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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

(17)

IN REPLY REFER TO
AGAM-P (M) (9 May 68) FOR OT RD 681246

13 May 1968

**SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 173d
Airborne Brigade (Sep), Period Ending 31 January 1968 (U)**

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1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT RD, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.
2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

Kenneth G. Wickham

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

1 Incl
as


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**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 173D AIRBORNE BRIGADE (SEPARATE)
APO San Francisco 96250**

AVDE-SC/AM

15 March 1968

SUBJECT: Corrections on the Brigade Operational Report Lessons Learned

**TO: Assistant Chief of Staff
For Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20310**

Request the following corrections be posted to the 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) Operational Report Lessons Learned for the period 1 November 1967 to 31 January 1968.

a. Section 3 (Intelligence) paragraph a, (2), (b), (Operation BOLLING) page 4, line 5 should read: On 14 December 1967 the Brigade less 1-503d Inf, 2-503d Inf, A-3-319th Arty and B-3-319th Arty returned to Operation BOLLING.

b. Section 4 (Combat Operations for November 1967) page 14, paragraph 4, sentence 3 should read A-1-12th Infantry instead of B-1-12th Cavalry.

c. Section 4 (Combat Operations for December 1967) page 15, paragraph 2, the following should be added: On 2 December the 2-503d Inf received 11 rounds of 122mm rocket fire at FSB 12 (EB 972257); one US Paratrooper was wounded.

d. Section 4 (Combat Operations for January 1968) page 17, paragraph 2: Change all artillery units listed as attached to OPCON.


**F. C. FOSTER
CPT, AGC
Brigade Historian**

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**FOROT RD
681246**

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173D AIRBORNE BRIGADE (SEPARATE)

**OPERATIONAL REPORT
LESSONS LEARNED**

1 November 1967 - 31 January 1968



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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 173D AIRBORNE BRIGADE (SEPARATE)
APO San Francisco 96250

AVBE-SC/MHD

15 February 1968


SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned
(1 November 1967 - 31 January 1968)

THRU: Commanding General
IFFORCEV
ATTN: AVFA-GC-OT
APO San Francisco 96350

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff
For Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C., 20310

The inclosed Operational Report Lessons Learned is forwarded in compliance with USARV Regulation 1-19 and AR 1-19.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



W. L. KVASNICKA
1LT, AGC
Asst AG

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FOR OT RD
681246

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AVBE-SC/MED
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

15 February 1968

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- III. Inclusures
 - ~~1. Roster of Key Personnel~~ Withdrawn, Hqs, DA
 - 2. Brigade Organisation Chart
 - 3. Supply and Combat Services Activities
 - ~~4. Combat After Action Report - "The Battle of DAK TOR"~~ Published separately
as CAAR 67X198

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AM 1040
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

15 February 1968

I. Significant Operational and Support Activities1. Introduction:

This Operational Report Lessons Learned covers the period 1 November 1967 through 31 January 1968. The 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) has continued to conduct operations aimed at locating and destroying Viet Cong, North Vietnamese Forces and installations. The Brigade, as I Field Force's reserve, remained ready to meet any mission required and continued operations in the Brigade's TAOR (Tactical Area of Responsibility). The Brigade's Civic Action Program continued to play a key role in the Brigade's counterinsurgency efforts.

To best accomplish its mission, the 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) conducted three major operations during the reporting period. Operation BOLLING, which commenced 19 September 1967, continued through the months of November, December and January to present. The Brigade's participation in Operation MACARTHUR commenced on 1 November 1967 and terminated 14 December 1967, however, the 1st and 2d Battalions, 503d Infantry remained in the DAK TO/KONTUM area under the OPCON (Operational Control) of the 4th Infantry Division. Operation WALKER (originally named DAZZLE) began 16 January and continued to present.

2. Organization:

The internal structure of the 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) has remained the same during the reporting period except for the detachment of the 12th Team ATAP, 2d Civil Affairs Company on 31 November 1967 by II Field Force's GO 25, dated 11 January 1968. No other units were assigned, attached or detached. For a breakdown of the Brigade strength see paragraph 8, Personnel and Administration. In addition, see Organization Chart (Inclosure 2).

3. Intelligence:

a. The enemy situation before and during each operation conducted by the Brigade during this reporting period is as follows:

(1) Operation MACARTHUR

(a) Enemy Situation Prior to the Operation: Prior to the commencement of the operation the following enemy units were believed to be in the area of interest: 1st NVA Division; 32d NVA Regiment; 66th NVA Regiment; 174th NVA Regiment; 24th NVA Regiment; 40th NVA Artillery Regiment; and the 304th VC Infantry Battalion. The enemy had the capability to:

1. Attack the DAK TO complex with three NVA Regiments supported by the indirect fires of the 40th NVA Artillery Regiment.

2. Defend in battalion strength when contacted by US troops. It was doubtful if he was capable of massing a regimental defense due to US Air and Artillery.

3. Withdraw from the area at the time and place of his choosing;

4. Reinforce the battlefield with the 174th NVA Regiment which was located west of DAK TO in the vicinity of the Cambodian border.

(b) Order of Battle Findings and Summary of the Area of Operation:

1. A Hoi Chanh, who rallied on 2 November at DAK RI

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Village, YB 977220, identified himself as a sergeant from a special reconnaissance element of the 66th NVA Regiment. The rallier stated he was an artillery specialist and that the mission of the reconnaissance element was to reconnoiter and to prepare rocket positions. The Hoi Chanh stated that a major for whom he worked indicated the following attack plan: Elements of the 40th Artillery located NE and SW of DAK TO Special Forces Camp, were to attack the camp and possibly the DAK TO district headquarters. The 66th and 32d NVA Regiments, located south and SW of the Special Forces Camp were to attempt to overrun the camp. The 174th NVA Regiment located approximately 10 kilometers west of DAK SEANG Special Forces Camp was to be in reserve. The 24th NVA Regiment was located 15 kilometers north of DAK TO and had the mission of blocking reinforcements to the camp and preventing friendly forces from evacuating.

2. The mention of the 40th Artillery Regiment by the Hoi Chanh was the first mention of this unit. The 40th Artillery Regiment includes the 200th Artillery Battalion which is equipped with 120mm mortars and 122mm rockets. On 20 November, 2-503d Infantry received 120mm mortar fire to lend credence to the report that the 40th Artillery Regiment was in the area. There were no prisoners or returnees who made mention of this unit. No documents were captured to confirm the presence of this unit in the area of operations.

3. Documents captured 6 November at YB 843203 identified C19, the Reconnaissance Company of the 66th Regiment and also identified elements of the 7th and 8th Battalions of the 66th Regiment. The 66th Regiment was in contact with elements of the 1-503d Infantry and 4-503d Infantry vicinity YB 853187. The 66th Regiment suffered 104 KIA (BC). On 11 November, YB 845185, 1-503d Infantry again engaged elements of the 66th Regiment killing 142 NVA (BC). The 66th Regiment moved to the west into Cambodia after these engagements.

4. On 12 November 1967, the 2-503d Infantry made contact with the 174th Regiment at YB 810151. The contact which lasted approximately 48 hours resulted in 32 NVA KIA (BC). PW's and documents captured 16 November at YB 801151 confirmed the presence of elements of the 174th Regiment. The 174th Regiment fought on Hill 875 with the 2-503d Infantry. Results of the contact on Hill 875: 298 NVA KIA (BC). This action assisted the 32d NVA Regiment, 66th NVA Regiment, and command elements to withdraw from the area of operations and enter Cambodia.

5. Nong Troung 1 - 1st NVA Division is believed to have been directing the operations in the DAK TO area. The confirmation of the 174th Regiment in the area confirms the fact that the 174th Regiment has probably replaced the 88th Regiment in the 1st Division. The 174th has previously been carried as subordinate to the B3 Front. The 88th Regiment has been reported to be operating in DARLAC Province.

(c) Terrain and Weather Analysis:

1. Terrain: The area of operations fell within KONTUM Province. The western boundary was the Cambodian and Laotian borders. The southern most boundary was designated by the YB 09 E-W grid line. The northern most boundary was designated by the YB 40 E-W grid line. The eastern most boundary was the DAK PSI River. The DAK POKO and DAK PSI Rivers are the major drainage systems in the area. The relief of the area is characterized by high mountain ranges interlaced by river valleys and streams. The vegetation is characterized by dense stands of bamboo in the low areas and on the mountain sides with a continuous canopy 40-70 feet high. There are some grasslands and savannah in the area. Major routes into the area are National Highway 14 and Communal Route 512.

2. Weather: The weather during the Battle of DAK TO was characterized by little rainfall or thunderstorm activity. Cloudiness was at a minimum with ceilings from 2000 feet to 5000 feet. Low clouds, bases 3000 to

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SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

5000 feet, cover more than half the area less than 10% of the time. Temperatures ranged from 55-91 degrees.

(d) The following is a list representing the enemy's order of battle:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>ESTIMATED STRENGTH</u>	<u>LAST CONFIRMED LOCATION</u>	<u>DATE</u>
40th Arty	Unknown	Unknown	Nov 67
66th NVA Regt	1700	YB 8418	Nov 67
32d NVA Regt	1700	YB 8516	Nov 67
174th NVA Regt	1700	YB 7416	Nov 67
24th NVA Regt	1300	ZB 0539	Nov 67
200th Arty Bn	Unknown	Unknown	Nov 67
304th VC Inf Bn	300	Kontum Province	Nov 67
1st NVA Div	Unknown	YB 8510	Nov 67

(2) Operation BOLLING

(a) Enemy Situation:

1. Disposition: Since 1 November 1967, the BOLLING Area of Operations has been the site of increased enemy activity. The enemy does not fully control the area around TUY HOA City because of the presence of friendly troops plus an aggressive revolutionary development program which has reduced the hold by the enemy on the population. Recently, reliable agents have reported the following units within the TUY HOA area or close enough to have influence upon the BOLLING Area of Operations. These units are:

- a. Hq, 5th NVA Division
(Total Approximate Strength: 3600)
- b. 95th NVA Regiment
(Total Approximate Strength: 1756)
- c. 4th Battalion/95th NVA Regiment
(Total Approximate Strength: 314)
- d. 5th Battalion/95th NVA Regiment
(Total Approximate Strength: 309)
- e. 6th Battalion/95th NVA Regiment
(Total Approximate Strength: 395)
- f. 18B NVA Regiment
(Total Approximate Strength: 1676)
- g. 95th Artillery Regiment
(Total Approximate Strength: 150)
- h. 30th Main Force (MF) Battalion
(Total Approximate Strength: 250)

SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned

1. 85th Local Force (LF) Battalion
(Total Approximate Strength: 300)
1. K-65 Engineer (Sapper) Company
(Total Approximate Strength: 90)
- k. K-76 Engineer (Sapper) Company
(Total Approximate Strength: 96)

2. Peculiarities and Weaknesses:

- a. The supply system of the enemy flows from west to east and can be best interdicted on the western edge of PHU YEN Province.
- b. The major weakness of the enemy is his inability to maintain contact due to his marginal logistics system.
- c. Recent successes by US troops, 3-503d Infantry, reflects the vulnerability of the NVA to psychological operations. The theme of the psychological operations should be to surrender to the ARVN and the direction of surrender should be given in the broadcast/leaflets.

3. Enemy Capabilities:

- a. Continue to build up their units through infiltration, recruitment and conscription. Recent reports indicate that the 5th NVA Division has received replacements and is nearing the posture to launch offensive operations.
- b. Attack installations and friendly forces in northern central PHU YEN Province with up to 4 combat effective battalions. These 4 battalions would consist of the 3d, 4th and 5th Battalions of the 95th NVA Regiment and the 85th Local Force (LF) Battalion. The 30th Main Force (MF) Battalion is not believed to be presently combat effective. Attack in central and southern PHU YEN Province with the same combat battalions as listed; however, this effort in south PHU YEN could be reinforced by the 18B NVA Regiment. This would bring the strength of the enemy force to 7 combat battalions.
- c. Continue harassment, terrorist and unconventional warfare activities throughout the province. The pontoon bridge at CQ 201351 is a target of particular interest as is the large bridge across the SONG BA River at TUY HOA.
- d. Conduct battalion sized attacks reinforced by local forces on weakly defended district headquarters and outposts.
- e. Reinforce the TUY HOA Valley area with elements of the 18B NVA Regiment within 5 days.

(b) Summary of Operation: During the month of November 1967 the Brigade, less 4-503d Infantry, participated in Operation BOLLING until 5 November. From 5 November 1967 until 14 December 1967, 3-503d Infantry with D/16th Armor continued Operation BOLLING while the rest of the Brigade participated in Operation MACARTHUR. On 14 December 1967 the Brigade less 1-503d Infantry, 2-503d Infantry, A-3-503d Infantry departed Operation BOLLING and moved to AO DAZZLEM near AN KHE. The remaining units continued Operation BOLLING II. During this reporting period of Operation BOLLING, Brigade units were involved in 239 incidents, 140 of which were friendly initiated.

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1. Significant contacts are listed below:

<u>DATE</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>FRIENDLY UNIT</u>	<u>ENEMY FORCE</u>	<u>RESULTS</u>
13 Nov 67	CQ 041471	A-3-503d Infantry	16 VC	8 KIA
16 Nov 67	CQ 074524	D-3-503d Infantry	6 VC	4 KIA
22 Nov 67	BQ 889592	Dong Tre Special Forces Camp (CSF)	20 VC	UNK
22 Nov 67	BQ 926736	Dong Tre Special Forces Camp (CSF)	40 VC	UNK
10 Dec 67		B-3-503d Infantry	3 NVA	3 KIA
15 Dec 67	CQ 016467	A-3-503d Infantry	3 NVA	3 KIA
22 Dec 67	BQ 918792	A-3-503d Infantry	VC Platoon	21 KIA
27 Dec 67	BQ 904791	B&D-3-503d Infantry	VC Company	69 KIA
7 Jan 68	BQ 821790	B-4-503d Infantry	VC Squad	6 KIA
27 Jan 68	BQ 955593	E/20th Infantry (LRRP)	2 VC	2 KIA
30 Jan 68	CQ 156473	C&D-4-503d Infantry	NVA Battalion	77 KIA

2. The Battalion size attack on 30 January 1968 was against the TUY HOA North Airfield occupied by C Battery, 6th Battalion, 32d Artillery. The attack was launched by the 5th Battalion, 95th NVA Regiment. C and D Companies, 4-503d Infantry were committed on 30 January with the 47th ARVN Regiment and Regional Forces and Popular Forces (RF/PF) supporting. Contact continued until 311900 January. Total enemy losses by elements of the 173d Airborne Brigade: 77 NVA KIA (BC), 2 NVA POW.

(c) Terrain and Weather:

1. Terrain: The area of interest is located in PHU YEN Province and is bounded by coordinates BQ 7000, BQ 7060, CQ 1060 and CQ 3000. The eastern boundary is the South China Sea. Three-fourths of the area is mountainous and forested. Most of the remainder of the area is flat land used either for cultivation of rice, or other lowland crops. Along the coast there are rolling hills and sand dunes except where the mountain outcroppings meet the sea. Since most of the area consists of mountains and hills, there is no drainage problem. The major drainage system is formed by the DA RANG or SONG BA River and its tributaries. This river traverses the center of the AO from west to east. (BQ 7039 - CQ 6346). The tributaries flow generally north - south depending upon their location relative to the SONG BA. The river empties into the South China Sea. Vegetation in the plains area is predominantly rice fields. Further inland, dense broadleaf evergreen forest covers the mountain ridges with canopy rising in excess of 80 feet. Interprovincial Route 7B and Route 1 are the main lines of communication in the area.

2. Weather: The month of November, December and January are months of the Northeast Monsoon season in the area of operations. Surface winds during the period will prevail from the north-northeast. Wind speeds range up to 16 knots. Winds gusting to 30 knots may be expected in the immediate vicinity of thunderstorms, along exposed locations during strong northeasterly flow, and area under the influence of typhoons or tropical storms. Calm conditions are observed most frequently during night and early morning hours.

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Precipitation from mid-December to March is light to moderate showers that occur in the mornings in the area of operations. Periods of three to five days without rain are common during the period. Cloudiness during the period includes considerable cloudiness in the mornings with ceilings below 1000 feet common in the exposed valleys. In general, the afternoons along the coast are partly cloudy with most clouds above 2000 feet. The major effect of clouds on operations will occur during the early or mid-morning hours in the exposed coastal area. Temperatures will range from 80 to 70 degrees along the coast and from 88 to 60 degrees in the interior. Relative humidities are high throughout the year. Mean monthly relative humidities are within the range of 70 to 90 percent. In the northeast monsoon the humidity along the northeast coast is about 91 percent.

(d) The following is a list representing the enemy's order of battle:

<u>UNIT & STR</u>	<u>SUB-UNITS</u>	<u>DATE & LOCATION</u>	<u>WEAPONS</u>
5th NVA Div (FWD) STR: UNK	95th NVA Regt 18B NVA Regt	Unlocated	N/A
5th NVA Div (MAIN) STR: Approx 2960	95th NVA Regt 18B NVA Regt Support Units	BQ 877238 (Div HQ) 1 Dec 67	See subordinate units
95th NVA Regt STR: 1756	4th Bn 5th Bn 6th Bn 95th Arty Bn	BQ 947595	6-82mm mortars 60mm mortars 6-12.7mm AAMG's 75mm RR's B-40 RL's K-51 rifles K-56 rifles AK-47 rifles SKS's 4-50cal HMG's LMG's 6-DKZ's
4th Bn/95th Regt STR: 314	1st Co 2d Co 3d Co 4th Co	CQ 055628 22 Nov 67	15-MG's 27-AR's 6-82mm mortars 3-RR's 27-B-40 RL's 27-T65 (GL)
5th Bn/95th Regt STR: 309	5th Co 6th Co 7th Co 8th Co	CQ 0146 20 Nov 67	15-MG's 27-AR's 9-SMG's 6-82mm mortars 3-RR's 27-B-40 RL's 27-T65 (BL)
6th Bn/95th Regt STR: 395	9th Co 10th Co 11th Co 12th Co	CQ 30487 1 Dec 67	4-M1945 MG's 3-75mm RR's 3-82mm mortars 9-MG's (Chicom) 27-B-40 RL's

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UNIT & STR	SUB-UNITS	DATE & LOCATION	WEAPONS
30th MF Bn STR: 250	1st Co 3d Co 5th Co 7th Co 9th Co	BQ 9236 1 Dec 67	3-60mm mortars 4-12.7mm MG's 3-57mm RR'S 2-B-40 RL's Various Small Arms
85th LF Bn STR: 300	DK-2 Co DK-4 Co DK-6 Co DK-8 Co or (poss 1st thru 5th Co)	Unlocated	81mm mortars 60mm mortars 57mm RR's HMG's 30cal MG's Individual wpns
K-65 Engr (Sapper) Co STR: UNK	Co's UNK Poss 5 Co's	Unlocated	3-BAR's 9-B-40 RL's 15-AK-47's 24- CKC's 75 Kilo TNT Hand grenades
K-76 Engr (Sapper) Co STR: UNK	UNK	Unlocated	AK-47's CKC's AR's B-40 RL's BAR's Ea plt has 20 anti-per mines Co has at least 150 kilo of TNT at all times.
377B LF Co STR: UNK	UNK	Unlocated	UNK
95th Arty Bn 68th Regt STR: Approx 150	H-14 Co 7th Co 8th Co	Unlocated	4-120mm mortars 4-75mm RR's 20-SMG's 21- AK-47's 37-SKS's

(3) Operation WALKER (Also called DAZZLEM)

(a) Enemy Situation before the Operation: The deployment of a one battalion size task force for defence of AN KHE/Camp Radcliff area occurred 17 January 1968. Although the enemy possesses the capability of launching a regimental size attack against Camp Radcliff, the probability is unlikely. However, the enemy is expected to continue limited size attacks against Camp Radcliff, the VINH TRANH CIDG Camp and Highway 19. The enemy in the past has experienced a good deal of success in conducting mortar and recoilless rifle attacks against Camp Radcliff. The enemy now has 122mm rocket capability. In recent months contacts with VC company, platoon and squad size elements have been reported in the Camp Radcliff area and in the outlying TAOR. Additionally, enemy elements in battalion strength have recently been reported as moving through the TAOR and/or preparing to conduct offensive operations against installations in the TAOR. The enemy has the capability to:

1. The enemy can conduct a limited ground attack on Camp Radcliff supported with crew served weapons.

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2. The enemy can conduct attacks on isolated posts with at least a company size force.

3. The enemy can conduct isolated mining, sabotage and terrorist activities against outposts within the AO along Highway 19.

(b) Significant contacts which have occurred during the reporting period are listed below:

At 0100 hours on 26 January 1968, Perimeter D Ring BR 484448 was penetrated by an estimated VC platoon. AN KHE Airfield was attacked by 60mm mortars and ground forces of the H-15 VC LF Battalion. Results: 13 VC KIA (BC), 1 NVA PW WIA.

(c) Terrain: Generally, the AO is two high river valleys defined by the IA KROM and DAK AYUNH Rivers and by three mountain ridges: KONG GRANG on the west, CHU TOMACH in the central portion of the AO and the high mountains along the PLEIKU-BINH DINH Province border. Average elevation of the river valleys is between 500 - 700 meters. The high hills have an average elevation of 1200 meters. The vegetation of the river valleys is primarily composed of two multi canopied dense undergrowth forest and single canopied light undergrowth forest. The dense undergrowth is found on the more rugged mountainous terrain. The light undergrowth forest is predominate throughout the river valleys. Highway 19 is the principle road in the area. It is an all weather loose surface road, two to three lanes wide. Highway 19 runs east - west through the center of the AO. The other roads in the area are unimproved dirt roads, useable only during fair weather.

(d) The following is a list representing the enemy's order of battle:

UNIT & STR	SUB-UNITS	LOCATION	WEAPONS
407th Sapper Bn STR: 300	1st Co, AKA 41st, K40 2d Co, AKA 42d, K50 3d Co, AKA 3d, D60 4th Co, AKA 44th, K70(82mm mortars) 5th Co, AKA 45th, K80	PLEIKU Province	3-81mm mortars 2-60mm mortars 3-57mm RR's 3-B-40 RL's 26-AK-47's 46-CKC carbines 9-RPD LMG 2-Auto rifles
H-15 LF Bn STR: 400	C1 Co, AKA 316 C2 Co, AKA 317 C3 Co, AKA 318 C4 Co, AKA 319	PLEIKU Province	82mm mortars 60mm mortars 75mm RR's MG SMG Small arms
5th Bn 95B Regt STR: UNK	UNK	UNK	UNK
124th Mortar Co STR: UNK	UNK	UNK	4-82mm mortar
D-26 LF Co STR: 87	UNK	Southwest of AO DAZZLEM	UNK

b. Enemy personnel losses for the reporting period were as follows:

	<u>OPN BOLLING</u>	<u>OPN MACARTHUR</u>	<u>OPN WALKER</u>	<u>BRIGADE TOTAL</u>
NVA/VC KIA (BC)	283	740	13	985
NVA/VC PW	29	11	2	42
Civil Defendants	126	0	0	126
Ralliers	0	1	0	1
Returnees	31	0	0	31
NVA/VC KIA (POSS)	30	44	1	75

c. Enemy equipment/supplies/installation losses for the reporting period were as follows:

	<u>OPN BOLLING</u>	<u>OPN MACARTHUR</u>	<u>OPN WALKER</u>	<u>BRIGADE TOTAL</u>
<u>WEAPONS</u>				
AK-47 rifles	7	62	0	69
AK-50 rifles	1	6	0	7
SKS	14	20	0	34
M16	0	3	0	3
CAR-15	0	1	0	1
Carbines	10	2	1	13
SMG	0	13	0	13
Pistols	3	0	0	3
Misc Small Arms	22	89	3	114
RPD-2 MG	0	6	0	6
LMG	0	4	0	4
HMG	0	1	0	1
B-40 Rkt Launcher	0	8	0	8
RPG Rkt Launcher	0	10	0	10
60mm Mortars	0	3	0	3
82mm Mortars	0	1	0	1
122mm Rkt w/launcher	0	1	0	1
<u>AMMUNITION, MINES and EXPLOSIVES</u>				
Small Arms Rounds	3617	4255	106	7978

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	<u>OPN BOLLING</u>	<u>OPN MACARTHUR</u>	<u>OPN WALKER</u>	<u>BRIGADE TOTAL</u>
Hand Grenades	166	298	2	466
Rifle Grenades	0	47	0	47
M-79 Rounds	25	0	0	25
60mm Mortar Rounds	0	235	0	235
82mm Mortar Rounds	39	27	0	66
60mm Fuses	0	32	0	32
B-40 Rockets	8	13	0	21
RPG-2 Rockets	0	16	0	16
12.7mm Rounds	0	80	0	80
57mm RR Rounds	0	1	0	1
Mines, AT	2	27	0	29
CBU	0	2	0	2
Explosive, lbs	16	24	0	40
Blasting Caps	1	0	0	1
Bangalore Torpedoes	4	0	0	4
105 Howitzer Rounds	3	0	0	3
Butterfly Bomb	1	0	0	1
<u>INSTALLATIONS</u>				
Huts	103	18	0	121
Firing Positions	0	36	0	36
Bunkers	177	24	0	201
<u>FOOD</u>				
Rice, lbs	11576	3891	0	15467
Corn, lbs	145	0	0	145
Beans, lbs	20	0	0	20
Bananas, lbs	5	0	0	5
Peanuts, lbs	120	0	0	120
Salt, lbs	155	0	0	155
Cows	17	0	0	17
Chickens	11	0	0	11

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	<u>OPN BOLLING</u>	<u>OPN MACARTHUR</u>	<u>OPN WALKER</u>	<u>BRIGADE TOTAL</u>
Pigs	12	0	0	12
Mica Food, lbs	200	0	0	200
<u>MISCELLANEOUS</u>				
Field Kitchen	0	1	0	1
Shovel	1	2	0	3
Canteens	8	8	0	16
Machetes	1	2	0	3
Clothing, lbs	204	26	0	230
Rucksacks	58	36	3	84
Ponchos	18	3	0	21
Binoculars	3	2	0	5
Web Gear, lbs	7	53	0	60
SA Magazines	5	22	0	27
Medical Supplies, lbs	15	4	0	19
Morphine, Bottles	2	2	0	4
Carrying Bags	8	0	0	8
Civilian Radio	3	0	0	3
Commo Wire	3	0	0	3
Sampans	6	0	0	6
Plows	11	0	0	11
Rice Polishing Machines	4	0	0	4
Grinding Machine	1	0	0	1
VN Piasters	\$11,955	0	0	\$11,965
Chemical Detection Set	0	1	0	1
Field Telephone	0	2	0	2
Gas Mask	0	3	0	3
Uniforms	9	10	3	22
Shovels	0	7	0	7
Helmets, Steel	0	3	0	3
Compass	0	2	0	2

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	<u>OPN BOLLING</u>	<u>OPN MACARTHUR</u>	<u>OPN WALKER</u>	<u>BRIGADE TOTAL</u>
Radio, Type 71B (Russian)	0	1	0	1
Tripod, 82mm Mortar	0	1	0	1
M-16 Magazine	20	15	0	35
Knives	1	1	0	2
Cooking Utensils	3	0	0	3

4. Combat Operations:

General: The Brigade continued to conduct combat and Revolutionary Development (Civil Affairs and Civic Action) operations designed to locate and destroy Viet Cong/NVA Forces, logistical installations and to further reduce his hold on the Vietnamese people.

November

The 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) minus the 3d Battalion, 503d Infantry and Company D/16th Armor disengaged itself on orders and deployed by air from Operation BOLLING in the TUY HOA area to Operation MACARTHUR in the DAK TO area of the CENTRAL HIGHLANDS. The Brigade (-) conducted search and destroy operations in the II CORPS TACTICAL ZONE, vicinity of DAK TO during the month of November (Operation MACARTHUR). The 3d Battalion, 503d Infantry with D/16th Armor and supporting Brigade elements conducted search and destroy operations (Operation BOLLING) in the II CORPS TACTICAL ZONE, vicinity of TUY HOA during the month of November.

On 31 October, the 4-503d Infantry and Battery B, 3-319th Artillery were alerted while on operations west of TUY HOA to prepare for movement to the DAK TO/DAK SEANG area north of KONTUM in the CENTRAL HIGHLANDS. The Brigade had previously been in this area on Operation GREELEY which had terminated on 14 October 1967. Intelligence sources had indicated that a large NVA force was poised north of the KONTUM area and planned assaults on Special Forces and CIDG forces would center around the DAK TO/DAK SEANG area. At 1100 hours, 1 November, Task Force 4-503d Infantry departed TUY HOA for KONTUM by C-130 aircraft and closed DAK TO by 1715 hours the following day. The 4-503d Inf and B-3-319th Arty then came under the operational control of the 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division and began operations in AO FALCON around Fire Support Base (FSB) #12. Search and destroy missions were conducted on the 3d, 4th and 5th but the battalion made no significant contact. Meanwhile, on 5 November, the remainder of the 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) (-), prepared for deployment to the DAK TO area in accordance with instructions received the night before. Beginning at 0750 hours, the 1-503d Inf and C-3-319th Arty were lifted out of AO GANDER directly to the airfield at TUY HOA SOUTH. These units were then airlifted into KONTUM. Throughout the rest of the day, the 2-503d Inf and A-3-319th Arty continued to lift from their AO back to PHU HIEP.

By the morning of the 6th, the situation around DAK TO was such that the lift of the 2-503d Inf and other Brigade elements was diverted directly to DAK TO. The 1-503d Inf companies helilifted to FSB 12 and the trains came by road from KONTUM to the DAK TO area, positioning one company at FSB 13 and the Battalion (-) at FSB 12, relieving the 4-503d Inf.

On 6 November, D-4-503d Inf and 3 platoons from A-4-503d Inf made contact with an estimated NVA company while moving overland from FSB 13 towards Hill 823 (YB 853187). The contact lasted from approximately 1300 hours until 1800

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hours resulting in 7 US KHA and 19 US WHA. Enemy losses were set at 40 NVA KIA and 50 NVA KIA (POSS). During the same day B-4-503d Inf conducted a heliborne assault on Hill 823 at 1430 hours after extensive artillery and TAC Air preparation. They made heavy contact with NVA forces shortly afterwards and attacks on their hilltop perimeter lasted throughout the night. C-1-503d Inf helilifted from FSB 12 to Hill 823 at 1300 hours closing at 1345 hours. They became OPCON to the 4-503d Inf. That day B & C-4-503d Inf and C-1-503d Inf swept the hillside and investigated an enemy base camp at YB 853187. Total results from Hill 823 were as follows: 86 NVA KIA (BC), 1 NVA POW, 54 small arms captured, 4 crew served weapons, 6 rocket launchers, 200 small arms rounds, 210 Chicom grenades captured. US losses were 9 KHA, 15 WHA. For the next few days the Brigade conducted search and destroy operations with minor contact.

On 11 November, at 0830 hours, A-1-503d Inf engaged an estimated NVA company at YB 845185 receiving heavy machinegun and mortar fire. D & D-4-503d Inf moved to reinforce A Company and made heavy contact with an estimated NVA battalion (YB 825184). Both C & D-4-503d Inf received mortar fire. Countermortar fire was initiated. C-4-503d Inf (OPCON to 1-503d Inf) linked up with C & D-4-503d Inf and captured 2 NVA POW's. A-1-503d Inf remained in contact until 1630 hours. Cumulative results. Enemy casualties - 142 NVA KIA (BC), 2 NVA POW's. US casualties were 20 US KHA, 154 US WHA and 2 US MHA.

On 12 November, A-1-503d Inf made contact with 6 or 7 NVA in bunkers (YB 835183) resulting in 6 NVA KIA (BC). US casualties: 3 US WHA. Weapons captured: 2 AK-47 rifles, 1 SKS carbine, 1 field telephone, 1 flare gun, 1 tripon for 12.7mm AA machinegun and 30 rounds of 12.7mm ammunition. A-2-503d Inf made heavy contact (YB 810151) with an estimated company size force dug in. At FSB 16 (YB 814155) B-2-503d Inf was attacked by elements of the NVA company and brought under mortar attack. C-2-503d Inf reinforced B-2-503d Inf and the enemy broke contact. Results: 4 NVA KIA (BC). US losses: 1 US KHA, 36 US WHA.

On 13 November, 1-503d Inf located 51 NVA bodies, 1 B-40 rocket launcher, 1 carbine, 11 AK-47 rifles, 4 RPG machineguns and 5 SKS rifles at YB 825185 as a result of the contact on 11 November. 2-503d Inf made contact with an estimated NVA company west of FSB 16 at YB 808149. The contact lasted two hours resulting in 10 US KHA, 20 US WHA and 6 US MHA with enemy casualties unknown. C-2-503d Inf was attacked by an unknown size enemy force at YB 815150 which broke contact after an hour with negative friendly casualties.

During the period 14 through 18 November, the battalions continued search and destroy operations. NVA elements engaged during this period were either platoon size or smaller. Paratroopers continued to find NVA bodies and equipment as a result of the 11 - 13 November contact. During this period Brigade elements located or killed 37 NVA, captured 4 POW's and had 1 CHIEU HOI surrender. A total of 27 small arms, 7 B-40 rocket launchers, 3 SKS rifles, 9 AK-47 rifles, 70 small arms rounds, 30 grenades and one 12.7mm AA machinegun with 50 rounds of ammunition, 7 rifle grenades, 11 60mm mortar rounds and 2 USSR carbines were captured.

On 18 November at 1400 hours, A-1-503d Inf made contact with an estimated company size force at YB 803160 and was reinforced by C & D-1-503d Inf. A-1-503d Inf fought off several successive platoon size attacks and received rocket fire causing casualties. Air and artillery supported. At about 1900 hours, all firing ceased. Results: 2 US KHA, 26 US WHA and 2 US MHA. Enemy casualties were 51 NVA KIA (BC). At 1045 hours, a MIKE Special Forces company under the operational control of the 2-503d Inf, made contact on the southern slopes of Hill 875 (YB 797-133). As a result of this contact, the 2-503d Inf was diverted and ordered to assault Hill 875 on the morning of 19 November.

After artillery and air preparation, the 2d Battalion assaulted Hill 875 with C & D-2-503d Inf abreast with A Company covering the rear and flanks. At 1100 hours, while advancing in column, the two lead companies made contact with

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well camouflaged NVA in bunkers and trenches. The two companies pushed forward slowly against heavy small arms, machinegun, B-40 rocket and 57mm recoilless rifle fire, while A Company kept the rear and flanks secure and began preparation of an LZ at the bottom of the hill. At 1430 hours, a two company NVA force attacked the rear and flanks of A Company, forcing them up the hill into D and C Companies perimeter. D and C Companies disengaged from the front and helped repel the attack from the rear. That night a misplaced bomb fell on the CP, killing and wounding many. 1LT Bart O'Leary, although wounded and temporarily deaf, took command of the battalion. Total casualties for the day were 46 US KHA, 71 US WHA and 32 US MHA. Enemy casualties were 51 NVA KIA (BC). Three helicopters were shot down while supporting this action.

The next morning the 2-503d Inf underwent a short mortar attack. B-4-503d Inf departed FSB 16 on foot with A & C-4-503d Inf following as a relief force. At 1700 hours, after a round about advance to avoid ambush, B-4-503d Inf linked up with the 2d Battalion. A & C-4-503d Inf linked up the 2-503d Inf later in the evening after dark. Casualty figures for the 20th were: 36 US KHA, 41 US WHA and 17 US MHA. Enemy losses were 39 NVA KHA (BC). Two helicopters were shot down while supporting this days action.

The 2-503d Inf began to extract wounded from the battle area on 21 November. Artillery and airstrikes were directed onto Hill 875 throughout the morning and early afternoon. At 1500 hours, B-4-503d Inf with A Company supporting its left flank and C Company supporting its right flank, assaulted the hilltop. After several hours of bitter fighting, darkness forced the paratroopers to withdraw for the night. Casualties for the day were 7 US KHA, 45 US WHA and 20 US MHA. Enemy casualties were undetermined.

During the entire day of 22 November, artillery and TAC Air pounded Hill 875. Elements of B-4-503d Inf located a total of 73 NVA bodies and a small amount of enemy equipment. B-1-12th Cavalry conducted a combat assault onto an LZ at YB 800127. From there they began movement towards Hill 875.

At 1109 hours, 23 November, the three companies from the 4-503d Inf again assaulted Hill 875. By 1140 hours, after fighting through sniper and mortar fire, they had taken the top of the hill. D/1-12th Cav also assaulted the hill and linked up with the 4-503d Inf by 1153 hours. During the afternoon, the 4-503d Inf received mortar fire resulting in 7 US KHA and 28 US WHA. Total results for Hill 875 are as follows: 298 NVA KIA (BC), 60 grenades, 34 small arms, 3 B-40 rocket launchers, 1 82mm mortar, 1 60mm mortar, 6 B-40 rockets, 30 60mm mortar rounds and 14 82mm mortar rounds captured. US losses were: 107 US KHA, 282 US WHA and 10 US MHA for the entire period of the battle of Hill 875.

From 24 November through the end of the month, the Brigade's elements continued to conduct search and destroy operations in their assigned area of operation. On 27 November, A-3-319th Arty received 25 to 30 82mm mortar rounds resulting in 1 US WHA. Other than this, there was negative significant contact. Brigade elements continued to find NVA bodies and equipment as a result of the months contacts.

The 3-503d Inf and D-16th Armor continued Operation BOLLING. During BOLLING the Brigade was involved in 40 incidents, 28 of which were friendly initiated. Most contacts during the period were with squad size or smaller elements. Contact was made on 13 November at CQ 041471 by A-3-503d Inf with a 16 man VC force. B-3-503d Inf engaged 6 VC at CQ 074524 on 16 November. The DONG TRE Special Forces Camp CSF engaged 20 VC at CQ 889592 and 40 VC at BQ 962736 on 22 November. Enemy losses for the month of November are as follows: 8 NVA/VC KIA (BC), 17 NVA/VC KIA (POSS), 2 NVA/VC POW's, 3 Civil Defendants, 4 Returnees and 1 AK-50 machinegun captured. The 3-503d Inf and D-16th Armor continued search and destroy operation on Operation BOLLING in the TUY HOA area.

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Security in the Brigade Rear Area (AN KHE) was provided by the 173d Support Battalion. Operations during the month were supported by 256 TAC sorties and 127 FAC missions, dropping a total of 981 tons of ordnance. Supporting artillery (3-319th Arty and B-2-19th Arty) fired a total of 1,474 missions expending a total of 46,429 rounds of ammunition. The Brigade Aviation Platoon (Casper), 335th Assault Helicopter Company (DS), 52d Aviation Battalion (GS), 4th Aviation Battalion (GS), and the 1st Cavalry Division (Arimobile) supported all operations. A statistical breakdown of their activities follows:

<u>Types of Missions</u>	<u>Sorties</u>
Combat Assault	943
Armed Helicopter	402
Resupply	3934
Command and Liaison	1119
Aerial Reconnaissance	98
Psychological Operations	0
Aerial Observer	126
Total Hours Flown	3653
Total Passengers	22500
Total Tons of Cargo	3700

Operations during the month of November resulted in the following VC/NVA and friendly casualties:

<u>VC/NVA Losses</u>	<u>US Losses</u>
KIA (VC) 720	KHA 192
KIA (POSS) 40	WHA 642
Returnees 4	MHA 15
Ralliers 1	Non-Battle
Detainees 12	Injured . . . 33

December

During the month of December, the 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) (-) continued Operation MACARTHUR in the II CORPS TACTICAL ZONE. From 1 - 14 December 1967 the Brigade (-) conducted operations west of the DAK TO area in KONTUM Province in the CENTRAL HIGHLANDS, while the 3-503d Inf and D-16th Armor continued Operation BOLLING in the vicinity of TUY HOA.

During the period 1 - 14 December the Brigade (-) maintained intermittent contact in the DAK TO area with small groups of NVA who usually fled to avoid contact. On 1 December, LRRP Team E engaged an unknown size enemy force (vic YB 866326) resulting in 3 NVA KIA (BC) and 3 AK-47 weapons captured. FSD 12 received 9 mortar rounds, wounding 2 men early in the morning of 2 December. After the mortar attack the enemy managed to avoid contact with searching paratroopers until 9 December when LRRP Team A ambushed an 8 man VC patrol at YB 964288, resulting in 5 VC KIA and 5 weapons captured. The next day D-1-503d Inf made contact with an estimated NVA platoon near YB 832296. Artillery and mortars were fired in support and the NVA broke contact leaving one dead behind. At dusk (1850 hours) 12 December, 173d Airborne elements at DAK TO (elements of the Support Battalion, 4-503d Inf and 3-319th Arty) received 20 - 30 incoming mortar rounds killing 3 and wounding four. Artillery was fired in return and airstrikes were called with unknown results. On 14 December the Brigade (-) returned to PHU HEIP leaving the 1-503d Inf and 2-503d Inf in the DAK TO/KONTUM area under the operational control of the Commanding General, 4th Infantry

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Division. The 3-503d Inf, 4-503d Inf and Camp Strike Force units OPCON to the Brigade continued search and destroy operations in their area of operations. D-16th Armor conducted convoy security between TUY HOA and VONG RO and acted as Brigade reaction force. Brigade elements maintained daily contact with VC/NVA forces operating in the TUY HOA/PHU HEIP area, however, the enemy was almost always found in small groups, seldom larger than squad size. The largest enemy contact took place 27 December when the 3-503d Inf conducted a four company combat assault into the mountainous area north of the SONG KY LO River. C-3-503d Inf completed its assault at 0911 hours into an LZ in the vicinity of BQ 874790. They were preceded by airstrikes and artillery. C Co received fire on the LZ and engaged the enemy with unknown results until they were extracted at 1553 hours. B-3-503d Inf made a combat assault into an LZ at BQ 883808 which also was prepared by air and artillery. They moved south and made light contact with 3 VC. D-3-503d Inf came into their LZ (BQ 903793) at 1120 hours. As they moved north they came under fire from the northeast, east and southeast. D Company returned fire and was supported by air and artillery initially killing 5 NVA. B-3-503d Inf was moved south to support and closed on D Company at 1700 hours. A-3-503d Inf assaulted into an LZ (BQ 900784) at 1200 hours and immediately received fire from the west, east and south. One helicopter making the final approach received heavy fire, landed on the LZ and burned. A Company called in air and artillery support and after forming a perimeter they cleared the surrounding woodlines of snipers and knocked out three bunkers on the eastern side of the LZ in a brisk fire fight. The enemy was estimated to be one company. D-4-503d Inf (the Brigade Reaction Force) conducted a combat assault into an LZ (BQ 918775) at 1437 hours and moved to reinforce A-3-503d Inf. The enemy conducted hand grenade and harassing attacks against the different companies perimeter during the night. The enemy broke contact and the 3-503d Inf continued search and destroy operations. Results of the contact on 27 and 28 December were: US; 12 KHA and 36 WHA. Enemy; 69 VC/NVA KIA (BC). Operations during the month of December 1967 were supported by 496 TAC sorties and 185 PAC sorties. A total of 1100.25 tons of ordnance was dropped by Air Force fighter bombers. Supporting artillery (3-319th Arty) fired a total of 699 missions and expended 14,562 rounds. The Brigade Aviation Platoon (Casper) supported all operations. A statistical report of their activities follows:

UH-1D Missions

Sorties Missions

Resupply	800 . . .	341
Command and Control	1175 . . .	400
Maintenance	250 . . .	152

Total Hours Flown	600
Total Passengers	666

OH-13 Missions

Sorties Missions

Command and Control	1986 . . .	375
Maintenance	265 . . .	165

Total Hours Flown	555
Total Passengers	245

Total 7.62mm ammo expended 23,900 rounds

Operations during the month of December 1967 resulted in the following VC/NVA and friendly casualties:

VC/NVA Losses

US Losses

KIA (BC)	111
KIA (POSS)	0

KHA	19
WHA	52

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VC/NVA Losses

Civil Defendants . . . 42
Returnees 1
POW 16

US Losses

MHA 0
Non-Battle Dead . . . 0
Non-Battle Injured . . 15

JANUARY

During the month of January 1968, the 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) (-) continued Operation BOLLING in the vicinity of TUY HOA on the coast of the South China Sea and in the mountain area in the vicinity of DONG TRE Special Forces Camp. Task Force POWERHOUSE composed of the 1-503d Inf, 2-503d Inf, A-3-319th Arty and B-3-319th Arty commanded by Colonel John J. Powers Jr. (Deputy Brigade Commander) remained in the KONTUM area of the CENTRAL HIGHLANDS under the operational control of the Commanding General, 4th Infantry Division.

In January the Brigade maintained a TAC CP at DONG TRE to direct search and destroy operations with the 3-503d Inf and 4-503d Inf. USSF's CSF companies conducted search and destroy operations and local security of rice harvest operations. Task Force MITCHELL (D-16th Armor and E-17th Cav) conducted local security and convoy security as required. B-5-27th Arty and A-6-32d Arty were attached to the Brigade on 2 January 1968. Brigade elements maintained daily contact with NVA/VC forces operating in the area, however, the enemy was almost always found in small groups, seldom larger than squad size. Throughout the month, Brigade elements uncovered enemy rice supplies and small base areas; numerous NVA/VC were killed in small skirmishes. IFFV's Company E, 20th Infantry LRRP (attached to the Brigade) under the direction of the Brigade S2 deployed it's LRRP teams almost daily for reconnaissance and intelligence missions. B-5-27th Arty and A-6-32d Arty left Brigade attachment on 10 and 17 January respectively, while C-6-16th Arty was attached to the Brigade from 10 January to 21 January 1968. On 11 January C-4-503d Inf, 2 CSF Companies armed propaganda platoons (TUY HOA), elements of the 172d MI Detachment, 173d Airborne Brigade and one platoon of the 173d Engineer Company conducted a cordon and search of the PAU XAUN 1 Village (BQ 9071). The operation screened 1150 personnel and evacuated 39 suspects to TUY HOA for interrogation. Under instructions from IFFV the 3-503d Inf deployed from the TUY HOA area to AN KHE assuming responsibility for the base defense of CAMP RADCLIFF and operations in AO DAZZLEM. The deployment was designated Operation WALKER. Operation BOLLING continued with the Brigade minus its units involved in Operation WALKER and those OPCON to the 4th Inf Div. At 0100 hours a platoon of the H-15 VC LF Battalion supported by 60mm mortars penetrated the perimeter D Rong (BR 484448) at Camp RADCLIFF and attacked the AN KHE Airfield. The 3-503d Inf's reaction force killed 13 VC (BC) and captured 1 POW. The next day, 27 January, the 173d Airborne Brigade's LRRP platoon departed PHU HEIP for AN KHE and became OPCON to the 3-503d Inf. C-4-503d Inf received 20 - 25 rounds of mortar fire on their night laager site (CQ 017491) while conducting a search and destroy operation. Countermortar and artillery was fired with unknown results. At 0410 hours 30 January, C-6-32d Artillery requested a reaction force to assist in defending their FSB located at the TUY HOA North Airfield (vic CQ 152482). D-4-503d Inf moved in by helicopter and cleared the FSB and then became heavily engaged with an NVA force in a village to the south. D-4-503d Inf later reinforced by C-4-503d Inf and supported by elements of the 47th ARVN Regiment, encircled the village and after heavy fighting and airstrikes the village was taken on 31 January. The NVA unit (5th Battalion, 95th NVA Regiment) suffered over 200 KIA in the two day battle; the 173d Airborne Brigade was credited with 77 of the NVA KIA. Operations during the month of January 1968 were supported by 223 TAC sorties, 257 FAC sorties. A total of 353.75 tons of ordnance was dropped by Air Force fighter bombers. Supporting artillery (3-319th Arty and attached units) fired a total of 946 missions expending 12,412 rounds. The Brigade Aviation

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Platoon (Casper) supported all operations. A statistical report of their activities follows:

<u>UH-1D Missions</u>	<u>Sorties</u>	<u>Missions</u>
Resupply	845	303
Command and Control	1180	402
Maintenance	175	85

Total Hours Flown	690
Total Passengers	930

<u>OH-13 Missions</u>	<u>Sorties</u>	<u>Missions</u>
Command and Control	1500	433
Maintenance	223	169

Total Hours Flown	473
Total Passengers	400

Total 7.62mm ammo expended: 25,349

Operations during the month of January 1968 resulted in the following VC/NVA and friendly casualties:

VC/NVA Losses

KIA (FV) 120	KHA 28
VC/NVA PW 15	WHA 108
	MHA 3
	Non-Battle Dead . . . 0
	Non-Battle Injured . .22

5. Training:

a. During the reporting period the 173d Airborne Brigade continued to conduct jungle warfare training of newly arrived replacements. In the past three months the jungle school has occupied a new site, rebuilt the present physical plant and constructed a complete VC/NVA base camp that is used in conjunction with the jungle warfare course. The VC/NVA base camp demonstrates VC/NVA mines and boobytraps, boobytrap detection and searching techniques employed in VC/NVA base camps. All students are required to negotiate a boobytrapped trail and clear a VC base camp and tunnel system of boobytraps. A breakdown of personnel trained by month follows:

- (1) November 16 Officers 627 Enlisted Men
- (2) December 10 Officers 527 Enlisted Men and an additional 40 enlisted men from the 1st Logistical Command.
- (3) January 10 Officers 124 Enlisted Men and an additional 79 enlisted men from other units.

b. Captain Paul H. Davin took over as commandant of the Brigade's Jungle School on 11 December 1967.

c. Depending upon the availability of aircraft, the weekly field operation has included an airmobile assault.

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6. Psychological Operations and Civic Actions

a. November:

(1) Revolutionary Developments: On the 2d of November through the 6th of November, crops were gathered and harvested by refugees from the village of PHU SEN near TUY HOA. From (6) six to eight (8) 2 1/2 ton trucks were used during the above dates to transport the refugees from TUY HOA North Refugee Center to the area where the crops were harvested. The crops harvested and the food gathered by the refugees is listed below:

Rice	21,000 lbs
Corn	4,000 lbs
Potatoes	800 lbs
Bananas	400 lbs
Peppers	150 lbs
Barley	120 lbs
Tobacco	50 lbs

(2) Psychological Operations: A total of 3,566,000 leaflets were dropped in the 3-503d Inf's AO for this month. Approximately seven hours of psychological warfare tapes were also played during the month.

(3) Civic Action:

(a) MEDCAP treated a total of 1,840 patients.

(b) Distribution for the month of November was as follows:

Rice	11,000 lbs
Corn	600 lbs
Potatoes	500 lbs
Soda (Fertilizer)	100 lbs

b. December:

(1) Psychological Operations: A total of 4,510,000 leaflets were dropped in the Brigade AO during the month. Approximately 10 hours of Psy Ops tapes were played in conjunction with the leaflet drops.

(2) Civic Action:

(a) MEDCAP treated 995 patients in PHU YEN Province.

(b) 500 pounds of food and 20 pounds of clothing were distributed to refugees at CHOP CHI Refugee Center on 25 December.

(c) 100 lbs of captured rice was returned to GVN control.

c. January:

(1) Psychological Operations: A total of 12,907,000 leaflets were dropped in the Brigade AO during the month and approximately 114 hours of Psy Ops tapes were played in conjunction with the leaflet drops.

(2) Civic Action:

(a) MEDCAP treated 1,107 patients.

(b) 30 pounds of food and 50 lbs of clothing were distributed to RF/PF dependents at DONG XUAN District Headquarters and 15 lbs of clothing

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were distributed to refugees at CHOP CHI Refugee Center.

(a) MEDCAP treated 1,107 patients.

(b) 30 pounds of food and 50 lbs of clothing were distributed to RF/Pf dependents at DONG XUAN District Headquarters and 15 lbs of clothing were distributed to refugees at CHOP CHI Refugee Center.

(c) 400 lbs of captured rice was returned to GVN control.

(3) Construction: Two bridges and 6 culverts were repaired and constructed. One school yard was built and 13 kilometers of road repaired.

7. Logistics During the reporting period, the Brigade's logistical capabilities have been required to split three ways and furnish logistical support to the DAK TO/KONTUM area, AN KHE and the TUY HOA areas. The logistical posture continued to remain excellent. Tactical operations were supported by air and land line of supply. A logistical summary by classes of supply is furnished by month in Inclosure 3. Logistics operations during the Battle of DAK TO (Operation MACARTHUR) are inclosed in paragraph 15 of Inclosure 4.

8. Personnel and Administration:

a. Personnel

(1) Brigade Casualties:

	<u>Battle Casualties</u>			<u>Non-Battle Casualties</u>	
	<u>KHA</u>	<u>WHA</u>	<u>MHA</u>	<u>DIED</u>	<u>INJURED</u>
November	192	642	19	0	33
December	19	52	0	0	15
January	<u>28</u>	<u>108</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>22</u>
TOTAL	239	802	22	0	70

(2) Brigade Strength:

AUTHORIZED AND ASSIGNED STRENGTH

	<u>AUTHORIZED</u>				<u>ASG 1 NOV 67</u>				<u>ASG 31 JAN 68</u>			
	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>AGG</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>AGG</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>AGG</u>
Assigned Units	291	31	4859	5181	300	45	4831	5176	316	43	4865	5224
Attached Units	12	2	34	48	15	1	36	52	13	2	40	55
Aggregate	303	33	4893	5229	315	46	4867	5228	329	45	4905	5279

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GAINS AND LOSSES BY MONTH

	NOVEMBER 1967				DECEMBER 1967				JANUARY 1968			
	OFF	WO	EM	AGG	OFF	WO	EM	AGG	OFF	WO	EM	AGG
Gains	17	0	374	391	80	4	875	959	55	3	161	219
Losses	18	1	360	379	28	5	475	508	27	5	337	369
NET	-1	-1	+14	+12	+52	-1	+400	+451	+28	-2	-176	-150

(a) During the reporting period the assigned units authorized increased. The increase was due to HHC, Bde; 17th Cav and 1st, 2d and 4th Bn's 503d Inf being reorganized under the "F" series MTOE in early Dec 67. Support Bn and 319th Arty being reorganized under the "F" series MTOE in mid Jan 68.

(b) During the reporting period the attached units authorized strength did not change.

b. Discipline, Law and Order

(1) The discipline in the Brigade has been excellent during the reporting period. No stragglers were reported.

(2) During this quarter there were 9 General Court Martials, 15 Special Court Martials and 317 Article 15's.

(3) Assistance from the Brigade IG was readily available throughout the reporting period.

c. Development and Maintenance of Morale

(1) Finance: The Brigade Finance Section (Company A, Administration) continued to provide financial support throughout the reporting period. Newly arrived replacements were made aware of the Soldiers Savings Program and the various allotments available to them through orientation and various newsletters.

(2) Chaplain: During the reporting period there were 624 religious services conducted (all faiths with a total attendance of 15,992).

(3) Special Services:**(a) Tours and Shows:**

1. November	0
2. December	0
3. January	0

(b) Rest and Recuperation: Brigade R&R allocations during the reporting period were as follows:

	<u>November</u>	<u>December</u>	<u>January</u>
Vung Tau (incountry)	42	55	66
Hawaii	77	79	68

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	<u>November</u>	<u>December</u>	<u>January</u>
Bangkok	46	74	84
Hong Kong	53	53	61
Tokyo	32	34	19
Taipei	19	54	70
Singapore	9	21	14
Kuala Lumpur	5	13	12
Manila	10	13	11
Penang	7	16	17
Australia	<u>21</u>	<u>21</u>	<u>59</u>
TOTAL	267	378	410

(5) There were a total of 1,632 awards for valor and meritorious service during the reporting period. A breakdown follows:

APPROVED AWARDS AND DECORATIONS

	<u>November</u>	<u>December</u>	<u>January</u>
Distinguished Service Cross	4	0	0
Silver Star	1	0	15
Legion of Merit	5	0	2
Distinguished Flying Cross	2	13	0
Bronze Star Medal (Valor)	2	28	276
Bronze Star Medal (Merit/Achievement)	31	98	216
Air Medal (Valor)	0	0	15
Air Medal (Service)	80	0	113
Soldiers Medal	2	0	0
Army Commendation Medal (Valor)	12	5	194
Army Commendation Medal (Merit/Achievement)	57	47	156
Purple Heart	<u>2</u>	<u>120</u>	<u>38</u>
TOTAL	198	311	1025

9. The 51st Chemical Detachment of the 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) provided chemical support on a standby basis when ever requested by elements of the Brigade. The following missions were accomplished.

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a. Herbicide Missions:

DATE	METHOD	AREA	TARGET	SORTIES	AMOUNT
17 Nov 67	UH-1	AO SPAATZ (FSB 16)	Hill (BQ 813154)	One	55 Gal
27 Nov 67	UH-1	AO SPAATZ (FSB 12)	Stream (BQ 870260)	One	55 Gal
30 Nov 67	UH-1	AO SPAATZ (FSB 12)	Stream (BQ 870260)	One	55 Gal
9 Dec 67	UH-1	AO Bolling	Rice	Two	100 Gal
19 Dec 67	UH-1	AO Bolling	Rice	One	50 Gal
20 Dec 67	UH-1	AO Bolling	Rice	One	50 Gal
23 Dec 67	UH-1	AO Bolling	Rice	One	50 Gal
28 Dec 67	UH-1	AO Bolling	Rice	One	50 Gal
29 Dec 67	UH-1	AO Bolling	Rice	One	50 Gal
2 Jan 68	UH-1	AO Bolling	Crops	One	100 Gal
3 Jan 68	UH-1	AO Bolling	Rice	One	100 Gal
6 Jan 68	UH-1	AO Bolling	Rice	One	100 Gal
14 Jan 68	UH-1	AO Bolling	Rice	One	50 Gal
29 Jan 68	UH-1	AO Walker	Grass	One	100 Gal
30 Jan 68	UH-1	AO Walker	Grass	Two	150 Gal

b. Flame Throwers: The chemical detachment assisted the chemical staff specialist of the 4-503d Inf in preparing flame throwers and thickened fuel for the offensive employment of flame on Hill 875.

c. Riot Control Agent CS:

(1) A riot control agent CS-1 (micro-pulverized) bag drop was flown on 20 Jan 68 using one UH-1 helicopter. Fifty 8 pound bags of CS-1 were dropped on an abandoned village (vicinity BQ 904760). Gunships suppressed the area immediately after the bag drop with unknown results.

(2) On 30 Jan 68, a gunship team reported an NVA platoon located in a village (vic CQ 156473). D-4-503d Inf sent an element to check out the village and become heavily engaged with the NVQ platoon in the village. At 0943 hours, D Company reported having a "horse-shoe" around the village. At 1146 hours, 10 cases of CS hand grenades rigged for employment from UH-1 aircraft were dropped on the village and an estimated 30 NVA broke out of the village to the northwest. Gunships were used as the NVA fled. 77 enemy KIA were counted after contact was broken.

(3) The E-8, Tactical CS Launcher were test fired by 4-503d Inf at their FSB on 26 Jan 68 with excellent results. The E-8 was also used effectively during the operation listed in (2) above.

d. Personnel Detector Program:

(1) Personnel detector missions were flown in support of Operation

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BOLLING from 17 Dec 67 to 31 Jan 68.

(2) One manpack personnel detector and operator was sent to AN KHE to support Operation WALKER on 26 Jan 68.

(3) Two manpack personnel detectors and one operator supported the ROK Tiger Division (vic QUI NHON) on 24 through 26 Jan 68.

e. Fougasse Mines: On 30 Jan 68, a program from employing fougasse mines around the perimeter at Camp Radcliff, AN KHE was initiated.

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II. Commander's Observations and Recommendations:

During the operational period, various lessons were learned. These lessons learned were drawn from all the operations which occurred during the period extending from 1 November 1967 through 31 January 1968.

1. ITEM: Air and Artillery Support

OBSERVATION: The NVA presses the attack in contacts apparently attempting to hug the US forces to avoid the US artillery and air support. Air and artillery are of great value blocking fires, but can be used as close-in support only at a high risk to friendly forces.

DISCUSSION: The effectiveness of air and artillery support is limited when units engage in close contact. When it is determined that you are engaged with a substantial enemy force that cannot be overrun, pull back with your wounded to a safe distance where you can adjust air and artillery support. Units must insure that they carry an adequate number of smoke grenades to mark friendly positions.

2. ITEM: Control of Artillery and Air Support

OBSERVATION: When the tactical situation permits, there should be a coordination meeting between ground commanders, artillery liaison personnel and Forward Air Controllers to incorporate tactical air into artillery fire support plans. Artillery must frequently be called off to permit airstrikes. In addition, there is a tendency in heavy contact to initially regard all indirect fire as friendly fire. This frequently results in elements requesting a check fire of mortars and artillery depriving friendly units of their supporting fires.

DISCUSSION: Closer coordination is essential for proper fire planning which allows TAC Air and artillery to be employed simultaneously.

3. ITEM: Enemy Fortifications and Tactics

OBSERVATION: The NVA utilized reinforcing trenches and tunnels to their bunkers which provided protection from direct fires. Their bunkers had extensive overhead cover (5 - 8 feet) allowing them to display determined resistance to air and artillery preparation fires, and enabling them to survive and put up a strong defense after bombardment. The NVA will also attack from these fortified positions.

DISCUSSION: Bunkers which are considered neutralized should not be bypassed until they have been thoroughly checked for reinforcing tunnels. Because of the extensive overhead cover utilized, more emphasis is placed on munitions with delayed fuse assemblies.

4. ITEM: Snipers and Tree Positions

OBSERVATION: The NVA uses tree positions to their advantage even when pressing the attack. The use of this technique gives them the capability of preventing resupply or evacuation missions.

DISCUSSION: Emphasis must be placed on defensive measures designed to locate, engage and destroy enemy snipers. CBU bomb clusters are effective against snipers in trees but should not be used unless friendly forces have overhead cover.

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5. ITEM: NVA Tactics

OBSERVATION: The NVA demonstrated a tactic designed to separate elements of a unit with the objective of a decisive defeat. When a friendly unit encountered a fortified position, it could expect a sharp assault from the flank or rear. The NVA continually probed unit flanks and rear to develop weakness which might be exploited. Upon discovery, enemy flanking forces would attack only when success was apparent. This tactic allowed the NVA to "hug" friendly forces, which practically nullified the effect of indirect fires and TAC Air.

DISCUSSION: Units must be constantly aware of this tactic, which if successfully implemented by a strong enemy force, could result in heavy friendly casualties. Commanders must be prepared to react and decisively defeat this enemy tactic. Constant physical security must be maintained to the flanks and rear even during offensive maneuvers and after contact had been established. Additionally, the commander should avoid decisive combat when adequate tactical air and artillery fires are available to destroy the enemy force or when preparing for future offensive actions. The tactic of immediately pulling back forces each time the situation arises must be weighted against the possibility of backing into a well-planned enemy ambush.

6. ITEM: Specialized Training

OBSERVATION: Use of Flame Throwers, LAW and satchel charges was restricted because of inadequate training in these areas.

DISCUSSION: Frequent specialized training is needed in the attacking of bunkers and fortified positions. Included in the use of flame throwers, CS, satchel charges and LAW.

7. ITEM: Use of Marking Smoke for Helicopters

OBSERVATION: On several occasions, the NVA mortared friendly positions when smoke was used to mark positions or to assist in the identification of helicopter landing zones. When smoke was not employed, mortar attacks were not received even though helicopters were landing and taking off.

DISCUSSION: The use of smoke to mark positions and assist in the identification of helicopter landing zones should be restricted to an absolute minimum when the enemy has a strong mortar or rocket capability.

8. ITEM: Mixing of Thickened Fuel and Servicing of Flame Throwers

OBSERVATION: Difficulty will be experienced in using M1 Thickener if debris is allowed to mix with the gas and thickener during preparation.

DISCUSSION: Plans and coordination for future use of flame throwers should include the mixing of thickened fuel and servicing of flame throwers at locations which provide favorable conditions.

9. ITEM: The Lack of an Adequate Arrival Airfield Control Group (AACG)

OBSERVATION: The lack of an adequate Arrival Airfield Control Group (AACG) at DAK TO during the deployment phase resulted in less than acceptable effectiveness in the reception of the units, unloading aircraft and clearing units from the airfield.

DISCUSSION: An Arrival Airfield Control Group organization should be developed and it should be included in the advance part of future deployments.

10. ITEM: Initial control of Hook and LOC Pads by Pathfinders

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OBSERVATION: Initial control of Hook and LOC pads by pathfinders from 4th Infantry Division proved unsatisfactory. Resupply loads were constantly sent to wrong units and Back Hauls were dropped off at wrong locations.

DISCUSSION: Control of LOC Pads should be planned and coordinated in advance. The predominate user should have primary control of the pads with other users assigning representatives to control group.

11. ITEM: Heavy Dust at Dustoff Pad and LOC Pads

OBSERVATION: Heavy dust at dustoff pad and LOC pads caused safety hazards as well as physical discomfort to personnel living and working in the area. The pads were constantly oiled which suppressed the dust to some extent.

DISCUSSION: Since dust cannot be competely suppressed, helicopter resupply and dustoff pads should be located separate from each other and away from dusty roads in the area. Constant effort must be made to keep pads oiled.

12. ITEM: FSA GRREG was reluctant to accept ARVN and CIDG KIA's

OBSERVATION: FSA GRREG was reluctant to accept ARVN and CIDG KIA's which caused some delay in processing KIA's. KIA's continue to be delivered to the clearing station instead of GRREG collecting point. This situation interfered with treating WIA's as well as having an adverse effect on WIA's.

DISCUSSION: All units and aviation elements must be notified of GRREG collection point.

13. ITEM: Shortage of Litters and Blankets

OBSERVATION: Co B (Med) experienced a shortage of litters and blankets when supporting hospitals failed to make direct exchange.

DISCUSSION: Continuous coordination with supporting hospitals is necessary to insure a direct exchange of like equipment.

14. ITEM: Inadequate Medical Coverage

OBSERVATION: Inadequate medical coverage was experienced initially due to late arrival of medical personnel and equipment.

DISCUSSION: Early deployment of a clearing station elements is necessary to provide immediate medical support.

15. ITEM: Float Howitzer

OBSERVATION: 3-319th Artillery had been deployed 36 hours before a needed float howitzer was available.

DISCUSSION: In future operations, a float howitzer should deploy with the artillery contact team. The contact teams should always deploy with the major element of the Artillery Battalion.

16. ITEM: Stopping to Fire Artillery

DISCUSSION: It is not generally a good idea to stop a unit which sights a small group of enemy in order to fire artillery on the enemy. Inevitable, the enemy will break contact completely while the clearance for artillery takes place. We have not had a single occasion when small groups of enemy was taken under fire which did not result in the enemy's escaping without a trace.

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17. ITEM: Use of High Drag Bombs

DISCUSSION: High Drag Bombs are much more effective than Low Drag Bombs and are less likely to cause casualties to friendly troops when close employment is required.

18. ITEM: Use of Air Strikes in Villages

DISCUSSION: Air strikes used against villages and hard targets should use M117 or M82 wall to wall. CBU, napalm and small bombs, though effective against troops above ground will not neutralize troops in typical villages honey-combed with tunnels and bunkers. These will withstand the effects of lighter ordnance.

19. ITEM: Use of CS against Dug-in Villages

DISCUSSION: CS smoke and munitions are effective initially to reduce the rate of enemy fire against assaulting troops, when entering fortified villages. The CS will rapidly disperse, however, perhaps due to the heat from burning huts and artillery fires. It should not be depended upon to make the enemy move out of his holes. Enemy soldiers have been known to "eat" CS without moving at all and then recover to fight effectively within a few minutes, even in areas where CS will partially debilitate friendly troops when they remove their masks.

20. ITEM: Ambushing of Previous Laager Sites

DISCUSSION: It has been found effective to ambush laager sites with stay behind patrols or LRRP's. The enemy moves into them to dig food and supplies out of the sumps and is then very susceptible to ambushes.

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AVFA-GC-OT (15 Feb 68) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending
31 January 1968 RCS CSFOR-65 UIC WARJFF 173d Abn Bde (U)

HEADQUARTERS, I FIELD FORCE VIETNAM, APO 96350 10 MAR 1968

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHQC-DST,
APO 96375

This headquarters has reviewed the 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1968 and concurs but makes the following comment in the interest of clarity. The item, Control of Artillery and Air Support, found in Inclosure 4, page 31, Commander's Analysis and Lessons Learned, should read, "In order for artillery and air to be employed simultaneously during combat operations it is essential that coordination between the commander, artillery liaison personnel and forward air controllers be close and continuous."

FOR THE COMMANDER:



ROBERT C. GABBARD

1LT, ADC

ASST ADJUTANT GENERAL

Copy furnished:

2 - ACSFOR, DA, Wash DC 20310

AVHGC-DST (15 Feb 68)

2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned (1 November 1967 - 31 January 1968)

HEADQUARTERS, US ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 21 MAR 1968

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,
APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1968 from Headquarters, 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) (WARLAA) as indorsed.

2. Concur with report as indorsed. Report is considered adequate.

3. Correct UIC (WARLAA).

4. A copy of this indorsement will be furnished to the reporting unit through channels.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

4 Incl
nc


C. S. NAKATSUKASA
Captain, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Copy furnished:
HQ, I FFORCEV
HQ, 173d Abn Bde (Sep)

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GPOP-DT (15 Feb 68) (U) 3d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 173d Abn Bde (Sep) for Period
Ending 31 January 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 25 APR 1968

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in the report as indorsed.


FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:



C.L. SHORTT
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

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ORGANIZATION: 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate)



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1. November:

a. Supply:

(1) Class I: Operations in Class I remained the same except for the fact that the Brigade went for a five day period without "A" rations due to the tactical situation and the destruction of the ration break-down point by an ammo dump fire.

(2) Class II & IV: The significant problem areas were in obtaining sufficient TA 50-901 to outfit a large influx of replacements. Sufficient quantities were not on hand in the base camp area. Information from the 1st Logistical Command stated that a central issue facility would be available in the base camp area.

(3) The Brigade has experienced a loss of large amounts of equipment due to combat action. A communications problem between the Brigade and 14th ICC Headquarters prevented timely replacement of these items.

(4) Class III: Normal operations to include the establishment of a JP-4 fueling point in the Brigade CP area and at FSB 12.

(5) Class V: The Brigade experienced a small problem in losing the Ammunition Supply Point operated by the FSA as a result of enemy mortar fire. The Brigade had to establish its own ASP with little advance notice.

b. Maintenance:

(1) The maintenance and care of the Handset, H-189, FSN 5965-069-8886 continues to be a problem in the Brigade. This item shows an extensive degree of abuse and neglect in handling by organizational personnel. This handset had been in critically short supply. The common failures are:

- (a) Broken Handle
- (b) Missing Microphone Element
- (c) Missing Earphone Element
- (d) Missing Microphone Mouthpiece
- (e) Missing Receiver Transmitter Cover
- (f) Missing Switch
- (g) Missing Connector
- (h) Cut Cable

(2) Antenna (FSN 5820-889-3803) continues to be a critical item. In addition, extensive deadline is also being experienced on the radio transmitter PRR-9 and PRT-4 due to repair parts.

(3) Significant projects accomplished during the month of November are as follows:

(a) A 100% inventory and location survey of the ASL of Company "D", 173d Support Battalion was initiated. This was necessary due to the condition of the stock when it was received from BEIN HOA.

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(b) A PLL was developed for several items of signal equipment and submitted to the organizational maintenance facilities during November.

(d) A maintenance class on the maintenance, operation, maintenance of records and repair parts supply has been developed for the units on generators.

c. Medical: Casualty figures for the month:

(1) KIA	192
(2) KBNRHA	2
(3) IRHA	483
(4) IBNRHA	23
(5) MIA	4
(6) Malaria	59

2. December:

a. Supply:

(1) Class I: The Class I supply was normal during the period with the exception of sporadic supply of ice cream and ice. Due to the limited capacity of the ice plants in the PLEIKU Area, the authorized quantity of six pounds per man per day has not been met. The Brigade in the DAK TO and KONTUM areas has been receiving less than two pounds per man. Ice cream supply has been almost non-existent in the DAK TO and KONTUM areas. The inoperation of the PLEIKU plant and lack of suitable storage and transport facilities were the reasons given by the supply source. "A" ration meals have been available for three meals a day when operations permitted their preparation.

(2) Class II & IV: The supply of Class II & IV equipment and clothing was less than desirable during the month of December. Problems encountered were the lack of fill on combat loss replacements of Command Controlled equipment and the relocation of the majority of the Brigade units. The recent movement of the 1st Logistical Command Headquarters and the 14th ICC resulted in a lack of response by these Headquarters. The split of the Brigade operating elements into two locations placed a heavy burden on the support elements.

(3) Class III: Normal operation.

(4) Class V: Normal operation.

b. Maintenance:

(1) The maintenance of electronic equipment continued to be a critical problem during December. The repair of the AN/VSC-2, PRR-9 and the PRT radios were deadlined long periods of time due to lack of repair parts, tools and test equipment and trained personnel.

(2) The Computer, Gun Directional M18 was issued to the 3d Howitzer Battalion, 319th Artillery during the month. The maintenance company does not have tools or trained repair personnel authorized in its TOE. This item was also issued without a unit PLL and ASL. A modification of Company D 173d Support Battalion has been requested.

(3) The ASL and units PLL zero balance continued to increase. Company D, 173d Support Battalion had only received fills on 02 and 05 requisitions.

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(4) Long deadlines were experienced on the following end items:

(a) Generators of all types.

(b) Communication and electronic equipment.

c. Medical: Casualty figures for the month:

(1) KIA 19

(2) KBNRHA 0

(3) IRHA 52

(4) IBNRHA 19

(5) MIA 0

(6) Malaria 33

3. January:

a. Supply:

(1) Class I: Rations were supplied to the Brigade from three locations during the month. Elements of the Brigade in the BOLLING AO drew from the TUY HOA Sub Area Command Ration Breakdown Point. Elements in the CORREGIDOR AO drew rations from the 173d Class I Field Breakdown Point. These rations were line hauled from PLEIKU Sub Area Command to KONTUM. After the movement of the Task Force Powerhouse to PLEIKU, units drew from the 4th Infantry Division Ration Breakdown. Base Camp Elements to include the 3-503d Infantry drew rations from the AN KHE Ration Breakdown which was co-operated by the 1st Cavalry Division and the 173d Airborne Brigade.

(2) Class II & IV: Class II support was furnished all Brigade units from AN KHE Base Camp by shipment to each of the AO's. Class IV was supplied from TUY HOA Sub Area Command and PLEIKU Sub Area Command. Combat loss replacements remained the major supply problem. The dispersed operations the Brigade has been involved in contributed to difficulty in responsive support and property accountability.

(3) Class II & IIIA: Class III activities were more complicated than usual due to the multiple AO's that required POL dispensing equipment and personnel. The operation in AO BOLLING alone required refueling in three locations causing a strain on personnel and equipment.

(4) Class V: The newly assumed mission of the DAZZLEM AO and Camp Radcliff defense resulted in the Brigade exceeding the ASR for 40mm and 81mm ammunition. Successive attacks on the Base Camp and the penetration of the perimeter resulted in a very high usage rate on these items.

(5) The necessity of providing support personnel and equipment in three locations has spread the resources extremely thin. There are many positions in the supply platoon where there are only one or two personnel and it is difficult to split them three ways and maintain effectiveness. The overall support however was considered good during the month.

b. Maintenance:

(1) Eight helicopters (UH-1H) were received in the Brigade during the month. These were to be exchanged for the UH-1D models. The UH-1D's have undergone PE's and are ready to be turned in.

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(2) Aircraft maintenance personnel received training on the LOH and the UH-1H. Additional schooling is planned during the month of February and March.

(3) The supply of repair parts continued to improve slightly. A corresponding fill of the units PLL's was experienced during January. This resulted in an overall reduction of down time for equipment.

(4) Increased and improved material readiness reporting was affected in January. Tank - Automotive material is to be reported Green, Red and Amber in conformity to the ESC.

(5) A technical assistance inspection was initiated 20 January 1968. This assistance will continue until all units have received assistance. Four (4) units of the Brigade have received assistance in the following areas:

(a) PLL's records.

(b) Maintenance records.

c. Medical: Casualty figures for the month:

(1) KIA	28
(2) KBNRHA	1
(3) IRHA	108
(4) IBMRHA	22
(5) MIA	3
(6) Malaria	23

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UNCLASSIFIED

Security Classification

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(Security classification of title, body of abstract and indexing annotation must be entered when the overall report is classified)

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