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AD NUMBER: AD0390505

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U per ONR per GP-4 dtd 29 Apr 1980; ST-A per OAG D/A ltr dtd 29 Apr 1980

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**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310**



IN REPLY REFER TO

AGAM-P (M) (10 Nov 66) FOR OT

28 November 1966

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 1st Cavalry
Division (Airmobile) (U)

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Forwarded as inclosure is Operational Report - Lessons Learned from Headquarters, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) for period ending 31 July 1966. Information contained in this report should be reviewed and evaluated by CDC in accordance with paragraph 6f of AR 1-19 and by CONARC in accordance with paragraph 6c and d of AR 1-19. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to the Commandants of the Service Schools to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

1 Incl
as

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(Distribution continued on page 2)

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- Research Analysis Corporation

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11 15 August 66

SUBJECT: Operational Report [redacted]
for quarterly period ending 31 Jul 66

THRU: Channels

12 74 p.

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20310

18 OACSFOR

19 OT-RD-660292

SECTION I COMMANDER'S NARRATIVE

1. (C) General

a. General Situation. During the period 1 May - 31 July 1966, the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) operated over an area of about 170km by 170km in the Binh Dinh, Pleiku, Kontum, Darlac, and Phu Yen Provinces. Division operations extended from the South China Sea to the Cambodian Border along the axis of Highway 19, from north of Bong Son to Qui Nhon along the South China Sea Coast and from Dak To to Ban Ma Thout along the Cambodian Border. Operations were characterized throughout by heavy reliance on airmobility. The Division base remained at Camp Radcliff, near An Khe throughout the period. During most of the period two brigades operated away from the Division Base, while the other brigade conducted offensive operations in the TACTICAL AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY (TAOR) and improved the security of the base. The Division clearly demonstrated its capability to conduct operations for an extended period against insurgent forces in some terrain which had previously been considered totally inaccessible to heliborne operations. Brigade missions during the period were largely search and destroy operations with the emphasis on searching for and finding the enemy. Numerous enemy camp sites and supply caches were uncovered and destroyed, and the significant engagements led to the pacification of areas previously controlled by the Viet Cong. Security of the TAOR and Division base, construction of barriers around the base, and a vigorous base development program continued simultaneously with tactical operations. Operations within the TAOR were characterized by numerous company sized offensive operations, daytime saturation patrolling, and nighttime ambush patrols.

b. Division organization and key personnel during the reporting period were as follows:

(1) Division Headquarters

Maj Gen Harry W. O. Kinnard	Commanding General
Maj Gen John Norton	6 May 66
Brig Gen John W. Wright	Ass't Div Comdr

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Operations in the TAO were characterized by numerous company sized offensive operations, daytime saturation patrolling, and night-time ambush patrols.

b. Division organization and key personnel during the reporting period were as follows:

(1) Division Headquarters

Maj Gen Harry W O Kinnard	Commanding General
Brig Gen John W Wright	Asst Div Commander
Brig Gen Richard T Knowles	Asst Div Commander
Colonel William A Becker	15 Jan 66
Col George S Beatty Jr	Chief of Staff
Lt Col John D White	ACofS, G1
Lt Col Bobby K Lang	ACofS, G2
Lt Col Earl K Buchan	ACofS, G3
Lt Col Benjamin S Silver	ACofS, G4
Lt Col Robert J Craig	ACofS, G5
Lt Col Monroe Kirkpatrick	10 Mar 66

(2) 1st Brigade (Airborne)

Colonel Elvy B Roberts	CO, 1st Bde (Abn)
Colonel John J Hennessey	1 Mar 66
Lt Col Kenneth D Mertel	CO, 1/8 Cav Bn
Lt Col Levin B Broughton	2) Mar 66
Lt Col John A Henphill	CO, 2/8 Cav Bn
Lt Col Rutland A Beard Jr	CO, 1/12 Cav Bn

(3) 2d Brigade

Col William R Lynch	CO, 2d Bde
Col Marvin J Berenzweig	17 Mar 66

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(5) Division Artillery

Colonel William F. Brand	CO, Div Arty
Lt Col Francis J. Dush	CO, 2/19 Arty
Lt Col Wilbur H. Vinson Jr.	9 Jul 66
Lt Col Morris J. Brady	CO, 2/20 Arty
Lt Col Ernest P. Tenhall	CO, 1/21 Arty
Lt Col William W. Palmer	31 Jul 66
Lt Col Harold T. Smith	CO, 1/77 Arty
Lt Col Arthur L. Kelly	5 Jul 66

(6) 11th Aviation Group

Colonel Allen M. Burdette Jr.	CO, 11th Avn Gp
Colonel Howard I. Lukens	29 Jun 66
Lt Col Jack Cranford	CO, 227 AHB
Lt Col A.T. Pumphrey	1 Jul 66
Lt Col Max Clark	CO, 228 ASHD
Lt Col Robert A. Michaelson	9 Jul 66
Lt Col Robert S. Keller	CO, 229 AHB
Lt Col Leo D. Turner	11 Jul 66
Maj Paul E. Clark	CO, 11th Avn Co (GS)
Maj William S. Perrin	26 Jun 66

(7) Support Command

Lt Col James C. Smith	CO, Spt Comd
Lt Col Benjamin S. Silver	3 May 66
Colonel Jonathan R. Durton	8 Jul 66
Lt Col Frederick Osterhout	CO, 15 S&S Bn
Lt Col Harry L. Corkhill	25 Jul 66
Lt Col Jueri Svjagintsov	CO, 15 Med Bn
Lt Col Charles McQueary	CO, 15 TC Bn
Lt Col Keith J. Dauer	24 Jul 66
Lt Col Granville M. Stagg	CO, 27 Maint Bn
Lt Col Shreve D. Squires	16 May 66
Capt Earl D. Rawlings	CO, 15 Admin Co

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- | | | |
|------|---|----------------------------------|
| (8) | Lt Col Robert M. Shoemaker
Lt Col James C. Smith | CO, 1/9 Cav Sqdn
1 May 66 |
| (9) | Lt Col Robert J. Malley
Lt Col Charles G. Olentine | CO, 8 Engr Bn
17 Jun 66 |
| (10) | Lt Col Paul N. Simon | CO, 13 Sig Bn |
| (11) | Capt Paul Lewis Jr.
Capt Gary W. Lawhead | CO, 545 MP Co
5 Jul 66 |
| (12) | Capt Glen C. Stephens
Capt Milton M. Peterson | CO, HHC 1st Cav Div
5 Jul 66 |
| (13) | Special Staff | |
| | Lt Col James McCarty
Lt Col James W. Ransome | Surgeon
27 Jul 66 |
| | Lt Col Francis A. McIntee
Lt Col Robert D. Stevenson | Inspector General
17 Jul 66 |
| | Lt Col David W. Einsel Jr.
Maj Herman F. Puckhaber | Chemical Officer
29 Jul 66 |
| | Lt Col Morris D. Hodges
Lt Col Emory M. Sneedon | SJA
18 Jul 66 |
| | Lt Col Chester R. Sindsey
Lt Col Thomas McGrath | Chaplain
21 Jul 66 |
| | Lt Col Malcolm R. Daer
Lt Col Daniel B. Plyler | Adjutant General
18 Jul 66 |
| | Maj Charles C. Siler
Maj John F. Phillips | Information Officer
20 Jul 66 |
| | Lt Col Wayne C. Campbell | Finance Officer |
| | Lt Col Herbert W. Uland | Provost Marshal |
| (14) | Attached Units | |
| | Lt Col Charles L. Zolner | CO, 3/18 Arty |
| | Lt Col Norman P. Chandler | CO, 2/17 Arty |
| | Capt Gary E. Schultz
Capt Riley J. McVeay | CO, Btry 29 Arty (SH) |

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Maj Raymond D. Franklin	CO, 17 Avn Co
Maj T. J. Clark	CO, 478 Avn Co
Maj James E. Moore	19 Jul 66
Capt Charles L. LaMere	CO, 586 Sig Co (Spt)
Capt Richard J. Coyne	31 May 66
Maj Gary D. Collier	CO, 191 MI Det
Maj Peter J. Samulevich	CO, 14 Mil Hist Det
Capt John M. Arnold	CO, 10 RRU
Capt Barry D. Ross	21 Jul 66
Capt Charles E. Hill	CO, 24 th Det 5 Wea Sqdn
Maj Joe H. Machetta	36 Jul 66

(15) Supporting Units

Lt Col Charles E. Leacock	CO, 34 QM Bn
Lt Col Leonard Edelstein	CO, 70 Engr Bn
Lt Col John R. Redmond	20 Jul 66
Lt Col Francis C. Dimon Jr.	CO, 2d Surg Hosp
Lt Col Thomas T. Swergart	CO, 56 Med Det
Maj Joseph L. Ecoppi	CO, 6/16 Arty
Maj Ralph O. Deneffield	CO, Btry E 82 Arty
Capt Benjamin Buckley	CO, 11 Avn Gp, Path Co
1/Lt Gary E. Harvey	CO, 184 Cml Plt
Lt James Koller	CO, Det 1, 54 Sig Bn
Maj Dillie Faurot	CO, 382 TC Det

2. (C) Personnel

a. Strength. Authorized and assigned strength at the beginning and close of the reporting period were as follows:

(1) Begin Report Per	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>AGG</u>
Authorized	1180	676	14,099	15,995
Assigned	1302	460	15,643	17,405

(2) Close Report Per	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>AGG</u>
Authorized	1180	676	14,099	15,995
Assigned	1671	551	16,772	18,994

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b. Replacements. A total of 5,789 enlisted replacements were received. During the same period Division losses were 5,451. Some 508 emergency leaves were processed during the period.

e. Morale and Personnel Services:

(1) Morale throughout the Division and attached elements remained excellent.

(2) Decorations awarded:

Distinguished Service Cross	2
Silver Star	40
Distinguished Flying Cross	95
Legion of Merit	7
Soldier's Medal	9
Bronze Star with V Device	365
Air Medal	2539
Army Commendation Medal with V Device	94
Army Commendation Medal	1873
Purple Heart	1500
Certificate of Achievement	183
TOTAL	6707

(3) Combat Badges

Combat Infantry Badge	1590
Combat Medical Badge	314
Aircraft Crewman Badge	575
TOTAL	2487

d. Promotions: A total of 1923 enlisted personnel were promoted during the reporting period.

e. Reenlistments: 285 reenlistments or extension actions were completed. The enlistment/extension breakdown was: First term RA reenlistments 55, AUS reenlistments 5, 202 RA extensions and 23 AUS extensions. Counselors continuously visited units both at base camp and in the field.

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f. Postal:

(1) Money Order Sales	\$2,381,195.00
(2) Postal and Parcel Post Fees	\$92,694.00
(3) Incoming Mail	819,722 lbs
Daily average	9,170 lbs
(4) Outgoing mail	403,848 lbs
Daily average	4,630 lbs
(5) Number of Incoming Mail Days	85
(6) Number of Outgoing Mail Days	87

g. Special Services. During the reporting period a total of 119 movies and TV films were circulated throughout the Division. Nine USO shows played to an estimated attendance of 8900. R&R quotas received were 4021 out-of-country and 661 in-country.

h. Financial Service:

(1) There was a change in the official exchange rate of piasters from 72.9 to 79.2 per \$1.00 U.S.

(2) Four Class "A" agents are working directly for the Finance Officer making visits to the units to pay replacements assigned to the units.

i. Chaplain Activities:

<u>DENOMINATION</u>	<u>NUMBER OF SERVICES</u>	<u>ATTENDANCE</u>
Catholic	768	15,620
Protestant	933	22,443
Jewish	32	255
Memorial	28	5,796
TOTALS	1780	44,362

j. Maintenance of Discipline, Law and Order

(1) Discipline: A total of 375 incidents were reported to the Provost Marshal's Office during the reporting period.

(2) Military Justice:

a. General Courts Martial 3

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(b) Special Courts Martial	96
(c) Summary Courts Martial	61

k. Inspector General Activities. No significant trends in complaints and/or requests were revealed.

1. Medical

(1) Disease and Injury Statistical Data:

(a) Injured as a result of hostile action (IRHA)	472
(b) Non-battle Injuries (NDI)	434
(c) Diseases	3935
1 Malaria Total	1132
Vivax	42
Falciparum	1090
2 Scrub Typhus	6
3 Hook Worm	39
4 Psychiatric Cases	77
5 Other	2
(d) Killed in Action (KIA)	145
(e) Returned to Duty	1069
(f) Remaining in Hospital	*651

*Some of this number were returned to duty, but records on them were not available as of the end of the period.

(2) Discussion of Diseases

(a) Malaria Cases: A total of 3092 cases of malaria occurred in personnel of this Division from 16 September 1965 to 31 July 1966 inclusive. Of these cases, 60 were caused by a type of malaria other than Falciparum Malaria. 9 persons have died during the period due to malaria encephalitis. The Plasmodium organism malaria incidence since arrival in Vietnam is as follows:

UNIT	September thru June	1 - 31 July	TOTAL
1st Dde			
HHC	9	0	9
1/12	391	74	465
1/8	334	59	393
2/8	414	29	443

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UNIT	September thru June	1 - 31 July	TOTAL
2d Dda			
HHC	1	0	1
1/5	175	3	178
2/5	250	10	260
2/12	376	12	388
3d Dda			
HHC	6	1	7
1/7	270	69	339
2/7	212	14	226
Div Arty			
HHD	3	0	3
2/19	50	5	55
2/20	0	0	0
1/21	32	5	37
1/77	40	1	41
2/17	15	3	18
1/30 & 6/14	10	0	10
3/18 & Others	9	4	13
1/9 Cav	66	18	84
GRAND TOTAL	2659	312	2971

1 The incidence rate appears to vary from unit to unit in direct relationship to the area and type of operation. Relatively stationary units have lower rates of malaria than units which are constantly on the move. This reflects the fact that the more stationary units are better able to take full advantage of protective measures against malaria.

2 The malaria incidence showed a high peak during the weeks ending 21 and 28 May. Units were operating in the Vinh Thanh Valley and the Song Da Valley respectively.

3 In June the high peak was reached during the weeks ending 18 and 25 June. The 1st Brigade units were operating in Vinh Thanh Valley approximately two weeks before their peak incidence. Units of the 2d Brigade were operating along the Cambodian Border during the first ten days of that month. The malaria incidence suddenly dropped to about 25 cases during the week of 2 July 1966. This is definitely dependent on the area of operation of all Division units. The 1st and 3d Brigades operated in the Tuy Hoa area, while the 2d Brigade was serving the Base Camp and Highway 19. These latter areas are well known to be regions with a low malaria incidence.

4 In July, the high peak was reached during week ending 16 and 23 July. Geographically, this peak was approximately 20-30 miles west of Tuy Hoa along the Song Da River. The center of this outbreak was pinpointed vicinity BQ8040 and extended outward with a radius of 15-20 miles.

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(b) Malaria Protection:

1 On 15 July 1966, the 1st Air Cavalry Division was directed by USARV to begin administering Dapsone (DDS). Dapsone will be administered daily by roster to all personnel of the Division. This is in addition to the Chloroquine-Primaquine tablets presently taken weekly.

2 Additional command emphasis has been placed on malaria protection measures. A command directive was issued 24 July 1966, which emphasized the necessity for commanders to insure that all possible measures available for protection were faithfully carried out. The importance of the new anti-malaria drug Dapsone when used with Chloroquine-Primaquine and personal protective measures was emphasized.

(c) Three cases of hepatitis have occurred during this report period. This was reported thru medical channels as required. On 25 July 1966, Change 12 to 1st Cavalry Division Circular 40-6, was published which pertained to the administration of Gamma Globulin to individuals exposed to a high degree of risk to infectious hepatitis. Technical control for the usage of gamma-globulin is retained by the Division Surgeon except individual, isolated cases which is specified in Change 12.

(3) Discussion of IRHA, WL, and NBI:

(a) KIA/IRHA ratio 145/472 or 1/3.2 was considerably different from the ratio of 1/4.07 observed in Korea.

(b) Types of IRHA's

1 During the report period 279 gamji stake wounds occurred.

2 No unusual non-battle injuries occurred.

m. Information Officer Activities.

(1) The Information Section operated forward press centers during the following operations:

(a) MOSBY II

(b) DAVY CROCKETT

(c) CRAZY HORSE

(d) HOOKER I

(e) NATHAN HALE

(f) HENRY CLAY

(2) Prepared a documentary film "1st Cavalry Division in Vietnam" for purposes of showing replacements and visitors.

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(3) Prepared a speech kit with 21 color slides for senior officers depicting the 1st Air Cav.

(4) Prepared a brochure for the 1st Cavalry Division Association, highlighting the activities of the Division in Vietnam and introducing delegates of the Skytropper Chapter to the August 25-28 convention in Miami Beach.

(5) Special Activities

(a) Two special articles were prepared for Saber News covering a summary of the combat action for the period ending 31 March 1966 and the period ending 30 June 1966.

(b) A special article was prepared for Army Magazine about the Pleiku Campaign. The article consisted of 11,000 words and was supported by maps and photos.

(c) Special support was provided for Brigadier General (Ret) S.L.A. Marshall during his preparation of a book about the 1st Cavalry Division participation in Operation CRAZY HORSE.

3. (C) Intelligence

a. G2 Organization. The re-organization of the G2 Section which was completed during the last reporting period was tested in actual operation and found to be effective. Two DTOC's, forward and base, were manned by G2 personnel on Operation CRAZY HORSE (16 May - 5 Jun), Operation NATHAN HALE (19 Jun - 1 Jul) and Operation HENRY CLAY (2 Jul - 30 Jul). Personnel and equipment were found to be sufficient to maintain a continuous 24 hour operation in both DTOC's.

b. Operations:

(1) Operation DAVY CROCKETT was conducted during the period 4 - 16 May in northeastern Binh Dinh Province. One confirmed regiment was believed to be in the area and two additional regiments were believed to be capable of re-enforcing. Contact was made with the 9th Bn, 22d NVA Regiment. Of particular significance in this operation was the perfection of the "Hunter-Killer" technique. Recon elements by constant patrolling collected information which was processed at brigade headquarters. The intelligence developed was then exploited by maneuver and artillery units who were air lifted to the target area. \$14,100,000.00 of North Vietnamese currency was captured during the operation.

(2) Operation LEWIS AND CLARK was conducted north-northwest of Camp Radcliff during the period of 3 - 16 May. No major units were believed to be in the area. No significant contact was made with the enemy but good detailed knowledge of infiltration routes and way-stations was gained. A small number of significant documents were captured.

(3) Operation CRAZY HORSE was conducted 16 May - 5 June east of Vinh Thanh Valley in south central Binh Dinh Province. Elements of the 2d VC Regiment were believed to be in the AO. Contact was made with the 2d Regiment; 14th Company, 32 Artillery (120mm mortar); and various local force units. Seventy five linear inches of documents

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were captured. These documents disclosed the VC infrastructure in Binh Dinh Province. Rosters, code names, and designations of installations were discovered during the operations. Large amounts of rice and salt were also discovered.

(4) Operation NATHAN HALE was conducted in eastern Phu Yen Province (19 Jun-4 Jul). Two NVA regiments were believed to be in the AO, 18B and 95th). Significant contact was made with the 18B Regiment. Lt. Le Duc Thong, Commanding Officer, 2d Company, 7th Battalion, 18B Regiment was captured. The lieutenant reconfirmed the presence of the 18B Regiment in the AO. Documents captured by the 3d Brigade on 23 June contained a list of code designations for the 18B Regiment. On 25 June Company A, 1st Battalion, 8th Cavalry captured documents that indicated the 18B and 95th Regiments may possibly be subordinate to Agriculture Site 5 (Division size headquarters).

(5) Operation HENRY CLAY - a reconnaissance in force conducted by the Division 2 July - 30 July from Phu Yen Province to Highway 14 and thence to the Cambodian border. Contacts in this operation were light and sporadic. The discovery of the 95th Battalion, 68th Artillery Regiment, which consists of a 120mm Mortar Company and a 75mm Recoilless Rifle Company lends credence to the belief that a control headquarters, possible division, has been found in Phu Yen.

(6) Overall results of operations during the reporting period:

	<u>KIA</u>	<u>VCC</u>	<u>WPNS</u>
May	351	84	53
June	967	62	284
July	33	8	86
TOTALS	1351	154	423

c. Order of Battle

(1) With the exception of Phu Yen and Kontum Provinces, the disposition of units carried on OB holding in the Division's areas of interest has changed only slightly. The 24th NVA Regiment confirmed in Kontum Province and possibly the 88th Regiment reported there, and new significance to the area. During Operation NATHAN HALE in Phu Yen Province the 18B NVA Regiment and the 95th Artillery Regiment were identified. Comments by VCC's and review of documents captured indicate that a control headquarters designated Agriculture Site 5 (a division level headquarters) is operational in the Phu Yen area. Captives and documents remain of prime significance in identifying units. Other sources, too numerous to mention, reporting on locations of VC units, are still found to be very inaccurate and tend to give a false picture of the actual disposition. It requires a major effort to screen the good from the bad.

(2) Despite the usual hindrance imposed during the transition of personnel due to rotation, the section successfully

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supported the Division G2 on two major operations in the field and was able to stay current with the necessary carding, filing, posting and analyzing to prevent a backlog of work and keep holdings current. During the period the section published a 137 page Order of Battle handbook, pocket size, that has proven to be very valuable to commanders and staff officers.

(3) To date no approval has been received to provide augmentation to the OS Section. To successfully service the requirements of the Division for its unusually large area of operational interest, additional personnel are required. The constant shifting of interest and work from one area to another, because of the lack of personnel has hampered the section in developing the degree of professionalism expected.

d. G2 Air

(1) Missions flown during the reporting period.

(a) IR	128
SLAR	50
Photo	82
Visual	299

(2) Aerial Surveillance and Target Acquisition.

(a) IR data was used for artillery H&I fires and by the infantry brigades in their patrols. During the recent HENRY CLAY and NATHAN HALE Operations, the G2 Air received requests from subordinate units for IR capabilities. Unit intelligence officers think that IR will pick up troops, bivouac areas, camp fires, etc. Recent testing by the ASTA Platoon revealed that the IR system cannot detect VC cooking fires if even the slightest passive measures are taken. Intensive visual reconnaissance follow-up missions revealed over 95% of the emissions to be caused by "slash and burn" farming practices. Intelligence officers at all levels should be aware that infra-red cannot detect personnel or small cooking fires under cover.

(b) Visual missions by far outnumbered all other type missions flown during this period. Numerous small sightings were made.

(c) Most photo missions were of small areas and were flown and processed within a few hours to a few days. Weather plays a part in this type of mission. With low cloud cover and bad weather photo missions have to hold until the weather clears. If units give leeway and do not insist on vertical photos, oblique photos can be made with a lower cloud ceiling and prints delivered in a shorter period of time.

(d) Little intelligence information of use to the Division was gained by SLAR except for the fact that the VC are not using vehicles on certain routes.

e. Maps: The new 1:50,000 maps, Series (L7014) was received at the Division map depot. Shortages of certain sheets of the 1:250,000

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maps exist. Photo-maps have been received for testing and evaluation.

f. 54th Infantry Detachment (Surveillance): Radars of the brigades have been attached to the 54th Infantry Detachment. In the base area 6 AN/TPS 33s are utilized on the barrier. One AN/TPS 33 is utilized on Hongkong for coverage on the west portion of the barrier. Terrain and airmobile operations mitigate their effective use outside of the static base area.

g. Detachment 24, 5th Weather Squadron.

(1) Support furnished 1st Cavalry Division:

(a) Forecast support (24 hour forecasts, climatic briefs and flight briefings) was provided to operating brigades and to the base camp.

(b) Observing support (0500 - 2000) hours in forward areas and 24 hours in base camp) was provided to operation brigades, Division forward and base camp.

(2) The problem areas are:

(a) Teletype outages causing shortage of valuable data for forecasting.

(b) The lack of a permanent location for the detachment. Both the forecasting station at the Golf Course and the observing site at An Khe airfield had to be moved due to construction.

(c) Necessary equipment was periodically deadlined due to tool and parts shortages.

(d) Inadequate communications precluded any forecasting from Division forward.

(e) Continued lack of Pilot Reports hampered forecasting and flight briefing functions.

h. 10th RRU. This unit participated in all combat operations during the reporting period. Special intelligence items were produced during operations which related directly to enemy activity.

i. 191st MI Detachment.

(1) The IPW Section interrogated 156 captives and 1219 Viet Cong suspects. Two hundred eighty-one linear inches of documents were screened, of which 9 $\frac{1}{2}$ linear inches were translated. Items not translated at this headquarters were forwarded to I Field Forces, Vietnam for further exploitation. Considerable intelligence was gained to include unit designations, locations, strengths, and activity.

(2) Brigade operations were supported by CI teams consisting of two agents and one interpreter. Documents and refugees were screened, liaison was established with local government agencies to obtain Order of Battle and counter-intelligence information.

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(a) There were no known threats to the internal security of the Division.

(b) The personnel security program was adequate.

(c) The Day Office established in An Khe by the CI Section during the previous reporting period has proven it's value. Agents were able to use the office as a point of contact. Close liaison with local Vietnamese agencies is now a routine matter. Plans have been made to have the office open 24 hours a day.

(3) Special areas receiving attention at end of reporting period:

(a) Accountability and destruction of classified information and destruction of non-classified defense information.

(b) Physical security of Camp Radcliff.

(c) Continuing emphasis on security of information covering future plans.

4. (C) Operations and Training

a. Organization

(1) Attachments and Detachments: During the reporting period two units were attached to the Division. On 17 June 1966 Battery C, 6th Battalion, 16th Artillery was attached to Division Artillery and on 20 June 1966 the 25th Infantry Scout Dog Platoon was attached to the 1st Brigade.

(2) Modification Tables of Organization and Equipment: At the end of the period there were three MTOE actions still in progress. All three recommendations had been approved by Headquarters, USARV and forwarded. These requests were as follows:

(a) 27th Maintenance Battalion (MTOE 29-86T) requested a Detachment BA General Supply and Detachment DA Automotive Repair.

(b) 184th Chemical Platoon (DS) (MTOE 3-7E) requested 3 automotive mechanics and appropriate tools.

(c) An emergency MTOE requested 198 helicopter mechanics to improve the Division's "A" level maintenance in 25 company size Divisional units.

(3) MTOE studies were conducted to standardize door gunner positions throughout the Division and to add psychological operations sections to the G3 Section and the Brigade S3 Sections.

(4) Chemical Operations:

(a) During the reporting period, the locally fabricated helicopter grenade dispenser continued to be used in support

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of operations, along with E159 Cluster Cannister, CS and the M5 Riot Control Dispenser. During Operation HAMTHORNE, the grenade dispenser with 400 M7 CS grenades proved particularly effective in penetrating the tree canopy. The CS agent cloud remained within the tree canopy and effectively reduced firing from the area. During May, E159 Cluster Cannisters of CS were used in Operation DAVY CROCKETT near Bong Son. Coverage averaged about 300 by 300 meters with one malfunction of half an E159. The munition had previously been exposed to considerable rain and it was generally believed that the malfunction resulted from damp powder train. During the period 24 - 27 May, in support of Operation CRAZY HORSE, a unique use was made of powdered CS1 riot control agent. Two M5 Riot Control Agent dispensers were mounted on a HU-1B helicopter. Flying at 80 knots at tree top level, a temporary barrier was emplaced to hinder enemy movement across an eight kilometer line. Reconnaissance elements on the far side of the line detected no enemy movement across this sector during the period. Each sortie used 80 pounds of CS1 and covered a distance of about 1.5 kilometers with a 100 meter wide area of contamination in a little over a minute of spray time. Heavy afternoon showers required respraying each morning to maintain the effectiveness of the barrier. Twenty-five expendable CS launchers, E8, were received late in the period for test and evaluation. No data were compiled on these at the end of the reporting period.

(b) Four modified light weight M9 portable flame throwers were also received during the period for test and evaluation. Initial tests indicated that the units were comparable in performance to the much heavier M9 portable flamethrowers. Testing and evaluation was continuing at the close of the reporting period.

(c) Defoliation of the Camp Radoliff barrier continued throughout the period. Spraying was done by hand and truck-mounted sprayers. 5665 gallons of a mixture of 2,4,5-T and 2,4-D in diesel fuel were sprayed over an area of about 422 hectares.

b. Operations:

(1) During the reporting period 11 major plans, 9 major operations orders, and 93 frag orders were issued. During the reporting period, the 8 organic infantry battalions operated outside the Division base a total of 654 battalion days, nearly 88% of the total of 736 infantry battalion days in the period. Division artillery battalions were committed for 498 battalion days of a total available 552 artillery battalion days in support of operations away from Camp Radoliff. In all 82 battery moves were conducted with the use of organic aircraft. The Cavalry Squadron was committed 93% of the troop days during the reporting period and was committed 68% of the days in operations beyond the normal Division tactical area of responsibility (TAOR).

(2) During the reporting period one infantry battalion, reinforced by up to 350 personnel from the resident units, continued to defend Camp Radoliff and conduct offensive operations within 21 kilometers of Camp Radoliff. These missions, broadly described through this report as TAOR operations, were given the continuous code designation, Operation BURNING, and included security of the base, An Khe Airfield, the bridges in An Khe, and the ground line of communications

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(National Route 19) from Deo Mang Pass to Pleiku; patrolling; show of force; support of local CIDG actions; pacification and civil actions.

c. Discussion and analysis of major operations:

(1) The operations discussed below were the operations which the division conducted during the period 1 May to 31 July 1966. In addition to these operations, the division participated in smaller operations. Within the TAOR, squad to battalion size airmobile search and clear, search and destroy operations were performed daily as part of Operation BENNING. These missions were characterized by intensive daytime patrolling and extensive nighttime ambushes, ranging from fire-team size to entire company operations. Some of the other type operations which the division accomplished but are not discussed below were: Engineer and artillery support of 3/25th Infantry in Operation PAUL REVERE I and 1/101st Airborne Division in Operation HAWTHORNE, artillery support of Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces, aerial artillery interdiction missions, escort of US and ARVN convoys, escort of engineer and tactical convoys, security for engineer construction of airfields, security of downed aircraft, reconnaissance missions by Cavalry squadron throughout Pleiku, Kontum, Phu Yen, Darlac, Binh Dinh and Quang Ngai Provinces in areas reported or suspected enemy activity, and maintenance of IFFV reserve-reaction force.

(2) Operation LEWIS AND CLARK: On 3 May the 2d Brigade initiated Operation LEWIS AND CLARK, a one battalion reconnaissance in force operation progressing from Plateau Gi (BS0914) in Kontum Province to the division base at An Khe. The operation was characterized by heliborne assaults followed by small unit sweeps with light to moderate contact. The heaviest contact was on 12 May when A 2/12 engaged a VC Company vicinity BR327650. In the course of the operation the battalion discovered an ordnance station, an aid station, a training area, and an enemy battalion headquarters. Much intelligence was gained concerning infiltration routes and staging areas. The operation was terminated on 16 May.

RESULTS	ENEMY LOSSES	TOTALS	FRIENDLY LOSSES	TOTALS
	KIA(BC)	6	KIA	7
	KIA(EST)	2	WIA	62
	WIA(EST)	2	MIA	0
	VCC	2		
	VCS	1		
	Indiv Wpns	10		
	C/S Wpns	1		

(3) Operation DAVY CROCKETT: The 3d Brigade launched Operation DAVY CROCKETT vicinity Bong Son (8797) in Binh Dinh Province on 4 May 1966. Action in the initial stage of the operation was characterized by violent engagements with encircled large NVA/VC

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forces, resulting in heavy enemy casualties and light to moderate friendly casualties. The 9th NVA battalion was virtually wiped out. The enemy defense employed anti-aircraft and recoilless rifles. After 11 May the operation was conducted in the Crow's Foot area of the Kim Son Valley (SW of Bong Son) using the hunter-killer concept. This concept utilized a very light force operating in a pure cavalry manner as the "hunter" team to locate enemy forces. A battalion size force, the "killer" team, remained poised to engage an enemy found. This system permitted covering very large areas in relatively short periods of time, reduced the requirements for logistical and aviation support, provided a relatively fresh combat force at all times and increased the likelihood of enemy reaction since the apparent friendly forces were initially small. The operation terminated on 16 May.

RESULTS	ENEMY LOSSES	TOTALS	FRIENDLY LOSSES	TOTALS
	KIA(BC)	345	KIA	27
	KIA(EST)	192	WIA	155
	WIA(EST)	112	MIA	1
	VCC	82	Equip	1 UH-1D
	VCS	720		
	Indiv Wpns	40		
	C/S Wpns	2		

(4) Operation CRAZY HORSE: Operation CRAZY HORSE was triggered on 16 May when Co B 2/8 Cavalry, in support of CIDG elements air assaulted into LZ Herford (BR663628) and made contact with an estimated enemy battalion. A total of 5 organic infantry battalions, 3 Cav Troops, 9 artillery batteries, 1 ROK battalion, 1 provisional CIDG battalion and four ARVN task forces were committed to the operation which extended from Vinh Thanh (Happy) Valley to the Suoi Ca Valley and the Crow's Foot, all in Binh Dinh Province. Much of the action was in densely jungled terrain in which most landing zones had to be hacked from the jungle. Contact resulted in virtual annihilation of at least 2 battalions of the 2d NVA Regiment. The operation ended 5 June.

RESULTS	ENEMY LOSSES	TOTALS	FRIENDLY LOSSES	TOTALS
	KIA(BC)	501	KIA	79
	KIA(EST)	380	WIA	346
	WIA(EST)	175	MIA	1
	VCC	27	Indiv Wpns	19
	VCS	112	C/S Wpns	1
	Indiv Wpns	97	USAF flare ship	1
	C/S Wpns	15		

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(5) Operation HOOKER I: The 2d Brigade initiated HOOKER I, a search and destroy operation in the vicinity of Poley Djereng (YA8753), Poley Mrong (ZA075675) and Poley Kleng (ZA0594) in Kontan Province on 10 June. The operation was characterized by extensive patrolling and search and destroy operations with only few and light contacts. The most important development was on 19 June when Co B 2/12 discovered a hut in the vicinity of YA955524 containing 2 US type 60mm mortars and other weapons. The operation terminated 21 June.

RESULTS	ENEMY LOSSES	TOTALS	FRIENDLY LOSSES	TOTALS
	KIA(BC)	1	KIA	0
	WIA(EST)	1	WIA	10
	Indiv Wpns	10	MIA	0
	C/S Wpns	2		

(6) Operation NATHAN HALE: This search and destroy operation in the vicinity of Dong Tre (BQ9070) and Tuy Hoa (CQ1747) Phu Yen Province began on 19 June, an operation of the 2/327 Infantry, 1st Brigade 101st Airborne Division. The battalion became heavily engaged with a large NVA force and the IFPV reserve-reaction force; TF Colt (1/8 Cav) was committed on 25 June. On 27 June 3/5 battalion, US Marine Corps, joined the 1st and 3d Brigades of the 1st Cavalry Division and was committed to the operation. The operation was characterized by vicious close combat in the initial phase and hunter-killer techniques were used extensively by friendly forces. The operation ended 1 July.

RESULTS	ENEMY LOSSES	TOTALS	FRIENDLY LOSSES	TOTALS
	KIA(BC)	459	KIA	34
	KIA(EST)	291	WIA	216
	WIA(EST)	103	MIA	2
	VCC	35		
	VCS	77		
	Indiv Wpns	131		
	C/S Wpns	29		
	Rice-355,000 lbs, Corn-1,000 lbs, Documents- 10 lbs			

(7) Operation HENRY CLAY: A continuation of NATHAN HALE, operation HENRY CLAY was initiated by the 1st and 3d Brigades of the 1st Cavalry Division and 2/327 Inf, 101st Airborne Division on 2 July in Phu Yen, Phu Bon, and Darlac Provinces. In the initial phase of the operation there was only light and sporadic contact. Intensive patrolling revealed bunkers, storage areas, rest sites, and training areas which were destroyed. In the final stages of the operation negative contact was made. The operation terminated 30 July.

RESULTS	ENEMY LOSSES	TOTALS	FRIENDLY LOSSES	TOTALS
	KIA(BC)	33	KIA	4
	KIA(EST)	14	WIA	23
	VCC	8		
	VCS	12		
	Indiv Wpns	82		
	C/S Wpns	4		

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c. Training

(1) Training activities continued under the provisions of Division Circular 350-50, which covers the period of 1 April - 30 September 1966. Training emphasized by the division program included:

(a) Replacement training, which was also the subject of Division Circular 350-51. This circular established standards for training of incoming personnel to meet the USARV requirement of a minimum of 40 hours of instruction prior to participation in combat operations. In addition to orientation, survival training and zero of individual weapons, replacement personnel were required to complete the Quick-Fire Reaction Course and become familiar with other weapons in the unit.

(b) The division orientation, normally conducted by the Replacement Company, was suspended during the period of heavy rotation of personnel. The scope of unit orientation prescribed by Division Circular 350-50 was expanded to include material formerly presented in the division orientation.

(c) Door gunner training was conducted for all incoming personnel assigned as door gunners or crew chiefs. Refresher training was conducted for all door gunners and crew chiefs during the period.

(d) A one-week orientation program for incoming senior officers was established by Division Circular 350-55. 29 colonels and lieutenant colonels attended the course, which was scheduled to be continued throughout the period of rotation of commanders and staff officers.

(2) Training support from non-divisional sources:

(a) Ninety division personnel attended aircraft maintenance training on the UH-1 and CH-47 aircraft under the Army Aircraft Mobile Training Assistance Program (AMTAP).

(b) Four division personnel attended maintenance training on the AN/PFC 74 conducted by the 578th Ordnance Company in Saigon.

(c) One officer attended a one-week civil affairs course conducted by MACV/USAID advisory personnel.

(d) Arrangements were completed to permit division personnel to attend the 5th Special Forces Group Long Range Patrol School. The initial division quota of 10 personnel was filled by the 2d Brigade units.

(e) The 1st Cavalry Division (AM) trained 27 students from IFFV OPCON units on the Chemical Detector Man-Pack. The course lasted 11 days and included both mechanical training and practical exercises.

(3) Special Training Programs

(a) Aerial suppressive fire, aviation personnel assigned to weapons companies and air cavalry troops conducted training in delivery of preparatory fires on landing zones and suppressive fire using aerial weapons.

(b) Autorotation training with the OH-13 and UH-1 aircraft was conducted with the majority of aviators completing a minimum of three autorotations during the period.

d. Combat Developments

(1) Combat Developments: During the period of this report the Division participated in the test and evaluation of the following equipment:

(a) The helicopter 20mm automatic gun system XM-31 was evaluated during the period. The purpose of this evaluation was to determine the operational suitability and the concepts for employment of the 20mm automatic gun system, XM-31 mounted on the UH-1B helicopter in the counterinsurgency environment of the Republic of Vietnam. This evaluation was completed by ACTIV but the final report was not published during this report. The XM-31 armament system was designed to give the helicopter the offensive capability placing rapid-fire, high-explosive incendiary (HEI), armor piercing incendiary (API), and armor piercing tracer (APT) rounds on a hostile area and soft point target at a greater stand-off range than is currently possible with existing helicopter armament systems.

(b) The evaluation of the Starlight Scope (SSS) and the Night Vision Sight for crew-served weapons (CSWS) was completed during this period. The Starlight Scope provided battlefield surveillance, target acquisition and the ability to deliver armed rifle and machine gun fire within a range of 400 meters. The Night Vision Sight for crew served weapons provided battlefield surveillance, target acquisition and delivery of armed fire from crew served weapons within a range of 1000 meters. The use of Night Vision Devices in both offensive and defensive operations was limited only by the imagination of the Unit Commander in his employment of the equipment. The Starlight Scope added greatly to developing the individual soldier's confidence in his ability to conduct night operations effectively and aggressively. When used in conjunction with the AN/PPS 4; Ground Radar Surveillance Set the night vision devices provided more accurate identification of targets sighted on the radar scope. Some weather conditions tended to reduce the effectiveness of these scopes. Fog had a tendency to reduce the ambient light level and also decrease the range. Light haze had very little effect on the sharpness of the images. On dark nights the devices were used with artificial illumination. The night vision scopes proved suitable for air surveillance along highways, canals, rivers, coastlines and these scopes were available in the Division in operational quantities.

(c) Twenty-five Long Range Patrol Radios were received by the Division on 30 June 1966. These radios were given to the brigades and the 1/9 Cavalry for evaluation. Maintenance personnel

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from the 27th Maintenance Battalion were trained in Saigon. The evaluation of this radio was not completed during this period.

(d) One Forest Penetrator was received on 13 July 1966 for evaluation. This was a device for extracting personnel from areas not open to helicopter landings. The final evaluation of this item was not completed during this period.

(e) Two hundred and eighty Individual Water Filter Pumps were received on 30 June 1966 for evaluation by the Division. The Individual Water Filter Pump is designed to remove foreign matter from water. By operating the pull-push type piston water may be pumped from its source filtered and transferred into a canteen which can be attached directly to the pump. Filtered water must be treated with water purification tablets. Evaluation was not completed during this period.

(f) A Heliborne Illuminating System consisting of 7 G-123 landing lights was fabricated in-country. The system was evaluated by the 1/9 Cavalry, who were satisfied that it was an aid in night operations. The system was usually employed using the light ship to mark targets only. Aviation Group's evaluation of this system was not completed during this period.

(g) Evaluation of the following experimental ammunition was conducted:

XM-546	105mm	Beehive Round
XM-590	90mm	Beehive Round
XM-591	90mm	HE Round
XM-581	106mm	Beehive Round
XM-576	40mm	Multiple Part id

USARV requested that these items be made available in operational quantities. These rounds have been fired in demonstrations with favorable results. Because of a lack of targets negative results have been achieved in combat.

(2) On 9 June 1966 a Combat Developments Board was established in the Division under Regulation 15-1.

(a) The mission of the board was defined as follows:

1 Determine all combat developments requirements and responsibilities within the Division.

2 Accept and recommend the allocation of all CD items sent to the Division for test purposes.

3 Determine projects to be studied.

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- 4 Determine and request equipment to be tested.
- 5 Recommend assignment of projects to units or agencies.
- 6 Monitor all projects.
- 7 Coordinate all CD activities in the Division and attached units.
- 8 Act as a repository and focal point for all CD information, files, correspondence, etc.

(3) Commanders of major commands, and separate attached units (not attached to a major or separate command) appointed a staff officer the additional duty of combat developments. This officer became the point of contact within that unit for all combat developments projects.

(4) Lt Col Henson was attached as the ACTIV Project Officer for the Division. His primary function was to serve as a point of contact between ACTIV and the Division.

5. (C) Logistics

a. General

(1) During the period covered by this report logistical support was provided for ten operations.

(a) Operation MOSBY II began on 21 April with the commitment of the 2d Brigade to the Pleiku area. The Second Forward Support Element was established at Pleiku and received support from logistical command stocks that had been built up at Camp Holloway, Pleiku. On 25 April the Second Forward Support Element displaced to Kontum as the brigade continued operations toward the northeast. In this phase logistical support was received from the Qui Nhon Support Activity which had prestocked supplies at Kontum. Resupply was effected primarily by GLOC from Qui Nhon and Pleiku with some use of ALOC for select items. The 2d FSE established forward emergency supply points at Pleiku Gi an? Mang Buk. Minimal stocks of JP-4, AVGAS and some Class V were stocked at these locations. Operation MOSBY II terminated on 3 May.

(b) Operation LEWIS AND CLARK, a battalion sized operation conducted by elements of the 2d Brigade was initiated on 3 May and terminated on 15 May. Initially the operation was supported logistically by the 2d FSE located at Kontum. As the operation continued near Camp Radcliff the 2d FSE displaced to Camp Radcliff and continued to support the operation from that location. The method of support employed was to deliver the supplies required to pre-selected locations along the route of march establishing supply points and effecting unit delivery. Operation LEWIS AND CLARK saw a logistical FIRST for the Support Command, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile); i.e., sustained logistical support by rotary wing aircraft of a maneuver element

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conducting a ground reconnaissance in terrain not accessible by other means.

(c) Operation DAVY CROCKETT, which began on 4 May and terminated on 16 May, was conducted by the 3d Brigade. The 3d FSE located at area Dog provided the logistical support. A FSE of the Qui Nhon Area was co-located with the 3d FSE. Resupply was effected by GLOC from Qui Nhon to area Dog. In some cases, throughput from Qui Nhon to the using unit was accomplished. Logistical support of DAVY CROCKETT was a routine operation characterized by a lack of supply problems.

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(d) Operation CRAZY HORSE began on 11 May. It was a continuation of operations begun by the 1st Brigade under OPORD 6615 (BURNING) (U). Logistical support was provided by the 1st FSE located at Camp Redcliff. A forward supply point was established in the vicinity of the Vinh Than CLG Camp with emergency supplies of JP-4, AVGAS, and selected Class V items. Resupply was effected using organic rotary wing aircraft and by GLOC from Camp Redcliff with some throughput of Class III and Class V from Qui Nhon by GLOC. The operation terminated on 5 June.

3
(e) Operation HAWTHORNE was initiated on 13 June and terminated on 20 June. The operation was conducted by the 101st Infantry with one battalion of the 1st Cavalry being deployed as TF Colt in support of the 101st. The participating 1st Cavalry unit was supported by the 2d FSE located at Kontum by organic aircraft, some GLOC from Pleiku Support Area, and some ALOC of supplies from Qui Nhon.

(f) Operation HOOKER I, a one brigade operation conducted by the 2d Brigade, began on 10 June and ended on 21 June. Logistical support was provided by the 2d FSE located at Kontum. During the course of the operation forward emergency supply points were established at Plei Krong and Plei Djereng. Qui Nhon Support Command provided support by GLOC from Pleiku with some throughput from Qui Nhon.

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(g) Operation MATHAN HALE started on 14 June when a battalion of the 3d Brigade was deployed as TF Colt as requested by a battalion of the 101st Infantry in contact with an enemy force of undetermined size. As the operation continued the 3d Brigade was deployed and later the 1st Brigade was deployed. On 27 June the Division forward CP displaced to the AO and assumed control of the operation. The 3d FSE was located vicinity Tuy Hoa South Airfield and supported the operation from there. As the force increased in size the FSE augmented with additional personnel and equipment. A forward supply point was established in the vicinity of Dong Tre with minimal stocks of all classes of supply. The operation was supported by the Nha Trang Support Command. The Nha Trang Support Command established a Forward Support Activity vicinity Tuy Hoa South co-located with the 3d FSE. Supplies were received by GLOC and ALOC, and, for the first time in support of the 1st Cavalry operations, an extensive Sea LOC was utilized. The operation terminated on 1 July.

(h) Operation HENRY CLAY, a divisional operation, was initiated on 2 July in Phu Yen Province. The Division's 3d FSE supported the initial stages on the operation from Tuy Hoa South, being co-located with the Tuy Hoa Sub Area Command. On 3 July, Route 7B between Tuy Hoa North and Cung Son was opened to logistical convoys. 1st Logistical Command throughput daily convoys to the forward refueling

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and rearming point at Cung Son, maintaining a one day stockage of Class I, III, and V. Security of Route 7B was provided by 2/327 Infantry. On 13 July, responsibility for logistical support of Operation HENRY CLAY was shifted from 3d FSE at Tuy Hoa South to the 1st FSE located at Ban Blech. Qui Nhon Support Command provided a Forward Support Activity at Ban Blech to support the operation. A land LOC was used for resupply, originating at Ileiku and terminating at Ban Blech or Cheo Reo. During the period 10 thru 15 July, four logistical convoys went into Ban Blech in support of the 1st Brigade and two into Cheo Reo in support of the Division Headquarters and elements of the 11th Aviation Group. On 16 July, the Division Headquarters and elements of the 11th Aviation Group deployed from Cheo Reo to An Khe and backhaul of supplies was completed from that location on 18 July. Thereafter, logistical convoys were sent to Ban Blech on requirements. Operation terminated on 30 July and the backhaul of supplies was completed the same day.

18 (1) Operation HAYES, a brigade size operation, was initiated on 7 July with the deployment of TF 1/7 to Dak To and 3d Brigade Headquarters to Kontum. 3d FSE supported the operation, being co-located at Dak To with a Forward Support Activity from QNSC. An ALOC was used as the primary means of resupply until weather conditions in the area required a land LOC to become operational. Ground convoys went into Dak To on 28 and 29 July. The operations continues.

(2) During the reporting period extensive logistical planning was accomplished in coordination with I Field Force Vietnam, Qui Nhon Support Area, Nha Trang Support Area, and the 1st Marine Division in preparation for planned operations.

(3) During the period 5 - 9 May personnel of this section participated in a war gaming exercise conducted at IFFV, Nha Trang.

(4) Lack of cargo vehicle transportation continues to handicap the movement of personnel and supplies over ground lines of communications. On 21 May this headquarters submitted another request for attachment of a Transportation Company, Light Truck.

(5) Priority requirements have been met throughout the reporting period by close liaison visits with 34th Supply and Service Battalion and Qui Nhon Support Area Command.

b. Supply and Services

(1) Class I: The Division has been subsisting on a modified A-ration during this reporting period. An unscheduled ration ship arrived in Qui Nhon which filled depot stocks, making it unnecessary to substitute B-rations for A-rations as was anticipated. The Division and the An Khe Area perishable storage problem has been solved with the completion of nine each cubic foot refrigerated boxes at the Division Class I Point, and installation of 22 each, 1200 cubic foot refrigerated boxes at the 34th Supply and Service Battalion. Class I is presently functioning smoothly. Continent issues are not complete, due to a general shortage in the supply system, however, it should be noted that improvement has been made in this area over the past three months. Presently this is not considered a serious problem.

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(2) Class II and IV: During the reporting period 294 GP medium tents were damaged by wind storms. Qui Nhon arranged shipments of 50 GP large tents and 252 medium tents as interim replacements. It is anticipated that all replacement tentage will be received by mid-August. Stockage levels are continuing to rise in the Self Service Supply Center, providing increased service to the customers. Vehicle UVM and hand tools continue to be short supply items; however, Qui Nhon stocks have filled during this reporting period and immediate relief is expected. To date, the Division has received 20,940 bags of cement against an allocation of 53,000 bags for construction of tent pads. Class II and IV continues to show improvement.

(3) Class III: Class III operations have functioned smoothly throughout the present reporting period. No problems are presently anticipated.

(4) Class V: Ammunition continues to be available in adequate quantities. During this reporting period, no major problem areas have arisen. Ammunition support has been satisfactory in all aspects.

(5) The following amounts in short tons were used by the Division during the quarter:

Class I		
<u>A Rations</u>	<u>B Rations</u>	<u>C Rations</u>
1,382.3	2,864.85	378.6
Class II & IV		
<u>Clothing and Equipment</u>	<u>Fortification Materials</u>	
963.4	1,616.5	
Class III		
<u>Type</u>	<u>Gallons</u>	
AVGAS	886,156	
JP-4	4,443,272	
MCGAS	1,149,167	
Diesel	632,686	
Class V		
<u>TONNAGE</u>		
9,769.87		

c. Transportation.

(1) On 11 May the Department of the Army approved the Division plan for replacement of approximately 10,000 rotatees during the months of June, July and August. Rotatees and replacements arriving after 1 July are flown by Military Airlift Command from Travis AFB to Pleiku.

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(2) On 16 May the panel bridge over the Song Ba River was opened extending Longhorn Road to An Khe Airfield and ultimately providing an additional access road to Highway 19 east of An Khe. The class 35 bridge, 12 feet 6 inches wide was installed by the 70th Engineer Battalion.

(3) On 25 May the 315th Air Commando Wing conducted a demonstration on the Golf Course fixed wing airfield. The demonstration consisted of aerial delivery by ILADS (Parachute Low Altitude Delivery System) and LAFES (Low Altitude Extraction System). Thirty drums of defoliant were dropped with a CEI of 35 feet and salvage of 60% of material delivered.

(4) The new Golf Course Fixed Wing runway opened on 17 June, closed on 28 June. During the time a total of 154, C-130 sorties were flown from the T-17 membrane runway. The runway was deeply rutted and torn by C-130 operations and required constant and continuous maintenance by the 8th Engineer Battalion for continuous operations.

d. Maintenance:

(1) Ground Maintenance: On 15 May a Heavy Artillery Repair Team headed by Lt Col Phillip H. Taft arrived at Camp Radoliff. The mission of this team was to make on the spot repairs to 175mm and 8 inch artillery pieces.

(a) The Division AGI Team conducted an inspection of the 3d Battalion, 18th Artillery during the period 18 - 21 July. This inspection was in preparation for the USARV AGI Team which was to inspect the battalion later in the month. Maintenance inspectors from the Division CMI Team and selected equipment inspectors from the 34th Supply and Service Battalion were used to inspect equipment and related records. The battalion received 40 satisfactory and 9 unsatisfactory ratings on equipment inspected.

(b) The technical inspection of all ground mount M60 machine guns which began in June is continuing. Five hundred and twenty two (522) M60's had been inspected of which 129 were found to be unserviceable. The program was 62% complete as of the end of July. Action has been initiated to replace the unserviceable machine gun bases on a 23% unserviceable rate for all M60's in the Division.

(2) Aircraft Maintenance.

a. Following number of aircraft by type have been dropped from property accountability during the reporting period.

UH-13	13
UH-1B	14
UH-1D	2
CH-47A	2

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(b) Following number of aircraft by type have been issued (from depot stock) during the reporting period.

UH-1B/540	16
UH-1D	14
CH-13	6

(c) Safety of Flight Inspections:

1 Combining Transmissions, CH-47A Aircraft: Excessive axial play was found on twenty (20) CH-47A combining transmissions. Eight additional combining transmissions were found to be borderline cases. Requisitions were submitted to cover borderline cases and future TBO requirements.

2 Engine Transmissions, CH-47A Aircraft: Nine CH-47A engine transmissions were found to have excessive radial play. Requisitions were submitted to cover Division requirements.

3 Tail Rotor Hub Assemblies have been inspected on a total of 197 aircraft (UH-1B and UH-1D) to date. Low torque was noted on thirty one bearing set retainer nuts. In addition, twelve bearing sets were found defective. Corrective action has been accomplished and inspection is continuing on remainder of the float.

4 A requirement has been imposed for a special X-Ray investigation of all CH-47A aft rotor blades. An inspection team from CONUS is setting up the required facilities at this station and the inspection program will be started on or about 1 August 1966.

5 All CV-2, CH-13, and OV-1 aircraft were inspected for compliance with modification work order directing installation of Chip Detector warning lights. A total of eighty seven CH-13 aircraft and six OV-1 aircraft required compliance with this modification. Supply action had been previously initiated for the CH-13's, and kit requirements for OV-1 were reported to 58th Trans Bn.

6 Main rotor hub sleeve nuts were inspected in accordance with TB 55-1520-211-20/6 on UH-1B/540 helicopters. No deficiencies were noted.

7 UH-1D aircraft were inspected for installation of modified barrier kits. A requirement for sixty three kits was indicated and reported for this Division.

8 Main rotor hub assembly UH-1B/E aircraft: All effected aircraft have been inspected and no unserviceable hubs were found.

9 Tail rotor installation UH-1B, UH-1D: All effected aircraft, as identified by TB 55-1500-200-20/9, were inspected and no substandard hub assemblies were found.

10 Main transmission Lift Link Spacers, UH-1B and UH-1D aircraft: All effected aircraft were inspected with a total of eleven faulty installations noted. Corrective action as outlined by TB 55-1500-200-20/8 was accomplished and aircraft returned to service.

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(d) Technical Assistance Program. In view of certain changes to AR 700-4, the fiscal year 1967 requirements for contract technicians had to be re-submitted. The requirement at this station were screened, re-evaluated within the scope of AR 700-4 and resubmitted to USARV.

(e) All aircraft assigned or attached to 1st Cavalry Division were screened for avionics configuration. A complete inventory of avionics equipment, by individual aircraft was submitted to USARV.

e. Construction and Facilities:

(1) Construction material for self-help construction was not available in quantities consistent with availability of labor force. Lumber for tent framing was approved for prefabrication and issued on 23 July 1966. 70th Engineers are planning to initially prefab 5 tent frames per day, working up to a goal of 10 per day as soon as possible.

(2) R & R (PL&E) continues to do outstanding work on construction of latrine/shower units, barrier latrines, and hold baggage boxes. Hold baggage boxes are now available in adequate numbers to handle departing personnel.

(3) Base Development: More than 60% of planned mess halls, including grease traps, have been constructed. Billet construction has been slow because of lack of materials but should improve since the 70th Engineers have been receiving larger quantities of lumber. Topo Survey is not available. It is presently programmed for completion on 6 August. An Khe Airfield construction is progressing well with 700 x 350 foot apron 80% complete, and parking ramp (present runway) 100% complete. Construction on the new runway began on 24 June.

(4) Contract for mess hall tables was recently signed in Japan. Delivery date is still unknown.

(5) New sanitary fill was placed in operation on 24 July 1966.

6. (C) Civil Affairs

a. General. During the reporting period the Division Civic Action program has continued to gain momentum, and substantial progress in improving the living standards of the Vietnamese have been made. Our techniques in supporting tactical operations have also been refined and improved. However, in view of the fact that combat operations have been conducted, for the most part, in sparsely populated areas, the majority of the civic action emphasis has been directed into the An Tue Valley which surrounds the Division base. Our civic action activities have shifted from short-range, high-impact types to those projects which will provide long range benefits. These projects include the construction and repair of public facilities, roads and bridges; supplementing the educational system by presenting English instruction

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to interested students and adults; establishment of a planned medical program for the An Tuc residents in cooperation with Vietnamese medical personnel; assisting in the distribution of commodities furnished by USAID and the International Voluntary Agencies; and providing gifts to the Vietnamese from the people of the Free World.

b. Civic Action Activities. The Division was primarily concerned with the following areas of civic action interest during the reporting periods:

(1) Construction Projects.

(a) The An Tuc District Dispensary. A ward to accommodate one-hundred patients was added to the An Tuc Dispensary. Design and technical guidance was provided by the 70th Engineer Battalion, and materials and funds were furnished by the 15th Medical Battalion.

(b) An Khe Resettlement Area School. The An Khe Resettlement Area School was constructed by the 8th Engineer Battalion with the cooperation of local district officials in less than two months. The five room school provides instruction to over five hundred students daily. The school was dedicated by the Province Chief on 4 June 1966. Province and local officials participated along with representatives from the Division to include the Commanding General.

(c) The Song Tan Hamlet Elementary School. A three room school was constructed under the supervision of the 1st Brigade for the children of Song Tan Hamlet. Funds were made available to support this project by residents of California, Pennsylvania and Virginia. Dedication ceremonies will be conducted on 9 August 1966.

(d) Additions to Song Tan Village School. Two additional rooms for the Song Tan Village Elementary School are in the process of being constructed by Song Tan residents with financial assistance from the 1st Brigade. This project is now 65% complete.

(e) An Khe Library. A room was renovated in the An Khe Vietnamese Service Building to be utilized as a library. The library was dedicated by the district chief on 2 June 1966, with Vietnamese officials, JUSPAO representatives, and the Assistant Division Commander attending. JUSPAO will provide 5,000 books for the library. JUSPAO has also provided funds for the expansion of reading room facilities in An Son and Cuu An Villages.

(f) Cuu An Village Dispensary. The 3d Brigade Civil Affairs Team is presently constructing a two room dispensary for the residents of Cuu An Village. This is a joint US/Vietnamese project and the dispensary is now 75% complete.

(g) Tan Cu Village School. The 2d Brigade, in conjunction with villagers of Tan Cu Village are constructing a two room school.

(2) Educational Development. A great deal of effort has been channeled into the field of educational development. Units of the Division have taught 143 English classes and students have

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occupied 4,203 classroom spaces. A total of 40 personal hygiene classes have been conducted, during which Vietnamese citizens have learned of sanitation, first aid, and the techniques of dental care. Voluminous reading material in the form of books, pamphlets, and information sheets regarding the Vietnamese Government, History, GVN Assistance Programs, and the English language have been distributed throughout the An Tuc Valley. A total of twelve bulletin boards were constructed and placed in the villages which surround the Division base.

(3) Public Health. The Division has been active in providing medical treatment to Vietnamese citizens. A total of 31,455 patients have been treated during the more than 493 sick calls held. Treatment was administered at district and village dispensaries, in refugee camps, and in support of combat operations. A total of 536 immunization shots have been given to protect civilians from Smallpox, Tetanus, Cholera, and the Plague. Two shower points were constructed and more than 23,600 bars of soap distributed to reduce skin diseases which are so prevalent. To further reduce disease, the division continues to support an active vector control program. On 12 separate occasions Vietnamese communities were sprayed with insecticides and fill dirt was added to low, swampy areas to eliminate mosquito breeding grounds. New wells were constructed and several units in the division periodically test the water to assure that it meets minimum sanitary standards.

(4) Civilian Labor. Division continues to hire laborers for brush clearing operations and activities related to the development of the division base. During the reporting period a total of 240,403 laborers were hired. The payroll amounted to 17,679,990 piasters.

(5) Agriculture. To assist local farmers in agricultural activities, seeds were distributed to local citizens for the establishment of truck farms. Fish ponds were stocked with 5,000 fish which were obtained from the GVN hatcheries. In addition, 50 chickens were presented to local farmers to assist them in the development of chicken poultry.

(6) Public Welfare. More than 267,859 pounds of food and over 30,705 pounds of clothing were distributed to needy families and war victims. Distribution was made through GVN representatives in order to assist them in winning the support of the people.

(7) Refugees. During tactical operations 359 refugees were evacuated to secured areas under the control of the GVN. The number of refugees encountered during combat operations was relatively small, and this may be attributed to the fact that the operations were conducted in sparsely populated areas. Civil Affairs techniques to control refugee movement, evacuate captured supplies, and to provide emergency food, shelter, and medical treatment for war victims were improved.

(8) Vietnamese Military and Civilian Festival (GOOD FRIEND). Operation GOOD FRIEND (Vietnamese Military and Civilian Day) with 2nd Brigade in conjunction with USSE/CIDG, Vinh Thanh CIDG Camp, RVN supporting agencies and officials from Binh Khe District, was conducted on 200900July66. The purpose of the festival was to build good will, a better relationship with the local civilians, enhance intelligence gathering sources and intice local VC back into the Government of Vietnam control. The program emphasized Vietnamese and American cooperation and demonstrated Free World Forces working side

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by side toward a common goal of destroying the VC and making Vietnam a free country. The activity was not a County Fair and was not held in an area controlled by the VC. This activity was the first of its kind to be held in the II Corps area. From past history it was noted that whenever the VC conducted parties for the people, the people were instructed to bring gifts for the VC, thus taking food and much needed supplies from the villagers. However, the Vietnamese military and Civilian Day Festival held in Vinh Thanh Valley was just the opposite. The people were invited to come and bring their families and have a day of fun and relaxation, play games, enjoy the music and entertainment. Gifts were given to each family in addition to prizes to winners of the various games. The whole program was directed toward the Vietnamese military and civilian populace having fun and enjoyment with no harassment from the VC. Providing music for the Festival was the 1st Cavalry Division Band, 22d ARVN Division Band and II Corps Cultural Team (Stage Show). Movies were also shown. The most popular were "The John Glenn Story" and "For the Freedom of Man". These films were in Vietnamese.

(9) Operation JAMES BOND. Operation JAMES BOND, conducted on 4 July 1966, achieved not only tactical objectives, but also accomplished notable humanitarian acts. Assistance was given to the people of An My and An Tan Hamlets of the An Khe Village after a pre-dawn raid on the hamlets. The objective of providing Civic Action assistance and activities in this operation was to show the Vietnamese people that the Government of Vietnam, the US military forces, and the district officials, were interested in their overall welfare as well as their security. A meeting was held with the Chief of each hamlet involved and means of supplementing family meals during the absence of the head of the household as a result of the raid were discussed. A total of 202 males over 15 years of age were apprehended. Response of the civil populace effected by this action was favorable. There appeared to be no dissatisfaction of the populace toward the government, district officials or toward US troops involved in the operation. A plan for distribution of available supplies and coordination with local officials for receipt was accomplished. Each hamlet chief assembled that part of the population for which he was responsible and insured that necessary containers to accept food were available. Hamlet chiefs explained to the people why they were assembled and emphasized the interest that South Vietnamese Government had in their welfare. All personnel were thanked for their cooperation in assisting in government efforts to eliminate VC elements from their hamlets. They were told that the government will continue to support its people to the best of its ability and to give them the protection and welfare necessary for a secure and better way of life. In turn, it was stressed that each citizen would be expected to help his government in order to help himself. Measuring the success of the psychological effort can be determined by the smiles displayed by the people and the acts of kindness displayed by the population in offering chairs and tables to sit in while issuing supplies. A couple of invitations were extended to have a cup of tea with a family and the hamlets chiefs. Invitations were accepted to further friendlier relationships between the people, the government, and the 1st Cavalry Division. The interpreter noted that the women were very much surprised to see so much food and gathered in small groups where they talked about the occasion. At 0830 hours distribution of bulgar and rice began in An Tan Hamlet.

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The inhabitants were gathered and food distributed at the hamlet meeting house. Approximately 200 Vietnamese were present. One bag of bulgar and 2½ bags of polished rice were issued. The assistant hamlet chief acted as the government representative and actually issued the supplies himself. Twenty five packages of Sweet Tarts were issued to the children. In An My, the hamlet chief assembled his people at the hamlet entrance where food was distributed by him.

Approximately 75 people of the 176 hamlet population were present and received food. One box of Sweet Tarts was issued to the children. The hamlet chief exercised excellent control of his people. They lined up in an orderly manner as supplies were being distributed.

(10) Operation JAMES BOND II. At the village of An Thuong (5) on 27 July 1966, a pre-dawn counterintelligence raid was launched. To illustrate the interest of the villager's welfare and security by the Government of Vietnam, US military forces, and district officials, a civic action team followed the show of force. Coordinated by the 2/12 S5 Section in the absence of the brigade S5 and joined by the 2/5 S5, commodities were distributed and a sick call was held in the school house. Agricultural pamphlets, 9 cases of soup, 6 assorted cases of toys and clothing, 1 case of powdered milk, 9 cases of cooking oil, and candy were issued to 180 people. The medical team from the 2/5 dispensed soap and vitamins and treated 60 patients for assorted illnesses. Their response was favorable and the interpreter noted that the populace was pleased with the goods. The women, children, and unretained men were summoned to the school building by loudspeakers. The village chief identified the families as they entered. The district chief informed the people that the present action was necessary to insure their safety from the VC and that he can help them if they cooperate with the officials. US, ROK and PF military forces participating in the mission were further evidence of the support available to him. At 0700 hours the sick call and distribution of goods began, assisted by the district and village chief and PF's which served as testimony of their good will. The people were orderly and receptive and returned to their routines in a normal fashion. All of the villagers had received a portion of the distribution when we stopped at 0800 hours. This was the best controlled and organized S5 operation that had been observed by the 2/12 S5, made largely possible through the cooperation of the district chief.

(11) Miscellaneous. Eleven hundred dollars was donated to the Qui Nhon and Ban Methuot Leprosariums by Division members of the Catholic and Protestant Chapels. An additional Boy Scout Troop has been organized for a total of two, thereby providing sixty four boys the opportunity to participate in this character building activity. A twenty five boy Cub Scout Pack was also formed, and a five day scout leadership course for patrol leaders and assistants was conducted to provide leaders for the two new scout troops. A telephone line was established from Song Tan Village to the district headquarters, and a perimeter fence was erected surrounding the Chieu Hoi Village of Kim Dong.

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SECTION II - Commander's Analysis and Recommendations

1. Lessons Learned

ITEM: Organization of LZ upon Landing

DISCUSSION: In LZ's where a large number of units are to land and occupy portions of the perimeter (ie Battalion size) it becomes increasingly difficult for the commander of the initial Air Assault company to effectively conduct his activities if he also must aid subsequent units in final selection of coordinating points on the LZ.

OBSERVATION: That whenever possible an S3 representative (LNO) move with the assault company and upon the arrival of subsequent companies in the LZ, aid the commanders by pointing out coordination points, thus relieving the assault company commander of this responsibility.

ITEM: Hunter-Killer Technique

DISCUSSION: The hunter-killer technique employed during operations was excellent. It provided immediate intelligence, conserved the infantry battalion energies until a target had been found and avoided the previous high degree of "brush beating" associated with search and destroy operations. One item that would provide increasing effectiveness is the launching of the hunter elements early in the morning (0600-0630) and NLT 1600. The VC habitually seek an opportunity to engage small elements late in the extracting afternoon when reinforcement is difficult due to the existing weather or last light conditions.

OBSERVATION: Commit the hunter team at first light each day to insure there is sufficient light left upon establishing contact to maneuver killer forces into positions that will enable the battle to be fought on our terms.

ITEM: Determining locations of units by use of smoke grenades.

DISCUSSION: The use of smoke grenades for marking friendly positions is necessary in the type of operations this Division conducts. It is noted, however, that units on the ground are telling aircraft the color of smoke that will be thrown making it possible for enemy forces to throw one of the same color, in an effort to confuse and lure friendly aircraft into undesirable areas.

OBSERVATION: When using smoke have the unit on the ground throw smoke but let the aircraft identify the color.

ITEM: Control of Aircraft on LZ's.

DISCUSSION: On several occasions aircraft received small arms fire from areas on known hostility while on final approach to LZ's. In almost every case aircraft pilots did not check in with the Pathfinder Team for landing instructions.

OBSERVATION: That all aircraft approaching any LZ request landing instructions from the LZ control personnel.

ITEM: LZ Selection.

DISCUSSION: Selection of LZs adjacent or in areas where the approach to an LZ passes over or near a village is inviting aircraft damage due to snipers. Current rules of engagement discourage placing fire on village complexes.

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Observation: Attempt to avoid LZ placement near villages or areas where the flight path subjects aircraft to unnecessary exposure to sniper fire.

ITEM: A close working relationship between the Cavalry Troop and the TAG Air Cap produced excellent results.

DISCUSSION: The harnessing of a Cav Recon Troop with an Air Cap in isolated inaccessible areas for an hour or hour and a half at a time produced effective results, resulting in several secondary explosions.

OBSERVATION: To increase the effectiveness of the Cav Recon Troop during Recon in force missions, that an Air Cap be provided to the Cav Troop attacking selected target areas.

ITEM: Psychological Operations.

DUSCUSSION: Many times loudspeaker capability was required on short notice but was delayed due to having to mount the loudspeaker to the helicopter.

OBSERVATION: That loudspeaker capability be made organic to each brigade.

ITEM: Pioneer Engineer Work.

DISCUSSION: With the advent of the rainy season, it can be expected that considerable difficulty will be encountered with washed out bypasses, unpaved roads that will become very difficult to traverse and difficulties caused by the heavy rains in soft alluvial soil in the area. While the engineers will repair major damage as quickly as possible, artillery units can not be held up waiting for the engineers when operational requirements call for immediate emplacement and fire. Artillery units must expect to do considerable engineer work on their own to get the guns through.

OBSERVATION: All Artillery units held classes on basic pioneer engineer work to allow repair of culverts, bypasses, and other road work so that roads can be made passable without engineer help.

ITEM: Use of a Float Howitzer.

DISCUSSION: That battalions retain one float M101 105mm howitzer to replace weapons needing evacuation for maintenance. This weapon proved to be invaluable during the period when a large number of tubes were condemned for excessive number of rounds fired. The float was rotated to each battery in turn to keep the batteries operating with six howitzers.

OBSERVATION: With the extensive firing done in the area of operation, the maintenance of the float howitzer proved to be a great asset in maintaining full operational capabilities.

ITEM: Establishment of a responsive clothing system for units operating away from Camp Radcliff.

DISCUSSION: Lifelines submitted for clothing during past operations required 3 to 5 days for supply actions to be accomplished.

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OBSERVATION: That a responsive system of clothing and footwear replacement be established to provide priority to the greatest need to troops in combat operations. Torn or damaged clothing increases the amount of exposed skin to insect bites.

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1. Personnel Management: The infusion program for Army Aviators was completed 10 June 1966. This program, though effective, did not fully resolve the rotational hump of aviation personnel and a continuing effort in this area is required. The necessary planning for future infusion programs is currently in progress.

2. (C) Intelligence: a. A large amount of intelligence was produced during the period. Much of it as a result of successful operations. Of particular significance was the capture of 75 linear inches of documents during Operation Crazy Horse. These documents provided an insight to the VC infrastructure in Binh Dinh Province (military and political) and were valuable during the operation. In addition the documents will be valuable for planning of future operations. Captives, both Viet Cong and NVA, also provided much valuable information. The IIV section interrogated 156 captives and 1,219 suspects, in support of combat operations.

b. The reorganization of the G2 Section was tested extensively in combat operations and found to be effective. Two DTAC's (base and ford) were manned continuously on Operations Crazy Horse, Nathan Hale and Henry Clay.

c. Visual and photo surveillance proved most valuable. Very little information was gained by SLAR in support of division operations although SLAR provided considerable intelligence on the strategic level during the period. The tactical value of Infra-Red (IR) has yet to be proven in division operations. The division aerial surveillance platoon determined through test that the IR system cannot detect cooking fires if passive measures are taken. The chance of locating an enemy unit through IR detection of cooking fires is so slight that it is not worthy of consideration. Visual follow-up observation of IR emissions has revealed over 95% of the IR returns to be caused by fires associated with "slash and burn" farming practices. Although this could indicate the work of a Viet Cong production unit it is most likely caused by the local Montagnard or Vietnamese farmers.

4. Operations and Trainings:

a. The division continued operations over substantially the same, and relatively large, area of operations over which it operated during the last quarter. This past quarter was marked by sustained operations by two (2) brigades outside the TAMR while elements of the 3rd Brigade secured the Camp Radcliff complex, conducting local offensive operations around base camp. The Cavalry Squadron perform valuable reconnaissance missions as the "eyes and ears" of the division throughout the Pleiku, Kontum, Phu Yen, Marlac, Binh Dinh and Quang Ngai Provinces. Major contact was established in several operations; Operation LEWIS and CLARK led to the discover of a training area, aid station, and an enemy battalion Headquarters; in Operation DAVEY CRICKETT, the 9th NVA Battalion was essentially annihilated; in Operation CRAZY HORSE virtually 2 Battalions of 2nd NVA Regiment were wipe out, and in Operation NATHAN HALE the IFFV reserve-reaction force was committed with the resulting enemy losses of 459 KIA (BC) and 291 KIA (Est).

Concurrent with these major operations, division units gained much valuable information on trail networks along the Cambodian Border, destroying way stations and logistical facilities, while instilling confidence in the RVN forces of the

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area and forcing the VC and NVA units to retreat into Cambodia.

Hunter-Killer techniques were used to great advantage, and proved very successful in locating the enemy to destroy him with the follow-up killer teams. Continued use was made of the field expedient grenade dispenser for a fast reconnaissance by CS and as a denial agent of areas up to 300 X 300 meters. Trooper ladders were used to attain otherwise inaccessible areas. Combat psychological operations were extensively and very successfully used, coupled with close and detailed guidance to combat soldiers in the use of limited response firepower. All of these measures were instrumental in achieving successful operations in heavily populated areas without undue casualties to non-combatant populations.

Command emphasis was also placed on dust control in aid of aircraft availability. A noticeable improvement was made in available aircraft after conscientious effort on dust control and limited use of aircraft for only necessary missions.

b. No major problems arose in the training facilities. Most of the training was accomplished at unit level and while in combat operations. Due to the heavy turn-over of personnel during the past quarter; smaller units are to be commended for the infusion of "green" troops into a combat organization. Training included use of trooper ladder, familiarization with M-16 rifle, jungle tactics, and detection of VC booby traps.

5. (C) Logistics:

During the reporting period, the logistical system supported 10 operations. Forward Support Elements deployed in several areas to support continuous operations in extended jungle areas. Support was provided moving units by deliver to pre-selected location along route of march, and Operation LEWIS and CLARK saw a logistical "First" for the Division's Support Command by sustained heliborne support with a maneuver element operating in terrain inaccessible by other means. The majority of the support operations went very smoothly with relatively few major problems. In Operation NATHAN HALE, beginning on 21 June, resupply was by GLOC and ALOC with an extensive SEA LOC being used for the first time by the Division. Ground movement of personnel and supplies has been handicapped because of limited cargo vehicle transportation. To alleviate this problem, G-3 submitted another request for attachment of a Transportation Company, light truck.

Resupply of some items have been slow, but close liaison with 34th S and S Battalion and Qui Nhon Support Area Command has insured immediate resupply of priority requirements.

6. Civil Affairs:

Civil Affairs efforts during the period were directed both to combat support operations and towards Civil Action projects in the An Khe area. Program emphasis shifted from short-range, high impact types to those providing long-range, lasting effect. The majority of Civil Affairs programs were concentrated in the An Khe - An Tuc area surrounding Base Camp, and was marked by public improvements of roads, bridges, construction of schools to improved the educational facilities, improved medical care, and hiring civilians laborers.


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Operation "Good Friend," a "First" in II Corps area, on 20 July, had a marked effect on winning the hearts and spirits of the local people, on cementing stronger relationships with local government officials and on building a stronger intelligence network from local sources.



JOHN NORTON

Major General, USA

7 Incl

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- 2- Hunter-Killer Concept
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AIR CAV HUNTER-KILLER CONCEPT As Developed by Colonel Moore

In recent large scale operations of both one and ~~two~~ brigade size it appears that we have become extravagant and ponderous in our use of infantry, firepower and helicopters primarily in searching for the enemy. In some areas, saturation patrolling is feasible and good approach. But it is not the solution to all missions just as company or battalion-size operations may not be the solution. Many of the areas selected are directed by FFV or MACV, based on intelligence those headquarters have gathered over a period of time. Some of these areas also include long known or established bases of the VC and entry into them represents a victory of sorts. However, once a force as large as a brigade is tactically deployed in an area, it is difficult and takes a lot of time to regroup and redeploy to another area to exploit contacts made by friendly forces. Often, in wooded areas, adequate landing and pick up zones are not available. To move forces over a large area in saturation patrolling or a widely dispersed recon-in force consumes many helicopters and helicopter hours, and adequate lift may not be immediately available to exploit a contact nor may sufficient infantry be immediately available if fragmented throughout an area. The infantry may also be so worn out by constant patrolling through mountainous, jungle-covered terrain that they are not able to react swiftly.

Brigade operations may well be slowed by our supporting elements. The practice of providing tube artillery support to all units conducting a dispersed recon in force consumes much lift, requires particularly good landing zones, and slows the operation considerably. Similarly, the logistical support required for large units operating as searchers in an area requires considerable lift and stifles speed and flexibility.

When large logistic bases are established and two to three days of supplies are on hand it is practically impossible to move the installation in less than 48 hours. In other words, large scale search operations based on sketchy or limited intelligence tend to wear out the infantry and put unnecessary hours on the aircraft and usually require large scale back haul operation for unused ammunition and other supplies.

The Proposed Concept

This concept is based on our belief that we should use the bulk of our infantry whenever possible primarily to execute the basic mission of the infantry e.g., "To close with the enemy in order to destroy or capture him." We should use our cavalry, some infantry, and measured firepower to uncover the enemy or cause him to disclose his presence. The big problem in this war is to find the enemy.

A proposed force would consist of two components carefully tailored to the mission, situation, the weather, and the terrain; a swift, highly mobile, lightly equipped, hunter element, which would seek out the enemy; and a much larger, heavily supported killer force, which would remain centrally poised and carefully positioned ready to pounce on and destroy enemy located by the hunters. The concept is analogous to the mobile defense with a reverse twist; for in both concepts light, resilient forces set the enemy up for decisive action by a cocked, responsive striking force. Variations are also possible such as in the "Eagle Claw" operation where we used hunters combined with killer ambush groups and where we used our firepower well integrated with the hunters.

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The resulting kill ratio was 47 to 1. Even the Forward Support Element could be so organized that only what is absolutely necessary to sustain the hunters would be moved to a forward base, i.e., fuel, limited quantities of ammunition and food. This could also be left at locations where security was available (USSF Camps, other friendly installations) thereby reducing or eliminating back haul. This would, over a period of time, provide the Division with prestocked supplies to be used by other hunter teams.

In a typical brigade organization for combat for a hunter-killer operation, the hunters might consist of one rifle company (less its mortars and 90mm RR), the reconnaissance platoon of one battalion, and all attached air cavalry. Ideally, the entire 1/9 Cavalry would constitute an especially effective hunter force (as in the anti-airborne phase of Air Assault II). If available, CIDG units could be used as hunters. The hunters would be supported by ARA, TAC air, and Cavalry Firepower. Tube artillery would not be positioned except where tactically and logistically inexpensive to do so (in terms of security and supply) for example at "DOG."

The killers would consist of the remainder of the brigade -- the bulk of the brigade. When committed, they would be given tube artillery support. To insure swift response, they would be co-located with some helicopter lift whenever possible.

Brigade and battalion CP's and supporting agencies would be leaned down. Jump CP's would be used where appropriate for brigade. To be flexible, to be mobile a unit must go light, think light and be careful not to get too much into "concrete" especially on only sketchy intelligence. Once in an area, District Chiefs, Province Chiefs, Vietnamese Army Units plus our own intelligence sources must be milked dry for all information. As we work throughout an area we would develop information on enemy, weather and terrain. In some areas, the commander might search in some strength - possibly a company-sized force. In other areas, widely disperse smaller elements might be the better technique.

Air elements and airmobile ground elements would be artfully coordinated. The successful performance of this mission demands speed, agility, ingenuity, and resourcefulness. Ruses would be used to trick the enemy into revealing himself. Attached CIDG and Popular Force units would make enticing bait in some circumstances. All sources of intelligence, U.S. and Vietnamese, must be exploited thoroughly to facilitate accomplishment of the hunters' mission.

While hunters hunted, the killers with helicopter lift support, would remain centrally located, ready to respond immediately upon detection of a suitable target. The initial lift would be placed on an appropriate time alert. As the hunt progressed, the killers would carefully monitor its progress, and tentatively plan commitments that might materialize (akin to continuous counterattack planning in the mobile defense). They would be particularly aware of the need for suitable LZ's, and the hunters would continually "feed" LZ information to the killers.

When the killers are committed, the principle of mass (sudden application of overwhelming force) both in combat power and helicopter lift, must be observed. The size of the committed force would depend on the situation, and the principle of economy of force would also be followed - measured force might be applied. For example, ARA or Cav gunship might uncover a "Turkey shoot" type target. In such a case, the killer strike force might consist

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of only a platoon or a company. Also, as a turkey shoot begins developing, the killers could be mounted up in helicopters and placed over the area in an eagle flight - or at least kept in a thunderbolt posture close by. A typical turkey shoot target was opened up in the recent Bong Son show of force operation on 27 April. The shock and firepower of ARA, closely followed in seconds by assaulting infantry against a surprised, crippled and stunned enemy presents an appealing tactical technique.

Against larger targets, the assault would be allocated more, possibly all, fire support available - tube artillery, ARA, and close air support. Tanks and APC's should be available whenever possible to employ in short, violent, slashes along with airmobile killers and ambush forces. The Killer force must have accurate information regarding the enemy's location (provided primarily by the hunters and by air elements) and must block all escape routes, if not by troops at least by fire. They must be ready for instant response DAY or NIGHT. In this regard, the hunters would usually be in position to guide in the killers for night landing.

To provide rest for the constantly moving hunters, rifle platoons from the killer force could be rotated with those of the hunter force. In this manner, the hunter phase could be maintained for considerable periods, but there would always be fresh units in the killer force ready to close with the enemy.

This concept could readily be executed by a Battalion Task Force. It appears that brigade level is perhaps as high as its control should go. By careful planning Division could have two brigades operating on this type mission simultaneously provided sufficient aircraft were available and each brigade commander has maximum freedom of employment in terms of time and area of operation. When one "struck oil," the other could be put on alert or curtailed until the situation was fully developed. Under this concept operating out of the base camp by the bulk of the killers force might be quite feasible. If a large base is needed at a forward location, an air line of ammo might be used initially. After large scale operations were started other units i.e., ARVN, ROKS or other US Forces could be tasked to open the roads into the operational area.

Summary

This resume represents only initial thoughts of this concept. This is only another manner in which the three-dimensional forces of this division might be employed. With further development and battle testing, the concept will be improved and refined.

The Air Cav hunter-killer concept offers many vital advantages. In this war the big problem is to find the enemy. Large areas could be searched with minimum cost in manpower and helicopter time; infantry will not wear themselves out searching; the "stay time" of a battalion or a brigade in the field with all supporting elements would be increased; searches of remote areas will be easier to support, and fresh units will always be ready to pounce upon any force located. The concept involves the risk that some small, lightly equipped hunters might be surprised and possibly overwhelmed before the arrival of the killers. Much the same risk exists now during disperse recon in force operations. However, in this concept the response time would be quicker, the killer force larger, and the potential gains are well worth the risk.

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TASK ORGANIZATION FOR MAJOR OPERATIONS

OPERATION:

LEWIS AND CLARK

Units:

TF 2/12 Cav
A & B 1/77 Arty (DS)
B & C 3/18 Arty (8") (GS)
Tm B 1/9 Cav
Sqdn, B 8th Engr
Tm, 10th RRU
Scout Dog Tm, II Corps
3 CIDG Guides, Plateau Gi

DAVY CROCKETT

Units:

3rd Brigade
1/5 Cav
1/7 Cav
2/7 Cav
1/21 Arty (DS)
A 2/17 Arty
C 1/30 Arty (Reinf)
C 2/20 Arty (ARA) (Reinf)
1/9 Cav (-)
3rd Trp 3/3 APC ARVN
Sct Co, ARVN

CRAZY HORSE (16 May 5 June 66)

Units:

1st Bde (Abn)
1/5 Cav
1/8 Cav (Abn)
2/8 Cav (Abn)
1/12 Cav (Abn)
2/12 Cav
2/1 Cav Regt, Cap ROK Div
2/19 Arty (Abn)
B 2/17 Arty
B 3/18 Arty
A 2/20 Arty (ARA)
C 1/30 Arty
Btry, Cap ROK Div Arty
1/9 Cav (-)

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CRAZY HORSE (16 May - 5 Jun 66)

TF BRAVO, 22nd ARVN Div
3/3 APC Co
Abn Inf Co
401st Set Co
405th Set Co

CIDG Provis Bn
236th CIDG Co
240th CIDG Co
241st CIDG Co
242nd CIDG Co

HOOKER I (10 - 21 June 1966)

Units

2nd Brigade
2/5 Cav
2/12 Cav
Co, CIDG
1/77 Arty (-) (DS)
B 6/14 Arty (Reinf)
C 2/17 Arty (Reinf)
B 2/20 Arty (ARA) (GSR)
C 1/130 Arty
2 Sec, B 29th Arty (GS)
1 Sec, E 82nd Arty (GS)
1/9 Cav (-)

NATHAN HALE (Dockhouse I) (19 June - 1 July 1966)

Units

1st Cav Div (AM)
3/5 BLT (USMC)
1/77 Arty
2/77 Arty (-)
C1/21 Arty
1st Bde (Abn)
1/8 Cav (Abn) (26-29 June)
2/8 Cav (Abn) (26 Jun-1 July)
1/12 Cav (Abn)
2/327 Inf (26 June - July)
2/19 Arty (Abn) (-)
A 1/9 Cav
Co, CIDG
3rd Brigade
1/7 Cav
2/7 Cav
1/8 Cav (Abn) (20-25 Jun 29 Jun-1 Jul)
2/8 Cav (Abn) (20-25 June)
2/327 Inf (20-25 Jun)
MIKE FORCE
1/21 Arty (DS)
C 2/20 Arty (ARA)
1/9 CAV (-)

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OPERATION:

HENRY CLAY (2 July -

Units

1st Brigade

- 1/7 Cav
- 1/8 Cav (Abn)
- 2/8 Cav (Abn)
- 237th Co, CIDG
- 241st Co, CIDG
- 257th Co, CIDG
- 258th Co, CIDG
- 285th Co, CIDG
- 290th Co, CIDG
- 2/19 Arty (-) (DS)
- B 2/17 Arty (105) (Atch)
- B 1/21 Arty (105) (Atch)
- A 2/20 Arty (ARA) (Atch)
- C 1/30 Arty (8") (GSR)
- 3 Sct Dog Plts

3rd Brigade

- 2/7 Cav (TF COLT)
- 1/21 Arty (-) (DS)
- C 1/9 Cav
- 2/327 Inf

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QUARTERLY REPORT

AVIATION

AVIATION OPERATIONS. DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD DIVISION AIRCRAFT FLEW 85,174 HOURS AND 190,515 SORTIES, MOVING 30,009 TONS OF CARGO AND 207,077 TROOPS. IN PERFORMING THESE MISSIONS, 213 AIRCRAFT WERE HIT BY HOSTILE FIRE, EIGHT BEING SHOT DOWN. OF THOSE SHOT DOWN, THREE WERE REPAIRABLE. DURING THE ENTIRE PERIOD, NINE CREW MEMBERS WERE KIA AND 31 WIA AS A RESULT OF ENEMY ACTION.

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PART I

AIRCRAFT FLIGHT HOURS (MONTHLY)

<u>MAY 1966</u>	O-1	OV-1	CV-2	EH-13	UH-1B,D	CH-47	CH-54
11th Avn Group	136	436	0	560	9,295	2,026	0
1/9th Cavalry Sqdn	0	0	0	2,452	4,138	0	0
Div Artillery	378	0	0	706	2,307	0	0
Support Command	0	0	1,299	152	997	50	145
1st Bde	0	0	0	404	297	0	0
2nd Bde	0	0	0	555	459	0	0
3rd Bde	0	0	0	216	350	0	0
DIVISION TOTALS	514	436	1,299	5,045	17,843	2,076	145

TOTAL FLYING HOURS - 27,358

CUMULATIVE - 27,358

JUNE 1966

11th Avn Group	125	429	0	618	11,251	2,164	0
1/9th Cavalry Sqdn	0	0	0	2,257	3,970	0	0
Div Artillery	288	0	0	692	2,372	0	0
Support Command	0	0	1,701	227	936	55	55
1st Bde	0	0	0	448	401	0	0
2nd Bde	0	0	0	568	496	0	0
3rd Bde	0	0	0	326	436	0	0
DIVISION TOTALS	413	429	1,701	5,806	19,862	2,219	55

TOTAL FLYING HOURS - 29,815

CUMULATIVE - 57,173

JULY 1966

11th Avn Group	104	427	0	642	10,536	2,072	0
1/9th Cavalry Sqdn	0	0	0	2,041	3,910	0	0
Div Artillery	232	0	0	645	2,223	0	0
Support Command	0	0	1,458	99	897	0	114
1st Brigade	0	0	0	567	450	0	0
2nd Brigade	0	0	0	465	319	0	0
3rd Brigade	0	0	0	408	392	0	0
DIVISION TOTALS	336	427	1,458	4,867	18,727	2,072	114

TOTAL FLYING HOURS - 28,001

CUMULATIVE - 85,174

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PART II

MAJOR OPERATIONS - MAY-JULY 1966

OPERATION	DATES	HOURS FLOWN	SORTIES FLOWN	TONS CARGO	PASSENGERS
Lewis & Clark	3-16 May	1,862	6,772	569	4,828
Davey Crockett	4-16 May	6,518	10,142	1,309	13,022
Crazy Horse	16 May - 5 June	9,705	14,543	4,731	32,105
Hooker I	10-21 June	5,991	21,594	2,731	22,229
Nathan Hale	19 June - 1 July	8,032	12,846	2,376	19,234
Henry Clay	2-30 July	19,600	46,104	7,030	55,122
Hayes	17 July - 30 July	2,240	5,269	803	6,299

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PART III

SUPPORT RENDERED

TO NON-U.S. FORCES AND CIVILIANS

Aviation support to non-U.S. Forces includes the movement of ARVN.

CIDG, Popular Forces, refugees and civic action missions.

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>TYPE AIRCRAFT</u>	<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>FLYING HOURS</u>
May 66	UH-1	264	132.0
	CH-47	32	16.0
JUNE 66	UH-1	318	107.3
	CH-47	61	17.9
July 66	Reporting requirement discontinued per USAFV eff 30 Jan 66.		
TOTALS	UH-1	582	239.3
	CH-47	93	33.9

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PART IV.

SUPPORT RENDERED TO NON-DIVISIONAL UNITS

Aviation support to non-divisional U.S. Forces includes support of the 1/101st Airborne Brigade and 3rd Brigade of 25th Infantry Division (except when attached to the 1st Air Cavalry Division) and recovery of downed USMC, USAF and Army aircraft. Detailed accounting of such support has not been a standing requirement. Therefore, the totals presented are estimates gained from situation reports. Support provided by UH-1 and CH-47 is expressed in days only.

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>UNIT SUPPORTED</u>	<u>CH-47 DAYS</u>	<u>UH-1 DAYS</u>	<u>CV-2 HRS</u>	<u>CH-54 HRS</u>
May 66	Recovery of A4D IFFV - Chu Lai	0	0	0	3.5
	Recovery of CH-34 IFFV - Support of	.5	0	0	0
	101 Abn Bn/10th Avn Bn (Nhon Co) 3-CH-47	21	0	0	0
	Support of 3/25 Inf IFFV 3 CH-47	69	0	0	0
	CH-46 Recovery USMC I Corps	1	0	0	0
	Movement of Generators IFFV - Phan Rang	.5	0	0	0
	Support of IFFV - Chu Lai (Decca Project)	1	0	0	0
	Support of IFFV - CV-2 Wing to Katan, I Corps	1	0	0	0
	Support of IFFV, USAF I Corps	0	0	0	14.0
	Jun 66	Movement of C-130 wings and tail from An Khe to Qui Nhon and movement of A1-3 from Qui Nhon to Pleiku.	0	0	0
Recovery of CH-46 for USMC - I Corps		0	0	0	4.2
Support of 1/101 Abn Bde and 3/25 Inf with 5 CH-47's from 18-30 Jun		65	0	0	0

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PART IV (CONT'D)

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>UNIT SUPPORTED</u>	<u>CH-47 DAYS</u>	<u>UH-1 DAYS</u>	<u>CV-2 HRS</u>	<u>CH-54 HRS</u>
July 66	Recover of 4 each CH-46 helicopters, USMC, I Corps	2	2	0	0
	Support of 3/25 Inf with 3 CH-47 1-31 Jul	93	0	0	0
TOTALS		254	2	0	25.2

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PART V

SIGNIFICANT AVIATION OPERATIONS PERFORMED BY ORGANIC AIRCRAFT

3-16 May 66 Operation LEWIS & CLARK
6 Infantry battalions airlifted
8 Artillery batteries

4-16 May 66 Operation DAVEY CROCKETT
11 Infantry battalions airlifted
9 Artillery batteries airlifted

16 May - 5 June 66 Operation CRAZY HORSE
28 Infantry battalions airlifted
17 Artillery batteries airlifted

10-21 June 66 Operation HOOKER I
9 Infantry battalions airlifted
8 Artillery batteries airlifted

19 June - 1 July 66 Operation NATHAN HALE
18 Infantry battalions airlifted
22 Artillery batteries airlifted

2 July - OPERATION HENRY CLAY
17 Infantry battalions airlifted
17 Artillery batteries airlifted

18 July Operations HAYES
4 Infantry battalions airlifted
1 Artillery batteries airlifted

Part VI

MONTHLY AVIATION STATISTICS

MONTH	FLYING HRS	SORTIES	TONS CARGO	PASSENGERS
May 66	27,358	58,018	8,958	48,303
Jun 66	29,815	66,634	11,008	80,028
Jul 66	28,001	65,863	10,043	78,746
Cumulative	85,174	190,515	30,009	207,077

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PART VII

AIRCRAFT HIT DATA

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TOTAL HIT</u>	<u>SRR</u>	<u>SRN</u>	<u>SNR</u>	<u>DAG</u>	<u>DEG</u>
11th Avn Gp	99	2	1	1	0	0
1/9th Cav Sqdn	73	0	1	1	1	0
Division Arty	21	1	0	0	1	0
Support Command	11	0	0	0	0	0
1st Brigade	4	0	1	0	0	0
2nd Brigade	3	0	0	0	0	0
3rd Brigade	2	0	0	0	0	0
TOTALS	213	3	3	2	2	0

KEY: SRR-Shutdown - Recovered - Repairable
SRN-Shutdown - Recovered - Not Repairable
SNR-Shutdown - Not Recoverable - Total loss
DAG-Damaged on Ground - Enemy Action
DEG-Destroyed on Ground - Enemy Action

AVIATION CASUALTIES

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>MIA</u>
11th Avn Gp	6	7	0
1/9th Cav Sqdn	3	17	0
Division Arty	0	5	0
Support Command	0	0	0
1st Brigade	0	2	0
2nd Brigade	0	0	0
3rd Brigade	0	0	0
Totals	9	31	0

PART VIII

MONTHLY MISSION READY AIRCRAFT AVAILABILITY

<u>TYPE AIRCRAFT:</u> <u>% AVAILABLE</u>	<u>CH-13</u>	<u>UH-1b</u>	<u>UH-1D</u>	<u>CH-47</u>	<u>CH-56</u>	<u>CV-2</u>	<u>CV-1</u>	<u>C-1</u>
IN; May	83	77	65	43	60	43	85	68
June	78	74	71	46	48	60	71	56
July	70	71	70	45	46	49	65	56
CUMULATIVE:	77%	74%	68.6%	44.7%	51.3%	50.7%	73.6%	60%

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BURNING (base, TACR defense) 1 May - 31 July 66
Includes interdiction fire in CRAZY HOURS & other areas.

Supporting Forces

a. US Air Force

(1) Aircraft

(a) Immediate sorties	0
(b) Preplanned Sorties	122
(c) Illumination Sorties	6
(d) B-52 Sorties	0
(e) Total Sorties	128

(2) Ordnance

(a) General Purpose Bombs and Fragmentation Bombs	125,000 lbs.
(b) CBU	6
(c) Napalm	15,000 lbs
(d) Rockets	768

MCSBY II

Supporting Forces

a. US Air Force

(1) Aircraft

(a) Immediate Sorties	0
(b) Preplanned Sorties	9
(c) Illumination Sorties	0
(d) B-52 Sorties	0
(d) Total Sorties	9

(2) Ordnance

(a) General Purpose Bombs and Fragmentation Bombs	18,000 lbs.
(b) CBU	0
(c) Napalm	9,000
(d) Rockets	0

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LEWIS & CLARK 3-16 May 66

Supporting Forces

a. US Air Force

(1) Aircraft

- (a) Immediate Sorties 20
- (b) Preplanned Sorties 30
- (c) Illumination Sorties 0
- (d) B-52 Sorties 0
- (e) Total Sorties 50

(2) Ordnance

- (a) General Purpose Bombs and Fragmentation Bombs 77,100 lbs
- (b) CBU 0
- (c) Napalm 29,000 lbs
- (d) Rockets 400

DAVEY CROCKETT 4-16 May 66

Supporting Forces

a. US Air Force

(1) Aircraft

- (a) Immediate Sorties 12
- (b) Preplanned Sorties 0
- (c) Illumination Sorties 0
- (d) B-52 Sorties 0
- (3) Total Sorties 12

(2) Ordnance

- (a) General Purpose Bombs and Fragmentation Bombs 19,000 lbs
- (b) CBU 0
- (c) Napalm 13,500 lbs
- (d) Rockets 0

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CRAZY HORSE 16 May - 5 June 1966

Supporting Forces

a. US Air Force

(1) Aircraft

(a) Immediate Sorties	83
(b) Preplanned Sorties	193
(c) Illumination Sorties	0
(d) B-52 Sorties	15
(3) Total Sorties	291

(2) Ordnance

(a) General Purpose Bombs and Fragmentation Bombs	82,980 lbs
(b) CBU	766
(c) Napalm	28,000 lbs
(d) Rockets	148

HUCKER I 10-21 June 1966

Supporting Forces

a. US Air Force

(1) Aircraft

(a) Immediate Sorties	2
(b) Preplanned Sorties	35
(c) Illumination Sorties	0
(d) B-52 Sorties	0
(3) Total Sorties	37

(2) Ordnance

(a) General Purpose Bombs and Fragmentation Bombs	25,500 lbs
(b) CBU	4
(c) Napalm	39,600 lbs
(d) Rockets	0

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NATHAN HALE 19 June - 1 July 1966

Supporting Forces

a. US Air Force

(1) Aircraft

- (a) Immediate Sorties 29
- (b) Preplanned Sorties 185
- (c) Illumination Sorties 0
- (d) B-52 Sorties 0
- (e) Total Sorties 214

(2) Ordnance

- (a) General Purpose Bombs and Fragmentation Bombs 24,850 lbs
- (b) CBU 24
- (c) Napalm 164,600 lbs
- (d) Rockets 978

HENRY CLAY 2 July - 30 July 1966

Supporting Forces

a. US Air Force

(1) Aircraft

- (a) Immediate Sorties 20
- (b) Preplanned Sorties 213
- (c) Illumination Sorties 0
- (d) B-52 Sorties 5
- (e) Total Sorties 238

(2) Ordnance

- (a) General Purpose Bombs and Fragmentation Bombs 384,760 lbs
- (b) CBU 14
- (c) Napalm 106,500
- (d) Rockets 202

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VISITORS

3 May 66	Maj Gen Fosythe	USAFAC G-3
4 May 66	Maj Gen Lollia	DCG 1st Log
5 May 66	22 visiting Generals	
6 May 66	17 Visiting Generals	
10 May 66	Gen Westmoreland	
13 May 66	Lt Gen Chang Kuo Ying	Vice Minister of Def Rep of China
	Maj Gen Chia Wee Lu	
	Maj Gen Chang Chih Su	
14 May 66	Hon: Howard Calloway	R-Georgia
	Hon Donald Rumsfeld	R- Ill
16 May 66	Gen Cowan	
	Dr Gottsch	
	Maj Stevenson	
18 May 66	Col Simpson	MACV J-3
	Gen Kinnard	
	Col Gallup	USARV SURGEN
19 May 66	Mr Richard Carr	
	Mr Keith H. Hawks	
	Brig Gen Zais	ADC 1st Div
	Lt Gen Heintages	
	Col Blomgren	USARN Comptroller
22 May 66	Col Kogsted	Asst To DCG, USARV for Spec Plans & (pn)
	Maj Gen Sir Stephen Wier	
	Mr Duncan McIntyre	MP Floor leader
	Mr Hugh Watt	MP asst Floor leader
	Mr Logan F. Sloane	MP
22 May 66	Mr Ellen M Finley	MP

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VISITORS

22 May 66	Mr Arthur Pope	
25 May 66	Gen Kinnard	CG, IFFV
	B/Gen (Ret) S.L.A. Marshall	
	Col Semkin	
26 May 66	Gen Dwight E. Beach	
	Maj Gen James A. Skeldon	
	Col Anthony J. Castagna	
	Lt Col Jack L. Leggett	
	Capt Custer	
	Maj Gen Tellson	J-3
	Lt Col Cronk	
29 May 66	Maj Gen Turner	Prov Mar Gen
	Brig Gen Moore	IMC USAFV
	Maj Gen Kinnard	
31 May 1966	Brig Gen Jones	MACVCC
1 Jun 66	Maj Gen Bruce Kendall	DCG USARYSIS
	Col Paul A. Fisher	G-3 USARYSIS
	Col J. P. Brown	USARV ACoFS
6 Jun 66	Brig Gen Goodwin	USARPAC G-1
	Col Bull	USARV G-1
	Col Thompson	FFV G-1
7 Jun 66	Brig Gen McChristian	MACV J-2
8 Jun 66	Col Williams	USABAAR
	Mr. Barney Roth	
9 Jun 66	Lt Gen Heintges	Dep CCNUS
	Brig Gen Cowan	
11 June 66	Lt Gen James Folk	ACoFS
	Col C'Keefe	ACTIV

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VISITORS

13 Jun 66	Maj Gen J. J. Tolson III	CG USARVN
	Brig Gen Saref	CG 1st Avn Bde
16 Jun 66	Gen James Collins	
	Mr. Robert Lewis	
	Johnney Grant	USO Show
17 Jun 66	Lt Gen Engler	CG USARV
	Col Sasse	G-4 USARV
	Maj Gen Larsen	CG IFFV
18 June	Col Nicholson	Dep CC Sig Bde
	Brig Gen Pleasant	
	Col Spence	
19 June 66	Lord Henry D.L.G. Welson	Minister Foreign Officer
	Ambassador R.G.A. Etherington Smith	
	Capt Moore	
	Mr Smith	
20 June 66	Lt Col Harrison	USARV Historian
21 June 66	Col Terry	USARV Sig Officer
22 June 66	Rev Thielman	
	Lt Gen Moore	CG 7th AF
23 June 66	Brig Gen Stiles	ADC 1st Marine Div
24 June 66	Maj Gen Arthur Collins	
	Col Kim	CAP ROK
30 June 66	Gen Michael Davidson	CG Ft. Leavenworth
	Hon Mr. Hasting Keith	R-Mass
1 Jul 66	Col Bissell	CH-47 Project Officer
	ADM Walzer	CC TF 76
	Hon Ian Senclair	
	Hon Men Scrid Servire	

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VISITORS

3 July 66

Sen Robert Cotton
Sen Joseph Fitzgerald
Mr Adams Armstrong
Mr Manfred Cross
Mr Leonard Reynolds
Mr Thomas Hughes
Mr R. Fry
Mr C Jones
Mr Fernandez
Maj Gen McFray

6 July 66

Col Ramez 18th Engr Bde

7 July 66

Hon John M. Murphy D-New York
Hon John J. Gilligan D-Chio
Hon Mr Teno Roncelio D-Wyo
Hon Mr Thomas C. Mcgreth D-New York
Hon Mr William D. Hathaway D-Maine
Hon Mr Roman C. Lucinski D-Illinois
Hon Mr Gale Schicler D-Illinois
Hon Mr. Robert Duncan D-Oregon
Hon Mr. Hasting Keith R-Mass
Maj Gen Lawrence Lightner Escort AF
Col John M. Chapman, EA Escort AF.
TSgt Lethetter DA Bilsited Escort
Capt Barden AF
Capt Hurst MACV Escort
photographer MACV
Maj Trinkler, USAFV
8 Jul 66 Cong Coman D-California

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8 July 66	Cong Curney	R-Florida
	Cong Carter	R-Kentucky
	Cong Whiteman	D-NC
	Lt Farmer	Escort
	Col Earl F. Cole	Dep C/S USAFV
	Col Meadler	LNO for DOD
	Lt Col Davis	
	Lt Col Overall	USAFV
9 Jul 66	Col Hugh Queenin	Dep C/S J-3 Force Development MACV
10 Jul 66	Col Louis J. Neyland	CG 3rd Weather Sqd
12 Jul 66	Hon Frontiss Wloker	R-Miss
	Mr Peterson	Escort Embassy
	Capt Hurst,	MACV
13 Jul 66	Brig Gen Brownfield,	USAFAC
	Mr Reutener	Escort, Dis USAFAC
16 Jul 66	Col James K. Terry	CDC, Ft Leavenworth
	Col Campbell, CDC	LNO to USAFAC
17 Jul 66	Gen Westmoreland	CG, USAFV
	Gen Larsen	CG, IFFV
	Col Terry	
18 July 66	Maj Gen Anderson	CG, Rock Island Arsenal
	Dr. Enko	Asst to Sec of Def for Economics
20 July 66	George Jossel	USC Show
21 July 66	Brig Gen Phong	RVN JGS J-3
22 July 66	Mr. Whitney Yang	Ex Sec National Urban League

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23 July 66	Col Kirkbridge	MACV Senior Army Deputy J-5
26 July 66	Col Weir	Dep Dir Mil OPS Australian Army
	Lt Gen Heintges	DCOMCS MACV
	Lt Col Harrison	USMACV Historian
	Lt Col Duncan	USMC
	Maj Revels	IFFV Historian
	Capt Mullenford	USA
27 July 66	Gen Symanski	IFFV Arty Commander
	Gen Larson	CG IFFV
29 July 66	Brig Gen Pearson	CG 1/101st AB

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PSYOPS

1. General:

During May, June and July 1966, Psyops was characterized by close coordination with tactical operations. There was an increase of quality as well as quantity in loudspeaker and leaflet missions. Themes were developed and improved. Some were discarded as not appropriate. Psyops also branched out into other communication medias, such as: Weapons displays, a county fair, banners, sign boards. Psyops was developed into a phased program in support of an operation. With only a few exceptions Psyops was conducted throughout each day. Whenever significant enemy contact was established, night missions were also flown utilizing both 5th Air Commando Squadron resources and available organic aircraft. Division Psyops was also closely coordinated with local MACV Psyops in those areas of operations outside the TACR.

2. Statistics.

a. Operation DAVY CRCKETT (4 May - 14 May 1966)

- (1) DONG SONG Area (DS3710)
- (2) 18 leaflet missions
- (3) 4,085,000 leaflets distributed
- (4) 12 loudspeaker missions
- (5) 9 hours and 55 minutes of loudspeaker broadcast
- (6) 15 ground loudspeaker/interpreter team days utilized at Brigade level or below.

(7) 2 returnees reported

(8) Significance

(a) A NVA Company political officer was captured and exploited by tape recording and leaflet.

(b) Extensive Psyops was conducted both day and night using organic helicopters and 245th Psyops Company loudspeaker equipment.

b. Operation CRAZY HORSE (16 May - 5 June 1966)

- (1) High ground between Vinh Thanh and Soui Ca Valley (BR 7065)
- (2) 60 leaflet missions
- (3) 5,995,000 leaflets distributed
- (4) 67 loudspeaker missions
- (5) 56 hours of loudspeaker broadcast
- (6) 7 ground loudspeaker/interpreter team days utilized at

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Brigade level or below.

- (7) 4 returnees reported
- (8) Significance

(a) Psyops interrogation of prisoners and returnees were conducted in conjunction with the Military Intelligence interrogations. A Psyops officer and interpreter asked specific designed questions to produce feed back and information for improved Psyops. A questionnaire with translation was developed.

(b) The 5th Air Commando Squadron rotated aircraft and crew weekly. During the week, the aircraft and crew were stationed with the Division Headquarters.

c. Operation NATHAN HALE (22 June - 2 July 1966)

- (1) Area between CANG TRE USCF Camp and TUY HOA (DQ 9659)
- (2) 39 leaflet missions
- (3) 4,97,000 leaflets distributed
- (4) 35 loudspeaker missions
- (5) 38 hours and 15 minutes of loudspeaker broadcast
- (6) 3 ground loudspeaker/interpreter team days utilized at
Brigade level or below.
- (7) 5 returnees
- (8) Significance

(a) Extensive interrogation of prisoners and returnees developed information which was exploited into new themes.

- 1 Eliminate the plotical cadre's influence
- 2 Some of the NVA are shirking combat
- 3 How long since your family heard from you?

(b) A joint-PHU YEN Sector 1st Air Cav Div-RUC enemy weapons and equipment display was held in TUY HOA. The material was captured during Operation NATHAN HALE. This project was well received by the people. An excellent program included speeches by 2 NVA returnees and a NVA company commander. As equipment is captured in future operations, these displays will be scheduled to stress the Allied victory.

d. Operation HENRY CLAY (3 July - 31 July 1966)

- (1) Area generally west of CUNG SON and CHEG REU (DQ 2546)
- (2) 147 leaflet missions

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- (3) 16,156,000 leaflets distributed
- (4) 137 loudspeaker missions
- (5) 89 hours and 30 minutes of loudspeaker broadcast
- (6) 3 ground loudspeaker/interpreter team days from 245th Psyops Company utilized at Brigade level or below.
- (7) 11 man days of support from 245th Psyops utilized by 2nd Brigade (Loudspeaker technician)
- (8) 2 returnees
- (9) Significances: There is an extensive network of both JARAY and BANHAR Tribesmen Agriculture Areas that extend into the Division TAOR from the Southwest. The Viet Cong apparently have organized these tribesmen into food production units. Present lack of communications with these people has hindered effective control of this Viet Cong Food supply. Several local language tapes have been developed to initiate this vital communications. Previous communications attempts through the use of District Officials and Allied ground forces resulted in negative contact.

3. Developments:

a. The Division was issued three (3) loudspeaker systems for mounting in both UH-1D aircraft and ground vehicles. These are presently on work order to the 15th TC Bn for the aircraft modification and to the 27th Maintenance Bn for the vehicle modification. They will be issued one to each brigade.

b. Division Psyops and JUSMAG representatives are combining resources to produce a Psyops poster for Nationwide distribution.

c. Daily Division Psyops summaries are now forwarded to IFFV and CO, 245th Psyops Company, Nha Trang, RVN with information copies to the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Brigades.

d. Within the TAOR, Psyops developed the theme "HELP US MAINTAIN SECURITY BY GIVING INFORMATION ON THE VIET CONG BANHITS." Leaflets, tape recordings, banners and permanent signs were distributed in populated area.

e. The status of a Division proposed award's leaflet is still undecided at MACV level. Division forwarded a request for increased awards to be offered in a revised leaflet series. It was expected that the increased amount would more effectively tempt potential returnees or information sources.

f. Two letters were forwarded to IFFV stating reasons why Mr. Rantanen, the Division JUSMAG Representative, should remain with the Division. Change of personnel increase in Psyops mission, vast area in which the Division operates, and knowledge of Division procedures were emphasized.

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g. Division Psyops has been authorized to establish three separate three man Brigade sections and a four man Division Section. The MTCB substantiating personnel and equipment was forwarded in July 1966.

h. Operation (OO) FRIEND, conducted jointly by the VINH THANH USSF/CING Camp and 2nd Brigade, was a county fair type festival for the benefit of VINH THANH Valley residents. The festival included speeches, food and magazine gifts, movies, a Vietnamese culture team presentation, lunch for approximately 2500 residents and an Air Force air Show. The people appeared to enjoy themselves. It was hoped to entice the local Viet Cong Guerrillas to rally. Extensive leaflet, loudspeaker, and Psyops was conducted in support of this operation. A local Viet Cong Returnee spoke to the audience. The primary goal was to enhance GVN prestige. It is considered a significant success.

i. The enemy forces have issued stern, explicit instructions to prevent their soldiers from reading our leaflets or listening to our broadcasts. Translations of enemy reports indicate that our Psyops has affected some of their soldiers, especially those involved in combat actions. This is encouraging.

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AVFA-GC-O&T (15 Aug 66)

1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966, RCS
CSFOR-65 (U)

Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam, APO US Forces 96240 30 SEP 1966

TO: Commanding General, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), APO US Forces
96490

1. Variations of friendly casualty statistics exist for Operations Crazy Horse, Hooker I and Nathan Hale as reported in 1st Cav Div (AM) Combat After Action Reports, Operational Report on Lessons Learned and I FFORCEV SITREPs, which cannot be reconciled by this headquarters.

2. Request the friendly casualty statistics for subject operations be reconciled with pertinent 1st Cav Div (AM) SITREPs and Combat After Action Reports when available.

FOR THE COMMANDER

ROBERT A. DICKOVER
Captain, AGC
Asst Adjutant General

AVDAGT (15 Aug 66)

2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966, TCS
CSFOR-65 (U)

Commanding General, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), APO 96490

TO: Commanding General, I Field Force Vietnam, APO 96350

1. The friendly casualty statistics have been reconciled with official G-1 casualty figures and after action reports as requested in the first indorsement. The difference between SITREPS and these figures is due to the refinement process following an operation. Corrected copies of pages 17, 18, 19 and 20 have been added.

2. In future the ORLL will reflex the source of the reports and units involved.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

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AVFA-GC-O&T (15 Aug 66) 3d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966,
RCS CSFOR-65 (U)

Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96350 20 OCT 1966

TO: ACofS for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington,
D.C. 20310
Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, APO US Forces
96307

Concur with the comments in the basic report.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

R. J. FAIRFIELD
Colonel, GS
Deputy Chief of Staff

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