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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
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IN REPLY REFER TO

AGAM-P (M) (16 Apr 68) FOR OT RD 67X196

24 April 1968

SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report - Operation KIEN GIANG 1-9, 3d
Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, Period 15-19 November 1967 (U)

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Kenneth G. Wickham

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
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HEADQUARTERS 3D BRIGADE
9TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO US FORCES 96373

AVDE-BCO

30 January 1968

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (MACV/RCS/J3/32)(U)

TO: Commander
US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
ATTN: J343
APO 96234

- 1.(U) Name of Operation: Kien Giang 9-1
- 2.(U) Dates of Operation: 151210-191915H Nov 67.
- 3.(C) Location: Base area 770 and specifically area bounded by XS090495, XS043540, XS043643, XS110643, XS106553, and XS131514.
- 4.(u) Command Headquarters: 3d Bde 9th Inf Div.
- 5.(C) Reporting Officer:
 - a. Colonel George W. Everett, Commanding Officer 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division.
 - b. Lieutenant Col William S. Hinton Commanding Officer 2d Bn 60th Inf, 3d Brigade.
 - c. Lieutenant Col William B Steele Commanding Officer 5th Bn (M) 60th Inf, 3d Brigade.
 - d. Lieutenant Colonel George Bland, Commanding Officer 3d Bn 47th Inf, 2d Brigade.

6.(C) Task Organization:

2-60 Inf:
2d Bn, 60th Inf (-)
B Co, 3-39 Inf
C Btry 2-4 Arty DS
Plat C Co 15 Engr Bn (DS)
TH, 9th MI Det (SPT)

3-47 Inf:
3d Bn, 47th Inf

5-60 Inf:
5th Bn (M) 60th Inf
B Btry, 2-4 Arty (DS)
Plat, C Co 15 Engr Bn (DS)

Bde Con
2-4 Arty DS
C Co 15th Engr (-) (DS)
3d Plat 9th MF Co (-)
3d Plat Co 3 9th Sig Bn (-)

Bde Con
Co D, 709th Maint Bn (SPT)
Co C, 9th Med Bn (SPT)
TH 9th MI Det (SPT)
6th AA Plat, 2d CA Co (SPT)

7.(C) Supporting Forces:

- a. 11 Field Forces Army Aviation Units
- b. 7th USAF
- c. 1st Log Chd

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30 January 1968

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (1ACV/RCS/J3/32)(U)

8.(c) Intelligence:

9.(c) Mission: The 3d Bde conducted airmobile assaults, search and destroy operations, saturation patrols, and established blocks within base area 470 to destroy VC forces, their supporting elements and base installations.

10.(c) Concept of Operations:

a. Phase I (15 Nov 67): The 3d Bde "Go Devils" displaced to staging area at Dong Tam, RVN, with the Bde CP moving by motor convoy from Tan An at 1350H and arriving at Dong Tam at 1510H. 2-60 Inf was moved by helicopter from Tan Tru at 1334H and closed Dong Tam at 1550H. 5-60 (M) Inf was moved by helicopter from Binh Phuoc at 1210H and closed Dong Tam at 1330H. 3 Btry 2-4 Arty was moved by helicopter from Tan Tru at 1530H and closed Dong Tam at 1630H. D Btry 2-4 Arty was moved by helicopter from Tan An at 1400H and closed Dong Tam at 1430H.

b. Phase II (16 Nov 67): 3-47 Inf (Tigers) conducted Co sized airmobile assaults and search and destroy operations via XS0345. A Co was moved by helicopter from Dong Tam in 1 lift at 0800H and inserted on LZ Blue XS0845525 at 0831H. The Co maneuvered to the south and secured FS/PB Cuigel XS085520 at 0915H without incident. E Co was moved by helicopter from Dong Tam in 1 lift at 0810H and inserted on LZ Blue at 0835H. The Co maneuvered north along the Tra Lee River sweeping obj's 9 A XS076525 and 9 XS073553 without contact or incident. The Co established its flag via XS073553 and conducted two platoon size night ambush patrols in the vic of Obj 9. C Co was moved by helicopter from Dong Tam in 1 lift at 0808H and inserted on LZ Blue at 0833H. The Co maneuvered to the south and east sweeping obj's 50 XS-090510, 50A XS098517 and 5 XS110524 without contact. The Co established its flag via XS108526 and conducted 1 platoon size night combat patrol at 2350H via XS114514. The combat patrol (2d Platoon) engaged and killed 3 VC (10) moving north in a sampan on the So Tam Canal. C Btry 2-4 Arty was moved by helicopter from Dong Tam at 0945H and inserted on FS/PB Cuigel at 0905H. The battery was ready to fire at 0920H. D Btry 2-4 Arty was moved by helicopter from Dong Tam at 1400H and inserted on FS/PB Cuigel at 1530H. The Btry was ready to fire at 1616H. 2-60 Inf conducted platoon and Co size airmobile assaults and search and destroy ops via XS0760. A Co was moved by helicopter from Dong Tam in 2 lifts at 1009H and inserted on LZ Green XS066593. The Co maneuvered northwest and north along both sides of the Tra Lee River sweeping through obj 20 XS065595. At 1405H via XS063595 the Co captured 1 VC armed with 2 chicken hand grenades. The element continued its sweep without further incident and established a block oriented to the east via XS062617. B Co (3-39) and Recon platoon were moved by helicopter from Dong Tam in 2 lifts at 1009H and inserted on LZ Black XS049609 at 1035H. The elements maneuvered north and east sweeping FS/PB Mace XS065613 and the southern side of the Tong Toc Lee Canal. At 1140H via XS067615, the elements established contact with an est VC Co resulting in 2 US KIA, 4 US MIA, and 4 M-16's and 1 M42 25 mm mortar missing. The Co established its flag on FS/PB Mace. C Co was moved by helicopter from Dong Tam in 4 lifts at 1115H and inserted on LZ Black at 1300H. The Co maneuvered north and secured FS/PB Mace at 1315H without incident. The Co conducted 2 reinforced squad size ambush patrols and established its flag on FS/PB Mace. Recon platoon returned to FS/PB Mace with B Co at 1610H and established its flag. B Btry 2-4 Arty was moved by helicopter from Dong Tam at 1145H and inserted on FS/PB Mace at 1205H. The Btry was prepared to fire at 1300H. At 2215H the FS/PB Mace came under enemy mortar and ground attack. The enemy launched a two-pronged attack from the east and west utilizing an est 2 VC Co's as attacking forces. Fire was returned with organic weapons, arty, gunships, tactical air, and a Spooky. Contact was broken at 2245H resulting in 6 US being KIA and 13 M-16's being destroyed. 5-60 (M) Inf conducted platoon and Co size airmobile assaults and S&D ops via XS0858. B Co was moved by helicopter from Dong Tam in 1 lift at 1106H and inserted via XS082617 at 1135H. The Co maneuvered south and at 1220H via XS080616, the Co established contact with an est 2 VC Co's. The Co remained in contact varying from light to heavy until 1830H and sustained 2 KIA and 15 MIA and lost an est (count not confirmed) 3 M-16's, 2 M-79's and 1 .45 cal pistol. VC losses

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were 6 VC KIA (BC) and 3 probable as verified by soldiers in combat. Recon platoon was moved by helicopter from Dong Tam in 1 lift at 1508H and inserted via XS082617 at 1539H. The platoon reinforced B Co in its defense position via XS082618 and provided security for a chopper that was downed due to an engine failure at 1225H. C Co was moved by helicopter from Dong Tam in 1 lift at 1101H and inserted on LZ Brown XS094612 at 1130H. Immediately upon landing, the Co established contact with an est VC platoon via XS094616. The Co remained in contact varying from light to heavy until 1815H and sustained 7 KIA. Enemy losses were 20 VC KIA (probable as verified by soldiers in combat). The Co established a blocking position oriented to the west via XS095598. A Co and Recon platoon were moved by helicopter (CH-47) from Dong Tam at 1245H to via LZ Brown. At 1308H while attempting to land one of the CH-47's received 7 hits from SA fire which wounded 2 crew members. The insertion was aborted and the helicopters returned to Dong Tam. At 1508H A Co was once again moved by helicopter from Dong Tam in 1 lift and inserted via XS100014 at 1537H. The Co maneuvered to the west along the northern side of the Tong Doc Loc Canal sweeping through obj 41 XS099614 without incident and established a blocking position oriented to the west via XS095613. The Bde and CP departed Dong Tam by convoy at 0805H and established its CP via XS228504 at 0947H. The Grip provided security to the 1st CP without incident. The G Devils had 23 supporting airstrikes resulting in: 15 VC KIA (confirmed), 26 bunkers, 2 structures and 6 RV position being destroyed, 2 secondary explosions and 5 sustained fires. ARVN ops: at 0700H the 3-11 ARVN was lifted by helicopter from PZ 20 XS076450 and inserted on LZ Alice XS135602 and LZ Barbara XS117593 at 0745H. Once inserted they proceeded to sweep SE along both sides of the Minh So Luc Canal through obj 44 XS125602, 45 XS130592, 46 XS135509, 47 XS139557, and 48 XS145567. The days ops resulted in no contact and the element set up in night location at 1700H via obj 48. At 0800 the 2-11 was lifted by helicopter from PZ 20 XS076450 into LZ Delorus XS123584 and LZ Gera XS116570 at 0845H. They swept SE along both sides of the Rach Cay Gao through obj 18 XS117577, 19 XS125570, 20 XS131562, 21 XS138556 and 22 XS145550. At 1000 via obj 18 the 2-11 captured the deputy security chief of the local base area who led them to 1 chicom rifle, 75 booby traps, plus numerous documents. They continued to sweep without incident and established night location via obj 21. At 0900H the third element of TF 11 (1-12) was lifted by helicopter from PZ 20 XS076450 into LZ Ella XS150603 and Flora XS137595. The 1-12 after insertion swept south SE along both sides of the Rach Cha La through obj's 53 XS155564, 54 XS149588, 55 XS152581, and 56 XS145597. Shortly after landing in the LZ gunships spotted 8 VC and engaged them resulting in 3 VC KIA (BC) w/o/wps. The 1-12 continued sweeping without further incident and established its night location via obj 57 at 1700H. 6 Co's of CIDG participated in ops sweeping along the northern bank of the Rach Ca Ngan through check points 77 XS202552, and 76 XS188555 to the junction of the Rach Bang Day. Ops resulted in capture of 1 chicom carbine near obj 72 at 1300 and capture of 1 VC POW and 1 VC KIA on checkpoint 10 at 1230H. The elements established their night locations on checkpoint 12 and near obj 69.

(1) US LOSSES:

(a) Personnel: 3 KIA, 42 MIA and 2 KIA.

(b) Equipment: Destroyed/missing 2 .45 cal pistols, 22 M-16 rifles, 2 M-79's and 1 PRC 25 radio.

(2) ARVN LOSSES: None.

(3) ENEMY LOSSES:

(a) Personnel: US-8 VC KIA (BC) 15 KIA (VC) (confirmed) 1 PW ARVN - 1 PW, 1 VC KIA and 8 VC KIA (BC).

(b) Equipment Captured: US-None ARVN 2 chicom carbines 75 booby traps and numerous documents.

(c) Equipment Destroyed: US 1 sampan, 26 bunkers, 2 structures and 6 RV positions.

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30 January 1968

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (TAOV/HCS/33/32) (U)

c. Phase III (17 May 67): The 3d Devils conducted platoon and Co size airborne assaults and S&D ops in AO Bravo XSO858. 5-47 Inf (Tigers) conducted Co size airborne assaults and S&D ops via XSO854. At 0410H, via XSO14514 an ambush patrol from C Co (2d platoon) engaged and sank 4 sampans resulting in 7 VC KIA (4C). A Co was moved by helicopter from FS/PB Cudgel XSO85520 in 2 lifts at 1147H and inserted on obj 16 XSO63555 at 1214H. The Co established a block oriented to the south while B Co maneuvered. B Co moved from its night location on obj 9 XSO75535 and conducted S&D ops on obj 10 XSO65546 and obj 16 maneuvering to the north against A Co's block. Both elements completed their sweeps without incident and were extracted in 4 lifts at 1442H and closed FS/PB Cudgel at 1512H. C Co moved from its night location on obj 8 XSO109523 and maneuvered north along the So Tam Canal sweeping obj's 30 XSO105534 and 12 XSO100540. The element completed its sweep without incident and was extracted in 2 lifts at 1439H and closed FS/PB Cudgel at 1459H. The element was extracted from FS/PB Cudgel in 6 lifts at 1503H and closed Bong Tam at 1715H. Upon completion of the day was released to 3d Bde, immediately upon closing.

2-60 Inf conducted platoon and Co size airborne assaults and S&D ops via XSO750. A Co conducted S&D ops from its night location on the northern side of the Tong Doc Loc Canal maneuvering to the east against A Co 5-60. At 1010H VC XSO65509 the Co apprehended 2 male detainees (1 age 41 w/ID, 1 35 w/ID), and destroyed 12 sq size bunkers (2-40x5), 30-200m sticky traps and 2 grenade baby traps. The element continued its sweep without further incident and was extracted by P-1s and closed FS/PB Hock XSO65613 at 1245H. B Co (3-39) swept the area around 13 Block and at 1152H via XSO69613 recovered the bodies of the two MIA's (16 May 67) and the 4 M-16's and 1 P-10 25 mm so that had also been carried as missing. The element completed its sweep without further incident and moved by foot to obj 20 XSO61595. A sweep of the area ended with no contact and the Co was extracted at 1655H in 2 lifts and inserted on obj 21 XSO73579 at 1703H. A sweep of the obj revealed nothing and the element was extracted in 2 lifts at 1750H closing the FS/PB Hock at 1800H. At 2300H the company received 3 rounds of M-79 fire resulting in 3 US MIA's. At 0300H via XSO69613, C Co sustained 1 MIA evacuated from SA fire. C Co moved from its night location and swept south of the Tong Doc Loc Canal maneuvering to the east against C Co 5-60. The element completed its sweep of the area without incident and was extracted in 2 lifts at 1305H and inserted on obj 22 XSO55579 at 1330H. The element was extracted after sweeping the area with negative results at 1607H and inserted on obj 21 XSO73580 at 1625H. Once again a sweep of the area was conducted without incident and the Co established its flag via XSO69581 and prepared for night ops. Recon platoon moved on foot from FS/PB Hock and swept obj 52 XSO49616 without incident. The platoon was extracted at 1327H and inserted via XSO75612 at 1330H to provide security for two choppers that were downed by engine failure. The choppers were extracted at 1525H and 1700H respectively. Recon platoon was extracted by air at 1715H and closed FS/PB Hock at 1712H. At 2300H the platoon sustained 2 MIA's from an enemy M-79 round. 5-60 conducted platoon and Co size airborne assaults and S&D ops via XSO858. A Co moved from its night location and swept the northern side of the Tong Doc Loc Canal maneuvering to the west toward A Co 2-60. At 0827H, via XSO84617 the Co destroyed 38 2-man bunkers (4X5X4). The element completed its sweep without further incident and was extracted in 2 lifts at 1150H and inserted on obj 15 XSO95503 at 1214H. Search of the area revealed nothing and the Co was extracted in 2 lifts at 1540H and inserted on obj 9 XSO75535 at 1646H. A sweep of the area was conducted without incident and the Co established its flag via XSO70540 and prepared for night activities. B Co and Recon platoon swept from their night locations via obj 41 XSO93614 south to the Tong Doc Loc Canal then east without incident. B Co was extracted in 2 lifts at 1215H and inserted on obj 18 XSO80598 at 1238H. At 1320H the CP destroyed 20 tons of rice via XSO81600. The element completed its sweep without further incident and was extracted in 2 lifts at 1620H and inserted on obj 14 XSO98565 at 1626H. A sweep of the area revealed nothing and the Co was extracted in 2 lifts at 1712H and inserted on obj 8 XSO109523 at 1740H. Immediately upon landing the element engaged 2-3 VC resulting in 1 VC KIA (4C), 1 US MIA. The sweep was continued without further incident and the Co established its flag via XSO109521 and prepared for night ops, recon platoon was extracted at 1239H and inserted on obj 17 XSO79566 at 1245H. A sweep of the area revealed nothing and the platoon was extracted at 1432H and closed FS/PB Cudgel at 1440H. C Co moved from its night location and swept along the south side

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of the Tong Doc Lee Canal maneuvering to the west toward C Co 2-60 without incident. The Co was extracted in 2 lifts at 1335H and closed FS/PB AS085520 at 1430H. The Grip continued to provide security for the Bie fuel CP via XS226503 without incident. The Go Devils had 6 supporting airstrikes resulting in 10 bunkers being destroyed.

(1) US LOSSES:

(a) Personnel: 5 MIA.

(b) Equipment Destroyed/Missing: None.

(2) ARVN LOSSES: None.

(3) ENEMY LOSSES:

(a) Personnel: US: 8 VC KIA (BC) ARVN: 3 PM, 6 Detainees.

(b) Equipment Destroyed: 48 Bunkers, 20 tons of rice, 20 20MM booby traps, and 2 grenade booby traps - 4 sampans, ARVN: None.

(c) Equipment Captured: US - None, ARVN - 1 AK-47, and medical supplies.

d. Phase IV (18 Nov 67): The Go Devils conducted platoon and company size airmobile assaults and S&D ops via XS0760. 2-60 Inf: At 0225H the Bn FS/PB Haze XS065613 came under an enemy mortar attack. A total of 50-75 82mm mortar rds were fired resulting in 1 US being wounded (not evacuated). The 2d platoon of A Co conducted Recon patrol to the east and south of FS/PB Haze. Patrol routes were traversed without incident or contact and the platoon closed FS/PB Haze at 1200H. The 2d platoon of B Co was moved by helicopter from FS/PB Haze in 2 lifts at 1212H and inserted on obj 1 XS064643 at 1225H. A sweep of the area revealed nothing and the platoon was extracted at 1440H and closed FS/PB Haze at 1447H. The 1st platoon of C Co moved overland from its night location on obj 21 XS073879, and established a block on obj 22 XS055579 oriented to the west. The remaining two platoons moved overland to obj 20 XS061595 where they also established a block oriented to the west. The Co was extracted from its blocking position in 3 lifts at 1134H and inserted on obj 52 XS051616 at 1205H without incident. Once again a blocking position was established oriented to the west. At 1200H via XS052614, the Co sustained 3 MIA's (1 evac) from a grenade booby trap. The Co conducted its block without further incident and established its flag via XS052614 and prepared for night activities. The Recon platoon moved overland from FS/PB Haze and established a block on obj 52 oriented to the west. The platoon conducted its block without contact and was extracted at 1131H and closed FS/PB Haze at 1140H. In addition to its earlier mission, the platoon conducted a Recon patrol west and south of FS/PB Haze. Patrol routes were traversed without incident and the platoon closed FS/PB Haze at 1630H. 5-60 conducted Co size combat patrols and S&D ops via XS0358. At 0200H, FS/PB Cudgel XS085520 came under an enemy mortar, recoilless rifle and ground attack. Fire was returned with organic weapons, arty (firing both 160 and Beehive rds), tactical air, army gunships and spookys. A Co moved from its night location on obj 9 XS075535 and conducted a Co size combat patrol and sweep of the battle area. The Co maneuvered south sweeping both sides of the Tra Loc Creek. The element linked up with Recon platoon at 0630H and assisted that platoon in its reorganization and consolidation of its position, and reestablished Recon's position on the western side of Tra Loc Creek. The Co closed FS/PB Cudgel at 0945H and without incident. B Co moved from its night location on obj 3 XS109525 and conducted a Co size combat patrol and a sweep of the battle area. The Co maneuvered west sweeping both sides of the Co Cien Creek then swept north to FS/PB Cudgel. Patrol routes were traversed without incident and the Co closed FS/PB Cudgel, and conducted a sweep of the battle area and discovered 5 VC KIA (BC). The Co closed FS/PB Cudgel at 1427H without further incident. Results of the attack were 7 US KIA, 5 VC KIA (BC), 78 VC KIA (probable as verified by soldiers in combat), 80 VC KIA (possible), 2 US M101 howitzers damaged, 1 starlight scope, 4 M60 MG's, 1 90mm RR, 32 M-16's, 2 M79's and 3 .45 cal pistols. The Grip continued the defense of the Bie fuel CP via XS226503 without incident. The Go Devils had 4 supporting airstrikes resulting in 3 bunkers being destroyed. ARVN ops: The 2-11 swept east from

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checkpoint 31 to 363 36 A 143557 then south to 363 37 14312516. From there they were lifted from their PZ at 1530H and inserted into LZ Winston 143232474 at 1555H. They then proceeded to Gai Lay where they were to remain as a reserve force. At 0800H, the 3-11 moved SE to checkpoint 1 143117557 and were also extracted to LZ Winston at 1630H where they proceeded to Gai Lay as a reserve unit. The 4 CIDG Co's were extracted from their PZ at checkpoint 10 and closed their base camp having finished their phase of the opns.

(1) US LOSSES:

(a) Personnel: 7 KIA, 74 IL.

(b) Equipment Destroyed/Unaccounted for: 2 M101 Howitzers damaged, 2 Starlight Scopes, 4 M60 MG's, 1 90mm RR, 32 M16's, 2 M79's, and 3 .45 cal pistols.

(2) ARVN LOSSES: None

(3) VC LOSSES:

(a) Personnel: 5 VC KIA (17), 73 VC MI (probable) and 80 VC KIA (possible).

(b) Equipment Destroyed: 50-75 rls 82mm mortar, 1 grenade booby trap, and 3 bunkers.

e. Phase V (19 Nov 67): The 3d Air 66 Devils concluded Opn Kien Giang and extracted by helicopter initially from field locations to Dong Tam and the 1st to their respective base camps. The 2nd CP was moved from Gai Lay by motorcade away at 1700H and closed Tan An at 1915H. 2-60 Inf was moved by helicopter from FS/PB area at 0530H and closed Tan Tru at 1500H. 5-60 Inf was moved by helicopter from FS/PB area at 0830H and closed Binh Phuoc at 1915H. B Btry 2-4 Arty was moved by helicopter from FS/PB area at 1215H and closed Binh Phuoc at 1915H. C Btry 2-4 Arty was moved by helicopter from FS/PB area at 1115H and closed Tan Tru at 1630H. D Btry 2-4 Arty was moved by helicopter from FS/PB area at 191345H and closed Tan An at 201530H.

(1) US LOSSES:

(a) Personnel: 12 KIA, 122 IL.

(b) Equipment Destroyed/Unaccounted for: 1 Starlight Scope, 5 .45 cal pistols, 4 M79's, 50 M16's (rifle), 4 M60 MG's, 1 90mm RR, and 2 M101 Howitzers.

(2) ARVN LOSSES: None.

(3) VC LOSSES:

(a) Personnel: US: 21 VC KIA (20), 15 VC KIA (confirmed), 128 VC KIA (probable as verified by soldiers in contact), 30 VC KIA (possible), 1 PW; ARVN: 8 VC KIA (20), 4 PW's, and 6 detainees.

(b) Equipment Destroyed: US: 76 bunkers, 2 huts, 23 booby traps, 50-75 82mm mortar rls, 5 sampans, 6 mil pans and 20 tons of rice; ARVN: 75 booby traps.

(c) Equipment Captured: US: None; ARVN: 3 SM's, 4 lbs of medical supplies, and 10 lbs of documents.

11.(C) Lessons Learned:

a. Operations:

(1) Defensive Considerations:

(a) Items: Day and night combat patrols must be used to clear the area around defensive positions.

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(c) Discussion: Such close in patrols will limit the enemy's ability to observe friendly units defensive posture and will prevent the enemy from sitting close to the perimeter. In addition to combat patrols, carefully planned and executed defensive fires provide an excellent means of harassing the VC and confining close in reconnaissance of defensive positions.

(2) Counterattack:

(a) Item: An aggressive counterattack plan with maximum use of supporting fires must be developed to prevent the enemy from policing the battlefield or regrouping at his leisure.

(b) Discussion: The enemy often after a vigorous and sustained attack will disengage by suddenly ceasing fire. If the friendly units also stop firing, the VC will use the lull in the battle to his advantage to (1) kill friendly wounded, (2) capture equipment and (3) recover his dead, wounded and equipment. This tactic can be stopped by a strong and vigorous counterattack. If the unit has been hit extremely hard a counterattack may not be practical, however, the cost to the enemy of policing the battlefield can be raised by sporadic firing of long range automatic weapons, artillery, JT fire, and armed helicopters on the battlefield to obtain maximum enemy casualties.

(3) Maintaining Contact:

(a) Item: Once contact has been established, pressure on the enemy must be maintained to keep him off balance.

(b) Discussion: The VC are experts in the use of delaying tactics. The situation must be developed rapidly or else the enemy will withdraw leaving a few well placed weapons behind to slow the advance of friendly units. An entrenched enemy is obviously at an advantage over friendly forces maneuvering through open terrain. The enemy can be defeated at his own game, by occupying a defensive position he has given allied forces an opportunity to bring massive supporting fires to bear. Careful consideration must be given to match the fire support available to the target. By employing artillery at the earliest opportunity on the suspected enemy location and likely avenues of escape, friendly units will be able to achieve fire superiority and prevent enemy infiltration. Light fire teams have proven invaluable when firing armed reconnaissance over open areas and likely routes of withdrawal. Smoke, CS or a combination of the two, should be intermixed with the artillery and tactical air preparations on and around the enemy's position to provide maximum cover for maneuver forces. Once fire superiority has been achieved and routes of withdrawal have been cut off friendly forces can commence their maneuver. Although maximum use of daylight is paramount the commander must not let the attack falter when darkness approaches. Units have a tendency to attempt to box the enemy in once darkness has fallen and continue the battle the next day. Although perhaps thought sound in theory, this approach seldom if ever works. Consequently, the commander must continue to press the enemy through the night using artificial light to illuminate the battle area.

(4) Air Fire Plan:

(a) Item: The success or failure of the air fire plan is determined by the amount of detailed planning given to that plan.

(b) Discussion: Bde/Ln S-3 air's must be familiar with (1) type and effects of ordnance, (2) target areas for airstrikes and (3) alternate target areas for airstrikes. Preplanned airstrikes are desirable from the standpoint of efficient utilization, since ordnance can be precisely matched to the target and the mission can be integrated into the operations plan to insure timely accomplishment and lack of interference. The use of numerous preplanned airstrikes does not create problems if (1) the FAC's are briefed on the scheme of maneuver and are assigned specific targets prior to take-off, (2) ground units are prepared to brief the FAC and mark their position, and (3) the JLC and FSC have coordinated use of air, artillery, and armed gunships.

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(5) Artillery Support:

(a) Item: Use of artillery by maneuver units.

(b) Discussion: Friendly units moving toward an objective should employ marching fires and actively recon by fire. This will clear the way for the advancing unit and will provide immediate fire power if a contact develops. Once contact is established, supporting fires should not be lifted. If airstrikes are desired, arty and armed helicopter fires can be shifted to routes of withdrawal, or to the flanks or rear of the enemy. Careful planning by the FSC will enable tactical air to drop their ordnance only seconds after the arty has shifted their fires to likely VC escape routes. The FSC must notify the FSC when the fighters have expended nearly all their ordnance so when the fighters have made their last pass the arty can be shifted back onto the target.

(6) Movement in Irregular Areas:

(a) Item: Irregular areas is hindered due to the ankle to chest deep water, uncharted and uncharted streams and canals that are prevalent in the area.

(b) Discussion: A means of countering this disadvantage is landing elements as close to objective areas as possible and by having the troops carry only those items of equipment that are necessary for the accomplishment of the mission.

b. Signal:

(1) During the first 4 or 5 hours the commander controlled the operation from a C&C ship until the brigade PW CP was established. The Brigade CP was mobile and did monitor all Brigade radio nets on the forward location. During the operation the following radio stations were operated at the Brigade CP's.

- (a) Division Command - FM.
- (b) Division Command - FM (Secure).
- (c) Division Operations and Intelligence - FM (Secure R+T).
- (d) Brigade Command Net - FM.
- (e) Brigade Command Net - FM (Secure) only to Brigade rear and Battalion rear basecamp.
- (f) Brigade Admin and Log Net - FM.
- (g) Brigade Admin Net - FM (Secure R+T) only to Brigade rear and Battalion rear basecamps.

(2) Operations:

(a) Wire Team - Equipment operated by personnel of 3d Platoon "B" Company, 9th Signal Battalion gave the Brigade access to reliable T-C switch board, Relentless Rear, and Hot Line to Division TOC, and 2nd Brigade TOC.

(b) Message Center Section - The Brigade Message Center provided scheduled air messenger service only to Battalions and Brigade log base. Secure MT was available to pass traffic to higher headquarters.

(c) Switch Board and Wire Section - The Brigade switchboard consisted of one SB-22, providing eight (8) local telephone circuits and three (3) trunk circuits. An average of over 400 calls were made per 24 hour period. Only internal wire communications were established.

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(d) FM Radio Section - The primary means of communications with subordinate units was FM radio. The Brigade Command Net (FM) was used to pass all traffic the first 12 hours of the operation but after a considerable amount of staff coordination and the use of the Brigade Admin and Log Net the amount of traffic passed over the command net was reduced tremendously. An automatic retransmission station for the Bde Admin and Log Net was located with the Bde Fwd CP to relay for any unit having difficulty transmitting to the Bde Log Base.

(e) Maintenance Section - 2nd echelon maintenance was available to the communication platoon at the Bde Fwd CP. One radio RT524 and one T-195 radio had to be evacuated to 3d echelon maintenance shop.

(3) Recommendations:

(a) Radios in C&C ship should be checked out 12 hours prior to reporting to requesting unit. This is necessary to allow any technical problems to be taken care of prior to the operation.

(b) Alternate location for retransmission station should be planned for all operations. This will allow the Brigade retransmission station more flexibility in support of other Brigade radio nets.

(c) Reverse SOI's must go forward with Brigade or Battalion CP. The availability of aircraft and the conditions that can prevent aircraft from flying could cause a long delay in getting the reverse SOI flown into a fwd CP when needed.

(d) All (NCS) net control stations and radio retransmission stations must use the antenna T-292 when operating in a stationary position for long periods. (2 or more hours)

(e) The Brigade DS Company (maintenance) should have a signal maintenance team at the Bde Log Base with a capability of direct exchanging major signal items, such as: RT-524, RT-504, TT-76, TT-4, and T-195. On many occasions if these items cannot be repaired within a period of 4-5 hours it can effect the mission of the unit. Furthermore, if this team is co-located at the Bde Log Base, inoperative signal equipment could be evacuated and returned in a much shorter period because of the continuous resupply ships going in and out of the log base.

(f) The Bde S-1 should be issued a radio to operate in the Bde Admin and Log Net. This radio could be taken from the S-5 section. This radio AM/WNC-53 can be better utilized if assigned to the Bde S-1 section.

(g) Four AN/PRC-25 radio's should be kept in the S-3 section to act as back-up equipment for radios in C&C ship. Then if the C&C ship becomes inoperative any other HU-1D helicopter can be used as a C&C ship for the command group.

a. Psyops:

(1) The Psyops Audio - Visual Team, with its organic main equipment displaced to the Tactical Command Post to undertake supervision of the Psyops support and to react to situations which could be successfully exploited on an immediate basis. During the operation, the team was employed in force-to-force Psyops using both projection equipment, loudspeakers and hand-disseminated leaflets. One situation presented itself which could have been exploited immediately with a limited degree of success. This was not accomplished because of a lack of photographic equipment in the field. Such equipment is organic to the infantry battalion, in the form of a Polaroid-Land camera, but is not organic to the Infantry Brigade or supporting Audio-Visual Team.

(2) Recommendations:

(a) Battalions should habitually carry into operational areas the Polaroid-Land camera, for use in immediate reaction situations.

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(b) Security should be planned in advance so that the audiovisual unit is able to enter insecure areas to ply its trade. In the tactical environment, use of this team in a secure village on a recurring basis provides only limited advantage. Far greater benefits are to be derived from operations in an insecure or contested area, both by the message delivery and by the physical presence of GVN/FMAF personnel. To the greatest extent possible, the security element should be Vietnamese.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

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MAJOR, INFANTRY
ADJUTANT

Inclosures:

1-Overlay of Area of Operation

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YR
INTERVALS DECLASSIF-
IED AFTER 12 YRS
DOD DIR 5200.10

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
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SKETCH MAP REFERENCE: MAP 1:50,000
 SHEETS: 6230 III, 6230 I, 6229 IV, 6229 I.



Inclosure 1

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