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AGAM-P (M) (9 Apr 68) FOR OT RD 681192 12 April 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam, Period Ending 31 January 1968 (U)

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

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FIELD FORCE VIETNAM



FOR OT RD
68/192

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, II FIELD FORCE VIETNAM
APO San Francisco 96266

AVFBC-RE-H

21 February 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Quarterly Period
Ending 31 January 1968 (RCS CSFOR-65) (W-DHO-TO-A) (U)

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

SECTION I

SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES

1. (C) COMMAND:

a. During the quarter there were five major changes in the staff, II FFORCEV.

(1) On 20 January 1968, Major General Keith L. Ware became the Deputy Commanding General, II FFORCEV, replacing Major General George S. Eckhardt. General Ware had previously served as Deputy Commander I FFORCEV.

(2) On 2 November 1967, Colonel Joseph D. Mitchell became the Deputy Chief of Staff. Colonel Mitchell previously served as Commanding Officer, 2d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division. He replaced Colonel Robert H. Offley.

(3) On 24 January 1968, Colonel Julien H. LaPage became the Provost Marshal, II FFORCEV, after an assignment as Commanding Officer, 89th Military Police Group. He replaced Colonel Paul B. Duruz.

(4) On 30 January 1968, Colonel Joseph A. Janzen became the Engineer, II FFORCEV. Before his present assignment he was Assistant Chief of Staff, P&O, US Army Engineer Command, Vietnam. He replaced Colonel Arthur T. Surkamp.

(5) On 22 January 1968, Lieutenant Colonel William V. Muroko became the Headquarters Commandant, II FFORCEV. Prior to his assignment he was an instructor supervisor at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. He replaced Lieutenant Colonel John P. Lamb.

b. The overall assigned/attached strength of II FFORCEV increased during this quarter. A comparison at the end of the last

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Ending 31 January 1968 (RCS CSFOR-65) (W-DHO-TO-A) (U)

four reporting periods follows:

<u>DATE</u>	<u>OFFICER</u>	<u>WARRANT OFFICER</u>	<u>ENLISTED MEN</u>
30 April 67	359	36	3503
31 July 67	332	37	3248
31 Oct 67	323	34	2807
31 Jan 68	334	26	2915

c. II FFORCEV Order of Battle, to include location and the control headquarters is shown as Inclosure 1.

d. A sketch showing the III Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ) with major unit CP locations is shown in Inclosure 2.

2. (FOUO) PERSONNEL, HEALTH, MORALE, SAFETY AND DISCIPLINE:

a. The personnel situation within units assigned, attached or under the operational control of II Field Force Vietnam remains satisfactory.

b. Vigorous implementation of the USARV infusion program has resulted in reduced rotational humps in all units within the command. Continued participation in this program will solve rotational hump problems in II FFORCEV units within six months.

c. The critical shortages in MOS 31M (Radio Relay and Carrier Attendant) and 13F (Automatic Weapons Crewman) reported in the last quarter's ORLL were eliminated by personnel replacements provided by higher headquarters.

d. The G1 and AG sections assisted newly arrived administrative elements of the 101st Airborne Division in establishing initial operations. Coordination visits were made, applicable publications were provided and limited duplicating and reproduction support rendered.

e. Since 1 November, the AG section published two AG Newsletters. These newsletters contained information in the personnel field of interest and included an index to all previous editions. It is anticipated that additional editions will be published in the forthcoming quarter.

f. During the period 1 November 1967 to 31 January 1968, the Awards and Decorations Division processed, approved and issued awards as follows:

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Silver	17
Distinguished Flying Cross	0
Soldier's Medal	0
Bronze Star Medal	96
Air Medal	119
Army Commendation Medal	69
Purple Heart	<u>42</u>
TOTAL	343

g. Development of the II FFORCEV base camp continued satisfactorily. Status of significant projects as of 31 January 1968 follows:

- (1) Tropical Construction BOQ - completed.
- (2) EM Club - completed.
- (3) NCO Club - 80% completed.
- (4) Officers Club - 30% completed.

h. The health of the command continues to be excellent.

i. Morale of the troops continues to be at a high level. During the reporting period a total of 2 USO shows visited the headquarters area.

3. (C) INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTER INTELLIGENCE:

a. Intelligence aspects of tactical operations conducted in the II FFORCEV area are discussed in ORLL submitted by units under operational control of this headquarters.

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b. Intelligence Collection:

(1) Prior to the arrival of the 101st Airborne Division, it was expected that it would be assigned a tactical area of interest (TAOI). As noted in the previous report, it was expected that a revised II FFORCEV Essential Elements of Information (EEI) would then be published with a new collection plan; however, the 101st Division was not given a specific TAOI. A new list of II FFORCEV EEI was published and disseminated to major OrCCG units, including the 101st Airborne Division without revision of the collection plan. This consolidated list of II FFORCEV information requirements is the first guidance of its kind to be published by this headquarters. The EEI do not specifically incorporate the requirements set forth in the MACV Intelligence Collection Plan, but rather were published as being **complementary** to that plan.

(2) The Intelligence Coordination and Exploitation for attack on VC Infrastructure (C) (ICEX) program made considerable progress during this reporting period. District Intelligence and Operations Coordination Centers (DIOCC) were established in 51 of the 55 districts in III CTZ. The two districts without centers were in the Rung Sat Special Zone (RSSZ). Close liaison was established between US units and many of the DIOCC, allowing for a free exchange of information between the agencies. Additionally, during the closing days of the reporting period, this headquarters began to initiate direct contact with the DIOCC to better utilize their services and obtain information on a more timely basis. The DIOCC emphasized the collection of and reaction to tactical intelligence rather than to intelligence pertaining to the infrastructure during this reporting period. This did not mean that the latter effort was neglected; considerable results against the infrastructure were achieved. In the field of tactical intelligence collection and reaction, the DIOCC conducted a number of very successful small unit operations against the VC. The table below indicates those districts having DIOCC in place and the provinces in which those districts are located as of 30 January 1968:

<u>Province</u>	<u>Districts</u>
Bien Hoa	Tan Uyen, Cong Thanh, Duc Tu, Di An, Long Thanh, Nhon Trach
Binh Tuy	Ham Tan, Tanh Linh, Hoi Duc
Long Khanh	Xuan Loc, Dinh Quan, Kiem Tan
Phuoc Tuy	Long Le, Long Dien, Dat Do, Duc Thanh, Xuyen Moc

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<u>Province</u>	<u>Districts</u>
Hau Nghia	Phu Duc, Cu Chi, Duc Hoa, Duc Hue
Long An	Binh Phuoc, Tan Tru, Ben Luc, Thu Thua, Thanh Duc, Can Duc, Rach Kien
Tay Ninh	Phu Khuong, Phuoc Ninh, Hieu Thien, Khiem Ninh
Gia Dinh	Tan Binh, Go Vap, Hoc Mon, Thu Duc, Nha Be, Binh Chanh
Binh Duong	Chau Thanh, Lai Thieu, Ben Cat, Phu Hoa, Tri Tam, Phu Giao
Binh Long	An Loc, Loc Ninh, Chon Thanh
Phuoc Long	Phuoc Binh, Bo Duc, Duc Phong, Don Luan

(3) The new procedure for reporting information obtained from prisoners of war and ralliers, initiated in the previous quarter, proved successful. Still further improvements are being sought which will enable this type of information to be disseminated on an even more timely basis.

(4) The G2 II FFORCEV Intelligence ADP system was expanded during the reporting period. To better identify enemy activities occurring in a given area, all friendly initiated actions, prisoner of war data, incidents of firing on aircraft, mines and booby traps, RF/PF OP attacks, underground fortifications and military structures destroyed, were added. The project to add July 1967 data was recently completed and files containing six months of data are now available for comparative purposes. In order to better process the increased number of items recorded, an IBM card puncher was acquired. An enlisted man was trained to operate the puncher and the approximate daily output is 200 cards. Over 18,000 cards are now in the system. A new program was written in order to have a monthly readout by grid square. This new program, when added to the readout by date/time and by type of incident, will give better coverage for targeting and order of battle purposes. There are plans to further expand the system to develop a data bank on order of battle for VC irregular forces.

(5) G2 Air:

(a) During the period covered by this report, the OV-10 (Red Haze) assets of the 73d Surveillance Airplane Company (SAC) were increased by one new aircraft for a total of four. All aircraft are now equipped with the AN/UAS-4A Infrared Sensor system. This system is more sensitive than the previously used item and it is

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expected that imagery quality will improve; however, during the dry season, the presence of natural and man-made fires throughout the III CTZ caused increasing difficulty in the discrimination of Red Haze emissions. This situation is expected to continue through the remainder of the dry season.

(b) Special maximum surveillance efforts were conducted during the truce periods which occurred during this quarter. The Christmas truce extended from 241800 to 251800 December 1967 and the New Year truce from 311800 December 1967 to 020600 January 1968. The T&T truce began at 291800 January 1968 and was cancelled by the CWT at 300930 January 1968 due to the unprincipled violations on the part of the VC. Cancellation of the T&T truce did not cancel the concentrated SLAR/RED HAZE coverage of selected areas in the TAOI. This coverage extended into the new reporting period due to the enemy offensive. During the earlier truce periods, a successful effort was made to provide 24 hour coverage along the Cambodian border and the coast line of III CTZ. During these periods, a coordinated effort was effected using the assets of the 1st Infantry Division Aerial Surveillance and Target Acquisition Platoon (ASTAP), the 73d SAC, Army and Air Force O-1 aircraft, and the assets provided by the 460th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing (TRW) of the 7th USAF. The reconnaissance effort thus effected provided excellent information on VC/NVA routes of movement into the III CTZ. One of the most active areas revealed was in the vicinity of WP9540 during the New Year truce period. This area was characterized by a buildup on the evenings preceding the truce, exceptionally heavy activity on the first night of the truce, a general tapering off of activity after the truce, and a complete absence of activity two days following the truce. The volume of surveillance effected during these special periods can be maintained only for limited periods of time due to maintenance requirements necessary to insure proper functioning of aircraft and sensor systems. The assets enumerated above provided aerial coverage of suspected enemy activity in the following manner during the truce periods:

1 VR reconnaissance aircraft of the 73d SAC covered the III CTZ border with Cambodia and the coastline for a minimum of twelve flying hours daily.

2 During the hours of darkness, each portion of the III CTZ was covered with SLAR once each hour. These missions were conducted by the 1st ASTAP and the 73d SAC.

3 Red Haze missions were conducted by all elements. The 1st ASTAP and the 73d SAC concentrated primarily on the border area while the 460th TRW principally covered the main VC/NVA base areas.

(6) There were continuing indications that the VC were experiencing serious difficulties as a result of Allied operations.

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Replacement from local resources of combat losses and ralliers appeared to be a particularly acute problem. (In this connection, it is believed that the infiltration of NVA replacements was increased to a great degree). Coercive measures against the local populace, the drafting of boys fifteen years of age, heavier taxation were some of the measures being resorted to by the VC. Even these measures did not enable the VC to replace their personnel losses from locally available resources. The only recourse was the utilization of NVA invaders. The 7th NVA Division and the 88th NVA Regiment are probably almost wholly composed of NVA personnel. Of the five VC regiments in III CTZ, it was estimated that the one having the smallest proportion of NVA personnel had 35% and the regiment having the most had 75% such personnel. Even at the VC LF battalion level, NVA personnel are present in strength. Indications were that the D440 LF Battalion of VC Ba Bien province has 75-80% NVA personnel.

(7) Documents and PW sources of information continued to indicate a food shortage among VC forces. There is little doubt that Allied operations forced changes in supply routes and made all routes more hazardous during the reporting period. Nevertheless, the enemy proved his resourcefulness once again by almost totally re-arming his forces with a new family of weapons (AK assault rifles, rocket launchers, 122mm rockets). (Comment: Appearance of these weapons in large numbers will substantially increase the VC firepower and, consequently, alter the situation whereby the Allied forces had enjoyed overwhelming fire superiority in any situation. This may alter the course of small unit engagements.)

c. Targeting System: The G2 Targets Division developed an improved targeting system which provided timely targets based on all source intelligence indicators. The division provided targets for artillery, combat sky spots and B52 assets. The system included a current area analysis of the III CTZ based on terrain analysis and a continual study of enemy tactics and habits. Superimposed upon that analysis was a daily plot of intelligence indicators of enemy activity. The indicators included intelligence reports, contacts, sightings, attacks by fire and ground attacks, booby traps, "people sniffer" returns and caches. Approximately 300 such indicators occurred in III CTZ each day and were meticulously plotted and graphically retained for one week. Enemy installations were then targeted within the concentrated area of activity, collated with the area analysis and targeted for the most appropriate available asset. Finally, the system provided a rapid means of evaluating Agent Reports of enemy concentrations, VR sightings and photography readouts.

d. Description and Recapitulation of Enemy Order of Battle:

(1) Description: The Central Office of South Vietnam (COSVN) continued as the supreme military and political headquarters

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for the VC in SVN and divided all territory in the II FFORCEV TAOI into Military Regions (MR) Sub-Regions (SR) and other provinces or zones. The precise political districting of all the territory is still not known with certainty; however, it is known that some boundaries recently underwent significant realignment. In October/November 1967, MRI, MR4 and Long AN province of MR2 were divided into new areas designated as SR 1 through 5, U-1 and the metropolitan area of Saigon. War Zones C and D, Tay Ninh and Ba Bien provinces, formerly parts of MRI, appear now to be separate entities, but this is uncertain as is their relationship to COSVN. The Sub-regions, U-1 and the Saigon area are directly subordinate to COSVN. New boundaries are shown on Inclosure 3.

(2) Significant Order of Battle Developments.

(a) Information gained from documents, IV, and Hoi Chanh indicated the formation of a new VC LF Bn, designated D40 in the former Ba Bien Province. Cadre for the battalion was extracted from the D445 VC LF Infantry Battalion and other local force units in the area. The battalion, composed of an estimated 75% NVA personnel, was organized into three rifle companies and one combat support company.

(b) On 27 November 1967, B/7/RAR captured a copy of a resolution adopted at a conference held in April 1967. The resolution predicted that the Allied forces would seek to create a "no-man's" land between the populated areas of Saigon and the VC bases in the mountains to the north. The main objective would be the VC bases in War Zone "C". To counter those operations, MRI and MR4 were to co-operate in extending "a steel belt" around the center of Allied/RVNAF activity, (the Saigon area). The resolution called attention to deficiencies of the VC forces, e. g., slow development of guerilla warfare, ineffective "three-pronged attacks", lack of determination and aggressiveness and poor leadership. To insure success, the deficiencies would have to be overcome. Partial alleviation of the problems could be achieved by infiltration of agents into Allied/RVNAF bases, increased harassment to rear areas so as to neutralize military potential, and frustration of the Rural Pacification Program. The MRI Party Committee indicated that their region was the most favorable area for the destruction of enemy (Allied/RVNAF) forces and also offered the greatest potential for attacks on Saigon-Cholon.

(c) A captured financial report prepared by the Rear Service Staff of MRI provided an estimate of expenditures to be incurred by the VC Dong Nai Infantry Regiment during the 4th quarter of 1967. Included were pocket money allowances for 29 battalion and regimental cadre, 369 company cadre and 1964 soldiers. The total strength of 2362 listed in the document tended to confirm a previous report which indicated the strength of this regiment as being 2260. That strength labels it as the largest regiment in III CTZ.

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(d) An undated draft plan of the COSVN Forward Supply Council for 1967, directed subordinate units to "double their efforts to meet the increasing war requirements, motivate the population to increase farm production... and also mobilize manpower and employ resources of the areas controlled by the VC, disputed areas and areas controlled by the GVN to serve the front line. "The draft indicated that the low VC farm production and heavy Allied/RVNAF destruction of supply depots had severely limited VC food storage capability. Intense Allied/RVNAF operations also had disrupted VC supply lines by blocking entry-exit points, denying the VC use of major lines of communication and destroying base areas. These operations forced the VC to "depend entirely on the population for provisions."

(e) An undated plan of activity, prepared by the Permanent Section of the Forward Supply Council Ba Bien Province, for the second quarter of 1967, stated that the Council attained only 15 to 25% of the prescribed quotas in the procurement of food supplies and recruitment of civilian laborers for the first quarter of 1967. It was required to procure for the second quarter of 1967 twice as much food and twice as many civilian laborers as in the first quarter of 1967. A report dated 20 July 1967, stated that the continuous attacks by Allied/RVNAF troops, pacification activities and Chieu Hoi activities affected the food procurement efforts of the Province. As a result, only 17% of the provincial requirement for recruitment of civilian laborers and procurement of food was met during the second quarter. An undated draft plan for the last quarter of 1967, and the first quarter of 1968, stated that the Ba Bien Province Forward Supply Council was facing a critical situation which resulted from the tight control exercised by elements of the US and Australian Forces on lines of communication. Procurement of provisions and the recruitment of civilian laborers were greatly limited. Finally, the document stated that the manpower and economic resources of Ba Bien Province were under Allied control. Therefore, to meet the logistical demands, it was mandatory that efforts be centered on the development of VC installations in GVN areas.

(f) An undated document, classified "SECRET", provided political reorientation. It dealt with Allied capabilities and intentions during the 1967-68 Winter-Spring Campaign. It anticipated the "culminating point" of the war by this time and urged special efforts to wear down US and RVN forces. Such efforts would lead to conditions favorable for the formation of a coalition government in which the NLF-SVN would play a key role. It was pointed out that "coalition government will be only a stratagem to deceive the enemy." Its main political purpose would be to compel US forces to withdraw from SVN because of political pressure. A document dated 20 August 1967 indicated that, "In order to have peace talks and to win at the peace conference, it is mandatory to destroy more enemy troops and to be more aggressive in the diplomatic field. We must accept peace negotiations, but peace talks do not help us reach our main objective-government under our control. It only confirms a diplomatic victory and is

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a stratagem which aims at supporting the three pronged attack." A major VC offensive is cited as the way to bring peace talks and to provide a favorable bargaining position. Recognition of the NLF/SVN as part of a coalition government would presumably lead to the withdrawal of US forces, thus creating conditions favorable to complete military, political and social victory for the VC.

(g) On 20 November 1967, Rallier DAN VAN CHIEU, a member of the 267th VC Main Force Infantry Battalion/MR2, stated that all of the officers in the 267th Battalion were NVA. An unidentified NVA PW captured on 16 December 1967 reported that he had infiltrated from NVN with 20 other NVA soldiers and had arrived in SVN in September. The PW reported that approximately 25% of the 267th Battalion is NVA. (Comment: These reports suggested that the VC in IV CTZ are no longer able to acquire needed replacements from indigenous manpower resources.)

(h) Interrogation of PW NGUYEN VAN BA of the BINH TAN Element/MR4 revealed information regarding recruitment problems in that area. According to BA, during the period 1966-1967, despite an intensive recruiting campaign, not a single person was recruited in BINH TAN District. All village chiefs claimed to have only a skeleton force of men in their villages and would not consent to losing any of them. Apparently, the 6th VC LF Infantry Battalion was not allowed to recruit from outside its own area and MR4 HQ was able to supply only three men as replacements after levying guerilla units in the area. Finally, it was said that "all units in MR4 were at approximately 50% strength, and that there would be no outside help in the near future for at least six months." (Comment: While it is difficult to believe that no personnel have been recruited in Binh Tan for the last year, this report does indicate the severe personnel problems facing the VC in that area.)

(i) On 28 November 1967 vicinity XT135360 documents were taken from two VC KIA which had the designation K5-D16-U5 written on them. The designation was believed to refer to the 5th Co/D16 VC LF Infantry Battalion/Tay Ninh Province which was previously mentioned in PW/Rallier reports. The unit is believed to be newly formed with a mission of operating in southwestern Tay Ninh Province. Its strength was 350 and it was located in southern Tay Ninh along the Cambodian Border.

(3) Recapitulation:

(a) The VC regions in III CTZ controlled 48 local force companies and 20 local force platoons.

(b) Within III CTZ there were 14 local force battalions subordinated as indicated below:

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<u>LOCAL FORCE BATTALION</u>	<u>SUBORDINATION</u>
2d VC LF Guard Bn	TAY NINH
14th VC LF Inf Bn	TAY NINH
16th VC LF Inf Bn	TAY NINH
D440 VC LF Inf Bn	Sub-Region E5
D445 VC LF Inf Bn	Sub-Region E4
PHU LOI VC LF Bn	Sub-Region E5
2d Independent VC LF Inf Bn	Sub-Region E3
506th VC LF Bn	Sub-Region E2
2d VC LF Inf Bn	Sub-Region E1
3d VC LF Inf Bn	Sub-Region E5
4th VC LF Inf Bn	Sub-Region E4
5th VC LF Inf Bn	Sub-Region E3
6th VC LF Inf Bn	Sub-Region E2
7th VC LF Inf Bn	Sub-Region E1

(c) There were nine VC main force battalions, ten VC/NVA main force regiments, and one VC/NVA command operating in III CTZ:

<u>VC/NVA MAIN FORCE UNIT</u>	<u>SUBORDINATION</u>
1st Bn/66th Base Security Regt	COSVN
1st VC Guard Bn	COSVN
46th VC Recon Bn	COSVN
Group 10	Sub-Region E4
267th VC MF Inf Bn	Sub-Region E2
269th VC MF Inf Bn	Sub-Region E2
G10 VC MF Sapper Bn	SAIGON/GIA DINH

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<u>VC/NVA MAIN FORCE UNIT</u>	<u>SUBORDINATION</u>
1st VC MF Inf Bn	Sub-Region E1
8th VC MF Arty Bn	Sub-Region E1
88th NVA Regt	Unk
274th VC Inf Regt	5th VC Div
275th VC Inf Regt	5th VC Div
271st VC Inf Regt	9th VC Div
272d VC Inf Regt	9th VC Div
273d VC Inf Regt	9th VC Div
165th NVA Inf Regt	7th N. Div
141st NVA Inf Regt	7th NVA Div
101st NVA Inf Regt	7th NVA Div
DONG NAI VC MF Inf Regt	Sub-Region E5
69th Arty Command	COSVN

(d) There were three VC main force battalions and one VC local force battalion which operated in My Tho Province of MR2.

<u>VC UNIT</u>	<u>SUBORDINATION</u>
261st VC MF Inf Bn	DT I Regt
263d VC MF Inf Bn	DT I Regt
267th VC MF Inf Bn	MR2
514th VC LF Inf Bn	My Tho Province

(e) See Inclosure 4 for enemy unit locations in III CTZ and My Tho Province of MR2 as of 23 Jan 68.

(4) Summary of Recent Activities:

(a) During the reporting period, the VC/NVA elements subordinate to COSVN in the III CTZ conducted three phases in their current DONG XUAN (Winter-Spring) Campaign, which is believed to have begun

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on 29 October with the multi-regimental size attacks against the LOC NINH area in northern BINH LONG Province. The attacks were conducted primarily by major elements of the 9th VC Division, as well as elements of the 141st and the 165th NVA Regiments of the 7th NVA Division. The action was supported by the 84A NVA Artillery Regiment, and the 58th VC Artillery Battalion of the 69th VC Artillery Command. Although the action at LOC NINH was a massive military loss to the VC, it was, nevertheless, a significant political victory inasmuch as the VC succeeded in dispersing the populace and in holding the village for a short time. The second phase of the campaign was oriented on the BU DOP - BO DUC area in northern PHUOC LONG Province. The third, and current, phase began as an apparent counter mission in eastern War Zone "C". On the last day of the reporting period, the emphasis changed radically as the enemy began large scale attacks in the Saigon-Bien Hoa-Long Binh areas coordinated with lesser attacks throughout the remainder of the II FFOURCEV TACI. It apparently signaled the beginning of the general offensive. During the period, the D16 LF Infantry Battalion was formed in TAY NINH Province, and the D440 VC LF Infantry Battalion was formed in VC BA BIEN Province. The most significant new unit to be formed during this period was the Dong Nai VC MF Infantry Regiment, which was subordinate to Military Region 1, but under direct operational control of COSVN.

(b) The 5th VC Division remained split with elements located in PHUOC LONG and BA BIEN Provinces. The Division Headquarters probably remained located in northern PHUOC LONG Province. Indications of the move of the Headquarters from the MAY TAO Mountain Area became evident when Operation SANTA FE failed to develop significant contact in that area during November 1967. On 5 November 1967, the 275th VC Regiment was identified in contact, vicinity YU175031. That contact confirmed reports that the 275th VC Regiment had moved into southern PHUOC LONG Province. Reports have indicated that the 88th NVA Regiment had been subordinated to the 5th VC Division. (Comment: While some coordination appeared to be evident between the 88th NVA and 275th VC Regiments during November, such subordination remains unconfirmed.) In BA BIEN, the 274th VC Regiment reportedly had been dropped from the 5th VC Division. Credence was added to those reports when the regiment was left behind in the HAT DICH area while the bulk of the division moved north. It is still possible, however, that the 274th remains subordinate to the 5th VC Division. The regiment has suffered from lack of food and an inability to replace personnel losses due to casualties, disease and desertion. On 20 December 1967, one of its battalions unsuccessfully attacked the Royal Thai Army Volunteer Regiment, vicinity YS330820. The 1st Battalion/274th Regiment was believed to have moved north across Highway 1 on 18 January 1968 and reportedly was moving to War Zone "D". With the identification of the 274th Regiment as one of those which initiated attacks on the Saigon-Bien Hoa areas on 31 January 1968, it is apparent that the move of the 1st Battalion was designed to conceal the major attacks which were to begin shortly. What the disposition

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of the regiment will be in the immediate future cannot be foreseen at this time.

(c) Throughout the period, the elements of the 7th NVA Division have remained in relatively static dispositions, and have assumed a primary support role in the conduct of the current Winter-Spring Campaign. Because of the recent increase of Allied activities near the "Fish Hook" area, Headquarters elements of the Division were forced to relocate to prepared bases in the central portion of Base Area 353 in northern War Zone "C". After the LOC NINH action, the 141st NVA Regiment returned to War Zone "C", leaving the area only once on 3 December, when the 1st and 2d Battalions were identified in contact in the attack against the 1st Battalion 18th Infantry, 1st Infantry Division Night Defensive Position at XT766737 in central BINH LONG Province. The battalions subsequently returned to War Zone "C", and the regiment was identified in contact on 20 December vicinity XT382857. Documents captured as a result of that contact indicated that the 141st NVA Regiment had been reinforced by an additional Battalion, and detached from the 7th NVA Division to operate independently in the BO TUC - KATUM area, directly subordinate to COSVN. A previous low level agent report indicated that the 1st Guard Battalion/COSVN, had been put under operational control of elements of the 7th NVA Division to operate in northern TAY NINH Province. The 101st NVA Regiment moved from traditional base areas in War Zone "C" to the Michelin Plantation area in late November 1967, where the unit continues to be located with an apparent security mission. The 165th NVA Regiment, which took the most active part at LOC NINH, withdrew to a base area located approximately 10 km NW of CHONH THANH, where the unit remains with the apparent mission of providing security for southern BINH LONG Province border. It is probably in the area to secure supply lines, and to neutralize the political effect of local patrolling by the 1st US Division. The regiment is also in an excellent position to reinforce any multi-regimental VC operation in Military Region 10, eastern War Zone "C" or northern VC THU DAU MOT Province.

(d) Headquarters 9th VC Division remained in base areas along the BINH LONG - PHUOC LONG Province border, just south of Cambodia. The Division has apparently been assigned to be the primary COSVN maneuver element for the current Winter-Spring Campaign, taking the initiative in each phase of the operation. The 271st VC Regiment played a very minor role in the action at LOC NINH, but helped to launch the PHUOC LONG Province phase by conducting a coordinated ground and mortar attack against the 1st US Division NDP and the USSF Camp at BU DOP. That attack was in conjunction with the attack against the BO DUC District Headquarters by the 272d VC Regiment on 29 November 1967. The 271st was supported by the 122mm rockets of the 84A NVA Artillery Regiment in the attack at BU DOP. That marked the second time that 122mm rockets had been employed in support of ground attacks in the III CTZ. The 273d VC Regiment participated in the second phase by attacking the USSF and CIDG Camp at BU DOP on 8 December. Taking

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advantage of the lull in Allied activities during the Christmas cease-fire, the 271st and the 272d VC Regiments displaced to Cambodian territory in the vicinity of the "Fish Hook" area. On 1 January, during the New Year's Cease-fire, the 1st and 3d Battalions of the 271st Regiment, and the 2d and 3d Battalions of the 272d Regiment launched a coordinated mortar, RPG, and ground attack against the 3d Brigade 25th US Infantry Division base camp at FSB BURT vicinity RM90850. The 2d Battalion, 271st VC Regiment, and the 1st Battalion, 272d VC Regiment provided logistical support and security for the action. A captured document indicated that the 272d VC Regiment had been assigned to the area of the contact until the end of January 1968, in order to interrupt Allied sweep operations. The 271st and 272d VC Regiments were believed to be located in the "Fish Hook" area. A rallier reported recently that the 273d VC Regiment, which had remained in Phuoc Long Province through December 1967, had crossed Interprovincial Route 13 east of Chi Linh on 19 January 1968. It was to have moved southwest for a planned attack against a city in the Phu Loi area. It was considered possible that the 273d VC Regiment might move into the "Catcher's Mitt" area.

(e) The 88th NVA Regiment, which infiltrated into III CTZ from II CTZ in September 1967, remained relatively inactive during the reporting period. The unit obviously avoided contact in order to replace heavy losses sustained in the attack against the 4/9th ARVN Infantry at PHUOC QUA (YU186035) in PHUOC LONG Province on 27 October 1967. A PW reported that elements of the 88th Regiment participated in the shelling of the refugee hamlet, DAK SON on 3 December 1967, but there was no evidence that the regiment was involved in the razing of the hamlet on 5 December. On 6 January 1968, vicinity XT580990, elements of the 11th ACR, while conducting Operation FARGO, made contact with elements of the 2d Battalion, 88th NVA Regiment in western BINH LONG Province. A PW captured as a result of that contact indicated that the 1st and 2d Battalions were expected to join the 3d Battalion in the "FISH HOOK" area of Cambodia, at the BINH LONG - PHUOC LONG Province border. Recent information, and the lack of contact with the regiment in the "FISH HOOK" area indicates that elements of the 88th NVA Regiment have displaced to southern BINH LONG Province, probably near the MICHELIN Plantation. Although various sources have indicated the subordination of the 88th NVA Regiment to the 5th VC Division, there has been no definite documentation to substantiate that fact.

(f) In the area formerly designated as MR IV and now split into sub-regions as described in subparagraph c above, the nine battalions remained dispersed in the new sub-region areas in a relative defensive posture. Despite that posture, battalion sized offensive operations were conducted in December 1967 and January 1968. The attacks were made against US and ARVN forces and fixed positions in the north-western portion of sub-region E1. Recently captured documents indicated that the VC are replenishing losses suffered during 1967. Replacements have been sent from NVN and IV CTZ and new weapons and equipment have been received from various areas.

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(g) The attacks which were initiated in the III CTZ on 31 January 1968 had been indicated, though the precise location and hour of the attacks was, of course, not known. As of the time this report was written, full details of the overall situation were not available and cannot be summarized properly. Among the many sites attacked during the early morning hours of 31 January 1968 were the following:

The American Embassy in Saigon

The Presidential Palace, Saigon

Officer HQ's, Saigon

TAN SON NHUT Air Base

BIEN HOA Air Base

HQ, II FFORCEV

199th Infantry Brigade

HQ, III Corps (ARVN), BIEN HOA

TAN AN

LAI KHE

BEN CAT

The attack on HQ, II FFORCEV area commenced at 510300H January 1968 with 122mm rockets. A ground attack commenced later and continued throughout the day. The enemy failed to penetrate the perimeter at any time and was engaged primarily by LFT's. The American Embassy compound in Saigon was penetrated, but Marine guards successfully defended the building until reinforcements from the 101st Airborne Division landed on the rooftop helipad. Nineteen VC were killed in the ensuing action. They were identified as members of the C10 VC NF Sapper Battalion. One PW reported that there were 21 battalions assembled in the Saigon - LONG BINH area. Another reported that 1000 VC were assembled east of LONG BINH military installations. These reports were fragmentary and preliminary, of course, but in view of the events which took place in the forenoon of 31 January 1968, they were considered to be possibly true. It can be reported at this time that the current attacks in the III CTZ represent the largest and best coordinated series of attacks ever perpetrated by the VC/NVA forces in this area. Preliminary document readouts and interrogations of PW indicated that the 274th and 275th VC Regiments together with several separate LF battalions were engaged in the attacks in the Saigon - BIEN HOA - LONG BINH areas.

e. VC/NVA Battle Losses:

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NOVEMBER 1967

<u>VC/NVA</u> <u>KIA</u> <u>(BC)</u>	<u>PW</u>	<u>Returnees</u>	<u>Ind</u> <u>Wpns</u>	<u>Crew</u> <u>Served</u> <u>Wpns</u>	<u>Mil</u> <u>Struc</u> <u>Dest</u>	<u>Bunkers</u> <u>Dest</u>	<u>Tons Rice</u> <u>Cptrd/Dest</u>
2461	447	216	895	98	372	2264	216.9

DECEMBER 1967

2182	251	162	534	128	167	1734	724.8
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JANUARY 1968

4177	528	83	697	220	209	2284	328.3
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TOTAL:

8820	1145	461	2126	446	748	6282	1270.0
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NOTE: The actual strength of Main Force units cannot be equated to battlefield losses for three reasons. First, supporting and Local Force personnel normally accompany Main Force units into battle and unit identification most often cannot be made. Second, it is impossible to assess accurately the number of enemy casualties resulting from air and artillery strikes. Though not as thoroughly in some instances as heretofore, the enemy continues to police the battlefield before Allied units can enter the area. Third, there is considerable variation in the time that particular units require to have their losses replaced. Trained invaders from NVN provide a high percentage of the replacements, but replacements are also drawn from local recruitment and by infiltration from other CTZ. Precise knowledge of the numbers of replacements and the time involved for their integration into the units is not available. Thus, the strength of individual units and the overall strength of the enemy in III CTZ must continue to be based in part on estimation.

f. Enemy Capabilities, Vulnerabilities and Relative Probability of Adoption at the End of the Quarter:

(NOTE: The following estimate is of necessity tentative due to the scope of the attacks initiated on 31 January 1968 and the preliminary and fragmentary nature of the intelligence as of the close of the reporting period. The capabilities and vulnerabilities of several major VC units will obviously be determined largely by the outcome of the series of battles now in progress. Indications at the close of the

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reporting period are that the 274th and 275th VC Regiments together with several RF and LF Battalions suffered heavy casualties and the estimate is based on the presumption that those early indications will be borne out).

(1) Capabilities:

(a) Attack:

1 The enemy is capable of continuing the attacks in the Saigon - BIEN HOA area with elements of the 7th NVA Division, the 9th VC Division, the VC DONG NAI Regiment, and LF Battalions.

2 The enemy is capable of attacking installations and LOC in TAY NINH, BINH LONG, and BINH DUCNG Provinces with elements of the 7th NVA Division and the 88th NVA Regiment, supported by elements of the 69th VC Artillery Command.

3 The 84A NVA Artillery Regiment, which possesses a rocket capability, can be employed against targets throughout the III CTZ.

4 The battalions of Sub-regions 21 through 25 are capable of conducting limited attacks against Allied units, outposts, LOC and installations within their respective areas of operations.

5 The VC are capable of attacking in VC MY THO Province with elements of the DONG THAP I Regiment and the 514th VC LF Battalion.

(b) Defense:

1 The VC can defend in TAY NINH, and BINH LONG provinces with elements of the 7th NVA and the 9th VC Divisions and the 88th NVA Regiment.

2 The VC can defend in War Zone "D" and VC BA BIEN Province with elements of the DONG NAI Regiment and Local Forces.

3 The VC can defend in PHUOC LONG Province with elements of the 9th VC Division supported by Local Forces.

4 Confronted with a superior force, the enemy is capable of breaking contact, dispersing into small groups, and withdrawing to safe positions.

(c) Reinforce: The enemy can reinforce his attack or defense in the northern III CTZ with 3 battalions from the II CTZ. In southern III CTZ he can reinforce with 2 battalions from IV CTZ. It

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is estimated that reinforcements could reach their destinations within three to ten days after movement commenced.

(2) Vulnerabilities and Weaknesses:

(a) The enemy control over the populace is vulnerable to revolutionary development and psychological warfare activities, especially in areas where the infiltrated NVA troops have given rise to apprehension among the people. As the GVN continues to gain the confidence and support of the population, the enemy's influence weakens.

(b) Low morale in the enemy's ranks is vulnerable to exploitation by Allied psychological warfare operations.

(c) The enemy's extended and insecure LOC are becoming more vulnerable to Allied interdiction, except for those LOC in neutral countries. The interdiction of enemy LOC has restricted his movement and ability to establish tax collection stations throughout the III CTZ.

(d) The neutralization of VC/NV Base Areas in III CTZ and the loss of caches has reduced the enemy's ability to resupply adequately his forces from within the III CTZ. This has forced the enemy to tax his supply system. An inability to resupply quickly has weakened his capability to maintain any extended offensive or defensive postures and also to hold any objective for an extended period.

(e) The enemy is vulnerable to reconnaissance in force missions of Allied mobile forces which are supported by artillery and close air support.

(f) There are increasing indications that the enemy's ability to obtain sound tactical intelligence is declining. This is possibly due to the forced dispersion of his units caused by aggressive Allied operations and in turn has resulted in his loss of Lt and Irregular support.

(g) In any large scale offensive action, such as that initiated on 31 January 1968, the enemy is extremely vulnerable to Allied firepower and force mobility.

(3) Relative Probability of Adoption at the End of the quarter: The intensity of the attacks increased at the end of the quarter and indications that the enemy does not intend to withdraw lend credence to the distinct possibility that the enemy has mounted his general offensive. He will continue attacks to seize and hold whatever terrain or population centers he can to place him in a position of power for any "peace talks".

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4. (C) OPERATIONS, PLANS AND TRAINING

a. Introduction:

(1) During the reporting period, II FFORCEV initiated the dry season campaign. Objectives of the operations included continued military pacification of the heavily populated provinces surrounding Saigon and security of the Allied base areas; neutralization of War Zone C and interdiction of main invasion routes into War Zone C; preemption of War Zone D; neutralization of VC main force capability and effective food resource control in the heavily populated Phuoc Long, Long Khanh, Binh Tuy, Phuoc Tuy, Bien Hoa, Binh Duong, Tay Ninh, Hau Nghia, Gia Dinh, Long An, Binh Tuong, Kien Hoa, Go Cong and Kien Phong provinces.

(2) During November, military activity in III CTZ was highlighted by the enemy's unsuccessful attempts to achieve a victory in MR 10. On three occasions (Loc Ninh, Song Be and Bu Cop/ Bo Duc) main force units were committed against seemingly vulnerable and lightly defended targets. In each case, the continuing improvement in the effectiveness of ARVN and RF/PF units was evident as RVNAF units withstood heavy assaults until additional units could be committed. The dry season campaign was initiated. Major elements of the 101st Airborne Division commenced arrival in country.

(3) December was marked by a significant increase in enemy contacts and willingness of the enemy to engage in sustained combat. II FFORCEV increased the scope of dry season campaign operations when operations YELLOWSTONE, SARATOGA and FARGO were initiated. Additional combat power continued to arrive in III CTZ. The 3d Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment closed at Nui Dat on 27 December increasing the strength of the 1st Australian Task Force by 796 personnel. The 101st Airborne Division (-) closed in country. Both units commenced training immediately upon arrival.

(4) January was characterized by increased offensive operations against the enemy particularly in War Zone C, northern Binh Long and Phuoc Long provinces, northern Hau Nghia province and near the junction of Bien Hoa, Binh Duong and Long Khanh provinces. Enemy initiated activity increased significantly, characterized by repeated attacks against friendly installations and defensive positions. A major violation of the New Year's truce occurred on 1 January when elements of the 271st and 272d VC Regiments attacked Fire Support Patrol Base Burt twelve kilometers northeast of Suoi Tre. During the attack, US forces killed 386 of the enemy. An additional 20 enemy were killed as they attempted to flee the area. The 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division came under operational control of II FFORCEV on 13 January, except the 3d Battalion, 506th Infantry which remained under the operational control of I FFORCEV. The 3d Squadron 17th Air Cavalry commenced combat operations and has performed

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well in combat. The 101st Airborne Division commenced large scale combat operations when it assumed responsibility for Operation MANCHESTER on 12 January. On 24 January, the 1st Australian Task Force commenced operations in AO Columbus (between the Dong Nai River and Highway 1, east of Bien Hoa). Contacts with the enemy in MR 10 during Operation SAN ANGELO remained light as main force units were concentrated in and near War Zone C in an effort to defeat Allied forces.

(5) In December ARVN units assumed complete responsibility for military operations in the Capital Military District, releasing the 199th Infantry Brigade for operations in AO MANCHESTER and UNIONTOWN. The significance of this action became readily apparent as the 199th Infantry Brigade commenced making heavy contact with enemy forces north of the Dong Nai River soon after initiating operations in that area.

(6) The continued steady improvement in the security status of road lines of communication (LOC) contributed to successful combat operations and to the economic growth of the RVN. Overland movement of convoys and supplies has reduced the time required to commit forces to battle and to conduct logistical operations. It reduces the airlift requirements for both USAF and US Army aviation units. The Vietnamese people move to and from work and transport commercial products to market with less fear of taxation, LOC interdictions and other incidents. Until the end of January, convoys could move over all national highways in III CTZ with the exception of the Interprovincial Highway 1A route to Dong Xoai and then on Highway 14 to the northeast. The enemy attack on 31 January resulted in some temporary interdictions and an increase in the number of incidents directed against convoys. The enemy did not control or interdict critical highways for extended time periods, and the resulting severe defeat more than offset any temporary psychological victory which the enemy may have gained initially.

(7) Offensive operations against main force units have driven the enemy from former base areas and have proven conclusively that there are no "safe havens" within the III CTZ. Until late January, the major enemy threat was located in northern Military Region 10 where there are no formally designated base areas, in War Zone C, and along Highway 13. Local force units were widely scattered outside of base areas. Operation SAN ANGELO was being conducted in MR 10 as the reporting period ended.

(8) A new technique adopted during late November was the employment of Company F (LRF), 51st Infantry with the 3d Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry in support of Operations MANCHESTER and UNIONTOWN. Company F engaged in training and preparation for future operations during November. The 3d Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry commenced limited operations along the eastern portion of the ATLANTA area of operation in November. In late November and early December, both units were under

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the operational control of the 9th Infantry Division and 199th Infantry Brigade (Separate) (Light) in succession, and operated together in close coordination in the MANCHESTER and UNIONTOWN areas of operation. Commencing on 8 December, the 3d Squadron, 17th Cavalry (less one air cavalry troop) participated in Operation YELLOWSTONE. One air cavalry troop and Company F (LRP), 51st Infantry remained under the operational control of the 199th Infantry Brigade (Separate) (Light). In January the 3d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division assumed operational control of Troop A, 3d Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry and Company F, 51st Infantry (LRP). Both units participated successfully in Operation MANCHESTER and then returned to operational control of the 199th Infantry Brigade (Separate) (Light).

(9) The high degree of tactical mobility and rapid reaction capability of all friendly forces was clearly demonstrated during the quarter. Large numbers of personnel and quantities of supplies and equipment were moved to areas of contact at Loc Ninh, Song Be and Bu Dop. The 4th Battalion, 39th Infantry was deployed on short notice from Bearcat to Ban Me Thout in II CTZ on 21 November, and the 2d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division was deployed to I CTZ in January. The Mobile Riverine Force (MRF) continued highly effective operations in the Delta area.

(10) Jungle clearing operations were continued in enemy sanctuaries and along land LOC. The long time base areas in the Ho Bo Woods, Boi Loi Woods and Iron Triangle were either cleared or cleared to the extent that military operations can be conducted with greater facility in these areas. The security status of key land LOC (Highways 1 and 13 for example) and some secondary roads was improved by clearing operations. Reconnaissance in force operations such as SARATOGA, FARGO, YELLOWSTONE, SANTA FE I and ATLANTA included jungle clearing and road upgrading operations.

(11) The highlight of the reporting period occurred on 310300 January when the enemy launched a coordinated rocket, mortar and ground attack throughout III CTZ. This treacherous attack was directed against both military and political objectives, particularly Saigon, the Long Binh - Bien Hoa complex, and province and district capitals. This attack was met by combined rapid reaction of maneuver forces, tactical air, army aviation and artillery which produced overwhelming firepower. A summary of major actions occurring on the initial day of the attack is contained on page 45.

b. Operations continuing into this reporting period.

(1) Operation LAM SON 67, initiated on 8 February 1967, continued through the reporting period. The 2d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, in close coordination with elements of the 5th and 18th Infantry Divisions (ARVN), conducted local reconnaissance in force, cordon

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and search and security of revolutionary development operations in heavily populated Binh Duong Province. Continuous emphasis was placed on strengthening local defense, extending developmental projects, elimination of Viet Cong infrastructure, winning the support of the population and road clearing operations. An example of the continuing effort to keep enemy forces off balance and to destroy the Viet Cong infrastructure was the organization of Task Force Madden (redesignated Task Force Meyer on 6 January). This specially tailored unit consists of a headquarters and one or more infantry companies with attached mechanized or armor units. These elements work in coordination and cooperation with Vietnamese province and district forces in Di An, Lai Thieu and Chanh Thanh Districts. The Task Force conducted patrols, cordon and search operations and day and night raids in southern Binh Duong Province, apprehending a number of personnel suspected of being members of the Viet Cong infrastructure, destroying tunnels, apprehending military deserters and draft delinquents, and capturing a small quantity of weapons. Enemy contact was light and sporadic until January. At 0726 hours, on 6 January, Company A, 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry conducted an air assault seven kilometers southeast of Ben Cat. At 0930 hours, Company A began receiving small arms and automatic weapons fire from an estimated enemy battalion. Artillery and tactical air supported the contact which was reinforced by the Reconnaissance Platoon, 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry and Companies A and B, 2d Battalion, 2d Infantry (M). At 1300 hours, the enemy broke contact leaving behind 90 dead, 2 captured, 14 individual weapons and two crew served weapons captured. Friendly losses were four killed and 14 wounded. On 11 January, the 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry conducted a highly successful cordon and search operation approximately three kilometers south of Ben Cat, in coordination with Vietnamese district officials and National Police. The cordon was in place by 2311 hours. Friendly forces commenced the search at daylight. Throughout the night the enemy employed sporadic small arms fire. Company B, 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry engaged and killed two VC who were trying to escape from the cordon. During the search an additional seven VC were found dead, 11 VC were captured, 17 VC suspects were apprehended (two of whom were determined later to be VC) and eight individual weapons were captured. Friendly losses were one killed and two wounded. This highly successful action indicates the outstanding results which can be achieved in combined operations by thorough planning, maximum security and deception, and decisive execution. This operation has denied the enemy a previous safe area, contributed to identification and elimination of the VC infrastructure, and afforded additional training in combined operations to RVNAF and US forces. Clearing of the Ong Dong Jungle and along Highway 13 has neutralized a large VC sanctuary and has improved the security condition of this major north/south highway. Convoys have moved between Di An and Quan Loi since 3 November without significant incident. Highways 7B, 2A and 1A between Ben Cat and Phuoc Vinh were opened from 23 November to 21 December. Convoys of the 3d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division traveled from Bien Hoa to Ben Cat on Highway 13 and then east to Phuoc Vinh. Convoys of the 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry

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Division traveled from Phuoc Vinh to Quan Loi. Road opening and up-grading operations have been conducted along Highway 1A between Phu Cuong and Phuoc Vinh and the road is used periodically for military convoys. Operation LAM SON 67 terminated on 312400H January 1968. Cumulative results include 59 US killed and 576 wounded. Two hundred eighty three (283) enemy were killed (144 during January), 2204 people were classified as detainees, eight crew served weapons and 165 small arms were captured. Seven small arms were destroyed. Operation LAM SON 68 continues in the same area of operations with the same mission.

(2) Operation SHENANDOAH II was a combined reconnaissance in force mission with road clearing and improvement. It was initiated by the 1st and 3d Brigades, 1st Infantry Division on 29 September and continued into the reporting period. The battle of Loc Ninh which began on 29 October was the highlight of the operation. At the beginning of the reporting period, enemy activity in the Loc Ninh area had decreased to sporadic contacts. Light contacts on 1 November resulted in two friendly personnel wounded and 20 enemy killed. Starting at 0045 hours, 2 November, the enemy attacked the subsector compound, CIDG camp, US 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry night defensive position, fire support patrol base at the Loc Ninh airstrip and both ends of the airstrip with a combination of 82 and 120mm mortar, RPG-2, automatic weapons and small arms fire. The small arms and automatic weapons fire at Loc Ninh came from the north, east and west. Between 0130 hours and 0600 hours, the enemy made at least three unsuccessful assaults on friendly installations and positions with massed forces. A combination of heavy, accurate fire by the defenders, artillery and effective close air support inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy. Approximately twelve .50 caliber weapons fired intense anti-aircraft fire at close support aircraft. There was a decrease in the fighting after 0600 hours, but contact was maintained and further enemy casualties were inflicted. Throughout the day, the US Infantry Battalions continued reconnaissance in force operations at distances up to six kilometers around Loc Ninh while ARVN forces maintained close-in security. At 0820 hours, the US 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry moved from Quan Loi and conducted an air mobile assault six kilometers northwest of Loc Ninh. At 1400 hours, two airstrikes killed 22 enemy four kilometers southwest of Loc Ninh. Two Mobile Strike Force Companies closed into Loc Ninh by 1400 hours. At 1847 hours, the US 2d Battalion, 12th Infantry completed an air mobile assault six kilometers northeast of Loc Ninh, establishing a night defensive position at that location. Between 2205 hours and 2304 hours, the enemy probed the night defensive position. This was the most significant day from the standpoint of resources expended and enemy casualties inflicted. Seven friendly personnel were killed and 36 were wounded compared to 296 enemy killed. At 0220 hours, 3 November, the US 2d Battalion, 12th Infantry night defensive position six kilometers northeast of Loc Ninh received 40-50 rounds of mortar, .50 caliber, small arms and automatic weapons fire. During the remainder of the day, US units in the surrounding area swept the battlefield, located 54 enemy dead and captured seven prisoners.

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The 36th Ranger Battalion (ARVN) closed into Loc Ninh at 0945 hours to assist the garrison and conduct close-in search and sweep operations. By this time, the 273d and at least one battalion of the 272d Viet Cong Regiments (composed mostly of North Vietnamese) had been identified along with unknown sized elements of the 141st and 165th North Vietnamese Army Regiments. Rockets used during the attack indicated the presence of the 84A North Vietnamese Army Artillery Regiment. Three friendly personnel were killed and 43 were wounded; fifty-seven enemy were killed. The four US infantry battalions conducted reconnaissance in force operations around Loc Ninh on 4 November with only one minor ground contact. During the day one VC was killed and 27 others were found dead from previous contacts. Thirteen more enemy dead were found on 5 November. On 7 November, at 1305 hours, the US 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry engaged an unknown size enemy force six kilometers northeast of Loc Ninh. Light fire teams and FAC supported the friendly force until the VC broke contact at 1420 hours. US casualties were 17 killed and 21 wounded; sixty six VC were killed. Key statistics in the Loc Ninh battle from 290115H October to 080600 hours November indicate the magnitude of the battle. 452 close air support sorties, 36 Sky Spot (radar controlled bomb strikes) and eight B-52 strikes were flown. Thirty thousand one hundred twenty five rounds of artillery were expended. Eight hundred fifty two enemy were killed at a cost of 50 friendly killed and 234 wounded. By 9 November, three additional enemy had been killed, for a total of 855. Operation SHENANDOAH II terminated on 19 November. One hundred seven (107) US personnel were killed and 322 were wounded; enemy losses were 956 killed.

(3) Operation BARKING SANDS was conducted by the 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division in eastern Hau Nghia, southern Tay Ninh and southwestern Binh Duong Provinces from 17 May to 7 December. The area of operations included long time enemy sanctuaries in the Ho Bo Woods, eastern Boi Loi Woods, Filhol Plantation and the Iron Triangle. Numerous small unit operations were conducted in conjunction with a massive land clearing operation. Large areas of jungle and forest were cleared by Rome plows. Operations resulted in generally light and sporadic contact with small enemy units. The evasive tactics of the enemy combined with his frequent and clever use of mines and booby traps made this a painstaking operation with a relatively modest enemy to friendly kill ratio of two to one; however, the persistence of friendly forces has provided increased security for the pacification effort, kept the enemy off balance and caused the relocation of some enemy units. Large areas, which until recently had been considered by the enemy to be safe sanctuaries, have been cleared. The long term benefits of this operation will include increased security along the Saigon River. One hundred and fifty two (152) US personnel were killed and 1060 wounded. Enemy losses were 304 killed, 2036 detainees, five returnees, 204 small arms and 17 crew served weapons captured.

(4) Operation KOLEKOLE was conducted from 13 May to 17

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December in Hau Nghia, Tay Ninh and Binh Duong Provinces by the 2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division. This was the most successful of the 25th Infantry Division "Monsoon" operations from a statistical viewpoint. It was also a vital adjunct to the revolutionary development programs being conducted in the area of operations. Combined reconnaissance in force, and cordon and search operations maintained steady pressure on the enemy. Operations were characterized by rapid response to intelligence reports in widely scattered areas of the division TAOI and light contact with small enemy units. In November, an increased number of combined operations were conducted with the 34th Ranger Battalion (ARVN). During Operation KOLE-KOLE, US and ARVN forces achieved a high degree of teamwork as they conducted combat operations, upgraded roads, repaired bridges, and provided security for the local population. These operations were instrumental in improving economic conditions in the area and enhancing the overland movement of military forces. The local population now uses restored highways to go to and from work and to transport products to market. Ninety two (92) US personnel were killed and 640 were wounded. Enemy personnel losses were 645 killed, 1232 detainees and 30 returnees. Enemy materiel losses included 2427 artillery and mortar rounds, 286 individual weapons and five crew served weapons either captured or destroyed.

(5) Operation DIAMOND HEAD was continued by the 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division in southeastern Tay Ninh and western Binh Duong Provinces. This operation was initiated on 17 May as part of the division monsoon campaign. Most operations were battalion size and smaller conducted in the Michelin rubber plantation, the "Trapezoid" area and western Boi Loi Woods. Extensive day and night patrolling, reconnaissance in force, and cordon and search operations were employed. On 25 November, Companies B and C, 2d Battalion, 22d Infantry killed 20 VC in an engagement with an estimated company five kilometers southeast of the Michelin rubber plantation. A small weapons cache containing 16 small arms was found by the Reconnaissance Platoon, 3d Battalion, 22d Infantry four kilometers east of the Michelin Plantation. After Operation ATLANTA was initiated on 18 November in the Iron Triangle, there was a marked increase in the frequency and intensity of contacts in the Trapezoid area, between the Iron Triangle and the Michelin Plantation. The reaction was predictable and understandable from the enemy's viewpoint since his traditional sanctuaries along the Saigon River were being threatened. This was a difficult operation due to heavy jungle, numerous base camps and fortifications in the area of operations and the enemy's skillful employment of mines and booby traps. It proved again that friendly forces can enter and conduct sustained operations in any area because of their superior combat power. Eighty friendly personnel were killed and 605 were wounded. Enemy losses were 237 killed, 499 detainees and four returnees. DIAMOND HEAD terminated on 7 December.

(7) Operation ENTERPRISE, was initiated on 13 February 1967, and continues into the next reporting period. The 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division is conducting this operation in Long An Province in coordination

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with ARVN, RF/PF, and FRU. Reconnaissance in force, cordon and search, saturation patrolling and eagle flight operations seek out and destroy the enemy, thereby improving security conditions in support of pacification activities. Night operations, including air mobile insertions, received increased emphasis. Enemy contact was heavier than during the previous reporting period. There were increased ground attacks by company size or larger enemy units, mortar attacks and incidents along Highway 4. However, enemy units remain dispersed in small groups and must be located by methodical search of suspected locations. There was one major enemy attack during the reporting period and two major contacts. At 0305 hours, 10 December, Company A, 2d Battalion, 60th Infantry at An Nhut Tan was attacked from the northeast by an estimated VC Battalion. Contact continued until 0550 hours. At 0407 hours, the 2d Battalion, 60th Infantry base camp at Tan Tru received 40-50 rounds of 81mm mortar fire. A light fire team, artillery and mortar fire supported these contacts. Two companies each from the 2d Battalion, 60th Infantry, 3d Battalion, 39th Infantry, and 5th Battalion, 60th Infantry moved overland (one company) and by air in reaction to these attacks to block escape routes from the area. Five PF companies assisted with these operations. At 1405 hours, on 17 January, while conducting reconnaissance in force operations approximately four kilometers west of Rach Kien, Company A, 3d Battalion, 39th Infantry was attacked by an unknown size VC force. Contact grew increasingly heavy and at 1419 hours the Reconnaissance Platoon, 3d Battalion, 39th Infantry conducted an air assault approximately two kilometers north of the area of contact. At 1530 hours, Company C, 3d Battalion, 39th Infantry air assaulted to a position five kilometers northwest of Rach Kien supported by artillery, light fire teams and tactical aircraft. Contact was broken at 1740 hours. Seventeen enemy were killed, one PW and eight individual weapons were captured. At 1324 hours, on 8 January, the 3d Platoon of Company A, 3d Battalion, 39th Infantry conducted an air mobile insertion approximately eight kilometers southeast of Can Giuoc. At 1320 hours, the platoon received heavy small arms and automatic weapons fire from an estimated VC platoon. Contact continued, and at 1343 hours the 1st Platoon of Company A was inserted approximately two kilometers to the northeast. At 1444 hours, the 2d Platoon of Company A, 3d Battalion, 39th Infantry was airlifted from Rach Kien and inserted in the area of contact followed by the 3d Platoon of Company B at 1510 hours. At 1707 hours, Company B, 2d Battalion, 60th Infantry was airlifted from positions five kilometers southeast of Tan Tru and inserted into the contact. At 2340 hours, the enemy broke contact and withdrew leaving twenty six dead on the battlefield. A search of the battlefield the following day revealed an additional eight enemy killed. Friendly losses were 23 killed and 31 wounded. ENTERPRISE has produced excellent results in support of pacification. Where abandoned villages once decayed and empty school rooms deteriorated, there is now a resurgence of normal life. There has been a steady increase in the number of residents returning to their former homes. The repair of bridges in the area has reopened roads and granted access to the major markets. There has been an increase in commercial activity. The constant presence of troops provides actual as well as psychological security for the inhabitants.

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Operations in the area provide security for the villagers from Viet Cong harassment. The soldiers participate in various civic action projects when not patrolling or conducting other combat operations. There is increasing cooperation between the local populace and military and civilian officials, indicating acceptance of government authority. Significant cumulative enemy losses include 1,607 enemy killed, 1012 detainees, 35 returnees, 332 individual weapons and 25 crew served weapons captured. Friendly losses include 220 killed and 1227 wounded. Operation ENTERPRISE continues.

(8) Operation FAIRFAX was initiated by the 199th Infantry Brigade (Separate) (Light) on 1 December 1966 and terminated on 14 December 1967. US Battalions were relocated from the FAIRFAX AO on 15 November (4th Battalion, 12th Infantry), 1 December (3d Battalion, 7th Infantry), and 15 December (2d Battalion, 3d Infantry), leaving only a small advisory element with the ARVN 5th Ranger Group. Prior to commencing independent military operations in the Capital Military District, the three battalions of the 5th Ranger Group completed training and were administered a five day concluding evaluation exercise. By 18 November, all units had been rated combat ready. When the 5th Ranger Group assumed responsibility for military operations in Capital Military District on 15 December, a major goal was attained. Additional US forces have been released for operations against main force units in areas more distant from Saigon. Operation FAIRFAX severely disrupted Viet Cong Activity in Gia Dinh Province and negated enemy efforts to reestablish his once strong influence in the area surrounding Saigon. The military significance of FAIRFAX is evidenced by enemy losses consisting of 1275 killed, 40 returnees, 2921 detainees, 487 individual weapons and 14 crew served weapons. Friendly personnel were 172 killed, 916 wounded and two are missing in action.

(9) Operation RILEY is a reconnaissance in force operation being conducted in Bien Hoa and western Long Khanh Provinces by the 1st Brigade, 9th Infantry Division. This operation commenced on 22 July. Basic objectives are to support pacification by conducting reconnaissance in force operations, providing a ready reaction force for RF/PF outposts, assisting the GVN in completing developmental projects and clearing existing roads and trails. It has produced benefits in Bien Hoa and Long Khanh Provinces similar to those resulting from Operation ENTERPRISE in Long An Province. Highways 1 and 15 are more secure and support increased commercial travel. Security conditions along the Saigon - Xuan Loc railroad are improved by the presence of military forces in the area. Significant cumulative enemy losses include 406 enemy killed, 516 detainees, two returnees, 109 individual weapons and 60 crew served weapons captured. Friendly losses include 55 killed and 253 wounded. Operation RILEY continues.

(10) Operation NARASUAN: On 20 October, the Royal Thai Army Volunteer Regiment initiated Operation NARASUAN in the Nhon Trach District, Bien Hoa Province. Combat operations are conducted in conjunction with psychological and pacification activities to reduce enemy influence and

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improve the capabilities of GVN forces. This will ultimately achieve a degree of pacification which will permit deployment of FMAF to other areas. The Royal Thai Army Volunteer Regiment conducts extensive reconnaissance in force, saturation patrolling, air mobile, riverine and ROAD RUNNER operations. Until 20 December, it was extremely difficult to locate a large size enemy unit. On 20 December, elements of the 274th VC Regiment conducted a coordinated attack against six RVN and FMAF positions along or adjacent to Highway 15 in Nhon Trach District. Enemy forces employed mortar fire against five of the friendly positions. At 2210 hours, an estimated Viet Cong Company, supported by 60 and 81mm fire, attacked the 1st Company, Royal Thai Army Volunteer Regiment, 12 kilometers south of Long Thanh, from the south and west. The Royal Thai, supported by light fire teams and artillery, repulsed the attack inflicting severe casualties on the enemy. At 2255 hours, the Viet Cong appeared to withdraw to the west, but resumed the attack at 2300 hours in an apparent attempt to retrieve their dead. Again the Royal Thai Army Volunteer Regiment fought gallantly and brought all available firepower to bear on the enemy. Sporadic mortar and small arms fire continued until 0645 hours when the enemy forces withdrew leaving 66 of their dead behind. At first light, a search of the area disclosed 20 small arms, 22 crew served weapons, 122 hand grenades, 52 RPG rounds, 30 mortar rounds, 7 mines, and 9597 rounds of small arms ammunition. The Royal Thai Army Volunteer Regiment lost 6 killed and 13 wounded. Cumulative results of Operation NARASUAN as of 31 January are 21 Thai killed and 82 wounded. Enemy losses are 113 killed, 89 detainees, 78 small arms and 28 crew served weapons captured. Operation NARASUAN continues.

c. Operations completed during this reporting period:

(1) Operation KIEN GIANG 9-1 was conducted from 16 to 24 November as a reconnaissance in force in Dinh Tuong Province. The Mobile Riverine Force, including the 2d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, the 5th VNMC Battalion (ARVN) and elements of the 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division operated in coordination and cooperation with the 7th and 9th Infantry Divisions (ARVN) and supported by Navy Task Force 117. The most significant contacts were on 18 November in western Dinh Tuong Province by elements of the US 9th Infantry Division, 7th Infantry Division (ARVN) and 5th VNMC Battalion. Nine US personnel were killed and 61 wounded. Thirty nine (VC) were killed by US forces while the ARVN and VNMC Battalions accounted for an additional 25 VC killed. The operation was reduced in scope when the 2d Battalion, 60th Infantry and 5th Battalion, 7th Infantry (M) terminated participation on 18 November. The Mobile Riverine Force and 5th VNMC Battalion, supported by a B52 strike, conducted air and riverine assaults in the Cam Son Secret Zone on 23 November to locate and destroy elements of the 516th LF Battalion. Eight kilometers southwest of Cai Lay, the 3d Co, 5th VNMC Battalion found a weapons cache consisting of 16 Chicoms carbines, 40,000 rounds of 7.62 ammunition and other miscellaneous items of materiel. Cumulative results of US operations were 16 US killed and 113 wounded. Enemy losses were 73

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killed, 48 detainees, four small arms and one crew served weapon captured. The 5th VNMC Battalion lost three killed and 35 wounded while accounting for 65 VC killed, 35 detainees and 82 small arms captured.

(2) Operation CAMDEN was conducted from 17 December to 31 December in northern Hau Nghia and southern Tay Ninh Provinces by the 25th Infantry Division. The initial task organization for this reconnaissance in force operation consisted of the 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry, 2d Battalion, 27th Infantry and one troop, 3d Armored Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry. The 1st Battalion, 49th Infantry (ARVN) and 3d Battalion, 49th Infantry (ARVN) worked in coordination and cooperation with US forces. On 20 December, the 3d Armored Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry (-) killed 14 VC ten kilometers east of Dau Tieng. On 21 December, the 2d Battalion, 27th Infantry in a day long contact five kilometers northeast of Trung Lap killed 42 VC while losing four killed and 17 wounded. Heavy contact involving the 3d Battalion, 22d Infantry and an unknown size enemy force occurred on 22 December twelve kilometers southeast of Dau Tieng, continuing throughout the day. Approximately eight miles to the southeast, Troop C, 3d Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry engaged another unknown size force. All contacts for the day resulted in 17 VC killed at a cost of 14 US killed and 45 wounded. CAMDEN terminated on 31 December. Cumulative results were 25 US killed and 118 wounded. Enemy losses include 101 killed, one returnee, 29 detainees, 18 small arms, one crew served weapon and 19 tons of rice captured. Thirty five tons of rice were destroyed.

(3) CORONADO IX was a combined riverine operation initiated on 2 November 1967 in western Dinh Tuong and eastern Kien Phong Provinces by elements of the 9th Infantry Division in coordination and cooperation with the 5th VNMC Battalion and Navy Task Force 117. On 4 December, operations were conducted in the My Tho area to locate and destroy elements of the 267th MF and 502d LF Battalions. The 5th VNMC Battalion was the lead element followed by the 3d Battalion, 47th Infantry as the force proceeded north on a river 12 kilometers east of My Tho. Upon receiving heavy small arms, automatic weapons, recoilless rifle and B-40 rocket fire from the west river bank, the 5th VNMC Battalion beached four companies and launched an attack against enemy positions. The 1st Company, 5th VNMC Battalion killed more than 100 enemy as it attacked a fortified position. The 3d Battalion, 47th Infantry beached two kilometers to the southwest of the 5th VNMC Battalion and attacked to the northwest. Three companies of the 4th Battalion, 47th Infantry were air lifted into blocking positions two kilometers to the northwest of the 3d Battalion, 47th Infantry. Pressed from the south, north and east, the VC units began withdrawing and were pushed into the 4th Battalion, 47th Infantry blocking position. Heavy to light contact continued throughout most of the day. Enemy losses from this engagement were 243 killed (156 by 5th VNMC), 24 detainees, 53 small arms and one crew served weapon captured. Friendly losses were 52 killed (40 VNMC), and 225 wounded (70 VNMC). There were two significant contacts during January. At 1605 hours, on 7 January while conducting reconnaissance in force operations twelve kilometers southwest of Ben Tre,

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Company B, 3d Battalion, 60th Infantry received small arms and automatic weapons fire from an estimated two VC platoons. Fire was returned with organic weapons and light fire teams, artillery and airstrikes supported the contact. At 2010 hours, the VC broke contact leaving behind 22 dead. US losses were seven wounded. At 1310 hours, on 10 January, Company A, 3d Battalion, 60th Infantry conducted an air mobile assault fifteen kilometers west of Cai Lay. The company received small arms, automatic weapons fire and rifle grenades from an estimated two VC platoons located near the landing zone. At 1610 hours, Company C, 3d Battalion, 60th Infantry received small arms and automatic weapons fire from an unknown number of VC approximately two kilometers west of the contact of Company A. At 1620 hours, approximately one kilometer west of the Company A contact, Company E, 3d Battalion, 60th Infantry engaged an unknown number of VC. Companies A, B and E of the 4th Battalion, 47th Infantry were inserted at 1230 hours to reinforce Company C, 3d Battalion, 60th Infantry which remained in heavy contact. All three companies of the 4th Battalion, 47th Infantry were engaged as they moved west to link up with Company C, 3d Battalion, 60th Infantry. All elements remained in contact until 2235 hours at which time the VC broke contact. Enemy losses were 47 killed. US losses were 18 killed and 50 wounded. Operation CORONADO IX terminated on 18 January. Cumulative results of the operation were 454 enemy killed, 611 detainees, 84 individual and two crew served weapons captured. Friendly losses were 75 killed and 374 wounded.

(4) Operation SANTA FE I was initiated on 3 November to clear, upgrade and open Highway 1 from Gia Ray to the II/III CTZ boundary, destroy VC/NVA forces and bases in the May Tao Secret Zone, and develop an LOC infrastructure between Highway 1 and Highway 23 within the area of operations. The operation was preceded by a deception plan designed to convince the enemy that a major operation would be conducted along Highway 20 and Route 332 in Long Khanh province. Deception measures included publication of a spurious operation plan for "Operation EMFORIA VI", detailed coordination with Long Khanh province and district officials and the displacement of a FS&B into the "EMFORIA VI" area of operations. Elements of the 18th Infantry Division (ARVN) worked in close coordination and cooperation with the US 9th Infantry Division. The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (-), 1st Australian Task Force and Detachment B 36, Company A, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) also participated. Highway 1 from the vicinity of Gia Ray to the II CTZ/III boundary and important lateral roads, (Highway 23 from Junction Highway 1 to Ham Tan, Highway 331 from Junction Highway 1 to Junction Highway 23 and portions of Highway 329 from Junction Highway 1 to Junction Highway 23) leading from Highway 1 have been upgraded. This will produce long range benefits to the civilian economy by helping control inflation, allowing goods to move freely to and from market, hindering the VC tax collection effort, reducing the probability of attacks by fire and other incidents. Enemy contacts have been extremely light and sporadic. The May Tao-Nui Be Sanctuary has been neutralized as a result of this operation, and over eight thousand acres of jungle have been cleared. The experience gained during this combined

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operation will prove valuable in future operations. By 5 January, US and Australian forces had terminated participation in the operation. The 18th Infantry Division (ARVN) remained in the area to ensure that maximum benefits would continue to be gained from the operation. Traffic now moves freely on Highway 1 in III CTZ. Cumulative results of the operation were six friendly killed (two US, one ARVN and three AUST) and 35 wounded (15 US, 13 ARVN, nine AUST). Enemy losses were 126 killed (34 by AUST, six by ARVN), 119 SA (52 by AUST, 48 by ARVN) and 20 crew served weapons (18 by ARVN) captured.

(5) Operation FORREST was conducted by the 1st Australian Task Force from 23 November 1967 to 5 January 1968 in south central Phuoc Tuy province to deny enemy access to the rice harvest. Extensive cordon and search, patrolling, and reconnaissance in force operations were employed to achieve the primary goal. Enemy contact was light, but the basic objectives were achieved. The extensive and wide ranging operations caught the enemy by surprise on several occasions. On 2 December, six VC were contacted near the south China Sea 12 kilometers southwest of Xuyen Loc. Four were killed and three small arms were captured. On 12 December, a Long Range Patrol engaged and killed seven VC and captured three small arms eight kilometers northeast of Binh Gia. On 20 December, 35 small arms were found in a weapons cache, four small arms were found in a base camp, three VC were killed and three small arms captured at a third location. All were in the same general area 10 kilometers northwest of Ba Ria. In addition to protecting the rice harvest in south central Phuoc Tuy Province, the operation has kept the enemy off balance, thus increasing his vulnerability to air, artillery and engagement by maneuver forces. Cumulative results were five Australians killed, 31 wounded; enemy losses include 51 killed, 58 detainees, three crew served weapons and 114 small arms captured.

(6) Operation FARGO. The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (- 3d Squadron) initiated FARGO on 22 December to open Highway 13 from An Loc to Loc Ninh, secure the construction of a heavy artillery Fire Support Patrol Base at Loc Ninh and destroy VC/PA forces in the Loc Ninh - Bu Dop - Song Be area. The 3d Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment deployed to the Loc Ninh area on 30 December, after being relieved of the KITTY HAWK mission by the 3d Squadron, 5th Cavalry. The Regiment deployed around Loc Ninh, secured Highway 13 to maintain a land LOC open, conducted local reconnaissance in force operations and provided security for construction of the FSPB. The area of operation was expanded later when the 2d Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment began operations along the Cambodian Border in the vicinity of the "FISH HOOK" area. On 6 January, as the 2d Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment moved west toward the Cambodian Border and the "FISH HOOK" area, the enemy reacted. Between 0815 hours to 1500 hours, Troop H was in sporadic contact with the enemy, ranging from small arms fire from snipers to moderately heavy small arms and automatic weapons fire from an estimated VC platoon. Results of these contacts were eighteen enemy killed

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and one captured. Friendly losses were two killed and six wounded. At 1830 hours, Troop E received small arms fire while reconnoitering in the vicinity of an air strike. Fire was returned and a subsequent search of the area revealed 16 enemy dead. On 21 January, the 1st and 2d Squadrons of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, under the operational control of the 101st Airborne Division, moved to an area approximately ten kilometers east of An Loc for participation in Operation ATTALA. The 3d Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment remained at Loc Ninh, secured the Regimental CP at that location and continued to secure Highway 15 between An Loc and Loc Ninh. Operation FARGO terminated on 21 January. Cumulative enemy losses were forty nine killed, ten detainees, five individual and three crew served weapons captured. Friendly losses were six killed and 47 wounded. The operation was characterized by very light enemy contact with the exception of 6 January actions discussed above.

(7) Operations MANCHESTER and UNIONTOWN (formerly Operation STRIKE/UNIONTOWN). As the 199th Infantry Brigade (Separate) (Light) relinquished responsibility for operations in Gia Dinh Province to the 5th Ranger Group (ARVN), operations in AO STRIKE and UNIONTOWN were expanded. On 15 November, the 4th Battalion, 12th Infantry was relocated from Capital Military District. On 17 November, Operations STRIKE I and UNIONTOWN were terminated and Operation STRIKE/UNIONTOWN was initiated in the same AO with the same mission. Concurrently, the 4th Battalion, 12th Infantry, assumed the STRIKE/UNIONTOWN mission under operational control of the 9th Infantry Division. In late November, Company F (LRF), 51st Infantry and the 3d Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry commenced operations in AO STRIKE/UNIONTOWN, under operational control of the 9th Infantry Division. On 1 December, the 199th Infantry Brigade (Separate) (Light) assumed the STRIKE/UNIONTOWN mission and operational control of both the 3d Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry and Company F (LRF), 51st Infantry. The 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry was added to the task organization. The 3d Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry (less one air cavalry troop) was released to the operational control of the 25th Infantry Division effective 8 December for employment in Operation YELLOWSTONE. One air cavalry troop remained under the operational control of the 199th Infantry Brigade (Separate) (Light). After the 2d Battalion, 3d Infantry was released from FAIRFAX on 14 December, it was also employed in the STRIKE/UNIONTOWN AO. The AO was expanded to the north in view of the additional forces involved and the offensive nature of the STRIKE portion of the operation. Operation STRIKE/UNIONTOWN was terminated on 17 December. Operations MANCHESTER and UNIONTOWN were initiated on 18 December with no change in the overall AO or mission. MANCHESTER (in an AO north of the Dong Nai River) replaces STRIKE and is an offensive reconnaissance in force operation directed against enemy main force units. Conversely, UNIONTOWN is primarily a security mission designed to prevent rocket and mortar attack against the Long Binh - Bien Hoa complex. The expanded UNIONTOWN AO includes the area to the north of the Dong Nai River from which the

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enemy would most probably launch a rocket attack on the Long Binh - Bien Hoa area. This changes in AO and separation of the operations provides the Commanding General, II FFORCEV greater flexibility. The UNIFORM mission can be assumed by another II FFORCEV unit on short notice if another battalion is required in the MANCHESTER AO. OPCON units have been informed of this contingency. The 199th Infantry Brigade (Separate) (Light) had three heavy contacts north of the Dong Nai River during the reporting period. On 6 December, elements of the 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry; 4th Battalion, 12th Infantry and Troop D, 17th Cavalry engaged an estimated VC battalion occupying well fortified positions. Twenty five US were killed and 82 wounded; 64 enemy were killed. On 19 December, the 4th Battalion, 12th Infantry (-) and Troop A, 3d Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry made sporadic to heavy contacts throughout the day with an unknown size enemy force. Forty nine enemy were killed at a cost of seven US personnel killed and 15 wounded. On 27 December, the 4th Battalion, 12th Infantry engaged an unknown size enemy force. Supported by artillery and a light fire team, the battalion killed 30 enemy while losing five killed and 34 wounded. Including the results of operations by Troop A, 3d Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry and Company F (LRF), 51st Infantry, 37 VC were killed during the day. Total US personnel losses were seven killed and 20 wounded. On 12 January, the 3d Brigade of the 101st Airborne Division assumed responsibility for Operation MANCHESTER and operational control of Troop A, 3d Armored Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry and Company F, 51st Infantry (LRF). Major objectives of the operation remained the same. Throughout the remainder of the reporting period the operation was highlighted by the destruction of VC supply bases and hospital complexes as well as numerous contacts resulting in heavy enemy casualties. At 1105 hours, on 16 January, approximately ten kilometers northeast of Tan Uyen the Reconnaissance Platoon and Company B of the 2d Battalion, 506th Infantry contacted an estimated reinforced VC platoon occupying a circular trench system protecting a VC hospital and supply base area. The VC fired claymores, small arms and automatic weapons at the friendly forces. Fire was returned with organic weapons. Artillery, light fire teams and tactical airstrikes supported the friendly forces. At 1145 hours, Company D, 2d Battalion, 506th Infantry moved to reinforce followed by Company A at 1305 hours. The enemy broke contact at 1415 hours and left behind three dead. The 2d Battalion, 506th Infantry remained in the area to exploit the complex which was a well constructed battalion size base camp and aid station, about two and one half to three years old, located in the midst of secondary jungle. The base camp contained a well built communications system and tunnel complex, the destruction of which would require an infantry battalion at least thirty days. At 0930 hours on 17 January, approximately nine kilometers north of Tan Uyen the 3d Battalion, 187th Infantry found a well constructed battalion size base camp including bunkers, hospital, mess and sleeping facilities with fighting positions. Several bunkers were underground, some above ground level and some half underground. The bunkers were as high as eight feet inside with five feet of cover on top. There were at least 100 well

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constructed bunkers connected by trenches. Contacts with the enemy remained heavy. On 17 January, ten kilometers southwest of Phuoc Vinh, Troop A, 3d Armored Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry engaged an estimated thirty enemy, resulting in eleven killed. Contacts on 19 January resulted in 18 enemy killed. Ten enemy were killed on 20 January. On 21 January, a brigade forward air controller directed artillery fire into an area resulting in nine enemy killed. On 20 January, Troop A, 3d Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry reverted to operational control of 199th Infantry Brigade (Separate) (Light) followed by Company F, 51st Infantry (L&L) on 22 January. As of 31 January, operations in AO MANCHESTER resulted in 345 enemy killed, 62 detainees, 23 individual weapons and six crew served weapons captured, and 37 tons of rice destroyed. Friendly losses were 32 killed and 161 wounded. Operation MANCHESTER continues.

(8) Operation ATLANTA was conducted from 18 November to 23 December by elements of the 25th Infantry Division in coordination and cooperation with elements of the 5th Infantry Division (ARVN). The initial task organization consisted of the 2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division with the 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry, 2d Battalion, 27th Infantry and 3d Battalion, 22d Infantry. The objective was to destroy enemy forces and installations in the Iron Triangle and southeast Trapezoid area. Major accomplishments of Operation ATLANTA were the destruction of a large enemy tunnel complex and ammunition factory, clearing of over 10,000 acres of jungle area with Rome Plows and disruption of normal enemy operations. On 23 November, the 2d Battalion, 27th Infantry found a 55 gallon drum containing 65 Chicom carbines, two .45 cal pistols and one 9mm Mauser rifle. Cumulative results were 18 friendly personnel killed and 108 wounded. Enemy losses were 81 killed, 113 small arms, four crew served weapons and 119.5 tons of rice captured. One small arm and 72.2 tons of rice were destroyed.

(9) Operation AKRON V was conducted from 11 January to 21 January by elements of the 9th Infantry Division in coordination and cooperation with elements of the 1st Australian Task Force. The initial task organization consisted of the 2d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division with the 2d Battalion, 39th Infantry, 2d Battalion, 47th Infantry (M), Troop A, 3d Squadron, 5th Cavalry and the 1st Australian Task Force. The objective was to locate and destroy elements of the 274th VC Main Force Regiment operating in the Hat Dich area southeast of the Binh Son Rubber Plantation. Major accomplishments of Operation AKRON V were the additional experience gained in combined combat operations, the destruction of a large enemy bunker complex and the disruption of normal enemy operations. On 14 January, while exploiting a bunker complex along the Suoi Le River, Company B, 2d Battalion, 39th Infantry found 11 enemy dead in graves. In the same area the company found a 60mm mortar, 3000 rounds of small arms ammunition, 27 grenades and 95 artillery and mortar rounds. Cumulative results were four friendly personnel killed and 80 wounded. Enemy losses were 47 killed, 15 small arms and 10 crew served weapons captured.

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(1) Operations in the Bu Dop/Bo Duc are significant because they demonstrate the outstanding reaction capabilities of friendly forces and indicate improved ARVN effectiveness. Bo Duc District Headquarters, two kilometers south of Bu Dop, was attacked by enemy forces on 29 November. Friendly forces at the time of the attack consisted of elements of one Regional Force company, two Popular Force platoons and the 5th Reconnaissance Company (ARVN). At 0027 hours, an estimated reinforced Viet Cong battalion, 272d Regiment, 9th Viet Cong Division, attacked the district headquarters compound from three directions, supported by 82mm mortar and B40 rocket fire. By 0200 hours, the southern part of the compound was penetrated and friendly forces conducted a fighting withdrawal to the northern part of the compound. All available supporting fires were directed against the attacking force. Thirty four airstrikes, artillery and light fire teams assisted the friendly forces in containing the enemy penetration. By 0630 hours, the enemy was expelled from the compound. Enemy losses from this attack were 96 killed, one prisoner, nine small arms and five crew served weapons captured. Friendly losses were 15 killed and 57 wounded. In response to the attack at Bo Duc, two ARVN battalions were moved by helicopter to Bo Duc, and the US 1st Battalion, 28th Infantry, with one artillery battery, moved by helicopter from Quan Loi to Bu Dop closing at 1113 hours. The 1st Battalion, 28th Infantry established a night defensive position at the north end of the runway. Commencing at 2202 hours, enemy forces fired approximately 125 rounds of mixed mortar fire and an estimated 18 rounds of 122mm rockets into the position. At 2206 hours, a ground attack was launched by elements of the 271st VC Regiment, 9th VC Division and the 80A Replacement and Training Regiment. Close fighting occurred around the perimeter. At 2332 hours, a reinforced VC squad was repelled by small arms fire as it attempted to enter the perimeter. Friendly forces were supported by airstrikes, artillery, a light fire team, forward air controller and an air observer. At 2257 hours, the enemy broke contact. Searches of the battlefield during the next two days revealed 39 enemy dead. Seven US personnel were killed and 11 were wounded. This is the first known employment of 122mm rockets in III CTZ against other than fixed installations. From 1 December to 4 December, there were numerous light contacts with enemy forces. The enemy employed mortar and rockets against friendly positions while avoiding major contact. On 5 December, the 2d Battalion, 28th Infantry moved to positions approximately one kilometer northeast of Bu Dop. On 6 December, the 1st Battalion, 2d Infantry moved to the vicinity of Bu Dop. On 8 December, the 1st Battalion, 2d Infantry night defensive position, two kilometers southeast of Bu Dop, was attacked by an estimated battalion of the 273d VC Regiment, 9th VC Division. At 0105 hours, enemy forces commenced a mortar attack and 30 minutes later began firing small arms into the friendly positions. At 0212 hours, enemy forces initiated a ground attack from the east and northwest with small probes from the southeast and southwest. Friendly forces were supported by six airstrikes, four light fire teams, artillery, Spooky, an air observer and a forward air controller. After 48 minutes of fighting, the enemy withdrew. Friendly losses were

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Four killed and 14 wounded while the enemy lost 48 killed, six prisoners and 25 weapons captured. The 1st Infantry Division maintained at least one infantry battalion in the Bu Dop area until 29 December. Cumulative casualties from US operations in the Bu Dop area from 29 November to 29 December were 16 US killed and 66 wounded. Enemy losses were 151 killed, 22 small arms and 11 crew served weapons captured. On 13 December, the 1st Battalion, 28th Infantry moved by helicopter from Quan Loi to Song Be. Until January, the 1st US Infantry Division conducted reconnaissance in force operations in the Song Be area with one battalion.

(11) Opening of Highway 13 (includes battle at F3FB CAISSON VI on 10 December). The 1st Infantry Division conducted operations to keep Highway 13 open during the reporting period. Semi-permanent night defensive positions and Fire Support Patrol Bases were constructed along this major north-south route. Construction included the clearing and leveling of fields of fire by bulldozers, installation of two triple bands of concertina around the perimeter and construction of minimum troop comfort facilities. This will permit more economical use of resources in carrying out the long term mission of maintaining Highway 13 open to the An Loc - Quan Loi area. Convoys have moved to Quan Loi since 3 November without significant incident. There has been a major increase in civilian traffic and economic activity along Highway 13. Allied forces conduct military operations by overland movement. The enemy once transported men and supplies along the highway and crossed it at will in movements between War Zone C and D. He has reacted violently to the loss of control of the road by attacking defensive positions and F3FB along the highway. One example is the attack on F3FB CAISSON VI, eight kilometers southwest of An Loc on 10 December. US forces at CAISSON VI consisted of Company A, 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry; 3d Platoon, Troop C, 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry; Battery A, 6th Battalion, 15th Artillery and Battery C, 8th Battalion, 6th Artillery. At 0200 hours, elements of the 165th NVA Regiment launched a ground attack, supported by mortar and RPG fire, against the night defensive position. Enemy forces employed claymores and bangalore torpedoes on the north, east and west side of the perimeter to breach the defensive wire. Approximately 165 mortar rounds ranging from 60mm to 120mm were fired into friendly positions. Friendly forces were supported by four airstrikes, four light fire teams, Spooky, a forward air controller, an air observer, artillery and mortars. The attack was repulsed after a one hour and 20 minute contact. Enemy losses were 143 killed, two PW, 43 small arms and 21 crew served weapons captured. US losses were one killed and 17 wounded.

(12) 101st Airborne Division (-):

(a) On 2 August 1967, the 101st Airborne Division (-) was alerted for deployment to the RVN. Equipment and personnel readiness dates were changed from February 1968 to 1 December 1967 to permit early deployment of the division. An intensive training program was initiated to train new personnel; emphasis was placed on individual training, FOR/POW requirements, quick-kill techniques, study of lessons

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learned in Vietnam, and maximum attendance at on-post and off-post schools. A provisional Schools Command was organized using non-deployable personnel to supervise the schools program. The Schools Command trained 5,647 personnel in various combat skills. An additional 659 personnel attended offpost service schools.

(b) Movement:

1 On 18 November, the United States Air Force began Operation Eagle Thrust, the movement of the division by C-141 aircraft from Fort Campbell, Kentucky to Bien Hoa, AFB, RVN in the following six echelons:

<u>ECHELON</u>	<u>ARRIVAL DATES</u>	<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>PAX</u>	<u>CARGO TONS</u>
Advance Command and Control Group	18-19 Nov 67	9	224	94.4
Advance Party	21-25 Nov 67	77	1013	1307.0
3d Brigade TF	2-7 Dec 67	109	3874	1296.6
Division Troops	7-13 Dec 67	85	1092	981.1
2d Brigade TF	14-19 Dec 67	84	3248	959.3
Rear	24-30 Dec 67	5	284	25.5

2 The USAF flew an additional twenty-two C-133 sorties loaded with helicopters and outsized cargo. On 19 December, at 1900 hours, the division officially closed with arrival of the last aircraft from the 2d Brigade TF. The following is a recapitulation of air movement of the division:

Dates:	18 November - 30 December 1967
Sorties:	391
Passengers:	9794
Cargo:	5083.6 ST

3 In addition, two surface vessels, the Ruth Lykes and James Lykes, were loaded at Mobile, Alabama and on 6-8 November 1967, departed for the RVN with the following personnel and cargo:

Personnel:	16
Short Tons:	4110.6

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Measurement Tons:	17,861.9
Conexes:	1281
Vehicles:	287

4 The Ruth Lykes cleared Saigon port and the James Lykes cleared Newport by 8 December 1967.

(c) Arrival/Reaction: The 2d and 3d Brigade Task Forces were sponsored and escorted to base camps at Cu Chi and Phuoc Vinh by the 25th Infantry Division and 1st Infantry Division, respectively. The bulk of personnel and equipment moved to base camps by military convoy in order to conserve critical airlift. The Division headquarters, Support Command, and 2d Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry established base camp at Bien Hoa within the defense perimeter and facilities vacated by the 175d Airborne Brigade. As of 31 December, the USAF had supported the in-country movement to base camps by providing airlift of priority cargo and passengers as shown below:

	<u>C7A</u>	<u>C123</u>	<u>C130</u>
Sorties	166	2	3
Passengers	1037	32	-
Cargo (short tons)	284	15	34

(d) Base Camp Development Period: After arriving at base camps, division units began an aggressive self-help improvement program. Special attention was required at each location for improvements in electrical facilities; potable water supply; drainage and erosion control; and construction of roads, revetments, bunkers, command posts and ammunition storage facilities.

(e) In-Country Training Program:

1 Concurrent with base camp development each brigade began a thirty day training program to conduct advance unit training not completed at Fort Campbell and to practice special skills peculiar to combat in Vietnam. The 3d Brigade began its two-phase program on 11 December and the 2d Brigade on 18 December. The first phase consists of special orientations and classes on a variety of subjects. Areas of special interest include Vietnam Orientation, intelligence procedures, prevention of heat injuries and tropical diseases, first aid and self aid, local policies - off limits areas, currency control, convoy procedures and immediate action drills and safety orientations.

2 The second phase of the training program consisted primarily of company and battalion level tactical training.

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Emphasis was placed on air mobile operations, road clearing and security for fire support patrol bases, to include use of artillery and TAC air support. The 25th Infantry Division, 1st Infantry Division and 9th Infantry Division provided mobile training teams and allocated substantial numbers of school quotas for 101st Division personnel. Arrangements also were made for small unit leaders to accompany their counterparts on combat operations prior to leading their own patrols into the field. A significant training problem experienced by the division was the need to provide combat personnel with those skills peculiar to the environment in Vietnam. A special need existed for experienced instructors on booby traps, mine detectors and tunnel operations. In these areas, the 25th Infantry Division and 1st Infantry Division provided valuable assistance.

3 The presence of an armed enemy in the training area instilled in the "students" a sense of urgency and importance seldom achieved in other training situations. As a result, the trainees of the division made substantial improvements in a very short time.

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d. Operations commencing during the reporting period and continuing into the next reporting period.

(1) Operation SARATOGA was initiated by the 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry, 2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division on 8 December as a reconnaissance in force operation in Hau Nghia province in support of pacification activities. This operation has maintained a sizable military force in the southern portion of the division TAOI while the majority of available resources are committed to Operation YELLOWSTONE. Contact has been infrequent with as large as battalion sized enemy forces. On 11 December, the 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry, in coordination with the Combined Reconnaissance Intelligence Platoon, killed 12 VC in scattered contacts near Trung Lap. On 12 December, the 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry base camp between Trang Bang and Trung Lap was attacked by an estimated VC Battalion. 39 VC were killed, two persons detained, six small arms and five crew served weapons captured with 11 US personnel being wounded. The 3d Squadron, 4th Cavalry killed 10 VC on 22 December near the Saigon River, 10 kilometers northeast of Trung Lap. On 21 December, the 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry located nine fresh graves 10 kilometers north of Tra Cu, each containing one VC KIA. During the month of January, contacts with the enemy became increasingly heavy indicating the importance that the enemy attaches to the Saigon River LOC, its tributaries and surrounding area. On 4 January, the 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry was engaged in sporadic contact throughout the day with the enemy in an area approximately eleven kilometers northeast of Cu Chi. The heaviest contact of the day occurred at 1240 hours when Company A, 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry became heavily engaged with an unknown size enemy force resulting in seven friendly killed and 26 wounded. Artillery and air strikes supported friendly forces throughout the day. Results of the days operations were 16 friendly killed, 44 friendly wounded and 40 enemy killed. Searches of the area the following day revealed an additional 29 enemy killed. On 10 January, the 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry while conducting reconnaissance in force operations five kilometers east of Trang Bang received heavy mortar fire followed by an attack from the northeast by an estimated enemy battalion. The enemy fired small arms, automatic weapons and RPG-2 rocket launchers. Fire was returned with organic weapons. Artillery (including direct fire beehive), light fire teams and "Spooky" supported the friendly forces. As heavy and accurate fire by friendly forces began to take their toll, the enemy broke contact and withdrew. All firing had ceased by 0540 hours. The enemy left 74 of his dead, 11 crew served weapons and nine individual weapons on the battlefield. That afternoon, Company B, 2d Battalion, 27th Infantry found 22 enemy dead in fresh graves one kilometer north of the area of contact. In reaction to the attack, the 2d Battalion, 27th Infantry and Air Rifle Platoon of Troop D, 3d Squadron, 4th Cavalry conducted an air assault along suspected routes of withdrawal. Armed helicopters scanning the area engaged scattered groups of the enemy as they attempted to escape. These operations resulted in an additional 14 enemy killed for a total of 110 enemy dead during the day's operations. US losses were six killed and 29 wounded. On one occasion, a mortar and recoilless rifle attack

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on a friendly base camp resulted in moderately heavy friendly casualties. As the reporting period ended, frequent enemy contacts continued as the enemy gave every indication that the Saigon River LOC and surrounding area were vital to his insurgency efforts in Hau Nghia Province. Cumulative results as of 31 January were 783 enemy killed, 79 individual weapons and 25 crew served weapons captured. Seventy five (75) crew served weapons were destroyed. Friendly losses were 82 killed and 447 wounded. Operation SARATOGA continues.

(2) Operation YELLOWSTONE was initiated on 8 December with the primary objective of neutralizing War Zone C and interdicting known invasion and escape routes to and from War Zone C. The task organization included major elements of the 25th Infantry Division, the 1st Battalion, 49th Infantry (ARVN), 3d Battalion, 49th Infantry (ARVN) and 2d Squadron, 17th Cavalry (less one troop). This operation is providing security for the relocation of CIDG camps at Trai Bi and Prek Klok and to the new fighting camps at Thien Ngon and Katum. Construction at Thien Ngon began on 9 December. Construction at Katum will commence at a later date. Jungle clearing operations are being conducted along secondary roads such as Highway 4 between Nui Ba Den and Katum; resupply convoys are moving over this important route. The operation was reduced in scope because elements of the 1st Infantry Division were deployed to Bu Dop in reaction to enemy attacks on the CIDG camp at Bu Dop and the Bo Duc District headquarters on 29 November. An additional battalion was deployed to Song Be in December. On 8 and 9 December, the 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry discovered 390 tons of rice 6 kilometers northwest of Katum. Between 0140 and 0530 hours on 20 December, the 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry night defensive position in the vicinity of Bo Tuc received approximately 250 rounds of 60 and 82mm mortar and was attacked by an unknown size force employing RPG, small arms and automatic weapons. Artillery, light fire teams and airstrikes supported friendly forces. Forty enemy personnel were killed, 19 small arms, eight crew served weapons and one radio were captured. Six US personnel were killed and 22 were wounded. The expected violent enemy reaction to operations in War Zone C occurred on 1 January while the New Year's truce was still in effect. Fire Support Patrol Base Burt, located approximately 12 kilometers northeast of Smai Tre, was the target of the attack. Friendly forces at FSPB Burt consisted of 3d Brigade headquarters, 25th Infantry Division with the 2d Battalion, 22d Infantry (M), 3d Battalion, 22d Infantry, Batteries A and C, 3d Battalion, 77th Artillery and Battery A, 3d Battalion, 13th Artillery. At 1844 hours, a patrol sent to investigate noises on the eastern side of the perimeter received small arms fire. At the same time, the 3d Battalion, 22d Infantry perimeter received 4 RPG-2 rounds and the 2d Battalion, 77th Artillery received two 60mm mortar rounds. In reaction to the attack, a light fire team conducted an aerial surveillance of the area of operation and counter-mortar fire was employed. At 2052 hours, the fire support patrol base received 15 rounds of 60mm mortar fire in the 3d Battalion, 22d Infantry area on the east side of the perimeter, 13 rounds of 60 and 82mm mortar fire in the 2d Battalion, 77th Artillery area on the southern side of the perimeter and 3 RPG rounds in the 2d Battalion, 22d Infantry area.

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on the west. Countermortar was fired and a light fire team was on station. At 2215 hours, a light fire team received small arms and automatic weapons fire taking an unknown number of hits. At 2220 hours, a light fire team observed lights and engaged them with small arms, automatic weapons, rockets and 40mm fire. Fifteen minutes later, Company A, 3d Battalion, 22d Infantry and a listening post on the perimeter observed 1 VC moving between the perimeter and the listening post. The VC was engaged with small arms and automatic weapons. At 2257 hours, a listening post received one hand grenade. At 2330 hours, the enemy commenced a mortar attack followed by small arms, automatic weapons and RPG fire. The attack was mainly from the southeast although all sections of the perimeter were subjected to fire. All six reconnaissance patrols operating in the vicinity of the fire support patrol base became engaged with the enemy to some extent. Fire was returned with small arms, automatic weapons, light fire teams, tactical air, artillery and Spooky. Thirty minutes after the attack began, the enemy launched a ground attack. The main effort was from the southwest, shifting subsequently to the southeast with secondary attacks coming from the northeast sectors. Direct fire artillery was employed using both beehive and high explosive ammunition and the local battalion reserve was committed. At 0145 hours, the enemy fire and intensity of attack lessened. At 0200 hours, fire increased and all sectors of the perimeter were again engaged with the main attack coming from the south and southeast and secondary attacks from the north and northeast. All available fire support means were used. At 0248 hours, tactical air was employed in the southern sector of the fire support patrol base while artillery fire was placed in other sectors. At 0311 hours, the attack lessened and ceased except in the south and southeast sectors where tactical air was being employed. At 0327 hours, all enemy efforts were directed at the south and southeast sectors of the perimeter with only sporadic fire directed at other areas. At 0500 hours, the VC began a withdrawal to the south, southeast and northeast leaving delaying forces to screen movement. All available fires were placed on routes of withdrawal. At 0745 hours, the 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry began arriving at Fire Support Patrol Base Burt by helicopter to relieve the 3d Battalion, 22d Infantry. The battalion closed at 1113 hours. The attack was made by the 2d and 3d Battalions of the 272d VC Regiment from the south and by the 1st and 3d Battalions of the 271st VC Regiment from the north and east. Throughout the morning the 3d Armored Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry (-) and tactical air engaged the enemy along withdrawal routes. Numerous VC were observed fleeing the area and some were observed carrying dead or wounded. Observations were for the most part southeast and northeast of the fire support patrol base. The 271st and 272d VC Regiments had moved down from Military Region 10 in an effort to counter the Allied threat in War Zone C. A search of the battlefield resulted in five enemy captured and revealed 355 enemy dead. Elements of the 3d Armored Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry killed 20 additional enemy along routes of withdrawal as the enemy attempted to escape. Subsequent searches of the battle area revealed an additional 31 enemy killed (total of 406 enemy killed in the FORD Burt action), 76 individual weapons and 40 crew served weapons and

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three additional VC captured. Friendly personnel losses were 23 killed and 153 wounded; materiel losses were one APC, three M42 duster and one 1/2 ton truck destroyed; one M55 Quad 50 and one UH-1C helicopter were damaged. Throughout the remainder of the reporting period the enemy continued to react violently to Allied presence in War Zone C. On 5 January, Company B, 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry was extracting from an area approximately three kilometers south of the Cambodian Border, vicinity of the FISH HOOK. As the last platoon attempted extraction, it was engaged by an estimated reinforced VC Company. Artillery and tactical air supported friendly forces in 3 1/2 hours of contact. Sixty eight enemy were killed. Friendly losses were seven killed and sixteen wounded. On 17 January, while conducting reconnaissance in force operations four kilometers east of Katum, the 2d Battalion, 14th Infantry received small arms and automatic weapons fire from an estimated two VC companies. Fire was returned with all available means to include small arms, automatic weapons, mortars, artillery and light fire teams. The contact resulted in 17 enemy killed and one crew served weapon captured. Friendly losses were five killed and twenty one wounded. As the reporting period ended, Operation YELLOWSTONE continued to be characterized by heavy and frequent contacts with the enemy. Enemy harassing efforts to prevent US forces from operating in War Zone C are expected to continue. Cumulative losses on Operation YELLOWSTONE as of 31 January were 932 enemy killed, 137 individual weapons and 60 crew served weapons captured. Friendly losses were 112 killed and 937 wounded.

(3) Operation SAN ANGELO commenced on 16 January in northern Phuoc Long province. The 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division initiated this reconnaissance in force operation with two battalion air mobile assaults to the northwest and north of Song Be. A third battalion conducted air mobile assaults on 17 January to the northeast of Song Be. Sporadic contacts commenced on 17 January in widely separated locations. Some base camps and a hospital complex have been discovered, but there had been no major contacts as of 31 January. Cumulative results of Operation SAN ANGELO as of 31 January were 13 US killed and 65 wounded. Enemy losses included 42 killed, 21 small arms, two crew served weapons and 74.5 tons of rice captured or destroyed.

(4) Operation ATTALA was initiated on 21 January in southwestern Binh Long province by the 2d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division and 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (- 3d Squadron). The objective was to locate and destroy the 165th NVA Regiment which was believed to be located in the area of operations. The scheme of maneuver involved the establishment of blocking positions on Route 13 by 1st Infantry Division units while the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (-) blocked on Route 13 in the south and Route 245 in the north. The Airborne battalions were to conduct reconnaissance in force operations to drive the enemy into the friendly blocking positions where he could be destroyed. There was no major enemy contact during the operation. The 2d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division curtailed operations almost immediately after Operation ATTALA commenced

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and started preparations for movement to I CTZ in reaction to a major enemy threat in that area. Movement to Phu Bai commenced on 23 January, with the 1st Battalion, 501st Infantry closing on that date. On 23 January, the 1st Infantry Division assumed operational control of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (-) and responsibility for conducting Operation ATTALA. The operation terminated on 27 January 1968.

(5) Operation COBURG. The 1st Australian Task Force initiated Operation COBURG on 24 January. This reconnaissance in force operation is in AO COLUMBUS to the northeast of the Long Binh area, north of Highway 1 and south of the Dong Nai River. The 1st ATF has adapted readily to the new AO and had killed 37 enemy and captured 32 individual and two crew served weapons as of 31 January. Friendly losses were five killed and 29 wounded. Operation COBURG continues.

e. Highlights of 31 January actions. Commencing at 0300 hours on 31 January, 1968, II FFORCEV and surrounding locations began receiving mortar and 122mm rocket fire. By 0400 hours, an estimated 90 rounds had been received in the Plantation area. The attack caused remarkably light personnel and materiel losses, although several rounds landed in close proximity to the headquarters and billet areas. At 0355 Ben Cat was attacked by an unknown number of VC employing small arms, automatic weapons, M79, RPG-2 and 82mm mortars. In the Long Binh area, the ammunition dump was penetrated at 0410 hours by an estimated VC Company. Military Police reacted to this threat. EOD personnel discovered and removed some explosive charges armed with time fuzes. One section of the ammunition dump was destroyed by enemy emplaced explosive charges. The Plantation area came under attack by small arms and automatic weapons at approximately 0430 hours. At 0515 hours, the 9th Infantry Division was directed to move a reaction force to Ho Nai village to the north of Plantation. While enroute to Ho Nai, Troop A, 3d Squadron, 5th Cavalry was attacked by small arms and RPG fire at Trang Bom. II Field Force units at Dau Tieng, Katum, and Song Be were attacked with mortar, RPG and 122mm rockets from 0415 hours to 0631 hours. At 0600 hours, the 199th Infantry Brigade trapped a VC unit in Ho Nai and engaged in a fire fight at the III Corps prisoner of war compound. Simultaneously, the Duc Hoa subsector and 25th ARVN Division Headquarters were attacked by an unknown size enemy force which penetrated the market place in Duc Hoa. 25th ARVN Division units engaged and repelled the enemy, who withdrew to the North and South. In significant contact near Tan Son Nhut commencing at 0700 hours, the 3d Squadron, 4th Cavalry killed 162 enemy and captured 24 prisoners while losing 15 personnel killed and 23 wounded. Three APC's and one tank were destroyed. Seven APC's and one helicopter were damaged. At Ho Nai village, gunships killed 27 VC. At 0845 hours, Troop A, 3d Squadron, 5th Cavalry killed 25 VC along the east end of Bien Hoa airstrip. In response to an attack on the American Embassy in Saigon, a platoon from Company C, 1st Battalion, 502d Infantry arrived in Saigon at 0850 hours and secured the embassy by 0940 hours. A prisoner captured at 1045 hours near II FFORCEV headquarters was identified as a member of the 275th VC Regiment.

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A command had allegedly told the PW that the 274th and 275th VC Regiments were to cooperate in the action. The 275th Regiment had moved to War Zone for training at the end of December. At 1115 hours, the 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry arrived at Tan Son Nhut. Base security elements at Bien Hoa air base reported that 14 NVA prisoners had been captured as of 1130 hours. At 1135 hours the 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry commenced movement under heavy sniper fire into the Race Track area of Saigon. At 1230 hours, at least 20 VC were killed by aircraft in Ho Nai village near the junction of National Highways 14 and 1. At the same location the 1st Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, captured 13 prisoners from the 28th NVA Regiment at 1550 hours. During the day, US units in Capital Military District were placed under operational control of the Deputy Commanding General II FFORCEV. Dispositions were as follows: 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry and Troop A, 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry were at Tan Son Nhut. Task Force Beyer secured the Ben Loi Bridge. 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry was at Hoc Mon, while the 2d Battalion, 27th Infantry conducted a combat assault near BOC at Tan Son Nhut. The 3d Squadron, 4th Cavalry (-) was located at Tan Son Nhut. The 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry (-) was at the Saigon Race Track and the 5th Battalion, 60th Infantry (-) was at Binh Chanh. There were numerous other changes in dispositions of II FFORCEV OPCON units in reaction to the attack. The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (- 3d Squadron) moved from the Trapezoid and Iron Triangle area to Long Binh and Bien Hoa to assist in the security of HQ II FFORCEV, III ARVN Corps, and the POW compound. The 3d Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (-) moved from Loc Ninh to Long Binh. Major elements of the 2d Battalion, 47th Infantry (M) moved to reinforce the 199th Infantry Brigade in the Ho Nai Village and North Uniontown area. An additional battalion mission was to assist in defense of the Long Binh ammunition storage area and III Corps Headquarters. The 2d Battalion, 20th Infantry attacked to the west toward Long Binh to block enemy movements into or away from the Long Binh area. The 2d Battalion, 506th Infantry (-) moved from Phuoc Vinh to Bien Hoa to assist in the defense of that area. At 1630 hours, the 2d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division was released to operational control of the Senior Advisor, IV Corps. In the Long Binh area on 31 January, the 1st Brigade, 9th Infantry Division accounted for 213 VC KIA, 32 detainees, and 23 small arms, 53 crew served weapons and 128 rounds of crew served ammunition captured. The 199th Infantry Brigade accounted for 303 VC KIA in the Long Binh - Bien Hoa area. Operations by units under operational control of II FFORCEV on 31 January accounted for 1148 VC KIA, 123 detainees, 97 small arms and 65 crew served weapons captured; US/FWMAF losses were 52 killed and 323 wounded. The high level of enemy activity continues into the next reporting period. The major impact on operations in progress before 31 January was that they were reduced in scope to permit rapid reaction to the enemy threat and the application of overwhelming firepower against the enemy.

f. Major planning actions during the reporting period. Opening and securing of specified road LOC received increased emphasis. Priority of effort was devoted to Highway 13 from Saigon to Loc Ninh, Highway 1

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from Gia Ray to the III/II CTZ boundary, Highway 7B/2A/1A from Ben Cat to Phuoc Vinh and Highway 1A from Phu Cuong to Phuoc Vinh. Another key action was planning for relocation of the 199th Infantry Brigade from Capital Military District. This operation has been discussed previously. Plans were developed for the 199th Infantry Brigade to provide support to ARVN forces in Capital Military District after the relocation of brigade units and for the 199th Infantry Brigade to assume the UNION-TOWN mission. The 101st Airborne Division (- 1st Brigade) completed deployment to Vietnam on 19 December 1967 in accordance with Operation Plan "QUICKSILVER". The Division initiated Operation SAN ANGELO on 16 January 1968. Planning for the dry season campaign was initiated in the previous reporting period and continued into this reporting period. Operation YELLOWSTONE was initiated in War Zone C; Operations SAN ANGELO and FARGO in MR 10 and Operation SANTA FE I in the MAY TAO Secret Zone. Operations were expanded in AO MANCHESTER, in the southern portion of War Zone D. A true Combined Campaign Plan was published for III CTZ through the joint endeavor of Headquarters III Corps and II FFORCEV personnel. This combined effort typifies the close association and cooperative spirit which exists between the Commanding Generals and their staffs. Plans were developed and executed for deployment of the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division to division control. The Brigade closed at Song Be in mid-January. Contingency plans were developed for the deployment of one or two brigades of the 101st Airborne Division to I FFORCEV. The 2d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division was deployed to I CTZ in late January and released to operational of III MAF. Plans for the Christmas, New Year's and TET truce periods included blocking along key LOC and avenues of approach to prevent the movement of enemy forces across the Cambodian border into the III CTZ. The rapid reaction to the flagrant truce violations at PSFB Burt on 1-2 January and throughout III CTZ on 31 January prevented the achievement of major military or psychological victories by the enemy.

g. Force structure and Training.

(1) The following changes occurred in Force Structure.

(a) The 1st Battalion, 327th Infantry; 2d Battalion, 327th Infantry; 2d Battalion, 502d Infantry and 2d Battalion, 320th Artillery (-) of the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division deployed to II FFORCEV on 13 January 1968.

(b) The 2d Battalion, 11th Artillery (-) deployed from the Americal Division to II FFORCEV on 10 January 1968.

(c) The 101st Airborne (-) closed in-country and became GFCOM to II FFORCEV 20 December 1967.

(d) The 3d Royal Army Regiment arrived in-country on 27 December 1967 and was assigned to the First Australian Task Force.

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(e) The 273d Assault Support Helicopter Company was assigned to the 12th Aviation Group on 19 December 1967.

(f) The 117th Assault Helicopter Company was assigned to the 12th Aviation Group on 1 January 1968.

(g) The following Long Range Patrol units were activated and assigned on 20 December 1967.

1 Company F, 52d Infantry assigned to 1st Infantry Division.

2 Company E, 50th Infantry assigned to 9th Infantry Division.

3 Company F, 50th Infantry assigned to 25th Infantry Division.

4 71st Infantry Detachment assigned to 199th Infantry Brigade.

(h) Company F, 58th Infantry activated and assigned to the 101st Airborne Division on 10 January 1968.

(i) The 2d Brigade (-), 101st Airborne Division deployed to I FFORCEV from II FFORCEV on 30 January 1968.

(2) Training. Reciprocal Mobile Training Teams (RMTT) were established between 1st Infantry Division and 5th Infantry Division (ARVN), 9th Infantry Division and 18th Infantry Division (ARVN), 25th Infantry Division and 25th Infantry Division (ARVN), and 101st Airborne Division and 5th Ranger Group (ARVN) on 28 January 1968. The RMTT program provides an exchange of information, experience, and training techniques which will further improve the combat effectiveness of ARVN and US units.

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5. LOGISTICS AND TRANSPORTATION.

a. Arrival of the 101st Airborne Division (-) and accelerated tactical operations resulted in an increased requirement for positioning elements of the 1st Logistical Command in forward areas. A Forward Support Area (FSA) was established at Phuoc Vinh to support elements of the 101st Airborne Division at that location. This support by the 1st Logistical Command is required because of the austere logistical support capability organic to the 101st Airborne Division. This FSA was resupplied by a combination of air and land LOC. The road to Phuoc Vinh was opened periodically to permit a supply buildup. This permitted minimum reliance on scarce fixed-wing assets. A FSA was established at Katum to support 25th Infantry Division's Operation YELLOWSTONE. This FSA was initially on an air LOC, however, by the end of the quarter it was being resupplied primarily by a land LOC. A FSA was established at Loc Ninh to support the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment during Operation FARGO. A land LOC has been used to resupply this operation. A FSA was established at Song Be to support the 101st Airborne Division during Operation SAN ANGEL. Due to its inaccessibility by road, all operations in the Song Be area are resupplied by an air LOC.

b. The 101st Airborne Division (-) arrived in RVN without many items of equipment required for sustained operations. The division received its essential equipment through extraordinary efforts of all concerned in the supply system.

c. Command emphasis was placed on using land LOC. Route QL-13 is now open on a continuous basis. This allows operations in the Quan Loi/Loc Ninh area to be resupplied primarily by road. This emphasis on the use of land LOC allowed USAF tactical airlift assets to be used to support operations in isolated areas.

d. Under the Closed Loop Program the exchange of gasoline powered APC for diesel powered APC was completed in the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment and RTAVR. A reduction in actual combat losses vs programmed losses allowed this program to be accelerated.

e. The loss of seven tanks in the Saigon River plus low input from COMUS is beginning to cause critical shortages within II FFORCEV units. Programmed incoming assets for the 1st Quarter will be applied against combat losses already sustained and will not be exchanged for high mileage and/or maintenance problem tanks.

f. II FFORCEV Regulation 750-3, subject: Organizational Maintenance, was published 12 December 1967. This updated organizational maintenance requirements for all assigned and attached units. This regulation may be used as a guide for all OFCON units.

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G. Status of Primary Land LOC as of 31 January 1968.

(1) For the purpose of this report, the following terms on condition of land LOC are defined.

(a) Condition I: The route is capable of carrying up to Class 50 loads (all division loads).

(b) Condition II: Up to Class 35 loads (the majority of logistical transport e.g., 5000-gallon POL tankers).

(c) Condition III: Up to Class 16 loads (Armored Personnel Carriers and 2½ ton trucks).

(d) Condition IV: Can carry only light civilian traffic; therefore, it is open only to light reconnaissance vehicles.

(e) Condition V: Closed to all traffic.

(2) Route QL 1.

(a) Cambodian Border (XT284244) to Go Dau Ha (XT-382250), lowest bridge capacity, Class 12, route condition III.

(b) Go Dau Ha (XT382250) to Cu Chi (XT628126), lowest bridge capacity, Class 50, route condition I.

(c) Cu Chi (XT628126) to Saigon (XT793942), lowest bridge capacity, Class 60, route condition I.

(d) Saigon (XT793942) to RJ 316 (YT072130), lowest bridge capacity, Class 40, route condition II.

(e) RJ 316 (YT072130) to (YT697026), lowest bridge capacity, Class 45, route condition II.

(f) YT697026 to II CTZ boundary (ZT180014), lowest bridge capacity, Class 30, route condition III.

(3) Route QL 4.

(a) RJ QL 1 (XS845914) to (XS423490), lowest bridge capacity, Class 50, route condition I.

(b) XS423490 to Tieng Giang River (WS985357), lowest bridge capacity, Class 15, route condition III.

(4) Route QL 13. RJ QL 1 (XS879971) to Cambodian Border (XU683233), lowest bridge capacity, Class 40, route condition II.

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(5) Route QL 14.

(a) Dong Xoi (YT079759) to blown bridge at (YT165-820) repair easily with fill, lowest bridge capacity, Class 30, route condition II. Condition will continue until the road is opened by tactical forces and repairs can be made.

(b) Route condition II continues to the damaged bridge at YU303010. From YU303010 to the II/III CTZ boundary (YU590-176) the road is accessible from II CTZ, lowest bridge capacity, Class 30, route condition II.

(6) Route QL 15.

(a) Bien Hoa (YT002114) to Baria (YS380607), lowest bridge capacity, Class 50, route condition I.

(b) Baria (YS380607) to Vung Tau (YS274444), lowest bridge capacity, Class 12, route condition IV.

(7) Route QL 20.

(a) RJ QL 1 (YT343101) to bridge at YT537356, lowest bridge capacity, Class 37, route condition II.

(b) Bridge at (YT537356) to III CTZ boundary (YT763-572), lowest bridge capacity, Class 25, route condition III.

(8) Route QL 22.

(a) Go Dau Ha (XT387251) to (XT097764), lowest bridge capacity, Class 50, route condition I.

(b) XT097764 to Cambodian Border (XT074896) with AVLB abutments prepared at XT097764, route condition V; with AVLB, route condition I.

(9) Route LTL 16. Bien Hoa (YT002114) to RJ LTL 1A (XT887373), lowest bridge capacity, Class 50, route condition I.

(10) Route LTL 1A.

(a) RJ LTL 16 (XT887373) to XT995588, lowest bridge capacity, Class 50, route condition I.

(b) XT995588 to RJ 311 (YU133062), bridge destroyed, route condition V.

(c) RJ 311 (YU133062) to RJ QL 14A (XU960221), bridge destroyed, route condition V.

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(11) Route LTL 2. RJ (YT437045) to Baria (YS380607),
lowest bridge capacity, Class 60, route condition I.

(12) Route LTL 51. Saigon (XS816890) to Cau Noi Ferry,
(AS786568), lowest bridge capacity, Class 16, route condition III.

(13) Route LTL 23. Baria (YS380607) to Xuyen Loc (YS-
657667), lowest bridge capacity, Class 50, route condition I.

(14) Route TL 9a and LTL 10. Saigon (AS790890) to Bao
Trai (AT526044), lowest bridge capacity, Class 50, route classification
I.

(15) Route 333 - 334 - 335. RJ QL 1 (YT630085) to Tan
Linh (YT935262), lowest bridge capacity, Class 25, route classification
III.

(16) Route LTL 26 and 239. Tay Ninh (XT259500) to Dau
Tieng (XT490460), lowest bridge capacity, Class 50, route classifica-
tion I.

i. Maintenance and Repair Programmed.

(1) Surface maintenance, drainage repair and reconstruc-
tion are in progress on the following routes: QL 1, QL 15, QL 22, QL 13,
LTL 1A, 240, TL 10, TL 4, 246, TL 8A, LTL 18. Repair consists of
reworking rutted surfaces, filling holes, patching pavement and repair-
ing drainage structures.

(2) In addition to improving land LOC in support of
tactical operations, an increasing amount of engineer effort is being
placed on permanent rehabilitation of major LOC to include replacement
of tactical bridging by permanent bridges.

6. REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT (RD)

a. The 1967 Revolutionary Development program continued to
progress at an increased rate during the quarter with 114 hamlets com-
pleted and 90 more under development at the end of December. The 1967
program was extended through January with the result that the program
objectives were achieved throughout III CTZ except for Binh Long and
Phuoc Long Provinces where enemy activity in the last calendar year
quarter seriously disrupted the program. In addition to the slippage
in time for the 1967 program there was a general failure, even in the
better hamlets, to meet some of the main objectives. First, the objective
to eliminate the VC infrastructure was not met effectively. This is a
necessary part of pacification, but is too ambitious an undertaking for
the RD team alone. More emphasis will be put on this objective in the
future by using the resources of the District Intelligence and Operations
Coordination Centers (DIOCC) with the Provincial Reconnaissance Units

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(PNU), the Combined Reconnaissance and Intelligence Platoons (CRIP), and the National Police Field Forces (NPFV). Second, there was a general failure to organize and train adequately hamlet self-defense groups. The RD team lacks the experience to design truly effective defenses, and proper equipment for arming the force is generally not available at this time. To build an inadequate defensive force would be worse than to build none, because it would invite the enemy to attack and discredit the efforts of the team. External forces will still be needed for some time to provide security to hamlets in which the teams are working and to completed hamlets. Finally, there was a general failure to organize people's groups to counter similar efforts by the enemy. Until such grassroots organizations are functioning on a basis equal or superior to that of the enemy it cannot truly be said that the GVN has actual political control. Such organizations are necessary in a politically immature country to provide the vehicle by which popular aspirations and grievances are determined and through which discontent is channeled into useful outlets. Major faults of the 1967 program were a late start and lack of experience of the cadre. Early budget approvals and the movement of teams before the TET season to their first semester hamlets have assured an earlier start on the 1968 program. The quality of the cadre improved during the year due to increased experience and the weeding-out of some misfits. Candidates are more carefully selected and screened now before being trained at Vung Tau. In all, most cadre today display a commendable spirit, and leadership, while still inadequate, is improving. The 1968 program calls for the completion of 307 hamlets (a 45% increase) with the greatest increase in Gia Dinh, Tay Ninh, Long An, Hau Nghia, and Long Khanh provinces.

b. Enemy activity during the quarter against the civilian population showed a marked increase. Prominent actions were attacks upon district and province capitals, assassinations and kidnappings. The enemy has begun to make a decided effort to discredit the government with the populace and to bring about a desire to negotiate a settlement which would include a coalition government. Under the present enemy threat, the active cooperation with or support of their government by the people is unlikely, and may be impossible. In spite of the great military successes of the last year, no real progress is possible until the enemy political infrastructure has been eliminated. The individual Vietnamese cannot and will not actively support the government or inform upon the enemy so long as infrastructure members are present in his hamlet and village. The discovery of such activities is a major mission of infrastructure members, and mere suspicion is sufficient cause for immediate retribution by local guerrillas or for elimination by main-force units when they next control the hamlet.

c. With the recent capture by friendly forces of large caches of food and weapons and the corresponding indications of critical shortages in enemy units of some items of equipment, an adequate resources control program becomes more desirable than ever.

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The present resources control program is very unpopular with the Vietnamese populace, as such programs always are everywhere, but even in its fledgling state this last year was responsible for the capture of numerous known VC, VC suspects, deserters, and illegal residents, as well as the seizure of quantities of food and medical supplies. The program in the past six months has been improved by the increased utilization of combined patrols and a greater reliance on mobile checkpoints, but is still inconsistent and limited to major highways and other fairly secure areas. Increased emphasis is needed to provide a systematic and selective program which can seriously tax the enemy's already overstrained supply line.

7. (U) PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS AND CIVIL AFFAIRS

a. Significant Psychological Operations Activities.

(1) The II FFORCEV PSYOP effort during the reporting period was devoted to the support of tactical operations and the Tet Chieu Hoi Campaign. A total of 3,845 sorties were flown by US/FMMAF Army and Air Force aircraft in support of PSYOP this quarter. In accordance with the II Field Force Commander's desire to reach optimum levels of effectiveness the dissemination of leaflets from aircraft was cut back to 468 million this quarter as compared with 572 million in the previous quarter. At the same time, the number of hours of aerial loudspeaker broadcasts was more than doubled (from 1,065 in the previous quarter to 2,396).

(2) Special Operations.

(a) An extensive program to improve the overall quality of PSYOP leaflets was initiated by II Field Force G5/S5 officers throughout III CTZ. A Propaganda Development Center was established within the 6th PSYOP Battalion to provide a technical review of all leaflets developed by OPCOF units. Subsequent to this review, leaflets, with the exception of the quick reaction type, are sent to the 4th PSYOP Group for evaluation. In addition, leaflets are submitted to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Political Warfare of III Corps (ARVN) for coordination prior to final approval by G5, II FFORCEV. By this procedure of review, evaluation, and coordination the quality of propaganda in III CTZ has been upgraded and has become more responsive to tactical requirements.

(b) To improve area coverage and lessen the man hours formerly required to disseminate leaflets from UH-1 helicopters, II FFORCEV has developed a portable leaflet disseminator. Nicknamed the "Hurricane Hustler", this disseminator was specifically designed for UH-1 aircraft. It can be installed in 25 seconds and enables the operator to deliver leaflets with exceptional accuracy on any type of target. The device is most effective for delivering rapid reaction

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leaflets and can disseminate 500,000 leaflets per sortie. Engineer drawings of the Hustler have been distributed to MACB and to GICOM units so that each unit can manufacture additional "Hurricane Hustlers" to support aerial delivery operations. (Inclosure 6)

b. Significant Civil Affairs Activities.

(1) The 2d Civil Affairs Company continued to support II FFORCELV GICOM units with 18 AA generalist platoons. Platoons have been attached to each brigade-size unit, each division headquarters and the Royal Thai Army Volunteer Regiment. In addition, seven AA generalist teams have been organized and deployed to support seven Province Senior Advisors in III CTZ (Gia Dinh, Bien Hoa, Hau Nghia, Long An, Binh Duong, Tay Ninh, and Phuoc Tuy). These teams are area-oriented and are under the direct supervision and control of the Province Senior Advisors.

(2) Military civic action projects increased significantly during the reporting period. The number of patients treated through MEDCOM was 343,862, an increase of almost 4,000 over the last reporting period. Major construction and repair projects increased 56 percent. The most significant increase in Military Civic Action activities was the construction and/or repair of 799 kilometers of road throughout the II Field Force area of operations as compared with 253 kilometers for the previous quarter.

(3) Attitude surveys taken during the quarter indicate that the Medical Civic Action Program and improvement of lines of communication continue to be the most popular programs with the Vietnamese people.

(4) Operation Friendship continued to produce increasing tangible results. This is evidenced by a continued participation and response on the part of the civilian population and their elected and appointed officials. The II Field Force Friendship Platoon, a civic action team which operates under the direct supervision of the II FFORCELV G5, concentrated its efforts on developing educational institutions, distribution of commodities and encouragement of local self-help projects to improve overall US/Vietnamese relations. Operation Friendship proved to be a particularly valuable asset for population control during VC/NVA attacks throughout III Corps Tactical Zone on 31 January 1968. The loyal and willing cooperation of hamlet and village officials in areas supported by Operation Friendship made the task of restoring order much easier.

(5) During the concentrated attack by VC/NVA forces on the Bien Hoa Long Binh complex on 31 January 1968 many civilian homes were damaged or destroyed. Some 50 civilians were killed and approximately 200 were injured. In addition, 10,000 people were temporarily displaced from their homes in hamlets and villages adjacent to II Field Force

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AFAC-RL-

SUMMARY: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Quarterly Period
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Headquarters. Operation Friendship provided immediate relief and assistance in the form of medical care for the wounded and homeless, identification of the dead, and distribution of food and water. Four civil affairs Friendship Teams were utilized under the direct supervision of the II Field Force G5 as an immediate reaction force. At the close of the reporting period the intensified civic action program was continuing to alleviate suffering and to provide care for the homeless. By 1800 hours on 31 January 1968 much had been done to restore order in those hamlets directly affected by the war.

8. (C) SIGNAL:

a. Communications activities in general have increased considerably over the last quarter with the arrival of the 101st Airborne Division and the commencement of several large operations within the III CTZ, to include YELLOSTONE, PARCO, SAN ANGELO, and several other smaller and continuing operations. Increased communications activity was also attributed to the realignment of area responsibilities of some of the II PFORCEV tactical units requiring new systems and numerous circuit changes. Circuit changes alone show an increase of 53% when compared to the same period of last year.

b. Tactical communications requirements have increased considerably this past quarter. The 53d Signal Battalion (Corps) has been taxed to maximum capability during multiple operations conducted simultaneously. Additionally, the Signal Battalion was required to establish communications facilities not normally provided. For example, the 101st Airborne Division has only 4-channel VHF radio relay equipment. In order for the division to perform its mission, the Corps Signal Battalion augmented the Division Signal Battalion by providing internal divisional VHF systems as well as the normal Corps to Division system. Another recent example required the Corps Signal Battalion to provide communications for a forward command post of the 1st Australian Task Force in addition to maintaining present communications with their base camp location. During this same period, the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment was employed as a covering force over an extended area in War Zone "C". The Corps Signal Battalion augmented the limited capabilities of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment in providing communications internally between the squadrons as well as regimental headquarters to corps headquarters. To meet these challenges, excellent cooperation exists among all the tactical signal battalions; for example, to establish radio relay to the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, the 125th Signal Battalion, 20th Infantry Division, provided an AN/MRC-54 radio relay on Nui Ba Den for the corps system to regimental headquarters. This method is not uncommon as all signal units should work together to meet the many unusual situations found in Vietnam.

c. Improvement of base camp communications, physical facilities, and operating procedures have continued and include an extensive program of rehabilitation of existing facilities. Installation of a dial central

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office at Plantation, HQ II FFORCEV improved telephone service considerably by permitting faster and more accurate service, as well as direct dial to MACV, Tiger, Lynx, Tan Don Nhut, Bearcat, and Long Binh.

d. Development of radio relay sites in support of II FFORCEV operations has progressed extremely well and has proven its worth in extending communications to distant points. Improvement of defenses and expansion of radio facilities on Hill 837 (Nui Chua Chan) continues. In addition to providing a radio relay point for tactical operations, it now provides a radio retransmission capability for COMUSMACV to Province, District, Village, and Hamlet level. This hill also is used as a radio retransmission site for the RVN National Police and USAID. FM radio retransmission facilities at Hill 986 (Nui Ba Den) have proven their worth in extending the FM capability to the most distant CIDG camps in III CTZ. Army Signal Brigade units have been placed on Hill 722 (Nui Ba Ra) and development and expansion of this mountain is progressing rapidly and will further assist in extending VHF and FM radio systems in support of tactical operations in the Northeastern region of III CTZ.

e. Construction of a new II FFORCEV photo facility was started on 8 October 1967. Two Pasco pre-fabricated steel buildings were obtained to replace the inadequate photo facility formerly housed in two frame supported GP tents. This facility was constructed by the 53d Signal Battalion and will greatly improve the photographic support rendered to this headquarters and OPCOM units. The new photo facility became operational on 31 January 1968.

f. USARV approved the request of this headquarters for local promulgation of Address Indicating Groups. The Address Indicating Groups were published in II FFORCEV Regulation 105-1 effective 30 November 1967. An Address Indicating Group is a form of address designation representing a predetermined list of specific and frequently combinations of action and/or information addresses. Address Indicating Groups reduce the size of message headings and increase the speed of teletype traffic handling. A considerable amount of circuit time will be conserved since lengthy address groups are often longer than the message text.

g. At 0300 hours, 31 January 1968, HQ II FFORCEV came under attack by rockets followed at 0430 hours by a ground attack which lasted throughout most of the day. The II FFORCEV Signal Office/53d Signal Battalion S3 office was damaged by rocket and small arms fire. Several major aerial cable systems within the base camp as well as interconnecting cable systems between Bien Hoa Army, III Corps Headquarters, COMUSMACV, and the Honour-Smith Compound were damaged by the attacks with the loss of many key circuits. Quick reaction on the part of cable repair teams restored most of the base camp circuits in minimum time. Due to constant small arms fire, Army Signal Brigade cable teams were unable to repair immediately the interconnecting base camp cables between COMUSMACV, III Corps,

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AVFC-22-H

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Quarterly Period
Ending 31 January 1968 (RCJ CJFOR-15) (J-EX-TO-1) (U)

Bien Ho Army, Plantation - Hq II FFORCEV, 199th Infantry Brigade, 12th Aviation Group, and the 20th Engineer Group headquarters. Consequently, emergency Field Force VLF systems were moved into location at some of these organizations to provide required communications. FM radio and the use of RLI proved again to be a quick and excellent emergency means of communications during this situation. The results of the emergency situation not only pointed out some weaknesses in our emergency preparedness, but also proved again a high degree of flexibility and the superior state of training the 53d Signal Battalion has exhibited to perform an outstanding job.

9. (U) STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE.

a. During the period 2 December 1967 through 2 January 1968, classes on the provisions of the Geneva Convention were given to members of all II Field Force Vietnam units based on the Plantation Compound.

b. On 6 November 1967 the construction of the II Field Force Vietnam General Courtroom was completed with self-help.

c. The 199th Infantry Brigade (Separate) (Light) (VIC FBD) per GC 6447, USAHV, 15 December 1967, effective 1 January 1968 was attached to II FFORCEV for administration of military justice, including the exercise of general court-martial jurisdiction.

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AV 00-111-1
SUBJ: Operational Report-Less ons Learned for the Quarterly Period
Ending 31 January 1966 (RCS C&M-65) (J-D.O-70-A) (U)

SECTION II

COMMANDERS OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

LOGISTICS

ITEM: Logistic Support Capability of an Airborne Division and an Armored Cavalry Regiment.

DISCUSSION: Neither the Airborne Division nor the Armored Cavalry Regiment have sufficient organic support capability to support sustained combat operations. They require substantial maintenance, supply and services support from an outside agency.

OBSERVATION: Force level and operational planners must recognize this lack of organic capability and take appropriate steps to provide the additional logistic support required.

ITEM: Supply conditions affecting the operational capability of the command.

DISCUSSION: During this quarter, an Airborne Division arrived from CONUS. The impact of equipping this unit with selected items of equipment did not seriously affect the combat readiness of this command; however, it had considerable effect on logistical operations at all levels as the unit had to be supplied equipment already in short supply in Vietnam.

OBSERVATION: The supply system must have maximum lead time to obtain equipment for units arriving from CONUS. If an item is in short supply in Vietnam and the unit has it on hand at its home station, the unit should be authorized to deploy with the equipment. This would eliminate redistribution of available in-country assets needed by tactical units already committed to combat.

ITEM: M16A1 Rifle.

DISCUSSION: The M16A1 Rifle has been and still is the subject for command attention. Changes to the rifle such as the new cyclic buffer and chrome chamber have been required. This rifle requires substantially more individual maintenance than the M14 rifle. USARV has published USARV Pamphlet No 750-30 covering care and maintenance of the M16A1 rifle. Individuals must be furnished required cleaning materials and impressed with their responsibility for maintenance.

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

ITEM: II PFORCEV/III Corps (ARVN) Psychological Warfare Coordinating Committee.

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MEMO-R-1

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Quarterly Period
Ending 31 January 1967 (RCS CSFOP-65) (U-DEC-UC-A) (U)

DISCUSSION: The II FFOCEV/III Corps Psychological Warfare Coordinating Committee was established to coordinate the PSYOP resources of all agencies and to insure a coordinated PSYOP effort within III CTZ. This committee, headed by the II Field Force G5 and the Deputy Chief of Staff for Political Warfare of III Corps is composed of representatives from all PSYOP support agencies within III CTZ. In addition to the regular members of the committee G5/S5 officers of II Field Force OPCON units are invited to attend committee meetings from time to time in order to discuss problem areas and tactical PSYOP requirements.

OBSERVATION: Establishment of the PSYWAR Coordinating Committee at Field Force/Corps level has proven to be an effective device for coordinating all PSYOP assets available within III CTZ.

ITEM: Exploitation of VC Atrocities.

DISCUSSION: The increasing number of atrocities perpetrated by VC/NVA Forces within III CTZ have been promptly exploited with quick reaction leaflets to reveal the wanton attacks on non-combatants, especially women and children. A PSYOP Exploitation Team has been formed from local resources to exploit VC/NVA atrocities on a quick reaction basis.

OBSERVATION: The timely exploitation of VC/NVA atrocities with quick reaction leaflets has done much to create a very favorable psychological impact in an important area of operations. These leaflets, depicting Vietnamese and US medical personnel providing medical care to the innocent victims of VC terrorism, have done much to gain the respect and confidence of the local population in the areas involved. Upon return to their village, these victims who have survived VC/NVA attacks will give added credence to the theme, "Vietnamese and US personnel are working together to help the people, while the VC/NVA terrorize the people and destroy."

ITEM: Model 85 Quick Reaction Press and AEM-A3-4 Aerial Loudspeaker.

DISCUSSION: All OPCON units now have Model 85 quick reaction presses and AEM-A3-4 aerial loudspeaker systems for added flexibility in psychological operations. Presses are located at division and separate brigade level. The loudspeaker systems are located at brigade level.

OBSERVATION: The added capability provided by these items has increased flexibility in exploiting tactical operations with verbal and printed media on a quick reaction basis. The availability of loudspeakers which can be mounted in helicopters has greatly improved II Field Force psychological operations during the hours of darkness. Darkness has proven to be a period when VC/NVA personnel are most receptive to psychological messages. The US Air Force has been unable to provide aircraft for night loudspeaker missions.

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AVFBC-11-H

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period
ending 31 January 1968 (NCS CSFOR-65) (A-DIC-TO-A) (U)

(U) CIVIL AFFAIRS/CIVIC ACTION

ITEM: Protection of Natural Resources.

DISCUSSION: The rubber industry in Vietnam at present accounts for 98% of the foreign exchange earned by the Government for South Vietnam. When peace is restored it is estimated that natural rubber will account for 50 percent of the total export income, rice 50 percent, and other commodities the remaining 20 percent. More than 95% of all rubber plantations in South Vietnam are located within the III Corps Tactical Zone. More than 100,000 people derive their livelihood from these plantations. During recent combat operations, II Field Force was required by tactical necessity to locate base camps in or adjacent to rubber plantations and to conduct road clearing operations to enhance the security of lines of communication. During these operations G5, II Field Force established close liaison and coordination with Province Senior Advisers, Province Chiefs, plantation managers, and tactical commanders to assure that the absolute minimum number of rubber trees would be cut. As an example, during a road clearing operation through a rubber plantation, an on-the-spot survey revealed that only 50 meters of rubber would have to be cut on both sides of the road as opposed to 100 to 200 meters as previously recommended, provided brush and jungle growth could be kept cleared by the plantation management. This cooperation assured both air and ground visibility and permitted sufficient off-the-road maneuverability for military convoys in the event of an attack or ambush. At the same time, a minimum amount of rubber was cut in accomplishment of the commander's mission.

OBSERVATION: The natural rubber industry is a key to South Vietnam's present and future economic posture. Using the process of "selective cutting" during tactical operations provides tactical security while at the same time preserving the most productive stands of rubber trees.

(C) COMMUNICATIONS

ITEM: Telephone Poles (75 to 90 feet in height) were installed at the CINC camps at Bu Doi, Loc Ninh, and the Song Be air strip to elevate the VHF and HF antennas.

DISCUSSION: Pre-stepped and guyed telephone poles are transported and placed rapidly by CH-47 aircraft. A VHF system, marginal due to distance (75 miles) to Blackhorse Forward at Loc Ninh experienced few outages after the antennas were placed on the pole on 21 December 1967. This increased the antenna height 15 feet and made the difference between no system and an excellent system. The range and reliability of FM nets have increased significantly upon elevation of the NCS antenna above jungle and rubber vegetation.

OBSERVATION: The utilization of telephone poles to mount antennae has increased communications effectiveness and has shown two advantages over construction of a fixed tower, AB-216: (1) Decreased installation time. (2) The pole can be abandoned upon unit movement.

ITEM: Interconnect cables between Long Binh Plantation, and Bien Hoa were installed and cut over.

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AVFBC-RS-II

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Quarterly Period
Ending 31 January 1968 (RCS CSFOR-65) (W-DHO-TO-A) (U)

DISCUSSION: A 600 pair cable was installed between Long Binh and Plantation in January with a 300 pair cutout to Bien Hoa and a 100 pair cutout to Bearcat. The Bearcat cutout is scheduled for completion in March 1968. Both loaded and non-loaded pairs are being installed.

OBSERVATION: Two II FFORCEV VHF systems from II FFORCEV to Bien Hoa have been cut over to cable releasing critical radio relay equipment for tactical operations. The two systems presently installed to Bearcat may be eliminated upon completion of that leg. Better telephone service should result to these two critical locations.

ITEM: The movement of the 101st Airborne Division Forward to Song Be resulted in the development of Nui Ba Ra as a major communications site.

DISCUSSION: The 36th Signal Battalion cleared the top of Nui Ba Ra Mountain and established a 24 channel tropospheric scatter system to Long Binh, a 12 channel system to Phuoc Vinh, and three 12 channel systems to Song Be airfield from the mountain. A 78' tower was installed adjacent to the airfield and an area switchboard and communications center were placed in operation.

OBSERVATION: The communications flexibility of the Army Signal Brigade was illustrated by the rapid establishment of the Song Be communications complex in conjunction with the 53d Signal Battalion and the 501st Airborne Signal Battalion.

ITEM: A 12 channel VHF system was established by II FFORCEV on 21 January 1968 between the 101st Airborne Division Main CP at Bien Hoa and the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division at Chon Thanh. A four channel VHF system was also established between Chon Thanh and Quan Loi. A total of 36 channels were brought into the 101st Airborne Division Advance CP at Song Be by the 2d Signal Group. One 12 channel VHF system was installed between Loc Ninh and Quan Loi to provide fire direction facilities for the 175mm artillery battery at Loc Ninh.

DISCUSSION: Internal division communications are normally provided by organic equipment. Self sufficiency of the 101st Airborne Division in this respect is lacking. This division is severely limited with four channel VHF radio relay equipment, not only in the number of channels but in range. The equipment is highly subject to FM interference.

OBSERVATION: Deployment of the 101st Airborne Division to dispersed locations similar to the deployment of the normal infantry divisions in Vietnam requires communications augmentation by Corps and Army Signal Battalions. Otherwise, the 501st Signal Battalion requires augmentation of 12 channel equipment and additional personnel to its TOC to properly perform its mission.

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
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AVFPOC-R-41

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Quarterly Period
Ending 31 January 1968 (RCS CSFOR-65) (J-DHO-TO-A) (U)

ITEM: Commander's Recommendations.

NOTE.


FRED C. WEYAND
Lieutenant General, USA
Commanding

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ACoFS, G5, II FFORCEV - 1
Joint Planning Group, II FFORCEV - 1
7th Mil Hist Det - 5

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AVHGC-DST (21 Feb 68) 1st Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Quarterly Period Ending
31 January 1968 (RCS CSFOR-65) (W-DHO-TO-A) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 3 MAR 1968

TO: ✓Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,
APO 96558

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army,
Washington, D. C. 20310

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1968 from Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam (DHOA).

2. Pertinent comment follows: Reference item concerning logistic support capability of an airborne division and an armored cavalry regiment, page 59: Concur. The 67th Maintenance Company (DS) (Div) has been designated to provide back up support maintenance for 101st Airborne Division and the 551st Light Maintenance Company is providing support for the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment. The supply and services support for these organizations are under constant review by appropriate staff agencies and necessary support provided within current capabilities.

3. A copy of this indorsement will be furnished to the reporting unit through channels.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Copy furnished:
HQ, II FFV

C. S. Nakatsukasa
C. S. NAKATSUKASA
Captain, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

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GPOP-DT (21 Feb 68) (U) 2d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report for the Quarterly Period Ending 31 January
1968 from HQ, II Fld Force Vn (UIC: WDHQAA) (RCS CSFOR-65)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 23 MAR 1968

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorse-
ments and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:



K. F. O'SCOURN
MAJ, AGC
Asst AG

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II FFORCEV ORDER OF BATTLE

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>PROVINCE</u>	<u>STATION</u>	<u>COORDINATES</u>	<u>CONTROL HQ</u>
II FFORCEV	BIEN HOA	LONG BINH	YT051111	COMUSMACV
1ST INF DIV	BINH DUONG	LAI KHE	XT772382	II FFORCEV
1ST BDE, 1ST INF DIV	BINH LONG	QUAN LOI	XT815905	1ST INF DIV
1-2D INF	BINH LONG	QUAN LOI	XT815905	1ST BDE, 1ST INF DIV
1-26TH INF	BINH LONG	QUAN LOI	XT815905	1ST BDE, 1ST INF DIV
1-28TH INF	BINH LONG	QUAN LOI	XT815905	1ST BDE, 1ST INF DIV
2D BDE, 1ST INF DIV	BIEN HOA	DI AN	XT907073	1ST INF DIV
1-18TH INF	BIEN HOA	DI AN	XT907076	2D BDE, 1ST INF DIV
2-18TH INF	BIEN HOA	DI AN	XT903077	2D BDE, 1ST INF DIV
2-16TH INF	BIEN HOA	DI AN	XT905077	2D BDE, 1ST INF DIV
3D BDE, 1ST INF DIV	BINH DUONG	LAI KHE	XT764378	1ST INF DIV
1-16TH INF	BINH DUONG	LAI KHE	XT770379	3D BDE, 1ST INF DIV
2-2D INF (MECH)	BINH DUONG	LAI KHE	XT784379	3D BDE, 1ST INF DIV
2-28TH INF	BINH DUONG	LAI KHE	XT764380	3D BDE, 1ST INF DIV
1-4TH CAV	BINH DUONG	PHU LOI	XT869175	1ST INF DIV
1ST INF DIV ARTY	BINH DUONG	PHU LOI	XT867157	1ST INF DIV
1-5TH ARTY (105T)	BINH LONG	QUAN LOI	XT815905	1ST INF DIV ARTY
1-7TH ARTY (105T)	BIEN HOA	DI AN	XT909071	1ST INF DIV ARTY
2-33D ARTY (105T)	BINH DUONG	LAI KHE	XT760375	1ST INF DIV ARTY
6-15TH ARTY (105T)	BINH DUONG	LAI KHE	XT780379	1ST INF DIV ARTY
8-6TH ARTY (155/8"SP)	BINH DUONG	PHU LOI	XT867157	1ST INF DIV ARTY

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>PROVINCE</u>	<u>STATION</u>	<u>COORDINATES</u>	<u>CONTROL R/L</u>
1ST AVN	DINH DUONG	PHU LOI	XT831171	1ST INF DIV
1ST ENGR	BIEN DUONG	LAI KHE	XT764379	1ST INF DIV
121ST SIG	BINH DUONG	LAI KHE	XT764380	1ST INF DIV
CO F, 52D INF (LRP)	BIEN DUONG	LAI KHE	XT761381	1ST INF DIV
9TH INF DIV	BIEN HOA	LONG THANH	YT163002	II PFORCEV
1ST BDE, 9TH INF DIV	BIEN HOA	LONG THANH	YT160015	9TH INF DIV
2-39TH INF	BIEN HOA	LONG THANH	YT163018	1ST BDE, 9TH INF DIV
2-47TH INF (MECH)	BIEN HOA	LONG THANH	YT171006	1ST BDE, 9TH INF DIV
4-39TH INF	BIEN HOA	LONG THANH	YT163042	1ST BDE, 9TH INF DIV
2D BDE, 9TH INF DIV	DINH TUONG	DONG TAM	XS417439	9TH INF DIV
3-47TH INF	DINH TUONG	DONG TAM	XS417439	2D BDE, 9TH INF DIV
3-60TH INF	DINH TUONG	DONG TAM	XS417439	2D BDE, 9TH INF DIV
4-47TH INF	DINH TUONG	DONG TAM	XS417439	2D BDE, 9TH INF DIV
3D BDE, 9TH INF DIV	LONG AN	TAN AN	XS556648	9TH INF DIV
2-60TH INF	LONG AN	AP TAN THUAN	XS669633	3D BDE, 9TH INF DIV
3-39TH INF	LONG AN	CAN GIUOC	XS835725	3D BDE, 9TH INF DIV
5-60TH INF (MECH)	LONG AN	BINH PHUOC	XS609953	3D BDE, 9TH INF DIV
3-5TH CAV	BIEN HOA	LONG THANH	YT167010	1ST BDE, 9TH INF DIV
9TH INF DIV ARTY	BIEN HOA	LONG THANH	YT172004	9TH INF DIV
1-11TH ARTY (105T)	BIEN HOA	LONG THANH	YT162018	9TH INF DIV ARTY
2-4TH ARTY (105T)	LONG AN	TAN AN	XS546648	9TH INF DIV ARTY
3-34TH ARTY (105T)	DINH TUONG	DONG TAM	XS417439	9TH INF DIV ARTY
1-84TH ARTY (155/8"SP)	DINH TUONG	DONG TAM	XS413440	9TH INF DIV ARTY

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>PROVINCE</u>	<u>STATION</u>	<u>COORDINATES</u>	<u>CONTROL HQ</u>
9TH AVN	BIEN HOA	LONG THANH	YT160012	9TH INF DIV
15TH ENGR	BIEN HOA	LONG THANH	YT168013	9TH INF DIV
9TH SIG	BIEN HOA	LONG THANH	YS170998	9TH INF DIV
11TH ACR (SEP)	LONG KHANH	LONG GIAO	YS438968	II FFORCEV
1-11TH CAV	LONG KHANH	LONG GIAO	YS440970	11TH ACR
2-11TH CAV	LONG KHANH	LONG GIAO	YS440976	11TH ACR
3-11TH CAV	LONG KHANH	LONG GIAO	YS433963	11TH ACR
919TH ENGR CO	LONG KHANH	LONG GIAO	YS440976	11TH ACR
CO & 50TH INF (LRP)	BIEN HOA	LONG THANH	YT163002	9TH INF DIV
RTAVR (SEP)	BIEN HOA	LONG THANH	YT160012	9TH INF DIV
25TH INF DIV	HAU NGHIA	CU CHI	XT655150	II FFORCEV
1ST BDE, 25TH INF DIV	TAY NINH	TAY NINH	XT168520	25TH INF DIV
4-9TH INF	TAY NINH	TAY NINH	XT168520	1ST BDE, 25TH INF DIV
2-14TH INF	TAY NINH	TAY NINH	XT168520	1ST BDE, 25TH INF DIV
2-34TH ARMOR	TAY NINH	TAY NINH	XT168520	1ST BDE, 25TH INF DIV
2D BDE, 25TH INF DIV	HAU NGHIA	CU CHI	XT655150	25TH INF DIV
1-5TH INF (MECH)	HAU NGHIA	CU CHI	XT655150	25TH INF DIV
1-27TH INF	HAU NGHIA	CU CHI	XT655150	2D BDE, 25TH INF DIV
2-27TH INF	HAU NGHIA	CU CHI	XT655150	2D BDE, 25TH INF DIV
4-23D INF (MECH)	HAU NGHIA	CU CHI	XT655150	2D BDE, 25TH INF DIV
3D BDE, 25TH INF DIV	BINH DUONG	DAU TIENG	XT483480	25TH INF DIV
2-12TH INF	BINH DUONG	DAU TIENG	XT483480	3D BDE, 25TH INF DIV
2-22D INF (MECH)	BINH DUONG	DAU TIENG	XT483480	3D BDE, 25TH INF DIV
3-22D INF	BINH DUONG	DAU TIENG	XT483480	3D BDE, 25TH INF DIV

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UNIT	PROVINCE	STATION	COORDINATES	CONTROL HQ
3-4TH CAV	HAU NGHIA	CU CHI	XT655150	25TH INF DIV
25TH INF DIV ARTY	HAU NGHIA	CU CHI	XT655150	25TH INF DIV
1-8TH ARTY (105T)	HAU NGHIA	CU CHI	XT655150	25TH INF DIV ARTY
2-77TH ARTY (105T)	BINH DUONG	DAU TIENG	XT483480	25TH INF DIV ARTY
6-77TH ARTY (105T)	HAU NGHIA	CU CHI	XT655150	25TH INF DIV ARTY
7-11TH ARTY (105T)	TAY NINH	TAY NINH	XT168520	25TH INF DIV ARTY
3-13TH ARTY (155/8"SR)	HAU NGHIA	CU CHI	XT655150	25TH INF DIV ARTY
25TH AVN	HAU NGHIA	CU CHI	XT655150	25TH INF DIV
65TH ENGR	HAU NGHIA	CU CHI	XT655150	25TH INF DIV
125TH SIG	HAU NGHIA	CU CHI	XT655150	25TH INF DIV
CO F, 50TH INF (LRP)	HAU NGHIA	CU CHI	XT655150	25TH INF DIV
101ST ABN DIV	BIEN HOA	BIEN HOA	YTO13143	II FFORCEV
1ST BDE, 101ST ABN DIV	PHUOC LONG	SONG BE	YU159079	101ST ABN DIV
1-327TH ABN INF	PHUOC LONG	SONG BE	YU159079	1ST BDE, 101ST ABN DIV
2-327TH ABN INF	PHUOC LONG	SONG BE	YU159079	1ST BDE, 101ST ABN DIV
2-502D ABN INF	PHUOC LONG	SONG BE	YU159079	1ST BDE, 101ST ABN DIV
3D BDE, 101ST ABN DIV	BINH DUONG	PHUOC VINH	XT960490	101ST ABN DIV
1-506TH ABN INF	BINH DUONG	PHUOC VINH	XT953494	3D BDE, 101ST ABN DIV
2-506TH ABN INF	BINH DUONG	PHUOC VINH	XT968487	3D BDE, 101ST ABN DIV
3-187TH ABN INF	BINH DUONG	PHUOC VINH	XT960499	3D BDE, 101ST ABN DIV
2-17TH CAV (-)	BIEN HOA	BIEN HOA	XT999145	101ST ABN DIV
101ST ABN DIV ARTY	BIEN HOA	BIEN HOA	YTO28152	101ST ABN DIV
326TH ENGR	BIEN HOA	BIEN HOA	YTO14144	101ST ABN DIV

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UNIT	PROVINCE	STATION	COORDINATES	CONTROL HQ
101ST AVN	BIEN HOA	BIEN HOA	YT013143	101ST AVN DIV
2-319TH ARTY (105T)	BINH DUONG	PHUOC VINH	XT995491	3D BDE, 101ST AVN DIV
2-320TH ARTY (105T)	PHUOC LONG	SONG BE	YU159079	1ST BDE, 101ST AVN DIV
CO F, 58TH INF (LRP)	BIEN HOA	BIEN HOA	YT014144	101ST AVN DIV
199TH INF BDE (SEP)	BIEN HOA	LONG BINH	YT077122	II FFORCEV
2-3D INF	BIEN HOA	LONG BINH	YT077122	199TH INF BDE
3-7TH INF	BIEN HOA	LONG BINH	YT077122	199TH INF BDE
4-12TH INF	BIEN HOA	LONG BINH	YT077122	199TH INF BDE
D/17TH CAV	BIEN HOA	LONG BINH	YT077122	199TH INF BDE
2-40TH ARTY (105T)	BIEN HOA	LONG BINH	YT077122	199TH INF BDE
87TH ENGR CO	BIEN HOA	LONG BINH	YT077122	199TH INF BDE
HQ 1ST ATF (SEP)	PHUOC TUY	NUI DAT	YS435667	II FFORCEV
2D RAR	PHUOC TUY	NUI DAT	YS443676	HQ 1ST ATF
3D RAR	PHUOC TUY	NUI DAT	YS448658	HQ 1ST ATF
7TH RAR	PHUOC TUY	NUI DAT	YS441684	HQ 1ST ATF
1ST SAS SQDN	PHUOC TUY	NUI DAT	YS434675	HQ 1ST ATF
A SQDN/3D CAV REGT	PHUOC TUY	NUI DAT	YS429664	HQ 1ST ATF
4TH FD REGT (105 PACK)	PHUOC TUY	NUI DAT	YS431663	HQ 1ST ATF
1ST FD SQDN RAB	PHUOC TUY	NUI DAT	YS437665	HQ 1ST ATF
104TH SIG SQDN	PHUOC TUY	NUI DAT	YS432666	HQ 1ST ATF
HQ II FFORCEV ARMY	BIEN HOA	LONG BINH	YT051112	II FFORCEV
5-2D ARTY (40MM AWSP)	BIEN HOA	LONG BINH	YT128114	II FFORCEV ARTY
8-25TH ARTY (TAB), HNB BIEN HOA		LONG BINH	YT052112	II FFORCEV ARTY
HQ 23D ARTY GP	BINH DUONG	PHU LOI	XT867162	II FFORCEV ARTY
2-13TH ARTY (105T)	BINH DUONG	PHU LOI	XT847152	23D ARTY GP
1-27TH ARTY (155 SP)	BINH DUONG	DAU TIENG	XT497481	23D ARTY GP

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>PROVINCE</u>	<u>STATION</u>	<u>COORDINATES</u>	<u>CONTROL HQ</u>
2-11TH ARTY (155T)	BIEN HOA	BIEN HOA	YT026149	23D ARTY GP
6-27TH ARTY (8"/175SP)	BINH LONG	QUAN LOI	XT809903	23D ARTY GP
2-32D ARTY (8"/175SP)	TAY NINH	TAY NINH	XT154513	23D ARTY GP
HQ 54TH ARTY GP	LONG KHANH	XUAN LOC	YT467089	II FFORCEV ARTY
7-8TH ARTY (8"/175SP)	BIEN HOA	B1 HOA	YT022152	54TH ARTY GP
7-9TH ARTY (105T)	BIEN HOA	LONG THANH	YS166991	54TH ARTY GP
2-35TH ARTY (155 SP)	LONG KHANH	XUAN LOC	YT473094	54TH ARTY GP
1-83D ARTY (8"/174SP)	PHUOC TUY	NUI DAT	YS422658	54TH ARTY GP
CO A, 5TH SFGA	BIEN HOA	BIEN HOA	YT007123	II FFORCEV
CO F, 51ST INF (LRP)	BIEN HOA	BIEN HOA	YT013156	II FFORCEV
12TH CBT AVN GP	BIEN HOA	LONG BINH	YT059118	II FFORCEV
11TH CBT AVN BN	BINH DUONG	PHU LOI	XT860158	12TH CBT AVN GP
126TH ASLT HEL CO	BINH DUONG	PHU LOI	XT860159	11TH CBT AVN BN
162D ASLT HEL CO	BINH DUONG	PHUOC VINH	XT961492	11TH CBT AVN BN
173D ASLT HEL CO	BINH DUONG	LAI KHE	XT780380	11TH CBT AVN BN
213TH ASLT SPT HEL CO	BINH DUONG	PHU LOI	XT860160	11TH CBT AVN BN
145TH CBT AVN BN	BIEN HOA	BIEN HOA	XT995102	12TH CBT AVN GP
68TH ASLT HEL CO	BIEN HOA	BIEN HOA	XT988129	145TH CBT AVN BN
117TH ASLT HEL CO	BIEN HOA	BIEN HOA	XT989129	145TH CBT AVN BN
118TH ASLT HEL CO	BIEN HOA	BIEN HOA	XT990129	145TH CBT AVN BN
190TH ASLT HEL CO	BIEN HOA	BIEN HOA	XT987129	145TH CBT AVN BN
334TH ASLT HEL CO	BIEN HOA	BIEN HOA	XT991129	145TH CBT AVN BN
210TH CBT AVN BN	BIEN HOA	LONG THANH	YS147990	12TH CBT AVN GP
120TH ASLT HEL CO	BIEN HOA	LONG BINH	YT076065	210TH CBT AVN BN
125TH ATC CO	BIEN HOA	BIEN HOA	YT005145	210TH CBT AVN BN
16TH SIG CO (HYPER NAV)	GIA DINH	TAN SON NHUT	XS821975	210TH CBT AVN BN
25TH AVN CO (CORPS)	BIEN HOA	LONG BINH	YT050105	210TH CBT AVN BN
54TH UTIL APL CO	PHUOC TUY	VUNG TAU	YS295471	210TH CBT AVN BN

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
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UNIT	PROVINCE	STATION	COORDINATES	CONTROL HQ
73D SURV APL CO	PHUOC TUY	VUNG TAU	YS295472	210TH CBT AVN BN
74TH RECON APL CO	BINH DUONG	PHU LOI	XT865155	210TH CBT AVN BN
184TH RECON APL CO	BINH DUONG	PHU LOI	XT862160	210TH CBT AVN BN
214TH CBT AVN BN	BIEN HOA	LONG THANH	YT167003	12TH CBT AVN GP
17TH ASLT HEL CO	BIEN HOA	LONG THANH	YT068113	214TH CBT AVN BN
135TH ASLT HEL CO	LONG KHANH	LONG GIAO	YS395995	214TH CBT AVN BN
191ST ASLT HEL CO	BIEN HOA	LONG THANH	YT167005	214TH CBT AVN BN
195TH ASLT HEL CO	BIEN HOA	LONG BINH	YT065112	214TH CBT AVN BN
200TH ASLT SPT HEL CO	BIEN HOA	LONG THANH	YT168009	214TH CBT AVN BN
240TH ASLT HEL CO	BIEN HOA	LONG THANH	YT167006	214TH CBT AVN BN
222D CBT SPT AVN BN	PHUOC TUY	VUNG TAU	YS296472	12TH CBT AVN GP
147TH ASLT SPT HEL CO	PHUOC TUY	VUNG TAU	YS295471	222D CBT SPT AVN BN
205TH ASLT SPT HEL CO	BINH DUONG	PHU LOI	XT860159	222D CBT SPT AVN BN
273D ASLT SPT HEL CO (HVY)	PHUOC TUY	VUNG TAU	YS296471	222D CBT SPT AVN BN
269TH CBT AVN BN	HAU NGHIA	CU CHI	XT656157	12TH CBT AVN GP
116TH ASLT HEL CO	HAU NGHIA	CU CHI	XT657158	269TH CBT AVN BN
187TH ASLT HEL CO	TAY NINH	TAY NINH	XT178521	269TH CBT AVN BN
188TH ASLT HEL CO	BINH DUONG	DAU TIENG	XT491475	269TH CBT AVN BN
242D ASLT SPT HEL CO	HAU NGHIA	CU CHI	XT662152	269TH CBT AVN BN
308TH CBT AVN BN	BIEN HOA	BIEN HOA	XT996103	12TH CBT AVN GP
3D SQDN, 17TH AIR CAV	BIEN HOA	DI AN	XT909056	12TH CBT AVN GP
53D SIG	BIEN HOA	LONG BINH	YT050110	II FFORCEV
168TH ENGR (CBT)	BIEN HOA	TAY NINH	XT159516	II FFORCEV
568TH ENGR (CBT)	TAY NINH	TAY NINH	XT159515	II FFORCEV

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
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EXISTING BOUNDARIES
SHOWING INITIAL INTER-
PRETATION OF RECENT
REORGANIZATION.


BOUNDARIES
— INTERNATIONAL —
— MR & SUGGESTION —



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ENEMY UNIT LOCATIONS
AS OF 23 JAN 68



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II FIELD FORCE VIETNAM TROOP LIST

1 Nov 67 - 31 Jan 68

OPCON UNITS

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
1st Inf Div	15 Mar 66	LAI KHE
9th Inf Div	14 Dec 66	BEAR CAT
25th Inf Div	22 Mar 66	CU CHI
101st Abn Div (-)	20 Dec 67	BIEN HOA
1st ATF	Jun 66	NUI DAT
RTAVR	22 Sep 67	BEAR CAT
199th Inf Bde (Sep) (Lt)	10 Dec 66	LONG BINH
11th ACR	26 Sep 66	LONG GIAO
23d Arty Gp	15 Mar 66	PHU LOI
54th Arty Gp	1 Oct 66	XUAN LOC
12th Avn Gp	15 Mar 66	LONG BINH
168th Engr Bn (Cot)	4 Jun 67	BIEN HOA
588th Engr Bn (Cbt)	4 Jun 67	TAY NINH
100th Engr Co (LE)	4 Jun 67	BIEN HOA
362d Engr Co (FB)	4 Jun 67	TAY NINH
500th Engr Co (FB)	4 Jun 67	BIEN HOA
*6th PSYOP Bn	6 Dec 66	BIEN HOA

UNIT DEPLOYED

2 Bde (-), 101st Abn Div	30 Jan 68	I FFORCEV
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TENANT UNIT

61st Med Det	25 Jun 66	LONG BINH
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UNIT ASSIGNED

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
IHC, II FFORCEV	10 Jan 66	LONG BINH

*246th PSYOP Co redesignated 6th PSYOP Bn

Incl 5

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DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

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

II FIELD FORCE VIETNAM TROOP LIST

1 Nov 67 - 31 Jan 68

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
HQB, II FFORCEV Arty	17 Jan 66	LONG BINH
HQB, 8th TAB, 25th Arty	13 Aug 66	LONG BINH
2 CA Co	7 Dec 66	LONG BINH
9th Trans Co (CAR)	23 Aug 66	LONG BINH
44th APU	1 Oct 66	LONG BINH
552d MP Co	23 Sep 66	LONG BINH
7th M11 Hist Det	20 Jan 68	LONG BINH
<u>UNIT ATTACHED</u>		
5th Bn, 2d Arty (AWSP)	27 Nov 66	LONG BINH
D Btry, 71st Arty (AW)	27 Nov 66	LONG BINH
53d Sig Bn (Corps)	4 Jun 66	LONG BINH
16th Sig Det	16 May 66	LONG BINH
16th FI Det	4 Jun 66	LONG BINH
29th Chem Det	10 Mar 66	LONG BINH
Det 32, Weather Sqdn	1 Oct 66	LONG BINH
219th MI Det	20 May 66	LONG BINH
303d RR Bn	8 Jun 66	LONG BINH
517th Engr Det	4 Jun 66	LONG BINH

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STATISTICAL SUMMARY
TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT
1 Nov 67 - 31 Jan 68

	<u>SUB TOTAL</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
1. Total air sorties during period:	USAF 10,962 VNAF 2,370	13,332
2. Number sorties flown by US support of ARVN:	2,163	
3. Number sorties flown by VNAF support of ARVN:	2,370	
4. Total sorties flown in support of ARVN:		4,533
5. Number sorties flown by US aircraft in support of US Forces:	8,799	
6. Number sorties flown by VNAF aircraft in support of US Forces:	64	
7. Total sorties flown in support of US Forces:		8,863
8. Number COMBAT SKY SPOT missions flown in support of ARVN:		272
9. Number COMBAT SKY SPOT missions flown in support of US:		
	1st Inf Div: 152	
	9th Inf Div: 58	
	25th Inf Div: 64	
	101st Abn Div: 15	
	1st ATF: 75	
	11th ACR: 4	
	199th Inf Bde: 38	
	Other (II FFORCEV): 217	
		623
10. Results of Air Strikes:		
KBA (BC)	285	KBA (EST) 851
Structures des	1491	Structures dam 918
Secondary explos	302	

Incl 7

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS,
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

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