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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

IN REPLY REFER TO

AGAM-P (M) (3 May 68) FOR OT-RD-681189

13 May 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 12th
Combat Aviation Group, Period Ending 31 January 1968 (U).

SEE DISTRIBUTION

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should be reported to ACSFOR OT RD, Operational Reports Branch, within
90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appro-
priate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current
operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

Kenneth G. Wickham

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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12th Combat Aviation Group

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 12TH COMBAT AVIATION GROUP
APO 96266

AVGC-SC

14 February 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (ORLL) (RCS CSFOR-65)
for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968 (UIC WCYPTO)

TO: See Distribution

A. GENERAL:

1. (C) This Quarter saw the start of a phased reorganization of the 12th Combat Aviation Group. Upon completion of the reorganization the Group's Battalions and Companies will be disposed throughout the III Corps Tactical Zone to provide maximum benefit to the Ground Tactical Units. The 308th Combat Aviation Battalion was activated and assigned to the Group on 20 December 1967. The 210th Combat Aviation Battalion and its subordinate companies joined the Group on 15 January 1968. At this same time all the fixed wing companies were reassigned to the 210th Combat Aviation Battalion.

2. During this period one reconnaissance airplane company and the assault helicopter company supporting the 173rd Airborne Brigade were transferred out of the Group. Two new units joined the Group; an assault helicopter company was transferred from the 17th Combat Aviation Group and an assault support helicopter company (Hvy) (-) arrived from the United States. The condition of the 117th Assault Helicopter Company upon assignment to 12th Combat Aviation Group and arrival at Bien Hoa was unsatisfactory. The company was only 80% trained and equipped upon arrival. The 117th AHC required a two week stand down for maintenance, refitting, and training before the company could be put up as operational. On the other hand, the 335th Assault Helicopter Company, which was transferred from 12th Combat Aviation Group to the 17th Combat Aviation Group, was trained, equipped, and operational when it arrived on station. The three assault helicopter companies, the Corps aviation company, and the air cavalry squadron that arrived in October 1967 became fully operational early in this quarter. Despite the increase in the number of operational units, the flying hour program is still being exceeded.

3. At 0248 hours, 31 January 1968, 12th Combat Aviation Group Headquarters received mortar and rocket fire from the East and Northeast which ended at 0300 hours. At 0315 the headquarters area was taken under fire by small arms and automatic weapons interspersed with RPG fire. A platoon of APC's began sweeping the area in front of 12th Combat Aviation Group and immediately lost one APC to RPG fire. Clearance was finally obtained from the command bunker to employ light fire teams dispatched to the area. A ten ship combat assault was made into the affected area and the enemy fire degenerated to virtually nothing. Results of the contact were 4 US KIA, light building damage, three 1/2 ton trailers with light damage and one 1/2 ton truck with moderate damage. Enemy losses were 17 VC KIA and 14 detainees.

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B. MISSION:

1. (U) 12th Combat Aviation Group provides Army Aviation support to Commanding General, II Field Force Vietnam/Senior Advisor, III Army Republic of Vietnam Corps and at the direction of the Commanding General II Field Force Vietnam, provides aviation support to United States, Republic of Vietnam, and Free World Military Assistance Forces in III Corps Tactical Zone.

2. (U) Provides Army aviation support as directed by COMUSMACV for support of United States, Republic of Vietnam, and Free World Military Assistance Forces in IV Corps Tactical Zone.

3. (U) Commands (less OPCON where specified) and administers assigned and attached Army aviation and support units.

C. ORGANIZATION:

1. (C) Organization of the 12th Combat Aviation Group during the reporting period included the following units with headquarters located as indicated:

- a. 12th Combat Aviation Group - Long Binh
- b. 11th Combat Aviation Battalion - Phu Loi
- c. 145th Combat Aviation Battalion - Bien Hoa
- d. 210th Combat Aviation Battalion - Long Thanh
- e. 214th Combat Aviation Battalion - Bear Cat
- f. 222nd Combat Support Aviation Battalion - Vung Tau
- g. 269th Combat Aviation Battalion - Cu Chi
- h. 308th Combat Aviation Battalion - Bien Hoa
- i. 3rd Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry - Di An

2. (C) In addition, these units had elements stationed at Phuoc Vinh, Lai Khe, Dau Tieng, Tay Ninh West, and Long Giao, as well as field positions as called for by the tactical situation. For a more detailed breakdown of the Organization of the 12th Combat Aviation Group, see Annexes A and B.

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SECTION I

SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

A. COMMAND:

1. (C) On 12 November 1967, LTC William A. Hobbs assumed Command of the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion, replacing LTC Leo E. Soucek.
2. (C) On 1 December 1967, LTC Robert M. Deets assumed Command of the 145th Combat Aviation Battalion, replacing LTC John A. Todd.
3. (C) On 20 December 1967, the 308th Combat Aviation Battalion was activated. LTC Omere E. Case assumed command.
4. (C) On 14 December 1967, LTC James H. McWhorter, Jr. assumed command of the 214th Combat Aviation Battalion, replacing LTC Robert J. Standley.
5. (C) On 15 January 1968, the 210th Combat Aviation Battalion commanded by LTC John A. Todd was assigned.
6. (C) On 13 January 1968, LTC Leo C. Bryan assumed command of the 214th Combat Aviation Battalion, replacing LTC James H. McWhorter, Jr.

B. PERSONNEL:

1. (C) Organizational Changes: During the past quarter the authorized and assigned strength of the Group has been subject to frequent change resulting from units gained and lost. The following units with authorized strength indicated were gained (or lost) by 12th Combat Aviation Group during the past quarter:

New Units Arriving & Authorized Strength

	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>AGG</u>
273rd Avn Co (AMH)	16	16	97	129
652nd Trans Det (JE)	1	1	57	59
117th Avn Co (AML)	15	52	152	219
140th Trans Det (KD)	1	1	70	72
256th Sig Det (RL)	1	0	9	10
210th Avn Bn Hqs	21	2	86	109
129th Med Det (OA)	1	0	8	9
USARV Flt Det	29	1	64	94
125th Air Traffic	18	6	333	357
120th Avn Co (AML)	14	41	140	195
98th Trans Det (KD)	1	1	70	72
16th Sig Co	6	4	137	147
208th Avn Bn Hqs	18	3	88	109

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Units Lost & Authorized Strength

	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>AGG</u>
335th Avn Co (AML)	15	52	152	219
166th Trans Det	1	1	70	72
234th Sig Det	1	0	9	10
25th Med Det	1	0	8	9
21st Avn Co (SAL)	32	1	95	128

2. (C) Organization of Units Involved in Changes: The 117th Aviation Company is organized under MTOE 1-77G, PAC 1/67, the same as the 335th Aviation Company (lost to 17th Aviation Group). The 273rd Aviation Company is organized under TOE 1-259G. The 210th Aviation Battalion (1-256F, CONARC 2/67) came under 12th Group with the following units: USARV Flight Detachment (TDA F5 1N13PAA OO), 125th ATC (1-207E, PAC 2/67), 16th Signal Company (11-303E PAC 1/67) and the 120th Aviation Company (1-77G, PAC 1/66). Other Group changes include the addition of the 308th Combat Aviation Battalion (MTOE 1-256F, PAC 3/68) and the loss of the 21st Aviation Company (TOE 1-7D) to the 16th Aviation Group.

3. (C) Personnel Strengths.

a. OFFICER: The following table depicts the Officer and Warrant Officer strength during the past quarter:

	<u>AUTH</u>	<u>ASG (Incl Atch Excl Intr)</u>	<u>PDY (Incl Atch)</u>
31 Oct 67	1842	1624 - 87%	1531 - 83%
30 Nov 67	1836	1584 - 86%	1505 - 82%
31 Dec 67	1836	1570 - 86%	1492 - 81%
31 Jan 68	2002	1755 - 88%	1673 - 84%

b. AVIATOR: Relative aviator strength during this past quarter rose from 4% below the manning level to 2% below the manning level. Officer Aviator assigned vs. WO Aviator assigned remained constant at 43:57 against the authorized ratio of 38:62. The ratio of majors assigned to majors authorized also remained constant at 2.9:1. During the reporting period there have been no shortages of particular officer skills. The manning level is a redistribution of assets based on operational requirements. It is determined quarterly by USARV.

c. ENLISTED:

(1) The following table depicts the enlisted strength of the Group during the past quarter:

	<u>AUTH</u>	<u>ASG (Incl Atch Excl Intr)</u>	<u>PDY (Incl Atch)</u>
31 Oct 67	6931	7321 - 106%	6982 - 101%
30 Nov 67	6919	7313 - 106%	6967 - 101%
31 Dec 67	6919	7459 - 108%	6942 - 100%
31 Jan 68	7896	8491 - 107%	7932 - 100%

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(2) A shortage exists in the following MOS's:

MOS	AUTH	ASG	% SHORT
05C40	31	12	61%
11B2Y	7	0	100%
11D10	24	18	25%
11D40	46	31	33%
11D50	8	4	50%
11F40	16	6	62%
11H10	12	8	33%
26D20	15	11	27%

4. (C) Casualties.

a. Casualties sustained by the units of the 12th Combat Aviation Group during the period 1 Nov 67 - 31 Jan 68 are as follows:

	<u>NOV</u>	<u>DEC</u>	<u>JAN</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Dead not as a result of hostile action:	10	13	3	26
Killed in Action:	4	5	13	22
Injured in non-hostile accidents:	16	10	34	60
Wounded in action:	<u>61</u>	<u>64</u>	<u>218</u>	<u>343</u>
TOTALS:	<u>91</u>	<u>92</u>	<u>268</u>	<u>451</u>

b. Personnel being carried in missing status now number 3. Two are from a missing OV-1 aircraft lost in 1965 and one is missing from an O-1 lost in September 1967.

5. (U) Reenlistment: Reenlistment statistics for the quarterly report period are:

<u>1st Term</u>	<u>Careerist</u>	<u>AUS</u>	<u>ER/NG</u>
39 - 14 36%	49 - 47 96%	185 - 4 2.15%	1 - 1 100%
<u>TOTAL: 273 - 65 27.47%</u>			

6. (U) Awards and Decorations: During this period 12,885 recommendations for awards were submitted and 11,222 awards were received. The following is a breakdown of the recommendations submitted and awards received:

	<u>SUBMITTED</u>	<u>RECEIVED</u>
MOH	0	0
DSC	0	0
DSM	0	0
SS	10	6
LOM	12	8
DFC	180	145

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	SUBMITTED	RECEIVED
SM	6	3
BS	301	215
AM "yn"	248	175
AM	11,543	10,351
ACM	324	281
PH	61	38

Emphasis is being placed on the requirement for social security numbers to be placed on the recommendation. Accuracy at company level has improved considerably resulting in fewer awards being returned for missing or incorrect information.

7. (U) Education: The education section has continued to provide all available information concerning the avenues of study in the Bien Hoa, Long Binh area. There have been no major problems in the area of education.

8. (U) Rest and Recuperation.

a. The R & R utilization rate for this quarter is 94.3%.

NOVEMBER: 93%
DECEMBER: 98%
JANUARY: 92%

b. 12th Group utilization rate remains high and approximately 200 more quotas are received per month than in months of the previous quarter.

c. Every effort is made to accommodate anyone desiring an R & R. Australia is by far the most popular site and more quotas to Sydney are expected in the coming months.

d. Command emphasis on curbing "No Shows" has been effective in eliminating unused seats. Early cancellation enables other subordinate units to fill extra allocations.

9. (U) Special Services: The special services section has continued to provide the battalions with the needed A & R equipment. Some items are becoming less and less available, i.e., day room furniture, pool tables, etc. Everything else is said to be plentiful by the Saigon Support Command.

10. (U) Civic Action.

a. During the reporting period all 12th Group units were engaged in Civic Action activities.

b. Progress was made in these areas:

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(1) Construction: 12th Group units have assisted in the repair of 4 dispensaries and three hospitals. One school and orphanage project is in progress at this time. The "Chieu Hoi" hamlet near Vung Tau is progressing at an improved rate over last quarter with several homes being completed during the quarter.

(2) Commodity Distribution: Commodity distribution is a continuing effort. Recovered or captured materials are distributed under recommendation of local advisors. The Civic Action Imprest Fund was used considerably during this period to provide aid to local Vietnamese.

(3) The 12th Group MEDCAP programs have increased treatment of persons by 50% over the preceding quarter. Vietnamese response to the program increases with each visit.

(4) English instruction to Vietnamese students increased over the last reporting period. Three hundred and twenty-six Vietnamese students received English instruction on a weekly basis.

11. (U) Civilian Personnel.

a. During the period of 1 October to 31 December, this command acquired an air cavalry squadron which it was required to fund for AIK from funds on hand. The arrival of this squadron had been anticipated and their needs had been included in the request for AIK funds for the period. Because of this anticipation, no problems were encountered in funding. The total amount of this fund for the quarter was 3,710,400 Piasters. This was about 55% of the total requested.

b. The Local National Direct Hire (LNDH) allocation for this period was 400 spaces. This is a reduction of 57 spaces from the previous period. This command overhired 125 spaces. Necessary FORM - 52 action has been initiated on these overages. At this time, however, the CPO has been unable to remove these overages. While our allocations decreased, our requirements increased but because of the overages in hires left over from previous periods, we were unable to have new spaces for new units approved. We are caught between having too many people in some places and having need for people in places where we cannot get any authorized. Until the CPO is able to remove our overages, this command will not be able to get any needed people authorized from USARV.

12. (U) Sundry Funds, Clubs, and Messes: During this period, the emphasis on better management has asserted itself in more efficient running of clubs with higher profits for the benefit and use of the membership. A number of Sundry Fund clubs submitted letters of request to USARV to remain under the 230-5 system of accountability because their net worth was growing over 5000 dollars. It was noted, however, that most of these letters were unnecessary because the clubs had included fixed assets in figuring net worth. These fixed assets greatly inflated the "net worth". Once the net worth was figured in accordance with 230-5, these Sundry Fund Clubs were able to remain under the 230-5 system of accountability.

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13. (U) Chaplain Activities.

a. Additional opportunities provided for worship in battalion and in company areas, and the rescheduling of services at different times, places, and on different days has resulted in a corresponding increase in attendance.

b. Attendance at showings of religious films has been greatly increased by scheduling the film to be shown just prior to a regular movie in the company area. The statistics on religious education (below) rather than showing this increase, show a decrease which is due to a correction in the way such figures are reported by the chaplains.

c. Further emphasis upon the chaplains' availability to personnel by more frequent regular visits to duty areas, day rooms and billets, has resulted in an increased ministry to them.

d. The use of mimeographed briefings distributed to personnel continues to result in an increase in participation in the Character Guidance Program.

e. Monthly Chaplains' Conferences conducted by the Group Chaplain, coupled with his frequent visits to chaplains and to unit areas, has resulted in increased unity, coordination, and supervision of chaplain activities.

f. Chaplain activities provided in Group this quarter were:

ACTIVITY	OCCASIONS	CHANGE FROM LAST QUARTER	ATTENDANCE	CHANGE
Group Worship	213	+45%	5848	+33%
Religious Education	112	- 1%	1238	-70%
Pastoral Visits	3123	+19%	N/A	N/A
(Includes Counseling)				
Character Guidance	50	+22%	8407	+ 9%
Civic Action	54	+125%	N/A	N/A

C. INTELLIGENCE:

1. (C) Security.

a. The S-2 Section continued in its capacity as the focal point of command guidance throughout the Group for matters pertaining to personnel and safeguarding of classified material.

b. The Group Headquarters continued to maintain a very good security posture. Security posters are displayed in all staff sections, and no security violations were noted during the reporting period. The S-2 Section conducted CI inspections of all staff sections, noting only minor deficiencies. These deficiencies were corrected on the spot. The section received one after-duty hour inspection by S/A Powers, 219th Military Intelligence Detachment (MID). There were no deficiencies noted and the inspection concluded with an exit briefing of the Assistant S-2 and a written report.

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c. In mid-December 1967, there was a change in the S-2 Staff Officer, resulting in a change in several control positions.

d. During January, a 100% inventory was conducted of all SECRET Documents within the Group Headquarters. There were no deficiencies noted. As a result of the inventory approximately 94 documents were destroyed. Before destruction of the documents, each primary staff officer concerned was contacted to verify that the document was no longer needed.

e. During the period 6 through 9 January 1968, Headquarters, 222nd Combat Support Aviation Battalion, had their annual IG inspection. Prior to the inspection, SSG Jared, Assistant Intelligence NCO, went to Vung Tau and assisted the S-2 in preparing for the inspection. It was noted that upon completion of the inspection there were no deficiencies found and the section received an outstanding rating.

f. In early December, the S-2, 11th Combat Aviation Battalion, discovered during an inventory of all classified material that no receipts existed for four SECRET documents. Upon close inspection, it was determined that the documents had been passed on to the battalion message center for further distribution to a signal unit for transmittal; however, the S-2 failed to obtain a receipt for the documents upon their release. The message center logged the documents out to the signal unit and they were retransmitted. An investigation was conducted and it was determined that there had been no compromise of classified information and it was recommended that all personnel concerned be relieved of accountability for the material. The investigation is maintained on file within the Battalion and appropriate entries were made in the SECRET document register.

g. In January 1968, S/A Powers, 219th MID, conducted a Security Survey of the Group Headquarters. Minor deficiencies were noted and corrected on the spot. The survey was very thorough and it was noted that locally established security procedures were adequate and that the security posture of the headquarters was outstanding. A written report of the survey was provided upon completion of the inspection.

2. (C) Statistics.

a. The classified repository and distribution facility operated by the S-2 section processed approximately 21,057 incoming and outgoing pieces of classified material. The repository contained 212 SECRET documents at the close of the period.

b. Also during the period, a total of 239 security clearances were validated throughout the Group.

c. Map processing continued to be an S-2 function which received considerable emphasis. A total of 12,000 maps were processed and passed on to subordinate levels. The section maintains a stockage level of approximately 10 copies of each map sheet of the entire III CTZ plus portions of the EASTERN IV CTZ, and WESTERN II CTZ. These maps are maintained in both 1:50,000 and 1:250,000 Scales.

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d. The section continued to maintain a spot intelligence net and a total of 87 reports were received from inflight aircraft during the period.

3. (C) Aerial Surveillance and Reconnaissance.

a. The dearming of the OV-1 has made the aircraft considerably more vulnerable. It appears that the hits on aircraft and shot at have increased over the period of dearming. It is apparent that the VC are aware of the OV-1 being dearmed; therefore, he does not hesitate to fire at the aircraft knowing that they are not immediately capable of returning fire.

b. The loss of the 21st RAC resulted in the complete reorganization of visual reconnaissance missions within the III CTZ. A new directive was written by II Field Force G2 AIR to eliminate visual reconnaissance missions within the III CTZ.

4. (C) Loss of SOI.

a. There were a total of 4 SOI's lost during the reporting period, and in these cases only a preliminary investigation was conducted to verify that there had been no breach of security procedures.

b. In one particular incident, where in a SOI was lost due to combat, it was determined beyond a doubt that the document was in the hands of the enemy. As a result a complete new 12th Group SOI was compiled and issued the aviators.

5. (U) Personnel changes: During the period there were three changes in personnel within the section. Major George W. Harris assumed the duties of the S-2 staff officer on 15 December 1967, and also the Intelligence Specialist and Clerk/Typist positions were changed. These changes were accomplished without loss of continuity and the section continued to accomplish its functions in a normal manner.

6. (U) Staff Visits, Briefings, and Liaison.

a. On a weekly basis, representatives of the section conducted staff visits with the subordinate battalions. These visits continued to provide the battalion S-2's with guidance and assistance pertaining to intelligence matters. In addition, mutual problems were discussed often resulting in changes of established policies and procedures.

b. Weekly a representative of the section attended the Intelligence conference at USARV Headquarters. Information and material obtained at the conference were often used at the briefing presented to the Battalion S-2's each Saturday morning. In addition, daily briefings were attended at II Field Force Headquarters, and liaison visits were made with 1st Aviation Brigade.

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c. Each Saturday an S-2 Intelligence briefing was presented to the Group staff and Battalion S-2's. The briefings depicted the current enemy dispositions, capabilities and probable courses of action for the Republic of Vietnam. In addition, information of particular interest and significance to the Group aviators in the accomplishment of their missions was discussed during the briefings. Often guest speakers and films were used to supplement the briefings.

7. (C) Order of Battle/situation map: An order of battle map, scale 1:100,000 was developed to depict the current disposition of enemy units and how significant developments and enemy actions on a daily basis. The map was designed for use by the headquarters staff and as a supplement to the weekly briefings. The map was well received and frequently used.

8. (C) Escape and Evasion.

a. For the reporting period, the E&E officer conducted staff visits to subordinate battalions. The visits provided the battalion E&E officers with guidance and assistance as pertains to Survival, Escape, and Evasion lessons learned and quotas for the Survival schools in the Philippines.

b. During November the Group E&E officer sponsored two instructors for JEST in the Philippines for 10 days. During these ten days the two Naval instructors and the Group E&E officers conducted seminars with the battalions of the 12th Combat Aviation Group as pertains to Survival, Escape and Evasion in South Vietnam.

c. In the past three months the 12th Group has sent 49 men to the Naval Survival School. These quotas represent a 57% increase over last reporting period.

9. (C) Aircraft Ground Fire/Hit Report: In early November 1967, the format and reporting procedure for the daily Ground Fire/Hit Report was changed somewhat. Previously, the data required was extracted from the "OPREP/5" reports submitted daily by the subordinate commands. This proved to be inadequate in that all the information required was often not included in the OPREP/5 text. To rectify this situation, a requirement was placed on each major subordinate unit for the daily submission, by electronic means when possible, of a report of all ground fire incidents giving the following information:

Date/time group of the incident
Coordinates
Type of Aircraft
Altitude of aircraft
Airspeed of aircraft
Intensity of fire
Type of fire, (SA/AW/.50 Cal/Other)
Number of hits sustained, if any
Extent of Damage, if any

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These daily reports were then consolidated and transmitted to each major subordinate command with information copies to DISS, 7th Air Force; CG, II FFORCEV C-2 Air; CG, 1st Aviation Brigade; and the CO, 45th Medical Battalion (Helicopter Ambulance). The information was then posted on situation maps and utilized in pre-mission briefings in order to show aviators and commanders the areas of high intensity ground fire. The reports have proved valuable and may have resulted in reducing the loss of aircraft through ground fire damage.

D. OPERATIONS AND TRAINING:

1. (C) Stationing: During the quarter the following units were assigned to the 12th Combat Aviation Group:

a. The Hqs and 1st Platoon of the 273rd Assault Support Helicopter Company (Hvy) arrived in-country 20 December 1967, and became operational at Vung Tau on 9 January 1968.

b. The 308th Combat Aviation Battalion was activated on 20 December 1967 at Bien Hoa. It will become operational in the next quarter.

c. The 135th Assault Helicopter Company moved from Vung Tau to Long Giao closing on 31 December 1967.

d. The 117th Assault Helicopter Company was assigned from the 17th Combat Aviation Group on 1 January 1968, and stationed at Bien Hoa.

e. The 335th Assault Helicopter Company was relieved from assignment to the 12th Combat Aviation Group and reassigned to the 17th Combat Aviation Group on 1 January 1968.

f. The 210th Combat Aviation Battalion was assigned from 1st Aviation Brigade on 15 January 1968, and stationed at Long Thanh. Its subordinate units and their stations are as follows:

- (1) 120th Assault Helicopter Company - Long Binh
- (2) 125th Air Traffic Control Company - Bien Hoa
- (3) 16th Signal Company (Hyper Nav) - Tan Son Nhut
- (4) USARV Flight Detachment - Long Thanh

g. The 21st Reconnaissance Airplane Company was relieved from assignment to the 12th Combat Aviation Group and reassigned to the 16th Combat Aviation Group on 15 January 1968.

2. (C) Training

a. Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) Pilot Training: The 12th Combat Aviation Group continued to provide transition training in the UH-1D for VNAF pilots. Upon completion of transition training the VNAF pilots fly combat missions as pilot or co-pilot until their period of TDY is completed. On 9 December 1967, five VNAF pilots graduated and returned to VNAF control. On 15 December 1967, eight VNAF pilots were attached and commenced their training.

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b. Thai Pilot and Maintenance Training: The 12th Combat Aviation Group, on 28 November 1967, undertook another phase of providing assistance to Free World Military Armed Forces. Thirteen aviators were attached to the Group for approximately four months to receive transition training in the UH-1D and participate in combat operations. In addition, twenty-seven mechanics will receive maintenance training in the UH-1.

E. LOGISTICS:

1. (U) Supply.

a. Turn-in of TOE/MTOE Equipment Not Needed for Operational Requirements: With encouragement and command emphasis from this headquarters, a very favorable response to this program was achieved. Many units in the 12th Combat Aviation Group have received approval from USARV G-3 to turn-in their unnecessary items. The prompt action that has been received from higher headquarters has encouraged additional units to submit their requests which are pending at this time and more units have indicated their intention to utilize this program.

b. Water Resupply at Base Camp.

(1) The TO&E for an aviation unit does not authorize sufficient equipment to transport the tremendous quantities of water which are used daily at the base camps.

(2) To resolve this problem, M-49 Tank Trucks have been diverted to transport water and some units have obtained 5,000 gallon trailers on temporary loan. This is not the acceptable solution to the problem as individuals must also be diverted from their intended purpose to operate this equipment.

(3) The acceptable solution to this problem is contract water service supplied through 1st Logistical Command. This service has been requested for the 135th Assault Helicopter Company, approved by USARV, and passed to 1st Logistical Command for action. The final results of this request will determine our future course of action.

c. Availability of Protective Equipment for Aircrewmembers.

(1) The following items of equipment have remained in critical short supply during the past ninety days: Gloves Leather, Flying; Flashes Sun, Flying; and Ballistic Helmets of which only sixty-two size small were received and distributed.

(2) Due to the non-availability of Ballistic Helmets, 506th Depot stocks of APH-5 Helmets were exhausted.

(3) 1st Aviation Brigade conducted a cross-level program to redistribute and equalize assets of Body Armor which significantly reduces unit assets within the 12th Combat Aviation Group.

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2. (U) Aircraft Maintenance.

a. Aircraft armament subsystems shortages during recent months has caused additional hardship for assault Helicopter companies to maintain prescribed number of "mission ready" gunships. Only through extreme care in cannibalization, and in some cases "Jury-Rigging", have the assault helicopter companies been able to keep shooting effectively. It is anticipated that shortages will be eased in the near future, due to new XM-21 (mini-gun), M-156 (mounts), and M-159 (rocket launcher) arriving in-country. The M-156 mount with M-159 launcher is to be installed with M-540mm grenade launcher and is to replace XM-3 rocket launcher.

b. Dirty turbine engine inlets and foreign object damage (FOD) are continuously decreasing in-country serviceable engine assets. Of one hundred and eight T-53-L-13 engines returned to CONUS for rebuild, 53 were a direct result of FOD. Countless T-53 engines are being operated with dirty engine inlets caused by accumulation of dirt, sand, and grease. High exhaust gas temperature (EGT) and a loss of power is a direct result of dirty aircraft engines. It has been learned that by utilizing a daily engine instrument reading and comparing these readings periodically, maintenance personnel are able to detect faulty engines.

F. INFORMATION:

1. (U) Information Program.

a. 12th Combat Aviation Group's public information program developed into a more significant role during the past quarter. It marked the first time that a newspaper printed by offset facilities was produced by Group Headquarters. It was learned that the previous method of production by stencil did not prove adequate enough to provide coverage or instill interest for a command of this size. Producing by offset proved to be successful by enabling this office to provide photo coverage of the units as well as having a clear, concise printed paper. Stencil productions are not capable of providing photo coverage of units and the final printed copy is so far below journalistic standards that it does not give the impression of being a command newspaper.

b. One important factor learned from the offset method of production is that it requires much more skill and ability of the editor than by the previous stencil method. Just as the paper is so much more easily readable and draws much more attention because of interest, so it is that mistakes are so much more readily noticed. Without an editor with a thorough knowledge of layout procedures, copy style, story importance and pictorial significance, the paper can prove to be just as big a flop as it is a success. It is felt that at least two months prior to departure of the present editor a suitable replacement be obtained so he may become familiar with all facets the job entails.

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c. It was learned during the past quarter that the amount of coverage given at battalion level depends not so much on ability, but on commanders preference. In those units where the commander took definite interest in the information program, release of stories was at a much higher level than those units in which the commander felt little interest. While commanders are responsible for the information program under their command, it appears that information officers rely too much on this. It has been learned that because of this, some units are not getting adequate coverage either in the Group produced newspaper or even having a chance at outside media. This is a definite dis-service to the men of those units. While the responsibility lies with the commander, the direction of the information program lies with the Information Officer.

d. The Home Town News Release program was at a good level during the period but it has been learned that unless the information office of a unit keeps this on the same level of importance as story production or pictorial coverage many eligible Home Town News Releases can be easily passed up. It has been found that most men in a unit are either totally unaware of the Home Town News Release program or have no knowledge about how to get the forms to participate in the program, thereby not going to the trouble to search it out. Information office personnel should take the initiative and be made aware of significant events happening to individuals within their sphere of activity and carrying this through by approaching the individuals and giving them the opportunity to participate in this program.

2. (U) Command Information Program.

a. During the last quarter command information continued to get particular emphasis. This is programmed so that the individual soldier has an opportunity to become aware of activity on the national and international scene as well as within South Vietnam and his particular unit. Special emphasis has been put on policy statements by the United States Government. As much dissemination of such statements as possible is done so that the soldier may understand his government's position in areas ranging from the war in Vietnam to the balance of payments deficit.

b. Posters continued to be received by this command and disseminated to the individual units. It has been learned that posters should deal primarily with providing useful information, but any attempt or tendency to present to the individual soldier through posters should be eliminated. There should be more of a negative effect on the soldier than a useful one.

c. The media used to disseminate command information in this unit has been supplemented by the use of posters and other hand out type information sheets published as necessary.

G. SIGNAL:

1. (C) Command Post Communications.

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a. During this reporting period command post communications remained substantially the same. Currently available equipment included high frequency transmissions: the AN/TRC-146 and the AN/VSC-2; for FM transmissions: the AN/VRC-46 and for UHF transmissions: the AN/VRC-24. Within the Group there are a total of twenty-one AN/VSC-2's and nine (9) AN/MRC-119's. This distribution allows the battalions and companies considerable latitude in establishment of internal High Frequency nets with a teletype capability. All 12th Group comm center equipment will attempt to be duplicated for the command post bunker now being constructed.

b. Direct dial telephone communications is now possible between several locations within the Saigon/Bearcat/Long Binh complex; however, common user trunks are still at times marginally effective for the amount of traffic flow. Consideration is being given by 12th Group to utilize the Hurricane TOC system for use between the G-3 Air Army Aviation Element at II FFORCEV and the Battalion Operations Centers throughout III Corps for passing of operational mission information. The battalions would in turn operate an internal operational switchboard for all other units at that location on a twenty-four hour basis.

c. There still remains a critical shortage of KY-8's within the command which precludes the issuing of this equipment to company level. The KY-28 program issue dates have slipped; however, the ultimate goal is still the establishment of a complete secure air to ground and ground to air FM voice net during this calendar year.

2. (U) Air Traffic Control and Navigational Aids: The Long Binh/Plantation area control system was established and is currently published in the DOD Tactical Aerodrome Directory. This system greatly enhanced the helicopter traffic flow within the local area and is currently under study for more improvements. The Plantation airfield near 12th Group Headquarters was completed and is currently under the operational control of the 25th Aviation Company. Improvements are continuing to be made on this airfield to meet established ATC and safety criteria.

3. (U) NOTAM and Weather Service: NOTAM service continues to be sent from the 12th Group Communications Center to 12th Combat Aviation Group and II FFORCEV units. Consideration is being given to monitoring the 125th Air Traffic Control NOTAM broadcast at 1630 daily to shorten the delay time prior to retransmission to subordinate units for posting. The USAF weather circuits are still monitored but distribution has been reduced due to the establishment of local USAF weather stations at unit locations throughout III Corps.

4. (U) SOI: The 12th Group SOI has a current distribution list of over 1200 copies and indications are that this will increase. The costing of changes and quarterly production becomes quite time consuming and is a full time job for one man. Considering such a position is not now authorized; a proposed MTOE change was submitted. When frequencies and call signs change, a teletype message is sent to all battalions for immediate pen and ink changes. Every ten days a summary is sent to unit SOI clerks to account and recap all SOI changes within that period.

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5. (U) Avionics: The Signal Detachments (RL) and Transportation Corps Detachments (AB) have received many items of test equipment and float items during this reporting period. This action has greatly enhanced the capabilities of these units and has allowed the General Support units to sufficiently lower their percentages of direct support work they were previously doing. Relocation of one signal detachment has provided support on an area basis where there was previously no support unit. This now gives avionics direct support at every major location where there are 12th Group aviation units.

H. MEDICAL:

1. (C) Summary of Medical Activities.

a. The Surgeons Section, HHC, 12th Combat Aviation Group has performed satisfactorily throughout period 1 November 1967 through 31 January 1968 in its mission of providing aeromedical coverage to the Group which is composed of eight battalions and thirty-nine companies.

b. During the above period there were nineteen flight Surgeons and twelve OA Medical Detachments under the supervision of the Surgeons Section. Over two hundred reports were submitted which were studied and consolidated and forwarded to the 1st Aviation Brigade. From these reports it has been determined that the health of the command, immunization coverage, environmental sanitation, preventive care, and injury coverage has been excellent throughout the command.

I. AVIATION SAFETY:

1. (U) General: The Group accident rate was reduced for the third consecutive quarterly reporting period. Group aircraft flew 204,000 hours and experienced 52 accidents, resulting in a rate of 25.5 accidents per 100,000 flying hours.

2. (U) Accident Causes: Engine failures or losses of power, tail rotor strikes and loss of ground reference due to dust continue to be major accident cause factors. The number of accidents caused by main rotor strikes, lost RPM, ground loops, and air traffic control facilities have been considerably reduced.

3. (U) Contributing Factors.

a. The operational necessity to fly units in excess of their programmed flight hours led to increased pilot fatigue and decreased maintenance efficiency. Both conditions precipitate accidents but it is difficult to determine the exact degree to which they are inter-related.

b. Failure to adhere to normal parameters has been a common contributor, especially on single-ship missions. Included are instances of lack of discipline and the combat syndrome, also known as over-aggressiveness or over-orientation to the mission. The concept that sound safety procedures must be ignored due to the pressures of combat has been too common among newer aviators and ground commanders.

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4. (U) Preventive Measures.

a. A continual education and re-education program is in effect to counteract the constant turnover of aviators and commanders of both supporting and supported units.

b. Disciplinary action is required in cases of negligence or failure to comply with regulations and SOP's.

c. Maximum loads have been prescribed for all aircraft.

d. Use of the trail formation has been severely limited.

e. Downwind operations have been prohibited unless specifically ordered by the supported commanders. A written explanation is required.

f. Shallow high-speed approaches are prohibited.

g. Hover checks are required prior to every takeoff unless specifically excepted by the air mission commander during a combat assault.

h. Selection of flight routes which afford the best possible forced landing areas has been emphasized.

i. Engine and filter inspections and cleaning has been required more frequently due to dusty operations.

j. Continuing command emphasis is gradually resulting in increased use of peneprime and other dust suppressants in frequently used landing areas.

5. (U) Summary: The Group Commander has constantly emphasized that safety and efficiency must remain inseparably related to realize maximum combat effectiveness. Command emphasis of this attitude beginning with the aircraft commander will result in a further reduction of mishaps. Each battalion has been assigned an accident rate goal for the six month period January - June 1968 which, if met, will result in a 20% reduction of the Group accident rate compared to the previous six month period.

SECTION II, PART I

LESSONS LEARNED

A. PERSONNEL: None

B. OPERATIONS: None

C. TRAINING AND ORGANIZATION:

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1. (U) Item: Instructor Pilots

Discussion: There is still a critical shortage of Instructor Pilots in the UH-1 and a foreseeable shortage looming in the near future in the CH-47 and the AH-1G (Cobra). The Chinook companies are presently in satisfactory condition, but the turn-around students are now beginning to replace the senior experienced aviators. As this experience diminishes the IP shortage will become critical. At present there is not an IP course for CH-47 pilots conducted at Ft. Rucker. The NETT team currently conducting Cobra training is not conducting IP training. Consequently, unless school trained IP's arrive in-country assigned to Cobra units, a serious IP shortage will develop in this area, thereby, units will not be able to comply with current regulations and requirements. The unit IP is responsible for conducting the initial in-country training for all aviators and periodic standardization rides. Training of Instructor Pilots is time consuming and at best is only qualifying when done at unit level.

Observation: With the increased responsibility of retraining to be accomplished by the unit IP, it becomes more apparent that emphasis must be placed on properly trained IP's. The best facility available is the Aviation School, Ft. Rucker. Recommend a continuous flow be monitored through the school and the IP assignment closely monitored in order that there is fair distribution to the units.

2. (U) Item: Replacement UH-1 Aviators

Discussion: The present system of training in the UH-1 is not compatible with the emergency situations encountered in Vietnam. The aviators do not receive training at Ft. Rucker in hydraulic off and tail rotor malfunctions. These two situations occur frequently due to hostile fire and normal system failure. Because this training is not given, and it is felt that this is an extremely important area, it causes excessive hours of training before a pilot becomes fully operational and capable of handling these emergencies. It places an extreme burden on a unit who is now pushed to its limits. Most units do not have sufficient IP's and training time required may amount to several hours re-training a new aviator depending on the individual's proficiency.

Observation: Complete qualification training should be conducted at the aviation school. It is felt that the school is not giving the units full support by causing excessive retraining time and aircraft time when all units are conducting combat missions each day of the week. This requires full unit support with personnel and equipment and allows very little time for re-training.

D. INTELLIGENCE: None

E. LOGISTICS:

1. (U) Item: Oil Analysis Laboratory relocated from Okinawa to Cam Ranh Bay.

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Discussion: Prior to the relocation of the Oil Analysis Laboratory, oil sample results took from 12 - 27 days.

Observations: After the laboratory moved to Cam Ranh Bay the time between oil sample and results was decreased considerably. A U-1A courier was scheduled three times a week to transport the samples from the Bien Hoa area to Cam Ranh Bay. Although this procedure is a great improvement over the old method, we are still looking for a quicker means of decreasing the time required.

2. (U) Item: 48 hour stand-down-time for assault helicopter companies.

Discussion: Three assault helicopter companies were afforded 48 hours stand-down-time in early December 1967.

Observation: It was noted, that during the forty-eight hour stand-down-time for each of the three companies, they were able to re-group, organize, and get abreast of required back-logged maintenance. An increase in aircraft availability was a direct result of the forty-eight hour stand-down-time.

3. (U) Item: Maintenance Support in the Cavalry Squadron.

Discussion: Assault Helicopter Companies presently in the 12th Combat Aviation Group all have Direct Support Detachments with backup maintenance by a Direct Support Company. The Cavalry units have less personnel in their Direct Support Detachment than our assault helicopter company detachments and are required to support almost three times the number of aircraft. The Cavalry Troops have no service platoon with organizational maintenance support.

Observation: Cav Squadrons coming in-country do not have adequate maintenance support.

4. (U) Item: Limited Supply of M/R Hubs for UH-1B/C.

Discussion: The dry season has brought us increased wear on our UH-1C M/R hub bearings. Also, increased problems with oil seals leaking on out UH-1B, UH-1D, and UH-1H aircraft.

Observation: The supply system has not been able to meet the demands we have for main rotor hubs and parts for these hubs. Surely every year during the dry season the same problems have been encountered; but we still have not solved the problems.

5. (U) Item: Dust Suppression.

Discussion: Control of dust in and around helicopter operating areas continues to be a problem affecting aircraft safety and maintenance.

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This problem is not new. It has been present ever since helicopters first began to support ground forces by operating in unprepared areas. Aviation commanders have been well aware of the hazards caused by dust but have not had dust suppression equipment directly under their control with which to combat the problem. Ground commanders have been aware of the problem but in many cases have considered it an aviation problem and not one of primary concern to them. In reality, dust suppression is vitally important to the ground commander, since it may determine whether or not his unit receives the aviation support it needs for success in combat. USARV UNCLASS msg AVHAV-S 32604, dtd 18 Jan 68, directed all commanders to "Review their priorities for soil stabilization to assure timely and continuing dust control in accessible forward operating areas as well as helicopter base areas." We now have the command emphasis that we need. The next step is to provide the necessary asphalt, penepriime, distribution equipment, and operating personnel. In the past, dust suppression has been tasked to individual units, PA&E and supporting Engineer units. Dust suppression capability has not kept pace with the expansion of Army aviation in RVN. Procurement of dust suppression equipment must be given higher priority. At this time, action is being taken by Hq, 1st Aviation Brigade to obtain penepriime distributors for issue to all aviation units in addition to the portable dispensers now available. Acquisition of these distributors will enable aviation units to control dust within unit parking and maintenance areas. Dust suppression for forward areas will remain the responsibility of the ground commander. Planning for future operations should include assigning high priority for dust suppression.

Observation: Effective dust suppression can only be accomplished if it is considered an absolute necessity by all commanders concerned. Procurement of dust suppression supplies and equipment must continue to be emphasized through the coming wet season if we are to be prepared for the dry season to come.

6. (U) Item: Construction of Facilities for Incoming units.

Discussion: The ORLL report prepared by this HQS on 10 May 1967 stated that "One of the most significant lessons learned has been the importance of programming to receive and base incoming units. If chaos is to be avoided, plans for developing adequate facilities for incoming units must be made at the earliest opportunity." The ORLL report for 3 August 1967, emphasized that "Construction to prepare for new incoming units is still critical, even when requested 90 to 120 days in advance." These observations are still valid. The 3/17th ACS is now on station at Tay Ninh without adequate facilities for aircraft parking, maintenance, administrative activities, and troop housing. MER construction (aircraft revetments) is still in progress for the 17th and 195th AHC's at Plantation. The critical shortage of engineer construction effort makes it necessary that stationing plans for incoming units or transfer of units in-country be made firm as far in advance as possible.

Observation: If operational requirements dictate relocation of aviation units on short notice the combat effectiveness of the units concerned will be adversely affected by lack of adequate facilities. Aircraft will not be revetted immediately after such a move.

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F. SIGNAL:

1. (C) Item: AN/VRC-24 (Ground Radio)

Discussion: The AN/VRC-24 is currently capable of receiving in tenths of megacycles only, for example 241.2. A requirement exists for a new UHF ground radio to net with the new family of airborne UHF sets which is capable of being tuned to double digit ending frequencies, for example, 241.25. Current UHF frequency congestion would partially be eliminated. Maintenance down-time on the AN/VRC-24 radio has been excessive due to continued 24 hour use under field conditions.

Observation: A requirement exists for a new UHF ground radio set that is capable of netting on all channels with the airborne AN/ARC-51. A small developmental requirement (SDR) should be prepared by ECOM as quickly as possible.

2. (C) Item: Avionics Direct Support Units

Discussion: Air cavalry squadrons are being deployed to RVN without avionics direct support units attached. Due to these employment and stationing of these squadrons, avionics direct support is not available at these locations. This requires that a direct support unit be formed from in-country assets. Due to shortages of test equipment, float equipment and personnel, this action has resulted in poor avionics support for the air cavalry units and the aviation unit from which the assets were taken.

Observation: Any unit that has a large quantity of organic aircraft must deploy with a direct support avionics team attached. This unit must also have on hand all necessary test equipment and float items.

G. MEDICAL:

1. (U) Item: Assignment of Aviation Medical Officers

Discussion: Aviation Medical Officers have been assigned on the basis of one per two companies when companies are co-located, and on a one per company basis when companies are deployed in an isolated area. There have been an adequate number of Aviation Medical Officers to do this during this report period.

Observation: Aviation Medical Officers should not be assigned on a one per company basis, but on a one per two company basis.

2. (U) Item: Aeromedical Dispensaries.

Discussion: In some battalions Aeromedical Dispensaries have been set up in battalion areas, thereby consolidating the medical care involving sophisticated medical equipment at battalion level.

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Observation: An Aeromedical Dispensary should be established, equipped and staffed at battalion level utilizing resources from OA Detachments until more can be approved.

3. (U) Item: OA Detachments.


Discussion: OA Detachments, in some cases, have been broken up to better utilize specialties and to disperse medical personnel throughout battalions for better overall medical coverage. Where OA Detachments and an Aviation Medical Officer support only one aviation company in a non-isolated area, neither the detachment, nor the doctor have enough work to do.

Observation: Personnel in OA Detachments should be utilized by battalion surgeons to cover needs of entire battalions.

SECTION II, PART II

RECOMMENDATIONS

- A. PERSONNEL: None
- B. OPERATIONS: None
- C. TRAINING AND ORGANIZATION: None
- D. INTELLIGENCE: None
- E. LOGISTICS: None
- F. SIGNAL: None


NICHOLAS G. PSAKI
Colonel, Infantry
Commanding

- ANNEXES: A - 12th Combat Aviation Group Structure
B - 12th Combat Aviation Group Troop List
C - 12th Combat Aviation Group Statistics

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AVFBC-RE-H (14 Jan 68) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (ORLL) (RCS CSFOR-65)
for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968 (UIC WCYPTO)

DA, HQ II FFORCEV, APO San Francisco 96266 29 FEB 1968

THRU: Commanding General, 1st Aviation Brigade, ATTN: AVBA-C, APO 96307

Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DS, APO 96375

Commander-In-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-OT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of
the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. Subject report is forwarded.

2. This command has reviewed the attached ORLL of the 12th Combat
Aviation Group and concurs with the report with the following comments:

a. p 5, para 6. The figure 12,885 for total recommendations
submitted should be 12,685.

b. p 14, para F,1. Information Program. Comments concerning
the unit newspaper should more properly be included as part of the Army
Command Information Program rather than Public Information.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



E. M. McGRATH
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

MAR 9 1968

AVBA-C (14 Jan 68)

2nd Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (ORLL) (RCS CSFOR-65)
For Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968 (UIC WCYPTO)


HEADQUARTERS, 1ST AVIATION BRIGADE, APO 96384

THRU: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST, APO 96375
Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOC-OT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, DA (ACSFOR DA),
Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters has reviewed subject report of the 12th Combat Aviation Group (CAG) and considers it to be adequate and concurs with the contents as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


JAMES H. GOLDMANN
1LT, AGC
Asst Adj General

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AVHGC-DST (14 Jan 68)

3d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (ORLL) (RCS CSFOR-65)
for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968 (UIC WCYPTO)

HEADQUARTERS, US ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 25 MAR 1968

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,
APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1968 from Headquarters, 12th Combat Aviation Group (WCYPAA) as indorsed.

2. (C) Pertinent comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning instructor pilots, page 19, paragraph C1. This headquarters has requested the 1st Aviation Brigade to investigate this matter to see if the shortage of instructor pilots is anticipated throughout the Brigade. If so, appropriate actions will be initiated from either the 1st Aviation Brigade or this headquarters.

b. Reference item concerning training of replacement UH-1 aviators, page 19, paragraph C2. Simulated tail rotor failure training is not currently being conducted at USAAVNS; however, students receive ground school instruction and must describe orally the recommended corrective actions prior to soloing. Consideration is being given to conducting limited in-flight instructions of this nature. Hydraulics or servo failure instructions have been discontinued at USAAVNS due to unsafe mechanical condition with the needle valve in the servo system. Method of correcting this deficiency is presently under study.

c. Reference item concerning maintenance support in the cavalry squadron, page 20, paragraph E3. The reduced direct support maintenance for cavalry squadrons is recognized and a maintenance detachment was formed from in-country assets to support these units upon arrival in RVN. There are units scheduled for arrival in RVN to provide this required maintenance support for each troop. In the present TOE, there is no service platoon per se, but there is a maintenance section consisting of helicopter mechanics, augmented by crew chiefs to perform organizational maintenance.

d. Reference item concerning limited supply of M/R Hubs for UH-1B/C, page 20, paragraph E4. There has been no shortage of UH-1B/C

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GROUP 4

Downgraded at 3 year intervals
Declassified after 12 years
DOD DIR 5200.10 Applies

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AVHGC-DST (14 Jan 68)

3d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (ORLL) (RCS CSFOR-65)
for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968 (UIC WCYPTO)

Hubs in this command. The 34th General Support Group has consolidated all UH-1C rotor hub repair in RVN at one location. This will decrease the number of spares to be prepositioned at the other repair facilities. Investigations are continuing by both USAAVCOM and the manufacturer on the seal leakage problem.

e. Reference item concerning construction facilities for incoming units, page 21, paragraph E6. The receiving and basing of programmed new units is a matter of concern to this headquarters and should be at all levels. It must be recognized that the tactical and operational posture of troop structure within USARV is often controlled at MACV level and is not normally determined well enough in advance to insure optimum planning. Specific or anticipated unit location and resulting necessity for MER should indicate the requirement for the assignment of a host unit who should develop a preplanned program of effort to facilitate an orderly base camp establishment, and an administrative plan so that DA Form 1391, Construction Requests for Semi-Permanent Base Camp Construction, may be submitted promptly. The facilities noted as lacking at Tay Ninh for 3/17th Air Cavalry Squadron fall within the semi-permanent base camp construction program. DA Forms 1391 with Base Development Board concurrence will be required. Short notice relocation of units is avoided where possible, but is seldom controlled at USARV. These determinations are made at field force level. The shortage of engineer effort is recognized and this fact should be made known to new units through their host. An aggressive self-help program then should be planned and implemented.

f. Reference item concerning AN/VRC-24, page 22, paragraph F1. Agree in principle that a capability is required to provide full ground set utilization of the channel capacity of the airborne AN/ARC-51. However, the need for developing a new radio set is questioned. The AN/ARC-51/BX is presently being used successfully in a ground role in the AN/TSQ-70, 71, and 72 towers. Shortage of the AN/ARC-51/BX precludes their use at present to replace the AN/VRC-24. It appears that developmental cost of producing a new radio set would not justify the initiation of a Small Development Requirement (SDR), when a satisfactory solution is in the Army inventory. It is recommended that a study be made to determine not only the feasibility of procurement and unit substitution of AN/ARC-51/BX for AN/VRC-24 through MTOE action, but also that a determination be made as to the need for a new radio set. There is no known item under development that meets the specific stated requirement.

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AVHGC-DST (14 Jan 68)

3d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (ORLL) (RCS CSFOR-65)
for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968 (UIC WCYPTO)

g. Reference item concerning Avionics Direct Support units, page 22, paragraph F2. Avionics Direct Support Teams have been authorized both for air cavalry squadrons in-country and those scheduled to deploy in the future. At this time, the DS Teams are being carried at zero balance. The availability date for these units is some time in June and July 1968. They are to arrive in-country with the required test equipment to perform their direct support avionics maintenance mission. Until the teams arrive, the 34th General Support Group will continue to provide direct support maintenance for avionics items.

3. (U) The correct Unit Identification Code is WCYPAA.

4. (U) A copy of this indorsement will be furnished to the reporting unit through channels.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C. S. Nakatsukasa
C. S. NAKATSUKASA
Captain, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Copies furnished:
HQ 12th Cbt Avn Gp
HQ 1st Avn Bde

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
32
GPOF-DT (14 Jan 68) (U) 4th Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 12th Cbt Avn Gp for Period Ending
31 January 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)


HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 -2 3 APR 1968

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorse-
ments and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:


C.L. SHORTT
CPT, AGC
Asst AG



CAG: Cbt Avn Gp
 CAB: Cbt Avn Bn
 AHC: Aslt Hel Co
 UAC: Util Apl Co

SAC: Surv Apl Co
 RAC: Recon Apl Co
 ASHC: Aslt Spt Hel Co
 PD: Flt Det

CAC: Corps Avn Co
 ACS: Air Cav Sqdn
 CSAB: Cbt Spt Avn Bn
 ATC: Air Traffic Control

ANNEX A

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12TH CBT AVN GP
TROOP LIST

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>APO</u>
<u>12TH COMBAT AVN GP</u>	Long Binh	96266
HQ & HQ Co	Long Binh	96266
338th Avn Det (OP)	(atch 1st Log Comd)	
340th Avn Det (OP)	(atch 1st Inf Div)	
341st Avn Det (OP)	(atch 25th Inf Div)	
87th QM Det (PETRL)	(atch 54th Arty Gp)	
390th QM Det (PETRL)	(atch 25th Inf Div)	
391st QM Det (PETRL)	(atch 101st Abn Div)	
9th SC Det (RL)	(atch 11th ACR)	
<u>11TH COMBAT AVN BN</u>	Phu Loi	96289
HQ & HQ Co	Phu Loi	96289
128th Aslt Hel Co	Phu Loi	96289
393rd TC Det (KD)	Phu Loi	96289
285th SC Det (RL)	Phu Loi	96289
432nd Med Det (OA)	Phu Loi	96289
162nd Aslt Hel Co	Phouc Vinh	96289
407th TC Det (KD)	Phouc Vinh	96289
450th SC Det (RL)	Phouc Vinh	96289
758th Med Det (OA)	Phouc Vinh	96289
173rd Aslt Hel Co	Lai Khe	96289
408th TC Det (KD)	Lai Khe	96289
451st SC Det (RL)	Lai Khe	96289
759th Med Det (OA)	Lai Khe	96289
213th Aslt Spt Hel Co	Phu Loi	96289
329th TC Det (AB)	Phu Loi	96289
<u>145TH COMBAT AVN BN</u>	Bien Hoa	96227
HQ & HQ Co	Bien Hoa	96277
145th Sec Plt	Bien Hoa	96277
68th Aslt Hel Co	Bien Hoa	96277
391st TC Det (KD)	Bien Hoa	96277
282nd SC Det (RL)	Bien Hoa	96227
430th Med Det (OA)	Bien Hoa	96227
117th Aslt Hel Co	Bien Hoa	96227
140th TC Det (KD)	Bien Hoa	96227
256th SC Det (RL)	Bien Hoa	96227

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>APC</u>
118th Aslt Hel Co	Bien Hoa	96227
573rd TC Det (KD)	Bien Hoa	96227
198th SC Det (RL)	Bien Hoa	96227
190th Aslt Hel Co	Bien Hoa	96227
605th TC Det (KD)	Bien Hoa	96227
520th Med Det (OA)	Bien Hoa	96227
334th Aslt Hel Co	Bien Hoa	96227
571st TC Det (KD)	Bien Hoa	96227
320th SC Det (RL)	Phu Loi	96289
<u>210TH COMBAT AVN BN</u>	Long Thanh	96370
HQ & HQ Co	Long Thanh	96370
129th Med Det (OA)	Long Thanh	96370
120th Aslt Hel Co	Long Binh	96384
98th TC Det (KD)	Long Binh	96384
622nd SC Det (RL)	Long Binh	96384
125th ATC Co	Bien Hoa	96227
16th Sig Co (Hyper Nav)	Tan Son Nhut	96307
USARV Flt Det	Long Thanh	96370
25th Avn Co (Corps)	Long Binh	96266
54th Util Apl Co	Ving Tau	96291
255th TC Det (KC)	Ving Tau	96291
73rd Surv Apl Co	Vung Tau	96291
74th Recon Apl Co	Phu Loi	96289
563rd TC Det (KC)	Phu Loi	96289
184th Recon Apl Co	Phu Loi	96289
243rd SC Det (RL)	Phu Loi	96289
<u>214TH COMBAT AVN BN</u>	Bear Cat	96370
HQ & HQ Co	Bear Cat	96370
772nd Med Det (OA)	Bear Cat	96370
17th Aslt Hel Co	Long Binh	96266
613th TC Det (KD)	Long Binh	96266
722nd SC Det (RL)	Long Binh	96266
93rd Med Det (OA)	Long Binh	96266
135th Aslt Hel Co	Long Giao	96257
614th TC Det (KD)	Long Giao	96257
68th SC Det (RL)	Long Giao	96257

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>APC</u>
191st Aslt Hel Co	Bear Cat	96370
606th TC Det (KD)	Bear Cat	96370
26th SC Det (RL)	Bear Cat	96370
195th Aslt Hel Co	Long Binh	96266
609th TC Det (KD)	Long Binh	96266
366th SC Det (RL)	Long Binh	96266
200th Aslt Spt Hel Co	Bear Cat	96370
611th TC Det (AB)	Bear Cat	96370
240th Aslt Hel Co	Bear Cat	96370
619th TC Det (KD)	Bear Cat	96370
932nd SC Det (RL)	Bear Cat	96370
<u>222ND COMBAT SPT AVN BN</u>	Vung Tau	96291
HQ & HQ Co	Vung Tau	96291
85th Med Det (OA)	Vung Tau	96291
147th Aslt Spt Hel Co	Vung Tau	96291
171st TC Det (AB)	Vung Tau	96291
205th Aslt Spt Hel Co	Phu Loi	96289
612th TC Det (AB)	Phu Loi	96289
273rd Aslt Spt Hel Co (Hvy)	Vung Tau	96291
652nd TC Det	Vung Tau	96291
<u>269TH COMBAT AVN BN</u>	Cu Chi	96353
HQ & HQ Co	Cu Chi	96353
116th Aslt Hel Co	Cu Chi	96353
392nd TC Det (KD)	Cu Chi	96353
283rd SC Det (RL)	Cu Chi	96353
431st Med Det (OA)	Cu Chi	96353
187th Aslt Hel Co	Tay Ninh	96252
602nd TC Det (KD)	Tay Ninh	96252
1st SC Det (RL)	Tay Ninh	96252
541st Med Det (OA)	Tay Ninh	96252
188th Aslt Hel Co	Dau Tieng	96268
603rd TC Det (KD)	Dau Tieng	96268
4th SC Det (RL)	Dau Tieng	96268
154th Med Det (OA)	Dau Tieng	96268
242nd Aslt Spt Hel Co	Cu Chi	96353
621st TC Det (AB)	Cu Chi	96353
<u>308TH COMBAT AVN BN</u>	Bien Hoa	96227
HQ & HQ Co	Bien Hoa	96227

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>APO</u>
<u>1st Sgd 17th Air Cavalry</u>	Di An	96345
HQ & HQ TROOP	Di An	96345
A Troop	Di An	96345
B Troop	Di An	96345
C Troop	Di An	96345
D Troop	Di An	96345
39th TC Det	Di An	96345

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12TH COMBAT AVIATION GROUP STATISTICS

OPERATIONAL HOURS

RW	FW	TOTAL
146,848	34,829	181,677

SORTIES FLOWN

RW	FW	TOTAL
382,064	30,646	412,710

COMBAT SORTIES FLOWN

RW	FW	TOTAL
250,380	0	250,380

PASSENGERS CARRIED

RW	FW	TOTAL
797,266	22,336	819,602

CARGO TRANSPORTED (TONS)

RW	FW	TOTAL
108,361	733	109,094

A/C HIT BY GROUND FIRE

RW	FW	TOTAL
504	8	512

COMBAT LOSSES (ACFT)

RW	FW	TOTAL
23	1	24

AMMUNITION EXPENDED

7.62MM	40MM	2.75"	50cal.
14,386,759	126,262	84,076	17,532

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ANNEX C

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ENEMY LOSSES/DAMAGE INFLICTED

KIA (BODY COUNT)-----628

KIA (ESTIMATED)-----458

VC CAPTURED-----27

STRUCTURES DESTROYED-----523

SAMPANS DESTROYED/SUNK---336

SAMPANS DAMAGED-----51

CASUALTIES MEDICALLY EVACUATED (ARVN & US)

1215

CASUALTIES (12TH CBJ AVN GP)

KIA-----22

WIA-----343

MIA-----0

C-2

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