (2) 5th BN, 24th NVA Regt - Estimated 300.

b. Weapons: 7th Co, 5th BN, 24th NVA Regt had the following weapons and ammunition in Dec 66.

ITEM	QUANTITY
AK	27
SKB	15
RPD	8
3-40	2
Rifle	2 (used for sniper)
Ammo	10,180 rds
3-40 ammo	6 rds

4. Training: No info
5. Tactics: No info
6. Logistics: No info

7. Combat Efficiency

- a. 5th BN, 24th NVA Regt: Good
- b. 4th & 6th BN, 24th NVA Regt: Unknown

8. Miscellaneous: Personalities are listed as follows:

UNIT	POSITION	RANK & NAME
24th NVA Regt	CO	Maj TRUONG
24th NVA Regt	XO	Maj TENG
4/24th NVA Regt	CO	Sr Cpt NHUONG
4/24th NVA Regt	XO	Cpt VAY
4/24th NVA Regt	FO	Cpt CUONG
1/4/24th NVA Regt	CO	Lt THEET
1/4/24th NVA Regt	XO	Lt DAI
1/4/24th NVA Regt	FO	Lt HOI
1/4/24th NVA Regt	AFO	Lt DAO
2/4/24th NVA Regt	CO	Lt BUI VAN PHON
4/4/24th NVA Regt	CO	Lt YAI
5/24th NVA Regt	CO	Cpt TRUNG
5/24th NVA Regt	XO	Cpt MINH
5/24th NVA Regt	FO	Cpt AN

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APPENDIX 1 to TAB A to Inclosure 1 (Intelligence) to After Action Report,
OPERATION FICKETT. (cont'd) 20

8. Miscellaneous: Personalities are listed as follows: (cont'd)


<u>UNIT</u>	<u>POSITION</u>	<u>RANK & NAME</u>
6/5/24th NVA Regt	CO	Lt BUG
7/5/24th NVA Regt	CO	Lt HA
8/5/24th NVA Regt	CO	Lt BOCH
10/5/24th NVA Regt	CO	Lt MCI
6/24th NVA Regt	CO	Cpt CHU BAN TAN
6/24th NVA Regt	XO	Cpt MINH
6/24th NVA Regt	FO	Cpt NO LONG

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
APPENDIX 1 to TAB A to Inclosure 1 (Intelligence) to After Action Report,
OPERATION PICKETT, (cont'd)

9. 24TH NVA REGT LINE AND BLOCK CHART




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CAMPBELL



LZ SHERMAN
3/42 ARVN

2/42 ARVN

LZ LEB
1/327

2/327

LZ RUET

2/502

LZ SHERMAN

POLEI NENG

POLEI KRONG


1/327
2/502

101ST A
OPERATION PICKETT
PERIOD 9 DEC - 18 DEC 66


NGUYEN

101ST A

25



CAMBODIA




1ST BDE 101ST AIRBORNE DIVISION

OPERATION PICKETT

PERIOD 18 DEC - 24 DEC 66

27

1ST BDE 101ST ABN DIV
OPERATION PICKETT
27 DEC 66 - 19 JAN 67



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Inclosure 3 (Personnel and Administration) to Combat Operations After
Action Report, Operation PICKETT

1. (C) UNIT STRENGTHS:

a. Beginning of Operation PICKETT.

(1) The Brigade personnel strengths at the beginning of Operation PICKETT were as follows:

Authorized Augmented (MTOE)	4490
Assigned	4913
Present for Duty	4438
Airhead - Tuy Hoa	3325
Base Camp - Phan Rang	815
Not Present for Duty	475

(2) The assigned strength was 110% of the augmented authorized strength. The present for duty strength was 98.5% of the augmented authorized strength.

(3) Of the not present for duty strength; 15 were hospitalized, 273 were intransit, 110 were on TDY/SD status, 56 on leave, 12 in confinement, and 9 AMOL.

b. Conclusion of Operation PICKETT.

(1) The Brigade personnel strengths at the conclusion of operation PICKETT were as follows:

Authorized Augmented (MTOE)	4490
Assigned	4800
Present for Duty	4362
Airhead - Kontum	3274
Base Camp - Phan Rang	1088
Not present for Duty	438

(2) The assigned strength was 107% of the augmented authorized strength. The present for duty strength was 97.5% of the augmented authorized strength.

(3) Of the not present for duty strength; 10 were hospitalized, 140 were intransit, 174 were on TDY/SD status, 93 on leave, 18 in confinement, and 3 AMOL.

(4) The 46th Army Postal Unit, attached to the Brigade, has three personnel present for duty of 11 authorized.

c. Replacements received during the Operation were assigned to subordinate units as follows:

	<u>OFF</u>	<u>EM</u>		<u>OFF</u>	<u>EM</u>
1/327	8	91	2/320	6	57
2/327	8	89	Spt Bn	2	88
2/502	8	107	Separate Co	8	80

2. (C) CASUALTIES:

a. Casualties for the Operation were as follows:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>MIA</u>
HHC LRRP		2
1/327	7	31
2/327	1	23
2/502	15	34

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Inclosure 3 (Personnel and Administration) to Combat Operations After Action
Report, Operation PICKETT

2/320		4
A 2/17 Cav		7
A 326 Engr		2
42 Inf (SD)		1
TOTAL	23	104

b. Total casualties to date:

<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>MIA</u>
343	1897	2

3. (U) PERSONNEL PROGRAMS:

a. The Red Cross Recreational Unit continued its visits to forward units during Operation.

b. Brigade troopers received many Christmas cards and packages from CONUS during the Christmas Holidays.

c. Records checks were conducted by AG in the forward area during the operation.

4. (U) PERSONNEL PLANNING: Planning during the period involved the following areas:

a. By the end of December 1966, the Brigade had rotated approximately 900 personnel during a three month period.

b. The plan developed and forwarded to USARV to level out the officer and warrant officer "HUMP" during months of May and June 1967 was forwarded to DA for final action.

5. (C) MEDICAL:

a. The Bamboo Threat: The "Punji stake" is a well known example of how bamboo can be utilized to maim and kill. Recently the ubiquitous bamboo plant proved that it possesses a danger for the soldier even when it stands unmolested in its natural habitat. A Brigade trooper, while stringing commo wire in a tree, accidentally fell into a bamboo thicket impaling himself upon an otherwise innocuous bamboo shoot. The stalk entered his upper right chest and exited his lower left back, fatally injuring the young soldier. This potential danger is especially of concern during helimobile combat assaults wherein the troopers often times exit the aircraft some distance above the ground over clearings covered with a fairly dense growth of grass and underbrush. Under these circumstances, bamboo thickets should be approached with the same respect one shows punji stakes, because they have more in common than one might think.

b. Patients treated by the 1st Brigade Clearing Station.

(1) WIA	104
(2) KIA	23
(3) Non Hostile Injury	210
(4) Disease	567
(5) Returned to Duty	284
(6) Evacuated to Hosp	595

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Inclosure 3 (Personnel and Administration) to Combat Operations After Action
Report, Operation PICKETT

(7) Remaining in Holding	3
(8) Total Patients admitted	879

c. Hospitalized Personnel Categorized by wounds:

(1) Head	12
(2) Chest	6
(3) Abdomen	4
(4) Upper Extremities	24
(5) Lower Extremities	60
(6) Back Injuries	6

d. SUMMARY: Due to the location of the AO, and the outstanding dustoff support, the Brigade Clearing Station was able to support the combat battalions from the Brigade Trains area. Though remaining flexible for any tactical situation which would dictate a change in posture for better cover, the Brigade Clearing Station was also able to provide complete medical coverage for the rear elements.

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Inclosure 4 (Logistics) to Combat After Action Report, Operation PICKETT

1. (C) Organization of Support:

a. Support Battalion. Support Battalion established a Forward Support Element (FSE) in the forward area to provide highly responsive combat service support to the Brigade units. The FSE was located adjacent to the Kontum Forward Support Area (FSA) at Kontum airfield. The FSE was commanded by a field grade officer and included Company D, 326th Medical Battalion, a maintenance section, a supply section, an ammunition section, a transportation section, an AG section, and an operations section.

b. Supporting Forces:

(1) Pleiku Sub Area Command of the US Army Support Command, Qui Nhon provided command and control of the Kontum FSA.

(2) 10th Combat Aviation Battalion provided UH-ID helicopters for logistical as well as tactical support.

(3) 135th Aviation Company provided CV-2 aircraft support between the Brigade base camp at Phan Rang and the Brigade field trains adjacent to Kontum airfield. The CV-2 was redesignated C7A and placed under US Air Force control effective 1 January 1967.

(4) 179th and 180th Aviation Companies provided CH-47 helicopter support.

(5) 598th Air Ambulance Company provided aeromedical evacuation support during the operation.

2. (C) Material and Services:

a. Supply.

(1) Class I supplies were received through the Kontum FSA. All Class I supplies were available in abundance throughout the operation. Fresh fruits, vegetable, rice and ice cream were received daily. Class I support throughout the operation was the most responsive and complete the Brigade has yet received in Vietnam. A total of 502 short tons of supplies were issued, to include 120,726 "B" rations and 46,682 rations of Meal, Combat, Individual.

(2) Class II and IV supplies were received primarily from the Brigade base camp at Phan Rang through an air line of communication. However, the Kontum FSA did establish a direct exchange (DX) facility for items which wore out quickly, such as jungle fatigues, boots, underwear, socks and towels; this permitted a reduction in equipment carried by Brigade units. Additionally, the FSA provided barrier materials, lumber and nails. A total of 44.5 short tons of Class II and IV supplies were received during the operation. The Kontum FSA provided highly responsive and effective Class II and IV support throughout the operation.

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Inclosure 4 (Logistics) to Combat After Action Report, Operation PICKETT

(3) Class III. All types of Class III and IIIA were drawn from the Kontum FSA for support of the Brigade and supporting army aviation units. A total of 8750 gallons of AVGAS, 52200 gallons of MOGAS, and 31250 gallons of DIESEL were issued in support of the operation. This equalled 298.2 short tons.

(4) Class V. Class V continued to be in adequate supply throughout the operation. All ASR items were stringently controlled by the Brigade SA and the FSE ammunition section. The low ASR of some ammunition items had no adverse effect upon combat operations. A total of 396.5 short tons of Class V supplies were issued during the operation.

(5) Water. Company A, 326th Engineer Battalion operated a 1500 gallon water purification unit which was adequate for the Brigade's needs.

b. Maintenance:

(1) Shop Statistics. The FSE maintenance detachment received 86 automotive, 150 armament, 475 signal, 20 instrument, 99 service, and 31 engineer jobs. Of this number all but 54 signal job orders were completed. A total of five M-151 trucks and one M-37B, trucks were salvaged during the operation.

(2) Maintenance Operation. The proximity of the FSE maintenance detachment to Kontum airfield facilitated the evacuation of unserviceable and salvaged vehicles to the rear area. In addition, the thorough Class II and IV support provided by the FSA permitted utilization of less aircraft cargo space for Class II and IV supplies and more space for repair parts aboard supporting aircraft sent from the base camp. Consequently repair parts arrived more quickly and with less lead time required.

(3) Maintenance Inspections. The program of roadside spot checks was continued and proved highly effective in uncovering maintenance deficiencies. The close proximity of all unit trains to the FSE facilitated recovery operations and turn in of job orders.

(4) Contact Teams. Contact teams became more effective, primarily because of the increased cooperativeness by all units. Units sent a thorough analysis of the maintenance difficulty with each request for assistance. As a result, the maintenance officer was able to dispatch a contact team with the proper tools and parts required to accomplish its mission. This accurate flow of information from requesting unit to maintenance officer contributed greatly to contact team efficiency.

c. Transportation:

(1) Ground Transportation. An average of 17-22 ton trucks were utilized to support the Brigade operations each day in the forward area.

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Inclosure 4 (Logistics) to Combat After Action Report, Operation PICKETT

(2) Air Transportation.

(a) C7A aircraft flew a total of 114 sorties and carried 1,442 passengers and 168,950 pounds of cargo in support of Operation PICKETT.

(b) Other Air Force aircraft, primarily C-130's, flew 76 sorties while hauling 2,377 passengers and 919,076 pounds in support of Brigade logistical operations.

d. Other Services:

(1) Graves Registration was provided by the Kontum FSA with personnel and equipment drawn from the Pleiku Sub Area.

(2) Bath. A quartermaster bath unit and showerhead was established in the vicinity of the Brigade water points, and operated by personnel from the Kontum FSA. The services proved adequate to meet the Brigade needs.

(3) Laundry. The Kontum FSA provided laundry facilities on both individual and unit bulk basis.

3. (U) Summary.

The organization for logistical support during Operation PICKETT was outstanding. The support rendered by the Kontum FSA was the best received by the Brigade. No major logistical problems developed, and the logistical system remained capable of fully supporting tactical operations.

4. (U) Conclusions. Except for continued refinements, the current organization for logistical support should be continued.

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Inclosure 5 (Signal) to Combat After Action Report, Operation PICKETT

1. (U) Background:

The 1st Brigade communications platoon and the 1st FASCP 501st Signal had the joint mission of displacing the communications systems from TUY HOA upon the completion of Operation GEROBMO, to KONTUM, reestablishing and maintaining communications for Operation PICKETT.

2. (C) Operations:

a. VHF Section - It was determined that the VHF section would not be required on Operation PICKETT. Upon termination of GEROBMO, the VHF section deployed by convey to the PHAN RANG Base Camp. The personnel were utilized in a combat assault to secure a radio relay site NE of KONTUM and occupy positions to secure the site until the completion of the operation.

b. Communications Center Section - Terminated operations in TUY HOA and reestablished them at KONTUM, terminating three half duplex circuits with higher headquarters. The motor messengers continued to provide message service within the Brigade.

c. Switchboard/Wire Section - Terminated the CP operations at TUY HOA and reestablished the CP at KONTUM. Thirty miles of wire were installed and sixty-eight circuits were terminated at the Strike Forward switchboard.

d. FM Radio Section - Provided FM radio nets within the Brigade, with auto retrans sites at LZ PETE and Hill 940.

e. AM Radio Section - Was not committed during Operation PICKETT. Personnel from this section continued to operate the Army MARS station at PHAN RANG and extended services to KONTUM during the Christmas and New Years period by installing a portable station.

f. Maintenance Section - Continued to provide maintenance support for Brigade Headquarters and Headquarters Company and attachments, and operated the CP lighting system.

g. 5th Signal Battalion - Continued to provide circuits into the area system, secure RTT and single sideband phone patch services from KONTUM to I FFORCEV, NHA TRANG and Brigade Base Camp at PHAN RANG.

3. (C) Problem Areas:

a. Equipment shortage: Due to the nature of the operations, the Brigade VHF section was not committed. Had it been committed, the shortage of 12 3KW and 20 AC Generators would have seriously affected the operational ability of this section. The generators were requisitioned on a 02 priority on March 1965 and again requisitioned on 23 August 1966.

b. Operational requirements for all the forces available for the operation limited the number of personnel available for a radio relay site security force. The uncommitted personnel of the Brigade Signal elements and personnel from the Infantry battalions who were unable to keep pace on search and destroy operations were employed to provide the relay site security.

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Inclosure 6 (Civil Affairs) to Combat Operations After Action Report
Operation PICKETT.

1. (U) Civil Affairs activities during the period covered by Pickett were centered around price and wage control to preclude a violent impact on the local economy and to assist in the brigade's plaster control program. Coordination with local GVN officials and their counterparts was made prior to the arrival of the brigade in Kontum and the beginning of Operation Pickett. During initial coordination with District officials the daily wage for laborers was set at 50GVN. The Kontum District Chief also stated that up to 250 male laborers would be available per day. Both items subsequently proved to be erroneous. The minimum daily wage in Kontum was 70GVN. No more than 90 male laborers could be hired on a daily basis and most of these would not be mature men but rather boys in their late teens. Unemployment is not a problem in Kontum and most laborers earn more than 70GVN per day.

2. Civic Action efforts during Operation Pickett were pointed at high impact, short duration projects with maximum integration of local military forces whenever possible. Cooperation and assistance from the local government official, civilian agencies and US personnel in the area was excellent and success was achieved in getting the ARVN to take over responsibility for projects initiated by the brigade. Although the brigade's stay in Kontum was short, by setting the example and by showing the way, a new and more active interest in Civic Action was generated in the Kontum area. The following significant events were accomplished.

a. A series of sickcalls were held in villages surrounding Kontum utilizing the medic from Tm 15, 41st CA Co and an ARVN medic from Province S-5. A total of 669 persons were treated in this joint Vietnamese/US projects.

b. Dental officers from the Bde Medical Co treated 84 patients at Dr Smith's Montagnard Hospital and the Lepersarium at Kontum.

c. A joint Vietnamese/Bde Medicine Show was conducted which treated 480 patients, allowed Province officials to speak with the villagers and movies (health and psy op) were shown. This was the first operation of this type Province officials had participated in. The operation lasted approx 24 hours and was considered a very valuable experience by the GVN personnel participating.

d. A project was executed repairing the foot walk across the river bridge at Kontum, Tm 15, 41st CA Engineer Officer provided technical advice and assistance, 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div provided the materials and an ARVN Engr Co did the work. This was a valuable, much appreciate project which reflected very favorably on the image of ARVN with the local population.

e. Troopers from the brigade finished several valuable projects at Dr. Smith's Montagnard Hospital which vastly improved the facilities serving the local population.

(1) A shelving system was constructed in the hospital warehouse and two medical supply specialist organized a mountain of medical supplies into an orderly, useful system greatly simplifying the hospital personnel's work.

(2) A fish pond was constructed, and stocked with carp and tilapia. This was a much needed project which will provide a continuous source of protein for the patients. Protein deficiency is one of the most prevalent complications with almost all illnesses in the area.

(3) A metal framework for a permanent building was erected and roofed. This building measures 30 feet by 75 feet and when finished will provide a tuberculosis ward for the hospital.

f. Four tons of food, clothing and other commodities were

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distributed in the Kontum area to villagers, hospitals and other institutions.

g. A joint project was conducted with the Kontum Province S-5 to provide a building in Trung Nhia for a day nursery and school. Bde troopers erected the metal framework the ARVN troops were in the process of finishing the building when Operation Pickett was terminated.

h. A Montagnard village (Kondosing NR 901912) alleged that personal property, money, and food was taken from the villagers by Vietnamese troops during a joint operation with Bde elements. The villagers were irate because of their strong pro GVN record, the fact that the village was Catholic, and that several PF were stationed in the village, and the villagers felt that their friends were treating them as enemies. The Bde S-5 section organized an operation in an attempt to reduce the ill feeling and worked closely with GVN officials to get the allegation investigated and claims paid by GVN to the villagers involved. The village was visited, food, clothing, candy and other commodities were distributed. This effort placated the village which then reciprocated with a festival for the troopers.

i. Two officers from the brigade attended the USAID/MACV/JUSPAO Orientation Course.

j. Support Battalion established a Voluntary Civic Action Fund to implement Project 101 which supports 101 scholarships in the Phan Rang area.

3. Lessons Learned:

a. Although Vietnamese interpreters are normally adequate when dealing with Montagnards it is much more desirable to use Montagnard interpreters. Montagnards are much more responsive to their own kind and they very often resent dealing through a Vietnamese interpreter.

b. Before visiting a Montagnard village it is wise to contact the local priest or missionary as he is normally the most informed person on local village activities. He is not only the religious leader of the people but very often he is the unofficial spokesman for several villages and is respected and obeyed by the members of his flock. His support and advice on civic action projects will do much to insure success.

c. In the event that a death or serious injury of a Vietnamese civilian is caused by US personnel the making of solatium payments and the offering of condolences should be coordinated with the local Vietnamese officials. Their assistance and advice in these matters can prove invaluable.

d. In the planning of search and destroy or cordon and search operations in heavily populated areas, coordination should be made with the S5 to obtain information he may have concerning the area and to effect the integration of medicine show operations when feasible.

f. Units must notify the S5 section whenever there is a change in the number of daily hire laborers they require. This procedure will insure an adequate supply of laborers and will preclude overhiring.

g. When entering a new area do not assume that locally stationed personnel have the civic action effort well in hand. Often the most obvious projects are the most needed. Take the initiative, set the example and get the civic action ball rolling.

h. Price control measures are not effective without constant troop orientation. Even though price lists are distributed and posted in business establishments, many troopers readily pay whatever price the shopkeeper quotes without question and without realizing that they are contributing to inflation and hurting our overall effort in Viet Nam. Commanders must continuously emphasize and impress upon the members of their units that they must pay only the official prices and no more.

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Inclosure 7 (Psychological Warfare) to Combat Operations After Action Report,
Operation PICKETT (U)

1. (U) Psychological Objective: Psychological Warfare activities were oriented and directed toward enemy units and friendly civilians in the operational area.

2. (C) Operation PICKETT:

a. Leaflets: A total of 2,300,000 leaflets were dropped during the operation.

b. Loudspeaker: A total of 38 hours of loudspeaker appeals were delivered by USAF U-10 aircraft and the Ground Speaker Team. The themes used in the appeals were CHIEU HOI and Demoralization. A total of six hours speaker time was utilized by the ground speaker team during the operation.

c. Summary: It is believed that psychological operations, together with the violent offensive nature of the tactical situation, contributed extensively to the demoralization of enemy personnel. By the closing date of the operation two NVA soldiers had surrendered themselves to the Brigade.

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Enclosure 8 (Artillery) to Combat After Action Report, Operation PICKETT (U)

1. Task Organization: Available Artillery: 3 Btry's (105) 2/320th Arty, 1 Btry (105) 221st ARVN Arty, 1 Btry (155) 1/30th Arty, 1 Platoon (155) ARVN Arty.

2. Supporting Forces: N/A

3. Intelligence: N/A

4. Mission: 2d Battalion (Airborne), 320th Artillery direct support of 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division. Battery B, 1st Battalion (towed), 30th Artillery reinforced fires of 2d Battalion, 320th Artillery.

5. Summary of Operation: Fire support coordination during Operation PICKETT continued to follow procedures that have proven successful during previous operations. No new or different techniques were developed. During Phase I of Operation PICKETT, two Black Eagle companies (CIDG, with special training in reconnaissance and surveillance) were attached to the battalion with the mission of conducting search and destroy operations between two battery positions. In addition, these CIDG companies were used to secure AO given 2/320th Artillery. This unit provided a FO with each to act as both liaison and observer. During PICKETT a MTT was sent to the SF camp at DAK SHANG to teach 105mm Howitzers techniques (FDC and firing). Combined operations with the 221st ARVN Arty were conducted during both phases. LNC's and FO's were provided the ARVN Infantry units. In addition to the gunnery aspects of the operations, the battalion survey section surveyed an extensive compass course and assisted in training Vietnamese forces in map reading. A Beehive demonstration was conducted for MACV, ARVN Arty officers, and newly assigned personnel to the brigade. Numerous service practices were conducted. Finally the battalion participated in Airborne Refresher Training culminated by parachute jumping.

6. Execution:

a. 9 December - 24 December 1966

(1) At 090900 December, C2/320th displaced to YA723863. Unit closed at 1430 hours. Direct support 1/327th Infantry.

(2) At 091000 December, A2/320th moved to YA027928 by convoy. Unit closed at 1400 hours. Direct support 2/502d Infantry.

(3) At 091000 December, B1/30th displaced by CH-54 to YA724872 with mission of reinforcing C2/320th Artillery.

(4) At 100700 December, B2/320th displaced by CH-47 to YA784926. Unit closed at 1420 hours. Direct support 2/327th Infantry.

(5) At 101100 December, the remaining platoon of B1/30th displaced by CH-54 to YA784916 with mission of reinforcing the fires of B2/320th Artillery.

(6) At 220800 December B2/320th closed back into the KONTUM Airfield complex and began training for future operations. The element of B1/30th also displaced back to airfield complex. The entire element closed at 1530 hours.

(7) At 230800 December A2/320th displaced back to KONTUM Airfield complex and began training for future operations. Unit closed at 1310 hours.

(8) At 240800 December C2/20th displaced back to KONTUM Airfield complex and began training for future operations. Unit closed at 1500 hours.

b. 27 December - 18 January 1967

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Inclosure 8 (Artillery) to Combat After Action Report, Operation PICKETT

(1) At 270700 December A2/320th displaced to AS853244 in direct support of 1/327th Infantry. Unit closed at 1040 hours.

(2) At 270900 December B2/320th began airborne refresher training.

(3) At 270900 December B1/30th Arty displaced by CH-47 and CH-54 to AS961026. Unit closed 1330 hours. Direct support 2/502d Infantry.

(4) At 300730 December C2/320 Arty displaced by CH-47 to AS973234. Reinforcing A2/320 Arty. Unit closed at 1225 hours.

(5) At 030800 January 1967 B2/320th Arty made a road march to AS778931 from here they fired their own preparation for subsequent air assault. Unit then was lifted by CH-47 to AS807018. Unit closed 1400 hours. Direct support 2/502d Infantry. B1/30th Artillery mission changed to reinforcing B2/320th Artillery.

(6) At 041000 January three (3) tubes of B1/30 Arty displaced to AS853244 by CH-54 reinforcing the fires of A2/320th Arty. Unit closed at 1415 hours.

(7) On 6 January, C2/320th Artillery displaced back to KONTUM Airfield complex for future operations and airborne refresher training. GS 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div.

(8) At 060900 January the remaining 3 tubes of B1/30th Arty displaced by CH-54 to AS807018 with mission of reinforcing fires of B2/320th Arty.

(9) At 141100 January C2/320th Arty exchanged personnel with A2/320th Arty so that A2/320th Arty could take airborne refresher training and conduct parachute jumps.

(10) At 150900 January B2/320th Arty displaced to AS839254. Mission: Direct support 2/327th Infantry. Unit closed at 1430 hours.

(11) At 180730 January C2/320th Arty displaced back to KONTUM Airfield complex and began training for future operations. B1/30th Arty (-) displaced back to KONTUM and began training for future operations.

(12) At 190515 January B2/320th Arty displaced back to KONTUM Airfield complex and began preparations for future operations.

7. Results: Estimate 7 VC (ZEA).

8. Administration Matters: N/A

9. Special Equipment and Techniques: N/A

10. Commander Analysis: That the 2d Battalion, 320th Artillery, Battery B, 1st Battalion, 30th Artillery, and tactical air continue to provide adequate fire support.

11. Recommendations: That six (6) CH-47's be attached to Brigade for movement of artillery.

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Inclosure 9 (Engineer) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation PICKETT (U)

1. This report describes two hasty methods for clearing landing zones in elephant grass or in bamboo using demolitions. Each of these methods has been tried and found to be effective, however it is believed that the final recommended procedures as described will make these methods more effective.

2. The requirement for hasty means of clearing landing zones became critical when the Brigade started Operation PICKETT in the mountainous jungle near the Cambodian border west of KONTUM. A method of clearing grass and small brush using bangalore torpedoes was suggested by the Brigade Engineer, 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division at a conference at I Field Force Vietnam. An adaptation of this method was successfully used, but a requirement still existed to cut landing zones without first having to place personnel on the ground. Aerial bombs have been used for this purpose, but they frequently leave a large crater and a fairly small clearing for the amount of explosives required.

3. Inclosure 1 describes the development of a hasty method for clearing landing zones in elephant grass or bamboo using bangalore torpedoes. This system requires personnel on the ground to place and fire the bangalores, but it saves a great deal of time and labor and it does not require a great safety distance when firing the bangalores. This method is recommended when troops are on the ground at or near the desired landing zone site.

4. Inclosure 2 describes the development of a hasty method for clearing landing zones in elephant grass or bamboo using a large explosive charge emplaced by helicopter. This method requires a very large safety distance but is extremely rapid and does not require any personnel on the ground. This method is recommended when no personnel are near the desired landing zone site.

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Appendix 1 (Hasty Method for LZ Clearing Using Bangalore Torpedoes) to
Enclosure 9 (Engineer) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation
PICKETT (U)

1. The initial idea was passed at a conference of Engineers at I FFORCEV in early December by Captain Brown, Brigade Engineer, 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division. He stated that they had successfully used bangalores to clear small bush and grass by placing the bangalores 16 feet on centers.

2. A test was run trying to place 15 foot sections of bangalore torpedoes fuze with time fuze from a helicopter. This test was not successful. The sections were very awkward to handle, could not be placed accurately, and only succeeded in making small, random clear spots. A test was later run carefully placing two long parallel sections of bangalores 20 feet apart in tall elephant grass. The elephant grass was effectively cut down to bare earth.

3. On 18 December 1966 a landing zone was needed for a battalion assault. An Infantry platoon for security and a seven man Engineer team jumped from hovering helicopters into what appeared to be tall elephant grass to cut an LZ for the battalion assault. On the ground it was apparent that the vegetation was primarily bamboo 15 to 20 feet tall. Eight complete bangalore torpedoes (80 five foot sections) were brought in slung under a helicopter and dropped to the Engineer team. These bangalores had been removed from the wooden boxes and a connecting sleeve had been placed on one end of each section. The bangalores were assembled into eight 50 foot lengths placed parallel approximately 15 feet apart (the closer spacing was used because the vegetation was bamboo). A ring main of detonating cord was run around the bangalores and they were primed at each end. The resulting blast cleared an area approximately 120 feet long and 60 feet wide. Although additional hand cutting was needed to level stubs to give bare earth for the helicopter skids and to cut down tall shoots of bamboo on the approach and exit paths, the first UH-1D helicopter safely landed 63 minutes after the bangalores were dropped on site. The loaded UH-1D's began arriving 20 minutes later and a total of two battalions were brought into the LZ during the day. The LZ was continually improved by hand, primarily clearing approaches, as the LZ was being used.

4. The most time consuming task was working in the extremely dense and tangled growth. It was difficult to carry the 5 foot sections, awkward to assemble even these short lengths, impossible to accurately space the rows and assure that they were parallel, and slow to place the ring main of detonating cord to fire the bangalores. It is believed that a substantial time saving could be realized by laying one long row of bangalore sections down the full length of the desired LZ and firing this one row. From the cleared lane formed by this blast bangalore sections could be quickly carried, assembled, and thrust outward into the growth to clear the LZ to the desired width. These parallel rows thrust outward from the cleared lane could be quickly primed for firing by a ring main deployed along the edge of the cleared area.

5. The final recommended procedure for clearing LZ's with bangalore torpedoes is as follows:

a. The bangalore torpedo sections are removed from the wooden box and a connecting sleeve is attached to one end of each section. (The required number of bangalores is computed by figuring that each bangalore clears a lane 20 feet wide in elephant grass and a maximum of 15 feet wide in bamboo). Slings the bare torpedo sections with connecting sleeve attached saves weight in the slung load and saves time on the LZ site.

b. A single row of bangalore sections is assembled full length down the center of the LZ and fired from one end. This will clear a lane from which to place all other bangalore sections.

c. Working from the cleared path, parallel sections of bangalore are assembled and thrust outward to the desired width of the LZ. These

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bangalores are placed on 15 or 20 foot centers depending on the vegetation to be cut. A ring main of detonating cord is run around the cleared path and the inside ends of the bangalores are primed. Firing these bangalores will cut the I2.

d. Necessary hand cutting is done to remove stubs and to clear approaches.

6. The use of bangalore torpedoes requires personnel on the ground to place and fire the demolitions. This method greatly increases the speed of cutting I2's and, in thick vegetation, the safety distance from bangalores is quite small - approximately 20 meters.

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Appendix II (Hasty Method for LZ Clearing Using Large Demolition Charges Emplaced by Helicopter) to Inclosure 9 (Engineer) to Combat After Action Report Operation PICKETT (U)

1. When it was demonstrated that personnel were required on the ground to effectively use bangalore torpedoes for LZ clearing, other methods of hasty LZ clearing were considered. Heavy aerial high explosive bombs delivered by tactical aircraft will clear LZ's in elephant grass or bamboo, however this method proved to be unsatisfactory because extremely accurate placement is difficult to achieve and the bombs leave substantial craters in the proposed LZ. A test using a large demolition charge emplaced by UH-1D helicopter was run on 21 December 1965.

2. The demolition charge basically consisted of 510 pounds of tetratol in a 55 gallon drum. The drum was rigged with a rope sling and a cloth donut to facilitate sling loading under a UH-1D helicopter. Some short sections of steel pickets were placed around the periphery of the drum. The drum was then filled with blocks of tetratol removed from the sachels in which they were packed. Four 2½ pound blocks of C-4 were wrapped with 2 lengths of detonating cord. After the drum was filled with tetratol a wooden top was attached to insure that the tetratol remained packed in the drum. Two leads of four strands of detonating cord were extended from the top of the drum for a length of 25 feet. These leads were taped to a length of rope to prevent tangling and blowing in the rotor wash.

3. The cloth donut was hooked to the sling hook of a UH-1D helicopter and the two detonating cord leads were handed to a man in each door of the helicopter. Each of the men receiving these leads had a non-electric blasting cap attached to a 2½ minute time fuze which was inserted in a fuze lighter. As the helicopter approached the area where the demolition was to be released the caps were taped into the detonating cord leads. When the pilot signalled that he was ready to release the charge the fuze lighters were pulled, but the lead with the fuze was held in the helicopter so that the fuze could be cut in case the hook release fouled. As the charge was released, the leads pulled free.

4. The charge was placed into a bamboo grove where the bamboo was about 20-25 feet tall. The charge was released at the level of the top of the bamboo and so fell about 25 feet. The blast occurred after the planned time interval which allowed ample time for the helicopter to fly to a safe distance. The blast cleared a circle approximately 55-60 feet in diameter and created a small crater in the center.

5. It would have been extremely difficult to land a helicopter in the cleared area, however placing a second charge approximately 60 feet from the location of the first would give a cleared area approximately 140 feet long by 60 feet wide.

6. The results of this experiment are not definitive. No landings were made and no occasion has arisen where this method of LZ clearing was required, however, it is believed that this offers a practical and satisfactory way to clear landing zones in elephant grass or bamboo without first placing troops on the ground.

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