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
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**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
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IN REPLY REFER TO

AGAM-P (M) (21 Mar 68) FOR OT RD 6/X179

29 March 1968

AD 389278

SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report - Operation DALLAS, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, Period 17 - 26 May 1967 (U)

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1. Subject report is forwarded as inclosure for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15.
2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

Kenneth G. Wickham

**KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
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HEADQUARTERS, 1ST SQUADRON
11TH ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENT
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96257

1. (U) REFERENCES.

a. OPRD 12-67 (Operation DALLAS (U) dated 16 May 1967 to implement instructions received in 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division OPRD 12-67 (Operation DALLAS) (U) dated 14 May 1967.

b. Maps, Vietnam, 1:50,000 Series L7014, Sheets 6330 IV, 6331 I, II, III.

2. (U) NAME AND TYPE OF OPERATION. The name of the operation was DALLAS and was a search and destroy operation conducted in the western portion of WAR ZONE D.

3. (U) DATES OF OPERATION. 170700 May to 260900 May 1967 (Squadron participation).

4. (U) LOCATION. The area of operations for the squadron's phase of the operation was conducted in the western portion of WAR ZONE D. The area was generally northeast of TAN UXEN, in an area bounded by Route 16 to the west, the Dong Nai River to the south and east, and the Song Be River in the north and west.

5. (U) CONTROL HEADQUARTERS. The 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division was the controlling headquarters for the 1st Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment. The reporting officer for this report is Lieutenant Colonel Martin D. Howell, Commanding Officer, 1st Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment.

Subordinate commanders during the operation were as follows:

Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, 1st Squadron	CPT John E. Bailey
Troop A	CPT John F. Votaw
Troop B	CPT John R. Landry (17 May to 22 May)
Troop C	CPT George L. Gunderman
Company D	CPT William C. Chadbourne
Howitzer Battery	1LT Lawrence H. Marine Jr.
1st Platoon, Air Cavalry Troop	MAJ Robert N. Truadway
1st Platoon, 919th Engineer Company	2LT Anthony T. Power

6. (C) GENERAL.

a. The below indicated organization was the squadron's basic configuration for the operation. Daily modifications were made to permit flexibility, but generally each team had access to all elements of their assigned task organization as outlined.

Squadron Controls:

Howitzer Battery

Aviation Section

1st Platoon, Air Cavalry Troop, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment

1st Platoon, 919th Engineer Company

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Team A:

Troop A (-)

Tank Section, Company D

Team B:

Troop B

3rd Platoon, Company D

Troop C

Team D:

Company D (-)

2nd Platoon, Troop A

b. Artillery: Direct support was provided by howitzer battery with reinforcing fires being provided by artillery supporting the 1st Brigade.

c. Army Aviation:

(1) First Platoon, Air Cavalry Troop flew in direct support of the squadron. Light and heavy fire teams were used continuously on a daily basis. The squadron aviation section provided daily command and control coverage over the area of operations.

(a) Employment:

- 1 Command and control
- 2 Aerial fire support
- 3 Column cover
- 4 Reconnaissance
- 5 Dawn and dusk patrols of laager areas
- 6 Mortar watch
- 7 Suppressive fire runs (Aerial Thunder Runs)

(b) Statistics on support rendered:

- 1 Sorties flown - 176 (43 combat missions)
- 2 Hours flown - 249

(c) Results: Aviation elements were credited with two VC KBA (PICS), six structures, two sampans destroyed and twenty-seven structures, one sampans damaged. Ammunition expenditures were 209,000 - 7,62mm rounds 76 - 2 1/2 inch mortar rounds 1,000 - 40mm grenades and 180 smoke grenades.

Air Force. During Operation DALLAS, nineteen TAC Air sorties were flown. Nine strikes were preplanned, nine were immediately requested for forces in contact and one flare ship was called during a mortar attack.

(c) INTELLIGENCE

a. Information available to the squadron prior to initiation of Operation DALLAS had primarily been gathered through agent reports from various sources. Because the area had not been penetrated by allied forces for some

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eight months, it was difficult to determine how much of the information was reliable. In addition, the squadron was not really sure how much track movement would be restricted by the terrain, mines, roadblocks, and impending monsoon rains. From experience and limited aerial reconnaissance, the consensus of the ground commanders was favorable. No major changes in methods of tactical employment were contemplated. Attention was initially directed to a known major rice route, east to west, generally through the center of the brigade area of operations; and possible detection and engagement of the VC 273rd Main Force Regiment, which was suspected because of the recent attacks on the PTEN HQ and PHUOC VINH bases. Possible reinforcement by the 271, 272 VC Regiments and the 101st NVA Regiment, meant that the squadron must increase preparedness in the two areas:

(1) Ability to reinforce the infantry battalions in the event of major engagement. This was accomplished by continuous aerial reconnaissance of access routes into the infantry's position and careful selection of daily areas of operations to facilitate immediate reaction.

(2) Protection against possible, large scale mortar attacks. The squadron reviewed and strengthened counter-mortar procedures and, in retrospect this was particularly rewarding.

b. Lastly, the enemy installation target lists provided by brigade intelligence were extremely valuable and accurate. On 22 May the squadron encountered significant enemy resistance at exact target list coordinates that had been received through brigade intelligence channels.

8. (C) MISSION. The 1st Squadron attacks north into sector, seizes and secures two artillery support bases. Conducts combat reconnaissance in assigned AO's; destroys VC/NVA forces and installations in sector.

9. (C) EXECUTION.

a. Maneuvers:

(1) The 1st Squadron was placed under control of the 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division on 16 May 1967, and moved into a forward assembly area at PHU LOI on the same date. The squadron's howitzer battery was emplaced initially at FSB A, vicinity YT952251.

The brigade area of operation was divided into six subordinate AO's, WAGO, HOUSTON, LONGVIEW, AUSTIN, KILIEN, and DRAGON. (See Annex A.) Initially, the squadron was to operate in AO's WAGO, AUSTIN, and KILIEN, which placed the squadron generally in the center of the brigade AO. Well positioned as a mobile reaction force for the infantry battalions, should they encounter substantial contact. However, the 1st Battalion, 16th Infantry was inserted into AO KILIEN, rather than AO HOUSTON and lost KILIEN. Howitzer Battery, 1st Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry was reemplaced first at FSB B and later at FSB D. This move necessitated limited engineer work on the road between the two fire support bases and the squadron assumed security responsibility for ammunition convoys along the route.

During Operation DALLAS, the 1st Brigade received two agent reports which located elements of the 273rd VC Main Force Regiment in the brigade AO. The 1st Squadron reacted in both instances, locating elements of the 2nd Battalion, 273rd VC Regiment on 21 and 22 May 1967.

(2) There were no squadron operations conducted in conjunction with ARVN forces during Operation DALLAS.

(3) The squadron conducted the following troop and platoon size missions during Operation DALLAS.

(a) Multi-troop combat attack (2 troops):	1
(b) Troop size search and destroy operations:	24
(c) Troop size LZ security mission:	3
(d) Troop size LZ security mission:	3

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(e) Troop size area reconnaissance missions:	1
(f) Troop size convoy escorts:	1
(g) Troop size engineer work party security:	1
(h) Troop size route security missions (OPCON Inf)	2
(i) Troop size reaction missions:	2
(j) Platoon size search and destroy operations:	7
(k) Platoon (composite) engineer work party security missions:	3
(l) Platoon size night route clearance missions (Thunder Mine):	3
TOTAL	51

Squadron elements made contact on eight out of the fifty-one missions mentioned above. Six of these contacts were light and two were moderate contacts, each lasting approximately three hours.

10. (C) SIGNIFICANT ACTION:

17 May 1967

The squadron crossed the line of departure at 170450H May with Team B leading, followed by Team A, Troop C and Team D. The first objective, FSB B, was entered at 0755 and completely secured by Team B and Team D at 0820. Team A had secured a landing zone for the 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry, along the route of advance, at 0710H.

At 0929 hours, a Chinook and the squadron's LFT received ground fire vicinity XT964340. Two platoons from Team B, reinforced with tanks attacked north to locate and destroy these enemy forces. At 1012 hours, while closing in the objective area, Team B's lead element spotted two VC running from north to south vicinity XT992343. The troop set up a small base of fire and began to assault the woodland directly to their right flank. Almost immediately, one of the tanks hit a mine as the maneuver element crossed a road parallel to their axis of advance. Three more VC were sighted at XT989347, moving east to west. Following this incident, an immediate air strike was placed on the objective area and artillery was utilized to attempt to seal enemy withdrawal routes to the north-east. During the remainder of the morning and afternoon, Troop B conducted operations in the general area. A small base camp was found at XT963411, with fresh trucks leading in from the south. 300 pounds of polished rice and sixty pounds of salt were uncovered and destroyed. Later, at 1342 hours, vicinity YT011341, elements found an antitank mine (estimated to be 10 lbs) and evacuated it through intelligence channels. No further contact was established.

Troop C had attacked through FSB B to the east to seize FSB D. At 1312 hours, the troop detonated an antitank mine vicinity YT042342. The vehicle sustained minor damage and there was one US KIA. At 1418 hours, Troop C found a VC body, with documents, at YT012371. Source of documents were from elements of 2nd Battalion, 273rd VC Regiment. At 1535 hours, Troop C found a second antitank mine, vicinity YT012397. There were no casualties and the ACNV sustained moderate damage. While sweeping the area, Troop C found and detonated a second mine at XT037397.

The squadron's howitzer battery began displacement from FSB C to FSB A at 1151H and closed in Position B at 1416 hours.

Troop A closed in FSB D at 1454 and conducted search and destroy operations to the north for the remainder of the afternoon.

18 May 1967

Troops A and C operated in Areas A and D within AO WAGO. Team B conducted

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two platoon size clearing operations north and south of FSB B. Team D conducted reconnaissance of a farm site, vicinity XT975347, which was to be used on the nineteenth during movement to secure a landing zone for the 1st Battalion, 16th Infantry.

At 1235 hours, Team A found three graves vicinity XT057364, which appeared to be a week old. Three bodies, wrapped in plastic and dressed in black, were found in the graves. Again at 1455 hours, Team A found and evacuated 23,000 pounds of polished rice and 1875 pounds of salt. At 1555 hours, Team B evacuated 150 steel reinforcing rods, 7 to 8 feet long, thirty sheets of tin and 50 pounds of salt, vicinity XT996334. At 1557 hours, Troop C evacuated 3900 pounds of rice from coordinates XT039399.

The only contact of the day occurred at 1745 hours, vicinity XT191745, when an observation post from Team A received one round of sniper fire. The squadron's LFT observed one VC withdrawing from this area, engaged him and was credited with one VC KIA (POSS).

19 May 1967

Team A conducted search and destroy operations in Area A, AO WACO; Troop C, search and destroy operations in Area C, AO WACO; Team D secured a landing zone (vicinity XT962368) and Team B secured FSB B. The 2nd Platoon, Team B was placed OPCON to the 1st Battalion, 16th Infantry at 1025 hours.

20 May 1967

Team A conducted search and destroy operations in A/19, AO WACO, Team B secured engineer work parties along the route from FSB B and D, Troop C conducted search and destroy operations in Area C, AO WACO, and Team D conducted search and destroy operations in FSB B. There was negative enemy contact during the day.

Troop A found three graves (less than 72 hours old) vicinity XT023377 at 1115 hours, and a third grave at XT024368 at 1415 hours.

Troop C hit a mine at 1810 hours, vicinity XT138398, with no US casualties and minor damage to one LAV.

During the day, 410 pounds of rock salt, two antitank mines, 1/2 pound of documents, four barrels of diesel fuel, 400 pounds of polished rice were recovered and one CHICOM grenade booby trap was blown in place.

21 May 1967

Team B attacked north to locate and destroy major units of the VC (Main Force) 273rd Regiment, suspected to be located vicinity coordinates, XT974388.

Team A and Troop C conducted search and destroy operations in Areas A/20, and C/20, AO HOUSTON, respectively. Team D conducted local search and destroy operations in Area D.

Team B, operating in conjunction with the 1st Battalion, 16th Infantry, searched the entire unposted area and access routes south with negative results. However, at 1605 hours, Troop B was engaged by an estimated company of VC believed to be occupying hasty ambush positions. The ambush was initiated with rocket and automatic weapons fire, claymores and grenades and apparently was tripped early by the Cavalry unit. Extremely heavy anti-aircraft fire was received in the area by gunships, high performance aircraft, and rescue choppers. One F-100 (Super Sabre) crashed during a napalm run, a Hushie rescue shipper was downed by enemy fire, and eventually had to be destroyed that night. Two Army gunships received 12.7mm hits and had to be grounded for repairs. The Air Force pilot was killed (immediately), it was Captain [REDACTED] USAF, who had been assigned earlier to the squadron as a PAC for approximately 6 months before being reassigned to the 7th ATF at BIEH MOA. These Air Force rescue crewmen were wounded and one Army gunship crew-chief was lightly wounded. US ground forces sustained five MIA, none serious. Enemy casualties were unknown. Immediate

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airstrikes and missions poured fires into the area most of the evening, and artillery continued H&I fires throughout the night.

Teams A and D both hit mines during the day, with negative friendly casualties and only light damage to vehicles in each case.

22 May 1967

Troop A (-) moved from FSB D to secure a LZ for the 1st Battalion, 16th Infantry and later, assisted in an attack conducted by Teams B and D. Teams B and D attacked north into a suspected base area found during operations the previous day. Troop C conducted search and destroy operations in Area C/20 - AO HOUSTON, cleared the route from FSB D to FSB B and escorted Howitzer Battery and the squadron command post to Position B.

Team B made initial contact with enemy forces at 0651 hours and moderate contact was maintained throughout the morning by both Teams B and D. The attack slashed through dense jungle, which had been raked by airstrikes and artillery pre fires earlier in the morning, to overrun a company size base camp occupied by an estimated two platoons of Viet Cong. Contact was broken by the VC at 1141 hours as they fled to the northeast. During this contact, ten VC were killed (BC). US casualties were one KIA and three VC MIA. The squadron captured one SKS Carbine, one RPG-2 launcher, one BAR, one Mouser, and one US M-1 rifle.

At 1421 hours, Team A received an RPG-2 round, narrowly missing the lead track, vicinity XT982386. At 1429 hours, Team A engaged four VC running from south to north across their front, and killed two. GBU runs and artillery were called to block withdrawal routes. Contact was not regained as Team A pushed forward.

23 May 1967

In accordance with terms of the cease fire, the squadron did not conduct offensive operations on this date. Troop C secured a LZ for the 1st Battalion, 16th Infantry and Team B conducted resupply convoy runs from FSB B to FSB C.

At 231914 hours, twenty-three rounds of 60 mm mortar fire fell to the southeast of the squadron night defensive position at FSB B. Perimeter elements reported that enemy fire positions appeared to be located to the north of the laager, at a range of 800 - 1000 meters. The squadron employed all counter-mortar procedures; there were no US casualties.

24 May 1967

Team A and Troop C attacked to the north to locate and destroy major forces of the 273rd Regiment suspected to be in the general vicinity of XT975377. Intelligence information had been received at 2000 hours from the 1st Brigade. At 0926 hours, Team A saw two VC vicinity XT980352; took them under fire, killing one, capturing a CHICOM Type 56 Carbine.

At 241320 hours, Troop C uncovered 420 (100 lb.) bags of polished rice vicinity XT982364. 114 bags were evacuated and the remainder, which had been hit by artillery, was destroyed. In the same general area, 35 minutes later, Troop C engaged a small tank killer team, killing one VC; capturing the RPG-2 launcher with one round.

On the evening of 24 May at 2051 hours, FSB B was hit with a second mortar attack. Seventy-three 60mm mortar rounds and eighteen 81mm rounds fell within the perimeter during the 4 - 5 minute attack. The squadron immediately initiated counter-mortar procedures which included artillery counter-mortar fires, perimeter direct fire, weapons firing, Army Aviation gunship attacks, and a flare/mini-gun mission and an AF Combat Proof mission. It was established that in 2 - 3 minutes of the initiation of the attack, that rounds were descending on a target-gun azimuth of 2300 - 1900 mils. The combat proof was cancelled and instead, the FAC directed an immediate airstrike and fire mission into the suspected target area with unknown results. US casualties were eighteen MIA, none seriously. No equipment was damaged.

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During the period 25 - 26 May 1967, the squadron's second phase of operations (see Annex B) commenced; no enemy contact was made. Numerous small base camps were found and destroyed but no enemy materials of significance were uncovered.

11. (C) RESULTS:

a. Personnel Losses:	US	VC
KHA	2	19 and 3 (Poss).
WHA	--	--
VOC	--	--

b. Equipment Losses:

(1) US Losses: None

(2) VC Losses:

(a) Weapons:

	CAPTURED	DESTROYED
RPG-2 Rocket Launcher	2	--
GHICOM Carbine Type 56	1	--
AK-47 Assault Rifle	1	--
Rifle	1	--
BAR	1	--
Mauser	1	--
M-1	1	--
Spare Barrel	1	--

(b) Ammunitions:	CAPTURED	DESTROYED
GHICOM grenades	--	25
Cal .30 rounds	200	--
Rifle grenades	6	--
RPG-2 rounds	23	--
AT mines	4	2
60mm mortar rounds	20	--
AK-47 (magazines)	2	--
155mm artillery shells	--	4
Clay mines GHICOM	--	1

(c) Foodstuffs:

	CAPTURED	DESTROYED
Rice salt	2335 lbs	100 lbs
Polished rice	258 lbs	--

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(d) Miscellaneous:

	<u>CAPTURED</u>	<u>DESTROYED</u>
Documents	10 lbs.	-----
Clothing	86 lbs.	-----
2½ ton truck	1	-----
Civilian type diesel fuel	---	4 - 55 gal drums
Steel reinforcing rods	150	1 ton
Copper cable	1 roll (100 ft)	-----
Tin	30 sheets	-----
CB gas	----	2 - 53 gal drums
ARC-114 radio parts	5 lbs.	-----

12. (C) LOGISTICS.

a. Class I: The squadron continued to use a 1-A and 2-C ration meal/day cycle during the operation.

b. Class II & IV: At the end of Operation DALLAS, the squadron was still short eight AGVs.

c. Class III: The squadron used 31,050 gallons of MGOAS and 9,300 gallons of diesel during Operation DALLAS. All Class III products were delivered by air.

d. Class V: The squadron expended the following amounts of ammunition during Operation DALLAS:

7.62mm	550,000 rounds
.50 Cal	125,000 rounds
40mm	4,500 rounds
90mm HE	30 rounds
90mm (Canister)	318 rounds
Hand Grenades	1,200

e. Transportation: During Operation DALLAS, the squadron used 150 CH-47 sorties and eighty-eight UH-1D sorties to move approximately 1,050,000 lbs of resupply material.

13. (C) COMMANDER'S ANALYSIS.

a. Selective extensions of AO's to exploit intelligence findings at squadron level.

(1) Problem: On 21 and 22 May 1967, the squadron was engaged in the most significant contact of Operation DALLAS. Initial contact was established at 1700 hours on the 21st. An exploitive attack was launched on the 22nd by the squadron and continuous contact was maintained throughout the morning. Battlefield intelligence revealed that the attacking force had engaged an estimated company size element from the 2nd Battalion, 273rd Main Force Regiment. Documents captured indicated possible presence of support elements from COSVN toward combat support units. This case file period from 1901 - 2300 hours, did not permit operations on the 24th. However, all intelligence points toward the strong possibility that a major VC installation existed further to the north east, vicinity grid squares, XT903, 9735, or XT9027. The squadron would have

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required an estimated one or two day extension to thoroughly search this area and could have conducted the operation with organic combat and combat support elements. However, the squadron was committed to the ONI DOMO secret area, to the west, and could not continue in this area of interest.

(2) Discussion and Recommendations: The squadron's experience during ten months in-country, has shown that battlefield intelligence reports provide the most useful information for armored cavalry exploitation. Scheduling of cavalry employment must provide sufficient flexibility to permit timely and thorough reaction to these battlefield intelligence reports. Our combined arms team composition, rapid reaction capability, and self sustaining characteristics, facilitate such employment.

b. Use of stay behind patrols and enemy target lists. Discussion: The squadron's experience has shown that the VC repeatedly use old base camps and consistently returned to sites of contact. During the initial stages of an operation, the enemy installation target list is extremely important, to establish contact and verify known installations. Stay behind patrols and IRRP's are extremely valuable to reestablish contact, trace infiltration and exfiltration routes, and possibly capture PW's.

c. Counter-Mortar Fire Procedures: Discussion: The squadron has developed a counter-mortar fire plan, integrating all organic and combat support fire, which was successfully employed during Operation DALLAS on two occasions. Procedures include: Artillery counter-mortar fires, direct fire from perimeter forces (7.62 MG, 50 Cal MG, 90mm HE delay and M-79), light and heavy fire team gun runs, non-stop mortar watch flights, AF flares/minigun ships, combat proof missions, and immediate airstrikes. These procedures require detailed planning and exercise. Other tactical considerations are: Enforcement of overhead cover policies for all, requirements for LP's/OP's and AP's to obtain cover from perimeter direct fire weapons, alert teams to provide information on crater analysis, light discipline and establishment of fire-control and medic parties.

d. Artillery Support:

(1) Problem Areas:

(a) Serious maintenance problems were encountered with the M-109 Howitzers during the reporting period. The lack of replacement parts presented the most serious problems and a partial list of the most critical of these parts are listed below:

1. Seals for hydraulic systems.
2. Bore evacuator plugs (150 rd life).
3. Firing locks.
4. Detent plungers (1500 rd life).

(b) Some problem arose on one occasion in obtaining permission to have one battery, firing (GS) for squadron troops in contact, revert to (DS) role during the duration of the contact.

(2) Discussion and recommendations:

(a) The maintenance problems of the M-109 Howitzer can be alleviated by a greater input of replacement parts and increased use of commander contact teams with a corresponding increase in a sense of urgency by the teams. In addition, when all six tubes are operational, it is recommended that one tube be administratively declared for 12 hours out of every 72 hour period, for complete maintenance.

(b) The squadron recommends that batteries firing in (GS) of maneuver battalions/squadrons, revert to (DS) of the battalion/squadron establishing significant contact for the duration of the encounter. These batteries would revert to (GS) roles or (DS) of other maneuver battalions, should the need arise, by more extensive use of artillery communications networks.


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(c. During Operation DALLAS, VT fuses were used extensively to cover roads and trails during hours of darkness. These fires supplement clearing teams and thunder runs, with considerable success in keeping lines of communication open. 12

(d) During Operation DALLAS, we found that initial reservations on the use of 155mm delayed-fuse rounds, to open up fortifications and installations, were incorrect. We initially expected to encounter a higher dud-ratio than would be acceptable. In fact the ratio is about the same as that with fuse QUICK.

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
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
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ANNEX B - AREAS OF OPERATION (Phase II),

Operation DALLAS



- Areas worked by the 1st Squadron

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N/A		OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310	
13. ABSTRACT			

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Security Classification