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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

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20 Apr 67

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SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report - Operation Junction City
conducted by the 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division
Honduran

(U) (8)

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

Forwarded as inclosure is a Combat After Action Report for Operation Junction City. Operation Junction City was conducted by the 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division during the period 22 February - 30 April 1967. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

Kenneth G. Wickham

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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
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82 ADE, 4TH INF DIV



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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 3D BRIGADE, 4TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96325

WIC-6

12 May 1967

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report. (U)

TO: Commanding General
25th Infantry Division
ATTN: AG of 8, 13
APO San Francisco 96325

1. (U) NAME OF OPERATION: Operation JUNCTION CITY, PHASE I, II, III.
2. (U) DATES OF OPERATION: Phase I 220001 Feb 67 - 172400 Mar 67,
Phase II 130001 Mar 67 - 072400 Apr 67, Phase III 000001 Apr - 202400 Apr 67.

3. (U) LOCATION:

Phase I: Western War Zone C, Tay Ninh Province
Phase II: Western War Zone C, Tay Ninh Province
Phase III: Central War Zone C, Tay Ninh Province and Western Binh
Dong Province

4. (U) COMMAND HEADQUARTERS: 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

5. (C) COMMANDERS:

3d Bn, 4th Inf Div	Col Marshall B. Orth
2d Bn, 12th Inf	LTC Joe F. Elliott
2d Bn, 22d Inf (M)	LTC Ralph W. Julian
3d Bn, 22d Inf	LTC John A. Bender (To 8 Apr)
	LTC James R. Milner (8 Apr to present)
1st Bn, 5th Inf (M)	LTC Richard C. Rogers
2d Bn, 16th Inf	LTC Charles A. Gillis
2d Bn, 16th Armor (-)	LTC Raymond L. Stalley
2d Bn, 77th Arty	LTC Walter E. Rahn (To 15 Mar)
	LTC Jack A. Wooley (15-24 Mar)
	LTC Fred J. Harvitt (24 Mar -)
C Btry, 1st Bn, 9th Arty (165)	CPT John L. Overly (11-15 Mar)
B Btry, 3d Bn, 13th Arty (160)	CPT Samuel R. Hite (17 Mar - 8 Apr)

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3 May, 2d Reg, 13th Army
(1000)

CPT

05 Mar - 7 Apr

C 1st L/10 Cav

CPT Douglas Barr

1st Support Bn (Prov)

MAJ Richard M. Moore

Co 1, 1st Reg Bn

CPT Carl R. Skiple

Co 2, 27th Reg

CPT Johnson R. Kohler

Co C, 583rd Reg

CPT Robert T. Howard

14th LPD

2LT Robert D. Penner

3d Plt, 4th MP Co

2LT Jerry Reed

6. (C) TASK ORGANIZATION:

a. Phase I:

2/22 Inf

1 Sq, 14th LPD
2 Bn, 27th Reg

2nd Control

Co A, 2/22 Inf (X)

Co D, 27th Reg

2/77 Arty (AB)

1 Sq, 4th MP

2/22 Inf (C)

C/1/10 Cav

1 Sq, 14th LPD

2 Bn, 27th Reg

2nd Reg

2/14 Inf

C/583 Reg

2/11 Arty (-)

14th LPD (-)

3/22 Inf

2 Sq, 14th LPD

1 Bn, 27th Reg

b. Phase II:

2/22 Inf

1 Sq, 14th LPD

2/22 Inf (X)

1 Sq, 14th LPD

3 Bn, C/1 Reg

3/22 Inf

1 Sq, 14th LPD

2nd Control

2/77 Arty

A/1/10 Arty

3d Bn Reg

C/1/10 Cav

A/1/10 Arty (-)

C/583 Reg

C/1 Reg (-)

14th LPD (-)

3d Plt, 4th MP

c. Phase III:

2/22 Inf

3 Bn, 14th LPD

2d Pol/Dash

Co, 2/14 Arty

Plt, C/1/10 Cav

Plt, C/1 Reg

5 Bn, 14th LPD

C/1 Reg

3 Bn, 14th LPD

3/22 Inf

2 Bn, 14th LPD

3 Bn, 14th LPD

Plt, C/1/10 Cav

Plt, 2/14 Arty

Sgt, 3d Plt, 4th MP Co

2nd Reg

C/583 Reg

C/1/10 Cav (-)

C/1 Reg (-)

3d Plt, 4th MP (-)

2nd Control

2/14 Arty (-)

2/77 Arty (-)

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7. (C) SUPPORTING FORCES:

a. Artillery:

Phase I:

(1) The 2d Bn, 77th Artillery was in direct support of the 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division. Its mission was to support the maneuver battalions with on call and immediate fire requests.

(2) Positions Occupied:

Btry	Coord	Dates Occupied	Means Occupied	Sorties	Distance
A/2/77	XT085800	22 Feb-4 Mar	Convoy	N/A	
A/2/77	XT045795	4 Mar-15 Mar	Convoy	N/A	5 Km
B/2/77	XT045800	22 Feb-12 Mar	Convoy	N/A	
B/2/77	XT045792	12 Mar-15 Mar	Convoy	N/A	13 Km
C/2/77	XT085800	22 Feb-5 Mar	Convoy	N/A	
C/2/77	XT045795	5-15 Mar	Convoy	N/A	5 Km
C/2/77	XT113705	15 Mar	Convoy	N/A	9 Km

(3) Statistical Data:

(a) Artillery Ammunition Expended:

	A/2/77	B/2/77	C/2/77	TOTAL
1. HE	4800	4355	6385	15,620
2. VP	310	122	213	645
3. ILL	25	0	87	112

(b) Fuses:

	A/2/77	B/2/77	C/2/77	TOTAL
1. PD	4741	4292	6356	15,389
2. TT	310	115	224	649
3. VT	164	70	97	331

(c) Missions By Type:

	A/2/77	B/2/77	C/2/77	TOTAL
1. RFI	547	563	845	1,955
2. Support	261	127	209	597

Phase II

(1) The 2d Bn, 77th Artillery reinforced was in direct support of the 3d Bde, 4th Inf Div. Its mission was to support the maneuver battalions with on call and immediate fire requests.

(2) Positions Occupied:

Btry	Coord	Dates Occupied	Means Occupied	Sorties	Distance
A/2/77	XT341583	17-19 March	Convoy	N/A	22 MI
B/2/77	XT382685	17-19 March	Convoy	N/A	22 MI
B/2/77	XT341583	18-19 March	Convoy	N/A	22 MI
C/2/77	XT388627	18-20 March	Convoy	N/A	25 MI
A/2/77	XT385705	19-29 March	CH-47	15	13 Km
B/2/77	XT385705	19-29 March	CH-47	15	13 Km
C/2/77	XT385705	20-29 March	CH-47	15	9 Km
C/1/0	XT388627	20 Mar-1 Apr	Convoy	N/A	6 Km
C/2/77	XT388627	21-25 Mar	Convoy	N/A	25 MI
B/2/77	XT388627	29 Mar-4 Apr	Convoy	N/A	12 MI
A/2/77	XT341583	29 Mar-3 Apr	CH-47	15	13 Km
B/2/77	XT388627	29 Mar-4 Apr	CH-47 & Convoy	15	14 Km (Air) (4 MI Road)
C/2/77	XT388627	29 Mar-4 Apr	CH-47 & Convoy	15	13 Km (Air) (4 MI Road)
A/2/77	XT495305	3-4 April	Convoy	N/A	25 MI

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A/2/77	KT527547	4-6 April	Convoy	N/A	24 MI
B/2/77	KT527547	4-7 April	Convoy	N/A	29 MI
C/2/77	KT527547	4-7 April	Convoy	N/A	29 MI
C/3/13	KT527547	4-7 April	Convoy	N/A	34 MI

(3) Statistical Data:

(a) Artillery Ammunition Expended:

			105mm				155mm
	A/2/77	B/2/77	C/2/77	C/1/10	C/2/13	TOTAL	B/3/13
1. HE	6672	5765	5590	2237	601	20,865	2279
2. WP	172	116	251	153	33	741	16
3. ILL	5	1	11	0	0	17	0
4. Bookive	3	34	3	0	0	40	N/A

(b) Fuses:

1. FT	6614	5685	5562	2203	593	20,684	2217
2. TT	193	1636	177	167	41	2,236	24
3. VT	43	32	36	0	0	133	34

(c) Missions By Type:

1. MBI	797	631	865	346	137	2,616	266
2. Spt	200	124	189	80	25	618	31

Phase III:

(1) The 2d Bn, 77th Artillery reinforced and in direct support of the 3d Bde, 4th Inf Div. Its mission was to support the numerous elements with on call and direct artillery support.

(2) Positions Occupied:

Day	Coord	Dates Occupied	Name Occupied	Sortie Distance
A/2/77	XT274700	11-20 April	Convoy	N/A 30 MI
C/2/77	XT278705	11-20 April	Convoy & CB-67	10 20 MI (Road)
B/2/13	XT274700	11-20 April	Convoy	N/A 20 MI (Air)

(3) Statistical Data:

(a) Artillery Ammunition Expenditure:

	A/2/77	B/2/77	C/2/77	B/2/13	TOTAL
1. HE	1303	1918	2697	2951	9,071
2. WP	70	12	62	47	211
3. ILL	33	0	0	69	107
4. Bookive	0	0	0	0	0

(b) Fuses:

1. FT	1473	1884	2670	2933	8,970
2. TT	117	36	91	116	360
3. VT	18	0	18	18	54

(c) Missions By Type:

1. MBI	388	308	477	476	1,643
2. Spt	70	19	70	71	230

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b. USAF

(1) Extensive use was made of tactical air to include pre-planned, immediate and combat proof missions with the normal air request channels being used for all missions flown.

(2) Statistical Data:

(a) Missions:

	JC I	JC II	JC III
1. Preplanned Miss Req	77	163	56
2. Preplanned Miss Flown	70	74	39
3. Preplanned Sorties	210	204	124
4. Immediate Miss Req	13	23	4
5. Immediate Miss Flown	13	24	4
6. Immediate Sorties	21	59	11
7. Combat Proof Miss Req	1	-	-
8. Combat Proof Miss Flown	1	-	-
9. Combat Proof Sorties	2	-	-

(b) Results of TAC Air:

1. VC KIA	Unk	Est 101	Unk
2. Structures Destroyed	12	9	5
3. Bunkers Destroyed	12	6	17
4. Bunkers Damaged	7	3	9

(c) Battle of Sui Tre:

- 1. Immediate Miss Req - 20
- 2. Immediate Miss Flown - 28
- 3. Immediate Sorties - 59
- 4. Estimated VC KIA - 101

(3) TAC Air support proved to be timely, accurate and an asset to the operation. Requests for both preplanned and immediate TAC Air support were submitted through regular channels with no difficulty encountered. All systems were thoroughly proven during the Battle of Sui Tre on 21 March 67 in which TAC Air proved to be an invaluable asset in sending off the reported criminal assaults by the VC 272 Regt on this Brigade's elements. On that day alone, TAC Air accounted for 101 VC KIA SE.

c. Army Evacuation:

Phase 2:

(1) Heliborne Operations: Heliborne operations were limited. All units were in place on D-Day and were not moved by air until the 7th of March when the 3/22 and 2/12(-) were lifted by CH-47's of the 213th Combat Assault Support Helicopter Company. The lift of the 3/22 from XT000234 to WT971751 commenced at 0900 hours and was completed by 0955. The aircraft were refueled and the lift of the 2/12 (-) started. This lift from FSB LHM (XT0002790) to WT971751 was completed at 1225. This was the

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first time the Brigade lifted troops by CH-47. The reason was the small LZ (the 3/22 area). Although this was a first, the lift went smoothly and was completed in a minimum time. On 12 March when the Brigade Day Force moved to the northernmost portion of the Line C back to Dai Nang (the 3/22 area) was again used in airlifting the 3/22 (1st) and the 3/22 (2nd) waves were sent from Biemung position P22 (AT77505) to Dai Nang. The troops were then flown by CH-47 aircraft to Dai Nang.

(2) Resupply: Aerial resupply during this period of time was limited. The majority of resupply was accomplished by convoys however, i.e., trucks etc. were flown to the units by H-47 helicopters. While operating on various days were the 4th, 1st, 11th, 11th and 12th Combat Assault Helicopter Companies. Resupply was conducted in routine manner and no unusual situations were encountered. In preparation for this exercise a non-directional beacon was erected at the Dai Nang air strip for use by USMC aircraft operating to and from the airstrip. It has since been taken down.

(3) Refueling: Refueling of our organic CH-47 aircraft while in Dai Nang became a problem and a man from the Bde section had to be placed with the Division Artillery Aviation Section. The service then became satisfactory. At this time the semi-permanent Aviation refueling point at Dai Nang was not operational. This meant the Bde aviation tanks had to remain at Dai Nang throughout this phase.

(4) Cable:

(a) Forward CH-47 aircraft flew many and varied missions during this phase. One such mission was the wire laying performed on 4 Feb. This was the first time this method had been employed. The mission enabled land line communications to be established immediately between the Bde CP and those of the 3/22 and 2/22. In support of this phase our CH-47's flew 814 missions, 1700 sorties and 10,410 hours and carried 1658 passengers.

(b) Problems experienced with our helicopters started on 6 March when during starting and run-up of one CH-47 the bubble started cracking and split. It was patched by "Z" Company 725th Maint Bn and is still in use.

(c) At 1730 hours 7 March the engine failed in an CH-47. The helicopter was autorotated to an unsecured area without further damage. The crew and passengers were extracted without incident. Overnight security of the helicopter was provided by the 11 ACR. The following morning the helicopter was extracted to Chu Chi although it took an unusual amount of time. Primary cause was the late arrival of the crew that prepared the aircraft for lifting.

Phase II

(1) Heliborne Operations: This phase was also characterized by few heliborne operations. The first helilift occurred on 19 March when a Combat Assault was made to LZ GOLD (XT304705). It was a two Bn lift with the 3/22 conducting the initial assault. The lift was made from the Suoi Da airstrip. Although the first flight of five aircraft experienced no difficulty, the second did. The VC had prepared this LZ with command detonated mines so that an air assault could be thwarted. Four of the choppers in the second flight were downed in the LZ, three were completely destroyed, the fourth was evacuated by CH-47. The lift continued until the 3/22 was in LZ GOLD. During this lift a total of 6 ships had been either damaged or destroyed. After the 3/22 lift had been completed a thorough search was made of the LZ and other mines were found with buried wires leading to concealed bunkers. The few VC at this LZ proved to be a scatterer force. After refueling and regrouping the 143rd Aviation Bn was able to provide 13 ships for the helilift of the 7/12. The lift of the 2/12 went smoothly until the last flight approached LZ GOLD. On final approach the VC fired at the flight. Another seven ships were damaged. One of the seven had to

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roughly the 2/22 Inf (M) by CH-47. All Class I resupply, ammunition, etc was being handled by CH-47. This eliminated several problems and has been the practice of this Brig. B since. As the units gradually turned their way toward Ban Tieng the turn around time was greatly reduced and resupply by a single source was accomplished without any major problems. During this phase an aviation tender was stationed at the Ban Tieng airstrip. This enabled a short turn around for refueling of the OH-10 aircraft. Airdrop with 4 refueling points and a 10,000 gallon bladder for JP-4 was also established at the Ban Tieng airfield. These devices saved many valuable minutes of flying time.

(A) Others:

(a) In support of this phase of the Operation the OH-10 aircraft flew 54 missions, 1072 sorties, 11650 hours and carried 1,229 passengers. On 3 April the OH-10s alone carried 208 passengers and a flying 23:00 hours. This phase was not free of incident with the OH-10s. At 1750 hours 23 March after an OH-10 had landed at Ban Tieng for a passenger pickup, a CH-47, Sycamore 28011, flew over and slightly in front of the OH-10. The rotor wash from the CH-47 caused the main rotor to flex down into the tail boom. The resulting damage was to the main rotor blade, the tail boom, and the drive train components of the tail rotor system. At the time of arrival of the CH-47 the aviator had shut down the engine, was not in the aircraft and could only hope no damage would occur. The main rotor blade on the OH-10 was turning fast enough that it could not be stopped. CH-47s were not working out of the pad at the time of the accident. OH-10 44011 was lifted by CH-47 from Ban Tieng to Camp at 1350L, 24 March 1977. It was further evacuated to the 605th Maintenance Bn (MS) at Phu Loi.

(b) On one occasion the 1/22 used CH to capture a POW. One of our aviators evacuated the POW from the area to the Ban Tieng Base Camp. Not knowing the method of capture a gas mask was not used on this flight. Before the landing was made at the base camp the aviator could hardly see from the effect of CH.

(c) On 7 April the 2/22 evacuated 30 tons of rice by CH-47. The rice was loaded internally and was a time consuming process. All rice of this quantity should be loaded in nets and sling loaded. The CH-47 is too valuable to spend extra time in a LZ when not really necessary.

Phase III

(1) Helicopter Operations: During the third phase of the Operation the Brigade used helilift to insert and extract the Infantry troops. The first lift was the 30th Ranger Bn, helilifted from Tay Ninh airfield to the airfield at the Prek Klok Special Forces Camp on 11 April 1977. This was the first in-country helilift by the 187th Combat Assault Helicopter Company. There were no problems encountered during this lift. On 12 April after flying by C-74 from Ban Tieng to Ban Tieng, the 2/22 was helilifted to LZ MUL (KIR61685). The LZ was secured by the 2/22. This lift was also made by the 187th, their second in-country lift as a unit. The lift was slow and took an unusual amount of time. Other units would have completed this lift without refueling however, the 187th did not. Time was not such an important factor during this lift or the delay could have been tactically significant. One of the two aircraft took seven rounds of small arms fire but there was no significant damage. On 12 April C/2/77 was helilifted by CH-47 from the Ban Tieng airstrip to the Prek Klok Special Forces Camp. The lift was accomplished by the 213th Combat Assault Support Helicopter Company. There were no problems experienced. The 2/22 moved from PH 824 to Ban Tieng by CH-47s from the 200th Combat Assault Support Helicopter Company. There were no problems experienced. C/2/77 was helilifted from Prek Klok to the Ban Tieng airfield. The back haul was used to move another battery of Artillery from Ban Tieng to Prek Klok camp. The lift was longer than required for a single battery move but the overall time for movement of the batteries was less.

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(2) Resupply: Aerial resupply was used extensively. The only significant problem encountered was the long turn around time. Supplies were lifted by UH1D and CH-47 aircraft in routine manner. The aviation section tender was stationed at Suoi Da and served many hours of flying time.

(3) Other: The OH23G aircraft flew 361 missions, 754 sorties, 212.25 hours and carried 778 passengers. The only incident experienced by this section during this phase occurred at 1030 on 19 April. After dropping a Special Forces NEO off on top of Nui Ba Din the sergeant in off loading his equipment threw his sleeping bag into the main rotor system. This required that the main rotor blades be changed.

(4) Summary: During the period of Operation JUNCTION CITY the Brigade conducted five Infantry Bn sized lifts by CH-47 and six by UH1D aircraft. There were four Artillery lifts by CH-47. Units conducting the UH1D lifts were the 60th, 110th, 162d and the 107th Combat Assault Helicopter Companies. In addition to the units listed above the 1st and 116th Combat Assault Helicopter Companies also supported the Brigade during the operations as resupply ships.

The Brigade's organic aircraft flew a total of 1739 missions, 3,526 sorties, 1,033.55 hours and carried a total of 3,663 passengers. The 1,033.55 hours flying time represents many hours of maintenance, most of which was accomplished during the hours of darkness. Excepting a few daily inspections at the field locations all maintenance was performed at Camp Rainier. The better lighting and working conditions can account for the high rate of flyable aircraft the section maintained throughout the operation. The total flying time represents 41 intermediate (23 hours) inspections. All except three of these were pulled during hours of darkness. In some instances the crew chiefs worked through the night so that we could have one more aircraft flying for the following days operation.

8. INTELLIGENCE:

a. Intelligence concerning the Brigade's area of operation during Phases I, II, and III of Operation JUNCTION CITY was obtained from 25th Division 2nd, the 125th Brigade RI detachment, and from liaison visits to the Trail III and Trail IV Special Forces Camps.

b. Available information concerning the area of operations for Phase I indicated a large number of base camps, hospitals, training sites and supply facilities were located within the AO. VC Forces believed to be operating in the AO included the 70th Security Guard Regiment via 122772 to 122776, elements of the 271st Regiment located west of the La Mot River (122780), and the 200 Artillery regiment which was unlocated. It was anticipated VC units would attempt to avoid large scale engagements unless success seemed certain.

(1) From the beginning of the operation February 27 until the end on 14 March there was only one significant contact. On the 25th of February 8/2/12, via 1204836, was engaged briefly by an estimated VC platoon. The VC used the ruse of tying a piece of coarse wire, similar to the type used with curved detached mines, across the anticipated route of the American unit. When the pointman reached the wire he followed it to the end where he was ambushed and killed by small arms. It was at this point the VC unit engaged in a brief fire fight, breaking contact before effective artillery fire was brought to bear. On the next afternoon, via 1204836, 8/4/12 was guided to a base camp by an aerial observer and was engaged by an estimated VC Battalion and completely surrounded. Using close artillery fire the company was able to hold off the enemy assault until they were reinforced by another company some 600 meters away. Results of the engagement were 11 VC KIA (HC), 30 VC KIA (RUC). Identification of the VC unit as the 3d Bn, 271st Regiment was possible through documents taken from dead VC. Only on this occasion did the VC attempt to engage decisively as American unit. All other contacts were limited to groups of three to six VC.

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(2) There were three significant mortar attacks during the operations of these only one had any effect. On 27 Feb at 0240H via 2/22 (N) larger site, K1078841, received 60-70 rps 82mm mortar fire causing 10 US KIA. The mortar attacks of 5 March, via K125777, and 9 March, via K1959768, both completely missed their targets. On both occasions what was believed to be mortar firing was heard shortly after the units stopped for the day. It is assumed the VC were reorienting in a different direction prior to the attacks later that night. Judging from the number of rounds, 30 and 150 respectively, which impacted out side the friendly positions it is apparent that no attempt was made to adjust the mortar fire once it began.

(3) Of the sixteen base camps discovered two were considered regimental size, ten battalion size and the remaining four were company size or smaller. All base camps located were at least 200 meters or closer to a stream or other source of water. Each camp was encircled by a bunker system with interconnecting trench system. Defensive positions showed evidence of careful planning of fields of fire, were well camouflaged and expertly organized. Heavy claymore positions were worked on the enemy side of a tree usually with a single strip of white cloth or an X cut into the tree.

4. During phase I of Junction City, elements of COSVN were reportedly trapped west of Route 4. Indications were that several reinforced units moved into the Iron Horse Zone C in an effort to relieve the pressure on COSVN elements. Enemy units expected to be encountered in the Phase II operational area included the 101st Regiment of the UCT artillery Regiment and possibly the 7th 1st Battalion. Due to heavy losses suffered by VC forces on 28 Feb 67, via K1289729 and on 10-11 March 67 via K1276755 it was believed that VC units would engage in decisive combat unless surprised or forced to fight to protect installations they deemed important.

(1) Proof that there were VC in the operational area was received on the first day of the operations. Three APC's were damaged by AT mines, two APC's were damaged by RPG rounds, and eight heavy troops were located and destroyed.

(2) On the 19th of March an airmobile assault into K2 0012 via K1959717 was met by command detonated mines causing the destruction of three helicopters, damaging three, killing 10 US soldiers and wounding 14.

(3) The attacking force on 21 March at the Battle of Ban Do was identified as the 2nd VC Regiment reinforced by elements of the U-80 Artillery Bn and other service elements. Identification was made from captured documents and interrogation of POWs. Of the weapons captured 30 were RPG-2's. The presence of such a large ratio of AT weapons indicates the VC are not for mechanized forces. Through Phase II the VC utilized the RPG-2 as an effective sniping weapon against APC's. The majority of weapons captured were in extremely good condition and a number of AK-47's with folding bayonets were captured. It can be reasonably assumed these weapons were recently brought in country.

(4) The other engagements covered but were limited to brief fire fights with 1st and 2nd VC units. On 25 March, Co C, 1st Bn 8th Bn on a daily road clearing operation was engaged by an estimated VC platoon resulting in 2 US KIA, 8 US KIA and 1 damaged tank. VC casualties were unknown. Co A, 2/22 briefly engaged an estimated platoon size unit via K1959754 on 24 April. The VC unit was very well armed and damaged 3 APC's with RPG rounds. Heavy casualties were unknown.

(5) There were a few minor encounters with small groups of 2 to 4 VC until the 31 of April when C/2/22 was contacted what was believed to be a reinforced element K141587. The fight occurred at 1400 in the afternoon and continued until dark when the VC broke contact. Entering the area of the previous days contact a regimental size base camp was located. The base camp had been recently occupied and departed VC abandoned 18 tons of food stuffs, some mine equipment and clothing. No further contact occurred during Phase II.

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(2) There was no ground contact with any force larger than a man. Booby traps and mining incidents dropped significantly.

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	Phase I	Phase II	Phase III
(1) Sniper Fire	7	27	4
(2) Mortar Fire	8	2	2
(3) Mining	7	19	2
(4) Booby Traps	0	6	0
(5) Emplacements	12	15	4
(6) Fire Against Aircraft	6	2	2
(7) Base Camps Located	16	22	1

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to Many Conversion Classes

wire was found throughout indicating extensive use of land line communi-
cations.

(2) An enemy radio captured during the Battle of Saï Tru was similar in configuration to our RC-35. The radio was of Chinese manufacture and identical to one captured during operation CHALKY. It is assumed that VC forces are attempting to equip their units with a standard radio making them independent of captured communications equipment.

to New Orleans

(1) In both Phase I and Phase II VC units took offensive actions where the opportunity presented itself for what appeared as easy victory. Such attacks initiated by the VC showed evidence of careful planning and displayed professionalism in execution.

(2) In each attack VC forces developed tremendous volumes of small arms fire. Utilizing this cover individuals did not attack in the early human wave attacks but advanced by leaps and bounds similar to our little drill.

(3) Fortifications encountered were capable of sustaining very heavy artillery and air attacks. There were no new designs or types of constructions noted that had not been previously encountered.

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1. Terrain: Area of operations for each phase was basically identical.

(1) Topography: Area is fundamentally low and flat. The predominant terrain feature is Muai Ba Dam which is 907 meters above sea level. The period of operations was characterized by low water causing minor streams to be very shallow or even intermittent. Principle streams have steep banks and bottoms of mud and silt.

(2) Vegetation: The area consists of primarily broad leaf evergreen forest. The secondary forest consists of broad leaf evergreen trees 75-90 feet in height. The canopy is usually discontinuous and the undergrowth is extremely dense. The undergrowth consists of low trees, shrubs, bushes and vines.

(3) Tactical Aspects of the Terrain

(a) Observation depends entirely upon the vegetation. In the forest regions observation is generally poor. In areas that have been defoliated both aerial and ground observation are aided significantly. Grassland areas generally furnished good observation.

(b) Fields of fire are extremely limited in dense forests and require clearing in all cases. Areas of grasslands and dry crops offer the best fields of fire.

(c) In areas of dense jungle track movement is slowed to 1000 meters an hour or less in places. These areas are extremely hard on tracked vehicles. In most places wheeled vehicles are limited to existing roads. Movement off of roads will be drastically curtailed during and after any rain fall.

2. MISSION:

a. Phase I: 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division was:

(1) To establish blocking positions in order on D-Day to seal escape routes to the west, vicinity Cambodian border.

(2) To conduct S&D operations following D-Day to destroy CGSV facilities and VC/VN forces, supplies, and installations.

(3) To provide security for FNB bases and Route 22 from sector to Trui M.

b. Phase II: 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division was to attack on D-Day into War Zone C to destroy CGSV and VC/VN forces and installations.

c. Phase III: 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division was to assume responsibility of 196th Light Infantry Bn, 25th Infantry Division Flanking Brigade Mission and continue responsibility for 3d Bn, 4th Inf Div Bn.

3. Concept of Operation Phase I:

a. Movement: On D-3 the 2d Bn, 14th Inf was to fly by C-123 from On Chi to Ban Tieng Base Camp and secure it. The 2d Bn, 15th Inf was to remain at FNB Bn (Operation Overlay Annex A) where they had been since the termination of Operation GAMBEL. The 2d Bn, 23d Inf, also still in the area of operation, was to secure FNB I and conduct local S&D operations. The 3rd Bn was to move overland from Trui M to FNB Bn. The 1st Bn, 21st Inf was to airlift from Ban Tieng to Trui M by C-123 and then billeting into the operational area. All units were to establish mobile blocking positions with contact patrols constantly keeping the units adjacent to each other in contact. All units were to conduct extensive S&D in the area of their own sectors. The Infantry units daily cleared and secured Route 22 w/ the mechanized battalion and cavalry troops escorted one or more convoys daily.

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Fire Support: Tactical Air was on call throughout the operation. Direct fire support was provided by organic and attached artillery at the Fire Support Base (See Annex A).

c. References:

- (1) OFORD 3-67, HQ, 3d Bde, 4th Inf Div dated 19 Feb 67
- (2) Frag 0 1 to OFORD 3-67 dtd 24 Feb 67
- (3) Frag 0 2 to OFORD 3-67 dtd 01 Mar 67
- (4) Frag 0 3 to OFORD 3-67 dtd 02 Mar 67
- (5) Frag 0 4 to OFORD 3-67 dtd 04 Mar 67
- (6) Frag 0 5 to OFORD 3-67 dtd 05 Mar 67
- (7) Frag 0 6 to OFORD 3-67 dtd 06 Mar 67
- (8) Frag 0 7 to OFORD 3-67 dtd 11 Mar 67
- (9) Frag 0 8 to OFORD 3-67 dtd 14 Mar 67

Phase II

a. Maneuvers: One reinforced mechanized company from 2/22 Inf (M) with attached engineer platoon and one battery from 2/77 Artillery initially moved overland from Du Tieng to Sout Da. The second day the infantry companies and engineer platoon explored a bridge at XT190627. The artillery battery was to establish a FSB at the bridge site. The 1/22 Inf minus Co C, 2/12 Inf and the 2/77 Arty (-) then were to airlift to LZ GOLD (X1366705) and establish FSB GOLD at that location. The 2/22 Inf was to move west to search and destroy. The 1/22 (-) was to secure the FSB and search and destroy in that sector. The 2/22 Inf (M) and the 2/14 Armor (-) were to cross the Sout Samat river and conduct 3rd operations. (See Annex B, Operations Overlay).

b. Fire Support: Tactical Air was on call. Direct support artillery was provided by the 2/77 Artillery and attached units.

c. References:

- (1) OFORD 4-67, HQ, 3d Bde, 4th Inf Div dtd 17 Mar 67.
- (2) Frag 0 1 to OFORD 4-67 dtd 18 Mar 67
- (3) Frag 0 2 to OFORD 4-67 dtd 19 Mar 67
- (4) Frag 0 3 to OFORD 4-67 dtd 20 Mar 67
- (5) Frag 0 4 to OFORD 4-67 dtd 21 Mar 67
- (6) Frag 0 5 to OFORD 4-67 dtd 24 Mar 67
- (7) Frag 0 6 to OFORD 4-67 dtd 25 Mar 67
- (8) Frag 0 7 to OFORD 4-67 dtd 28 Mar 67
- (9) Frag 0 8 to OFORD 4-67 dtd 29 Mar 67
- (10) Frag 0 9 to OFORD 4-67 dtd 01 Apr 67
- (11) Frag 0 10 to OFORD 4-67 dtd 02 Apr 67
- (12) Frag 0 11 to OFORD 4-67 dtd 03 Apr 67
- (13) Frag 0 12 to OFORD 4-67 dtd 05 Apr 67

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- (14) Prag 0 13 to OICRD 4-67 dtd 05 Apr 67
 (15) Prag 0 14 to OICRD 4-67 dtd 06 Apr 67
 (16) Prag 0 15 to OICRD 4-67 dtd 07 Apr 67

Phase III

a. Maneuvers: 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division assumed responsibility of 1st Light Infantry Brigade Base Camp and TACB with 1/22 Inf, 1/5 Inf (H) and TF 30th ARVN Ranger Bn. 2/3d Armor (-) secured Joint Bn. 2/22 Inf moved by air and 2/22 Inf (H) moved overland to War Zone C to conduct S&D operations in War Zone C. (See Operations Overlay, Annex C).

b. Fire Support: Tactical air was on call. Direct support artillery was provided by the 2d Bn, 77th Artillery.

c. References:

- (1) OICRD 5-67, Hq 3d Bde, 4th Inf Div dtd 9 Apr 67
 (2) Prag 0 1 to OICRD 5-67 dtd 10 Apr 67
 (3) Prag 0 2 to OICRD 5-67 dtd 12 Apr 67
 (4) Prag 0 3 to OICRD 5-67 dtd 15 Apr 67
 (5) Prag 0 4 to OICRD 5-67 dtd 18 Apr 67

11. EXECUTION:

a. Chronological Summary (Units less than Bn also included only on days of significant contact or activity).

(1) 27 Feb 67 (Sat)

(a) 2/22 Inf: A Company reported a sniper fired several rounds of automatic weapons fire at a unit on Hwy 22. A Coy may returned fire with an M79 and sent a patrol in pursuit with negative results. At 1105 hrs Company A observed 1 VC at coord KX067807. Artillery fire was called in with negative results.

(b) 2/22 Inf (H): At 0700H Co A was placed under OPIC of 3d Bde, 4th Inf Div. At 0730 hrs a patrol from Co B established contact with an unknown number of VC, who coord KX077814, resulting in the wounding and capture of 1 VC who later died. The VC was armed with a US M-16 rifle, automatic, and 160 rds of 7.62 ammunition. At 0930 hrs 1/22 Inf arrived at the Br-1489 position (vic coord KX078812) and departed to the South to establish contact with 3 VC at coord KX081419, resulting in 1 VC KIA (Post).

(c) 1/22 Inf: 1/22 Inf airlifted by C-119 from Ban Hiep to Trail M for further heli-lift into 12 1/2 mi. vicinity coord KX079810. From 12 1/2 mi. the battalion conducted S&D operations south along both sides of QL 22 to establish blocking position HEDRD vic coord KX081415. One US KIA resulted from fragments of a marking round which landed in an A Co ambush patrol vicinity coord KX081418 at 1735 hours.

(d) 2/77 Artillery: Remained at FSB ZKE (KX045800), location of the unit at close of operation GARDEN.

(e) 2/22 Inf: Secured Ban Hiep Base Camp, conducted local patrols with no contact.

(2) 28 Feb 67 (Sun)

(a) 2/22 Inf: Continued to conduct local patrolling and provided security for FSB ZKE.

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(c) 2/22 Inf (M): Companies B and C conducted S&D operations in their designated sectors of the Bn AO. At 1130 hrs an element of C/1/10 Cav closed the Bn laager area (vic coord XZ07742) and was placed under CTRN of 2/22 Inf (M).

(c) 1/22 Inf: A Co's 1st platoon secured LZ ENK vic coord XZ060875, while 3d platoon cleared QL 22 to the northern limit of T&OR. B Co departed at 1233 hours on a company S&D operation northwest of R&SFRD and established a defensive perimeter vic coord XZ093823. 3d platoon, Co C cleared QL 22 to southern limit of T&OR. The 2d platoon, while on a reconnaissance patrol, engaged an unknown number of VC vic coord XZ04452. Results: One US KIA and one US MIA. Company C elements cleared R&SFRD at 1600 hrs. Co B received small arms fire from an estimated 10 VC vic coord XZ093823 at 2205 hrs. Fire was returned and artillery called in. Results: 4 VC KIA (BC), 1 Chicom 9mm sub machine gun, 1 Chicom 40-7, 1 US M-1, 2 Chicom grenades, 2 ammo pouches, web gear, and loose ammunition recovered.

(d) 2/77 Artys: Remained in IB at F33 LEE.

(e) 2/12 Inf: Continued to secure Chu Thang Nam Camp with local patrols.

(3) 22 Feb 67 (D-Day):

(a) 2/12 Inf: Continued to secure F33 LEE, conducted local patrols and ambushes.

(b) 2/22 Inf (M): Co's B and C 2/22 Inf (M) and C/1/10 Cav conducted search and destroy operations in pre-designated sectors of the Bn AO. At 1415 hrs Co B closed their laager area vic XZ060811. At 1740 hrs an element of C/1/10 Cav hit a mine at coord XZ057448, resulting in 1 US MIA with extensive damage to the M161 tank. At 1904 hrs Co C closed their laager area vic coord XZ07457. At 1930 hrs C/1/10 Cav closed Bn laager area XZ074841.

(c) 1/22 Inf: A Co 1st platoon secured LZ ENK vic coord XZ060825 at 0700 hrs for the extraction of 1/32 Artillery. 3d platoon cleared QL 22 south to defensive strong point Thang Square vic coord XZ083517, while the mortar platoon cleared QL 22 to the northern limit of T&OR. All Co A elements returned by 1600 hrs with negative contacts. Co B assumed security mission for Bn R&SFRD. Co C departed R&SFRD at 0705 hrs on a company size search and destroy mission southeast to the Sui My river. One US MIA resulted from a self inflicted gunshot wound. During evacuation of MIA, Dustoff helicopter received automatic weapons fire vic coord XZ099805. Supporting gunships delivered suppressive fires with unknown results. Co C established a night defensive perimeter vic coord XZ03609 at 1740 hrs.

(d) 2/77 Artys: Began Operation JUNCTION CITY with 4/2/77 IB to 2/22 Inf (M), 4/2/77 IB to 2/12 Inf and C/1/77 IB to 1/22 Inf.

(e) 2/14 Inf: Secured Chu Thang Nam Camp, conducted local patrols and ambushes.

(f) 2/27 Engrs: IB of the Brigade, repaired by 22.

(g) C/504 Engrs: Continued development of the Bn Camp at Chu Thang.

(4) 23 Feb 67 (D+1):

(a) 2/12 Inf: Continued to secure assigned sector and conduct local patrols and ambushes. Conducted S&D operations west of Day 21.

(b) 2/22 Inf (M): Co's B & C, 2/22 Inf (M), and C/1/10 Cav conducted S&D operations in designated sectors of Bn AO. At 1535 hrs C/1/10 Cav received 1 US KIA and is remaining by fire at coord XZ041841.

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At 1400 hrs G/1/10 Cav discovered a base camp at coord XID3002, and captured 10 bicycles and a small quantity of documents. They laagered at this location. At 1700 hrs, Co B laagered at coord XID30439. At 1730 hrs Co C laagered at coord XID30440.

(c) 1/22 Inf: Co A departed Operational Base HENHO for a one day S&D operation east of CL 22. A tunnel two feet long was destroyed via coord XID30441. Co A closed Base HENHO at 1450 hrs and resumed perimeter defense. A Co's M platoon and Mortar platoon marched and cleared CL 22 to the northern and southern limit of Bn HQ. Co C continued S&D operations along the western bank of the Sami May River. At 1730 hrs Co C discovered 7 VC on the eastern bank of the river via coord XID30442. Results: 3 VC KIA (77), 1 VC KIA (78), and 7 pairs of black pajamas captured. Three airtimes were called in on suspected VC base camp via coord XID30441 at 1830 hrs with unknown results.

(d) 2/77 Arty: Remained in EL.

(e) 2/14 Inf: Secured Ban Thang Base Camp, conducted local patrols and ambushes.

(5) 24 Feb 67 (D-2):

(a) 2/12 Inf: Continued to secure assigned sector and conduct local patrols and ambushes. Conducted S&D operations west of My 22.

(b) 2/22 Inf (M): Co's B & C, 2/22 Inf (M) and G/1/10 Cav conducted search and destroy operations in designated sectors of the Bn AO. At 0700 hrs G/1/10 Cav continued search of the base complex at coord XID30441, resulting in the capture of 50 pounds of equipment and destruction of 10 huts and 5 bunkers. At approximately 1130 hrs Co B discovered a VC base camp complex at coord XID30440. A small quantity of documents, small arms ammunition, and 14 hand grenades were found. One flame boot trap was destroyed. At 1700 hrs Co's B & C laagered at coord XID30445. At 1800 hrs G/1/10 Cav laagered at coord XID30446.

(c) 1/22 Inf: Co A conducted search and destroy operations northwest of HENHO. A heavily mined base camp containing twenty bunkers and sleeping platforms was found and destroyed via coord XID30446. 1 VC KIA (78) was found. Co B secured Base HENHO and cleared CL 22 to the northern and southern limits of Bn HQ. Co C continued S&D operations and swept previous day's airtime zone. 4 VC were engaged via coord XID30440 with unknown results. Search of area resulted in the discovery and destruction of a VC base camp containing 3 AT mines, 1 two pound block of explosives, three bunkers, 12 foxholes, and 3 weapons. The wreckage of a B-57 bomber, TMF O-21557, and the remains of the crew were located via coord XID30447. Co C established a defensive perimeter via coord XID30447.

(d) 2/77 Arty: Continued in M Bn.

(e) 2/14 Inf: Secured Ban Thang base camp, conducted local patrols and ambushes.

(6) 25 Feb 67 (D-3):

(a) 2/12 Inf: Co B, departed FWD BNP on a S&D mission NW of EL. At approximately 1225 hrs, Co B made contact with an estimated VC platoon with automatic weapons at coord XID30446 resulting in 2 friendly KIA and 5 UN KIA. Co B reported receiving sniper fire at 1700 hrs at coord XID30440. VC casualties unknown.

(b) 2/22 Inf (M): At 0700 hrs Co's B&C resumed S&D operations in designated sectors of Bn AO. At 1130 hrs Co B discovered a base camp at coord XID30446 and engaged it with artillery and mortar.

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There were no US casualties and VC casualties are unknown. At 1400 hrs coord XT127455, Co C destroyed 1,400 lbs of polished rice and 400 bags of salt. They captured 190 rds of M-1 ammunition. At 1515 hrs, 2/22 recon platoon escorted a long range reconnaissance patrol of 1st Cav to coord XT052464. At 1700 hrs Co B & C laagered at coord XT115833.

(c) 3/22 Inf: Co A continued search and destroy operations and destroyed a VC base camp containing 15 bunkers, 1 tunnel, 170 meters in length, and several bottles of 337 beer vic coord XT123435. An LZ was prepared to evacuate 1 US MIA (broken arm) and the crew of the B-57. A night defensive perimeter was established vic coord XT123435. Co B secured Operational Base RENGRO. At 2045 hrs a B Co ambush patrol fired four claymore mines at an estimated 1 VC vic coord XT14875 with unknown results. Co C continued S&D operations and engaged a squad of VC vic coord XT118433. Results: 1 VC KIA (BC), 1 VC MIA (Prob), several weapons, ammunition, money, letters and documents recovered. A cache consisting of 24 180 pound bags of salt and 6 five gallon cans of dried fish was found and destroyed vic coord XT126832. C Co closed RENGRO and assumed responsibility for operational base security.

(d) 2/77 Arty: Continued DB 3d Pds.

(e) 2/14 Inf: Secured Don Tieng Base Camp, continued local patrols and ambushes.

(f) 26 Feb 67 (D-4):

(a) 2/12 Inf: B Co made contact with 8 VC at 1115 hrs with negative friendly and unknown VC casualties. At approximately 1135 hrs Co B found a 3 gallon can of documents at XT043827. Co B reported finding a base camp at XT045829 at 1400 hrs containing several bunkers, with huts and a trench system. All of the huts were destroyed. B Co made contact at 1335 hrs at XT046830 with an estimated 20-40 VC with automatic weapons. Co B had contact from the front, left and right flanks and the rear. B/3/22 started to B/2/12 location at 1330 hrs. The linkup of the two elements was effected at 201754 Feb 67. Results of the encounter were 6 US KIA and 24 MIA. Enemy losses were 11 VC KIA (BC), 5 thatched huts destroyed, 330 rds of linked Chicam 7.62 ammo, 900 lbs of unpolished rice, a bicycle repair shop, 2 Chicam automatic weapons and 1 M-79 were captured.

(b) 2/22 Inf (M): Co B, C and C/1/10 Cav conducted S&D operations in designated sectors of Bn AO. At 1140 hrs, Co B moved into an area, vic coord XT117862, marked "Restricted Area Mines". They discovered and destroyed one Chicam grenade booby trap. At 1515 hrs Co B 2/22 Inf engaged 4 VC at coord XT122861, resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC), 1 US MIA and the capture of 1 AK-30 weapon SN130763 w/3 magazines, 22 rds 7.62 AK-67 ammunition, 79 rds of 7.62 ammunition, Chicam serrated grenade booby trap, 2 Chicam hand grenades and 1 set of web gear. At 1730 hrs Co B laagered at coord XT115835. C/1/10 Cav laagered at coord XT073862. At 1600 hrs Co C laagered vic coord XT073893.

(c) 3/22 Inf: Co A continued S&D operations near RENGRO. A large VC base camp (200 meters by 300 meters) was located vic coord XT110838. Numerous huts, food, ammunition, grenades, propaganda material and weapons were evacuated or destroyed. Co B departed Base RENGRO to conduct S&D operations west of QL 22. At 1600 hrs Co B was attached to the 2/12 Inf and ordered to link up with an unknown size VC force vic coord XT046830. Link up was made at 1734 hrs and Co B secured an LZ vic coord XT043831 for the evacuation of US wounded. C Co continued security of Operational Base RENGRO.

(d) 2/77 Arty: Continued DB 3d Pds.

(e) 2/14 Inf: Secured Don Tieng Base Camp, conducted local patrols.

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(8) 27 Feb 57 (D-6):

(a) 2/22 Inf (N): Co A and Co B continued to secure FIB LBN and conducted local patrols. Co A, C, recon and log element secured FIB LBN conducted local patrols.

(b) 2/22 Inf (N): At 0700 hrs the 2nd Lt area received approximately seventy enemy fire resulting in 1 US KIA, and 11 US WIA. At 0700 hrs Co B & C and C/1/10 Cav conducted S&D operations in designated sectors of the 2nd Lt. At 0705 hrs Co B destroyed 2 US KIA & 1 mine, which were stacked one on the other and placed for pressure or command detonation. The bunker from which the mine could be detonated via cord K704744, was also destroyed. At 1015 hrs, via cord K719664, Co B found a partially destroyed base camp. At 1700 hrs, Co B located via cord K715355. Co C located via cord K704044. C/1/10 Cav located via cord K705587.

(c) 2/22 Inf: Co A continued search of VC base camp located via cord K710636. A night defensive perimeter was established via cord K711313. Co B remained attached to 2/22 Inf and swept battle area via cord K704040. Numerous huts, bunkers, tunnels, ammunition, RCL, mines, tools and other equipment were found and destroyed. Co B secured via cord K704040 and established a night defensive perimeter. Co C continued security mission for base RBN70. A reconnaissance patrol from Co C reported sightings of five mortar base plates via cord K707185. Patrol closed RBN70 at 1330 hrs.

(d) 2/27 Art: Continued 20 M Rds.

(e) 2/24 Inf: Secured Ban Heng Ban Camp, conducted local patrols.

(9) 28 Feb 57 (D-6):

(a) 2/22 Inf: Continued to secure FIB LBN and conducted local patrols. At 0051 hrs the 2nd Lt reported four incoming mortar fire resulting in negative friendly casualties.

(b) 2/22 Inf (N): Co B & C and C/1/10 Cav conducted S&D operations in designated sectors of 2nd Lt. At 0658 hrs, the Recon platoon while retrieving a vehicle discovered a battalion size base camp via cord K707344. At 1008 hrs, via cord K704040, C/1/10 Cav destroyed 3 bunkers. At 1125 hrs via cord K704040, C/1/10 Cav destroyed 2 huts and 50 meters of trench in a small base camp.

(c) 2/22 Inf: Co A continued search of base camp located via cord K711988 and evacuated or destroyed mine, bicycle, mortars, weapons, tools, RCL, ammunition and rice. Co A continued S&D operations and closed operational base RBN70 at 1705 hrs. Co B continued S&D operations and at 1120 hrs was detached from 2/22 Inf. Co B closed base RBN70 at 1715 hrs and assumed base security mission. Co C continued security mission for base RBN70. At 1730 hrs Co C began S&D operations east of CL 22.

(d) 2/27 Art: Continued 20 M Rds.

(e) 2/24 Inf: Secured Ban Heng Ban Camp, conducted local patrols and missions.

(10) 1 Mar 57 (D-7):

(a) 2/22 Inf: Co A reported finding 2 huts, 1 ton of polished rice, several new fuel tanks, 1 grenade, 3 bolt action rifles and 1 Chicom machinegun at K7076784 on a Recon mission.

(b) 2/22 Inf (N): Co B & C and C/1/10 Cav conducted S&D operations in designated sectors of 2nd Lt. At 1015 hrs, via cord K711987 C/1/10 Cav hit 2 AT mines, resulting in 5 US KIA, and destroyed 1 bunker to an LBN (D-13). At 1130 hrs via cord K704040, Co C destroyed one 200 lb bomb (dud). At 1230 hrs Co B discovered a base camp and storage area, 20-

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(c) 1/22 Inf: Co A overhauled a VC base camp via cord KX09818 and overhauled or destroyed large quantities of ammunition, food bicycles, rice, tea, huts, electrical wire, and clothing. Co A continued S&D operation and established a night defensive position via cord KX21184. Co B located and destroyed rice, documents, clothing, uniforms, weapons and explosives via cord KX09145 and established a night defensive perimeter. Co C returned to base KX310 and assumed responsibility for perimeter defense. One Chieu Mai rallied at 1500 hrs.

(d) 2/77 Artys: Continued in 3d Bn.

(e) 2/14 Inf: Secured the Trang Bao Camp, conducted local patrols and ambushes.

(13) 4 Mar 67 (D-10):

(a) 2/22 Inf: Continued to secure FSB IRE and conduct local patrols.

(b) 2/22 L&F (N): Co B and C/2/20 Cav conducted S&D operations in designated areas of the 1st AO. Co C remained in the 1st larger area, via cord KX07304 for maintenance. At 1600 hrs Co B engaged via cord KX07784. At 1800 hrs, C/2/20 Cav returned to OVN 3d Bn, 4th Inf Div, and Co A returned to control 2/22 Inf (N) from 3d Bn, 4th Inf Div. Co A engaged via cord KX00760.

(c) 1/22 Inf: Co A and B continued S&D operations west of Q 22. Co were extracted from FZ via cord KX15884 and returned to base KX0780 at 1500 hrs. Co C continued security of the base KX0780.

(d) 2/77 Artys: 1/2/77 plus a small advanced party from C/2/77 and B/2/77 moved by convey to AO HACHINH (KX05775).

(e) 2/14 Inf: Secured the Trang Bao Camp, conducted local patrols and ambushes.

(14) 5 Mar 67 (D-11):

(a) 2/22 Inf: Co A made contact on a perimeter operation at KX16007 with an estimated 3 VC. Results were 2 VC KIA (Jaws) and 2 US KIA.

(b) 2/22 Inf (N): Co B & C secured route 22 North of the 1st larger for elements of the 11th ACR, 19th 2d Inf Bn, and the 19th Inf Div. Co A and elements of Recon secured 12 at cord KX015730 for a Vietnamese Marine Bn. At 0800 hrs, via cord KX09760, Co B found and destroyed approximately 3000 lbs of unpolished rice and 2000 lbs of salt. At 1115 hrs, via cord KX071873, Co A received 2 US KIA resulting from a VC rifle grenade. At 1400 hrs companies B & C cleared the 1st larger area, via cord KX07760, for maintenance. At 1800 hrs, via cord KX073775, Co A and Recon discovered and destroyed 6 huts, and engaged in that via.

(c) 1/22 Inf: Remained at the base F-770 and prepared for movement to the cord KX07072.

(d) 2/77 Artys: C/2/77 and B/2/77 moved by convey to AO HACHINH to join 1/2/77. B/2/77 remained at FSB IRE and became CB. A/2/77 and C/2/77 remained in 2/22 Inf and 1/22 Inf respectively. A/2/22, B/2/22 and C/2/22 Artys reinforced 2/77 Artillery.

(e) 2/14 Inf: Secured the Trang Bao Camp, conducted local patrols and ambushes.

(15) 6 Mar 67 (D-12):

(a) 2/22 Inf: Continued security of FSB IRE, conducted local patrols.

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(b) 2/22 Inf (N): Co A with attached Sqr elements moved to Hwy 20 and began road clearing operations west from coord XT013773, towards LOGO. At 0730 hrs, via coord XT013441, Co C located various butts and a can of 40 CBU units. Between 0730 hrs and 1130 hrs, Co B and C (-) secured for convoys from 2/33rd Arty to AO BLANKHRS coord XT013792. At 1145 hrs, Co B & C and the CP Gp 2/22 Inf (N) displaced to via coord XT013773 closing at 1225 hrs. A patrol from Co C which was on an observation and rear security mission (coord XT079837) closed the Bn larger area at 1600 hrs.

(c) 3/22 Inf: Airlifted from RHUHO to LE JULIAN via coord WT946730. Bn moved north toward Objective BENDER via coord WT946709. Co B located and destroyed at large VC base camp via coord WT946772. A Bn eight defensive perimeter was established via coord WT953774.

(d) 2/77 Arty: At 0217 hrs Bn (-) received 60 rds of 82mm and 60mm mortar fire via coord XT035790 resulting in no casualties and insignificant damage.

(e) 2/24 Inf: Secured Phu Thang Base Camp, conducted local patrols and ambushes.

(25) 7 Mar 67 (D-13):

(a) 2/22 Inf: On 7 Mar at 1200H, Co A, C, Hq element and Recon were airlifted to LE LOGO (XT966758) and moved to secure blocking position ELLIOTT at coord XT079799. Co B continued to secure F28 LEE at XT079709. Co A, C, Hq element and Recon platoon closed blocking position ELLIOTT at 1830H.

(b) 2/22 Inf (N): At 0715H 2/22 Inf (N) displaced from larger position and attacked west along Hwy 20 to secure LE LOGO, via coord XT969752. At 0735H, Co C detonated 1 pressure type mine, with no casualties or damage to equipment, via coord XT968765. At 0815H Co's B, C and CP Group 2/22 secured LE at LOGO. At 0935H, Co A provided security for attached elements of 4/4th Sqr to complete mission of clearing Hwy 20 to LOGO. At 1000H Co C displaced north to secure a foot bridge for 2/22 Inf via coord XT940771. Bridge was secured at 1122H. Air lift movement of 1/22 Inf and 2/22 Inf was completed at 1230H. Co A and CP Gp 2/22 Inf displaced to AO JACK via coord WT966761. Recon elements 2/22 Inf destroyed a bunker. Recon element remained at LOGO to assist Co A in a security mission moving north to the Bn CP location. At 1800H via coord WT94766, Co B destroyed a rice hut. At 1825H the last elements from 2/22 Inf cleared the foot bridge, and Co C moved to larger area via coord WT94766. Co A engaged via coord XT969752.

(c) 1/22 Inf: Co A shifted night defensive position via coord WT959776 and continued Bn S&D operations. A river crossing was made via coord WT962771. The US MIA resulted from short artillery rds. A Co joined Bn perimeter via coord WT954776. Co B continued to search the VC base camp located on 6 Mar via WT959776. Base camp was destroyed and B Co continued Bn S&D operations. One fresh VC grave was found via coord WT967760. Co B joined Bn defense perimeter via coord WT954776 at 1400H. Co C continued Bn S&D operations and destroyed 1 straw hut via coord WT967760 at 1230H. 1 55 gal drum of unknown oil, stumps, butts, chemical munitions and chemical were found and destroyed via coord WT967760. Co C joined Bn perimeter via coord WT954776 at 2000H.

(d) 2/77 Arty: Continued Bn S&D.

(e) 2/24 Inf: Secured Phu Thang Base Camp, conducted local patrols and ambushes.

(23) 8 Mar 67 (D-14):

(a) 2/22 Inf: 8 Mar 67 at 0730H Co A & C moved out from blocking position ELLIOTT on separate Co sized S&D operations. Co C re-ported a VC base camp at coord XT957760 at 1130H. Co C started receiving sniper fire from inside the base camp resulting in 2 US MIA. Artillery

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and air strikes were employed with unknown VC results. After the artillery and air strikes were lifted, Co C moved inside the base camp discovering 2 large bins of an estimated size of 300000 lbs filled with 240 tons of unpollished rice. The rice and bins were destroyed. Co C & A positions for 4 March were in vic coord K1757756. Recon and Fg elements stayed in blocking position K111017.

(b) 2/22 Inf (M): Remained in blocking positions AO JUMIAL and conducted S&D operations in the vic of their laager area. At 0930H, via coord W1940752, recon platoon destroyed 4 pigs. At 1000H, 1 BN from Co C accidentally shot himself in the hand while cleaning an M16 rifle, and was immediately evacuated. At 1030H, via coord K1757753, Co B discovered 480 gals of cooking oil. At 1230H elements of the Recon platoon moved to coord W1972751 to escort an Amer work party at AO NACH-HOAN via coord W1027760. The mission was completed at 1400H. At 1530H via coord W1955762 an individual from Co B received shrapnel in the knee from a grenade used to blow a bunker while on patrol. The man was evacuated. At 1800H all elements closed laager area.

(c) 1/22 Inf: Co A continued S&D operation NW of 1000. The VC base camp containing 20 pigs, 20 chickens, grenades, huts, 2 weapons and documents were found and destroyed via coord W1930702. A telephone was connected to a wire line discovered via coord W1944750 and Vietnamese voices were heard. Co A joined the 3d night perimeter via coord W1944756 at 1730H. Co B continued S&D operations NW of 1000. At 1130H Co C found and destroyed 1 weapon and 450 lbs of polished rice via coord W1946785. At 1330H Co B destroyed six 2 man bunkers via coord W1944784. 1 VC KIA (DC) wrapped in poncho was found via coord W1944756. Co C continued S&D operation NW of 1000. At 1700H Co C found and destroyed one 55 gal drum of polished rice via coord W1944756 at 1315H.

(d) 2/77 Arty: Continued IS 3d Bn.

(e) 2/14 Inf: Secured Ban Thang Base Camp, conducted local patrols and ambushes.

(10) 9 Mar 67 (D-15):

(a) 2/22 Inf: The recon platoon and Bg element received approximately 150 mortar rds at coord K1954778 at 0145H, all landed out side the perimeter. No friendly casualties were received. Co A found twenty 5 gal cans of lead type (English) and a lead plate type sitting at coord K1955764. Co C received sniper fire via of coord K1956769. Fire was returned resulting in 2 VC KIA (DC) and an additional 5 tons of rice was found.

(b) 2/22 Inf (M): At 0130H Co B & C reported incoming mortar rds to the North of their position. At 1045H 2/12 attached along Axis C-TRIDINE and Axis BULINT, to objective via coord W1973073. At 1215H via coord W1970777, Co B discovered a hut containing approximately 15 lbs of bicycle parts. At 1310H via coord W1937768, Co A destroyed a 55 gal drum of kerosene. At 1330H, via coord W1946771, Co C located an empty underground room 12'x12'x20'. At 1530H via coord W1942732, Co B discovered a deserted base camp. The base camp was 150-200 meters in diameter, with surrounding trench system and connecting trenches and tunnels. At 1800H the Bn closed objective area.

(c) 1/22 Inf: Co A continued S&D operation NW of 1000. At 1400H Co A joined battalion perimeter via coord W1940075. Co B continued S&D operation and destroyed five 55 gallon drums of kerosene via coord W1945762. Co B joined defensive perimeter via coord W1946075 at 1400H. Co C continued S&D operation. A base camp was found and destroyed via coord W1944785. Co C joined defensive perimeter via coord W1946075 at 1400H.

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(4) 2/77 Arty: Continued DS, 3d Bde.

(a) 2/14 Inf: Secured Don Tien Base Camp, conducted local patrols and ambushes. At 0900H Co A conducted S&D operations to coord WT312424.

(19) 10 Mar 1967 (D-16):

(a) 2/12 Inf: Continued local patrols and ambushes, continued searching area of previous day's action.

(b) 2/22 Inf (M): At 0915H, via coord WT904043, Companies A&B attached through AO WHITE. At 1145H, Co C attached through AO BLUE. At 1335H, CP Group 2/22 Inf (M) followed Co C axis of advance to a Bn laager site via coord WT902295. Co A laagered via WT904030. At 1425H, via coord WT904104, Co A discovered a base camp, surrounded by a bunker and trench system with six huts, two of which had concrete floors. In one hut 30 lbs of document and propaganda sheets were found.

(b) 3/22 Inf: Bn continued S&D operation until 1711H when a Bn night defense perimeter was established via coord WT772824.

(4) 2/77 Arty: Continued DS, 3d Bde.

(a) 2/14 Inf: Secured Don Tien Base Camp, conducted local patrols and ambushes.

(20) 11 Mar 67 (D-17):

(a) 2/2 Inf: Continued S&D operations via WT995005.

(b) 2/22 Inf (M): Companies A, B and C conducted S&D operations in designated area of Bn AO. Co A laagered at coord WT903026. Co B laagered at coord WT904027. Co C laagered with Bn CP Group, via coord WT903026.

(b) 3/22 Inf: Co A departed Bn defensive position via coord WT772824 and conducted S&D operation to the Northwest. A Co returned to Bn defensive perimeter via coord WT772829 at 1900H. Co B secured Bn defensive perimeter via coord WT772824. Co C departed Bn defensive perimeter and conducted S&D operations South along Jaoi In M. River. Fourteen huts, a wall, a latrine, quantities of cement and documents were found and destroyed via coord WT770016. Co C closed Bn defensive perimeter coord WT772824 at 1530H.

(4) 2/77 Arty: Continued DS, 3d Bde, C/L Arty became attached 2/77 Arty.

(a) 2/14 Inf: Secured Don Tien Base Camp, conducted local patrols and ambushes.

(b) 1/34 Inf (M): 0900H 3d Bde 0900H, commenced S&D operations and blocking positions WT772824, destroyed one small base camp at WT904027.

(21) 12 Mar 67 (D-18):

(a) 2/12 Inf: Continued local patrols and ambushes, continued S&D operations.

(b) 2/22 Inf (M): Companies A, B and C conducted S&D operations in designated area of Bn AO. Co A laagered at coord WT903026. Co B laagered at coord WT904027. Co C laagered with the Bn CP Group, via coord WT903026.

(c) 3/22 Inf: Companies A&B continued defense of battalion perimeter via coord WT772824. Co C conducted S&D operations to the West and returned to Bn base at 1330H.

(4) 2/77 Arty: 2/2/77 moved by convey from F&B L&B (WT904030) to Military Reservation (WT977021) and remained there.

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(u) 2/14 Inf: Secured Dau Tieng Base Camp, conducted local patrols and ambushes.

(f) 1st Inf (4): SMO operations, destroyed two 2.75 rockets at WY7070, 3 huts, 2 bunkers, 12 huts, 1000 lbs rice, 1 bicycle at WY7079.

(22) 13 Mar 67 (D-19):

(u) 2/12 Inf: Recon platoon destroyed one boat, two bunkers at WY73777, Co C destroyed 2 walls and 2 foxholes at WY786779.

(b) 2/22 Inf (H): At vic coord WY992829, Co A discovered one accordion, one trailing aid of a US M1 carbine, and one sack filled with rice. At 1014H, vic coord WY999118, Recon platoon 2/22 Inf (H) discovered an East-West trench line 150 meters long, which contained 10 lbs of documents. Co C lingered at the same location on 12 Mar 67.

(e) 3/22 Inf: Companies A&B conducted SMO operations to the Southeast and Northwest of Bn base via coord WY72828. Both units closed Bn base by 1600H. Co C secured Bn perimeter.

(1) 2/77 Arty: Continued DS, 3d Bn.

(e) 2/14 Inf: Secured Dau Tieng Base Camp, conducted local patrols and ambushes.

(f) 1/5th Inf (4): Conducted SMO operations via WY966793. Co A made contact with unknown number of VC resulting in one VC KIA, one US KIA, destroyed one foot bridge, 4 bunkers, 8 huts, 4 canvas printers ink, 165 gals motor oil, killed one VC, captured 1 Chinese carbine.

(23) 14 Mar 67 (D-20):

(e) 2/12 Inf: The 2/12 Inf conducted SMO operations North toward OBI RMV via WY773803 and discovered a high class base camp and recreation area at WY771797. They then established blocking position NED at WY773803.

(b) 2/22 Inf (H): Companies A, B and C 2/22 Inf (H) conducted SMO operations in designated sectors of Bn AO. At 1110H via coord WY000530, a patrol from Co A received one US M1 from a VC force of unknown size. Area was swept with neg results. Co A lingered via coord WY903826, Co B lingered coord WY903827, and Co C lingered with Bn CP Group at coord WY903826.

(e) 3/22 Inf: 3/22 Inf departed Bn base via coord WY907924 and moved to FE NED via coord WY773802. Bn elements secured LE RMV for the extraction of 2/12 Inf.

(4) 2/77 Arty: Continued DS, 3d Bn.

(e) 2/14 Inf: Secured Dau Tieng Base Camp, conducted local patrols and ambushes.

(f) 1/5th Inf (H): Reported for Bn Co to come under OTCN 1044h 14 Inf Bn at 1530H. At 1000H Recon platoon APC damaged by a mine at WY707090. B Co had one APC damaged by a mine at WY773713 resulting in light damage.

(24) 15 Mar 67 (D-21):

(e) 2/12 Inf: At 0800H the Bn (-) hoisted from blocking position NED to Trail M and then shifted by 0-123 to Dau Tieng clearing base camp at 1330H.

(b) 2/22 Inf (H): 2/22 Inf (H) executed 2/77 Arty and elements of 2/12 Arty to Dau Tieng. The Bn closed Camp Baidar at 1600H.

(e) 3/22 Inf: The Bn was extracted from FE NED via coord WY773802 by 08-47 to Trail M and shifted to Dau Tieng by 0-123. Bn closed Dau Tieng by 1600H.

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(4) 2/77 Arty: Operation terminated successfully to Dan Tien was initiated. Batteries leapfrogged into positions along the route of march to provide continuous artillery coverage.

(6) 2/14 Inf: Released from security mission of Dan Tien Base Camp, began move to Cu Chi.

(25) 16 Mar (D422):

(a) 2/12 Inf: Base camp security, local patrols and ambushes, prepared for future operations.

(b) 2/22 Inf (H): Base camp security, local patrols and ambushes, prepared for future operations.

(c) 3/22 Inf: Base camp security, local patrols and ambushes, prepared for future operations.

(d) 2/77 Arty: Prepared for continuation of operations.

(26) 17 Mar 67 (D423):

(a) 2/12 Inf: Continued security of Dan Tien Base Camp prepared for continuation of operation.

(b) 2/22 Inf (H): Continued security of Dan Tien Base Camp prepared for continuation of operation.

(c) 3/22 Inf: Continued security of Dan Tien Base Camp prepared for continuation of operation.

(d) 2/77 Arty: Continued security of Dan Tien Base Camp prepared for continuation of operation.

(27) 18 Mar 67 (D424):

(a) 2/12 Inf: The 2/12 Inf airlifted from Dan Tien at 0850H by C-123 to Suoi Da, clearing at 0945H. The Bn (-) spent the rest of the day at Suoi Da.

(b) 2/22 Inf (H): At 0630H 2/22 Inf (H) (-) inserted Camp Raider for coord XJ367035. At 0730H Co C and Recon departed Suoi Da enroute to coord XJ367035. At 0730H, via coord XJ366630, an APC M113 from Co C detected a mine resulting in 4 US KIA with moderate damage to the APC. At 0800H, via coord XJ366630, an APC M113 from the Recon platoon detected a mine resulting in 4 US KIA with moderate damage to the APC. At 0850H via coord XJ366630 Recon platoon received 2 to 3 rds from an RPG II, resulting in no casualties. Air strikes were immediately called to cover the hostile area. Recon platoon continued to receive RPG II fire from two positions at the same location. At 0930H Recon had another RPG II hit an APC resulting in 2 US KIA and 3 US WIA. At 1100H, after 6 TAC air strikes, and artillery preparation Co B swept the area in which Recon had contact. At 1100H, an APC from Co B detected a mine resulting in 6 US KIA and one APC M113 destroyed. One US KIA was killed by small arms fire. Co B completed the area sweep with no results. At 1630H 2/22 Inf (H) languished at via coord XJ366630.

(c) 3/22 Inf: 3/22 Inf began Operation JUNCTION CITY, PHASE II at 0800H when Bn elements were airlifted by C-123 to Suoi Da via coord XJ366630. Airlift was completed at 0830H and a defensive perimeter was established via coord XJ366630.

(d) 2/77 Arty: 2/77 Arty, less Btry A, moved by convey to Suoi Da (XJ366630). Btry C occupied a position at PBN HENHE (XJ366637) with the mission of direct support to 3/22 Inf (H) as they moved overland to LE SILHE. 2/77 tactical headquarters and Batteries A and B prepared for airlift into LE SILHE. On 2/13 Arty moved to Dan Tien for base camp defense.

(e) 2/14 Bn: At 0430H Bn in ARL at XJ366637, removed ARL at 1730H after sweeping was completed. Base teams attached to each Inf Bn.

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(28) 19 Mar 67 (DeS):

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(a) 2/12 Inf: At 1300N the Bn (-) was airlifted into LZ GOLD. Lift was completed at 1415N. Bn (-) moved to via coord (XJ364700) to set up a CP and assist in providing security of LZ GOLD.

(b) 2/12 Inf (M): At 0650N, Recon plt moved as the Bn advance guard to coord XJ375673. At 0756N, Recon plt received an RPG II and small arms fire at coord XJ375673. Co A swept the area and found one US claymore mine with blasting cap, one battery and one Chiem hard grenade. At 0915N via coord XJ377677 Recon plt again received RPG II and small arms fire. 81mm mortars and artillery were employed. After the supporting fires had ceased the area was swept with neg results. At 1205N, via coord XJ378676, Co A received small arms fire and 1 claymore mine, resulting in 4 US KIA, and 2 US TIA. Co A was withdrawn and two sections of TAC air were employed along with medium and light artillery. At 1545N Recon and Co C closed the Bn laager area via coord XJ377672. At 1615N Co B swept the area of Co A's contact and came under small arms fire, but received no casualties. Co B found a heavy blood trail (1 VC KIA Poss) and 2 light blood trails (2 VC KIA Poss). Co B also destroyed two AT mines at coord XJ377677. At 1700N Co C received one US TIA which resulted from a short artillery round at via coord XJ377672. At 1710N Co A moved to coord XJ400677, and was placed under OPCK of 2/14th Armer.

(c) 3/22 Inf: Companies A and B began an airborne assault into LZ GOLD via coord XJ365704 at 1015N. B Co's 2d lift landed, hidden VC triggered a command detonated mine causing heavy damage to 4 helicopters and numerous casualties among Co B personnel. When Co A's first and second lifts landed on LZ GOLD, the VC detonated two additional command detonated mines causing heavy damage to the remaining helicopters. VC snipers in the tree line surrounding LZ GOLD were engaged with unknown results. LZ GOLD was secured and defensive perimeter established at 1300N. Results of assault: Three UNHs destroyed, three UNHs damaged, ten US KIA, eighteen US WIA, seven aviators KIA. A sweep of the LZ revealed nineteen 81mm mortar rds and two 175mm rounds rigged for command detonation. Company C (-) continued security for Bn CP at Sui Da via coord XJ344583.

(d) 2/77 Arty: Headquarters, 2/77 Arty, Batteries A and B airlifted into LZ GOLD, (XJ35705), after the LZ had been secured by 3/22 Inf. LZ GOLD was then redesignated Fire Support Base GOLD. (A last minute change in plans designated GOLD instead of SILVER as the objective area).

(e) 2/14 Armer (-): Became OPCK of Bn, 4th Inf Div, cross attached one Co with 2/22 Inf (M):

(29) 20 Mar (DeS):

(a) 2/12 Inf: At 0730N the Bn (-) commenced movement to AO ORANGE. At 1300N the Bn located a small base camp at coord (XJ363711). One claymore was detonated as US forces approached base camp, resulting in neg friendly casualties. VC casualties unknown.

(b) 2/28 Inf (M): At 0950N via coord XJ378676, Co B discovered a large base camp and captured eight weapons. Approximately 30 rifle grenades, 4 directional mines, 40 lbs of documents, and approximately 3000 lbs of assorted items consisting of clothing material and guns were also captured. At 1215N Co A 2/14 Armer was placed under OPCK of 2/28 Inf (M). At 1230N 2/22 Inf (M) laagered at coord XJ366492.

(c) 3/22 Inf: Companies A and B continued security for GOLD and conducted platoon size reconnaissance patrols with neg results. Co C (-) continued security mission for Bn CP at Sui Da. A Company B ambush patrol located via coord XJ365704 reported heavy VC movement at 1925N.

(d) 2/77 Arty: Battery C airlifted into FSB GOLD joining the remainder of the Bn. C/1/8 Arty became attached and occupied positions at FSB ORANGE.

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(e) 2/14 Arroy (-): 17TH began moving 0600Z/2/22, effected link up at 0835H. At 1115H elements began movement toward AO BLACK. At 1300H received 1 MFG II rd, no damage or casualties. At 1400H located small VC base camp, lagered at XT66716.

(f) 21 March 67 (De27):

(a) 2/12 Inf: At 210600H Mar 67, the 2/12 Inf located via coord XT66718 was alerted by HQ, 3d Div, that FSB GOLD was under attack and to be prepared to move to that location. Co C, 2/12 Inf was alerted to move and received the order to move to FSB GOLD at 0600H. The 2/12 Inf received 16 rds of mortar fire of unknown origin at 0700H. Six rounds fell on the CP Group resulting in 5 KIA within the CP Group and 2 MIA within the Recon pl. Approximately 10 rds falling on A and B Co resulting in 1 KIA and 7 MIA of Co A and 1 MIA from Co B. At 0740H Co C, moved toward FSB GOLD by the most direct route. Co A followed a proximately 15 minutes later. Co B, secured an LZ successfully effecting a Dust-Off for injured personnel. About 0800H Co B, CP Group and Recon pl departed for FSB GOLD. Co C moved at maximum speed through 150 meters of heavy bamboo thicket. They were exposed to sporadic sniper fire and mortar fire in an effort to prevent them from reinforcing the units under attack. Lead elements of Co C made contact with the enemy security forces as they reached the outer perimeter of FSB GOLD at 0800H. The 3d of the 3/22 Inf directed Co C to take up defensive positions on the Southwest portion of the perimeter as the unit closed in at 0830H. During movement to relieve the units under attack C Company received 6 MIA. Upon arrival of Co C along with outer reinforcing friendly forces the VC broke contact after suffering heavy casualties. Co C was joined by other elements of the 2/12 Inf as they arrived at FSB GOLD. Co A made contact with 1 VC resulting in 1 VC KIA during a sweep of the perimeter.

(b) 2/22 Inf (M): At 0800H Recon and Co C led the Bn to reinforce 3/22 Inf and 2/77 Arty at FSB GOLD and began engaging the enemy. Two minor US KIA and 4 VC POW and a large amount of weapons and ammunition resulted from this engagement. At 1200H via coord XT66709 Recon pl 2/22 Inf (M) departed to recover the bodies of 2 Air Force P/C KIA resulting from the crash of a P/C plane shot down during the battle. Upon reaching the site the bodies were recovered. Also, 7 VC KIA were found via coord XT66702. The Bn lagered at coord XT66707. The Bn collected an additional 30 VC (DC) after the Battle of FSB GOLD. This DC was submitted for addition to the Bn total.

(c) 3/22 Inf: C Co (-) continued security mission for Brigade CT at Sud Bn via coord XT66703. A and B Companies continued security mission for FSB GOLD via coord XT66704. At 0400H, B Co, 3d Plt night ambush located via coord XT66703 reported movement in front of and around the ambush position. No further movement was reported and at 0600H patrol prepared to return to GOLD. At 0615H FSB GOLD came under heavy enemy (40mm and 82mm mortar attack, and 3d Platoon ambush patrol made contact with a large VC force. Within five minutes this patrol was overrun and all personnel were killed or wounded. At 0630H the Reconnaissance Patrol, 3/22 Inf engaged a large VC force which had approached to within thirty-five meters of FSB GOLD's Southeastern perimeter. Shortly thereafter, the entire perimeter came under attack by waves of VC firing recoilless rifles, RPG II rocket launchers, automatic weapons and other small arms. Heaviest attacks were concentrated on the Northeast and Southeastern portions of the battalion defensive perimeter around FSB GOLD. As the attack continued, the three artillery batteries of the 2/77 Arty began firing counter-mortar fire in an effort to neutralize the VC mortar concentrations which continued to rain the entire fire support base. During the initial assault, Co B reported that 1st Plt positions (Southeastern perimeter) had been penetrated and that the reaction force from 2/77 Arty was required to reinforce this sector. At 0700H the reaction force began moving to the 1st Platoon's portion of the perimeter. At 0700H the first P/C arrived at GOLD and within five minutes airstrikes had begun. Additionally, close supporting fires from two batteries of 105mm (W) had been brought in to within one hundred meters of the battalion's perimeter. At 0715H, Co B reported that its 1st Platoon had been overrun and surrounded by a bunch was attack. Airstrikes were called in along the contact frontlines to relieve the pressure on B Co's perimeter. The P/C who was controlling these strikes was killed by VC anti-aircraft weapons fire and was shot down. At 0730H, the 2d Co commander requested that

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the 2/77 Artillery fire beehive rounds into the Southeastern and Southern sectors of his perimeter. At 0756H B Company reported that complete penetration had been made in 1st Platoon's sector and that ammunition reserves were exhausted. Ammunition and a twenty and reaction force from A Company were sent to B Company at 0815H when B Company's Northern sector was overrun by another human wave attack. At 0815H A Company's night ambush patrol which had established a night ambush at vic court 2134704 reinforced FSB GOLD's perimeter. All personnel had several to include the surrounding VC. At 0815H the A Company Commander reported that a VC penetration had been made in the Northern sector of the perimeter. At 0817H the quad 50 located in the Northern sector of the perimeter was hit by FSB II rocket rounds and overrun. By 0840H, the Northern, Eastern, and South sectors of FSB GOLD's perimeter had withdrawn to a secondary defensive line around the guns of the artillery batteries. The Northern, Western, and Southern sectors held firm despite the presence of large numbers of VC who had infiltrated to within fifteen to twenty-five meters of the defensive barriers. Attacking VC had infiltrated to within hand grenade range of the Battalion CP and to within five meters of the Battalion Aid Station. To counter this new threat, the remaining howitzers of the 2/77 Artillery began firing beehive rounds into the attacking VC. Airstrikes were brought in to within fifty (50) meters of friendly forces and supporting 105mm and 155mm batteries threw up a continuous wall of high explosive around the battalion perimeter. When the 2/77 Artillery exhausted its supply of beehive rounds, HE rounds at charge and were fired direct fire at point blank range. At 0900H the situation, though tense because of ammunition shortages, was still under control. The Northern, Western, and Southern sectors of the perimeter were still intact and under moderate pressure from the VC. Although parts of the Northern, Southeastern, Eastern portion of the perimeter were intact and had contained and broken the continuous VC attacks which had been thrown against them. At 0900H, a relief column from the 2/12 Inf broke through from the South and linked up with Company B. Joining forces, Co B and elements from the 2/12 Inf counter-attacked from West to East to re-establish the original perimeter. At 0915H, a mechanized infantry and armor column from the 2/22 Inf and the 2/14 Armor, broke through from the Southwest and swept forward along the trailhead toward the Northwest. By 0920H the original perimeter had been re-established and mopping up operations had begun. At 1007H four (4) resupply UNID's arrived at FSB GOLD with ammunition and began evacuating the wounded. By 1045H medical evacuation of friendly casualties had been accomplished; the battle area had been secured; and artillery and airstrikes continued to pound the VC routes of withdrawal. For the remainder of the day, battalion elements continued police of the battle area and reorganized for future combat actions.

(d) 2/77 Art: 2/77 Art remained at 2134708 and supported elements in contact. The Bn received mortar and ground attack in conjunction with attack on 2/22 Inf (-) at FSB GOLD. Bn adjusted artillery and air strikes. Artillery was initially fired as counter mortar then guns were used in a direct-fire flail protective role. Bn observed FAE crash at 0745H, requested and got another FAE. Bn had three guns out of action at 0820H and 1 Bn had one gun out of action. Bn penetrated to vic of one gun position. Bn began using beehive rounds in direct fire supplementing with HE. By the end of the action 17 guns were damaged but all but three were kept operational through cannibalization.

(e) 2/14 Armor (-): At 210700H 2/14 Armor (-) effected link up with elements of 2/22 Inf (H) followed the column to relief of FSB GOLD.

(f) 22 Mar 67 (D-40):

(g) 2/12 Inf: The Bn (-) assisted in securing 22 MAR with local patrolling. Results were 13 VC bodies discovered as well as a quantity of miscellaneous equipment.

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(b) 2/22 Inf (N): 2/22 Inf (N) moved from FSB OCLD via route XT36706 and attacked to secure Obj K1 via route XT36727. At 0913H, Tn A 2/14 Armor attached followed by B 2/22 Inf. Tn B 2/22 Inf attacked via route XT377705. Tn A detected 2 enemy AT mines with no casualties. They also located a grave site containing one VC. At 1043H via route XT377704, another grave site was discovered. At 1412H, Bn and the CP Group 2/22 Inf (N) moved along Axis WHITE to join Tn A 2/14 Armor. At 1710H Tn C 2/22 Inf (N) and Tn A 2/14 Armor discovered a base camp which contained 20 hand grenades. At 1700H the Bn moved. Three pre-planned air strikes were placed along axis of advance route XT36736.

(c) 3/22 Inf: Companies A and B continued security of FSB OCLD. One US KIA received at 0530H when individual failed to answer challenge. A reconnaissance patrol found two VC KIA (HC) and one RVC II killed road. Two VC KIA credited to the Battle of Sam Tre on 21 Nov 67. Co C (-) continued security mission for Bn CP at Sam Tre.

(d) 2/77 Arty: Continued SB mission.

(e) 2/14 Armor: Continued sweep in area of previous day's battle in conjunction with 2/22 Inf (N).

(f) A Trp 3/4 Cav: Conting security.

(3) 23 Mar 67 (Sat):

(a) 2/12 Inf: At 0800H Co B ambush patrol reported finding 1 VC body, 1 can of machinegun ammo, 1 VC hat, 4 grave sites, web gear, grenades and a hand made stretcher at route XT371703. At 0915H the Bn and pl reported finding 1 Chinese grenade and one VC punks at XT371703. Co A reported 3 VC bodies at route XT366715 at 1115H. Co B found 2 VC bodies at route XT366777. All were results of the Battle of Sam Tre. In the area of the battle large amounts of web gear, grenades, small arms ammunition and 3 RVC II anti-tank weapons were located.

(b) 2/22 Inf (N): At 0815H Tn C 2/22 Inf (N) departed Lager area in route to Obj K1. At 0840H via route XT371736 Tn C found several garden plots and bunkers with evidence of recent occupancy. At 0915H they discovered two hole sites 20'x20' and 15'x15', via route XT370737. Both hole sites were well bunkered. At 0930H via route XT367726 the Bn PAC reported receiving heavy ground fire. At 0930H Tn C destroyed four garden plots, three hole sites, and two dozen garden tools at route XT371726. At 1125H via route XT366727 Tn C discovered three VC KIA (HC) in bunkers. The 3 VC KIA were the result of air strikes at 0930H. At 1315H via route XT367728 Tn C discovered 8 footlock around a clearing. At 1330H Tn B discovered a VC base camp with a trench line running S-N. At 1400H via route XT361726. At 1500H Tn B engaged an undetermined size VC force. Three claymore mines were fired at their location. Artillery was fired into the area but with unknown results. At 1600H via route XT361721 Tn C had one officer KIA. At 1800H Co C discovered two VC KIA (HC) and captured one col AS grease gun. At 2000H the last element of 2/22 closed the Lager site at route XT377723.

(c) 3/22 Inf: Companies A & B continued security mission for FSB OCLD. At 1 Co ambush patrol located six VC bodies, one machine gun barrel and 200' of wire via route XT36706. VC KIA credited to the Battle of Sam Tre, 21 Nov. Co C (-) continued security mission for Bn CP at Sam Tre.

(d) 2/77 Arty: Continued SB, 34 Bn.

(e) 2/14 Armor (-): Continued attack into War Zone C with no contact.

(f) 3/1/6 Cav (-): CPEN 34 Bn, continued mission of securing passage between Tay Ninh, Sam Tre, FSB HONG with no contact.

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(13) 24 Mar 67 (D-31):

(a) 2/22 Inf: At 0400H Co B reported finding a VC body at coord XT369702. At 0440H Co A captured 1 VC POW from the Battle of Sami Tro at coord XT369711.

(b) 2/22 Inf (H): At 0510H Co B reported the larger position for pre-designated S&D operations. At 0540H Co A 2/14 Armor departed on S&D operations. At 0620H Co C departed in route to previous day's contact. At 0640H via coord XT361712 Co B discovered a cache of loose rice in a hole about 1/2 mile. It was destroyed in place. At 1000H Co C discovered one moss ball and a variety of livestock. One VC KIA was also captured. At 1030H via coord XT361721 Co B found a bloody belt (1 VC KIA Posing). POW captured by Co C stated that the 15th and 16th Regt took part in the action of 21 March 67. At 1145H Co C found three NFO rds in a trench which were destroyed in place. At 1200H via coord XT361701 Co B discovered a base camp which contained a pair of bloody trousers (1 VC KIA Posing), evidence indicated that fifteen VC had spent the night there. At 1530H via coord XT361728 Co C discovered and destroyed one 500 lb bomb. At 1930H all elements closed larger areas.

(c) 3/22 Inf: Companies A & B continued security mission for FSB 0012. Co A (-) conducted a one day S&D operation Northwest of FSB 0012. Five VC bodies were found via coord XT361716, credited to Battle of Sami Tro. Co C continued security of 3rd CP at Sami Tro.

(d) 2/77 Arty: Continued SB, 3d, 4th.

(e) 2/14 Armor: Continued attack into the Zone C.

(f) 4/23 Inf (H): 0400H 3d Rds.

(14) 25 Mar 67 (D-31):

(a) 2/22 Inf: The 2/22 Inf advanced along the QUICK and set up the CP at coord XT361723.

(b) 2/22 Inf (H): At 1030H via coord XT361710, Co C discovered an ammo bag and Chicom grenades. There was evidence of recent activity at this location. At 1530H, 2/22 Inf CP Group with Co A 2/14 Armor closed new larger site via coord XT361720. At 1730H Co B arrived at the larger site to take up security positions. At 1840H all elements closed in larger site.

(c) 3/22 Inf: Companies A and B continued security mission for FSB 0012. An A Co ambush patrol observed one VC via coord XT361699. Arty was called in with unknown results. Co C (-) infiltrated into LZ 0012 at 0730H and joined the perimeter at FSB 0012. An ambush patrol from Co C (-) found three VC bodies, one pistol belt, one entrenching tool, one canteen, detaching cord and clothing via coord XT361709. Three VC KIA were credited to the Battle of Sami Tro, 21 Mar.

(d) 2/77 Arty: Continued SB 3d Rds.

(e) 2/14 Armor: Continued S&D operation in 40 HAZ, located 8 bunkers and 800 lbs unpolished rice at XT361722. An estimated VC Co was observed from the air at XT361765, air strikes and artillery were called in and 2/14 Armor pursued, located 5 VC KIA (HC), killed by artillery, observed one secondary explosion in view of air strikes. Received one RPO II round and spotted 5 VC, engaged with unknown results. One APC damaged. Elements lagged at XT361734.

(f) 2/77 Arty: Continued SB, 3d Rds.

(g) 6/1 Regt: Continued clearing and repairing road from FSB 0012 to XT361643. Lead elements of road clearing team were engaged by approximately 14 VC at XT361765, air strikes and artillery called in, results were 2 VC KIA and 8 VC KIA, unknown enemy results.

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(C) 25 Nov 67 (D-1):

(b) 2/2 Inf: Continued SLD operations, received sniper fire at 1700Z with no results.

(c) 2/22 Inf (M): At 0500 Co B reported in SLD operations. At 0600 Co C reported in SLD operations. At 0700 Co B returned to its base. At 1700, the B Co group and the B Co pit arrived at a new base site, via road 1700Z.

(d) 2/22 Inf: Co A continued security mission for FSB T12. An ambush patrol from Co A found two VC members in a rice field, the guerrillas, following and fired via road 1700Z. A night ambush patrol from B Co detected movement at 2200Z via road 1700Z and returned to 0200 at 0700. Co C (-) continued security of FSB T12. A night ambush patrol located two VC members, one KIA, via road 1700Z, and one B Co pit arrived via road 1700Z. At 1300 a night patrol found and destroyed a VC camp consisting of four huts, eight guerrillas, a kitchen, and a latrine via road 1700Z. At 1300 two VC members with guerrillas and opium were found via road 1700Z. An ambush patrol from Co C (-) called in artillery on movement via road 1700Z with no results. SLD VC KIA (K) (K title of SLD T12).

(e) 2/27 Artillery: Continued SLD, Y: Ab.

(f) 2/28 Artillery: Continued SLD operations in AO 0200. In progress at 1700Z.

(g) 2/28 Inf (M): Continued SLD operations in area, located and destroyed hangers at 1700Z, 1700Z, and 1700Z. Co B reported from air 500 at 1700Z, engaged with SLD members, unknown results. At 1300 (1700Z) a company also was activated against 2/27 road building in 3000. One ALC damaged as a result of a mine. Three VC captured with unknown results. In progress with ALC Co at 1700Z and 2/27 at 1700Z.

(h) 2/28 Artillery: Continued SLD operations from FSB 0200 to FSB 0200, destroyed one missile site at 1700Z, CP located at FSB 0200.

(i) 27 Nov 67 (D-1):

(a) 2/28 Inf: Co (-) conducted SLD operations in AO 0200. In progress at 1700Z. Co B discovered a SLD 10 hanger at road 1700Z and in separate locations were mortar rounds. These were all set up to be captured destroyed. All were destroyed.

(b) 2/28 Inf (M): At 0500 Co B reported in larger site on SLD operations. At 0600 Co C reported the B Co larger site on SLD operations. At 1300 via road 1700Z Co B discovered an abandoned base camp. Within the camp they found 100 ammunition boxes of 100mm, 100 10 bags of rice, 100 containers, rubber shoes for guerrillas and 3 recently dug trenches. All equipment was destroyed. At 1700 via road 1700Z from 2/28 Artillery reported hearing missile rounds to their front at a distance of 100-500 meters. Artillery was placed on the target area, but with no results. At 1700, an ALC from Co B reported movement to their front. After engagement with head guerrillas, a patrol made a search of the area with no results.

(c) 2/28 Inf: A and B Companies continued security mission for FSB 0200. Co C (-) conducted SLD operations in eastern sector of AO 0200. Co C's 1st and 2nd platoons closed FSB 0200 at 1300 while 2nd platoon established a night ambush patrol via road 1700Z.

(d) 2/27 Artillery: Continued SLD, Y: Ab.

(e) 2/28 Artillery: Continued SLD mission.

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(F) 4/23 Inf (A): Continued S&D in camp.

(G) C/4 Regt: Located and destroyed one 20 lb mine at KTH1435.

(H) 28 Mar 67 (D-34):

(a) 2/12 Inf: Continued S&D operations.

(b) 2/22 Inf (H): At 0815H Co B departed the Bn laager area to conduct S&D operations in the sector. At 0800H Co C departed the laager area to conduct S&D operations in the sector. At 1400H after completing the S&D operation in sector, Co C returned to the Bn laager area to perform reconnaissance. At 1500H a combat patrol from Room pit 1/77 Inf (H) conducted a S&D operation to the South of the Bn laager position. The patrol closed in the laager area at 1800H. The result of the patrol was the discovery of one SS gal drum of CB which was destroyed in the laager area.

(c) 3/22 Inf: Bn conducted security mission from FEB 0410 and conducted daylight reconnaissance and night ambush patrols within the Bn area.

(d) 2/77 Arty: Continued S&D, 3d Bn.

(e) 2/3 Arty (-): Continued S&D in AO H-CL. The VC were seen at KTH1375 and engaged resulting in 1 VC KIA (K) and one Chicom cartridge and miscellaneous personal documents captured.

(f) 4/23 Inf (H): Assumed GPOH of C/1/10 Coy and their mission of Route 239 security and convey escort. Reported convey between the Dong, Tay Ninh, Binh Duong and Phuoc Ninh.

(g) 4/3 Coy: Released GPOH of 3d Bn, 1st Inf Div at 0810H.

(h) C/4th Regt: Continued present mission of opening road, destroyed one 20 lb mine at KTH1465.

(I) 29 Mar 67 (D-35):

(a) 2/12 Inf: Conducted S&D operations Southwest toward FC COMB with no contact.

(b) 2/22 Inf (H): At 0700H the Bn Room pit area departed the Bn laager area heading South. At 0715H, Co B and C proceeded to the Western edge of the Bn AO. The Bn was caught in the act with two companies strong. At 0815H the CP Group and Co A 2/3 Arty departed to a new laager area. At 1000H Co B discovered 10 bats, some clothing, 2 Chicom grenades, and 1 lb of documents. At 1511H Co C closed the laager position. At 1600H a Room element crossed a stream via cord KTH1768 and found evidence of recent cutting of trees. At approximately 1900H Room element returned to the laager position.

(c) 3/22 Inf: Bn continued security of FEB 0410 and at 1115H began a S&D operation to the Southwest. At 1130H Co A found and destroyed three bunkers and five bunkers via cord KTH1705. The VC KIA (K) were credited to the Battle of Binh Duong. At 1300H two last operations were carried out from a Bn via cord KTH1768. Co C (-) had no contact. A Bn perimeter was established via cord KTH1769 and night ambushes were established. A patrol from Co C (-) observed three VC via cord KTH1770 at 2115H and called in arty fire with unknown results.

(d) 2/77 Arty: 2/77 Arty airlifted from FEB 0410 to Binh Duong and, less Bn A, assigned to FEB 0410. A Bn assigned positions at Binh Duong. 2/3/73 Arty assigned from French Port (KTH1465) and joined the Bn at FEB 0410.

(e) 2/3 Arty: Continued search and destroy mission.

(f) 4/23 Inf (H): Continued S&D mission.

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(39) 30 Mar 67 (D-36):

(a) 2/12 Inf: Conducted S&D operation Southeast to PL COCHA.

(b) 2/22 Inf (N): Approximately 0800H Co C departed the larger site for S&D operation along assigned axis to the Southeast. Approximately 0900H Co B departed larger site for S&D operations to the Southeast. At 1000H the CP Group with the second platoon closed at an intermediate larger site via coord KX27240. At 1100H via coord KX277500 Co B received small arms fire from an estimated reinforced VC squad. There was one US MIA and no enemy casualties. Co B also detonated a mine with an APC M113. This was a pressure type mine employing 100mm mortar rds. There was no damage to personnel or equipment. At 1200H Co A & 2/14 Armor continued to move on their axis to the Southeast. At 1300H Co B discovered hand grenades, clothing and claymore mines in the vic of their previous contact. At 1315H via coord KX285600, Co C received small arms fire and hand grenades. Artillery was employed into the area with unknown results. At 1430H Co C received two AF rds into their position. An APC was hit with both rds causing 3 US MIA with moderate damage to the APC. At 1725H Co B found three claymore mines.

(c) 3/22 Inf: 3/22 Inf continued S&D operations Southeast of FSB COCHA. Co A found and destroyed 2 grenades rigged as booby traps via coord KX117667. Co B found and destroyed three 75mm howitzer rds and three 160mm mortar rds via coord KX116677 at 1015H. Two men and one dog suffered from heat exhaustion and were evacuated from a LZ via coord KX113671. At 1710H a Bn perimeter was established via coord KX122660.

(d) 2/77 Artys: Continued IB, 3d Tab.

(e) 4/23 Inf (N): Continued S&D operations.

(f) 2/14 Armor (-): Continued S&D operations.

(40) 31 Mar 67 (D-37):

(a) 2/12 Inf: The Bn (-) crossed PL COCHA via coord KX393632 and conducted a S&D operation Southeast to PL COCHA via coord KX116576.

(b) 2/22 Inf (N): All elements of the Bn proceeded to the Southeast and searched areas of the previous day contact. At 0822H Co C found on trails 1 VC KIA (Pons). At 0930H Co B discovered a classroom 18m x 20 meters with a seating capacity for 70 personnel. At 0955H Co B discovered another classroom which contained 26 5 man tables, and a mess hall. At 1025H via coord KX392601, Co A discovered 3 fresh graves (3 VC KIA IC). At 1100H via coord KX390600, Co C found one bolt action carbine. At 1115H Co B found one carbine, 3 claymore mines, and sixty 60mm mortar rds. At 1310H Co B discovered 7 bicycles and several rds of ammunition, which were destroyed. At 1330H, Co B discovered an ammo cache which contained 1 new type grenade. At 1335H Co A & 2/14 Armor found a bin of rice measuring 12' x 3' and 4 bicycles. At 1417H Co A & 2/14 Armor discovered 10 bags of rice at coord KX386677. Also discovered were three claymore mines, one 105mm dsh, 10 bicycles and approximately 400 lbs of rice which were destroyed. At 1420H via coord KX387601, Co B found two carbines. At 1440H via coord KX387676 Co A & 2/14 Armor discovered a base camp which had been recently used. It was well constructed and contained huts, bunkers, and a mess hall with a 40 man sitting capacity. Evidence indicated that the base camp was a medical school. At 1535H Co B discovered two bunker systems approximately 200 meters in length. At 1545H via coord KX387609, Co C discovered a long base camp with several well built bunkers. At 1550H via coord KX386601, Co B discovered a trench system in the shape of a star and two more small base camps.

(c) 3/22 Inf: Bn elements continued S&D operations Southeast of FSB COCHA. Co B found and destroyed one Chicom AP mine and one 250 lb bomb (OP) via coord KX122699. At 1335H Co C (-) engaged an estimated VC squad with unknown results via coord KX122655. At same

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location C Co (-) found and destroyed a VC base camp (150m250 meters) which contained hats, bunkers, a well, bicycles and parts, clothing, a compass and documents. A perimeter was established at 1645H via coord XH23653.

(d) 2/77 Arty: Continued BS M Bds.

(e) 4/23 Inf (M): Continued present mission, located and destroyed bunkers and a mine at XH27634, injured one civilian via Sam Bds, evacuated.

(f) 2/34 Armer (-): Continued to attack PL, crossed PL COMB with no contact, hit a mine at XH27634 with heavy damage to one tank, no casualties.

(g) C/A Regt: Received one RFO II rd at XH27634, resulting in 3 US KIA and one bulldozer damaged. Fire was returned with unknown results. One homemade mine destroyed at XH23643.

(h) 1 Apr 67 (D-38):

(a) 2/12 Inf: Continued operations south of PL COMB.

(b) 2/22 Inf (M): At 0700H began moving enroute to via XH257625. At 0945H coord XH257625 an AFG M113 from Co B detonated a mine resulting in 1 US KIA with moderate damage to the AFG. At 1130H the Bn Recon elements moved South of the larger area coord XH257625, to check for possible crossing sites. At 1140H all companies moved out on S&D missions. At 1800H all companies had closed the Bn larger site via coord XH257625.

(c) 1/22 Inf: 1/22 Inf continued S&D operations SW of FSB COMB. Co A found and destroyed 20 old bunkers via coord XH10653, and an abandoned VC base camp via coord XH13648. Fifteen bunkers were found and destroyed via coord XH27636. Co B found and destroyed a weapons cache via coord XH25637. Cache contained one German Mauser rifle, one M40 M2 barrel, 200 rifle grenades, tools and assorted ammunition and explosives. Co C (-) engaged an unknown number of VC via coord XH28437 at 1605H resulting in 1 VC KIA (HC) and 1 AFG captured. A VC base camp was found and destroyed via coord XH28637. 1/22 Inf established a night defensive perimeter via coord XH23635.

(d) 2/77 Arty: C/1/8th Arty was detached from 2/77 Arty and departed.

(e) 4/23 Inf (M): A Co received one RFO II at XH28634 with heavy damage to one AFG. Co C received sniper fire from via XH29534, returned fire with 61mm mortars. No US casualties were sustained, unknown VC casualties.

(f) 2/34 Armer (-): Continued attack to PL COMB, linked up with 2/22 Inf (M) and purified tank organization (released cross-attached companies). A Co received small arms fire via XH29633 with no casualties, returned fire with unknown results. Bn became OPCON to 196th Bds at 1200H.

(g) C/A Regt: Withdrew AFG at XH29633 after crossing of 4/23 Inf (M) and 2/34 Armer (-).

(h) 4th S&T: Tank lightly damaged by mine at XH24626.

(i) 2 April 67 (D-39):

(a) 2/12 Inf: Discovered 1 grave of VC KIA (HC) at XH15505.

(b) 2/22 Inf (M): At 0700H Co A received three sniper fire resulting in neg US casualties. At 1300H via coord XH27634, Co A

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discovered three old Mauser rifles and three receiver groups. At 1500H via coord XH06005 the Bn recon platoon detonated a booby trap which resulted in one US KIA. Co A searched the area and discovered approximately 130 booby traps which were surrounding the base camp. This base camp consisted of 30 bunkers and 18 structures. Captured were 30 lbs clothing, 18 lbs documents, 10 lbs medical supplies and one M49 model 1938 7.5 rifle. At 1800H via coord XH06005 Co A received 1 US KIA from sniper fire. At 1900H all elements closed the Bn laager site via coord XH06006.

(c) 1/22 Inf: Bn continued S&D operation SE of F33 0012. Co A located and destroyed a VC base camp via coord XH06023 at 1250H. One VC was engaged at 1745H via coord XH06023 with unknown results. Co B and Co C reported no contact throughout the day. Bn elements formed a defensive perimeter via coord XH06020.

(d) 2/77 Artys Continued SE, 3d Bn.

(e) 1/23 Inf (M): Conducted S&D operations in AO FINE. B Co ambush patrol engaged 2 VC at XH75158, results 1 VC KIA (Pace), no US casualties. At XH75159 B Co engaged 5 VC killing one with no US casualties. At XH13533 located and destroyed a small base camp. A Co detonated a grenade booby trap with no damage at XH17570. C Co destroyed a base camp with underground tunnels, mine area and hidden ammunition at XH02557. Bn laagered at XH10511.

(h3) 3 April 67 (D-40):

(a) 2/12 Inf: The Bn (-) crossed FL COMB and conducted S&D operations SE to FL PTINB via coord XH5550.

(b) 2/22 Inf: At 0730H Co's A&J began sweeping the 3 portion of the Bn AO. At 0800H the Bn Recon platoon moved to a possible crossing site on the Saigon River and began preparing it for crossing on 4 Apr. The crossing site was located at via coord XH37607. At 1220H via coord XH75210 Co C discovered a small recently used base camp. One Thompson SMG and M45 was found. At 1230H via coord XH75538 Co A apprehended a National Policeman who stated that he had been kidnapped in Saigon and held prisoner by the VC since Nov 66. The victim was badly burned in a recent airstrike and stated that 7 VC had been killed, two or more would die, and seven were wounded during the same airstrike. Co A also found and destroyed 10 lbs of documents, 5 lbs of medical supplies, 20 hand grenades, 1 rifle grenade, three M16 "Bouncing Betty" mines, 8 huts, 1 bunker and 300 lbs of polished rice. At 1450H via coord XH60570 Co C discovered an old base camp and destroyed 15 huts, 24 grenades, 5 lbs fried meat, and 5 lbs dried fish. At 1615H via coord XH79566 Co C discovered and destroyed 12 bunkers and 2 huts. At 1725H via coord XH70576 Co B received two KIA from a US hand grenade. At 1915H all elements closed Bn laager area via coord XH66006.

(c) 1/22 Inf: 1/22 Inf continued S&D operations SE of F33 0012. Co C (-) received sniper fire via coord XH90559. Fire was returned with unknown results. At 1642H Co C (-) located a large VC base camp occupied by a unknown number of VC via coord XH06507. The VC broke contact at 1800H. Results: 3 VC KIA (MC), 1 US KIA, 2 US MIA, large quantities of enemy equipment, narcotics, clothing, bicycles, food and ammunition destroyed. Co C (-) closed Bn perimeter via coord XH55596 at 1910H. Co A reinforced Co C (-) at 1650H and at 1737H A Co made contact with an unknown number of VC at a base camp via coord XH0390. Results: 1 US MIA, 1 VC KIA (MC). Co A closed Bn perimeter via coord XH55596 at 1605H.

(d) 2/77 Artys: Btry A displaced from Grid B to F33 0012 (XH95305) by convey to support the elements of the Bn as they moved Eastward toward the area SE of the Michelia Plantation.

(e) 1/23 Inf (M): Co C ambush patrol received small arms fire and hand grenades from unknown size VC force at XH02545. Patrol moved

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and received fire from unknown force at XTJ4254. Patrol left story behind patrol and moved again. Reaction force moved to location of contact and could find no results. Contact not made again.

(c) C/A Bagra: Improved FSB 47712 and cleared HIB 14 to FSB 47712.

(144) 4 Apr 67 (E-41):

(a) 2/12 Inf: The Bn (-) halted to LZ BUNT -- XT26025.

(b) 2/22 Inf (N): At 0700H the Bn began a move to an LZ via coord XT54624. At 1145H Companies A & B secured LZ for elements of 2/12 Inf. Upon completion of the security mission the Bn moved to a larger position via coord XT54602.

(c) 1/22 Inf: Co B secured Bn perimeter via coord XT55596. Companies A & C (-) searched VC base camp located previous afternoon. Numerous items of equipment and food supplies were found and destroyed. One VC PW with weapon was captured and evacuated. At 1613H, 1/22 Inf halted to FSB GEN via coord XT52954. A & B Companies secured FSB GEN while Co C (-) prepared to cordon and search AP CHAM 14 via coord XT55450.

(d) 2/77 Arty: 2/77 Arty (-) and 2/3/13 Arty moved by motor convey to FSB GEN XT52757. Arty A then displaced to this same location to again have the entire Bn in FSB GEN. One 2 1/2 ton truck damaged and 2 US KIA at XT52122 by RPO II round.

(e) 4/23 Inf (N): Moved overland from Bunt Bn to Camp Rainier, attack along Axis NCHM 7, detected one mine at XT23409 resulting in moderate damage to 1 APC and two US KIA, landed at XT54524.

(f) C/1/10 Cav: Provided convey escort between Camp Rainier, FSB GEN and Tay Ninh, had one tank damaged by RPO II or MR round, at XT52122, no casualties.

(145) 5 Apr 67 (D-42):

(a) 2/12 Inf: Encountered and killed one sniper at XT53857, captured 1 Soviet 9mm pistol, located a base camp that had been struck by air and artillery at XT53760 and one VC buried at XT53854. Nine bicycles, 2 pigs, 3 cook stoves, 2 tons rice and miscellaneous furniture were destroyed in the base camp.

(b) 2/22 Inf (N): At 0730H the Bn began S&S operations in assigned Bn AO with neg contact. At 1800H all Bn elements landed at coord XT54602.

(c) 1/22 Inf: A and B Co's continued security mission for FSB GEN. Co C (-) cordoned AP CHAM via coord XT53050 at 0820H. Search was completed by 0730H with neg contact. One Bn was overwatched with anti-aircraft from a LZ via coord XT52957. At 1600H, 2d plt engaged 2 VC via coord XT52954 with neg results. The Bn 85 and a Civil Action Group joined Co C at AP CHAM 14 to conduct Civil Action/Boycott Activities. Two VC again entered the cordon via coord XT53050 at 1915H and were engaged with neg results. Co A continued security of FSB GEN and contacted platoon also daylight reconnaissance patrol to the East. Co B conducted S&S operations South and West of FSB GEN with neg results.

(d) 2/77 Arty: Continued Bn, 3d Bn.

(e) 4/23 Inf (N): Continued to attack along Axis NCHM until 1200H when mission was changed, searched area bounded by XT54602, XT54604, XT54630.

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(U) 6 April (D-43):

(a) 2/22 Inf: Continued S&D. Recon pit found a small base camp at XT50602. A Co found base camp at XT50603 with no men, some weapons and 10 tons of rice at XT50608 (map p. 3) to 1000. At XT50607 killing 1 VC and capturing one 7.62mm rifle. Also some propaganda materials were evacuated.

(b) 2/22 Inf (U): At 0600H units conducted S&D operations in designated areas of operations. At 1100H via coord XT50621 Co 3 sighted 10 VC. The VC were contacted with rifle and machine guns. Casualties were established by ground troops. At 1600H via coord XT50621 resulting in 10 VC killed with unknown VC casualties. At 1800H all elements departed via coord XT50602.

(c) 3/22 Inf: All elements continued security of F33 GEM. Co 3 conducted S&D operations north of F33 GEM. Further pit, Co 3 reported 10 VC (-) at coord of AP Chanh 12 via coord XT50640. At 2300H Co 3 departed AP Chanh 12 for the north to the coord XT50641. Co 3 reported F33 GEM at 2100H to secure the area between F33 GEM and Du Thang.

(d) 2/77 Arty: Arty 4 returned to Camp Buihiep by convey in a displacement by echelon as the maneuver elements of the 3rd began working their way back toward the base camp.

(e) 4/23 Inf (U): Continued S&D operations, located port of block at XT50602 where LP shot at night the previous night, received 3 r's and/or fire at XT50606, escorted A Arty 2/77 Arty to Du Thang base camp, reverted to OPON of parent unit at 1800H.

(U) 7 Apr 67 (D-44):

(a) 2/12 Inf: Continued S&D, located 1 small base camp at XT50603 and 1 large base with carrying arms at XT50650. CP for the night at XT50603.

(b) 2/22 Inf (U): At 0600H 2/22 Inf (U) began search and destroy through the Michelin Plantation towards Camp Buihiep. At 0900H via coord XT50656 Co 3 discovered a small base camp. At 1000H via coord XT50674 Co 3 destroyed 9 huts. At 1100H the An Recon pit detected an LP mine with an APC M113 resulting in no US casualties and minor damage to the APC. At 1115H Co's 1 & C ran a search operation to AP 13 via coord XT50606, with no results. At 1200H all elements except Recon closed Camp Buihiep. The An Recon pit is engaged via coord XT50671.

(c) 3/22 Inf: Co 3 continued security of F33 GEM, while Co 4 established defensive perimeter via coord XT50650 at 0600H. At 0700H Co 4 closed Du Thang base camp at 1900H. Co 3 continued movement to AP Chanh 6 via coord XT50657, and established cordon at 0500H. Civil Action/Support activities took place while Co 3 secured and searched the village with no results. At 1600H Co 3 received 15 to 20 r's and/or fire at AP Chanh 6. Fire was returned with unknown results. The artillery convey departed F33 GEM, 3 Co began S&D operations toward Du Thang. At 1800H concertina wire and fifteen VC body traps were found and destroyed via coord XT50655. Co 3 closed Du Thang at 1600H.

(d) 2/77 Arty: 2/3/77 Arty detached, and with C/2/77 Arty departed Du Thang. 2/77 (-) closed back to base camp.

(U) 8 Apr 67 (D-45):

(a) 2/12 Inf: The 2/12 Inf conducted S&D operations in the Michelin Plantation closing base camp at 1822H.

(b) 2/22 Inf (U): All 2/22 Inf (U) units conducted extensive maintenance on vehicles and equipment for entire day. Recon pit closed Camp Buihiep at 0800H.

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(c) 1/22 Inf: A Co secured assigned sector of Ban Tieng Base Camp. At 1300H B Co moved by convey to secure Mai Ba Dan Gravel Crusher via coord X126574. B Co elements closed gravel crusher at 1645H and established a defensive perimeter. C Co continued its S&B operations in Michelin Rubber Plantation. At 1130H C Co found and destroyed 3 AP mines via coord X1509487. 2 UN W/A were chased off at 1515H from a LZ via coord X1509487 when Co C elements detonated two AP mines. Four additional mines were found and evacuated via coord X1509487. C Co closed Ban Tieng Base Camp at 1515H and reported no further contact.

(d) 2/77 Arty: Continued BS from Ban Tieng Base Camp.

(49) 9 Apr 67 (D-46):

(a) 2/12 Inf: Conducted maintenance and preparation for future operations.

(b) 2/22 Inf (N): Conducted maintenance and preparation for future operations.

(c) 1/22 Inf: Co A departed Ban Tieng by convey to secure Tay Minh West Base Camp. B Co continued security mission at Mai Ba Dan Gravel Crusher. C Co departed Ban Tieng by truck at 0630H for FSB HUE via coord X130744. Co secured FSB HUE at 0807H and secured LZ 26 from Tay Minh to N via coord X1372421. At 1700H C Co's 3d plt found and destroyed two hundred pounds of plastic shooting via coord X133473. At 2040H 3d plt's ambush via coord X1326452 detected movement and called in artillery with unknown results.

(d) 2/77 Arty: Continued BS mission from Ban Tieng Base Camp.

(e) 1/5 Inf (N): 0700H 3d Bn, conducted S&B operations in conjunction with 36th ARVN Ranger TP, launched at X130744.

(50) 10 Apr 67 (D-47):

(a) 2/12 Inf: Conducted maintenance and preparation for future operations.

(b) 2/22 Inf (N): Conducted maintenance and preparation for future operations.

(c) 1/22 Inf: A Co assumed responsibility for security for Tay Minh West Base Camp perimeter and interior pit via coord X112497 at 1000H. B Co's 2d plt was attached to A Co at 1025H. 1 BN from A Co was accidentally struck and killed by a low flying C-130 while standing a bunker on Tay Minh West Base Camp perimeter. B Co continued security mission for Mai Ba Dan Gravel Crusher. Co C continued security mission for FSB HUE and LZ 26 from Tay Minh to N via coord X1372421.

(d) 2/77 Arty: Continued BS mission from Ban Tieng Base Camp.

(e) 1/5 Inf (N): Conducted S&B operations with 36th ARVN Ranger TP, captured 1 VC (female) at X109244, destroyed 30 lbs of rice, 1 weapon at X109244. Captured 1 German Wehr rifle.

(51) 11 April 67 (D-48):

(a) 2/12 Inf: Conducted maintenance and preparation for future operations.

(b) 2/22 Inf (N): At 0630H 2/22 Inf (N) with attachments Co G 2/34 Armer and 1st plt C/A Bn deployed from Ban Tieng and Mai Ba Dan via coord X146472 and moved via coord X147400 to secure an area for 3d Bn CP and an LZ for 2/12 Inf. 2/22 Inf (N) moved along the HUE providing security for 3d Bn CP and Co A 2/77 Arty, clearing the Bn between Mai Ba Dan and FSB HUE. Co B moved as advanced guard to guard to

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(c) 3700 Luf. A Co continued security mission for Tay Ninh West Base Camp Helicopter. While B Co continued security mission for Chuoi Chu Travel Center. On 10/5/68 a B Co reconnaissance patrol obtained three WS vic coord 47240576. At 1100 a second B Co reconnaissance patrol approached one female WS vic coord 47239559. All detainees were evacuated to Tay Ninh West by helicopter at 1300H. Don Charlie continued security mission of RSP 4123 and LTL 26 from Tay Ninh to RV vic coord 47272433.

(d) 2/7 Arty 2/77 Arty minus 3 Btry, moved by a convoy to Suoi Da (X230533). From Suoi Da, Arty 2 advanced into FSB GUK (X278785) near an Peak Kick Special Forces Camp and had the assigned mission of DS of the 36th ARVN Ranger Bn. The Headquarters and Btry A continued by convoy to FSB EAM (X274700), escorted by the 2/22 Inf (c) and was joined by B/2/13 Arty which was attached. 4/2/77 was assigned the mission of DS of 2/12 Inf and B/2/13 Arty DS of 2/22 Inf (d). 3/1/73 Arty was attached and replaced B/2/13 Arty at FSB GUK LINE (X205533).

(c) 1/5th Inf (M): Evacuated 36th ARVN Ranger TP to Tay Ninh, reverted to CACVN parent unit at 1200H.

(52) 12 Apr 67 (D-49):

(1) 2/2 In-1: The 3n (-) straggled from Suu Tung to Suai In commencing at 0630H. They then straggled from Suai In to Li Nui commencing at 1130H. S&D operations were conducted in AO 0600Z.

(b) 2/72 Inf (4): At 0730H Co C departed to secure LZ PAUL. At 0745H Co A departed on a S&D operation. At 0815H Co C upon completion of securing LZ PAUL, performed S&D operations. At 0815H via coord XT205595 two C-47 air sorties were flown on a suspected VC camp. Two 500 lb bombs were dropped via coord XT205595 during this strike. At 1000H CP displaced to a new location via coord XT32736. Co C was relieved of its S&D mission to provide security for this move. At 1120H Co B discovered a hut containing 100 lbs of polished rice via coord XT247692. The rice and hut were destroyed. At 1720H Co B closed at the new CP location.

(e) 3/22 Inf: A Co continued security mission for Tay Nish West Base Camp perimeter. B Co continued security mission for Tay Nish Don Gravel Crusher. Co C continued security mission for F28 SAK and LZ 26 from Tay Nish to NJ via route XX72423.

(c) 2/77 Arty (+): Continued support with 3 Btry at Camp Reinder, 4 Btry and CP at PSB KIM (X127470C), C Btry at Fed Oak. ~2/73 Arty was at PSB C. BOLIDE, 2/2/73 at PSB KIM.

(e) C/4 Engr: Assisted in establishing FSB ENL.

(2) 2/3d Armored CPOON 3d Bn, attached platoon to 3d Bn, remained at Shad Bn.

(59) 29 APR 67 (2-29):

(1) 2/12 Inf; Commanded move to 733 EIA and closed at 1215L. A ground defense of 733 EIA, conducted SLD in AO 0000-2, CP at 1217/169.

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(b) 2/22 Inf (M): All Bn elements performed maintenance until 0900H. At 0900H S&D operations were conducted in AO PANTHER. At 0935H Co A vic coord XT225719 discovered and destroyed one hut and one bicycle. They captured 1 model #8 rifle, 1 Phillips radio, 15 lbs of documents, 10 lbs miscellaneous ammunition, practice grenades, a pistol and various homemade items. At 1130H vic coord XT207736, Co C discovered and destroyed 1 hut and five 1 man bunkers. At 1300H vic coord XT221777 Co A discovered a VC base camp and captured 20 lbs of miscellaneous gear (clothing, parachute material and soap). All elements closed larger site by 1735H.

(c) 3/22 Inf: Co A continued security of Tay Ninh West Base Camp. B Co continued security mission for Hai Ba San Gravel Crusher vic coord XT260574. Team Charlie continued security mission for FSB BLIN vic coord XT372423 and secured LTL 26 from Tay Ninh to BJ vic coord XT372423.

(d) 2/77 Artys: Continued DS, 3d Bn.

(e) 2/34 Armor: Continued to secure Sand Bn.

(54) 14 Apr 67 (D-51):

(a) 2/12 Inf: Continued security of FSB KIM, conducted local S&D operations, destroyed one bicycle at XT290708.

(b) 2/22 Inf (M): At 0730H Co A departed its larger area for S&D operations. At 0737H Co C departed CP location for S&D operations. At 0910H Co B departed CP location for S&D operations. Prior to this time, this unit performed maintenance in the larger area. At 1040H vic coord XT229704 Co A discovered 1 hut which was destroyed. At 1110H CP Group secured by the Bn Recon pit displaced to vic coord XT212747. The Recon pit then conducted S&D operations in Bn AO. At 1220H vic coord XT087765 Co C found and destroyed 100 rds of cal .30 ammunition. At 1700H vic coord XT190714 the Bn Recon pit discovered and destroyed 1 hut, 2 bunkers and 1 fencehole.

(c) 1/22 Inf: A Co's 2d pit ambush patrol reported hearing movement vic coord XT108526 at 0326H. At 0457H the patrol engaged movement with the following results: 1 VC KIA (MC), 2 VC KIA (Confirmed) and 1 AK-47 captured. Ambush patrol closed Tay Ninh West at 0710H and reported no further contact. B Co continued security of Hai Ba San Gravel Crusher. Team Charlie continued security mission for FSB KIM and LTL 26 from Tay Ninh to BJ vic coord XT372423.

(d) 2/34 Armor: Continued security of Sand Bn, no contact. A/2/34 Armor remained under OPCON 3d Bn for security Sand Bn, Bn reported OPCON parent unit.

(e) 2/77 Artys (+): Moved FSB CAROLINE to XT307497, laid and ready to fire at 1000H. At 1930H A Fly received 75 rds 81mm mortar fire and small ground attack. Defensive fires and air strikes caused enemy to break contact. One howitzer was damaged, 4 US KIA, 14 GID KIA.

(55) 15 Apr 67 (D-52):

(a) 2/12 Inf: Continued security of FSB KIM, conducted S&D operations locating a deserted base camp at XT257021, destroyed 6 rifle grenades with crisp cartridge, 2 rolls fuse wire.

(b) 2/22 Inf (M): At 0800H Bn Recon pit began search and destroy operations. At 1100H vic coord XT190715 Bn Recon pit discovered a base camp surrounded by a trench system. Within the base camp they discovered 5 boxes, 1 containing 20 bushels of unpolished rice. Other units of the Bn remained at the CP location, vic coord XT212747, for maintenance, training and establishment of daylight patrol.

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(c) 1/22 Inf: A Co continued security mission for Tay Ninh West Base Camp perimeter. A Co's reconnaissance platoon at the Interior platoon reported receiving information from a VC at 1200 hrs. Co continued security mission for Tay Ninh West Base Camp perimeter. Co continued security mission for Tay Ninh West Base Camp perimeter. Co continued security mission for Tay Ninh West Base Camp perimeter.

(d) 2/77 Arty: Continued DB, 3d Bn.

(e) 2/74 Arty (-): Continued security of Suoi Da.

(56) 16 Apr 67 (D-53):

(a) 2/12 Inf: Continued security of FSB KIM. A Co destroyed 2 tons of unpolished rice at K1264717. B Co made contact with estimated VC squad and located extensive tunnel system at K1264680.

(b) 2/22 Inf (M): At 0730 hrs Co A departed the CP location for S&D operations. In conjunction with this mission, Co A was to prepare a crossing site via coord K1266744. At 0755 hrs Co C departed the CP location for S&D operations. At 0800H Co B departed the CP location for S&D operations. At 1205H Co A had completed the creek crossing via coord K1266744. At 1310H Co A via coord K1263776 discovered three bloody hand bandages. At 1425H they discovered an old base camp via coord K1226773. The camp contained 8 huts, and 7 bunkers which were destroyed. It appeared the huts had not been occupied for a long period of time. At 1500H all Bn elements had closed the Bn CP location upon completion of S&D operations.

(c) 1/22 Inf: Night ambush patrol from Co A reported hearing an ox cart approaching ambush site via coord K1264553. 4.2 inch mortar fire was called in via coord K1264553 with unknown results. B Co continued security mission for Tay Ninh West Base Camp perimeter via coord K1260574. Co C established and secured FSB CLONLINE via coord K1205492 and continued security for LTL 26 from Tay Ninh to BJ via coord K1272423.

(d) 2/77 Arty: Continued DB, 3d Bn.

(57) 17 Apr 67 (D-54):

(a) 2/12 Inf: Bn (-) continued to secure FSB KIM and conduct S&D operations in AC COUGAR. The Recon platoon of the 2/12 Inf initially attached to C Btry 2/77 Arty at FSB OAK at coord K1274775. Co B made contact with 4 VC at coord K1264680 resulting in 1 US KIA and neg VC casualties. They also found a base camp at K1264775 recently used including bunkers with trench system.

(b) 2/22 Inf (M): At 0825H units departed the CP location via coord K1260003 for S&D operation. The Bn Recon platoon remained behind for CP security. At 1415H Co B reported bunkers over looking a trail, via coord K1223797 to K1224795 and bunkers with overhead cover coord K1228797 and K1228803. At 1415H Co C reported sighting 3 VC in the open via coord K1249820. At the same time Co B reported discovery of a base camp via coord K1203617 which was approximately half destroyed by previous air strikes. At 1600H Co B sighted a complex of trench lines via coord K1213903.

(c) 1/22 Inf: A Co continued security mission for Tay Ninh West Base Camp while B Co continued security for Tay Ninh West Base Camp perimeter via coord K1260574. A reconnaissance patrol from Co B apprehended 1 AMB LAKE, and 1 VC via coord K1276557. Co C continued security mission for FSB CLONLINE via coord K1205492 and LTL 26 from Tay Ninh to BJ via coord K1272423.

(d) 2/77 Arty: Continued DB mission.

(58) 18 Apr 67 (D-55):

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(a) 2/22 Inf: Continued security of FSB EBN and conducted JG operations. One small enemy mortar was shot down by small arms fire while another was returned to FSB EBN. No other activity was reported.

(b) 2/22 Inf (4): In continued SSB operations in AO FANTHER, the Recon platoon provided CP security. By 0700 all elements had cleared the CP location via cord X212813. At 0700H via cord X212813 Co B reported passing through a VC hospital complex which had been destroyed by Co A on 29 Mar 66. There were no signs of activity since that time. At 1005H via cord X2143827 Co B received small arms fire from 2 to 3 VC resulting in 1 US WNL. The enemy was engaged by fire with negative results. At the same time a Co B APC M113 detected a mine resulting in negative casualties and minor damage to the APC. At 1055 hrs via cord X2143827 Co B encountered a narrow detonated mine which exploded in front of the APC and caused no casualties or damage. At 1120 hrs via cord X2143827 Co B received small arms fire while checking out a trench line. At 1130 hrs a Co B APC M113 detected a mine with no casualties and minor damage to the APC. At 1235H the CP Group 2/22 Inf and the Recon platoon were displacing toward via cord X2143827. At 1245H the lead element (1 Recon APC M113) detected a mine and immediately received small arms fire and rounds from an RPG II. Results of the action were one US KIA, five US WNL, and unknown enemy casualties. 2 APC's had moderate damage caused by mine and RPG hits. At 1300 hrs via cord X2143827 Co B received small arms fire while checking a hut resulting in 1 US KIA. At 1400H via cord X2143827 Co B discovered an extensive boom camp area containing approximately 15 huts, 3 classrooms, and documents which indicated the camp could be an old signal school. There was an estimated 500 feet of trench system in and around the complex. The VC employed approximately 12 enemy detonated explosives or booby traps as Co B entered the area. This included a rifle grenade which was used against an APC. An estimated 8 to 12 VC were in the area. At 1500H Co A was ordered to move East and link up with Co B. Upon link up at 1535 hrs both units completed a thorough search of the boom camp without incident and returned to the CP location via cord X2143827 at approximately 1735 hrs. Co C linked up with the CP group and Recon platoon at the area of contact, and proceeded to the new CP location via cord X2143827 during the early afternoon.

(c) 1/22 Inf: Co A continued security mission for Tay Nish West Base Camp. B Co continued security mission for Hai Ba Son General Cracker via cord X2160576. Para Charlie continued security mission for FSB CUBILIFE via cord X2160576 and LFL 26 from Tay Nish to SF via cord X2172423.

(d) 2/77 Arty: Continued IS mission.

(59) 19 Apr 67 (D-46):

(a) 2/12 Inf: Continued SSB, security of FSB EBN with no contact.

(b) 2/22 Inf (4): 2/22 Inf (4) displaced to FSB EBN via cord X212813.

(c) 1/22 Inf: A Co continued security mission for Tay Nish West while B Co secured Hai Ba Son General Cracker. Co C secured FSB CAROLINE via cord X2160576 and LFL 26 from Tay Nish to SF via cord X2172423.

(d) 2/77 Arty: Continued IS MI.

(60) 20 Apr 67 (D-57):

(a) 2/12 Inf: The Recon platoon was transferred from FSB EBN to Camp Baidier. Recon transferred from FSB C-1 to Camp Baidier. The Recon cleared at 0940 hrs.

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PMJH 8

(2) Personnel: 63 SEA, 224 WMA, 7 WMA (Non-hostile)
(3) Equipment:

Geography

2 REC 15 destroyed
2 SA 312 phones destroyed
1 911 out-board destroyed

057

26 AJC down rd
2 bulldozers damaged
2 2 1/2 trucks damaged
2 tanks damaged

(1) Personal: 671 EA (25), 246 WG EA (Over), 22
7-2, 3 & 4-10-68.

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7

Pr. 1

[illegible]

Q2451

2200 lbs web gear and equipment
5 gal FC
1 fork lift
1 shon factory
55 gal CS gas
2 gas masks
3 cork stoves
1 bicycle

Ms. A. 9.2.10.2

- 6 barrel and receiver groups
- 1 Service gun pistol
- 1 7.62 rifle
- 6 hand made body traps (1 lb TNT)

Q121

1 bicycle
1 mg fish
10 tons rice
5 gal FOL
100 lbs web gear and equipment

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1. Early Lessons

(U) Personal: 1 EA (20)

(2) Equipment: 2: traps, 21 bats, 21 barrels, 20,250 lbs rice, 1 basket fish, 1 cup, 3 AT mice, 2 lbs salt, 2 bottles, 3 bicycles, 6 rifle grenades, 6 crates + weapons, 1 pump, 2 rolls fine wire, 15 chickens, 1 175 mm, 2000 ft. of aluminum, 27 C&S sub-lets, 3 small grenades, 1 box 50 cal ammo.

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(3) During the operation, the 3-1 section maintained an officer and 1 enlisted man with the forward command group. The officer provided assistance to the brigade and over-looked the movement of the 3-1 section to the forward area. The enlisted man received and transmitted messages, passing such information to the rear elements for the initial to the rear area. The majority of the 3-1 section was positioned in the rear area, with only the necessary personnel required to the CO's signature being forward.

2. Administration

a. Personnel Administration

(1) Phase I, 12 Feb - 17 Mar 57

During this phase of the operation, the 3-1 section maintained an officer and 1 enlisted man with the forward command group. The officer provided assistance to the brigade and over-looked the movement of the 3-1 section to the forward area. The enlisted man received and transmitted messages, passing such information to the rear elements for the initial to the rear area. The majority of the 3-1 section was positioned in the rear area, with only the necessary personnel required to the CO's signature being forward.

(2) Phase II, 18 Mar - 7 Apr 57

During the second phase of Operation JUNCTION CITY, the 3-1 section maintained an officer and 1 enlisted man with the forward command group. The officer provided assistance to the brigade and over-looked the movement of the 3-1 section to the forward area. The enlisted man received and transmitted messages, passing such information to the rear elements for the initial to the rear area. The majority of the 3-1 section was positioned in the rear area, with only the necessary personnel required to the CO's signature being forward.

(3) Phase III, 8-20 April 1957

In Phase III, the 3-1 section over-looked from the brigade base camp at the Hill. Due to infrequent contact with the enemy, casualties were light and no problems encountered in casualty reporting. Actions requiring the brigade commander's signature or endorsement were forwarded by courier to the brigade sergeant major.

(4) Comments: Since most administrative actions are accomplished in the rear, there does not appear to be any requirement to have more than one officer and one enlisted man with the forward elements on operation. Casualty reports are more efficiently processed when transmitted directly to the rear than command element point.

b. Supply Operation JUNCTION CITY PHASE I, II and III.

During Phase I of JUNCTION CITY all classes of supply were issued through the FM located at Trail 1. The Brigade Troop was also located at Trail 1. Distribution to the forward areas was made by land and air.

During Phase II of JUNCTION CITY all classes of supply except Class III and Class V (Army only) were issued from the Hill by air. A Class III and Class V (Army only) were not issued from the Hill. A survey was dispatched daily to the Hill for status of necessary items.

During Phase III all resupply was by air from the Hill. No problems in the resupply areas were encountered during the operation.

c. Maintenance

(1) During Phase I of Operation JUNCTION CITY, a support element was Co B, Fifth Battalion, located in the FM to support the 3-1 section and maintain equipment. Repair parts were received from the rear area at the Hill by road. High priority repair parts were flown in from Co B of the Hill, as the need arose.

(2) During Phase II & III of Operation JUNCTION CITY support was provided from the rear area. At the Hill, repair parts were flown in to the 3-1 section and equipment was maintained. Support teams, primarily armament, were part of the forward element as the

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units requested items.

2. Status of each Class of Supply

(1) During Phase I a three day stockpile of C-ration and a one day stockpile of A-ration was maintained at the BZ. During Phase II and all Class I was maintained at Dau Tieng with 5 days of C-ration and one day of A-ration.

(2) Class II: (Stockpile Level)

(a) MSGAS 7 days

(b) JFAS 5 days

(c) AVS 10 days

(d) FIVE 5 days

(3) Class V: An ASP was maintained at Trại B during Phase I. During Phase II the 3d Bn was maintained on Class V (Army) area at Suoi Da, during Phase III all came over from Dau Tieng and Tay Ninh by air and overland convoy.

3. Hospitalization and Evacuations

(1) For Operation JUNCTION CITY, beginning 22 Feb 1967, it was decided to move Co A, 25th Medical Bn to the forward logistical base at Trại B. This company became operational on 24 Feb, replacing Co A, 1st Med Bn which had deployed a medical section at Trại B for Operation GADSDEN. Co A, 25th Med Bn was able to deploy a laboratory and dental capability with their medical section in Trại B. Two aeromedical B-119s were placed on standby at the medical company location at Trại B.

(2) Early in Operation JUNCTION CITY, the 3d Bn, functioning as a blocking force, was in a relatively static role. It operated from fixed CP locations in a fixed TCR. In this configuration, it was possible to locate the battalion aid station and surmount in the rear of the CP in direct support of the tactical units. At POC 122, where the artillery and an infantry battalion were located, a single aid station was adequate for medical support. Evacuation was primarily by air, the routine and priority patients being returned to Trại B on resupply helicopters, and the less serious patients evacuated by Dust Off. In the later phases, units of the brigade were in a more mobile role, moving from objective to objective through dense jungle foliage. Consequently it was impractical to maintain a fixed aid station with the infantry units. There was increased reliance on the company aid men who often decided which of the wounded and sick required evacuation. Aid stations were maintained at the forward support base where the 3d Bn CP and artillery were deployed.

(3) JUNCTION CITY II, beginning 28 Feb 1967, presented the brigade with its first mass casualty situation. Early in the battle of 21 March 1967, in anticipation of a large number of casualties additional Dust-Off helicopters were requested. A total of four Dust-Off ships were on standby, ready to enter the landing zone as soon as the tactical situation permitted. These ships plus four resupply ships were used for aeromedical evacuation. In addition, many casualties were returned to Dau Tieng on the return flight of resupply helicopters which were taking ammunition and other supplies into the area of operations. Many patients were returned to duty after being treated at the battalion aid station in the forward area. Approximately 130 casualties were evacuated in the action, 5% requiring evacuation to hospitals, including the brigade's medical company in Dau Tieng.

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(4) Medical evacuations and treatment after the Battle of Suoi Tre were routine and no significant or unusual situations were encountered. JUNCTION CITY, Phase III began 8 April 67 and presented little problem as to medical evacuation and treatment. The 4th Medical Bn clearing company returned to base camp at Ban Tlong as the need for its presence in the field during Phase III was not indicated. Adequate medical care and performance was given by the individual battalion aid stations. An additional Duct-Off was assigned to Tay Ninh which alleviated the problem of an adequate number of helicopters for evacuation. There were 18 casualties evacuated during the last phase of the operation and no significant delays were encountered.

14. Special Equipment and Techniques

a. Special Equipment: Perimeter defense of a fire support base may be greatly enhanced by the addition of preplanned machine concentrations to the normal direct fire assignments. These concentrations are identified to the personnel manning the perimeter and are assigned to specific hardware sections for firing. Firing data is predetermined and kept at the gun positions. (See Lessons Learned, Battle of Suoi Tre).

b. M-576 proved to be unsatisfactory for cross-country use even less current housing and which as used during GADKHEM. It was unable to stay with the M-113 and M-557. The use of an M-113 with fabricated hoist has proved adequate.

c. The diesel powered M-113 proved superior to the gasoline powered M-113 in all respects.

d. Techniques

(1) An OH-230 helicopter was used to lay communication wire between remote Fire Support Bases and the Bn CP. The helicopter merely dropped the wire across the top of the jungle canopy enabling the brigade to have land line communication very quickly after establishing positions.

(2) Construction of bunkers, particularly for fire direction centers and CPs can be completed rapidly when bunkers are used for the initial excavation. The bunker is then built with the top at ground level, greatly reducing the vulnerability of the bunker to flat trajectory fire.

(3) Speed was found to be most essential in the construction of CP and Fire Direction Center Bunkers. Several extra personnel were brought to the field just to aid in the construction of the Bn and Bn CP. Once the bunker was complete they were sent back to base camp.

(4) The use of the counter-mortar guard proved effective. The mortar guard got an estimate to the incoming rounds by sound. The following day when the enemy mortar position was found; it lay extremely close to the estimate determined by the guard the previous evening during the attack.

15. Commander's Analysis:

a. Operations within Western and Central War Zone C during the three phases of Operation JUNCTION CITY are considered to have been highly successful.

The destruction of base camp facilities and capture of quantities of supplies, documents, ammunition and weapons seriously hampered enemy propaganda, recruitment and combat effectiveness. The extensive improvement of road net works and construction of landing zones will enhance future operations in the area.

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The pressure of the initial phase of Phase II, in conjunction with the overall pressure of Operation JUNCTION CITY, caused the enemy to commit his forces in a major battle resulting in the defeat and, to a large extent, the destruction of the combat power of one of the enemy's main force regiments. This was the first major battle in which the Brigade as a whole participated. It renewed the confidence of the Brigade in its ability to engage and defeat the best efforts of the enemy and proved the validity of the fundamental principles of security, firepower, and adherence to basic concepts of ground warfare.

B. Lessons Learned:

(1) (a) Items: Engineer work party security.

(b) Discussions: Engineer work parties have been subjected to ambushes and sniping because security forces were too far away.

(c) Observations: Security forces must be with the lead elements (usually mine clearing teams) and on either flank to be effective. Accompaniment by fire (artillery and small arms) works very well during road clearing operations.

(2) (a) Items: Mine Landmine Lessons.

(b) Discussions: Many LZ's and potential LZ's were heavily trapped with command-detonated charges. Charges varied from bombs (up to 750 lbs), to claymore mines, to 155, 105, 82 and flame shells. Usually a small permanent force guards the LZ and is prepared to detonate the mines as helicopter land.

(c) Observations: A heavy artillery preparation fire - frequently causes the party to leave or will destroy the wires of command detonated devices. When discovered command detonated mines should be destroyed in the following manner:

1. Cut all wires leading from charge, one at a time.
2. Tie wires together: Use "Western-union pig tail tie".
3. Blow charges in place by placing C-4 (usually ribbon charge) on top so that main force of charge will be down into the ground.

See Annex D.

4. For Lessons Learned, Battle of Sam Tye.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

James S. G. in 4, 12, 27
 GILBERT E. SMITH
 Major, Infantry
 Adjutant

5 Annexes

- Annex A - Operation Overlay - Phase I } Withdrawn at Rgo BA
- Annex B - Operation Overlay - Phase II } Withdrawn at Rgo BA
- (C) Enclosures
- Annex C - Operation Overlay - Phase III } Withdrawn at Rgo BA
- Annex D - Lessons Learned, Battle of Sam Tye
- Annex E - Photographs, Battle of Sam Tye } Withdrawn at Rgo BA
- (Selected copies only)

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 3D BRIGADE
4TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO US FORCES 98268

AVDDC-C

31 MARCH 1967

SUBJECT: Lessons Learned "Battle of Suoi Tre."

TO: CC, 25th Infantry Division
ATTN: S-3 AVDDC-C

1. 3d Bn, 22d Infantry.

a. Item: "Stand to" Formation.

Discussion: In accordance with SOP the battalion conducted a 100% alert thirty minutes prior to EOWT and began a perimeter sweep to clear the area of possible infiltrators. This action probably triggered the enemy attack. At the time, the Battalion was at 100% alert and this was critical in blunting the first assault.

Observation: Conducting stand to and perimeter sweeps continues to be one of the most important security measures.

b. Item: Conduct of security patrols.

Discussion: Around the base camp at FSB GOLD there were two reinforced squad size ambush patrols and OP/LP positions in front of each platoon. One patrol did hear and report noise at 0633 hours which alerted the battalion. More patrols observing the enemy would possibly have fixed the avenue of approach and enabled us to spoil his attack with artillery.

Observation: Saturation patrolling is necessary for early warning. A squad size patrol from each company, OP/LP's in front of each platoon, and platoon size ambush on the primary avenue of approach is recommended.

c. Item: Reaction force.

Discussion: The Bn reaction force consisted of the Reconnaissance platoon and elements from the 1d Bn, 77th Artillery. The enemy attack, once initiated, was vigorous and determined. There was little time for any reaction before the base camp was heavily engaged. The reaction force had been rehearsed the night prior to the attack. They were committed and were able to blunt one penetration and reestablish the perimeter.

Observation: A ready reaction force proved to be a vital asset. To be effective they must be rehearsed and available with equipment immediately at hand. Areas of responsibility and signals must be rehearsed.

d. Item: Planned artillery concentrations.

Discussion: Very quickly after the assault was initiated artillery concentrations were needed within 30 meters of the perimeter. There was some delay in getting this fire as there were no preplanned firing data.

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Observation: Preplanned fire should be planned within 30 meters of the defensive perimeter. Preplanned fire should be adjusted as close as troop safety permits during initial organization of the defense and even closer concentrations should be plotted and on call.

2. 2d Bn, 12th Infantry.

a. Item: Fire coordination between units closing during relief of area under attack.

Discussion: During movement to PSB GOLD on 21 March 67 it was necessary for the lead element of 2/12 Inf to shift from its original course during final phases of units closing. There was some difficulty encountered in coordinating fires as the reinforcing elements closed on PSB GOLD.

Observation: Aerial observers can eliminate problems of fire coordination. It is advisable to have one per battalion.

b. Item: Use of established trails during movement to provide relief to units under attack.

Discussion: Upon receipt of warning order to provide a force to reinforce units under attack at PSB GOLD on 21 Mar 67, 2/12 Inf formed to move out. The battalion perimeter then came under attack by indirect fire from VC mortars (at that time it was of undetermined origin). Co C moved out immediately by the most direct route avoiding established trails. They were followed by the remainder of the battalion. Co C encountered sniper and mortar fire enroute to PSB GOLD but did not meet a large enemy force. By avoiding established trails units of 2/12 Inf were not effectively blocked in moving toward PSB GOLD. There is every indication from the mortar attack just when the battalion started to move that the enemy had located the 2/12 Inf and had anticipated their attempt to reinforce. If an enemy blocking force was used, they were not in the heavy jungle but were on the main avenues of approach. They were not able to significantly delay or block the advance of the 2/12 Inf.

3. 2d Bn, 77th Artillery.

a. Item: Artillery Inner Perimeter.

Discussion: Even with Infantry support around the artillery element, an inner perimeter is developed within the infantry perimeter. This inner perimeter consists of fighting holes close to the howitzers and the FDC bunkers. This perimeter is not manned, but is available in case of ground attack for the artillerymen to fight from and protect their howitzers and FDC.

Observation: When the infantry was hit by the mass assaults, the inner perimeter gave the infantry a secondary position to fall back to. At the inner perimeter the artillerymen were also available to beef up the fighting line. Use of the howitzers in direct fire could also be effected when the inner perimeter was manned.

b. Item: Use of Beehive in Direct Fire.

Discussion: After coordination between the infantry security and the artillery, the time came when the need for beehive was essential to hold the enemy. The infantry had fallen back to the howitzer positions or taken cover into their own foxholes to avoid the blast and the flechettes. Because of the close range of the enemy waves the fuses were set at mass action.

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Observation: The beehive round was extremely effective in stopping the assaulting enemy troops. Later there were numerous bodies found that had been killed by the flachettes of the beehive round. It stopped everything in its path. An after action was the preparation of preplanned beehive concentrations for all howitzers. If the infantry and the individual howitzer sections had the data for those concentrations, they would have called for them by target number depending on what portion of the perimeter needed them. Reaction time would have been reduced.

c. Item: Artillery Reaction Force.

Discussion: The artillery battalion had two (2) reaction forces of 10-15 men each for use in strengthening the perimeter, both were needed. During the attack both reaction forces were committed to strengthen the infantry perimeter. Everyone on the reaction force must know the signal to assemble, where to assemble, and exactly how to maneuver out to the weakened portion of the perimeter.

Observation: Rehearsals are essential in the assembly and deployment of the reaction force and the reaction force was rehearsed the evening before the attack of LZ GOLD. This rehearsal proved invaluable as both the assembly and deployment went very swiftly and smoothly. Also each group should be armed with several M-79 Grenade launcher and numerous hand grenades as both proved invaluable in holding off the assaults.

d. Item: Placement of Artillery for Mutual Support.

Discussion: Each artillery position should have artillery within range to support that position. The mutually supporting units can fire in the defensive concentrations for each other, fire the counter-mortar targets for each other, and fire in general support in case of ground attack.

Observation: The 105mm Howitzer battery within supporting range of the FSB provided the primary artillery support, firing nearly 1100 rounds in less than four hours with most of it in the first 90 minutes. It was instrumental in the defense of the artillery position, and may have been the extra punch needed to prevent an enemy penetration.

e. Item: Shields of the 105mm Howitzers.

Discussion: Because of the air-mobile concept in the movement of 105mm howitzers, shields have been removed to reduce the weight. During the attack on the artillery position the howitzers proved to be a prime target of the enemy. Both recoilless rifle rounds and small arms fire were used very extensively against the howitzers. Had the shields been on the howitzer, the crewmen would have been afforded more protection and there would have been fewer friendly casualties.

Observation: The extra weight involved with keeping the howitzer shields attached can be compensated for by leaving back several non-essential items of equipment. This policy has been initiated and one lift with shields has been made with no problems.

f. Item: Use of hand grenades and grenade launchers (M-79) in fighting off an attacking force.

Discussion: The most effective small arms weapon in stopping the attacking force was the M-79 grenade launcher. Hand grenades were also very effective. The terrain was extensively furrowed hence the enemy had natural cover in his approach to our position. The grenade launcher and hand grenades were used very effectively against the attacking enemy.

Observation: The small arms basic load of ammunition for the howitzer battery should be adjusted to double the number of M-79 grenade launchers and hand grenades. Extra grenades and small arms ammo should be stored where it is easily accessible and close to the fighting holes.

h. Item: Storage of ammunition adjacent to howitzers.

Discussion: All ammunition in an artillery position should be broken down and stored at the howitzer positions. Under heavy attack, it is very difficult to get to an ammunition storage area. The ammunition should also be placed in a bunker for protection. Much of our ammunition was ruined by fire and several rounds detonated at the gun positions.

Observation: As quickly as an ammunition resupply comes in it should be stored at the howitzer positions. Bunkers with overhead sand-bag cover should be constructed at each position to protect the ammunition.

4. 2d Bn 22d Infantry & 2d Bn 34th Armor:

a. Item: Speed and shock action in the attack.

Discussion: Once the enemy had committed himself to the battle the reinforcing armor and mechanized forces were employed with as much speed as possible. They entered PSB GOLD taking full advantage of their speed and shock action.

Observation: The tactic of firepower and shock action was again proved effective as all the mechanized elements were brought into use and none were neutralized despite the number of anti-tank weapons available to the enemy. (Over 50 RPG-11 weapons and nearly 11 rounds of ammunition).

5. General.

a. Item: Reinforcement time.

Discussion: Once ordered to move to reinforce PSB GOLD the commanders of the reinforcing battalions (2/12 Inf, 2/22 Inf (M), and 2/16 Armor) pressed to the attack without allowing their elements to get sidetracked, slowed down or engaged with enemy delaying actions.

Observation: The aggressiveness of the Battalion Commanders in moving to the scene of the battle enabled the Brigade to turn a well fought defensive action into a timely offense and substantial victory.

6. Summary:

With the exception of some techniques in the use of the Bee-Hive round there were no new or startling lessons learned as a result of the Battle of Suoi Tre. Rather, the value of the essentials of pre-planning, rehearsing, preparing positions, and proper training to insure that every man can properly accomplish his assigned mission constitute the lesson of the Battle of Suoi Tre. The principles of security, surprise, mass, and the importance of commanders at all levels remaining mission oriented are as applicable in guerrilla warfare as in conventional warfare.