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AGO ltr 29 Apr 1990 ; AGO ltr 29 Apr 1980

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

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**OACSFOR**

IN REPLY REFER TO  
AGAM-P (M) (29 Jun 67)

19  
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OT-RD-670107

5 July 1967

4  
17859  
GENERAL  
DATE

SUBJECT: ~~Operational Report~~ Lessons Learned, 1st Military Intelligence Battalion (ARS) (FLD A) ~~for period ending 31 January 1967~~

11 10 Feb 67

12 176

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

9 Operational report for quarterly period ending 31 Jan 67.

1. Forwarded as inclosure is Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 1st Military Intelligence Battalion (ARS) (FLD A) for period ending 31 January 1967. Information contained in this report should be reviewed and evaluated by CDC in accordance with paragraph 6f of AR 1-19 and by CONARC in accordance with paragraph 6c and d of AR 1-19. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to the Commandants of the Service Schools to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

*Kenneth G. Wickham*

KENNETH G. WICKHAM  
Major General, USA  
The Adjutant General

Incl  
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
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
1ST MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION (ARS) (FLD 1)  
APO San Francisco 96307

AVGJ-ACO

10 February 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1967  
(RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

TO: Commanding Officer  
525th Military Intelligence Group  
APO San Francisco 96307

(U) The following report is submitted in accordance with USARV Regulation 870-2, dated 19 July 1966:

## SECTION 1 SIGNIFICANT ORGANIZATION ACTIVITIES

1. (U) The battalion was operationally engaged in the performance of its mission for the entire reporting period, a total of 92 days.

2. (C) The primary mission, that of providing tactical interpretation of aerial imagery resulting from tactical air reconnaissance operational elements operating from the Republic of Vietnam in support of all Free World ground forces, was successfully accomplished during the reporting period. Reproduction of aerial imagery and delivery of imagery to the requesting units, were also accomplished most successfully. Statistically, the increases are as follows compared to the previous reporting period.

	<u>1 Aug-31 Oct 66</u>	<u>1 Nov 66-31 Jan 67</u>
Items of military significance extracted from aerial imagery:	11,050	23,669
Imagery Interpretation reports:	762	2,243
Imagery reproduction:	804,000 ft	898,623 ft
Aerial delivery of imagery to requestors:	1,129	1,187

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GROUP - 4  
Downgraded at 3 year intervals;  
Declassified after 12 Years

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3. (C) In addition to fulfilling its primary combat support missions, elements of the battalion were able to assist numerous military organizations with various types of aerial reconnaissance support. Examples of the most significant projects are as follows:

a. Mosaics were prepared for the 1st ARVN Division to be used for the planning of future operations.

b. Mosaics were prepared for the Capital Military District, Saigon. These mosaics were used for operational planning.

c. Four priority II missions flown along the Cambodian border were processed for COMUSMACV through IV Corps Senior Advisor. The missions were used to obtain intelligence concerning border violations.

d. A map revision of I Corps was accomplished, which materially assisted comparative cover analysis.

e. Beach analysis reports of the coastline in Quang Tri Province, I CTZ, below the DMZ were prepared for the Naval Advisory Group. The reports will be used to assist the Navy in future operations in that area.

f. Fourteen bridge and route studies and sixteen outpost studies were prepared for the G2, 21st ARVN Division.

g. A study of major and secondary canals and waterways within IV Corps is being prepared for the 4th Riverine, a joint naval force composed of U.S. Patrol Boat River (PBR) units and VNAV River Assault Group (RAG) units. This study is to determine the width of canals and waterways, obstacles in the canals and waterways and the heights of bridges crossing them. This study will greatly assist the River Assault Group and Patrol Boat River units since they are responsible for patrolling the canals and waterways and also for conducting waterborne assault operations.

4. (C) A special study to determine the number of hectares of rice under cultivation in 1965 in the IV Corps area was requested by COMUSMACV through IV Corps Senior Advisor. Unit base cover of 1:50,000 scale Navy mapping photography was used for the study. The Tactical Imagery Interpretation Facility (TIIF) AN/TSQ-43 was used for the project. The study commenced on 15 November 1966 and was completed 10 January 1967.

It was estimated that the use of the AR-85a Viewer/Computer, a component part of the TIIF, saved approximately 2000 man-hours during the project. This project will be conducted each year for the purpose of comparative study.

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5. (C) It has been determined that existing Imagery Interpretation (II) Keys concerning South Vietnam are inadequate. This was found to be true concerning both conventional photography and Infrared (IR). 1st MIBARS began a project to prepare both IR and conventional II Keys for all II units in the Republic of Vietnam and the Army Intelligence School. In order to expedite this project, the MIBARS detachments were instructed to supply imagery and written reports about each print. The imagery will depict defensive positions, both insurgency and counterinsurgency, lines of communications, industrial areas, agricultural areas and other activities typical in each corps area. The estimated date for completion is March 1967.

6. (C) Infrared imagery has proven to be of great value in Vietnam, used either by itself or in conjunction with other sensors. IR deals with energy (heat) emissions whereas conventional imagery deals with photographic images. II's from all services have received training in the interpretation of IR; however, few are thoroughly trained in the use of IR in Vietnam. Therefore, a five-day course of IR instruction will be offered by the MIBARS to all interested Army, Air Force, Marine Corps and Navy II's. This course will commence in March 1967. The basic purpose of the school is as a refresher course for prior Imagery Interpretation IR students and is an introductory course for personnel with no previous training.

7. (C) Experience to date has indicated that personnel assigned G2/S2 Air duties have never received formal training or have little or no experience in this field. This problem has been mentioned in the past Quarterly Reports. To assist in alleviating this situation, MIBARS is establishing a G2 Air School designed to orient intelligence personnel from corps down to battalion level on what is available in the aerial reconnaissance field, regular aerial reconnaissance procedures to follow, types of imagery and imagery to request in various situations. Factors indigenous to each corps will be stressed.

8. (C) During the period 3-21 January 1967, MIBARS conducted a training program and an operational survey on the Tactical Imagery Interpretation Facility (TIIF) AN/TSQ-43. The primary area of instruction on the TIIF centered on the AR-85a Viewer/Computer and was conducted for twenty-five MIBARS and CICV imagery interpreters. The purpose of this instruction was to familiarize and motivate personnel in the functions and capabilities of the AR-85a.

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9. (C) The problem of unreliable radio communication still exists. The Air-Ground Operations Net utilizes the AN/GRC-26 radio which has been in the Army inventory for over 15 years. This High-Frequency (HF) radio, due to long distances, weather interference and lack of frequencies cannot give adequate communications support in Vietnam. The USARV Signal Officer has directed that 1st MIBARS be given dedicated circuits, sole user, long-line teletype system and that HF radios be used only as a back-up system. When implemented, this system would meet the requirements for a fast, reliable means of relaying perishable intelligence information.

10. (C) The U-6A aircraft, presently utilized within the Delivery Platoon for delivery of aerial imagery and reports to requesting units, does not meet all requirements for sustained operations. Primarily, it lacks speed for rapid dissemination of information to remote units. Secondly, all aircraft presently used do not contain the ARC/102 radio needed for making instrument flights during periods of low ceiling and poor visibility. The use of an aircraft possessing these two capabilities, as well as those now possessed by the U-6A, will greatly increase the responsiveness and capabilities of the Delivery Platoon. The XV-4A Hummingbird, or similar aircraft, will satisfy the requirements of speed and all-weather operations. The interim use of an aircraft on the order of the U-8 will greatly improve the Platoon's capabilities.

11. (C) The battalion has sent imagery, II reports and instructional materials related to imagery interpretation in Vietnam to the 15th MIBARS, presently located at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Large amounts of imagery of Vietnam have also been forwarded to the Army Intelligence School, Fort Holabird, Maryland, to provide this school with more imagery directly concerned with internal defense. The USMC Liaison Officer for Operation Deckhouse 5 was furnished with IV Corps imagery to be forwarded to Marine Corps Barracks, U.S. Naval Station, San Francisco Cal. 1st MIBARS will continue to support other units in this respect, whenever possible.

12. (C) To assist in the education of air reconnaissance matters, the battalion is revising the MIBARS Aerial Reconnaissance Booklet. The anticipated date for final revision is April 1967. The booklet will be distributed to intelligence personnel of U.S. Forces, Free World Forces and a Vietnamese edition to ARVN intelligence personnel.

13. (C) The MIBARS Special Photographic Team conducted tests on the Questar and Perkin-Elmer lens systems in conjunction with the High-Magnification/Hand-Held Camera Project. During the testing, various types of film were used. It was determined that both lens systems were unsuitable for obtaining aerial photography of specific military targets in the counterinsurgency environment

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in the Republic of Vietnam. Both lens systems were rejected because the required exposure could not be obtained and because of the extremely limited depth of focus. Although the two lens systems were found inadequate, the test results proved that the Hand-Held Camera Project is still an excellent vehicle for immediate intelligence. To insure a better quality of photography, the battalion purchased five Pentax 35mm cameras, equipped with 200mm telephoto lenses. The battalion has issued these cameras to each of the MIBARS detachments' Special Photographic Teams, in each of the corps areas.

Excellent photographs have been obtained of targets in dense jungle terrain by having the aircraft make a treetop pass over the target area.

Two examples of the results obtained are: (1) A Viet Cong training area was photographed while under construction. Approximately 50-60 Viet Cong were observed in the open, digging tunnels and preparing fortifications. (2) A Hand-Held Camera mission was flown at the request of the U.S. 4th Division. The photography revealed camouflaged positions in the dense jungle. An air strike was ordered on these positions as a result of the photography. After the air strike another Hand-Held Camera mission was ordered to the same area for the purpose of bomb damage assessment.

14. (C) Imagery resolution versus scale should be considered. Most of the counterinsurgency-type targets that the Army imagery interpreter is looking for on aerial imagery is by its nature small in ground size, such as a fox-hole, an emplacement, a jungle trail, personnel indications and the like. In order to identify such objects the imagery must be sharp and clear. The scale of imagery normally required for identification of Viet Cong activity ranges between 1:2000 and 1:5000. Such large scale imagery enables the imagery interpreter to identify Viet Cong activity utilizing his main tool, a 2X or 4X stereoscope. The imagery presently taken by the Air Force air reconnaissance elements in Vietnam at scales of 1:4000 or 1:5000 is not sharp or clear enough for proper identification of ground targets, due to the lack of good imagery resolution. However, the Air Force reconnaissance elements contend that at smaller scales, such as 1:15,000 or 1:20,000, the same camera systems presently utilized will provide extremely good resolution and enable the imagery interpreter to identify the small objects he is looking for on the imagery (mainly photographic). At scales of 1:15,000 or 1:20,000, or even 1:10,000, the identification of enemy activity becomes extremely difficult, if not impossible, using a simple 2X or 4X stereoscope, which is the instrument primarily utilized by the Army imagery interpreter in the field at present. It would benefit the Army imagery interpretation units to possess the kind of equipment necessary to enlarge small-scale, high-resolution imagery of the type that the Air Force could provide to the Army in Vietnam, in order to better accomplish the imagery interpretation mission.

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## SECTION 2

### Part 1

#### Observations (Lessons Learned)

##### Training and Organization

(C) Item: Infrared School.

(C) Discussion: Interpretation of infrared imagery is an area of aerial reconnaissance which needs much improvement. It is realized that more intelligence can be extracted from infrared imagery than has been in the past. Experiments during the previous quarter, using infrared and conventional imagery in a simultaneous mode, have proven with the highest degree of certainty the necessity for multisensor coverage in support of counterinsurgency operations.

(C) Observation: An infrared imagery interpretation course of instruction is being prepared by the MIBARS. This instruction will be given at Tan Son Nhut Air Base. Instruction will be directed to introduce the interpreter unfamiliar with infrared to the many capabilities of the infrared sensors and to apply his abilities in such a manner that the maximum intelligence can be extracted from this unique aerial imagery.

(U) Item: G2 Air School.

(U) Discussion: The Army Intelligence School at Fort Holabird does not provide an adequate G2 Air course of instruction. Therefore, because of the lack of formal training of G2/S2 Air personnel, the MIBARS will conduct a G2 Air Course.

(U) Observation: The G2 Air School will provide the G2/S2 Air with the functions of the aerial reconnaissance system, requesting procedures, types of imagery and an introduction to the Hand-Held Camera System and its significance.

(U) Item: AR-85a Viewer/Computer program change.

(U) Discussion: The change of programs in the AR-85a in December 1966, required that MIBARS conduct courses of instruction for in-country imagery interpreters on the AR-85a.

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(U) Observation: The training will continue to be given by the MIBARS on an "as required" basis until a sufficient number of school-trained personnel are in-country.

(U) Item: TIIF air conditioning system.

(U) Discussion: The air distribution system in the TIIF van forces cold air directly on the AR-85a Viewer/Computer causing moisture to form in the computer, resulting in computer failure.

(U) Observation: MIBARS has modified the air ducts to redistribute the air circulation, effectively eliminating the moisture problem.

(U) Item: TIIF generator failure.

(U) Discussion: Seven of nine generator failures have been traced to the automatic governor system. This failure is apparently due to a low power demand on the generator.

(U) Observation: A MIBARS detachment, by putting a near maximum power demand on the generator, experienced no subsequent failure.

(U) Item: TIIF computer console connections.

(U) Discussion: Poor electrical and circuit connections between the computer console and the main computer assembly have caused the majority of the reported failures in the AR-85a Viewer/Computer.

(U) Observation: The factory service team is aware of this problem and corrective action is being taken on the present TIIF units and will be modified on future models.

Operations

(C) Item: Communications.

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(C) Discussion: The Air-Ground Operations Net is currently in operation, but is still inadequate to fill the communications needs of the aerial reconnaissance system in Vietnam.

(C) Observation: The Air-Ground Operations Net utilizing the AN/GRC-26 Radio cannot adequately fulfill the communications needs of the 1st MIBARS. USARV Signal Operations Section and the 2nd Signal Group are presently preparing a multi-point communications system, utilizing a dedicated, sole-user circuit on the long-line teletype network. When completed, this system will provide adequate communications support for the aerial reconnaissance system in Vietnam.

(C) Item: Questar and Perkin-Elmer Lens Systems.

(C) Discussion: The Questar and Perkin-Elmer lens systems were tested by 1st MIBARS as a part of the High-Magnification/Hand-Held Camera Project. Both systems were tested in fixed and rotary wing aircraft under a variety of light conditions and with various types of film.

(C) Observation: Both of these lens systems were designed for ground photography, permitting use of a very stable platform such as a tripod. The major shortcoming was the impossibility of obtaining the correct exposure while using a shutter speed of 1/1000 of a second. This speed is necessary to eliminate image motion due to the speed of the aircraft. While the lenses are excellent for their original purpose, they are not suitable for use as an aerial photo system.

(U) Item: Imagery resolution versus scale.

(U) Discussion: The Army imagery interpreter in the field is not properly equipped to interpret good, high-resolution, small-scale imagery. To properly interpret the imagery of the sensor systems used in the RF-4C aircraft and to achieve maximum benefits from this high resolution, a new generation of optic systems must be obtained. The present optics available to the Army imagery interpreter, such as the 2X or 4X stereoscope, are ill-equipped to work with small-scale, high-resolution photography.

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(U) Observation: Obtaining better optic systems or rear projection viewers, such as ITEK or Nuclear Research Institute (NRI) equipment would definitely improve the capabilities of the Army imagery interpreter. With the high-resolution imagery being used in Vietnam to support the ground combat units, a magnification system with at least 60X capability is desirable.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1967  
(RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

10 February 1967

## SECTION 2 Part 2 Recommendations

1. (C) That imagery interpretation personnel assigned to USARV and 7th Air Force be required to attend the Infrared course upon arrival in Vietnam.
2. (U) That the G2 Air School be attended by newly arrived G2/S2 Air officers and enlisted men.
3. (U) That copies of the instructional materials and program used in the G2 Air Course, be distributed by MACV to all units utilizing G2/S2 Air personnel unable to attend the MIBARS course.
4. (U) That the G2 Air School be reinstated at Fort Holabird.
5. (U) That 1st MIBARS continue to train personnel on the TIIF, as needed.
6. (U) That units attempt to "load" TIIF generators near the maximum KW output. This will cause a more constant load level on the engine, resulting in a decrease in generator down-time.
7. (C) That action be taken by Headquarters, MACV, and Headquarters, USARV, to accomplish as rapidly as possible, the change-over from HF radio communications to dedicated, sole-user, long-line circuits.
8. (C) That support and assistance be given signal units in establishing a combined TASE-MIBARS comcenter in the Tan Son Nhut area to act as a Net Control Station for this system.
9. (U) That two U-8 aircraft be obtained for use by MIBARS Delivery Platoon until such time as the XV-4A Hummingbird, or an aircraft with similar capabilities becomes available for MIBARS' use.

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(RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

// 10. (U) That up-to-date imagery interpretation equipment with high-powered optics be made available to imagery interpretation units in the Republic of Vietnam, to effectively utilize small-scale, high-resolution imagery.

  
EUGENE KELLEY JR.  
LTC, AIS  
Commanding

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AVHGC-DST (10 Feb 67) 2d In  
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending  
31 January 1967 (RCS CSFOH-65) (U)

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HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96307 15 MAY 1967

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-OT  
APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the period ending 31 January 1967 from Headquarters, 1st Military Intelligence Battalion (ARS)(FLD A) as indorsed.

2. (C) Pertinent comments follow:

a. (U) Reference paragraph 9, page 4; item: communications, pages 7 and 8; and paragraph 7, page 10, concerning the need for a sole-user long-line teletype system: A method of teletype netting using long lines circuits to satisfy this requirement is presently under test by the 1st Signal Brigade. Upon completion of these tests a suitable system will be provided.

b. (C) Reference paragraph 10, page 4; and paragraph 9, page 10, concerning the requirement for aircraft:

(1) Nonconcur with comment that the U-6A does not meet all requirements for sustained operations in the delivery of aerial imagery and reports to requesting units. The U-6A has a cruise speed of approximately 105 knots true airspeed with a duration of over 4 hours. It does contain all necessary instrumentation and radio navigation for making instrument flights during periods of low ceilings and poor visibility. The ARC/102 is a high frequency single sideband communication radio and is not required for instrument flight.

(2) Concur with statement that XV-4A Hummingbird or similar aircraft with vertical landing/takeoff capability and near mach speed would improve the responsiveness and capability of the delivery platoon. A recommended TOE change was submitted on 8 April 1965 to the US Army Combat Development Command Intelligence Agency, recommending that six (6) XV-4A Hummingbird or an aircraft with similar capabilities be authorized when finally approved for purchase.

(3) Nonconcur with comment and recommendation that the interim use of two U-8 aircraft would greatly improve the delivery platoon's capability. The only capability gained with the substitution of U-8 aircraft for the U-6A would be approximately 40 to 45 knots true airspeed. Additionally, there are no U-8 aircraft presently in-country

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which could be allocated to this unit.

(4) The 560th Aviation Detachment is scheduled for arrival and assignment to 525th Military Intelligence Group (MI Gp) in July. This unit is authorized two (2) U-8 type aircraft and may be used to satisfy the stated requirement if the group commander so elects.


c. (U) Reference item on the tactical imagery interpretation facility, page 7; paragraph 6, page 10; and paragraph 2, 1st Indorsement: It appears that the using unit has taken appropriate corrective action on its own initiative. This headquarters will include information on proper loading of power generators in the next Maintenance Information Summary for dissemination throughout the command.

d. (U) Reference paragraph 1, page 10, concerning mandatory training: This paragraph should be changed to delete reference to the 7th Air Force, and the following sentence added: "Imagery interpretation personnel of the 7th Air Force will be invited to attend the infrared course."

e. (U) Reference item on imagery resolution versus scale, pages 8 and 9, and paragraph 10, page 11: If this equipment is urgently needed, unit should submit a request for expediting non-standard urgent requirements for equipment (ENSURE) in accordance with USARV Regulation 705-2.

f. (U) With the exceptions noted above, this headquarters concurs with the observations and recommendations in the basic report.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

  
**E. L. KENNEDY**  
**CPT. AGC**  
**Adjutant General**

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GPOP-OT(10 Feb 67) 3d Ind (U)  
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending  
31 January 1967 (RCS CSFOR-65), HQ 1st MI Bn (ARS) (Fld A)

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HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558 21 JUN 1967

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the  
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in the basic report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:



HEAVRIN SNYDER  
CPT, AGC  
Asst AG

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