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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

IN REPLY REFER TO

AGAM-P (M) (14 Nov 67) FOR OT RD 670644

12 November 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Reports-Lessons Learned, [2d Battalion] 94th
Artillery, Period Ending 31 July 1967

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

Operational rept. for quarterly period ending 31 Jul 67.

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation by USACDC in accordance with paragraph 6f, AR 1-19 and by USCONARC in accordance with paragraph 6c and d, AR 1-19. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from Lessons Learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

(11) 8 Aug 67

(12) 20 P.

1 Incl
as

Kenneth G. Wickham

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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 - 2d Battalion, 94th Artillery

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
2D BATTALION 94th ARTILLERY
APO San Francisco 96269

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AVFA-AT-2/94

8 August 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967 (RCS CSFOR-65)

TO: Commanding General
I Field Force Vietnam Artillery
APO 96350

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SECTION I: (C) SIGNIFICANT UNIT ACTIVITIES

1. (U) General--This is the third report of this unit.

a. During the reporting period the battalion has continued to build and improve its base camp position areas. Replacement of sandbag walls around tents is a continuing major project since the sandbags deteriorate in 3-6 months. Improvements of trenches with overhead cover has also continued since all position areas (Camp J.J. Carroll, Dong Ha, and Gio Linh) have been subject to enemy mortar, artillery and rocket attacks throughout the quarter.

b. During the period 9-14 July and Annual General Inspection of the battalion was conducted by the USARV Inspection team. No major problem areas were discovered and an overall rating of satisfactory was received.

c. From 1 May thru 12 June one firing battery was positioned at Gio Linh (YD21257411). There were 81 separate attacks by enemy mortar, rocket and artillery. Equipment losses were moderate but there was 1 KIA and 26 WIA's during the period at Gio Linh.

d. The majority of firing (82%) during this quarter has been in support of Operation High Rise which is the systematic attack of military targets in the DMZ and North Vietnam.

2. (U) Intelligence

a. General. Intelligence functions for this battalion have been normal since the last reporting period.

b. Weather. The weather for this reporting period has been relatively dry. A wouthwesterly wind with an average ground speed of 16 knots accompanied by large amounts of blowing dust has created unfavorable conditions in billet and work areas and has had considerable influence on maintenance of engines operating with air cleaners. Mean daytime high temperature has been 91 degrees fahrenheit.

c. Forward Observers. Ground Observation continues to be a major problem limited by the heavy vegetation and mountainous terrain.

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d. Aerial Observers. Aerial observation continues to be the best method of observation. Weather conditions have been very favorable for flying throughout the period.

e. Meteorological Data. The Metro Section continues to operate satisfactorily providing three 10-line met messages daily.

f. Enemy Attacks. During the reporting period all positions occupied by the battalion have been subjected to attacks by enemy 82mm mortars, 122mm & 140mm spin rockets, 122mm artillery and 85mm recoilless rifles. The following list summarizes the number of incoming rounds by month for each area:

(1) Gio Linh (1 May-12 June 67)		
May:	50 attacks	523 rds all types
June:	31 attacks	498 rds all types
Totals:	81 attacks	1021 rds all types
(2) Dong Ha		
May:	3 attacks	221 rds Rkts & Arty
June:	0 attacks	0 rds
July:	8 attacks	116 rds Arty
Totals:	11 attacks	337 rds
(3) Camp J J Carroll		
May:	2 attacks	37 rds Rkts & Arty
June:	1 attack	2 rds Mtrs
July:	2 attacks	13 rds Rkts
Totals:	5 attacks	52 rds

3. (C) Operational and Training Activities

a. Plans: 3d Marine Division OPLAN 41-67

b. Operations:

(1) Mission: The battalion provides, from positions at Camp J J Carroll (YD063545) and Dong Ha (YD228582), GS to the 3d Marine Division. Direct support for patrols of the 3d Force Recon Battalion is provided as directed by the 12th Marine Regiment. Supporting fires for the Khe Sanh area can be provided on call from Camp J J Carroll. On 29 July 1967, Battery A, 2d Bn 94th Arty moved from vicinity of Chu Lai (BS631851), where it had been attached to the 3d Bn 18th Arty, to a location southwest of Hue (YD619096) and became OPCON to the 1st Field Artillery Group (US Marine Corps). A Battery will provide GS to the 3d Marine Division in the Hue-Phu Bai area.

(2) Operations Supported: The unit has fired continuously throughout the period in support of the following 3d Marine Division Operations.

- (a) Prairie IV (20 April-3 May)
- (b) Crocket (Khe Sanh) (13 May-16 July)

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- (c) Ardmore (Khe Sanh) (17 July-Present)
- (d) High Rise (25 Feb-Present)
- (e) Hickory I (16 May-28 May)
- (f) Cimarron (1 June-2 July)
- (g) Buffalo (2 July-14 July)
- (h) Hickory II (14 July-16 July)
- (i) Kingfisher (16 July-Present)

(3) Organization:

(a) On 1 May the organization of the battalion was as follows: Hqs and Hqs Btry and B Btry were located at Camp J J Carroll, C Btry and Service Btry were located at Dong Ha, and B Btry, 6th Bn 27th Arty (attached) was under the operational control of the Gio Linh Provisional Battalion at Gio Linh.

(b) B Btry, 6th Bn 27th Arty remained under the operational control of the Gio Linh Provisional Battalion until 28 May 1967, at which time it returned to operational control of this battalion.

(c) From 24 April thru 28 May, C Btry occupied a position at Dong Ha (YD228582) under the operational control of the battalion. From 28 May thru 15 June, C Btry was under the operational control of the Gio Linh Provisional Battalion. On 15 June C Btry was returned to operational control of this battalion.

(d) B Btry remained under operational control of this battalion throughout the reporting period.

(e) An organizational chart as of 31 July is attached as .

Inclosure 1.**(3) Capabilities:**

(a) From the Camp J J Carroll position the battalion can support Khe Sanh and fire across the DMZ from the Gulf of Tonkin on the east to coordinates YD775661 in the west. The western 13kms of the DMZ are out of range. The battery at Dong Ha gains some additional range into North Vietnam and also provides fire support for Quang Tri City (YD338532) and fires into the Hai Lang National Forest Reserve to the south.

(b) A Btry 2d Bn 94th Arty from its position (YD19096) can provide support from the South China Sea northeast of Hue to the Laotian border in the west. It can also fire throughout the majority of the A Shau Valley.

(4) Displacements:

(a) B Btry 6th Bn 27th Arty displaced from Gio Linh (YD213741) to Dong Ha (YD228582) on 28 May 1967 to recuperate from the numerous hostile attacks and to perform maintenance on their equipment.

(b) C Btry displaced from Dong Ha (YD228582) to Gio Linh on 28 May 67 to relieve B Btry 6th Bn 27th Arty and continue to fire at extended range into North Vietnam.

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(c) B Btry displaced one platoon from Camp J J Carroll to the vicinity of Ca Lu (YD983543) on 11 June 67 to support a recon patrol near the Laotian border. The platoon returned to Camp J J Carroll on 11 June 1967.

(d) B Btry displaced a platoon from Camp J J Carroll to the vicinity of the "Rockpile" (XD983543) on 13 June 67 to provide fire support for the 26th Marine Regiment near the Laotian border. The platoon returned to Camp J J Carroll on 17 July 1967.

(e) C Btry displaced from Gio Linh (YD213741) to Truc Khe (YD223645) on 12 June 1967, to allow the battery to fire from a safer environment. Prior to the battery displacing permanently, they moved on four different occasions to alternate positions between Gio Linh and Truc Khe for daytime firing.

(f) B Btry 6th Bn 27th Arty displaced from Dong Ha (YD228583) to Camp J J Carroll (YD063543) on 12 June 1967.

(g) C Btry displaced from Truc Khe (YD223645) to Dong Ha (YD228583) on 14 July 1967.

(h) A Btry displaced from Chu Lai (BS631851) to vicinity of Hue (YD619096).

(5) Ammunition Expenditures: The following list shows the number of rounds fired during the quarter, rounds fired into North Vietnam (Operation High Rise) and the cumulative totals since in country:

	<u>TOTAL ROUNDS</u>	<u>HIGH RISE TARGETS</u>
May	10,651	9,275
June	7,932	5,831
July	<u>10,542</u>	<u>9,037</u>
Quarter Total	29,125	24,143
Total in Country	85,494	High Rise Total 47,953

(6) Gun Tubes Expended: Gun tubes have been expended as follows:

May 67 18
June 67 9
July 67 22

Total 49

In Country total 133 (Since 15 October 1966)

c. Training:

(1) Training for the battalion encompassed three phases:

- (a) Individual replacement indoctrination
- (b) Formal unit instruction
- (c) Integrated training

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(2) "Classroom" instruction for the second calendar quarter 1967 stressed the following subjects:

- (a) Military Justice
- (b) CBR Refresher
- (c) Survival, Escape and Evasion
- (d) Prevention of Heat Injuries
- (e) Sentry Duty
- (f) Command Information
- (g) Character Guidance

(3) To assist the batteries, the S3 section provided the lesson plans for all subjects with the exception of Command Information and Character Guidance.

(4) Integrated subjects were incorporated into day-by-day operations as deemed necessary by the battery commanders in such areas as:

- (a) Use of sign and countersign
- (b) Light discipline
- (c) Range estimation, compass and grid azimuths
- (d) Recognition of enemy uniforms
- (e) Communications security
- (f) Map reading

(5) Cannoneer's hop and formal and informal FDC training were also stressed during the period.

(6) During the month of May 1967, the battalion conducted a one week school for twelve (12) enlisted personnel in forward observer procedures and techniques. This instruction provided qualified personnel to man the observation post towers at Camp J J Carroll and Gio Linh.

(7) Familiarization firing. Individual and crew served weapon firing is scheduled once a week. Batteries attempt to send twenty-five percent of their personnel each week to insure all individuals fire once per month. Each individual who performs guard duty is required to fire the M60 MG, M79 Grenade Launcher, and his individual weapon within one week after reporting to the Battalion.

(8) The number of unit training days for this quarter for the battalion is explained and cited in the following manner. Considering formal and informal instruction to include mandatory training subjects, individual batteries averaged the following number of hours per week:

- (a) Headquarters Battery: 10 hours
- (b) Service Battery: 3 hours
- (c) Firing Batteries(3 ea): 6 hours

d. Chemical. CBR refresher training was given to include care and fitting of the protective mask.

e. Psychological Warfare. Not applicable.

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4. (U) Logistics.

a. Support Structure. The battalion remains deployed in northern Quang Tri Province, Republic of Vietnam, under operational control of the 12th Marine Regiment. Army logistical support is furnished by the Da Nang Sub-Area Command (DSAC) through Task Force Pike located at Dong Ha.

(1) Class I & III are requisitioned and drawn from Marine facilities, Fleet Logistical Support Unit (FLSU).

(2) Class II & IV are requisitioned from Da Nang Sub-Area Command through Task Force.

(3) Class V is provided by 1st Log Command and stored in the Marine ASP located at Dong Ha until drawn by this unit.

(4) Medical supplies are requested and drawn from Marine medical facilities at Dong Ha.

b. Support Adequacy.

(1) (a) Class I support is adequate. However, variety and meal planning is hampered in that it is not known what will be available until day of issue.

(b) Ice is authorized on the basis of 2 lbs per man per day. Seldom is this amount received due to an inadequacy of ice making facilities and transportation problem to the class I facility. Further loss of ice results from having to transport the ice in metal GI cans to the batteries 14 miles away. Issue of ice making machines and ice chests which were deleted from this battalions W.BTOC package would eliminate this problem. Ice making machines and ice chests are on requisition.

(2) Class III procured through FLSU at Dong Ha has posed no problems.

(3) (a) Class II & IV support has improved greatly during the quarter. Some difficulty is still experienced in receipt of requisitioned items. DSAC has frequently filled and shipped requested items but they are not received by this unit. Examples are as follows:

1 4 truck, 5 ton M54A2, requisitioned on 7053-1725 was listed as issued by DSAC on 7107; this vehicle has not been received by this battalion.

2 30 each circulating fans were requisitioned on 7107-001. DSAC lists these items as issued on 7154, but they were never received.

3 500 pairs of fatigues, size short small, were requisitioned and listed as issued on 10 June 1967, but were never received.

(b) 1 availability of TM50-901 equipment has improved to the point

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that newly arrived personnel can be fully equipped with all essential items.

2 The slow resupply of WD-1/TT cable (commo wire) has been a problem. Requisitions submitted for this item in January 1967 were filled 31 July 1967.

(4) Class V support has shown improvement and is adequate. Ammunition resupply is initiated by a daily report to DSAC by Task Force. When a prescribed stockage level is reached resupply is initiated by DSAC. Stockage levels have been maintained satisfactorily and no difficulty has been experienced this quarter.

(5) Maintenance Support & Supply

(a) Third echelon support has been outstanding during the past three months. The direct support unit now has a good stock of repair parts in its ASL. In the past some items of equipment were deadlined for two or three weeks waiting parts; this has been reduced to 2-3 days.

(b) Second echelon repair parts have generally been available in all cases. Parts not on hand in PLL or in direct support ASL have been requisitioned and filled rapidly.

(c) Signal repair support continues to be unsatisfactory. In the last quarter report, 23 items of signal equipment were reported as being over 30 days in repair. Since then, all of these items have been requisitioned but only 2 received. As of 31 July, 21 items have been lost to the unit for at least 120 days.

(d) PLL Status. The total number of line items stocked for this reporting period has dropped considerable. This decrease was due to review, and subsequent downward adjustment, by a team called Project Counter. Since that time many of the deleted line item parts have been put back in stock because of experience gained by this unit. As of 31 July 1967, the current status of PLL is as shown in the following table:

Line	Total # of Line Items	% of total at 100% fill	% of total at 50% fill	% of total at 0 balance
1. Artillery	93	37%	36%	27%
2. Auto & Eng	814	26%	35%	39%
3. Signal	29	52%	21%	27%
4. Qtrmstr & Chem	190	38%	35%	27%
5. Total	1,126	29%	35%	36%

Total items Req. 6749

Total items Rec. 2041

% of total items Rec. 38%

Total # of Req validated 1331

Total items cancelled 1404

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95%
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c. Transportation.

(1) TOE vehicles continue to be adequate to provide transportation with the exception of the of the POL capability. 2 trucks mounted with tank and pump units are authorized by the TOEs. These proved unsatisfactory for the following reasons:

(a) Excessive maintenance is required on the pump motor and repair parts are difficult to obtain.

(b) Seams burst on the tanks.

(c) The entire tank assemblies break loose from truck beds.

(2) This problem has been eliminated by the issue, on a 180 day loan basis, of two M49 Tankers, which are sturdier than the POL & Pump unit.

(3) Transportation to the Dong Ha area continues to be by air and sea. These means have been adequate this quarter due to the good weather conditions experienced. Some problems can be expected when the monsoon season and high running seas return in October.

5. (U) Civil Affairs

a. The assigned area of responsibility for Civil affairs remains the same. Since the last reporting period the following has been accomplished:

- (1) Distribution of 200 lbs of food.
- (2) Distribution of 300 lbs of clothing.
- (3) Distribution of 300 bars of soap.
- (4) Construction of one water well.
- (5) Receipt and distribution of two carpenter tool sets

b. MEDCAP continues to be administered by the battalion medical section. Patients treated by the month are:

- (1) May 0 (See Note)
- (2) June 172
- (3) July 151

NOTE: During the month of May this unit was without an interpreter. Consequently, medcap activity was impossible.

c. This battalion has had two vehicular accidents resulting in injury to two Vietnamese citizens. In both cases, solatium payments were made immediately. This action was instrumental in eliminating a claim against the United States Government.

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6. (U) Personnel/Administration

a. There have been minor changes in ADCON and OFCON during the reporting period. The 1st Section, 8th Battalion, 26th Artillery was attached for logistical support and court-martial jurisdiction. A Battery 2d Bn 94th Arty was returned to our ADCON on 29 July 1967.

b. Normal S1 activities have been conducted since the last quarterly report.

c. Strength.

(1) Authorized and assigned strength for the period ending 31 July 1967:

UNIT	AUTHORIZED			ASSIGNED		
	Off	WO	EM	Off	WO	EM
2d Bn 94th Arty	32	4	518	26	4	652
Btry B 6th Bn 27th Arty	3	0	110	4	0	148

(2) Changes during the period:

	GAINS:			LOSSES:		
	Off	WO	EM	Off	WO	EM
2d Bn 94th Arty	4	0	215	7	0	95
Btry B 6th Bn 27th Arty	2	0	23	2	0	26

(3) Casualties during the period include:

TYPE	NUMBER
Killed in action	2
Died of Battle Wounds	0
Wounded in action	36
Missing in action	0
Non-Battle Death	0
Non-Battle Casualties	1

d. Personnel Management. An enlisted infusion program was successfully completed in May to reduce the units rotational hump in September 1967.

e. Morale. The morale of this command is outstanding.

f. P&R program. The following out-of-country P&R quotas have been allocated to the command.

LOCATION	MAY	JUNE	JULY
Bangkok	13	7	12
Hawaii	13	9	9
Hong Kong	8	5	10
Kuala Lumpur	3	2	3
Manila	1	1	2
Penang	2	1	4
Singapore	2	1	1
Taipei	12	7	13
Tokyo	12	7	11
Total	66	40	65 = 171

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g. Decorations and Awards. The following awards and decorations have been presented during the reporting period.

Bronze Star Medal with "V" Device 3
Army Commendation Medal with "V" Device 1
Purple Heart 1

h. Mail. Battalion Mail Clerk picks up mail from APO 96269 and delivers to each battery.

i. Religious Services. Religious services are scheduled and held weekly by Protestant and Roman Catholic Chaplains assigned to adjacent Marine Corps units.

j. Medical. This battalion operates a battalion aid station under the supervision of the battalion surgeon. The following statistics are for the period ending 31 July 1967.

(1) Patient visits (unit personnel)	444
(2) Patient visits (other US Army personnel)	116
(3) Patient visits (US Marine Corps personnel)	42
(4) Admitted to Hospital	25
(5) Evacuated out of country	19

k. Discipline, law and order. Judicial and non-judicial administration.

ARTICLE 15		COURT-MARTIAL		
Btry CO	Bn CO	Summary	Special	General
9	1	0	2	0

l. Education: Approval for the operation of a USAFI Registration Section was received and a USAFI Test Control Officer was appointed during the reporting period. The section has been operational from 24 June-31 July and the following statistics compiled.

(1) Student Interviews	75
(2) USAFI course enrollments	27
(3) Refresher course loaned	23
(4) ES-Gen test applications submitted	29
(5) CCT-Gen Exams applications submitted	6

m. Safety. Recordable accidents are as follows:

1-Vehicle 2-Personnel

SECTION II: COMMANDERS OBSERVATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

PART I Observations (Lessons Learned)

1. (U) Operations

a. ITEM: Displacements

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DISCUSSION: In order for the battalion to accomplish assigned tasks, it has been necessary on a number of occasions for a platoon or firing battery to displace from Camp J J Carroll. To date nineteen displacements have been made to locations as far west as Ca Lu and as far north as Gio Linh. Nine of these displacements involved only a platoon, primarily to support deep recon insertions out of range of the guns at Camp J J Carroll. The 175mm gun has been highly mobile provided bridges along the route are Class 30, gaps in the road or terrain do not exceed 93", and fording depth greater than 42" is not exceeded. It should be noted, however, that when splitting a M107 firing battery into two separate groups, certain problems exist. The TO&S does not allow for two separate fire direction centers and the problems of coordination of organizational and direct support maintenance, ammunition resupply, and messing of personnel are greatly increased. These problems become more acute when key vehicles are deadlined for mechanical reasons.

OBSERVATIONS: It is definitely undesirable to displace a platoon to gain a charge 2 range capability when a battery can accomplish the same mission firing charge 3 from its original position. What over may be gained in tube life is lost in increased support requirements including materiel and personnel. Further, the difference in tube life criteria for charge 2 compared with charge 3 does not compensate for the problems encountered operating a platoon at extended distances from its parent battery. All attempts should be made to maintain 175mm firing battery integrity.

b. ITEM: Direct Fire

DISCUSSION: The 175mm gun is extremely accurate in a direct fire role. The gun has been fired at ranges of 3,000 to 8,000 meters using at different times all three charges with very good results. At Gio Linh, gun crews as a matter of self defense, employed direct fire to suppress hostile fire. Direct firing exercises as well as firing on hostile targets has been accomplished from Camp J J Carroll. If a gun has been laid, the fire direction center can provide initial pointing data through it is not necessary. By using the TFT's to obtain the C factor, and the initial starting elevation, and knowing the mil formula, rounds can be adjusted rapidly and accurately. Direct fire, using charge 2 has been found to be as effective as charge 3 with the advantage of conserving tube life.

OBSERVATION: The use of direct fire is important in Vietnam and all deploying units should be proficient in this area.

c. ITEM: VT Fuzes Bursting on Impact.

DISCUSSION: The battalion continues to experience some difficulty obtaining the desired height of burst with the M514M1 fuze. Procedures in FM 6-40 paragraph 412 were followed and an experience factor of rounding down and subtracting 3 seconds is producing the best overall results. The time of flight scale on the new GFT 175 40(Rov II) H&M 437, Ft Sill, appears to be valid. The possibility does exist that the muzzle velocity of the projectile firing charge 2 or 3, may in some cases, damage the radio activation unit in the fuze. Again, the terminal velocity of the projectile, bad fuze lots, or the angle of fall may be factors contributing to improper functioning.

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OBSERVATION: It would appear that additional testing of the M514M fuze fired with the 175mm projectile at charge 2 and 3 is in order.

d. ITEM: Armor Protection

DISCUSSION: When the battalion was subjected to enemy attacks in the form of mortars, rockets and artillery, it was apparent that a need existed for some type of armor protection. Armor shielding plates are needed on the side of the M107 to provide fragment protection to personnel and easily damaged gun items such as hydraulic lines. On many occasions at Gio Linh, one or more guns would be out of action after an attack until damaged hydraulic lines could be replaced. At times it was necessary for gun section personnel to suppress hostile fire using direct fire. Armor shields would have afforded some degree of protection during the counter fire. In certain daylight attacks when crews were firing a mission, there was no warning of incoming rounds. From the time the sound of the weapon was heard firing, until the rounds landed in their position, personnel had from 1 to 6 seconds to react. Armor shields would have provided some protection.

OBSERVATION: Armor shields could provide personnel protection and would reduce gun damage during enemy mortar, rocket & artillery attacks.

e. ITEM: Changing M-107 Gun Tubes

DISCUSSION: Changing gun tubes on the M-107 is a relatively easy task if all necessary tools & equipment are available. At the present time the Ordnance Direct Support team is required to change all gun tubes. Because of a shortage of support personnel the Battalion Maintenance section frequently assists the support personnel and are thoroughly familiar and qualified to do the job.

OBSERVATION: If the changing of gun tubes on the M-107 was made a 2nd Echelon function, support personnel would have additional time to work on third echelon repair jobs.

f. ITEM: Exercising the M-107

DISCUSSION: During the reporting period most of the M-107 guns of this battalion remained in position for long periods of time and only moved to have tubes changed or displace when ordered. It was found that fewer chassis maintenance problems developed after the gun had been driven several miles. A practice of driving each gun at least 2 miles twice a month was adopted with a subsequent reduction in chassis maintenance problems.

OBSERVATION: Regular exercising (driving) of the M-107 gun prolongs engine life and reduces chassis maintenance problems.

2. (J) Training & Organization

a. ITEM: Training

DISCUSSION: The training required to maintain proficiency in all areas was more extensive than under normal conditions based primarily on the

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large turnover of personnel. Sixty-five percent of the Personnel present for duty on 20 June 1967 were replacements received after the battalion arrived in Vietnam. Although few had any experience with the 175mm gun system, an intensive and aggressive program of orientation, instruction and on the job training by the battalion officers and NCO's precluded any loss of combat effectiveness. Training was divided into three categories: Individual replacement indoctrination formal unit instruction and integrated training. Quarterly training programs were developed by the Battalion S3 Section. The batteries used this program as a guide and scheduled their instructions based upon their operational commitment. On-the-job training was stressed to provide retraining, updating and conversion of individual skill when required. Individual proficiency, unit readiness and material readiness were stressed in all phases of training. The battalion conducted a one week school in May 1967 on forward observer procedures and techniques to furnish qualified personnel for various commitments. Fire direction center sections have held formal and informal training and daily drills to maintain proficiency. The survey section held classes in the field. "Cannoneers Hop" was conducted in each firing battery at least once a week to work on timing, teamwork and procedures.

OBSERVATION: Training is vitally important to the success of any unit, especially when the unit experiences a large turnover of personnel. Training must be aggressive, well organized, and supervised by the chain of command to be effective.

b. ITEM: Organic Air Section

DISCUSSION: The need for an organic air section for each 175mm battalion must be stressed. The battalion was authorized two additional officers to perform the duties of aerial observers. The tactics of the NVA/VC forces and the terrain encountered justifies the need for aerial observers. Targets of opportunity can be spotted in many instances only from the air, since in many areas it is impossible to maintain patrol bases. During mortar, rocket, or artillery attacks, an air observer would be an invaluable asset in locating enemy firing positions. Air observers could also be dispatched to areas when intelligence sources indicate the location of NVA/VC forces. Transportation of the commander or members of his staff to widely separated units in a shorter period by air increases efficiency and allows these personnel more time to lend assistance to projects or interest areas. Aircraft would also play a very important role in the transportation of spare parts for deadlined guns or equipment to widely separated areas. This method of resupply reduces deadline time and increases operational capabilities.

OBSERVATION: The attachment of an organic air section is justified and all efforts should be made to secure this capability.

SECTION III (U) RECOMMENDATIONS

1. (U) Operation

a. It is recommended that armor shields be designed for installation on the M-107 gun to provide crew and gun protection.

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b. Recommend that all M-107 battalions adopt a policy of driving their guns twice a month at least 2 miles.

c. Recommend that ordnance consider the feasibility of allowing battalion maintenance section to change the M-107 gun tubes.

2 (U) Training and Organization

a. It is recommended that all deploying artillery battalions be required to practice and be proficient in firing direct fire.

b. Recommend all 175mm gun battalion be authorized and provided air sections on a priority bases.

Robert H. Kamstra
ROBERT H. KAMSTRA
LTC, Artillery
Commanding

SS

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AVFA-AT-D (8 Aug 67)

1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period
Ending 31 July 1967, (RCS CSFOR-65) (UIC WDNNA) (2d Bn, 94th
Arty) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, I FIELD FORCE VIETNAM ARTILLERY, APO 96350, 28 August 1967

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D.C., 20310

1. Concur in the observations and recommendations contained in the
basic communication.

2. Reference Section I paragraph 4b (3)(a)(1). This truck was re-
ceived by Task Force Pike and issued to the 1st Bn, 40th Arty to replace
a combat loss. The requisition of the 2d Bn, 94th Arty is still valid and
will be issued upon receipt.

3. Reference Section I paragraph 4b (5)(c). In response to mes-
sage, I Field Force Vietnam Artillery, AVFA-AT-E 135086, 18 July 1967
which described signal support problems at DONG HA, the USASUPCOM, QUI
NHON has reacted to improve the situation:

a. Additional radio repairmen and one signal noncommissioned officer
have been reassigned to DA NANG Sub-Area Command to augment repair cap-
ability.

b. A current density and customer listing has been developed
and an adequate maintenance float requisitioned.

c. A courier system has been established to expedite evacuation
and return to user for items being repaired in General Support facilities
at QUI NHON.

d. Liaison has been strengthened between the DNSAC and artillery
units supported.

e. Top priority has been given for the repair of DNSAC signal
equipment in the QUI NHON General Support Shop.

4. Reference Section I paragraph 5b, NOTE. The 2d Bn, 94th Arty
will be advised that interpreters can be obtained as outlined in the
following authorities.

a. USARV Reg 612-6.

b. USARV msg AVHA-RC 40969 DTG 160519Z Dec 66.

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AVFA-AT-D

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period
Ending 31 July 1967, (RCS CSFOR-65) (UIC WDNNA) (2d Bn, 94th
Arty) (U)

c. USARV msg AVHA-MC 01092 DTG 071043Z Jan 67.

d. IFFV msg AVFA-AG B-1847 DTG 041200 Mar 67.

5. Reference Section II part I paragraph 1a. Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam Artillery concur that firing batteries should not be split except in valid emergency situations. Procedures have been established to implement this policy for I Field Force Vietnam Artillery units.

6. Reference Section II part I paragraph 1d. The 2d Bn, 94th Arty has been directed to prepare their recommendations to include specific requirements for armor shields for the M107. This will be forwarded thru channels upon receipt.

7. Reference Section II part I paragraph 1f. This information will be disseminated in a future I FFORCEV Arty Newsletter.

8. Reference Section II part I paragraph 2b. The Commanding Officer 2d Bn, 94th Arty will be advised that the policy established by DA to deploy Combat Support and Combat Service Support units to RVN with aviation sections at zero strength, the present DA moratorium on submission of MTOEs to fill requirements of these units, and the existing shortage of aircraft preclude action at this level to alleviate the problem. CINCUSARPAC has recommended that DA review existing criteria for aviation sections of Combat Support units. Artillery units will be notified when the DA moratorium has been lifted.

9. The requirements outlined in paragraph 12a (1) AR 1-19 will be reemphasized for future reports.

10. 2d Bn, 94th Arty UIC is WDNNA.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl
nc


LEO E. ELLIS
LTC, Artillery
Adjutant

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2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending
31 July 1967, (RCS CSFOR-65)(UIC WDMNA) (2d Bn, 94th Arty)(U)

HEADQUARTERS, I FIELD FORCE VIETNAM, APO 96350

13 SEP 1967

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, APO 96375

Concur with the observations and recommendations of the basic document
as modified by the 1st Indorsement.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl
nc


B. L. CHENAULT
2LT. AGC
Asst Adjutant General

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AVHGC-DST (8 Aug)

3d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending
31 July 1967 (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375

6 OCT 1967

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-OT,
APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the period ending 31 July 1967 from Headquarters, 2d Battalion 94th Artillery (WDNNA-TO) as indorsed.

2. Concur with basic report as indorsed. Report is considered adequate.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl
nc

E. L. Kennedy
E. L. KENNEDY
CPT AGC
Asst AG

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GPOP-DT(8 Aug 67) 4th Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report for the Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967
from HQ, 2d Bn, 94th Arty (UIC: WDNNA) (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558 1 NOV 1967

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310


This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding
indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

1 Incl
nc


K. F. OSBOURN
MAJ, AGC
Asst AG

AS OF 31 JULY 1967



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