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(6) Lessons Learned,

HEADQUARTERS, 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION, After Action Report - Operation Junction City,
APO San Francisco 96345

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(11) 8 May 1967

AFTER ACTION REPORT - OPERATION JUNCTION CITY

1. NAME AND TYPE OF OPERATION: Operation JUNCTION CITY was a search and destroy operation. Reference: Maps Vietnam, 1:50,000, Series L7014, Sheets 6231 I, IV; 6232 II, III; 6332 III, IV; 6331 IV, and Series L7016, Sheets 6131 I, II, and 6132 II.

(12) 169 p.

2. (U) DATES OF OPERATION: Initiated 220700 February 1967; terminated 152400 April 1967.

3. (C) GENERAL: Operation JUNCTION CITY was a multi-division, IIFFV controlled operation. The 1st Infantry Division was augmented by the 173d Airborne Brigade; 1st Brigade, 9th Infantry Division; 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (-); and ARVN Cavalry Troop and Ranger Battalion. The operation was intended to destroy COSVN and VC/NVA forces and installations in northern and eastern War Zone C. The operation was conducted in two major phases. JUNCTION CITY I placed blocking forces near the Cambodian border in a horseshoe configuration. The 1st Infantry Division forces occupied the northern and eastern portions, as a search and destroy force drove north. Phase I included two major engagements and the first U. S. battalion-sized parachute assault since the Korean War. Two airfields and one CIDG camp were constructed during this phase. JUNCTION CITY I ended 172400 March 1967; JUNCTION CITY II commenced on 180001 March 1967. JUNCTION CITY II placed two reinforced brigades astride enemy lines of communication in eastern War Zone C to conduct search and destroy operations. Concurrent operations opened Hwy 13 from DI AN to QUAN LOI during this period. One airfield capable of receiving C-130 aircraft was constructed, one CIDG camp was established, and a bridge capable of supporting armored vehicles was erected over the SAIGON River. These latter projects were undertaken in eastern War Zone C to facilitate reentry into that area. The general area of the operation is at Annex C.

a. The reporting officer for this report is Major General John H. Hay, Commanding General, 1st Infantry Division.

b. Task Organization: Control of the operation was exercized by Headquarters, IIFFV. 1st Infantry Division forces were controlled from a forward command post located initially at MINH THANH and later at LAI KHE. The initial task organization is listed below. Subsequent changes are shown, as they occurred, in paragraph 7 of this report. Commanders are shown at Annex A.

(18) OACSFOR

(19) OT-RD-67X216

1st Bde	2d Bde
1-2 Inf	1-16 Inf
2-18 Inf	2-16 Inf
1-26 Inf	1-18 Inf
1-28 Inf	3-5 Cav
TF WALLACE	C/5-2 Arty
36th Ranger Bn (ARVN)	Sect 3/D/71 Arty
Troop, 3-1 Cav (ARVN)	1-7 Arty DS
Sect, 1 and 5/D/71 Arty	
1-5 Arty DS	

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FOR OT RD 67X216

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MH (003650)

3d Bde

2-2 Inf (Mech)
2-28 Inf
B/2-34 Armor
1-4 Cav
A/5-2 Arty
2-33 Arty DS

Div Arty

8-6 Arty GSR
1 FB 8-6 Arty GSR 1-5 Arty
1 FB (155) 8-6 Arty GSR 2-33 Arty
C/2-35 Arty GSR 3-319 Arty

Div Trps

1st Avn Bn
1st Engr Bn
121st Sig Bn

173d Abn Bde

1-503 Inf
2-503 Inf
4-503 Inf
3-319 Arty



4. (C) INTELLIGENCE: See Annex B

5. (C) MISSION: 1st Infantry Division conducts airmobile and ground assault with three brigades to block escape routes in northern and eastern portions of AO; conducts search and destroy operations to destroy COSVN and VC/NVA forces and installations; secures LOC from TAY NINH to KATUM; secures NATIONAL ROUTE 13 from DI AN to QUAN LOI; provides security for engineers constructing airfield vic KATUM (XT3390) and for SF/CIDG camp with airfield vic PREK KLOK (XT277788); continues Revolutionary Development Support operations in TAOR.

6. (C) CONCEPT OF OPERATION:

a. Phase I: The multi-division blocking force was to be positioned on 22 February, with 25th Division forces blocking on the west along Highway 22 from vic TAY NINH to vic XT1796, 1st Bde assaulting by air to block in the north from vic XT2097 to vic XT2796, 173d Abn Bde assaulting by air to establish blocking positions vic XT3194 to KATUM (XT3390), and 3d Bde attacking north along Highway 4 to block on the west from vic SUOI DA (XT3457) to KATUM (XT3390). These forces would maintain their blocking positions, conducting search and destroy operations in zone, for an estimated three weeks while ground and air assault forces under control of the 25th Division swept north toward the blocking forces.

b. Phase II: The 25th Division was to continue search and destroy operations in western War Zone C. The 3d Brigade, 1st Division, and the 173d Airborne Brigade were to continue search and destroy operations upon repositioning of their forces into eastern War Zone C; 1st Brigade was to complete repositioning into MINH THANH/AN LOC/QUAN LOI and was to secure the bridge site vic XT 624815 (RTE 246) for the engineer construction party. The 1st Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, OPCON to 1st Infantry Division effective 040800 March 1967, was to move to LAI KHE on 4 March 1967 and open Highway 13 to AN LOC/QUAN LOI on 6 March 1967. The 2d Brigade was to prepare for employment in eastern War Zone C on or about 15 March 1967.

7. (C) EXECUTION:

22 February - The 1st Brigade commenced Operation JUNCTION CITY at 0721 hours by conducting a three battalion airmobile assault from MINH THANH with 1-28 Inf, 1-26 Inf, and 1-2 Inf into landing zones (LZs) 5, 1, and 3 respectively. The air assaults encountered sporadic small arms fire on the LZs. The 173d Airborne Brigade conducted one parachute assault from BIEN HOA by the 2-503 Inf and two airmobile assaults by the 1-503 Inf and the 4-503 Inf from MINH THANH to LZs

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C, E, and 4A and 4B, respectively. The 3d Brigade initiated the operation at 0630 hours by moving from artillery Base I (FSB1) (XT2768) along Axis IRON with the 1-4 Cav (-) and B/2-34 Armor followed by the 2-2 Inf (Mech) (-). The 1-4 Cav (-) became OPCON 173d Airborne Brigade upon reaching CP 4 (XT3393). Elements of the Division Artillery displaced forward to FSBs II, III, IV, V, and VI.

23 February - Changes in Task Organization:

3d Bde

2-2 Inf
1-16 Inf (eff 1746 hrs)
2-28 Inf
1-4 Cav (-)

All units conducted limited search and destroy operations while continuing to improve upon their blocking positions. The 2-2 Inf (Mech) (-) and 1-4 Cav (-) conducted road security operations in sector. At 0905 hours, 2-28 Inf conducted an airmobile assault from SUOI DA to a LZ (XT231871). At 1746 hrs 1-16 Inf closed SUOI DA.

24 February - Changes in Task Organization: None

The 1-16 Inf moved from SUOI DA to a blocking position vicinity XT273729. The 2-28 Inf secured Highway TL-4 in sector. All other battalions conducted limited search and destroy operations and improved upon blocking positions.

25 February - Changes in Task Organization: None

The battalions continued limited search and destroy operations and route clearance in sector and improved upon blocking positions.

26 February - Changes in Task Organization: None

The 2-28 Inf located and destroyed 2.5 tons of dried fish and 3.5 tons of rice. The 1-2 Inf located .5 ton of rice and a cache of communications equipment at XT219963. The 1-26 Inf captured 10,000 units of penicillin.

27 February - Changes in Task Organization: None

Activities for this day consisted of limited search and destroy operations and route security operations. To date, minor contacts have occurred, and many small base camps and supply caches have been located and destroyed.

28 February - Changes in Task Organization: None

The 1-28 Inf located 90 tons of polished rice and 2.3 tons of dried fish vicinity XT293968. At 1025 hours, B/1-16 Inf made contact with a battalion of the 101st NVA Regiment at XT287726. The enemy attacked Company B on the north, east, and south, causing the company to defend in a horseshoe configuration. The VC employed automatic weapons and snipers to good effect. The B Company commander employed all available artillery and airstrikes. At 1500 hrs the VC broke contact. At 1600 hrs, B/2-18 Inf air landed in a nearby LZ and proceeded to B/2-16 Inf position and provided security while a police of the battle area was conducted. B/2-16 Inf suffered 25 KHA and 27 WHA; the VC lost 167 KIA (BC). See Annex C, Incl 1.

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1 March - Changes in Task Organization: None

During the day, 1-2 Inf engaged two squad-sized VC elements vic XT221959 and XT203925. The 2-503 Inf located 16.4 tons of polished rice. The 2-2 Inf (Mech) (-) and 1-4 Cav (-) continued to secure Highway 4 in sector. All other units continued local search and destroy operations and improved upon their blocking positions.

2 March - Changes in Task Organization: None

The 1-2 Inf moved by air to QUAN LOI, closing at 1325 hrs. The 1-26 Inf found 29 bunkers vicinity XT233963. The 1-16 Inf with B Co, 2-18 Inf found and destroyed 1 ton of rice in 200-lb bags.

3 March - Changes in Task Organization:

173d Abn Bde

1-503 Inf
2-503 Inf
4-503 Inf
2-34 Armor (-) (eff 1500 hrs)

The 1-26 Inf was airlifted to MINH THANH, closing at 1458 hours. At 1208 hrs, C Co, 2-503 Inf was engaged by an estimated VC company killing 40 VC (BC). Co A, 2-503 Infantry and Co D, 16th Armor were committed to assist Co C. The 2-34 Armor (-) closed SUOI DA at 1500 hrs.

4 March - Changes in Task Organization:

1st Bde, 9th Inf Div (eff 0800 hrs)	173d Abn Bde
4-39 Inf	1-28 Inf (eff 1445H)
2-47 Inf (Mech)	1-503 Inf
3-5 Cav (eff 0800 hrs)	2-503 Inf
7-9 Arty (-) DS	4-503 Inf
1 FB (155) 1-84 Arty	2-34 Armor (-)

The 1st Brigade, 9th Infantry Division moved by road from CAMP COX (YT 165001) to LAI KHE, closing at 1415 hrs. The 3-5 Cav closed LAI KHE at 1112 hrs. The 1-28 Inf was airlifted from its field position to KATUM (XT 3389). The 2-28 Inf was airlifted from its field position to KATUM (XT 3389). The 2-28 Inf found and destroyed 8 sampans at XT 340857. Search and destroy operations continued to locate small base camps and supply caches; occasional contact with snipers continued.

5 March - Changes in Task Organization: None

The 2-47 Inf (Mech), followed by the 3-5 Cav, cleared Highway 13 from LAI KHE to CHON THANH (XT 7662) and established a night defensive position at XT 760614. The 4-39 Inf was airlifted from CAMP COX to QUAN LOI, closing at 1515 hrs.

6 March - Changes in Task Organization:

3d Bde	173d Abn Bde	1st Bde, 9th Inf Div
2-2 Inf (Mech)	1-503d Inf	2-47 Inf (Mech)
1-16 Inf	2-503 Inf	4-39 Inf
1-28 Inf (eff 0200H)	4-503 Inf	3-5 Cav
2-28 Inf	TF TANKER	TF DIXIE (eff 0600H)
1-4 Cav	2-34 Armor (-)	
	D/16 Armor	

The 1-28 Inf secured pick-up zones for the 173d Airborne Brigade. The 1-503 Inf, 2-503 Inf, and 4-503 Inf conducted an air assault from their field positions into LZ's 11 (XT 357792), 21 (XT 380856), and 41 (XT 368328), respectively Task Force (TF) TANKER, consisting of the 2-34 Armor (-) and Company D, 16 Armor, attacked southeast along Route 246 from KATUM (XT 3390) to BO TUC (XT 3885). The 2-47 Inf (Mech) and 3-5 Cav cleared and secured Highway 13 in sector. The 4-39 Inf conducted an airmobile assault into multiple LZs between XT 7673 and XT 7680, and cleared and secured Highway 13 in sector. TF DIXIE cleared and secured Highway 13 in sector.

7 March - Changes in Task Organization: None

The 1-2 Inf with Troop A, 3-5 Cav secured Route 246 from AN LOC to the bridge site (XT 623825) while the 1-26 Inf was airlifted to the bridge site from MINH THANH, closing at 1507 hrs. The 3d Brigade forces continued to secure Highway 4 in sector. Elements of 4-503 Inf and TF TANKER made contact with a VC platoon at XT 377832, killing 7 VC (BC).

8 March - Changes in Task Organization: None

The 1-2 Inf and 1-26 Inf continued their missions from the previous day. The 2-18 Inf discovered two mine fields at XT 644689 and XT 649694. At XT 375859, 2-503 Inf received 30-60 81mm or 82mm mortar rounds. The 2-47 Inf secured FSB "A" (XT 702819).

9 March - Changes in Task Organization: None

The 1-26 Inf located a battalion-sized base camp at XT 597 796. The 2-18 Inf located a mine field at XT 636686. The 2-28 Inf engaged a VC squad at XT 304896. The 4-503 Inf, assisted by TF TANKER, made contact with dug-in VC at XT 354835, killing 3 VC (BC). The 4-39 Inf conducted a seal and search of AP TRA THANH with negative results. The 3-5 Cav conducted a show of force from AN LOC north along Highway 13 to LOC NINH.

10 March - Changes in Task Organization: None

At 2203 hrs, the 2-2 Inf (Mech) (-) position at FSB II (XT 2778) was subjected to a 30 minute mortar attack of 200 mortar rounds from 120mm, 82mm, and 60mm mortars. The mortar attack was followed immediately by an assault by two battalions of the 272d VC Regiment. The battle continued until 0500 hrs, when the VC broke contact. Throughout the battle, continuous artillery fires were placed around the perimeter, as were coordinated airstrikes. A police of the battle area revealed 196 VC KIA (BC). The 2-2 Inf (Mech) (-) lost 3 KHA and 38 WIA. See Annex C, Incl 2.

11 March - Changes in Task Organization:

3d Bde

2-2 Inf (Mech)
1-16 Inf
1-28 Inf
2-28 Inf
1-4 Cav (-)
TF TANKER (Eff 1900H)

The 1-28 Inf made contact with an estimated VC squad vic XT 344898. The 1-503 Inf engaged an unknown number of VC at XT 385794, resulting in 29 VC KIA (BC).

12 March - Changes in Task Organization:

1st Bde	1st Bde, 9th Inf Div
1-2 Inf	4-39 Inf
2-18 Inf	2-47 Inf
2-26 Inf	TF BRONCO
1-28 Inf (eff 1550H)	A/2-16 Inf
TF DIXIE (eff 0600H)	B/3-5 Cav
	B/1-4 Cav

The 1-28 Inf was airlifted from KATUM to QUAN LOI, closing at 1550 hrs. The 2-34 Armor (-) with Co D, 16 Armor secured KATUM airfield TF BRONCO, composed of B/3-5 Cav, and A/2-16 Inf cleared Highway 13 from LAI KHE to BAU BANG.

13 March - Changes in Task Organization:

1st Bde

1-2 Inf
1-18 Inf (eff 1550H)
2-18 Inf
1-26 Inf
1-28 Inf
TF DIXIE

The 1-2 Inf with A/3-5 Cav and B /2-47 Inf (Mech) made contact with an estimated two VC platoons at XT 674833, resulting in 3 VC KIA (BC). The 1-18 Infantry was airlifted from LAI KHE to QUAN LOI, closing at 1550 hrs. The 2-28 Inf was airlifted from KATUM to SUOI DA, closing at 1210 hrs. The 4-503 Inf was airlifted from KATUM to SUOI DA, closing at 1003 hrs. TF TANKER secured the KATUM airstrip until the 2-28 Inf and 4-503 Inf were airlifted to SUOI DA, and, subsequently, FSB III (XT 2880). The 1-503 Inf had small, sporadic contacts throughout the day at XT 393795, XT 386802, XT 371798, and XT 390795. The 1st Brigade, 9th Infantry Division continued to secure Highway 13 from QUAN LOI to LAI KHE.

14 March - Changes in Task Organization: None

The 3d Brigade began repositioning elements for future operations. At 1235 hrs, 2-2 Inf (Mech), began movement to SUOI DA and then to LAI KHE. The 2-28 Inf was airlifted from SUOI DA to LAI KHE, closing at 0940 hrs. The 1-4 Cav (-) moved by road from SUOI DA to PHU LOI and LAI KHE; the squadron (-) closed on PHU LOI at 0805 hrs and C/1-4 Cav closed on LAI KHE at 1010 hrs. The 1-503 Inf was airlifted from Objective RON (XT 3880) to SUOI DA, closing at 0925 hrs. The 2-503 Inf moved by air from SUOI DA to BIEN HOA, closing at 1545 hrs. The 1st Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, continued to secure Highway 13. The 1-18 Inf was airlifted into position along Route 245 to clear the road in sector.

15 March - Changes in Task Organization: None

Upon closing BIEN HOA at 1530 hrs, 173d Airborne Brigade reverted to IIFFV control. The 2-2 Inf (Mech) closed LAI KHE.

16 March - Changes in Task Organization:

The 1st Brigade continued to secure Route 246 from AN LOC (XT 7588) to the bridge site (XT 624815), and Route 245 from MINH THANH to Highway 13 (XT 7684). The 2-47 Inf (Mech) (-) located 250

bunkers vic XT 805734, The 1st Infantry Division Forward Command Post displaced from MINH THANH to LAI KHE, closing at 1250 hrs. Operation JUNCTION CITY, Phase I, terminated 172400 April 1967.

17 March - Changes in Task Organization: None

At 0600 hrs, 2d Brigade passed control of Operation LAM SON to 3d Brigade. All other units continued their missions.

18 March - Changes in Task Organization:

1st Bde

1-2 Inf
1-18 Inf
2-18 Inf
1-26 Inf
1-28 Inf
1-4 Cav (-) (eff 1300H)
TF DIXIE

The 1-18 Inf assumed the mission of 1-26 Inf to secure the construction sites of the bridge, CIDG camp and airfield (XT 624815). The 1-26 Inf established a battalion base (XT 598828). The 2d Brigade trains and command post moved by road to QUAN LOI. The 1st Brigade, 9th Infantry Division continued to secure Highway 13 from XT 765723 to XT 765800, the 4-39 Inf from XT 767617 to XT 765723, and TF BRONCO from XT 767617 to XT 765723. At 1145 hrs, 2-47 Inf (Mech) engaged a reinforced VC platoon, killing 39 VC (BC).

19 March - Changes in Task Organization: None

The 2-16 Inf moved by road from DI AN to BIEN HOA and on to QUAN LOI by fixed wing aircraft. At 0945 hrs, based upon a 1st Infantry Division G-2 report, seven airstrikes and 8" and 175mm artillery fire were placed on XT 5797, resulting in 37 VC KIA (BC).

20 March - Changes in Task Organization:
173d Abn Bde

1-503 Inf
2-503 Inf
4-503 Inf

The 2-18 Inf conducted an airmobile assault from MINH THANH to an LZ (XT 685745) on Highway 245 without contact. The 2d Brigade Tactical Command Post moved to FSB C (XT 5685), closing at 1730 hrs. The 173d Airborne Brigade became OPCON 1st Infantry Division at 0550 hrs. At 0030 hrs the perimeter of A/3-5 Cav, securing FSB 14 (XT767470), was hit by an unknown number of 60mm mortar rounds, rifle grenades, RPG-2 and recoilless rifle fire. At 0048 hrs, the 273d VC Regiment assaulted the perimeter from the southwest, west, southeast, and northeast. Immediate fire support was provided in the form of artillery fires, airstrikes delivering bombs, CBU, and napalm, gunships and "dragon ships". This fire support continued throughout the battle. At 0310 hrs, a platoon from C/3-5 Cav, arriving at 0127 hrs and 0147 hrs, respectively. The VC broke contact at 0700 hrs. The VC lost 227 KIA (BC), while friendly losses were 3 KHA and 63 WHA. See Annex C, Incl 3.

21 March - Changes in Task Organization

2d Bde

2-16 Inf
2-18 Inf
1-26 Inf (eff 0800H)
2-11 ACR (eff 0800H)
36 Ranger Bn (ARVN) (eff 0800H)

At 1243 hours, a 1-2 Inf patrol engaged a VC squad at XT675866, killing 8 VC (BC) and capturing ten weapons. The 2d Brigade launched an air ground assault into eastern War Zone C with 2-18 Inf conducting an airmobile assault from MINH THANH to LZ B (XT 5190), closing at 1155 hours; 2-16 Inf conducting an airmobile assault from QUAN LOI to LZ C (XT 5290), closing at 1530 hours; and 2-11 ACR moving to secure FSB C (XT 5685), closing at 0915 hours. The 1-26 Inf and 36th Ranger Battalion (ARVN) also joined in securing FSB C. The 1st Brigade, 9th Infantry Division continued to secure Hi hway 13.

22 March - Changes in Task Organization:

173d Abn Bde

1-503 Inf
2-503 Inf
4-503 Inf
2-11 ACR (-) (eff 1316H)

The 1st Brigade continued to secure construction sites along Route 246. The 2-18 Inf and 2-16 Inf conducted search and destroy operations south into objective FAUST (XT 5186). The 2-11 ACR continued the attack south from Objective THRUST to Objective PARRY (XT 5075).

23 March - Changes in Task Organization: None

The 2-18 Inf conducted search and destroy operation south of LZ B (XT 5190) and LZ E (XT 5089). The 2-16 Inf conducted search and destroy operations into Objective FAUST (XT 5185). The unit located and destroyed a base camp containing 32 positions, 1 ton of polished rice, and a tunnel. The 2-16 Inf secured Route 246 in sector. The 173d Airborne Brigade conducted a multibattalion air assault into War Zone C, with 1-503 Inf closing at 1411 hours into LZ A (XT 4768), 2-503 Inf closing at 1022 hours into Objective PARRY (XT 4975), and 4-503 Inf closing at 1230 hours into LZ A (XT 4768).

24 March - Changes in Task Organization:

3d Bde

2-2 Inf
1-16 Inf
1-28 Inf (eff 1807H)
2-28 Inf

The 1-28 Inf moved from QUAN LOI to PHUOC VINH, closing at 1807 hours. The 2-18 Inf directed air and artillery fires on a base camp (XT 529986) containing 225 bunkers and 110 huts. The 2-16 Inf destroyed a 78 bunker base camp (XT 515869). At 1953 hours, FSB C (XT 5685) received 100-150 rounds of 82mm mortar fire. The 1-503 Inf conducted search and destroy operations in Objective ELM (XT 4770). The 2-503 Inf conducted an airmobile assault into LZ C (XT 4467). The 4-503 Inf conducted search and destroy operations in Objective OAK (XT 4665). The 2-11 ACR (-) continued to secure Objective PARRY.

25 March - Changes in Task Organization: None

The 2-18 Inf and 2-16 Inf continued to conduct search and destroy operations in objectives 3 (XT 5085) and 4(XT 5285), respectively. Between 2109 hours and 2115 hours, 2-47 Inf (Mech) received 80 rounds of 60mm and 82mm mortar fire. The 2-503 Inf continued to conduct search and destroy operations in Objective BIRCH (XT4567); sporadic contact was made throughout the day.

26 March - Changes in Task Organization: None

The 1st Bde, 9th Infantry Division continued to secure Highway 13 between LAI KHE and QUAN LOI. All other units continued their missions. The 2-16 Inf located 12.9 tons of polished rice at XT 536855, at 1342 hours.

27 March - Changes in Task Organization:

2d Bde

1-2 Inf (1300H)
2-16 Inf
2-18 Inf
1-26 Inf
2-11 ACR (1240H)

The 2-16 Inf conducted search and destroy operations in objective 6 (XT 5386), as did 2-18 Inf in objectives 3 (XT 5085 and 5 (XT 5084).

28 March - Changes in Task Organization:

1st Bde , 9th Inf Div	2d Bde	1st Bde
4-39 Inf	1-2 Inf	2-16 Inf (eff 1253H)
2-47 Inf (Mech)	1-18 Inf (eff 1310)	1-4 Cav
3-5 Cav	2-18 Inf	TF DIXIE
2-11 ACR (eff 2143H)	1-26 Inf	

The 1-18 Inf moved by road from FSB (XT 6132) to FSB C (XT 5685), closing at 1310 hours. The 2-16 Inf moved by road to FSB B (XT 6182), closing at 1253 hours. The 1-503 Inf secured the FSB at Objective PARRY (XT 4975).

29 March - Changes in Task Organization:

173d Abn Bde

1-503 Inf
2-503 Inf
4-503 Inf
2-11 ACR (eff 1300H)

The 36th Ranger Battalion (ARVN) sealed the village of AP TAN THANH (XT 870963) with negative results. The 1st Brigade, 9th Infantry Division reverted to control of the 9th Infantry Division at 1930 hours.

30 March - Changes in Task Organization: None

The 1-26 Infantry conducted an airmobile assault from FSB C (XT 5685) to LZ GEORGE (XT 4284), closing at 1415 hours. The 1st

Brigade and 173d Airborne Brigade continued their missions without significant contact. At 1948 hours, FSB C (XT 5685) received 40 rounds of 82 mm mortar fire; counter mortar fire caused a secondary explosion at XT 555863.

31 March - Changes in Task Organization: (Battle of AP GU)

1st Bde	2d Bde
1-28 Inf (eff 1200H)	1-2 Inf
1-4 Cav	1-16 Inf (-) (eff 1555H)
TF DIXIE	1-18 Inf
	1-26 Inf

At 0930 hours, the 1-2 Inf air landed in LZ GEORGE (XT 4284) without incident and moved two kilometers to the west. The 1-26 Inf initially secured LZ GEORGE until the 1-2 Inf landed, thereafter conducting local search and destroy operations. At 1200 hours, elements of the 1-26 Inf made contact with an undetermined VC force in the woodline north of LZ GEORGE. Air strikes and artillery fires were put into the area. Contact was broken in the late afternoon and the 1-26 Inf occupied its night defensive position at LZ GEORGE. At 1555 hours, the 1-16 Inf (-) air landed in LZ GEORGE and moved to a night defensive position vic XT427853.

1 April - Changes in Task Organization:

1st Bde	11 ACR (-)
2-16 Inf	2-11 ACR
2-18 Inf (eff 1305H)	3-11 ACR
1-28 Inf	
1-4 Cav	
TF DIXIE	

At 0500 hours, several hundred founds of 60mm and 82mm mortar fire landed in the northeastern portion of the 1-26 Inf perimeter and in the 1-16 Inf (-) perimeter vic XT 428847. Immediately following the mortar attack, the 271st VC Regiment assaulted the 1-26 Inf perimeter. All available air and artillery were used in repelling the attack. Contact was broken at 0808 hrs with the VC withdrawing to the northeast. A police of the area of the battle revealed 609 VC KIA (BC), 5 PW, and 23 weapons. US casualties were 17 KHA and 69 WIA. See Annex C, Incl 4.

2 April - Changes in Task Organization:

1st Bde	2d Bde
1-18 Inf	1-2 Inf
2-18 Inf	1-16 Inf
1-26 Inf (eff 1425H)	2-16 Inf (eff 1457H)
1-4 Cav	
TF DIXIE	

The 1-18 Inf secured Route 246 from FSB THRUST to CF 137 (XT528830). The 2-18 Inf continued to secure FSB C. The 1-26 Inf was airlifted from LZ GEORGE to QUAN LOI, closing at 0825 hours. The 1-28 Inf was airlifted from QUAN LOI to FSB B (XT6281), closing at 0825 hours

and assumed responsibility for the CIDG camp construction site. The 1-2 Inf and 1-16 Inf conducted search and destroy operations vic XT4584 and XT 4485, respectively. The 2-16 Inf was airlifted from FSB B to LZ GEORGE commencing at 1130 hours and closing at 1457 hours. The 11 ACR (-) secured Highway 13 between BAU BANG and QUAN LOI The 173d Airborne Brigade conducted search and destroy operations in [illegible] assigned AO in southeastern War Zone C.

3 April - Changes in Task Organization: None

The 1-2 Inf and 1-16 Inf conducted search and destroy operations in the southern and northeastern portions of Objective SIOUX (XT 4484) respectively. At 1040 hours, the 1-2 Inf engaged an unknown size VC force at XT 442845, resulting in 15 VC KIA (BC).

4 April - Changes in Task Organization:

1st Bde

1-16 Inf (eff 1340H)
1-18 Inf
2-18 Inf
1-26 Inf
1-28 Inf
1-4 Cav (-)
TF DIXIE

The 1-16 Inf was airlifted from LZ GEORGE (XT 4384) to QUAN LOI at 0734 hours, closing at 1340 hours. The 1-18 Inf, 2-18 Inf, and 1-26 Inf secured FSB THRUST (XT 5080), FSB C (XT 5685), and QUAN LOI respectively. The 1-4 Cav (-) secured Route 246 from FSB B (XT 6281) to AN LOC. The 1-503 Inf received 150 rounds of mortar fire at 1910 hours while securing FSB PERRY (XT 4975). The 2-503 Inf and 4-503 Inf conducted search and destroy operations. toward Objectives ASH and FIR, respectively, making light contact enroute. The 11 ACR (-) escorted a total of 164 vehicles between QUAN LOI and LAI KHE.

5 April - Changes in Task Organization:

2d Bde

1-2 Inf
2-16 Inf
1-18 Inf (eff 1200H)

The 1-16 Inf moved by C-130 aircraft from QUAN LOI to SONG BE and by CH-47 helicopter to BUNARD (XT 270888), to protect the TF from 168th Engineers constructing an airfield and CIDG camp in support of Operation HARVEST MOON, a IIFFV directed SF/CIDG operation, closing at 1530 hours. The 11 ACR (-) escorted a total of 170 vehicles between LAI KHE and QUAN LOI. At 1910 hours, 1-503 Inf received 150 rounds of 82mm mortar fire; the attack ceased at 2015 hours. The 2-503 Inf conducted search and destroy operations at Objectives ASH and FIR, respectively.

6 April - Changes in Task Organization:

2d Bde

1-2 Inf
2-16 Inf
1-18 Inf
2-18 Inf (eff 0930)

The 1-16 Inf destroyed 2.5 tons of rice vicinity BUNARD (YT 270888). FSB C received a total of 200 rounds of mortar fire during attacks at 1115 hours and 1745 hours. The 11 ACR (-) escorted 74 vehicles between LAI KHE and QUAN LOI.

7 April - Changes in Task Organization:

2d Bde	3d Bde
1-18 Inf	1-2 Inf (eff 1610H)
2-16 Inf	2-2 Inf
2-18 Inf	2-28 Inf
1-28 Inf (eff 1935H)	

The 2-16 Inf was airlifted from field positions in Objective SIOUX to FSB B, closing at 1020 hours. The 1-28 Inf was airlifted from FSB B to FSB THRUST, closing at 1135 hours. The 4-503 Inf made sporadic contact in Objective FIR at XT 443766 and XT 443764.

8 April - Changes in Task Organization: None

The 1-16 Inf continued in support of Operation HARVEST MOON at BUNARD (YT 270888). From 2200 hours to 2212 hours, the 1-4 Cav (-) command post received 40 rounds of mortar fire. The 4-503 Inf engaged a VC squad in AO FIR at 1245 hours, resulting in 5 VC KIA (BC).

9 April - Changes in Task Organization: None

At 2050 hours, the 1-18 Inf received 25 rounds of 82mm mortar fire. At 1512 hours, an aerial observer of the 1-28 Inf observed 60 VC in the open (XT 533789); artillery fired into the area resulted in 35 VC KIA (BC). The 11 ACR (-) escorted 75 vehicles between LAI KHE and QUAN LOI. The 1-503 Inf commenced search and destroy operations toward Objective SAND (XT 5470). The 2-503 Inf conducted an airmobile assault into LZ ROBERT (XT 5166) commencing at 1122 hours; heavy fire from the LZ permitted only the first airlift to land. The battalion (-) diverted to MINH THANH until the LZ was secured with the support of artillery and air strikes. The airmobile assault into LZ ROBERT continued at 1445 hours, closing at 1615 hours. The 4-503 Inf was airlifted into LZ ROCK at 0800 hours, closing at 1018 hours without contact.

10-11 April - Changes in Task Organization: None

Operation JUNCTION CITY continued without significant incident.

12 April - Changes in Task Organization:

1st Bde	11 ACR (-)
1-16 Inf	2-11 ACR
1-26 Inf	3-11 ACR
1-28 Inf	1-4 Cav (-) (eff 1821H)

The 1-503 Inf and 2-503 Inf were moved by air from field positions to MINH THANH, closing at 1321 hours. The 4-503 Inf conducted search and destroy operations in Objective ROCK (XT 6067).

13 April - Changes in Task Organization:

1st Bde	3d Bde
1-16 Inf	1-2 Inf
2-16 Inf (eff 1003H)	2-2 Inf
1-18 Inf (eff 1103H)	1-28 Inf (eff 1700H)
1-26 Inf	
2-18 Inf (eff 1740H)	

The 2d Brigade, 173d Airborne Brigade, and 2-11 ACR terminated participation in Operation **JUNCTION CITY.** The 1-16 Inf at BUNARD destroyed 2.2 tons of rice. The 1-18 Inf moved by air from FSB C to FSB B, closing at 0835 hours, and moved by foot to relieve 1-28 Inf along Route 246 by 1103 hours. The 2-18 Inf was airlifted to QUAN LOI, closing at 1740 hours.

14 April - Changes in Task Organization:

2d Bde

2-16 Inf (eff 1405H)
2-18 Inf

The 1-18 Inf was airlifted to QUAN LOI, closing at 1650 hours. The 2-16 Inf moved from FSB B to BIEN HOA by air, and then by truck to DI AN, closing at 1405 hours. The 11 ACR (-) continued route security along Highway 13.

15 April - Changes in Task Organization: None

The 1st Infantry Division terminated Operation JUNCTION CITY at 152400 April 1967. The day's activities concluded the movement of units from the area of operations. No significant incidents occurred.

8. (C) Supporting Forces:

a. Artillery: See Annex E
b. Signal: See Annex F
c. Engineer: See Annex G
d. US Air Force Close Air Support:

(1) Tactical Air Support provided by 7th Air Force during Operation JUNCTION CITY was excellent. The primary missions assigned to tactical aircraft were as follows:

(a) Landing zone preparation

(b) Convoy cap

(c) Prestrikes of objective areas

(d) Destruction of VC facilities

(2) On Operation JUNCTION CITY 2,483 tactical air sorties were flown expending 3,235 tons of ordnance as follows:

	BRIGADES							
	1st	2d	3d	173d	1/9	11th ACR	TOTAL	TONNAGE
Feb 22	64		6	60			130	168.0
23	35		15	16			66	88.5
24	32		16	9			57	73.0
25	25		20	4			49	59.5

		1st	2d	3d	173d	1/9	11th ACR	TOTAL	TONNAGE
Feb	26	10		17	40			27	37.4
	27	26		25	0			49	77.3
	28	14		40	6			60	89.0
Mar	1	12		12	6			30	39.8
	2	12		20	6			38	41.3
	3	4		24	10			38	57.2
	4	13		10	16			39	41.2
	5	6		10	5			21	45.2
	6	0		6	52			58	80.0
	7	27		11	24			62	82.7
	8	0		21	15			36	47.3
	9	0		19	12	15		46	57.7
	10	17		21	25	0		63	81.5
	11	19		10	12	0		41	56.0
	12	17		10	12	0		39	45.5
	13	18		6	14	5		43	56.8
	14	14			6	4		24	35.7
	15	4			0	4		8	10.8
	16	13			0	0		13	13.2
	17	13			0	2		15	22.0
	18	14			0	12		26	45.0
	19	19			0	4		23	32.5
	20	13	2		0	25		40	43.4
	21	4	69		0	0		73	82.7
	22	10	32		0	5		47	47.8
	23	3	31		25	0		59	94.8
	24	4	22		29	0		55	75.5
	25	0	21		23	6		50	63.5
	26	0	30		17	5		42	51.5
	27	3	19		11	3		36	48.5
	28	0	40		13			53	70.7
	29	0	14		13			27	38.7
	30	9	42		6			57	52.5
	31	2	74		8			84	108.7
Apr	1	0	103		11		0	114	128.9
	2	11	20		23		3	57	78.6
	3	0	68		11		0	79	99.0
	4	8	16		19		2	45	64.5
	5	10	24		11		0	45	59.3
	6	5	55		6		2	68	88.0
	7	12	29		11		2	54	62.3
	8	10	23		12		5	50	37.3
	9	5	32		30		0	67	83.5
	10	12	21		10		0	43	59.5
	11	10	16		12		3	41	58.4
	12	7	17		8		2	34	54.3
	13	12	19		0		4	35	54.0
	14	9	0		0		10	19	25.3
	15	0	0		0		9	9	20.0
		518	629	319	619	90	42	2483	323593

(3) Air power played a significant role in the battles of BAU BANG and AP GU on 20 March and 31 March - 1 April 1967 respectively. In both instances a heavy ground attack was repulsed through the skillful use of small arms fire, artillery, and tactical air. Flights were requested at 15 minute intervals, which permitted continuous delivery of ordnance on the attacking VC. After the VC broke off the engagement airstrikes were employed to pursue the VC by striking likely routes of withdrawal and known base camps in the area. In the April 1 battle an estimated 350 VC were killed as a direct result of the airstrikes employed. Some difficulty was encountered in obtaining CBU for the immediate strikes; however, the frequency with which the aircraft were scrambled

was outstanding. The physical and psychological value of massive air power in defeating a determined ground attack was again demonstrated.

(4) The landing zone preparations of 22 Feb 67 were the most extensive ever conducted by this division. Five battalion landing zones were prepared for airmobile assaults and one drop zone was prepared for parachute assault. In order to control the utilization of airspace a coordination meeting was held by G-3 Air with the Brigade S-3 Air officers, ALOs, and the mission commanders of the Army and Air Force troop lift aircraft. Flight routes and altitudes were specified to insure that all missions could be accomplished without interference. 130 sorties of tactical aircraft were flown on 22 February in the 1st Division area of operations without any of the operations conflicting with each other. As a result of the extensive air preparation, landings were made within five kilometers of the Cambodian border without incident.

(5). B-52 Strikes: A total of 22 B-52 strikes were conducted during Operation JUNCTION CITY: 8 in support of JUNCTION CITY I and 14 in support of JUNCTION CITY II. Two of the strikes delivered during JUNCTION CITY I were QUICK RUNS and were based upon reliable intelligence reports on the 9th NVA Division. Two of the strikes delivered during JUNCTION CITY II were also QUICK RUNS and were utilized to exploit the battle of AP GU. The targets selected after this battle were known base camp areas that were believed to be utilized as assembly areas along withdrawal routes used by the VC. All other strikes were delivered based upon intelligence and upon their impact on the scheme of maneuver. They were particulary effective in destroying VC base camps, storage areas, supplies and in facilitating the maneuver of Division units. CS strikes were utilized when appropriate to cause VC units to move into the strike area. All strikes within range of artillery received an artillery follow-up. Airstrikes were conducted to complete the destruction of exposed but undamaged VC facilities. Where possible ground follow-ups were conducted to exploit the B-52 strikes.

9. (C) Results:

a. Friendly Losses:

KIA: 147
WIA: 836
EQUIPMENT DAMAGED: Tanks 27, APC 28, Tank Dozers 2, UH-1D 4, Trucks 32, Tank Retriever 1, SP How 1.
EQUIPMENT DESTROYED: Tanks 1, APC 14, UH-1D 1, Trucks 10, SP How 2.

b. VC Personnel Losses:

(1) VC KIA (BC) 1776
(2) VC PW's 20

c. VC Equipment Losses:

(1) Weapons:

(a) Machine guns:
1. LMG 14
2. HMG 1
3. SMG 5

TOTAL 20

(b) Rifles: 149
(c) Pistols: 3
(d) Shotguns: 4
(e) Rocket Launchers: 17
(f) Grenade Launchers: 3
(g) Recoilless Rifles: 1

(2) Ammunition:

(a) Mortar: 233
(b) Rockets: 80
(c) Recoilless Rifle: 36
(d) 75mm How: 49
(e) Mines:

1. Claymores: 57
2. AP: 83
3. AT: 113

(3) Explosive Material:

(a) Explosives: 1016 lbs
(b) Blasting caps: 176
(c) Claymore wire: 50 meters
(d) Det cord: 600 meters

(4) Grenades:

(a) Rifle:	267
(b) Hand:	3702
(c) Gas:	3
(d) M-79:	22
TOTAL	3994

(5) Foodstuff:

(a) Rice: 258.35 tons
(b) Salt: 7.81 tons
(c) Dried Fish: 13.15 tons
(d) Sugar: 135 lbs
(e) Tomatoes: 80 lbs
(f) Peanuts: 600 lbs
(g) Bananas: 35 lbs
(h) Beans: 1.55 tons
(i) Cooking oil: 96 gal.
(j) Molasses: 200 gal.
(k) Milk: 125 cans
(l) Pigs: 69
(m) Chickens: 206

(6) Photographic Equipment:

(a) Cameras: 22
(b) Projectors: 5
(c) Movie Screen: 1
(d) Dark rooms: 1

(7) Signal Equipment:

(a) Radios: 18
(b) Telephones: 21
(c) Switchboards: 2
(d) Intercoms: 1
(e) Tape Recorders: 1
(f) AMP meters: 3
(g) Amplifiers: 2
(h) Generators: 5
(i) Transformers: 1
(j) Wire: 6.8 miles

(8) Miscellaneous:

(a) Ruck sacks and packs: 31
(b) Entrenching tools: 131
(c) Canteens: 72
(d) Ponchos: 130
(e) Hammocks: 64
(f) Gas masks: 42
(g) Binoculars: 1
(h) Saws: 51
(i) Pick axes: 176
(j) Pistol belts: 15
(k) Weapon magazines: 113
(l) Plastic weapon covers: 82
(m) Lamps: 82
(n) Sandals: 7500
(o) Flashlights: 6
(p) Assorted Medical Supplies: 100 lbs
(q) Penicillin: 10,000 units
(r) Bicycles: 123
(s) Charcoal ovens: 10
(t) Brick ovens: 5
(u) Gasoline Engines: 2
(v) Cooking pots: 53
(w) Mess Halls: 6
(x) Cement (lbs): 100
(y) Typewriters: 3
(z) Rice polishing machine: 1
(aa) Rice husking machines: 3
(bb) Shower Points: 1
(cc) Ox Carts: 19
(dd) Kerosene (gal): 355
(ee) Tin (sheets): 278
(ff) Electric Water Pumps: 1
(gg) Air Compressors: 1
(hh) Transistor Radios (Civ): 37
(ii) 12v Batteries: 5
(jj) 4.5v Batteries: 30
(kk) Flare pistols: 26
(ll) Flares: 1000
(mm) 500 lb bombs: 2
(nn) Piasters: 33,290
(oo) Numerous uniforms
(pp) Numerous documents
(qq) Assorted bicycle parts
(rr) Assorted tools

10. (C) ADMINISTRATION and LOGISTICS: See Annex D

11. (C) COMMANDER'S EVALUATION:

a. Operation JUNCTION CITY was the largest operation of the Vietnamese War to date. It demonstrated the US capability to enter areas which were previously Viet Cong sanctuaries and to conduct successful search and destroy missions. Actions taken during the operation to facilitate reentry into War Zone C will further decrease the VC tendency to regard the area as impenetrable.

b. The 1st Infantry Division gained extensive experience in fighting main force VC/NVA units in heavily forested areas and in conducting such operations with extended lines of communications, both land and air.

c. The Big Red One met and defeated each of the four regiments of the 9th VC Division during Operation JUNCTION CITY. The 101st NVA Regiment and the 271st, 272d, and 273d Main Force Regiments lost a combined total of 1203 combat soldiers killed in four separate battles. A total of 1809 VC soldiers were killed by the 1st Infantry Division during the entire operation. The actual number lost may be twice as large; the total given reflects those killed by body count.

d. One objective of the operation which was not achieved was the capture or destruction of the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN) and of the Headquarters, 9th VC Division. Several factors contributed to this result:

(1) The proximity of a privileged sanctuary to the reported locations of COSVN and Headquarters, 9th VC Division.

(2) The extreme difficulty of establishing a seal with sufficient troop density to deny exfiltration routes to VC units thoroughly familiar with the dense jungle terrain.

(3) The difficulty of gaining complete surprise, as a result of extensive repositioning of troops and logistical support prior to D-Day, in spite of the efforts devoted to deception measures.

e. Subsidiary operations conducted during Operation JUNCTION CITY concurrently with the primary search and destroy effort contributed in no small measure to the overall success of the operation. The 1st Engineer Battalion constructed two new airfields in War Zone C and erected a Class 45/55 bridge across the SAIGON River at XT624815, providing for ready highway access into eastern War Zone C. Large stores of VC supplies, arms, and ammunitions were captured or destroyed, and Highway 13 was held open for traffic almost continuously for three months from SAIGON to QUAN LOI.

12. (C) CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED

a. Conclusions.

(1) VC activity during Operation JUNCTION CITY confirmed the 1st Infantry Division intelligence estimates made during December, January, and February. Positive identification of the 9th VC Division and COSVN in War Zone C was established.

(2) Personnel and material losses inflicted upon the 9th VC Division limit that division's capability for extended operations unless extensive refitting and personnel replacement is accomplished. The 9th VC Division has not, however, been rendered ineffective.

(3) A marked increase in VC anti-tank effort, both by mining and the use of RPGs, was experienced. This trend can be expected to continue.

(4) The improved facilities constructed in War Zone C and the knowledge of the area acquired will make it easier to reenter this area in the future. Knowledge of the demonstrated US capability to range virtually at will throughout the area cannot but affect the VC modes of operations in War Zone C. More time and effort will probably be expended on construction, concealment, and exfiltration routes.

b. Lessons Learned.

(1) A lesson reinforced rather than newly learned during this operation is that it is virtually impossible to prevent small, determined VC "counterswoop" teams from mining roads and ambushing resupply columns along routes where heavy vegetation closely borders the road. Such teams are capable of surviving artillery blocking fires and reconnaissance by fire from the column. The combat power required to secure a long land line of communications under conditions such as those encountered on Operation JUNCTION CITY is not normally available. Suppressive fires and aggressive patrolling can limit the effectiveness of VC "counterswoop" tactics; they cannot completely overcome it. Given the extreme difficulty of detecting VC mines, using mine detecting equipment presently available, the best tactic is to concentrate on the enemy mine layer—to attempt to prevent emplacement rather than to rely primarily on detection.

(2) Three of the four large battles in which the 1st Infantry Division participated during the operation were brought about by VC initiative: US forces were attacked in prepared positions by larger, aggressive, well-equipped VC forces. Each attack was preceded by an intensive mortar barrage. Each attack failed. Each resulted in an extremely high VC/US kill ratio. US casualties were minimal, particularly considering the intensity and close range of the action in each battle. Several factors contributed importantly to these lopsided results:

(a) Careful preparation of defensive positions and preplanning of defensive fires. Well dug fighting positions with adequate overhead cover are particularly important.

(b) Insistence that all units be within range of adequate 105mm artillery support.

(c) Adequacy of tactical air support.

(d) The ability of armored/mechanized units (engaged in two of the three defensive battles) to bring heavy direct fires to bear against the assaulter and to maintain a heavy volume of fire for a relatively long time period before requiring ammunition resupply. Armored/mechanized forces are well suited for use in the defense of fire support bases, particularly if the armored/mechanized forces can be used for road security during the day, then assembled at night for the defense of critical bases. Their use in this manner constitutes a desirable economy of force measure.

(e) In conjunction with the foregoing factors, rapid reaction to bring maximum firepower to bear on the attacker. This requires that the defending force anticipate with complete and rapid measures in the early stages of an attack if it is to meet that attack with adequate and timely artillery and tactical air fires.

(3) The VC have become increasingly sophisticated in preparing potential landing zones for defense against airmobile assaults. This development was particularly evident during Phase II of Operation JUNCTION CITY. There are few suitable LZs in eastern War Zone C. The VC emplaced command detonated mines along the woodline bordering these LZs and—in at least one instance borne out by a captured document and subsequent enemy actions—prepared detailed "counterswoop" plans. Two techniques, used in combination, are indicated as an effective US countermeasure. Both were employed successfully by the 1st Infantry Division during Phase II of Operation JUNCTION CITY:

(a) Vary the approach means to LZs, using ground maneuver part of the time and airmobile assault part of the time.

(b) Prepare each LZ to be used for airmobile assault by employing heavy CBU runs along the woodlines, napalm perpendicular to the woodlines, and 500 or 750 pound bombs with instantaneous fuze down the center of the LZ. (The instantaneous fusing allows command detonation wires to be cut without unacceptable cratering in the LZ.) Reinforce the tactical air preparation with an intensive artillery preparation. Move both air and artillery to suspected enemy locations during the assault and continue their fires.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

E J Heacock

E. J. HEACOCK
2LT, AGC
Asst AG

ANNEXES:

~~A - List of Commanders~~
B - Intelligence
~~C - Operations Overlay~~
D - Logistics
E - Division Artillery After Action Report
F - 121st Sig Bn After Action Report
G - 1st Engr Bn After Action Report
H - 1st Bde After Action Report
I - 2d Bde After Action Report
J - 3d Bde After Action Report
K - 1st Bde, 9th Inf Div After Action Report 67X151
L - 1-4 Cav After Action Report
M - 1st Avn Bn After Action Report
~~N - Military Police After Action Report~~
~~O - Psychological Operations~~

Annex B (Intelligence) to After Action Report for OP JUNCTION CITY (U)

1(C) Intelligence prior to operation--the 271st VC, 272d VC, and 101st NVA Regiments of the 9th VC Division and the 70th Security Guard Regiment are the major VC forces that are expected to be encountered in the operational area. These units could be supported by elements of the 69th Arty Regt (AKA U80), the 680th Tng Regt, and the 273d Regiment. It is expected that operations GADSEN and TUCSON will influence the disposition of these VC units. Initial stages of operations GADSEN and TUCSON are expected to cause the 271st Regt to shift from the western border area and the 101st NVA Regt to move south from the BINH LONG, TAY NINH, Cambodian base into north central area of War Zone "C." It is likely that Operation TUCSON may force the 272d VC Regt to move from LONG NGUYEN area to War Zone "C." COSVN can be expected to begin to move toward the Cambodian border with the onset of Operation JUNCTION CITY. The 70th Guard Regt will be utilized in protecting COSVN's withdrawal to the border. Captured enemy documents, ralliers, and other intelligence sources indicate that COSVN is established in extremely well fortified installations. These reports indicate that the VC will make extensive use of mines and booby traps to delay maneuvering of friendly troops. VC elements can be expected to defend their base camps, supply areas, and other installations from strong defensive positions. Recent information indicates that the VC have stepped up their construction of fortifications in War Zone "C." At the present time, COSVN is believed to be situated in the area north of KATUM (XT 332902), while the 9th VC Division Headquarters is reportedly situated in the southeastern portion of the operational area.

2(C) Enemy situation during the operation:

a. JUNCTION CITY started on 22 February 1967 and through 28 February, there were no major contacts.

b. On 28 February at 1052 hours a squad from B/1-16 Inf made contact with an estimated VC company at XT 289727. Artillery and air strikes were called in to support the unit in contact. Artillery fire continued throughout the night and the next morning a police of the battle area revealed 167 VC had been killed. It was then estimated that the VC force could have been as large as a battalion. US losses in the battle were 25 killed and 27 wounded. A PW captured in the battle area on 1 March stated that he was the Assistant Company Commander of the 3d Company, 2d Battalion, 101st NVA Regiment which is assigned to the 9th VC Division. He stated that his unit had participated in this battle.

c. There were no significant engagements with the enemy on 1 and 2 March.

d. On 3 March at 1215 hours the 173d Abn Bde Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol engaged an estimated VC company at XT 360785 resulting in seven VC killed. LBN's taken from the body of one VC were HT900AC21 and HT86502YK21 which indicate 272d VC Regiment and DOAN 66/165A.

e. On 3 March at 1644 hours B/2-28 Inf engaged an unknown size VC force along with supporting air strikes at XT 324851. This action resulted in seven VC being killed. There was no unit identification made as a result of this contact.

f. On 3 March at 1642 hours A and C 2-503 Inf engaged an estimated VC platoon at XT 361941. The battle area was policed on 4 March and revealed 39 VC had been killed during the battle. There was no identification of this unit.

g. There were no significant activities between 4 March and 9 March. On 9 March C/4-503 captured one PW at XT 348834. The PW, TRAN VAN NGHIA, said that he was a member of 3d Squad, 1st Platoon, 3d Company, 529th Battalion of U80 Artillery Regiment. He infiltrated from NVN in mid 1966. B/4-503 captured some documents which placed the 56th Battalion of U80 Artillery Regiment at XT 380856 and XT 380820.

h. On 10 March, 3d Bde received a mortar and ground attack at XT 276785. The attack started at 2213 hours and lasted until 110002 hours. When the battle area was checked there were 196 VC killed and five wounded VC captured. Documents captured in the area indicated that the 272d VC Regiment may have participated in the attack.

i. On 10 March at 0945 hours 1-503 Inf engaged an unk size VC force (XT378782) resulting in 39 VC killed and one captured. Captured VC said he was

a member of 3d Squad, 3d Platoon, 8th Company, 3d Battalion of the 16th Regiment (AKA 101st NVA Regiment).

j. There were no significant engagements between 11 March and 18 March.

k. On 19 March an aerial observer spotted a large number of VC moving along a trail at XT 568989. Artillery and air strikes were called in resulting in 39 VC killed and an additional 47 VC probably killed. The unit was estimated to be a company size unit. No unit identification was made.

l. On 20 March at 0040 hours A/3-5 Cav received a mortar and ground attack at XT 780450 which lasted until 0215 hours. At 0510 hours the enemy again attacked from the south. This contact was broken at 0615 hours. The battle resulted in 227 VC killed and three wounded VC captured. US losses were three killed and 63 wounded. The enemy unit in this battle was the 273d VC Regiment.

m. There were no significant engagements with the enemy between 22 March and 30 March.

n. On 31 March at 1258 hours the Reconnaissance Platoon 1-26 Inf made contact with the 1st Battalion, 70th Security Regiment in bunkers and trenches at XT 436857. A and B/1-26 Inf moved in to reinforce the Reconnaissance Platoon. C/1-26 Inf made contact at XT 438850 with an unknown size VC force that was attempting to flank the other elements in contact. The results of this battle were 28 VC killed and 50 - 60 probably killed by air strikes. US losses in this action were seven killed and 38 wounded.

o. On 1 April at 0625 hours LZ George (XT 430840) was attacked by at least two battalions of the 271st VC Regiment. This contact lasted until 0951 hours and resulted in 581 VC killed and five wounded VC captured. The PW's indicated that the 1st, 2d, and 3d Battalions of the 271st Regiment had participated in the attack. US losses were ten killed and 64 wounded.

p. JUNCTION CITY ended at 152400 hours April 1967 with no further significant contacts being reported.

q. Aerial Surveillance: (See Appendix I to this Annex)

3.(C) Weather and Terrain:

a. Terrain:

(1) The JUNCTION CITY area of operations is characterized by relatively flat land with gentle rolling hills. There are only two prominent land features in the area. NUI BA DEN, a 986 meter mountain, is located at XT 2858. NUI ONG, NUI CUA CONG, and NUI THA LA form a continuous ridge which extends from XT 5259 to XT 4853. The drainage pattern is formed by the head waters of the SONG SAIGON. There are many small streams in the area but they did not create any major obstacles to foot movement. Vegetation in the area ranges from dense forest, to light forest, brush wood, and bamboo thickets. There are large open rice fields around NUI BA DEN and a large rubber plantation, the DON DIEN MICHELIN, southeast of the NUI ONG mountain ridge. Open areas are scattered throughout the area of operations.

(2) National Highway 13 is the only paved road in the area of operation. There are two dirt highways, 244 and 246, and numerous well used trails in the area of operations.

b. Weather: The weather during JUNCTION CITY was generally excellent. The average temperature during the operation ranged from a low of 71° to a high of 97°. The average relative humidity during the operation was 71%. The number of days with fog restricting visibility to five miles or less was 39. The number of days with a ceiling below 4000 feet was 24. The total amount of rainfall during the entire operation was 2.11 inches. Weather during the period had no adverse effects on tactical operations.

4.(C) Fortifications: There were numerous fortifications throughout the area of operations. Fortifications included bunkers, fox holes, trenches, tunnels, and crew served weapons positions. There were several very large fortified areas estimated to be battalion size base camps. There were some bunkers made of concrete indicating that the VC had planned long term use of these bunkers. (See Appendix to this Annex.)

Appendix 1 (Aerial Surveillance) to Annex B (Intelligence) to After Action Report for OP JUNCTION CITY (U)

1. (C) During the operation all available resources were integrated into the surveillance and reconnaissance program. To preclude alerting the VC/NVA forces of a pending operation, overflights of the operational area, including avenues of approach and escape, were performed in accordance with normal reconnaissance procedures, and without obvious concentration on areas important to the operation.

2. (C) Although surveillance of the area began during January, the mission and results data submitted in this report covers the period 22 February through 15 April 1967.

3. (C) The G2 Air Section utilized Airborne radar, Airborne Infrared sensors, photography, and aerial observers in its surveillance and reconnaissance program. The following statistics represent the data collected by these sources:

a. Airborne Radar (SLAR):
   (1) Number of missions flown: 177.
   (2) Number of targets detected: 678.
   (3) Number of targets detected and disseminated by unit TAOR:
      (a) 1st Inf Div: 389
      (b) 25th Inf Div: 240
      (c) 173d Abn Bde: 24
      (d) 11th ACR: 15
      (e) 4th Inf Div: 9

b. Airborne Infrared Sensor (Red Haze):
   (1) Number of missions flown: 199
   (2) Number of targets detected: 219
   (3) Number of targets detected and disseminated by unit TAOR:
      (a) 1st Inf Div: 187
      (b) 4th Inf Div: 4
      (c) 25th Inf Div: 6
      (d) 173d Abn Bde: 1
      (e) 11th ACR: 21

c. Photographic support is subdivided into three common types of imagery. Number of missions flown: 76. Number of each type of imagery with respect to units supported:
   (1) Mosaics: 1st Inf Div-74, 173d Abn Bde-10, 11th ACR-3.
   (2) LZ's: 1st Inf Div-120, 173d Abn Bde-15, 11th ACR-5.
   (3) Area prints: 1st Inf Div-18, 173d Abn Bde-0, 11th ACR-0.
   The above imagery required the processing of 15,500 nine inch by nine inch photo prints.

d. Aerial observation (OI-G):
   (1) Number of missions flown: 55
   (2) Aerial observation missions resulted in the detection of three base camps, four river crossing sites, two supply depots, and one troop concentration.

Appendix 2 (Hard Installations, 22 Feb-15 Apr 67) to ANNEX B (Intelligence) to After Action Report for Op JUNCTION CITY (U)

XT 333907	B 1/503	7 HUTS	DEST
XT 796246	C 5/2 ARTY	2 BOMB SHELTERS	DEST
XT 129890	C 1/503	1 REST AREA, 9 FOXHOLES, 4 HUTS	DEST
XT 275954	B 1/28	25 BUNKERS	DEST
XT 264967	1/28	SMALL BASE CAMP	DEST
XT 215973	DIV ARTY	BASE CAMP, 2 BUNKERS	DEST
XT 283965	C 1/28	2 BUNKERS, TRENCH SYSTEM	DEST
XT 268964	C 1/28	1 BUNKER	DEST
XT 348934	C 2/503	3 HUTS, 2 BUNKERS	DEST
XT 214976	A 1/26	HOSPITAL	DEST
XT 360928	C 2/503	6 HUTS	DEST
XT 280955	B 1/28	REST AREA, 30 FOXHOLES	DEST
XT 293955	A 1/28	2 HUTS	DEST
XT 340909	B 1/503	1 BUNKER W/OH COVER	DEST
XT 308853	A 2/28	2 HUTS	DEST
XT 339902	A 1/503	4 HUTS, 2 BUNKERS, 1 TUNNEL	DEST
XT 355923	C 2/503	1 HUT	DEST
XT 335915	RECON 1/503	4 BUNKERS, 2 HUTS	DEST
XT 328899	C 1/503	3 HUTS, 2 TUNNELS	DEST
XT 349930	2/503	7 BUNKERS	DEST
XT 219977	1/2	15 HUTS	DEST
XT 269957	B 1/28	2 HUTS, 4 BUNKERS, TRENCHES	DEST
XT 342911	A 1/503	1 HUT W/UG BOMB SHELTER	DEST
XT 280979	1/28	10 HUTS	DEST
XT 353937	C 2/503	1 BUNKER	DEST
XT 333897	1/503	SPIDER HOLE	
XT 335918	1/503	25 FT. TUNNEL, 2 BUNKERS	DEST
XT 255945	1/26	BASE CAMP	DEST
XT 353 922	2/503	BASE CAMP W/BOMB SHELTERS	DEST
XT 254964	1/26	1 HUT, 1 BUNKER	DEST
XT 350605	2/2	BN SIZE BASE CAMP	
XT 373941	173 LRRP	BASE CAMP	
XT 343939	2/503	3 HUTS, 2 BUNKERS	DEST
XT 345919	4/503	1 BUNKER W/OH COVER	DEST
XT 345916	2/503	14 BUNKERS W/OH COVER	DEST
XT 325948	4/503	400 M TRENCH SYSTEM	DEST
		10 BUNKERS	DEST
XT 338898	1/503	11 FOXHOLES	
XT 347910	2/503	BASE CAMP, 3 BUNKERS,	DEST
		3 HUTS	DEST
XT 326950	4/503	BASE CAMP, 4 BUNKERS,	DEST
XT 349921	2/503	BASE CAMP, 4 HUTS	DEST
		W/UG SHELTERS	DEST
XT 268958	1/28	4 BUNKERS	DEST
XT 264955	1/28	SMALL BASE CAMP	DEST
XT 203982	1/2	1 HUT	DEST
XT 280720	1/16	OLD BASE CAMP, 7 BUNKERS	DEST
XT 260959	1/26	1 HUT	DEST
XT 355610	2/2	BASE CAMP W/15 FOXHOLES	
XT 275715	1/16	BASE CAMP	DEST
XT 844314	3/5 CAV	SMALL BUNKER, SHORT TUNNEL	DEST
XT 766203	2/16	1 HUT, 15 BOMB SHELTERS	DEST
XT 336937	A 2/503	1 BUNKER, 1 MORTAR PSN	DEST
XT 340905	A 1/503	2 BUNKERS	
XT 352911	2/503	7 HUTS, 14 BUNKERS	DEST
XT 280754	1/16	1 HUT	DEST
XT 285950	C 1/26	BASE CAMP	
XT 299850	2/28	1 HUT	DEST
XT 299955	1/28	BASE CAMP, SEVERAL BUNKERS	DEST
XT 344907	C 2/503	SMALL BASE CAMP,	DEST
		3 HUTS, 1 BUNKER	DEST
XT 326910	2/4/503	25-1 MAN BUNKERS	DEST

XT 340940	A-2/503	1 BUNKER	DEST
XT 335956	D-4/503	BASE CAMP, 40 BUNKERS	DEST
XT 354949	A-2/503	1 HUT, 1 BUNKER	DEST
XT 269968	1/28	2 BUNKERS, 2AA PSNS	DEST
XT 305775	2/2	1 HUT	DEST
XT 202963	1/2	SMALL BASE CAMP,	DEST
		3 BUNKERS, 1 HUT	DEST
XT 301858	2/28	10 BUNKERS W/OHCover	DEST
		1 TRENCHLINE, 13 FIGHTING	DEST
		PSNS	DEST
XT 292963	A 1/28	BASE CAMP, BUNKERS,	
		TRENCHES, 3 HUTS	
XT 342937	B-4/503	15 FOXHOLES (5W/OHCover)	DEST
XT 301908	B-1/503	12 BUNKERS	DEST
XT 305905	B-1/503	3 HUTS, 6 BOMB SHELTERS,	DEST
		100M TRENCH	DEST
XT 306932	4/503	BASE CAMP, 18 HUTS W	DEST
		BOMB SHELTERS	DEST
XT 370958	C-2/503	2 BUNKERS	DEST
XT 368937	C-2/503	3 HUTS	DEST
XT 244886	B-2/503	3 HUTS	DEST
XT 361927	C-2/503	4 HUTS	DEST
XT 198975	C 1/2	1 HUT	DEST
XT 342885	B-2/503	5 AW PSNS	DEST
XT 370920	C-2/503	5 HUTS, 10 BUNKERS	DEST
XT 330887	1/503	1 HUT	DEST
XT 213972	1/2	CO SIZE BASE CAMP	
XT 292842	B-2/34	SMALL BASE CAMP,	DEST
		10 HUTS	DEST
XT 294854	C-2/28	LARGE BASE CAMP,	DEST
		2 BUNKERS W/OHCover	DEST
XT 234958	B-1/26	LARGE BASE CAMP	DEST
XT 266951	C-1/28	OLD BASE CAMP	ARTY DEST
XT 264720	1/16	2 HUTS	DEST
XT 262948	C 1/2	8 BUNKERS	DEST
XT 344546	A-2/503	1 BUNKER, 1 HUT	DEST
XT 272955	C-1/28	1 TUNNEL	DEST
XT 297452	A-1/28	2 BUNKERS	DEST
XT 230960	1/26	9 BUNKERS W/OHCover	DEST
XT 233963	1/26	9 BUNKERS W/OHCover	DEST
XT 354946	A-2/503	BASE CAMP, 15 HUTS,	DEST
		125M TRENCH	DEST
XT 307930	A-4/503	1 HUT	DEST
XT 314847	B-2/28	BASE CAMP	
XT 410720	D 1/4 CAV	LARGE BASE CAMP	DEST
XT 366826	173 LRRP	CO. SIZE BASE CAMP,	DEST
		10 BUNKERS	DEST
XT 321838	2/28	PLT. SIZE BASE CAMP,	DEST
		12 BUNKERS	DEST
XT 364942	A-1/503	2 BUNKERS	DEST
XT 370942	A-1/503	BASE CAMP, 35	DEST
		BUNKERS	DEST
XT 283781	C-2/2	SMALL BASE CAMP	
XT 349910	A-1/503	BASE CAMP, 1 TUNNEL,	DEST
		7 HUTS, 21 BUNKERS	DEST
XT 264727	1/16 RECON	1 BUNKER	DEST
XT 262694	173 RECON	2 HUTS, 1 FOXHOLE	DEST
XT 283900	C-2/28	3 HUTS	DEST
XT 286898	C-2/28	BASE CAMP, HUT,	DEST
		NUMEROUS BUNKERS	DEST
XT 367854	C-2/503	BASE CAMP, 40 BUNKERS	DEST
XT 292900	C-2/28	BASE CAMP, 5 BUNKERS	DEST
XT 370860	B-2/503	BASE CAMP, 1 HUT,	TARGETED
		3 FOXHOLES	FOR ARTY
XT 316828	D-2/28	BASE CAMP, 20 FOXHOLES	TARGETED FOR ARTY
XT 293883	A-2/28	FIVE BUNKERS	DEST
XT 279717	C-1/16	BASE CAMP, 8 BUNKERS	DEST
XT 363843	A-1/503	7 BUNKERS	DEST

Appendix 2 (Hard Installations, 22 Feb-15 Apr 67) to ANNEX B (Intelligence) to After Action Report for Op JUNCTION CITY (U) (cont)

XT 359807	A-1/503	5 BUNKERS	DEST
XT 379846	D-16	4 BUNKERS	DEST
XT 366802	A/1-503	BASE CAMP, 10 BUNKERS	DEST
XT 347895	1/28	1 HUT	DEST
XT 336874	B/2-28	BASE CAMP, 15 BUNKERS,	DEST
		4 HUTS	DEST
XT 348859	B-2/503	BASE CAMP, 2 TRENCH	DEST
XT 358864	B-2/503	2 HUTS	DEST
XT 362837	C-4/503	BASE CAMP, 14 BUNKERS	DEST
XT 352838	A-1/503	7 BUNKERS	DEST
XT 362804	A-1/503	18 FOXHOLES	DEST
XT 364936	A-1/28	BASE CAMP, 3 HUTS	DEST
XT 367805	C-1/503	75M TRENCH	DEST
XT 397707	D-1/26	BN. SIZE BASE CAMP	
XT 298890	C-2/28	BASE CAMP	TARGETED FOR ARTY
XT 348830	A-4/503	FOOD STOR	DEST
XT 349829	B-4/503	BASE CAMP, 3 HUTS,	DEST
		1 BUNKER, TRENCH,	DEST
		NUMEROUS FIGHTING PSNS,	DEST
		9 HUTS, UNDERGROUND STOR	DEST
XT 357825	A-4/503	1 HUT	
XT 353823	A-4/503	3 HUTS	DEST
XT 353824	A-4/503	5 BUNKERS	DEST
XT 298890	C-2/28	BASE CAMP	
XT 306925	B-1/28	5 HUTS	DEST
XT 309923	B-1/28	3 HUTS	DEST
XT 319926	B-2/2	3 HUTS	DEST
XT 240802	A-2/2	BASE CAMP, 15 FOXHOLES,	DEST
		15 BUNKERS	DEST
XT 372787	C-4/503	1 HUT	DEST
XT 300872	2/28	TUNNEL COMPLEX	
XT 342837	D-4/503	1-2 BN BASE CAMP,	DEST
		45 HUTS, 50 BUNKERS,	DEST
		TRENCH	DEST
XT 349853	A-2/503	TUNNEL	DEST
XT 283672	1/4 CAV	5 FOXHOLES	DEST
XT 265774	C-1/28	BN. SIZE BASE CAMP,	DEST
		5 HUTS	DEST
XT 344897	1/28	2 HUTS	DEST
XT 348858	B-2/503	BASE CAMP, 7 HUTS,	DEST
		TRENCH, 5 BUNKERS	DEST
XT 349857	A-2/503	BUNKER	DEST
XT 349853	A-2/503	BUNKER	DEST
XT 331820	2/34ARMOR	BASE CAMP, 10 BUNKERS	DEST
XT 389794	C-1/503	27 BUNKERS	ARTY DEST.
XT 313897	B-2/28	BASE CAMP	
XT 280791	C-2/2	53 FIGHTING PSNS	DEST
XT 385795	C-1/503	BASE CAMP, BUNKERS	TARGETED FOR ARTY.
XT 276721	A-2/2	1 HUT	DEST
XT 637657	B-1/28	BASE CAMP, 30	TARGETED FOR ARTY.
		FOXHOLES, SAW PSNS	
XT 289709	A-2/2	SMALL BASE CAMP	TARGETED FOR ARTY.
XT 387794	C-1/503	9 BUNKERS	TARGETED FOR ARTY.
XT 670833	B-2/47	BASE CAMP W/22-	
		2 MAN FOXHOLES	
XT 590794	RECON-1/26	BASE CAMP, 29	ARTY
		BUNKERS	DEST
XT 805734	C-2/47	250 BUNKERS	ARTY DEST
XT 798508	D-3/5 CAV	2 BUNKERS	DEST
XT 584822	A-1/26	2 BUNKERS	DEST
XT 752764	A-2/47	2 SPIDER HOLES	
XT 558858	2/11ACR	1 SMALL BUNKER	
XT 449662	173LRRP	10 BUNKERS W/THCover	

Appendix 2 (Hard Installations, 22 Feb-15 Apr 67) to ANNEX B (Intelligence) to After Action Report for Op JUNCTION CITY (U) (cont)

XT 568832	RECON-1/26	419 BUNKERS, 725 SLEEPING QUARTERS, 1 TUNNEL	DEST
XT 558857	36 AVN RANGERS	12 BUNKERS	DEST
XT 518897	C-1/26	3 BUNKERS	DEST
XT 575851	1/26	4 BUNKERS	DEST
XT 558842	1/26	BASE CAMP, 25 BUNKERS, 4MTR PSNS.	DEST DEST
XT 522868	2/16	BASE CAMP, 9 BUNKERS	DEST
XT 554869	E-2/11 ACR	1 HUT	DEST
XT 486604	B-4/503	BASE CAMP, TRENCH, 4 HUTS, 4 BUNKERS	DEST DEST
XT 527868	2/16	BASE CAMP, 12 BUNKERS, 20 FOXHOLES	DEST DEST
XT 446721	C-2/503	TUNNEL	
XT 545817	1/26	400 BUNKERS, FIGHTING PSNS	
XT 515855	2/16	2 HUTS	DEST
XT 558848	36 AVN	10 BUNKERS	DEST
XT 521751	H-2/11 ACR	PSN, 4 BUNKERS, 3 HUTS	DEST DEST
XT 515866	C-2/16	8 BUNKERS	DEST
XT 521751	H-2/11 ACR	5 HUTS & TRENCH	DEST
XT 530610	1/26	150 BUNKERS, 60 HUTS	
XT 530800	1/26	95 BUNKERS, 50 HUTS TUNNEL	
XT 525740	H-2/11 ACR	3 BUNKERS	DEST
XT 495588	C-1/503	BN SIZE BASE CAMP W/ 25 BUNKERS	DEST DEST
XT 558837	1/26	6 BUNKERS	DEST
XT 508887	2/18	3 BUNKERS	DEST
XT 517751	2/11 ACR	4 FOXHOLES	DEST
XT 515758	2/11 ACR	2 FOXHOLES	DEST
XT 499887	2/18	TRENCH, 8 BUNKERS	DEST
XT 489692	173	BASE CAMP, 6 HUTS	DEST
XT 438683	E-3/19 ARTY	BASE CAMP, 2 HUTS	DEST
XT 510863	1/26	7 BUNKERS	DEST
XT 543848	1/26	6 BUNKERS	DEST
XT 451666	A-1/503	4 BUNKERS, 80 FOXHOLES	
XT 564832	36 AVN	BASE CAMP, 8 BUNKERS	DEST
XT 452682	B-2/503	8 BUNKERS	DEST
XT 490886	2/18	BASE CAMP, 8 HUTS, 11 BUNKERS	DEST DEST
XT 494872	2/18	7 FOXHOLES	DEST
XT 471688	B-2/503	4 BUNKERS	DEST
XT 476708	RCN/1/503	FORTIFIED AREA, BUNKERS	
XT 560857	1/26	1 BUNKER	DEST
XT 492881	2/18	BASE CAMP	
XT 459708	A-4/503	BASE CAMP, 50 BUNKERS, 6 HUTS	DEST DEST
XT 496865	2/18	3 BUNKERS, 1 AW PSN	DEST
XT 470692	D-4/503	TRENCH, BUNKER SYSTEM	DEST
XT 464704	B-4/503	BASE CAMP, 20 FOXHOLES	
XT 568862	1/26	10 HUTS	DEST
XT 470692	0/4-503	10 BUNKERS	DEST
XT 454659	B-2/503	20M TRENCH	DEST
XT 448703	C-4/503	WAREHOUSE (U/G)	
XT 454661	B-2/503	1 BUNKER (W/)HC), AW PSN	
XT 473689	D-4/503	BASE CAMP, 20 HUTS, 20 BUNKERS (W/OHCover)	DEST DEST
XT 449670	B-2/503	3 BUNKERS (W/OHCover)	DEST
XT 445702	C-4/503	10 BUNKERS	
XT 492770	RCN-1/503	CO SIZE BASE CAMP, W/30 40 BUNKERS	DEST DEST

Appendix 2 (Hard Installations, 22 Feb-15 Apr 67) to ANNEX B (Intelligence) to After Action Report for Op JUNCTION CITY (U) (cont)

XT 490764	RCN-1/503	BUNKER	
XT 491768	RCN-1/503	7 MW POSITIONS	
XT 559583	1/2	2 BUNKERS	DEST
XT 431884	1/26	4 FOXHOLES	DEST
XT 454701	B-4/503	PLT. BASE CAMP, 2 BUNKERS	DEST
		4 FOXHOLES, 6 FIGHTING PSNS	DEST
XT 428851-428847	B-1/26	FOXHOLES	
XT 448702	C-4/503	12 BUNKERS,	DEST
		CO. SIZE BASE CAMP	DEST
XT 436683	B-2/503	CO. SIZE BASE CAMP,	
		25 BUNKERS	
XT 445672	C-2/503	11 FOXHOLES	
XT 463337	1/26	65M TRENCH	PARTIALLY DEST
XT 433841	1/26	1 PSN & MORTAR PIT	
XT 432840	1/26	40 BUNKERS, FOXHOLES	
XT 490808	1/18	BASE CAMP	
XT 423700	C-2/503	20 BUNKERS	DEST
XT 450871	A-1/16	BASE CAMP, 12 SPIDER-	DEST
		HOLES (W/OHCover)	DEST
XT 434707	B-2/503	1 HUT	DEST
XT 500800	1/18	BASE CAMP	TARGETED FOR ARTY
XT 427709	C-2/503	7 FOXHOLES	
XT 432703	C-2/503	4 BUNKERS, 1 FOXHOLE	TARGETED FOR ARTY
XT 427709	C-2/503	BASE CAMP, 15 BUNKERS	DEST
XT 513733	RCN-1/503	BASE CAMP, 7 BUNKERS	DEST
XT 415850	B-2/16	20-25 BUNKERS	TARGETED FOR ARTY
XT 429874	C-1/16	6 FOXHOLES (W/OHCover)	DEST
XT 450726	D-4/503	200M TRENCH, 1 BUNKER (W/OH COVER)	DEST
XT 532629	E/17 CAV	BASE CAMP W/35-2 MAN	TARGETED FOR ARTY
		BUNKERS (W/OH COVER)	
XT 425848	C-2/16	2 BUNKERS	DEST
XT 505743	A-1/503	BN. SIZE BASE CAMP W/	DEST
		BUNKER & TUNNEL SYSTEMS	DEST
XT 459838	A-1/2	20-25 FOXHOLES	
XT 515736	A-1/503	CO. SIZED BASE CAMP	
XT 437837	A-1/2	3 BUNKERS	
XT 512723	A-1/503	2 BUNKERS, 1 TRENCH	
XT 435730	C-2/503	BASE CAMP, 7 HUTS,	DEST
		4 BUNKERS (W/OH COVER) TRENCH	DEST
XT 439722	A-2/503	15 HUTS, 1000M TRENCH	DEST
XT 435731	C-2/503	1 HUT	DEST
XT 437714	RCN-2/503	4 BUNKERS (W/OH COVER)	DEST
XT 445756	B-4/503	15 FIGHTING POSITIONS (W/OH COVER),	DEST
		20 FOXHOLES	
XT 409815	2/16	3 HUTS	DEST
XT 489799	1/18	BASE CAMP	
XT 418827	2/16	10 SMALL BUNKERS	DEST
XT 443753	B-4/503	BASE CAMP W/4 BUNKERS	DEST
XT 488727	B-1/503	2 HUTS, 6 BUNKERS	
XT 757743	F-2/11 CAV	50 FOXHOLES	DEST
XT 765743	F-2/11 CAV	15 FOXHOLES	DEST
XT 512722	A-1/503	BASE CAMP, 11 HUTS W/	
		BOMB SHELTERS, 11 FOXHOLES,	
		1 TRENCH SYSTEM	
XT 500762	RCN-4/503	BASE CAMP, 20 2-Man PSNS W/	DEST
		OHC, 15 BUNKERS (W/OHCover)	DEST
XT 573850	2/18	1 BUNKER	TARGETED FOR ARTY
XT 559855	2/16	2 BUNKERS (W/OHCover)	DEST
XT 507758	RCN-1/503	5 MORTAR PSNS	DEST
XT 502755	RCN-1/503	35-2 MAN PSNS	DEST
XT 418731	A-2/503	3 BUNKERS, 22 HUTS	
XT 421752	B-2/503	BASE CAMP	DEST
XT 583880	D-1/4CAV	TUNNELS	PREVIOUSLY DEST BY B52

Appendix 2. (Hard Installations, 22 Feb-15 Apr 67) to ANNEX B (Intelligence) to After Action Report for Op JUNCTION CITY (U) (cont)

XT 530777	1/18	BN SIZE BASE CAMP		
XT 420762	A-2/503	BASE CAMP, BUNKERS,		DEST
		13 FOXHOLES		DEST
XT 413742	C-2/503	4 BUNKERS (W/OHCover)		DEST
XT 528748	A-1/503	BASE CAMP, 12 BUNKERS, 15 FOXHOLES, 1 HUT		
XT 771745	C-2/11CAV	3-1 MAN FOXHOLES		DEST
XT 553788	B-1/28	BASE CAMP	TARGETED	DSTY
XT 522719	A-1/503	5 FOXHOLES (W/OHCover)		
XT 543784	A-1/28	1 HUT		
XT 543784	1/28	BASE CAMP,	TARGETED FOR	DSTY
XT 596674	B-4/503	6 BUNKERS, (1W/OHCover)		
XT 561795	C-1/28	1 BUNKER	TARGETED FOR	DSTY
XT 582807	1/28	25 BUNKERS		DEST
XT 562802	1/28	BASE CAMP, 125 BOMB		DEST
		SHELTERS, TRENCH		DEST
XT 519700	C-2/503	BASE CAMP, 6 HUTS, 8		DEST
		BUNKERS (W/OHCover)		DEST
XT 520695	C-2/503	BASE CAMP, 6 BUNKERS, 2 HUTS	TARGETED FOR	DSTY
XT 522688	A-2/503	BASE CAMP, 14 BUNKERS, TRENCH SYSTEM	TARGETED FOR	DSTY
XT 521681	2/503	BASE CAMP, 6 BUNKERS,		DEST
		23 HUTS		DEST
XT 561867	1/18	3 HUTS		DEST
XT 527719	A-1/503	BASE CAMP, NUMEROUS BUNKERS, HUTS AND A TRENCH SYSTEM	TARGETED FOR	DSTY
XT 558875	1/18	SMALL BASE CAMP, SEVERAL		DEST
		BUNKERS		DEST
XT 571875	DIVARTY	12 BUNKERS		DEST



VÉAL AMPIL
TỈNH TÂY NINH
SRÔK TBONG KHMUM
KHÉT KÂMPONG CHAM
NAM PHÂN
CAMBODIA
VIETNAM
VÉAL ROMDUOL CHRAN
Suối Chor
Trâpeâng Asey
VÉAL DAMREY SY
Prêk Krassang
Trâpeâng Ang Khak
Trâpeâng Antot
Suối Chor
Suối Tabon
Phum Romduol
Phum Chrâk Romduol
PREY KAMBANG
VÉAL DEY KHMAU
Phum Sag
Beng Kas Andeth
Bà Cây Sai
Suối Mây
Suối Calorn
Bàu Giải
Bàu Chông
Bàu Ô
Bàu Chùng Lòng
Bàu Thai
Bàu Tàlot
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
CONFIDENTIAL
2
CAMBODIA
VIETNAM
KHẾT KÂMPÔNG CHAM
NAM PHẦN
TỈNH TÂY NINH
SRÔK MÊM
Chamkar Dey Kranh
Phum Trâpeăng Phlos
Prêk Ta Ruong
Romduol
Ph Sotey
Ph Châmbâk
Phum Chrek Kranh
Phum Chipéay
Véal Chinit
Phum Trâpeăng Sala
TÂN HỘI
VÉAL PREY CHOM
PHUM THUNG
Trâpeăng Prey Touch
Prêk Klong
Phum Cheam Bôs
PREY TRÂPEĂNG KBOCH
Trâpeăng Cheal
Phum Ve Em
PREY KAMBANG
Trâpeăng Kaben
DEY KHMAU
Trâpeăng Thléas
VÉAL CHANG KRAN
Bàu Cavonn
Bàu Ta Chok
Bàu Thlan
Ta Dath
Bàu Bà Già
Bàu Dài
Bàu Tà Chanh
Bàu Tà Khét
Prêk Kandie Poam
Tapang
99
98
97
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30
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LZ 3
FSB III LZ 1
FSB II LZ 5



DENTIAL
3
Ph Sotey
Ph Châmbâi
VÉAL ROUNG
Phum Chrek Kranh
Phum Khuoch
CAMBODIA
VIETNAM
Ph Taôn
Ph Béng
Ph Chân Mul
Ph Tolo
Kh Rung
Ph Ândong Tachôu
KAMPONG CHAM
SRÔK MÉMÛT
TỈNH TÂY NINH
TÂN HỘI
Véal Chinit
Phum Chipéay
Ampil
Phum Thmey
Prêk Klong
Cheam Bôs
Phum Sâlô
Phum Trabuk
Phum Krabau
VÉAL CHANG KRAN
Katum
Bâu Ta Chôk
Ta Dâh
Prêk Kandie Pâdu
Prêk Kral
Prêk Klok
Phum Chuoi
Prêk Beng Chrong
FSB II
LZ 5
1 X 173
LZ 4A
LZ 4B
LZ D
FSB V
FSB IV
LZ 6
TF TANKER
3 X 173
BON
LZ 4
27
28
29
30
31
33
35


4
25TH DIVISIO
QUẬN PHÚ KHƯƠNG
Suối Mây
Suối Ky
Sóc Ky
BM 14
Military reservation
Military reservation
247
Bầu Tong Le
Bầu Chảo
Bầu Gia
Bầu Tre
QUẬN PHÚ KHƯƠN
QUẬN PHƯỚC NI



5
AXIS
FSB III
FSB II
FSB I
BATTLE OF PREK KLOK II
BATTLE OF PREK KLOK I
Prek Klok
Bàu Tầm Rhông
Bàu Chát
Bàu Lùng
Suối Ky
Bàu Châu E
83
82
81
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76
75
74
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68
67



IRON
Prek Klok
Phum Lovéa
FSB III
LZ 11
6
Prek Klok
Suối Dây
Suối Dây
Suối Samat
Hương Hào Dịch
Suối Samat
BATTLE OF PREK KLOK I



7
QUAN PHU KHUONG
QUAN PHUOC NINH
Bàu Tre
Xã Hao Duoc (2)
Xã Hao Duoc (1)
Suối Con
B. Sa Nghe
Ấp Mo Cong
Bàu Xà Mai
Ấp Suối Sắc
Bàu Lò Mán
Ấp Ba Nghe
Ấp Lò Ho
Bàu Sáng Chà
Suối Lò Ho
Suối Bà Đá
Bàu Muồng
Xóm Trà Cốt
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11
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B. Nâu
B. Cỏ Sắt
Ấp Bình Luong (1)
Bàu Trà Cốt
Bàu Sắt Con
Bàu Sen
Suối Bà Tự
Ấp Bình Luong (2)
Ấp Bình Trong
Suối Đá
Xóm Bàu Sao
Tay Ninh West
(airfield under construction)
THAI BINH



8
25
Bàu Tânôi
Bàu Cần Thô
Bàu Xôm
Trảng Nen
Bàu Bom
Bàu Rờ
Bàu Bắc
Xã Tân Hưng
Bàu Sấu
Bàu Cây Cầm
Suối Tà Hộp
Ấp Khe Dol
Suối Sau
Suối Cạn
Suối Tra Phát
Suối Tra Phi
Suối Dân
Ấp Long Thới
Suối Cảnh Nam
Ấp Thành Sơn
Bàu Bồ Lớn
Ấp Bồ Lớn
Ấp Bồ Bàng
Bãi Trai
PH


9
SUOI DA
PHASE I
Bàu Rầm
Bàu Đel
Bàu Sấu
Bàu Cây Cầm
Bàu Sen
Đồng Bàu Cây
Suối Bàu Vuôi
Xã Lộc Ninh
Ấp Tân Thiết
Military post (abandoned)
Bàu Đưng
Ấp Trại Đèn
Phú Khương
Ấp Phước Hòa (Phú Khương)
Military area
Ấp Phước Long
Bàu Bồ Lớn
Ấp Bồ Lớn
Ấp Phước Tân
30
31
32
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

Ấp Suối Sốc
Bàu Lò Mãn
Ấp Bà Nghe
Ấp Lò Ho
Bàu Sáng Chà
Suối Lò Ho
Suối Bà Đế
Bàu Muồng
Xóm Trà Cốt
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B. Nâu
B. Cỏ Sả
Ấp Bình Lương (1)
Xóm Bàu Trà Cốt
Ấp Bình Lương (2)
Bàu Sủi Can
Bàu Sen
Suối Bà Tự
Ấp Bình Trong
Suối Đá
Xóm Bàu Sao
Tây Ninh West
(airfield under construction)
THÁI BÌNH
Cho Tây Ninh
TRÍ BÌNH
Suối Cây Chai
Ấp Thái Thương
Ấp Thanh An
Playground
Sân chơi
Ấp Cao Xa (2)
Ấp Cao Xa (3)
Ấp Cao Xa (1)
Ấp Tâm Long
Ấp Xóm Ruộng
Ấp Thái Thông (1)
Ấp Thái Thông (2)
Ấp Phú Ninh
Tam Hạp
Ấp Thành Phước
Rạch Bến Kinh
Military area
Ấp Thành Đông
Bến Sỏi
(Phước Ninh)
Thanh Hàm
Military area
SÔNG VÀM CỎ ĐÔNG
QUẬN PHƯỚC NINH
PHÚ KHƯƠNG
Bến Cừ
Ấp Thanh Trung
Rạch Cỏ Nhi
Tổ Hạp
Xóm Mía
Rạch Trapeong Cu
THANH ĐIỀN
10


PH
56
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45
44
Suối Trà Phát
Suối Trà Phi
Suối Dồn
Suối Đá
Suối Cảnh Nam
Suối Vuôn Dien
Suối Bồ Bàng
Suối Vuôn Dien
Suối Đá Bàng
Rạch Tây Ninh
Rạch Rẻ Trên
Rạch Rẻ
Kinh Sérille
Suối Giai Kho Kien
Bàu Bồ Lớn
Ấp Long Thới
Ấp Thành Sơn (1)
Ấp Thành Sơn (2)
Ấp Bồ Bàng
Ấp Bồ Lớn
Ấp Hiệp Thuận
Ấp Hiệp Lam
Ấp Phước Hòa
Ấp Long An
Ấp Long Yên
Ấp Long Vân
Ấp Bàu Sen
Ấp Phước Bình
Ấp Long Biên
Ấp Long Thới
Ấp Long Đại
Ấp Tân Cam (1)
Ấp Tân Cam (2)
Ấp Tân Cam (3)
Ấp Tân Cam (4)
Ấp Trảng
Ấp Thành Phước
Ấp Thành Đông
Ấp Thành Phước
Ấp Thái Thông (2)
Tây Ninh City
12
Playground
Sân chơi
Tây Ninh
NINH THANH
THÁI HIỆP THANH
HIỆP NINH
LONG THANH
TRƯỜNG HOA
Tây Ninh/Cao Đại
(abandoned airfield)
12
Military area
Military area
QUẬN PHƯỚC NINH
QUẬN PHÚ KHƯƠNG
Chợ Tây Ninh
241
LTL 13
LTL 26
PAGE 30
CONFIDENTIAL
11


SUOI DA
PHASE I
Ấp Trại Dân
Phú Khương
Ấp Phước Hòa
(Phú Khương)
Military area
Ấp Phước Long
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40
Bàu Bồ Lớn
Ấp Bồ Lớn
Ấp Phước Tân
Ấp Hiệp Thuận
Xóm Mới
PHƯỚC HỘI
Rạch Rễ Trên
Ấp Phước Bình
Xóm Láng
TỈNH TÂY NINH
TỈNH BÌNH DƯƠ
QUẬN PHÚ KHƯƠNG
QUẬN KHIÊM HẠNH
Suối Cây Khô
Rạch Rễ
Đồn Điền Thies
Cây Khô
Cao Khô
Xóm Ông Hưng
QUẬN TRỊ TA
QUẬN KHIÊM H
Ấp Tân Cam (2)
Ấp Trảng Dầu
Ấp Cây Khô
Ấp Nam Ngon
Tân Cam (3)


CONFIDENTIAL
1
Ph Dong
Ph Chôam Ampil
Ph Chôam
Ph Chhung
Ph Leach Leu
Ph Leach Kraôm
Ph Bâng Chroûng Leu
Ph Bâng Chroûng Kraôm
Ph Kahat
Ph Moûng
O Moûng
O Bâphlôâm
CAMBODIA
VIETNAM
TÂN HỘI
KHẾT KÂMPÔNG CHAM
NAM PHẦN
SRÔK MÊMÚT
Prêk Chugar
Prêk Poplam
Prêk Mong
40
41
42
43
47
48
BATTLE OF
AP GU
LE GEORGE
OB


2
VIETNAM
CAMBODIA
NAM PHẦN
TÂN LONG
LZ B
LZ C
OBJ FAUST
FSB C


3
CONFIDENTIAL
Ap Ta Thiêt Krom
Abandoned
Suối Tonlé Trôu
QUẢN LỘC NINH
QUẢN LỘC
Ap Tuk Chât
Suối Trôu
Ap Soai Kong
AN PHÚ
Ap Cherac
Ap Phú Lô
Suối Nron
Phum Chuôm Thoum
Phum Sa-ang
68
69
70


ENTIAL
QUẢN LỘC NINH
Suối Tonlé Trou
Cầu Cam
304
Ấp Cam
Ấp Kaleli
Ấp Charac
Ấp Phú Lộc
Ấp Đồng Long
Ấp Ba
Srok Ben Gaye
Ấp Bình Phú
An Lộc
(Hòn Quản)
Ấp Phú Bình
Suối Chu
Ấp Thanh Bình
68
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76

4



5
LZ GEORGE
OBJ
SIOUX
Ấp Gù
Ôn Dốc
Suối Ngô
Tâu Tung Thngai
Tà Dung
25 X 1
OBJ
THRU
Suối Chàng Ru
Suối Cụt
Prêk Tan Tung Chnai
Prêk Ta
EFF 0/0
OBJ
ASH
Trai Bi
Suối Tà Ôn
Suối Pa Chiêm
OBJ
OAK
Ấp Suối Tre (2)
OBJ
LZ


6
AXIS PANZAR
OBU THRUST
OBU PARRY
2
X
173
1
X
173
Suối Chà Và
Suối Tà Tà
Suối Cụt
Suối Đôn
Suối Bò Hút
Srok Cây Son
Lái Minh
Ấp Lái Minh
Sông Sàigòn
Sông Tà Mon
Sông Sàigòn
Sông Cảnh Cu
Sông Bàm
85
83
82
78
77
74
73
72
71



Lòng Nam
Water
7
Suối Tàkom
Prek Thiêu
Suối Xa Cam
Suối Đôn
Suối Bò Hùi
QUẬN PHÚ KHƯƠNG
QUẬN AN LỘC
QUẬN AN LỘC
QUẬN CHƠN THÀNH
Suối Xa Cát
Suối Đạn
Suối Bàu Lưng
Suối Cây Gia
Ấp Hòa Phú
Ấp Hòa Cường
Suối Nhà Máy
Suối Bàng Cường Hàng
Suối Lập
BM
245
73



Đồn Điền de Xa Cát
Ấp Đức Thịnh
Military area
Nhà Thương Minh Đức
Ấp Lộc Khê
Ấp Đức Vinh (2)
Ấp Đức Vinh (1)
Prek Thlea
Suối Xa Cát
Suối Chồm
Suối Đồng
Bàu Đồng Ló
8
QUẬN AN LỘC
QUẬN CHƠN THÀNH
Suối Xa Cát
Suối Lập
BM
83
BM
245
Suối Cây Gia
Suối Cầu Đất


OAK
OBJ
LZ A
LZ C
BIRCH
25 × × 1
Ấp Suối Tre
Ấp Chà Dỏ
Suối Đồng Kèn
Suối Lung
Suối Bàu Bố
Suối Bà Hao
Rạch Nhiêm
Ấp Rạch Nhiêm
Xóm Trại Đèn
Ấp Bà Sử
Phum Tamong
TỈNH
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

FSB ROCK
L2 ROBERT
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Sóc Tổng Mạnh
Sông Sàigòn
Suối Đông Cảng
Suối Bến Hu
QUẬN CHƠN THANH
QUẬN TRÌ TÂM
TỈNH BÌNH LONG
TỈNH BÌNH DƯƠNG
Phum Tamang
Prek Chak An Song
Suối Cao
Xóm Bầu Dầu
Xóm Chan Lak
Suối Lung Long
Ấp 18 (Xã Đinh Thơi)
Tower
Đồn Điền Michelin
Suối Trại Sâu
Ấp 15
Ấp 14 Bis
Ấp 14 Chánh
Ấp Số 22
Suối Thơ Dương
Suối Lòng Lôi
Suối Cong Cảm
Suối Trại Tâm
Suối Tre
Suối Thơ
Ấp Gi
Ấp Hòa Lợi
Ấp Hòa
Ấp Bà Sô
Suối Rạnh Đá
Suối Bến Hu
Prek Sia Nap


FSB ROCK
FSB D
MINH THANH
PHASE II
11
Ấp Hòa Cường
Ấp Hòa Mỹ
Xã Minh Hòa
Ấp Giáp Minh
Xã Minh Thạnh
Suối Cái Liên
Suối Biên Mộc
Suối Bà Và
Bàu Sấu
Military area
Địa Điểm Dinh Điền Hiếu Văn
Suối Ông Thành
Suối Thơ Dương
Suối Vân Tâm
Ấp Số 22
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
QUẬN AN LỘC
QUẬN CHÔN THÀNH
NH THANH
Xã Minh Thanh
Suối Cầu Đất
Suối Bà Vá
Bàu Sầu
Bàu Đông Lan
Suối Xóm Nò
Suối Hồ Đá
Suối Ông Thành
Military
Địa Điểm Dinh Dũng Hiếu Văn
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PHASE II
Suối Ông Chùi
CHÔN THÀNH

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

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

Ấp 18
(Xã Định Thọ)
Tower
Tower
Đồn Điền Michelin
Ấp 15
Ấp 14 Bis
Ấp 14 Chánh
Đồn Điền Michelin
Ấp Số 22
Cầu Suối Trắc
Suối Cầu Trắc
Ấp Số 13
Ấp 6 Chánh (2)
Đồn Điền Michelin
Ấp 12
Ấp Số 11
Hospital
Cầu Suối Cát
Ấp 13 Bis
Ấp 6 Chánh (1)
Ấp 3
Ấp 6 Bis
Xã Định Phước
Ấp Số 12
Ấp 5
Dầu Tiếng
Ấp Nam
Ấp Bến Tranh
Xóm Tra Ginh (2)
Xóm Bến Cát
Military area
Xóm Cầu Cát
Xóm Bầu Vinh
Xóm Bầu Đá
Xóm Bầu Đồng
Xóm Đồn
Xóm Cha Bình
Suối Dầu
Suối Bầu Đồng
Suối Cầu Trắc
Rạch Thầy Ba
Bầu Sình
Bầu Sing
Núi
Suối Bến Đò
Ấp Bà Sô

PAGE 3

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
PHASE II
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Military area
Địa Điểm Dinh Điền Hiếu Văn
Suối Thơ Dương
Suối Vân Tâm
Suối Cầm Xe
Đồn Điền Michelin
Ấp Số 22
Ấp Số 13
TỈNH BÌNH LONG
TỈNH BÌNH DƯƠNG
QUẬN CHƠN THÀNH
QUẬN BẾN CÁT
Xã Thị Tính
Rạch Cầm
Suối Đá Yêu
Suối Gay Tram
Rạch Thị Tính
Suối Hồ Đá
Ấp Vân Hương
Ấp Bến Tranh
Xóm Tra Ginh(2)
Xóm Tra Ginh(1)
QUẬN BẾN CÁT
QUẬN TRỊ TÂM
Bàu Tạp
Ấp Bo Cang
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

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
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QUẢN LỘC NINH
QUẢN AN LỘC
QUẢN LỘI


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QUAN LOI
TỈNH BÌNH LONG
QUẬN AN LỘC
TỈNH PHƯỚC LONG
QUẬN PHƯỚC BÌNH
Ấp Phú-hung
Ấp Đức-Liên
Ấp Tân Lập Phú
Ấp Bu-Thanh
Ấp Lo-O
Ấp Tra Thanh
Ấp Soc Kiem
Ấp Soc Rung
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

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Ấp Đồng Phát (2)
Srok Lịch Lộc
Ấp Sóc Tranh
Srok Sóc Tranh
Srok Lôi Sơn (1)
Srok Lôi Sơn (2)
Bầu Vàng
Kóm Tân Quản
Bầu Nát
Ấp Nhà Nội
Buốp Nha Bích
Srok Nha Bích
Nha Bích
Cái Sang
Kóm Ruộng
Suối Sa Cát
QUẢN AN LỘC
QUẢN CHÔN THÀNH
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
Ấp Văn Hiến
Football field
Ấp Hưng Hải
Football field
Ấp Sóc Xoài
Water
Srok Sóc Tranh
Srok Sóc Xoài
Suối Xoài
Srok Mười Bốn
Srok Lôi Sơn (1)
Srok Lôi Sơn (2)
Suối Lôi
Suối Tân Lập
Suối Xanh Lan
Bàu Rạm
Bàu Vàng
Bàu Dông
Kóm Tân Quản
QUẢN LỢI - AN LỘC
QUẢN AN LỘC - AN THẠNH
QUẢN CHƠN THÀNH
Ấp Nhà Nổi
Suối Tà Vách
Suối Tàu
Suối Tàu Hủ
Cầu Chùa Hoa
Buộp Nhà Bích
Srok Nhà Bích
Nhà Sích
Cầu Sing
Kóm Bưởng
Suối Sa Cát
Suối Tàu Hủ
Suối Tàu
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Suối Tàu



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Xóm Ruộng
Suối Sa Cát
Suối Ngang
Suối Cát
Cầu Suối Bôi
Cầu Bến Bình
Suối Cầu
Ấp Chơn Thành
Ấp Bái Yến
Ấp Bầu Cầm
Ấp Trà Đục
Ấp Bầu
Xóm Quạt
Suối Thôn
Suối Cầu Dộn
Suối Dầu
Cầu Xe Lửa Bầu Long
Military area
TỈNH BÌNH LONG
5
PHASE



Nha Bích
Xóm Ruộng
Suối Sa Cát
Suối Ngang
Suối Đồng Lân
Suối Sa Cát
QUẬN CHÔN THÀNH
QUẬN ĐÔN LUÂN
Bàu Nhà Tốt
SÔNG BÉ
TỈNH BÌNH LONG
TỈNH PHƯỚC LONG
Bàu Chung Đam
Suối Sắc Lát
Ấp Bái Yến
Xóm Bùng Sây
Ấp Bàu Cầm
Ấp Phồm Mít
SÔNG BÉ
Ấp Trà Đục
QUẬN CHÔN THÀNH
QUẬN PHÚ GIÁO
Ấp Bái Bằng
Ấp Ruộng
Suối Xà Mách
Suối Thôn
Ấp Bàu
Ấp Hồ Đá
Ấp Ba Bông
Suối Cầu Độn
Xóm Quạt
TỈNH BÌNH LONG
TỈNH BÌNH DƯƠNG
Suối Dầu
TỈNH BÌNH LONG
TỈNH BÌNH
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PHASE I & II


PHAS
BATTLE OF
BAU BANG II
F58
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BAU BANG
PAGE 7
TỈNH BÌNH LONG
TỈNH BÌNH DƯƠNG
QUẬN
CHÔN THÀNH
ĐẾN CẠT
Cầu Xe Lửa Bầu Long
Suối Bầu Long
Suối Cầu Dộn
Suối Thôn
Suối Ông Bằng
Bàu Lồng
Bàu Giấp
Bàu Hốt
Bàu Xà Mách
Military area (abandoned)
Ấp Xà Mách
Xóm Ông Hó
Ấp Bầu Sàng
Đồn Biên Lo Xe
Suối Xà Vân
Suối Chiêu
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
PHASE I & II
80
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QUẬN CHÔN THÀNH
QUẬN PHÚ GIÁO
Ấp Trà Dục
Ấp Bãi Bằng
Ấp Rường
Ấp Bàu
Ấp Hồ Dá
Ấp Ba Bằng
Suối Cầu Dầu
Suối Dầu
Xóm Quạt
TỈNH BÌNH LONG
TỈNH BÌNH DƯƠNG
TỈNH BÌNH LONG
TỈNH BÌNH DƯƠNG
QUẬN CHÔN THÀNH
QUẬN BẾN CÁT
QUẬN PHÚ GIÁO
An Linh
Rạch Rinh
Cà Sạc
Suối Ông Bằng
Bà Chân (1)
Bà Chân (2)
Suối Ông Dầu
Xóm Cây Quít
Ấp Xà Mách
Suối Chéo
Long Bình
Xóm Bầy Giồn
Xóm Rạch Ngay
Suối Rạch Ngay
Xóm Đá Trắng
BAU BANG
PAGE 32
8

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BATTLE OF PREK KLOK I
28 FEBRUARY 1967



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Inclosure 1

BATTLE OF PREK KLOK II
10 MARCH 1967
VIC XT2778



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BATTLE OF BAU BANG II
20 MARCH 1967



VC MORTAR POSITIONS
1500 METERS E OF
AP BAU BANG

Inclosure 3

CONFIDENTIAL


DIVERSIONARY ATTACK
A
1-16
(-)
B
RECON
A
RECON
B
1-26
XT428851
B
A
LZ GEORGE
B
C
MAIN ATTACK
ROUTE OF WITHDRAWAL
C
1-26
1-26
B
A
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Inclosure 4

I. (C) CONCEPT OF SUPPORT OPERATIONS:

A. (C) GENERAL:

The basic concept for logistical support of Junction City featured supply point distribution of high tonnage items from division supply points and 1st Logistical Command Forward Support Areas located as far forward in the tactical areas of operations as practicable. The impetus of supply was from the rear and focused on maintenance of adequate stockages at all forward supply locations to meet peak unit demands without any delay or adverse effect on tactical operations. Army aviation was utilized extensively for delivery of fast moving items and spare parts to units in field locations. Wherever possible land LOC movement of Class III and V in bulk was scheduled to maximize thru put to using units. Through continuous liaison by Support Command Commanders and staff, personnel from the office of the ACofS, G-4, and the full use of the coordinating capabilities of the LOCC, logistical problems were identified early or anticipated before they reached a magnitude that hampered tactical disposition. Through the LOCC machinery corrective action and anticipatory planning was initiated in a timely manner to insure adequate logistical support of all operations.

B. (C) FORWARD COMMAND POST:

1. The Support Command Forward Command Post established at Minh Thanh during Phase I, and Lai Khe during Phase II. It was colocated with the ACofS, G-4 element in the Logistics Operation Coordination Center (LOCC) at Division Headquarters (forward). The LOCC function was to coordinate all support rendered and to receive, evaluate, consolidate and transmit to Division Logistical Base in Di An all requests for supply and service support for appropriate action; to coordinate with the 1st Logistical Command demands exceeding the capabilities of the Support Command; and through aggressive follow-up action, to insure that all valid demands were satisfied in the shortest possible time. The LOCC also served as the focal point for the consolidation of information pertaining to the status of all Class I, II & IV, III and V supplies such as consumption, receipts, on and dues in. This information was translated into concrete planning data to insure the uninterrupted, adequate and timely flow of all classes of supplies to the ultimate consumer.

2. Representatives in the LOCC were:

Support Command S-4 Section - 1 officer
701st Maintenance Battalion Material Section - 1 officer
Division Transportation Office - 2 officers
1st Supply and Transport Battalion S3 Section - 1 officer and 1 NCO
Division Ammunition Officer - 2 officers and 1 NCO
ACof S, G-4 - 1 officer (Phase I only). During Phase II, G-4 established his office next to the LOCC.

3. 1st Medical Battalion did not have fulltime representation in the LOCC. Operations were controlled from the Battalion Headquarters at Di An, and frequent field liaison visits were made by the Battalion Commander and staff.

4. A Support Command Coordinator was established at Soui Da during Phase I to coordinate the activities of subordinate elements at that location.

C. (C) METHOD OF DIRECT SUPPORT AND RESUPPLY:

1. 1st Supply and Transport Battalion

a. The overall support concept envisioned the utilization of existing base camps as logistical bases when they were accessible to the planned disposition of tactical units. When, for either time or distance factors, one of the base camps became inaccessible, a temporary forward support section or a POL "jump team" was established to provide continuity of operations. During Junction City, the permanent base camps at Lai Khe and Quan Loi were used as logistical bases.

b. Temporary forward support sections were established at Soui Da and Minh Thanh during the operation. POL "jump teams" were established at Katum, Nui Ba Ra, FSB "B" and FSB "C".

c. Throughout the operation, the battalion maintained the capability to establish temporary forward support sections and POL "jump teams" as required. As the operation progressed, and tactical units moved, personnel and equipment were relocated to provide backup capability near the areas of troop concentration.

d. Support Locations:

DATES OPEN	LOCATION	SUPPORT	PERSONNEL
20 Feb - 13 Mar	Soui Da	I II&IV III	1 Off 17 EM
22 Feb - 23 Mar	Minh Thanh	I II&IV III GR	1 Off 22 EM
24 Mar - 15 Apr	Minh Thanh	III	11 EM
25 Feb - 12 Mar	Katum (XT3390)	III	1 Off 5 EM
21 Mar - 28 Mar	FSB "B" (XT6281)	III	1 Off 3 EM
28 Mar - 5 Apr	FSB "C" (XT5685)	III	1 Off 3 EM
5 Apr - 7 Apr	Nui Ba Ra (XT153072)	III	1 Off 3 EM

e. A combination of area, task and unit support was used during this operation. Class I and II&IV supplies were normally provided on a unit basis. Class III supplies and GRREG service were normally provided on an area basis. Although infrequent, task support was provided also. Examples are the Class II&IV support given to the 2/11 ACR and C Battery, 3/319 Arty after a fire at Objective Parry on 23 March. Summaries of the operations in each area are listed below.

(1) Soui Da: Unit support was used for Class I and II&IV supplies. Class III was provided on an area support basis. A land LOC was the primary means of resupply into Soui Da. A very small amount of Class I supplies were brought in by air.

(2) Minh Thanh: Class I and II&IV supplies and salvage service was provided on a unit basis. Class III supplies and GRREG service were provided on an area basis. Both land and air LOCC were used for resupply.

(3) Katum: Class III was provided on an area basis with primary resupply by land LOC.

(4) Fire Support Base "B": Class III was provided on an area and a unit basis. Resupply was by land LOC.

(5) Fire Support Base "C": Class III was provided on an area basis, with resupply by air and land LOC.

(6) Nui Ba Ra: Class III was provided on an area and unit basis. Resupply was by air LOC.

2. 701st Maintenance Battalion

a. Maintenance Contact Teams furnished support on an area basis, ad provided service to both divisional and nondivisional customers. Teams were established in initial positions, and then moved with their supported densities of equipment as the situation dictated.

(1) The chronological disposition of the teams is shown below:

DATE	LOCATION	TEAM COMPOSITION	SUPPORTING
2 Feb - 16 Mar	Minh Thanh	Co D - 14 men	1st Bde TF
14 Feb - 21 Feb	Ben Cui	Co C - 20 men	3rd Bde TF
21 Feb - 14 Mar	Soui Da	Co C - 20 men	3rd Bde TF
22 Feb - 15 Apr	Quan Loi	Co D - 12 men	TF Dixie
11 Mar - 7 Apr	FSB "B"	Co A - 10 men	Engr/Arty Bn's
19 Mar - 14 Apr	Quan Loi	Co B - 25 men	2nd Bde TF, DIV ARTY
7 Apr - 14 Apr	Quan Loi	Co A - 13 men	Engr Bn

(2) Additionally, technical assistance teams were operational for short periods at the following locations:

LOCATION	COMPOSITION	SUPPORTING
Arty Base VI	Co D - 4 men.	3rd Brigade
FSB "C"	Co B 3 men	DIV ARTY
Obj Thrust	Co B 3 men	DIV ARTY
Phu Loi	Co A 12 men	DIV ARTY, 1/4 Cav
Phu Loi	Co B 8 men	1/4 Cav, 2/2 Mech

b. Repair parts requests were forwarded from each contact team to its parent unit (A Co and B Co at Di An, C Co at Lai Khe, and D Co at Phuoc Vinh). These requests were then filled by the parent unit or sent back to battalion headquarters for fill by Co A or backup support.

c. Aircraft maintenance support was provided by Company E Phu Loi, and contact teams were sent on request to on-site locations. 83 such visits were made during the period. One combat assault mission was escorted and emergency repairs were made on one aircraft.

3. 1st Medical Battalion

a. Forward medical treatment facilities provided area support to all organic and attached units of the division. The chronological disposition of teams is shown below:

DATE	LOCATION	UNIT
20 Feb - 14 Mar	Soui Da	Co C (-)
20 Feb - 14 Mar	Soui Da	Hq & Co A, Forward Medical Supply Point
20 Feb - 5 Mar	Minh Thanh	Co D, Clearing Flat Section - 4 Off 23 EM
6 Mar - 15 Apr	Quan Loi	Co D, Clearing Flat Section
21 Mar - 15 Apr	Quan Loi	Hq & Co A, Co C, Rapid Reaction Med Team
22 Feb - 15 Apr	Lai Khe	Co B

b. In addition to these forward medical treatment facilities, area support was furnished from base camps at Di An, Lai Khe, and Phuoc Vinh.

c. A portion of the division medical supply was moved forward to Soui Da. It was set up in proximity to "C" Company and provided medical supplies to all divisional units in the area plus the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment and the 173d Airborne Brigade. Two (2) medical supply specialists and one (1) generator operator handled the receipt, issue, and ordering of supplies. Requests for resupply items were sent via land line or radio to the battalion S-4 from the forward depot. Supplies were shipped forward either by road or air. The S-4 had operational control over the depot. This was the first time the forward medical depot concept was utilized within the 1st Infantry Division in Vietnam.

d. Medical supply functions were performed by the medical activities at Lai Khe, Minh Thanh, Quan Loi and Phuoc Vinh. Resupply was principally by air, with small portion going by truck to Soui Da.

e. On previous operations, "Dust Off" helicopters were used for transportation of personnel, equipment, and medical supplies from Di An to the forward area. During this operation, convoys and non-medical helicopters were used more than in the past. See Section III, Item J.

4. Division Transportation Office

a. The Division Transportation Office was organized into two sections, one forward and one rear. The forward element was concerned with direct transportation support to all units in the forward area. This included scheduling and controlling of all convoys from the forward area to other locations and scheduling and controlling all fixed wing airlift, both tactical and logistics lift.

b. The rear element handled the same convoy functions in the division rear. All convoys departing Di An were controlled and coordinated from there. All convoys through Saigon were cleared through the rear office. All C7A traffic out of Di An was controlled from the Di An Airstrip.

c. All units in the division desiring to move a convoy were required to obtain clearance through the DTO office, either forward or rear. A clearance number was issued to the unit and this number, along with the time cleared for movement, given to the Military Police. A convoy attempting to move without a clearance was halted by the military police and not allowed to proceed. Units wishing to move vehicles south from Lai Khe to Di An, as part of the return resupply run, were required to obtain a clearance number to become part of the convoy. This was required regardless of the number of vehicles involved.

d. Lai Khe was used as a coordination point for all convoys, both those originating in Lai Khe and those passing through from other areas. All convoys were stopped here, regrouped, rebriefed, and tied in with new security elements. If it became necessary to adjust the progress of a convoy, this was done at Lai Khe by holding it for a period of time or allowing it to proceed, depending on the desired results. A DTO representative, along with an MP representative, stationed at either the north or south check point at Lai Khe insured: that the drivers of all vehicles were in proper uniform, that each vehicle had a shotgun, proper speed, and proper interval.

e. All major convoys reported checkpoints to the Division Transportation Office forward, and the Provost Marshal flew convoy control over all resupply convoys and some tactical convoys. While in the air, the PM representative was able to report the progress to the DTO by radio.

f. On resupply runs to Phuoc Vinh, a convoy meeting was held prior to the first day's convoy. The purpose was to put out the convoy policies and instruction to unit representatives in attendance. A short march unit commander's meeting held daily before the departure of the convoy also reiterated the points needed for effective control.

g. The most effective means of control for all road movement activities at the forward location was through close coordination with the military police. These were especially helpful in controlling civilian traffic during peak times of convoy movement.

4. Division Ammunition Office:

a. During Plase I of Operation Junction City, Class V support was provided through a 1st Logistical Command ASP located at Soui Da for for artillery units and elements of the 3rd Brigade and 1st Brigade operating north of Soui Da to the Cambodian border. At the same time units of the 1st Brigade, whose trains were located at Minh Thanh, were also supplied by a small supply point at Minh Thanh operated by the Division Ammo Section.

b. During Phase II of the operation, the main logistical base was shifted to Quan Loi where the 1st Logistical Command again operated an ASP. Also included in the Class V support provided by the 1st Logistical Command was Explosive Ordance Disposal (EOD) service. A team from the 42nd Detachment was stationed at Minh Thanh during Phase I and at Quan Loi during phase II.

c. Ammunition supply service to the division was controlled by the Division Ammunition Officer whose base of operation was in the LOCC Danger Forward. The DAO section operated the supply point at Minh Thanh with additional manpower assistance from DIV ARTY. Stockage of this supply point was coordinated by the DAO-LOCC and the Long Binh DAO team. The DAO operated an office at both 1st Logistical Command ASP's, Soui Da and Quan Loi, in order to anthenticate and approve transportation orders and to relay timely stockage data back to the DAO at the LOCC.

D. (C) GENERAL SUPPORT AND RESUPPLY SOURCES:

1. 1st Supply and Transport Battalion:

a. Normal resupply sources were used throughout the operation. Requirements generated by supported units were routed to the Assistant Division Supply Officer at Di An. For those items not available, or for future programmed requirements, a request was placed on the 506th Field Depot in Saigon.

b. The 1st Logistical Command provided a Forward Support Activity at Soui Da from the 3rd Ordance Battalion. This FSA used a land LOC to bring forward all classes of supply. Class I and III supplies were distributed to the 1st Supply and Transport Battalion's forward support section at Soui Da for further distribution to supported units.

15TH SPT BPE

c. The 1st Logistical Command also provided an FSA at Quan Loi from the ~~[illegible] Group.~~ This FSA used air and land LOC to provide Class I and III supplies. Class III was retailed by the 1st Supply and Transport Battalion. Class I was retailed through a joint effort by the FSA and the 1st Support and Transport Battalion forward support section.

2. 701st Maintenance Battalion:

The majority of parts were obtained from the normal supply depot, 506th Depot in Saigon, although someparts were obtained from the 185th, 725th, and 610th Maintenance Battalions.

3. 1st Medical Battalion:

a. The advanced platoon of the 32nd Medical Depot provided medical resupply to the division from its location in Saigon. This support was excellent.

b. Patient care was provided to the division by hospitals under the control of the 44th Medical Brigade. The 3rd Field Hospital in Saigon, 93rd Evacuation Hospital and 24th Evacuation Hospital in Long Binh, 3rd Surgical Hospital in Bien Hoa, 12th Evacuation Hospital in Cu Cui, and the 45th Surgical Hospital in Tay Ninh provided this care.

c. Aeromedical evacuation was provided by the 283rd Medical Detachment, 254th Medical Detachment, and 57th Medical Detachment from Long Binh. Area aeromedical evacuation was provided by the Air Ambulance Company (Prov.) by locating standby "Dust Offs" at Soui Da, Dau Tieng, and Minh. These aeromedical evacuation helicopters were under Army control. The standby "Dust Off" at Minh Thanh moved from Minh Thanh to Quan Loi on 6 March 1967, and continued to provide area medical support under the control of Company "D", 1st Medical Battalion.

4. Division Transportation Office:

Airfield operations were controlled by the US Air Force 8th Aerial Port, teams on location and by DTO personnel operating on the strip, during peak periods of activity. This became the case at Minh Thanh and Lai Khe during the time when the division was located there. During heavy troop lifts, one of the two Air Force airlift officers attached to the division would go to the lift origin and assist in any way necessary to keep air traffic flowing smoothly. A mission commander, ordinarily a senior Air Force officer, was also put on the ground to effect liaison with aircraft crews and the unit making the move.

5. Division Ammunition Office:

The Long Binh Ammunition Depot, operated by the 3rd Ordnance Battalion, was the backup source of all ammunition support for the operation. The ASP's at Soui Da and Quan Loi, operated by the 40th Ordnance Company, received their stock from the Long Binh Depot. In the case of the Support Command operated FSP at Minh Thanh, ammunition was issued to the division at Long Binh and delivered by air LOC to Minh Thanh.

E. (C) UNIT RESUPPLY CONCEPTS:

1. 1st Supply and Tranport Battalion:

a. Supply point distrubution was used approximately 95-98% of the time. Unit distribution was made for emergency requests and for a limited amount of perishable Class I supplies.

b. Unit trains were located at Soui Da, Minh Thanh and Quan Loi. Units picked up supplies at the 1st Supply and Transport forward support sections situated at these locations.

2. 701st Maintenance Battalion:

Both land and air LOC were utilized to move repair parts forward to using units in the most expeditious manner possible on a daily basis. Small parts and high priority items were delivered directly to field positions using the Support Command helicopter.

3. 1st Medical Battalion:

Medical resupply to units was by supply point distribution. Requests were brought to the medical supply point, and the supplies issued by the medical company to the representative of the units.

4. Division Ammunition Office:

a. Throughout the operation, the supply point method of distribution was used. During Phase II, however, numerous thru-put issues were made wherein ammunition was delivered by Logistical Command transportation to artillery units at Fire Support Base "Charlie", and to units along highway 13 between Chonh Thanh and An Loc.

b. Units supported by both Soui Da and Quan Loi ASP's resupplied both by land and air LOC. At Minh Thanh the units resupplied predominantly by air. The relative usage of air and land LOC's is indicated by the following approximate percentages:

Soui DA ASP:	Air LOC	- 15%
	Land LOC	- 85%
Quan Loi ASP:	Air LOC	- 32%
	Land LOC	- 68%
Minh Thanh ASP:	Air LOC	- 86%
	Land LOC	- 14%

F. (C) SUPPORT OF NON-DIVISIONAL UNITS:

1. 1st Supply and Transport Battalion:

a. 1st Brigade, 9th Infantry Division - All classes of supplies were provided, along with salvage and GRREG service.

b. 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment - All classes of supply were provided. In addition, salvage and GRREG service were provided.

c. 173rd Airborne Brigade: POL equipment and personnel were provided.

d. A fire occurred at Objective Thrust as a result of enemy action. Units at that location lost several items of equipment which the 1st Supply and Transport Battalion assisted in providing:.

(1) 2/11th Armored Cavalry Squadron

36 each M-14 rifles. 50 sets jungle fatiques.

(2) C Battery, 3/319th Artillery (173rd Airborne Brigade)

1 each 292 antennea
2 each Range Deflection Protractors
7 each Flashlights
4 each Graphic Firing Table
3 each Graphic Site Table

2. 701st Maintenance Battalion:

Support was rendered to non-divisional units as outlined below:

UNIT	LOCATION	SUPPORTED RENDERED
27th Engr Bn	QL	Major Assys
C - 2/35th Arty	BC	Major Assys
6/27th Arty	QL	Auto Parts
2/34th Armor	QL	Track Parts and Assys
3/5th Cav (9th Div)	QL	Track Parts and Assys
5/2nd Arty (Quad 50's)	QL	Track Parts and Assys
47th Truck Co	QL	Auto Parts and Assys
5th Special Forces	QL	Auto Parts and Assys
USAF 8th Aerial Port (Det)	QL - MT	Auto Parts and Assys
173rd Abn Bde	SD	Assys
Dixie North	QL	Assys
168th Engr Bn	DA	Assys
1/11 Cav	LK - SD	Assys

(See Section III, Logistical Problems, item G.)

3. 1st Medical Battalion:

Patient care and medical resupply were rendered to the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment and the 173rd Airborne Brigade as required.

4. Division Transportation Office:

a. During the course of Junction City, various units were OPCON to the division and drew transporation support from the DTO. This included requests for airlift, advice on preparation of cargo for airlift, and followup action to insure the smooth completion of the mission.

b. During the periods of time when the 1st Brigade, 9th Division, and later the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment were securing the portion of Route 13 between Lai Khe and Quan Loi, constant liaison was maintained by DTO personnel using personal visits, telephone and radio communications.

c. On major moves, such as those made by the 173rd Airborne Brigade and the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, a movement order, containing a march table, was submitted to the DTO for approval. If it became necessary to adjust the march table, because of possible convoy conflict or road congestion, this was done and the change then given to the unit making the move.

d. Convoy clearances and military police support were provided the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, 173rd Airborne Brigade, and the 9th Infantry Division during the periods that these units were OPCON to the division.

5. Division Ammunition Office:

Ammunition stocked at either of the supply points supporting the operation was available to all units assigned, attached or under the operational control of the 1st Infantry Division.

G. (C) MAJOR ITEM LOSSES:

1. 1st Supply and Transport Battalion:

NOMENCLATURE	NR LOST	CAUSED BY	LOCATION	DATE
Receiver-transmitter RT 524	1	Mortar fragment	Soui Da	13 Mar
Truck, 2½ ton	1	57mm Recoiless Rifle	XT499817	31 Mar
Truck, 2½ ton	1	Mine	XT284661	2 Mar

2. 701st Maintenance Battalion:

Truck, M151	1	Explosion and Fire	Soui Da	14 Mar
Radio, VRC 47	1	Explosion and Fire	Soui Da	14 Mar

II. (C) EXPERIENCE DATA

A. MATERIAL AND SERVICES

1. (C) Supply

a. (U) Quantities of Supplies Consumed:

ITEM	Air LOC	Land LOC	TOTALS
Class I (short Tons)	1722.3	2756.1	4478.4
JP-4 (Gallons)	208,005.0	564,359.0	772,364.0
MOGAS (Gallons)	86,638.0	545,600.0	632,238.0
AVGAS (Gallons)	36,250.0	85.255.0	121,505.0
DIESEL (Gallons)	26,320.0	277,010.0	303,330.0
Class II & IV (Short Tons)			
Less barrier material	364.5	1,148.2	1,512.7
Barrier Material	87.5	196.1	283.6
Repair Parts	40.5	62.5	103.0
Medical Supplies	25.5	70.5	106.0
Class V (Short Tons)			
Small Arms and other	23.1	210.3	233.4
Arty and Large Caliber	4801.9	11,508.3	16,310.2

b. (U) Class I Analysis

(1) Location: Lai Khe

(a) A Rations

DATES	S/O	TOTAL RECEIVED	AV DAILY RECEIPTS	TOTAL AIR	S/T HWY	TOTAL ISSUE	AVG D ISS ISSUE	AV DAILY O/H END
Mar/4-10	1 day	49,160	7,023	41.6	0	23,570	3,367	16,779
11-17	1 day	21,110	3,016	29.9	0	39,540	5,649	12,877
18-24	1 day	38,390	5,484	41.1	0	47,035	6,719	5,186
25-31	1 day	66,990	9,570	77.3	0	48,635	6,948	10,428
Apr/1-7	1 day	42,700	6,100	36.6	2.0	39,025	5,575	22,287
8-14	1 day	31,000	4,429	35.3	0	32,164	4,595	19,918
15	1 day	12,602	12,600	15.5	0	5,950	5,950	21,325
RECAP	1 day	261,950		277.3	2.0	235,919	5,486	

Highest Issue Day 8,565 on 28 Mar 67

(b) B Rations

Mar/4-10	15 day	0	0	0	0	29,190	4.170	103,000
1-17	"	75,000	10,714	0	112.5	53,120	7,589	105,950
18-24	"	105,000	17,000	0	157.5	55,635	7,948	100,489
25-31	"	0	0	0	0	59,955	8,565	131,137
Apr/1-7	"	91,500	13,071	0	137.3	43,575	6,225	1105,981
8-14	"	0	0	0	0	39,600	5,657	116,353
15	"	0	0	0	0	0	0	112,767
RECAP	15 DOS	271,500		0	407.3	281,075	6,535	

Highest Issue Day 59,955 on 28 March 67

(c) C Rations

Mar/4-10	5 day	6,000	857	0	21.0	676	97	17,273
11-17	"	0	0	0	0	7,904	1,129	16,780
18-24	"	14,088	2,012	0	49.1	7,484	1,069	19,202
25-31	"	15,336	2,191	0	54.	12,472	1,782	11,236
Apr/1-7	"	10,228	1,461	0	35.8	6,638	948	19,878
8-14	"	10,220	1,460	0	25.	1,793	256	28,352
15	"	3,048	3,048	14	0	2,564	2,564	28,736
RECAP	5 DOS	58,920		14	194	39,531	919	

Highest Issue Day 6,536 on 25 Mar 67

Confidential

(d) Sundry Packs

DATES	S/O	TOTAL RECEIVED	AVG DAILY RECEIPTS	TOTAL AIR	S/T HWY	TOTAL ISSUE	AVG DAILY ISSUE	AV DAILY O/H END
Mar/4-10	3 day	30	4	0	.4	134	19	102
11-17	"	150	22	3.5	0	156	22	119
18-24	"	180	26	2.8	1.4	118	17	91
25-31	"	60	9	1.4	0	179	26	78
Apr/1-7	"	0	0	0	0	41	6	116
8-14	"	90	13	0	2.1	90	13	102
15	"	0	0	0	0	3	3	102
RECAP	3 DOS	510		7.7	3.9	721	17	

Highest Issue Day 89 on 5 Mar 67

(2) Location: Minh Thanh

(a) A Rations

Feb/22-28	1 day	19,255	2,750	57.5	0	22,800	3,257	4,254
Mar/1-7	"	13,910	1,987.7	17.1	0	15,830	2,261	2,012
8-14	"	8,910	1,272	12	0	8,870	1,267	1,181
15-21	"	3,570	506	3.3	0	4,500	750	785
RECAP	1 DOS	45,645		89.9	0	52,000	1,925	

Highest Issue Day 3,460 on 26 and 27 Feb 67

(b) B Rations

Feb/22-28	8-10 day	0	0	0	0	41,370	5,910	23,400
Mar/1-7	"	0	0	0	0	2,930	418	6,201
8-14	"	0	0	0	0	4,090	584	3,338
15-21	"	700	100	.5	0	700	100	0
	8-10 DOS	700	25	.5	0	4,909	182	

Highest Issue Day 22,260 on 22 Feb 67

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(c) C Rations

DATES	S/O	TOTAL RECEIVED	AV DAILY RECEIPTS	TOTAL AIR	S/T HWY	TOTAL ISSUED	AV DAILY ISSUE	AV DAILY O/H END
Feb/22-28	5 day	5,000	714	15	0	11,884	1,697	12,064
Mar/ 1- 7	"	3,508	501	11.7	0	3,420	488	9,849
8-14	"	0	0	0	0	9,436	1,348	5,918
15-21	"	2,548	430	9	0	3,608	601	1,373
RECAP	5 DOS	11,092		35.7	0	28,348	1,050	

Highest Issue Day 5,728 on 25 Feb 67

(d) Sundry Packs

Feb/22-28	3 Day	90	12	28	0	259	37	87
Mar/ 1- 7	"	120	17	2.8	0	160	22	28
8-14	"	90	12	12	0	90	12	10
15-21	"	60	10	1.4	0	60	10	14
RECAP	3 DOS	360		9.1	0	569	21	

Highest Issue day 95 on 23 Feb 67

(3) Location: Quan Loi

(a) A Rations

DATES	S/O	TOTAL RECEIVED	AV DAILY RECEIPTS	TOTAL AIR	S/T HWY	TOTAL ISSUED	AVG DAILY ISSUE	AV DAILY O/H END
Mar/3- 9	1 Day	25,250	3,607	27.9	0	23,840	3,405	4,937
10-16	"	38,850	5,550	45.8	0	39,442	5,634	11,461
17-23	"	55,000	7,857	29.5	35.0	45,505	6,500	21,470
24-30	"	65,000	9,428	0	65	39,500	5,642	38,092
31M-6 Apr	"	37,000	5,285	37.0	0	45,695	6,529	37,357
6-13	"	25,000	3,571	15	10	49,057	7,008	25,386
14-15	"	3,000	1,500	30	0	5,281	2,640	13,397
RECAP	1 DOS	249,100		185.2	110	248,320	5,644	

Highest Issue day 10,000 on 10 Apr 67

(b) B Rations

Mar/3-9	8-10 D	0	0	0	0	22,478	3,211	42,396
10-16	"	39,000	5,571	58.5	0	33,846	4,835	30,858
17-23	"	45,000	6,428	75	22.5	33,090	4,727	34,447
24-30	"	45,000	6,428	0	67.5	49,795	7,113	50,292
31M-6 Apr	"	44,520	6,360	66.7	0	55,680	7,954	16,765
7-13	"	30,000	4,285	22.5	22.5	38,545	5,506	17,741
14-15	"	20,000	10,000	30	0	6,525	3,464	10,570
RECAP	8-10 DOS	223,520		252.7	112.5	239,959	5,453	

Highest Issue day 26,640 on 7 Apr 67

(c) C Rations

Mar/3-9	5 Day	11,154	1,593	39.1	0	16,532	2,361	9,211
10-16	"	39,670	5,667	133.4	0	18,845	2,692	20,133
17-23	"	9,728	1,389	0	34	24,396	3,485	17,306
24-30	"	27,136	3,876	0	99	20,924	2,989	20,153
31M-6 Apr	"	13,056	1,865	45.8	0	25,940	3,705	12,966
7-13	"	19,640	2,720	26.3	40.3	18,502	2,643	9,760
14-15	"	5,004	2,502	0	11	3,244	1,622	7,210
RECAP	5 DOS	124,788		244.6	184	128,384	2,941	

Highest Issue day 8,128 on 8 Mar 67

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(c) Sundry Packs

DATES	S/O	TOTAL RECEIVED	AV DAILY RECEIPTS	TOTAL AIR	S/T HWY	TOTAL ISSUED	AVG DAILY ISSUE	AV DAILY O/H END
Mar/3- 9	3 Day	0	0	0	0	75	10	51
10-16	"	696	99	14.8	0	374	53	111
16-23	"	120	17	2.8	0	352	50	233
24-30	"	970	138	0	2011	487	69	489
31M-6 Apr	"	226	32	5.4	0	536	76	231
7-13	"	240	31	0	5.6	442	63	101
14-15	"	480	240	0	11.2	19	91	230
RECAP	3 DOS	2,732		23	36.9	2,285	52	

Highest Issue Day on 13 Apr 67

(4) Location: Soui Da

(a) A Rations

DATES	S/O	TOTAL RECEIVED	AV DAILY RECEIPTS	TOTAL AIR	S/T HWY	TOTAL ISSUED	AVG DAILY ISSUE	AV DAILY O/H END
Feb/22-28	1 Day	71,885	11,930	0	70	52,460	8,743	9,244
Mar/ 1- 7	"	56,-58	9,343	0	73	64,288	9,184	9,990
8-14	"	46,136	7,677	0	62.3	43,909	7,317	5,308
RECAP	1 DOS	174,077		0	205.3	160,657	8,033	

Highest Issue day 10,540 on 26 Feb 67

(b) B Rations

Feb/22-28	8-10 D	73,286	10,469	0	107	52,460	7,494	13,314
Mar/ 1- 7	"	56,066	8,008	0	114.7	56,288	9,184	9,990
8-14	"	46,136	6,590	0	64.4	43,909	6,292	9,244
RECAP	8-10 DOS	175,488		0	286.1	152,659	7,633	

Highest Issue day 10,540 on 26 Feb 67

(c) C Rations

Feb/22-28	3 Day	52,390	8,731	0	168.9	15,308	2,551	44,113
Mar/ 1- 7	"	3,750	535	0	13.1	22,928	3,275	40,583
8-14	"	0	0	0	0	16,080	2,680	23,070
RECAP	3 DOS	56,140		0	182	54,316	2,716	

Highest Issue day 9,252 on 6 Nov

(d) Sundry Packs

Feb/22-28	3 Day	240	34	0	7.4	101	14	43
Mar/ 1- 7	"	741	105	0	17.3	678	99	213
8-14	"	90	12	0	2.1	273	39	69
RECAP	3 DOS	1071		0	26.8	1052	56	

Highest Issue day 179 on 7 Mar 67

(5) Class I Comsumption Trends:

Class I was available for issue at all supply points, and consumption was based on ration requests from the using units. The proportion of A ration requested/consumed vs MCI rations was normal at Lai Khe, about 6 to 1, because of the high density of permanent base camp troops. The proportion at Quan Loi, Soui Da and Minh Thanh was about 2 to 1. The reason this occured was the desire (ration request) of the using unit, coupled with the heavy action at LZ George and intense patrolling deep in the jungle far from the LZ's and FSA's. On 7 March 67 there were ration requests submitted for 33,905 5400ps; on that day 35,425 A rations and 6,668 MCI's were issued, equivalent to a six brigade force. This compares with a TOE capability to provide Class I support for a division strength of 15,349.

d. (C) Class III Analysis

(1) Location; Lai Khe

(a) JP-4:

DATE	AV NR OF DISP PTS	S/C CAL	TOTAL REC'D	AV DAILY DEC'D	TOTAL AIR	S/T HWY	TOTAL ISSUE	AVG DAILY ISSUE	AVG DAILY O/H	VARIATION END S/O + -
Mar/4-10	4	80,000	25,000	3,571	0	75	34,000	4,858	107507	+27,507
11-17	4	80,000	0	0	0	0	11,000	1,571	97000	+17,000
18-24	4	80,000	20,000	2,857	0	60	44,000	6,571	78144	- 1,856
25-31	4	80,000	30,000	4,285	0	90	33,000	4,714	62714	-17,286
Apr 1- 7	12	80,000	65,000	9,285	0	195	68,000	9,714	66428	-13,572
8-15	12	80,000	70,000	10,000	0	210	54,000	7,714	80428	+ 428
RECAP			210,000		0	630	244,000	5,710		-19,412

Highest Day Issuess: 23,500 on 4 Mar 67
Percentage of highest day over Average day for the period: 411%.

(b) Avgas:

Mar/4-10	1	9,000	0	0	0	0	1,000	-	28000	+19,000
11-17	1	9,000	0	0	0	0	4,000	571	26428	+17,828
18-24	1	9,000	0	0	0	0	4,500	642	21214	+12,214
25-31	1	9,000	0	0	0	0	6,500	928	16357	+ 7,357
Apr/1- 7	1	9,000	10,000	1,328	0	30	3,000	428	17214	+ 8,214
8-15	1	9,000	10,000	1,328	0	30	7,500	1,714	22285	+13,285
RECAP			20,000		0	60	26,500	654		+19,374

Highest Day Issues: 3,000 on 30 Mar 67
Percentage of Day over Average day for the period: 457%.

(c) Mogas:

Mar/4-10	1	65,000	30,000	4,286	0	90	30,000	4,286	39714	-25,286
11-17	1	65,000	20,000	2,857	0	60	34,000	4,857	40000	-25,000
18-24	1	65,000	40,000	5,714	0	120	42,500	6,071	37428	-27,572
25-31	1	65,000	63,000	9,000	0	180	44,500	6,357	36857	-28,143
Apr/1- 7	1	65,000	30,000	4,286	0	90	37,500	5,357	43714	-21,286
8-15	1	65,000	55,000	7,857	0	165	50,500	2,714	54857	-10,143
RECAP			238,000		0	705	239,000	5,690		-27,464

Highest Day Issues: 12,000 on 12 Apr 67
Percentage of highest day over Average day for the period: 213%.

(d) Diesel:

Mar/9-10	1	55,000	25,000	3,571	0	75	13,000	1,857	47857	- 7,143
11-17	1	55,000	22,500	3,214	0	66.5	34,500	4,928	45857	- 9,143
18-24	1	55,000	35,000	5,000	0	165	27,500	3,928	49517	- 5,483
25-31	1	55,000	40,000	5,714	0	120	30,000	4,285	53785	- 1,215
Apr/1- 7	1	55,000	30,000	4,286	0	90	31,500	4,500	54785	- 215
8-15	1	55,000	20,000	2,857	0	60	32,000	4,571	60142	+ 5,142
RECAP			172,500		0	5165	168,500	3,709		- 9,085

Highest Day Issues: 17,000 on 2 Apr 67
Percentage of highest day over Average day for the period: 457%.

(2) Location: Minh Thanh

(a) JP-4:

DATE	AV NR OF DISP PTS	S/O CAL	TOTAL REC'D	AV DAILY REC'D	TOTAL AIR	S/T HWY	TOTAL ISSUE	AVG DAILY ISSUE	AVG DAILY O/H	VARIATION O/H END S/O + -
Feb/22-28	21	50,000	94,430	13,490	283.0	0	92,370	13,196	29604	-20,396
Mar/ 1- 7	13	50,000	51,385	7,347	153.8	0	44,377	6,340	36771	-13,229
8-14	12	50,000	12,760	1,823	38.3	0	1,932	2,761	41591	- 8,409
15-21	21	50,000	16,430	2,377	49.3	0	15,030	2,147	36,040	-13,160
22	32	50,000	23,000	23,000	69	0	8,500	8,500	51000	+ 1,000
RECAP			198,005		593.2	0	162,209	5,796		-10,839

Highest Day Issues: 42,200 on 22 Feb 67
Percentage of highest day over Average day for the period: 728%.

(b) Avgas:

Feb/22-28	1	5,000	4,400	629	13	0	8,410	1,201	4179	- 821
Mar/ 1- 7	1	5,000	7,920	1,131	23.8	0	4,930	704	5155	+ 155
8-14	1	5,000	0	0	0	0	3,600	514	3175	- 1,825
15-21	1	5,000	1,430	24	4.3	0	1,130	161	2085	- 2.915
22	1	5,000	0	0	0	0	2,400	2,400	8749	+ 3,749
23				CLOSED OUT						
RECAP			13,750		41.1	0	20,470	706		2,366

Highest Day Issues: 2,400 on 22 Mar 67
Percentage of highest day over Average day for the period: 339%.

(c) Mogas:

Feb/22-28	1	10,000	6,190	884	18.4	0	14,134	2,019	12634	+ 2,634
Mar/ 1- 7	1	10,000	21,180	3,026	54.5	0	15,400	2,200	15147	+ 5,147
8-14	1	10,000	0	0	0	0	9,880	1,411	12029	+ 2,029
15-21	1	10,000	0	0	0	0	5,160	737	2962	- 8,038
22	1	10,000	0	0	0	0	1,460	1,460	1380	- 8,620
23				CLOSED OUT						
RECAP			27,370		72.9	0	46,034	1,576		- 6,606

Highest Day Issues 5,630 on 1 Mar 67
Percentage of highest day over Average Day for the period: 357%.

(d) Diesel:

Feb/22-28	1	10,000	3,040	434	9	0	11,520	1,646	31104	+21,104
Mar/ 1- 7	1	10,000	5,400	771	16.2	0	7,671	1,096	28226	+18,226
8-14	1	10,000	880	125	2.6	0	5,459	779	24950	=14,950
15-21	1	10,000	0	0	0	0	11,910	1,703	10885	+ 885
22	1	10,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	10885	+ 885
23				CLOSED OUT						
RECAP			9,320		27.8	0	36,595	1,261		+14,012

Highest Day Issues: 11,750 on 15 Mar 67
Percentage of highest day over Average day for the period: 932%.

(3) Location: Quan Loi

(a) JP-4

DATE	AV NR OF DISP PTS	S/O GAL	TOTAL REC'D	AV DAILY REC'D	TOTAL AIR	S/T HWY	TOTAL ISSUE	AVG DAILY ISSUE	AVG DAILY O/H	VARIATION O/H END S/O + -
Feb/22-28	8	50,000	1,320	188	4	0	54,991	7,855	50,734	+ 734
Mar/ 1- 7	12	50,000	25,840	3,691	75.9	0	26,250	3,750	44,037	- 5,963
8-14	12	50,000	61,5 0	8,787	181.9	0	23,100	3,585	60,504	+10,504
15-21	8	50,000	0	0	0	0	31,400	4,485	63,645	+13,645
22-28	4	50,000	10,000	1,428	0	30	47,959	6,851	21,747	-28,253
29M-4 Apr	4	50,000	79,920	11,417	39.5	200	123,170	17,595	83,645	+33,645
5-11	12	50,000	60,000	8,571	0	180	100,330	14,331	74,240	+24,240
12-15	8	50,000	20,000	2,857	0	60	26,205	3,743	25,270	-24,730
RECAP			258,590		297.7	470	133,405	2,565		—35,428

Highest Day Issues: 34,750 on 22 Feb 67
Percentage of highest day over Average day for the period: 1355.0%.

(b) Avgas:

Feb/22-28	1	5,000	0	0	0	0	6,240	891	9,707	+ 4,707
Mar/ 1- 7	1	5,000	0	0	0	0	2,040	291	7,055	+ 2,055
8-14	1	5,000	15,640	2,262	47.5	0	4,020	573	13,252	+8,252
15-21	1	5,000	0	0	0	0	6,535	933	14,906	+ 9,906
22-28	1	5,000	3,025	432	0	9	11,079	1,725	5,532	+ 532
29M-4 Apr	1	5,000	5,280	750	15.8	0	16,755	2,353	16,515	+11,515
5-11	1	5,000	16,465	2,357	44	45	15,725	2,246	11,467	+ 6,467
12-15	1	5,000	8,025	1,146	0	2.1	2,810	401	5,885	+ 885
RECAP			48,655		67.4	78.1	65,204	1,254		11,079

Highest Day Issues: 5,450 on 1 Apr 67
Percentage of highest day over average day for the period: 434%.

(c) Mogas

Feb/27-28	1	25,000	2,970	424	86	0	4,050	578	42,896	+17,846
Mar/1 - 7	1	25,000	4,160	594	124	0	9,600	985	42,521	+17,521
8 -14	1	25,000	15,870	2,153	45.2	0	30,800	4,400	34,870	+ 9,870
15-21	1	25,000	310,500	4,435	0	93.2	42,663	6,094	24,111	- 889
22-28	1	25,000	103,090	14,727	10.2	239.2	44,478	6,345	84,154	+59,154
29M-4 Apr	1	25,000	43,163	6,765	83.7	45	66,453	9,497	73,718	+48,718
5-11	1	25,000	16,265	2,323	0	48.7	56,125	8,017	45,151	+20,151
12-15	1	25,000	10,000	1,428	0	30	16,760	2,394	16,032	- 8,968
RECAP			225,768		217,1	500.1	274,949	5,287		45,781

Highest Day Issues: 18,180 on 9 Apr 67
Percentage of highest day over Average day for the period: 349%.

(d) Diesel:

Feb/22-28	1	20,000	0	0	0	0	925	132	61,184	+41,184
Mar/ 1- 7	1	20,000	0	0	0	0	2,025	289	59,936	+39,936
8-14	1	20,000	5,400	771	16.2	0	26,800	3,828	47,856	+27,856
15-21	1	20,000	0	0	0	0	22,700	3,242	23,211	+ 3,211
22-28	1	20,000	30,825	4,403	7.4	84.3	38,495	5,499	35,707	+15,707
29M-4 Apr	1	20,000	58,800	8,400	26.4	150	50,683	7,240	44,006	+24,006
5-11	1	20,000	16,465	2,357	0	49.4	46,810	6,687	46,653	+26,653
12-15	1	20,000	10,000	1,428	0	30	13,770	2,754	21,612	+ 1,612
TECAP			121,510		50	313.7	202208	3,868		45,641

Highest Day Issues: 18,550 on 8 Apr 67
Percentage of highest day over Average day for the period: 477%.

(4) Location: Soui Da

(a) JP-4

DATE	AV NR OF DISP PTS	S/O GAL	TOTAL REC'D	AV DAILY REC'D	TOTAL AIR	S/T HWY	TOTAL ISSUE	AVG DAILY ISSUE	AVG DAILY O/H	VARIATION O/H END S/O + -
Feb/22-28	8	135,000	213,500	30500	6	634.5	149000	21285	65957	-69043
Mar/1-7	8	105,000	100,000	14285	0	300	106800	15275	86357	-18643
8-14	8	50,000	25,000	3571	0	75	77900	11142	39014	-10986
15 -				CLOSED OUT						
RECAP	8		338,500		6	1009.5	333700			-186328

Highest Day Issues: 49400 on 23 Feb 67.
Percentage of Day over Average day for the period: 313%.

(b) Avgas:

Feb/22-28	1	10,000	22,600	3229	4.5	63.	13600	1943	9729	-271
Mar/1-7	1	10,000	16,500	7642	0	49.5	12500	1786	16214	+6214
8-14	1	10,000	0	0	0	0	13300	1900	5682	-4318
15 -				CLOSED OUT						
RECAP			39100		4.5	112.5	39400	1872		-19197

Highest Day Issues: 7600 on 9 Mar 67.
Percentage of Day over Average day for the period: 406%

(c) Mogas:

Feb/22-28	1	33,000	85100	12157	3	252	51800	7400	29881	-3119
Mar/1-7	1	33,000	35000	5000	0	105	48100	6871	26642	-6358
8-14	1	33,000	25000	3571	0	75	51100	7300	18685	-14315
15 -				CLOSED OUT						
RECAP			145100		3	432	151000	7190		-23792

Highest Day Issues: 12000 on 5 Mar 67.
Percentage of Day over Average day for the period: 160%.

(d) Diesel:

Feb/22-28	1	27,000	99300	14181	3	295	83000	16810	24400	-2600
Mar/1-7	1	27,000	40000	5714	0	120	46100	6871	34042	+7042
8-14	1	27,000	20000	2857	0	60	42700	6100	15957	-11043
15 -				CLOSED OUT						
RECAP			159300		3	475	173800	8271		-6823

Highest Day Issues: 28000 on 25 Feb 67.
Percentage of Day over Average day for the period: 338%.

(5) Class III Consumption Trends:

Consumption rates for JP-4 and Avgas during Junction City were approximately the same as those for Attleboro and Cedar Falls. There was, however, an upward trend in Mogas and diesel consumption. This was due to the fact that Junction City made use of more Cav and Engineer units. There was also an upward trend in the consumption of packaged POL products. This again is due to the use of units with a high density of automotive equipment.

(a) The following data was compiled by the 1st Supply and Transport Battalion from the following units: 1/4 Cavalry Squadron, 2/11 and 3/11 Squadrons, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment; 2/34th Armor; and 2/2 Mechanized Infantry Battalion.

(b) Planning Factors: 1 day supply of:

SQUADRONS	MOGAS	DIESEL
Division Cavalry Squadron	2500 gal	1000 gal
Armored Cavalry Regiment Squdron	3000 gal	4000 gal
COMPANIES		
Hq Company, Armor Battalion	1000 gal	200 gal
Tank Company, Armor Battalion	500 gal	1000 gal
Mechanized Infantry Company	600 gal	1000 gal

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e. (U) Class II-IV Analysis

(1) Selected Common Items:

ITEM	TOTAL ISSUED
Fatigues, Jungle (Sets)	55,893
Boots, Tropical (pr)	10,047
Socks (Pr)	41,851
Undershirt	29,115
Drawers	31,275
Plates, Paper	678,000
Cups, Paper	1,215,000
Knife, Plastic	421,700
Fork, Plastic	513,000
Spoon, Plastic	606,500
Soap, Gl (lbs)	19,140
Can, Water, 5 gal	2,220
Sandbags	1,467,900
Concertina (bdls)	229
Pickets	23,595
Batteries:	
BA 386	4,074
BA 30	38,476
BA 42	2,619
BA 1100	849
BA 58	885
BA 200	3,155

(2) Selected Repair Parts/ASL Item Demand Data

Following are the quantities of major assemblies used to support the operation for selected major end items:

MAJOR END ITEM	NR SPT'D	MAJOR ASSYS REPLACED
M113, Carr, Pers, Ftrac, Armd (Mogas)	71	20E, 12T, 2t, 2D
M113A1, Carr, Pers, Ftrac, Armd (Diesel)	60-63	7E, 4t
M48A3, TK, CBT, Ftrac, 90mm Gun	23-25	14E, 7T, 4F, 1t
M132A1, Flame Thrower, Mech	6	None
M577, Cmd Post (Mogas)	6	2E, 1t
M577A1, Cmd Post (Diesel)	13	1E, 1D, 1t
M578, Recovy, Veh, Ftrac, Lt, Armd	5	None
M88, Recovy, Veh, Ftrac, MDM	9	4E, 4T, 3F
M101A1, How, Lt, Twd, 105mm	18	5R, 8C
M102, How, Lt, Twd, 105mm	0	None
M114A1, How, Mdm, Twd, 155mm	0	None
M109, How, Mdm, SP, 155mm	18-19	1E
M110, How, Hv, SP, 8 in	5	20 Misc, 3 Rammers
M107, Gun, Sp, 175mm (non-divisional)	0	None
M125A1, Carr, 81mm Mort	9	None
M106A1, Carr, 4.2" Mort	13	None

Note; E - Engine
T - Transmission
t - Transfer
F - Final Drive
D - Differential
R - Recoil
C - Cannon Assy

(3) Selected Medical Supply Demand Data

ITEM	SOUI DA	LAI KHE	PHUOC VINH	TINH THANH	QUAN LOI	TOTAL
Albumin	96	168	100	52	192	608
Dextran	192	120	56	40	168	576
Dextrose & Sodium Chloride	33	8	0	0	0	41
Lidocaine	30	0	25	10	25	90
Water for Inj 5cc	96	0	18	6	48	168
Water for Inj 1000cc	22	10	18	6	22	78
Ringers Injection	6	16	3	1	0	26
Sodium Chloride	20	82	20	14	16	152
Adhesive Tape	224	456	284	100	96	1160
Ace Bandage 2x5 1/2	36	72	92	30	112	342
Ace Bandage 3x5 1/2	72	144	70	19	96	401
Ace Bandage 4x5 1/2	72	72	20	8	48	220
Ace Bandage 6x5 1/2	30	72	60	12	48	222
Band Muslin	288	0	628	200	288	1404
Battle Dressing lg	248	0	70	26	576	920
Battle Dressing med	212	288	388	200	576	1664
Battle Dressing sm	660	288	564	300	576	2388
Blood Recipient set	30	132	180	60	216	628
Intravenous Inj set	240	242	80	16	288	866
Suture set	40	0	0	0	0	40
Cannula, Trach Jackson Size #4	0	0	0	0	0	0
Cannula, Trach Jackson Size #5	3	0	0	0	0	3
Cannula, Trach Jackson Size #6	7	0	0	0	0	7
Litter Folding	234	0	35	15	50	334
Blanket Wool Red	100	0	100	25	24	329

(4) The following allocation of canvas shower buckets, as approved by the Chief of Staff, was made on 1 March 1967:

1st Bde	95	1/4 Cav Sqdrn	25
2nd Bde	95	Signal Bn	15
3rd Bde	95	MP Co	10
Div Arty	95	HHC Div	0
Spt Cmd	30	Reserve (S&T)	15
Engr Bn	25	TOTAL	500

f. (U) Class V Analysis

(1) Location of ASP: QUAN LOI Dates Open 15 Mar - 15 Apr

Items	Stock Obj	Av Daily O/H End	Total Recvd	Av Dly Recvd	S/T Received Air	S/T Received Hwy	Av Nr Tubes	Total Iss	Av Dly Iss	Rds Per Tube/Dy
60 mm HE		2	210	7		.53				
81 mm HE	10500	10155	48086	1551	101.76	306.87		62638	2021	
90 mm HE	750	767								
90 mm Can	1000	1378	216	7		6.30		417		
105 mm HE	22000	20435	186057	6002	1427.72	4143.99	48	159067	5131	107
155 mm HE	8886	7784	46696	1506	437.15	2621.44	19	30852	995	52
175 mm HE	450	1336	834	27	76.86	24.89	2			
4.2 in HE	3635	5444	30988	999	433.36	217.39	17	18886	689	36
8 in HE	1500	1596	6626	214	78.75	749.50	6	4723	152	25

(2) Location of ASP: Soui Da Dates Open 22 Feb - 14 Mar

Items Stock Obj	Av Daily O/H End	Total Recvd	Av Dly Recvd	S/T Received Air	S/T Received Hwy	Av Nr Tubes	Total Iss	Av Dly Iss	Rds Per Tube/Dy
60 mm HE 1383	891	2166	103		5.42		1000	48	
81 mm HE 6900	7555	30767	1465		261.52		20159	960	
90 mm HE 600	1109	474	23		15.41				
90 mm Can 900	847	2196	105		68.67		160		
105 mm HE 20000	10588	78423	3787		2352.69	54	49414	2353	44
155 mm HE 9000	2523	19132	863		1253.15	19	13434	640	34
175 mm HE 300	541	204	10		14.89	2			
4.2 in HE 2070	1861	9978	475		208.54	17	6072	289	17
8 in HE 1200	1138	3455	107		431.88	6	875	42	7

(3) Cavalry Ammunition Planning Factors

(a) The following information was compiled by the Division Ammunition Officer from the 1/4 Cavalry Squadron and ammunition records.

(b) Planning Factors: One Day of Supply for:

	Div Cav Sqdrn (in the attack)	Tank Co	Mech Inf Co
90 mm Cann	108	170	NA
90 mm HE	9	85	NA
90 mm WP	9	34	NA
40 mm HE	900	NA	NA
50 cal MLB	36,000	10,500	10,500
7.62 mm MLB	36,000	17,000	16,000
5.56 mm	1000	NA	NA
Flare, Trip	48	NA	NA
Mine, M18A1	6	NA	NA
Smoke Grenades	24	NA	NA
4.2 in HE	NA	NA	400
81 mm HE	NA	NA	300

2. Services

a. (U) Maintenance

(1) DS Workload 701st Maintenance Battalion

Job orders received	11,202
Job orders completed	10,841
Average ASL on hand	64%
Average ASL demand accommodation	80%
Total demands	60,035
Total issues	38,438
Total transactions	107,214

(2) Summary of Job Orders by Location

TYPE	BEN CUI	SOUI DA	MINH THANH	QUAN LOI	FSB "B"	PHU LOI
Aircraft						231
Aircraft Components						602
Arty	1	6	2	32	3	
Wheel	4	4	29	93	9	
Track	9	56	6	27	4	
Signal	68	161	158	676		
Armament	127	285	300	86	10	
Other	33	33	28	51	10	
TOTAL	242	545	523	975	36	833

GRAND TOTAL 3,154 job orders completed

(3) Average Daily Tank and Track Status

The figures below reflect average number of vehicles in the unit which were operational and deadlined during the operation. The figures are based on the number on hand, Deadlined figures include organizational and direct support maintenance.

Daily Average	Tank M-48A3		Pers Carr M113		Flm Thrwr M132A1		VTR M88		Cmd Post M577A1		4.2 Mort Carr M106	
	Oper	D/L	Oper	D/L	Oper	D/L	Oper	D/L	Oper	D/L	Oper	D/L
11 ACR	19.3	8.7	181.2	3.8	4.0	5.0	4.0	0	23.3	.7	16.5	.5
2/2 MECH	N/A	N/A	56.6	.4	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	7.0	0	4.0	0
2/34 ARM	11.8	3.2	3.0	0	N/A	N/A	1.0	0	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
1/4 CAV	16.3	5.7	70.0*	5.0	4.0*	2.0	4.4*	.6	4.2*	.8	8.4*	.6

*NOTE: Figures are based on the number authorized

(4) Average Daily Dozer Status

Daily Average	D-7E	D-8	HD-16	TD-24
Operational	7.8	2.5	2.1	0
Deadlined	4.2	.5	2.9	2

(5) (C) Significant Maintenance Services Summary

(a) The self-propelled, 155 Howitzer, M109 was introduced into the Division during the operation, replacing the 155 Howitzer, towed. With the assistance of Technical Representatives, crews from three batteries of the 8th Battalion, 6th Artillery were given orientation training on proper operation and maintenance procedures. Personnel from the 701st Maintenance Battalion also received instruction from the Technical Representatives. Parts for stockage of the M109 ASL/PLL have been on requisition since October 1966 but a satisfactory level of parts on hand was not available. In order to alleviate this situation, a master list of zero balance items was submitted to the 506th Field Depot. Those items the depot could not provide were referred to the Director of Maintenance, 1st Logistical Command for expedited action.

(b) Two M-110, 8" SP replacement chassis were received, inspected, and guns were mounted during the first week of March for D Battery 8/6 Artillery.

(c) A maintenance stand-down was conducted to assist the 1/4 Cav and the 2/2 Mech. Infantry. In a 4 day period, an average of 4 engines or transmissions were changed every day.

(d) During the operation, 2 officers of the 701st Maintenance Battalion flew to Cam Ranh Bay Support Command to look for critically needed parts to repair bulldozers, M48A3 tanks, and signal items. They arranged for the transfer to the division of over 2,000 M48A3 track blocks, 20 repair parts for bulldozers, and 250 signal repair parts which removed 50 end items from deadline.

(e) A potential equipment problem was avoided when the 2/2 Mech Infantry discovered an apparent fault in a blower drive shaft on M113A-1's. The faulty shafts were breaking, apparently because of a structural weakness caused by a hollow shaft. Solid replacement shafts were located at 1st Logistical Command and replacements were furnished to the 2/2 Mech. Stockage quantities were also obtained as back-up within the 701st Maintenance Battalion.

(f) A special air-courier system, using the Support Command helicopter, has been devised to expedite the handling of requisitions. Requisitions are picked up at special Red Ball helipads. This is done on a daily basis, and allows Red Ball requests to be in 506th Field Depot hands within 24 hours.

b. (C) MEDICAL

The following statistics reflect only patients processed by elements of the 1st Medical Battalion, and do not reflect patients evacuated directly to general support medical facilities supporting the Division.

LOCATIONS SUPPORTING OPERATIONS

Patients Treated	Quan Loi	Minh Thanh	Phuoc Vinh	Lai Khe	Soui Da	Total
IRHA	361	8	Not directly	106	43	518
KRHA	43	4	involved in	15	26	88
NBI & DIS	1365	126	this operation	2741	506	4738
VC	0	0	for patient care in forward areas.	4	3	7
DOA - NBI	1	1		0	0	2
Whole Blood (Unit)	124	34	30	85	36	309
Medical Supply (lbs)	11950	8200	13497	17550	15150	66347

c. (U) LAUNDRY AND BATH

LOCATIONS SUPPORTING OPERATIONS

	Quan Loi	Minh Thanh	Lai Khe	Soui Da	Total
Number of shower heads	8	8	8	8	32
Number of washers	3		2	3	8

d. (U) GRAVES REGISTRATION

LOCATIONS SUPPORTING OPERATIONS

	Quan Loi	Minh Thanh	Lai Khe	Soui Da	Total
Remains processed	35	6	15	27	83

e. (U) SALVAGE COLLECTION

LOCATIONS SUPPORTING OPERATIONS

	Minh Thanh	Soui Da	Quan Loi	Total
Turn in documents processed	7	25	46	78

f. (U) EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL

A recapitulation of Explosive Ordnance Disposal Support provided by the 42nd Ordnance Detachment (EOD) during operation Junction City is:

(1) Number of Incidents - 56
HE items destroyed - 2,951 - this includes 3 each 500 lb bombs, 392 items of VC ordnance and 76 anti-personnel bombs.
(2) Small arms ammunition destroyed - 29,700
(3) Unserviceable Ammunition Destroyed
HE - 276
Small Arms - 0
(4) A considerable quantity of unserviceable ammunition was left at Quan Loi to be destroyed or backhauled for renovation after the operation.

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B. TRANSPORTATION

1. Summary of Fixed Wing Airlift

Origin Air Strip	Tactical and Logistical Sorties								
	C 7A			C 123			C 130		
	Sorties	Pax	Cargo	Sorties	Pax	Cargo	Sorties	Pax	Cargo
Di An	455	3091	1,343,200						
Tan Son Nhut	447	3132	569,700	9	239	16,100			
Phuoc Vinh	42	325	94,300	26	235	234,900	40	1283	526,800
Minh Thanh	16	26	33,000	7	20	86,400	74	271	1,309,800
Quan Loi	3	3	7100	11	427	42,500	96	2287	1,237,200
Lai Kho	22	214	20,400	68	2186	136,300	5	351	3700
Bien Hoa				17		244,400	24	473	366,500
Soui Da	1	23		55	1720	519,900	43	1638	620,100
Tonle Cham	17	340					29	1301	446,500
Phu Loi	4	62	7500	31	550	134,400			
Katum				24	496	158,500			
Tay Ninh West	1	1	2100						
Cam Ranh Bay							1		3000
TOTAL	1008	7217	2,077,300	248	5873	1,573,400	312	7604	4,533,600

(SEE NEXT PAGE FOR CONVOY DATA)

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2. SUMMARY OF CONVOY OPERATIONS

LINE	ORIGIN	DESTINATION	No of VEH TOTAL	No of VEH AV CVY	UNIT	DATES OPEN
A	Tay Ninh	Soui Da	1015	59	1st Log	22 Feb-11 Mar
B	Soui Da	Tay Ninh	1015	59	1st Log	22 Feb-11 Mar
C	Di An	Soui Da	25	25	1/16 I	23 Feb
D	Soui Da	Di An	507	129	1st E, 1/5 A, 1/16 I, 2/28 I, 3d Bde	4,5,13,14,Mar
E	Long Binh	Lai Khe	15	15	1st Log	25 Feb
F	Lai Khe	Long Binh	57	14	86 E, 1st Log, 2/33 A,	24,25,Feb;15 Mar;1 Apr
G	Di An	Phouc Vinh	890	297	1st Bde,1st E	27-30 Mar
H.	Phouc Vinh	Di An	865	291	1st Bde	27,29,31,Mar
I	Di An	Lai Khe	901	64	1stLog,8/3A,1stE,1/7A, 1/16I,3dBde,2dBde	27Feb;3-6,8, 10,11,13,15, 29,31Mar15Apr
J	Lai Khe	Di An	355	39	1st Log, 86 E	22,27Feb;3,6, 8,10,16,31Mar 2 Apr
K	Di An	Phu Loi	274	18	1stE,104E,1stMed,2dBde, 86E,8/6A,2/33A	23-28Feb;1-4, 16,21,23,24, Mar
L	Phu Loi	Di An	96	10	104E,86E,2/33A,1stMed,	23,24,26-28 Feb;1,2,4,21, 25 Mar
M	Di An	Quan Loi	3057	118	1/5A,8/6A,1/7A,1stS&T, 1stE,27E,2dBde,4C,1st Log	6,11,14,16,18 20-28Mar;2-13 Apr
N	Quan Loi	Di An	2722	116	1stS&T,49Div,1stE,1st Log,2d Bde	13,15,17,19, 21-29Mar;3-12 14 Apr
O	Lai Khe	Phu Loi	332	84	3dBde,A/2/11ACR,2/28I	18,23,28 Mar; 1Apr
P	Phu Loi	Lai Khe	348	69	86E,2/16I,1/16I,3dBde A/2/2I	23Feb;15,19, 24,31, Mar
Q	Lai Khe	Quan Loi	687	229	1stE,1/9Div,1/18I,2/34 Arm	6,14,15 Mar
R	Phu Loi	Long Binh	420	15	86E,196E,8/6A,2/16I 2/33A	22,25Feb;4,15 19,22-31Mar; 1-8,10,12-15 Apr
S	Long Binh	Phu Loi	447	22	2/11ACR,86E,2/33A, 23G,2dBde,104E,583E	3,17,22-31Mar 1-7,10,12,14, 15 Apr
T	Minh Thanh	Lai Khe	104	104	Div CP	16 Mar
U	Xuan Loc	Quan Loi	225	225	11 ACR	20 Mar
V	Bien Hoa	Phu Loi	276	276	173d Airborne	20 Mar
W	Xuan Loc	Position West of Lai Khe	302	302	11 ACR	1 Apr

LINE	ORIGN	DESTINATION	No OF VEH TOTAL	AV CVY	UNIT	DATES OPEN
X	Minh Thanh	Bein Hoa	276	276	173d Airborne	13 Apr
Y	Minh Thanh	Xuan Loc	225	225	11 ACR	13 Apr
Z	Bear Cat	Lai Khe	398	398	1/9 Div	4 Mar
		RECAP:	15,831	134		

3. Support Command Participation in Convoys.

Dates	From - To	Number of Vehicles	
		S&T Bn	Med Bn
20 Feb-24 Feb	Di An - Soui Da	12	18
27 Feb-10 Mar	Di An - Lai Khe	81	0
6 Mar	Lai Khe - Quan Loi	0	2
12 Mar	Di An - Quan Loi	18	0
13 Mar	Soui Da - Di An	0	18
14 Mar-18 Mar	Di An - Lai Khe	44	0
20 Mar-28 Mar	Di An - Lai Khe	54	0
20 Mar-25 Mar	Di An - Quan Loi	23	0
28 Mar-30 Mar	Di An - Phu Loi	114	8
31 Mar	Di An - Lai Khe	20	1
2 Apr- 14 Apr	Di An - Quan Loi	24	0
2 Apr- 15 Apr	Di An - Lai Khe	118	0
15 Apr	Quan Loi - Lai Khe	0	2

Total Vehicles Utilized: 517
Total Convoy Participation: 37

(Data for Maintenance Battalion not available)

III. LOGISTICAL PROBLEMS

A. ITEM: Planning Of Areas To Accomodate Forward Supply Points

DISCUSSION: The establishment of a 1st Logistical Command Forward Support Area at Soui Da revealed a major weakness in the planning for the occupation of ground space.

1. Real Estate Allocation - The 3d Brigade was responsible for assigning areas to units arriving at Soui Da. Areas were physically pointed out to most units by the S-4; however, due to his sudden departure on emergency leave, no firm follow-up was made on the refining of boundaries. As a result, some units moved into adjacent space allocate to, but not occupied by the planned logistical activities. This later required movement of some bivouac areas and filling-in of foxholes in the Class V storage area.

2. Site Selection and Preparation - The Class I area had many holes, ditches and high mounds of dirt which made it extremely difficult for trucks and fork lifts to operate. The same problem applied to the Class II & V and Class III areas. In the Class III area, holes could have been dug for the 10,000 gallon bladders and berms erected during the initial construction work at the base. An engineer dozer can construct an area for a 10,00 gallon bladder in approximately 20 minutes. Specifications or sketches for these areas were apparently never made and no engineer unit was assigned the mission of site preparation. Improvements to the above areas were finally accomplished by special arrangements between the Support Command Forward CP and engineer units working on a part-time basis. The Class V area was prepared by 1st Logistical Command engineer equipment which arrived with the ASP personnel after Class I & III stocks had arrived.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That operation plans include necessary specifications for the improvement of field positions to accomodate logistical activities.

2. That procedures be developed within Support Command to standardize specifications when ever possible and form quartering parties which will: physically stake out areas, advise the designated engineer unit and coordinate with the organization allocating real estate.

B. ITEM: Availability Of Forklifts For Movement To Field Positions

DISCUSSION: On 6 March a requirement developed for the immediate movement of a forklift to Quan Loi to assist in supply handling. This situation has developed previously in other operations. In each case immediate investigation is started to determine the number of forklifts available from various sources in 1st Logistical Command and the 1st Infantry Division. When the 1st Supply and Transport Battalion is given an alert notice for possible furture movement of a forklift, the question naturally arises as to where current assests are located. It was found that this information was not readily available and required last minute telephone calls to various locations.

RECOMMENDATION: That the 1st Supply and Transport Battalion representative in the Logistic Operations Coordination Center maintain a current report showing the location and operational status of organic forklifts, and all supporting forklifts from 1st Log Comd, and AF aerial port teams at division airstrips.

C. ITEM: Preparation of POL Teams For Forward Displacement

DISCUSSION: The requirement was established for a Command Control helicopter refuling point in the vicinity of Katum XT 333906. The prepartion of the team and selection of the exact site was poorly coordinated and resulted in three location changes due to large quantities of dust at the landing pad, and lack of perimeter defense arrangements for security of the equipment and product.

Additionally, the team displaced to Katum without adequate parts and and fittings for the equipment. This required special transportation the next day to supply the needed items. At one time the POL team was required to clear a helipad of underbrush, but this task had to be assigned to an artillery unit in the area because the POL team did not have machetes.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That personnel reconnaissance by the 1st S&T Bn personnel be conducted to select specific sites for POL teams prior to assignment of missions to the teams.

2. That perimeter security arrangements be coordinated by S&T representative with the tactical unit responsible for the area prior to the team arrival on-site.

3. That the 1st Supply and Transport Battalion establish a "checklist" type procedure to guide personnel planning POL team operations.

4. That the 1st Supply and Transport Battalion establish standardized accessory kits for POL equipment that include necessary repair parts and fittings which might be required in field operations. These kits should be available on a stand-by basis for immediate movement with any POL team.

5. That all POL Teams be equipped with one machete per man.

D. ITEM: Operator Maintenance

DISCUSSION: Many using units did not carry operator/organizational parts, in particular, oil and fuel filters. This created excessive downtime while such items were brought forward, and often resulted in duplicate demands.

RECOMMENDATION: That units be required, by the division operations orders, to take POL with them to the field, with particular emphasis on oil and fuel filters.

E. ITEM: Log Book Maintenance

DISCUSSION: Very few log books accompanied vehicles or artillery pieces turned in for major assemblies. The 701 Maintenance Battalion is required to record serial-numbered component or assembly changes. If neglected until after the operation, the recording never gets accomplished, resulting in faulty records, and poor consumption data for the National Inventory Control Point and National Maintenance Point.

RECOMMENDATION: That units be required to take and maintain log books with them on operations.

F. ITEM: Organizational Maintenance

DISCUSSION: Some units were not equipped to support themselves in 2d echelon repair. Units left their battalion maintenance personnel at base camps, thus decreasing the 3d echelon effectiveness of the 701st contact teams, who were required to do some 2d echelon work.

RECOMMENDATION: That units be required to take to the field sufficient battalion maintenance personnel, commensurate with equipment density, to accomplish their 2d echelon maintenance.

G. ITEM: Maintenance Support of Non-Divisional Units

DISCUSSION: In a sample 2 week period during the operation, about 150 job orders were performed for non-divisional units. This was done because the normal supporting units were either unavailable, or were not aware of the requirements.

This type of support to all needy customers is particularly hard on supply channels, because stocks are not provisioned for these added units either quantitatively or qualitatively. In the two week period, a total of about 28 major assemblies were furnished and installed by contact teams for these customers. The 701st Maintenance Battalion is designed to support only 80% of the division maintenance workload, and any addition of non-divisional workload decreases capability for divisional support. The authorized stockage list for repair parts is designed to support the quantity and type of equipment in the division and that alone.

RECOMMENDATION: That Division G-4 advise II FFV G-4 of the requirement to provide for maintenance of non-divisional units in the Admin portion of future Operation Orders.

H. ITEM: Evacuation and Backhaul From Forward Supply Points

DISCUSSION: The movement of unserviceable vehicles, ammunition residue, salvage, and supplies from Soui Da by the 1st Logistical Command presented several coordination problems:

1. Unserviceable Vehicles - Such items collected at 1st Supply and Transport Battalion Salvage Collection Points were processed for turn-in to the 1st Logistical Command for further evacuation to the Long Binh/Saigon area. Initially 1st Logistical Command did not feel this was their responsibility. This was resolved and arrangements were made to obtain transportation form 1st Logistical Command sources. Loading and tie down were accomplished by Support Command. Planning for this evacuation was complicated when it took the Highway Traffic Center four days to determine that there was a height obstruction on the road, and to designate another usable route.

2. Ammunition Residue - Great quantities of howitzer cartridges and packing material were at this position. When the 1st Logistical Command vehicles arrived to backhaul these items there were no side panels on the trailers. This required field expedient methods using wooden pallets which proved to be less than satisfactory.

3. On Hand Supplies - The evacuation of Soui Da at the termination of Phase I was made difficult by the lack of prior knowledge on the termination date. Supplies were still being hauled into the base when, in effect, backhaul operations were required. When the termination date was moved up, 1st Logistical Command was left with a large stock on the ground. Eventually this location remained open to support elements of the 25th Infantry Division.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That operations plans include specific responsibilities for evacuation, to include units supporting the division.

2. That division procedures be developed to ascertain highway height obstacles when the information is not available from normal sources.

3. That particular arrangements be made to insure that trailers selected to backhaul ammunition residue be specifically equipped with necessary side panels which can readily be picked up at a point of origin.

I. ITEM: Timely Turn-In of Repairable Vehicles

DISCUSSION: When the close-out of Soui Da support area was announced, unserviceable, repairable vehicles had been on hand in units for several days. No turn-in had been made to direct support maintenance contact team. As a result the contact team was overburdened at time of displacement.

RECOMMENDATION: That commanders emphasize the importance of timely turn-ins to direct support facilities and speedy evacuation when required.

J. ITEM: Availability of Non-Medical Helicopters

DISCUSSION: During previous operations "dust-off" helicopters were used for medical resupply and the movement of Priority and Routine patients to rear medical facilities. During this operation the helicopters were not readily available because of heavy commitments, helicopter shortages, changes in organization, and changes in routine flight routes (not over Di An). This caused a greater reliance on road convoys and non-medical helicopters from the supported Brigades.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That the movement of priority medical supplies be routinely included in the Red Ball parts run made each day by the Support Command helicopter.

2. That forward medical companies continue to coordinate with the Brigades for required helicopter lifts.

3. That procedures be established to obtain required helicopters through the Logistic Operations Coordination Center, when requirements cannot be filled through other procedures.

K. ITEM: Units Moving Without Proper Convoy Clearance.

DISCUSSION: Occasionally a unit attempted to move five or more vehicles from one point to another without a clearance from the DTC. Five or more vehicles constitute a convoy and require a clearance. Military Police were forced to stop convoys moving without clearance until the matter had been investigated, and the unit had been given permission to move or had been ordered to turn back. The reason for requiring a clearance is elementary; it is essential if any form of traffic control and traffic management is to exist.

RECOMMENDATION: Some form of disciplinary action be considered against commanders whose units move convoys without proper clearance.

L. ITEM: Coordination With ARVN Convoys

DISCUSSION: During Junction City, a number of ARVN convoys ran in conjunction with the regular resupply convoys to Lai Khe and Quan Loi. The main difficulty was control of these vehicles. The ARVN advisor to the division stated that the advisors with ARVN have no controlling authority, that they act merely in an advisory capacity. This is undoubtedly the heart of the problem. The ARVN convoys were totally undisciplined, unmilitary (in fact they were saturated with civilian vehicles), and while they were on the road, trafficability was nearly impossible. It is extremely difficult to obtain prior information on an ARVN convoy. Insufficient information prevents adequate planning and leads to trafficability problems.

RECOMMENDATION: It is essential that ARVN convoys have a responsible individual in charge of them. It is also essential that all information required by the DTC be furnished by the ARVN advisor to the division, so that proper planning can be accomplished.

M. ITEM: Delay of Resupply Vehicles

DISCUSSION: Problems arose during the resupply of fire support bases Bravo and Charlie, just to the west of Quan Loi. Units were taking 1st Logistical Command trucks into the fire support bases for thru-put ammunition issues, but were not getting them offloaded and returned to Quan Loi in sufficient time to join the return convoy to Long Binh. This type of activity reduced the capability of 1st Logistical Command to resupply the forward areas by reducing the number of trucks available to haul supplies.

RECOMMENDATION: Units' S-4's must be made aware of the ramifications of this type of activity. Commanders must receive specific direction on the handling of resupply vehicles and definite command action must be taken to preclude this type of activity.

N. ITEM: Failure to Coordinate Changes in Airlift Cargo

DISCUSSION: When a unit's airlift request reaches the Air Force, aircraft are fragged according to the amount of cargo and passengers to be moved. If the requesting unit makes no changes to its request before the day of the lift, it is assumed that the cargo brought to the airstrip is the same as what is on the airlift request. Units will sometimes make changes without informing the DTO. This delays the established airlift schedule. It is ordinarily not difficult to change airlift request, provided the changes are requested in sufficient time to alert the Air Force

RECOMMENDATIONS: Unit planners must make an effort to determine what equipment is to be moved with their unit. The division should adopt a policy of moving a unit by straight configuration, be it "A", "B", or "C". This would give the units little choice of what to airlift and would greatly reduce the delay in submitting airlift requests.

O. ITEM: Excessive Delay in Submitting Airlift Requests

DISCUSSION: There was sometimes a considerable delay between the time a unit received notification of a planned move, and the time in which it submitted its requirements for airlift. Requests for airlift must be submitted a minimum of 72 hours prior to the required delivery date of the unit at its destination. If this 72 hour lead time is not met, it becomes necessary for the priorty on the lift to be raised to a CE (combat essential). This disrupts the airlift scheduling and often results in a delay of other division lifts of lower priority.

RECOMMENDATION: Units must submit their requirements immediately upon notification of a future move. Careful prior planning would allow much of this information to be readily available.

P. ITEM: Difficulty in Obtaining Status of Airlifts

DISCUSSION: Once an airlift begins, progress reports are needed to determine whether the airlift is satisfactory or if corrective action is necessary. This problem is not so noticeable in convoy movements because the military police are constantly reporting status of road moves. Obtaining feeder reports on airlift is more difficult. The information must be sought. It does not automatically flow back to the DTO. Some units have improved over the past few months but for a majority, it is still a problem.

RECOMMENDATION: The unit S-3 Air must constantly furnish information to the DTO on the progress of his lift.

Q. ITEM: Waiting Time For Troop Units During Airlifts

DISCUSSION: Air Force policy is that troops and cargo will be available for movement at a forward air strip two hours before the aircraft will arrive. For major ports (Bien Hoa and Tan Son Nhut) the gap is four hours. It is unnecessary to have a battalion or a company of troops sitting on an airstrip for two hours waiting for an aircraft to arrive. The Air Force's view is that the time difference is necessary to insure that cargo and troops are there in case the aircraft arrives early. When the Air Force schedules a mission, the time given the DTO should be an aircraft arrival time. The DTO should determine a troop and cargo show time, one that will not allow troops to sit on an airstrip for three hours.

RECOMMENDATION: A series of conferences on this subject or a study on the matter should be conducted as a joint Army/Air Force effort.

R. ITEM: The Lack of Ammunition Handlers And MHE

DISCUSSION: When the locale and size of the operation warrants a forward ASP, and support from the Logistical Command cannot be obtained, as in the case of Minh Thanh, there are no ammunition handlers and MHE organic to the Division specifically for this purpose.

The present TO&E storage capacity of the 1st Supply and Transport Battalion is 135,200 gallons. The TO&E also provides personnel to operate at three refueling locations. During the operation as many as eight locations were operated at one time.

RECOMMENDATION: Appropriate increases in POL capabilities will be included in the 1st Supply and Transport Battalion MOT&E now being staffed by Support Command.

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IV (C) LESSONS LEARNED

A. Thru-put Issues of Artillery Ammunition

Issue of artillery ammunition by the "thru-put" method has proven highly effective. This involves unit distribution by 1st Logistical Command trucks passing through the Ammunition Supply Point (for accounting purposes) and continuing movement to forward artillery bases. Upon arrival the ammunition is off-loaded near the gun positions. This does not change the unit's responsibility for pick-up under the supply point distribution method, but it does prevent double handling and provides increased tonnages in artillery positions. This method can only be used when 1st Logistical Command assets are available and it requires maximum effort on the part of the unit to off-load the trailers immediately so they can join a return convoy the next morning. See Sec III Logistical Problems, Item M.

B. Utilization of CH-47's on the Way to their Assigned Mission

The 1st Supply and Transport Battalion utilized CH-47 aircraft to move supplies from source to field positions. A request came into the LOCC for supplies, they were assembled and the CH-47 leaving Phu Loi in the morning going to a work location picked them up and delivered them to the destination. After delivery, the helicopter proceeded on its scheduled mission. Close coordination between the aviation unit and the 1st Supply and Transport Battalion results in minimum delay of the scheduled mission, yet allows the aircraft to carry a load enroute.

C. Proper Equipment for Salvage Collection Points

Turnbuckles, cable clamps and cables are stocked in required quantities in 1st Supply and Transport Battalion forward support sections. Therefore, the items are readily available on short notice for use in back-hauling salvage. It is important to have these items on hand since vehicle transport often becomes available on short notice. See Sec III, Logistical Problems, Item H.

D. Traffic Control in Forward Areas

Due to an increasing volume of cargo being moved by convoy, and the high density of both tactical and logistical vehicles on the roads, Military Police control in forward combat areas is the most important factor in efficient traffic control. The following types of control measures have been used successfully:

1. Route check points and convoy control numbers established by the Division Transportation Office.
2. Use of formal convoy planning and convoy commanders conferences
3. Selection of a base camp for use as a coordination point where incoming and outgoing convoys can be regrouped, briefed and assigned security elements by forward Division Transportation Office personnel.
4. Maximum use of informed Military Police at check points to control and report the status of convoys
5. Use of helicopters by the Provost Marshal to fly over and control convoys on the main supply routes.

E. Airlift Coordination at Forward Airfields

Airfield operations are much more efficient with a Division Transportation Office representative on the airstrip. This man, in radio contact with the Logistic Operations Coordination Center, renders reports on the progress of airlifts. He also relays information to aircraft crews and aerial port personnel. Being familiar with Division Transportation Office functions and Air Force operations, this representative is able to quickly resolve problems which otherwise take a multitude of phone calls.

F. Courtesy Maintenance Inspection Teams

With the concurrence of the Commanding Officer, 1st Engineer Battalion, courtesy inspection/assistance teams were sent to field locations by the 701st Maintence Battalion to check out, step by step, the accomplishment of operator maintenance services on bulldozers. Many deficiencies were found and corrected, and operators and platoon leaders were made more aware of preventive maintenance requirements. Visits by these teams will be continued, subject to customer concurrence, and applied to other categories of materiel.

G. Medical Resupply Techniques

Resupply of the forward medical companies is best accomplished by air. When other than aeromedical helicopters are utilized, it is necessary to accompany the supplies to their destination to insure their delivery. When a multi-brigade force is in the field and a complete medical company is displaced forward, medical resupply is best accomplished by moving a section of the division medical supply section forward to establish a small medical supply point. This point must be co-located with the medical company supply point but is under the operational control of the Division Medical Supply Office.

H. Fire Prevention and Protection

Three known fires occurred which endangered Support Command personnel, equipment, and stocks. At Soui Da, in an area north west of the runway, a fire raged in close proximity to POL bladders. Also at Soui Da, a fire started in the bed of a 2½ ton truck loaded with ammunition and destroyed several vehicles and tents. Adjacent to the aircraft turn-around in Minh Thanh, a fire in the penaprime storage area jeopardized ammunition stocks. Instructions on fire control measures were disseminated to subordinate units. The 1st Supply and Transport Battalion was assigned the responsibility of positioning and operationg 40 gallon wheeled foam extinguishers at forward field locations during operations.

ANNEX A: (C) AREA OF OPERATIONS & LOGISTICAL UNIT DEPLOYMENT



NOTE:
Schematic diagram, not to scale

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ANNEX B - MAIN SUPPLY ROUTES



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ANNEX B

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HEADQUARTERS
1ST INFANTRY DIVISION ARTILLERY
APO US Forces 96345

AVDB-RA 1 May 1967

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report

TO: Commanding General
1st Infantry Division
Attn: AC of S, G-3
APO US Forces 96345

1. (U) Operation JUNCTION CITY.
   a. Phase I 22 Feb 67 - 15 March 67
   b. Phase II 16 March 67 - 15 April 67

2. (C) Concept of Operation (Phase I)
   a. Organization for Combat

1st Infantry Division Artillery

1/5 Arty DS 1st Bde
A/1/5
B/1/5
D/1/5

1/7 Arty DS 2d Bde
A/1/7
B/1/7
C/1/7

2/33 Arty DS 3d Bde
A/2/33
B/2/33
C/2/33

8/6 Arty (-) GS
A/8/6 Arty GSR 2/33 Arty
B/8/6 Arty GSR 2/33 Arty
C/8/6 Arty GSR 2/33 Arty
D/8/6 Arty GS
C/2/35 (attached) GS
LHAAA DS 1/18 Inf
LHAAB DS 2/18 Inf

7/9 Arty Reinforcing 1/7 Arty.
A/7/9
B/7/9
C/7/9
LHAAC (attached)

3/319 Arty DS 173d Abn Bde
A/3/319
B/3/319
C/3/319

6/27 Arty (-) GSR 1/7 Arty
A/6/27 Arty GSR 7/9 Arty
2/11 Arty (-) GSR 1/7 Arty
C/2/13 Arty GSR 1/7 Arty
B/2/32 Arty GSR; priority of fires to 25th Infantry Division.

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b. Artillery Bases: Seven (7) artillery bases were established during Phase I.

(1) Arty Base I : vic XT2769
(2) Arty Base II : vic XT2778
(3) Arty Base III: vic XG2981
(4) Arty Base IV : vic XT3392
(5) Arty Base V : vic XT3592
(6) Arty Base VI : vic XT2797
(7) Arty Base VII: vic XT2496

c. Deployment:

(1) Following Operation TUCSON (16 Feb 67), Artillery was positioned in preparation for JUNCTION CITY - Phase I. The 1/5 Arty was positioned at Minh Thanh from where they would stage for CH 47 lift into the operational area on D-Day. The 2/33 Arty and 8/6 Arty (-) were positioned at Beu Cui. On D-2, two (2) batteries, A and D/8/6, were positioned at Souida and on D-1 the 2/33 Arty and 8/6 Arty (Minus A/8/6 which remained at Souida) moved to positions at Arty Base I. The 3/319 Arty, along with the 173d Abn Bde, staged at Quan Loi for airlift into the operational area on D-Day. LHAAA and LHAAB, positioned at Souida and Minh Thanh respectively, performed base defense missions. The Division and Division Arty forward CP's were located at Minh Thanh.

(2) On D-Day and D+1, Artillery was to be positioned in the operational area. The 2/33 Arty and 8/6 Arty would move by road, using highway TL4, from Souida and Arty Base I to positions at Arty Bases II,III,IV,V. The timing and progress of these moves depended upon the clearance and security of highway TL4 by Engineer and manuever elements. 1/5 Arty and 3/319 Arty would move by CH 47 (on D-Day) into Arty Bases V,VI,VII to support blocking forces in the northern part of the operational area.

(3) D-Day, 22 Feb 67: D/1/5 Arty displaced by CH47 to Arty Base VI, closing at 1905H, to support 1st Brigade Heliborne assaults into AO TAN (Northern blocking positions), B/1/5 Arty displaced by CH47 to Arty Base VII and 1/5 Arty TAC CP to Arty Base VI later in the day. The 3/319 Arty lifted one battery by CH 47 and heavy dropped a second battery, positioning them both at Arty Base V to support 173d Abn Bde operations in AO Red (Blocking positions in northeast portion of operational area). Meanwhile in the southern part of the operational area (AO Blue) 2/33 Arty and 8/6 Arty displaced from Arty Base I and Souida by road (Hwy TL4) North. HQS,B,C,2/33 positioned at Arty Base II by 1025H. A/2/33 continued North to Arty Base II, closing 1400H. C/8/6 remained in position at Arty Base I in order to cover the move north. 8/6(-) displaced by road with, A/8/6 occupying a position at Arty Base III and HQS, D/8/6 and C/2/35 continuing on to Arty Base IV, closing at 1715H.

(4) 23 Feb: Highway TL4 from KATUM north was cleared and secured allowing HQS, D/8/6 and C/2/33 to displace to Arty Base V. The 3/319 Arty airlifted (CH 47) the remainder of it's battalion into Arty Base IV. It was planned to move A/1/5 Arty by CH 47 to Arty Base VI, however this was cancelled in favor of using available lift to haul ammunition to Arty Bases VI and VII. A/1/5 remained at Minh Thanh in a base defense role. The 1/5 Arty now minus one of it's batteries, needed additional Artillery, thus C/2/35 was given the mission of GSR 1/5.

(5) 24 Feb: HQS,D/1/5 Arty received 9 rounds of 60mm mortar at 0001H resulting in 3 WIA. At 1115H, Arty Base VI received sniper fire resulting in 2 WIA (D/1/5). Arty fire was returned in both instances with unknown results.

(6) 27 Feb: During ammunition resupply convoys from Souida north, two (2) trucks (1-2½ ton and 1-5 ton) were destroyed by mines resulting in 3 WIA.

(7) 28 Feb: 1/16 Infantry (3d Bde) made contact with an estimated VC Bn. 2/33 Arty reinforced by A,C/8/6 fired in support of this action. [illegible]

(8) 1 March: A Div Arty air observer adjusted artillery fire on a VC squad resulting in 6 VC KIA. During ammunition resupply convoys on Hwy TL4 (North of Souida) three (3) trucks (1-2½ ton and 2-5 ton) were destroyed by mines and RR fire.

(9) 2 March: Again during resupply convoys on Hwy TL4, the 8/6 Arty lost two (2) 5 ton Bridge trucks as a result of mines. There were no U.S. casualties.

(10) 3 March: HQS1/5 displaced by CH47 to Quan Loi. B/1/5 displaced by CH47 to An Loc. C/2/35 and B/2/33 displaced by road to KATUM in order to reinforce the fires of the 3/319 Arty in AO RED. HQS,A,D/8/6 Arty displaced by road south out of the operational area and conducted a night road march to Phu Loi, closing 040730H.

(11) 4 March: D/1/5 Arty displaced by road to KATUM and was attached to 2/33 Arty. B/1/84 Arty (155T) was attached to 1st Infantry Div Arty and further attached to 7/9 Arty to assist in support of road opening operations on Hwy 13.

(12) 5 March: 3/319 Arty displaced to Arty Base III to support search and destroy operations by 173d Abn Bde in AO Parachute (east of AO Blue). The 1st Bde, 9th Infantry Division was placed OPCON 1st Infantry Division and was given the mission of opening Hwy 13. Convoy operations north on Hwy 13 to Quan Loi were to be conducted thus establishing a logistics base in preparation for Phase II. 7/9 Arty, with C/1/7 and B/1/84 attached) was assigned the mission of DS to 1st Bde, 9th Div, and began positioning along Hwy 13. A/7/9 remained in position at Lai Khe; B/8/6 (GSR 7/9) was positioned at Bau Bang; C/1/7 displaced to Bau Long; B/7/9 displaced by fixed wing aircraft from Phuoc Vinh to Quan Loi, being replaced at Phuoc Vinh by C/1/11 Arty (Reinf 1/7) which assumed the base defense role there.

(13) 6 March: Artillery positioning along Hwy 13 was completed by moving B/1/84 north to Chon Thanh and C/7/9 and the 8in How Platoon, A/6/27 Arty from Quan Loi to vicinity Ap Tau-O Bridge (XT7677). B/1/5 positioned 3 tubes at XT772825 to cover the C/7/9 and A/6/27 position. HQS,A,D/8/6 displaced from Phu Loi by road with A/8/6 relieving B/8/6 in position at Bau Bang and HWS,B,D/8/6 proceeding north to accupy positions at Minh Duc (XT7081) Upon passage of 8/6 (-), C/7/9 and 8in Plt, A/6/27 returned to Quan Loi and the 3 tubes, B/1/5 rejoined their battery at An Loc.

(14) 7 March: B/1/5 and C/7/9 displaced to Minh Duc (XT7081) to support 1st Bde operations west of that position. The Minh Duc position was designated as FSB"A". B/7/9 Arty displaced to An Loc in order to cover FSB"A".

(15) 8 March: In preparation for Phase II, 1st Bde supported by Engineers began work on a portion of Hwy 246 which runs west from An Loc to vicinity XT6248L. At the latter location, FSB"B" was secured and LHAAC displaced by road from Quan Loi to that location. D/1/5 Arty displaced by fixed wing aircraft from KATUM to Quan Loi and then by road to an Engineer Base located at XT6987. After D/1/5 closed at the Engineer Base, B and C/7/9 returned to positions at Quan Loi, Search and destroy operations continued in the area of operations - Phase I.

(16) 9 March: Convoy operations on Hwy 13 were completed until thus releasing B/1/84 from Chon Thanh. B/1/84 displaced to XU728013 and C/7/9 to XU744066, both batteries supporting a local CIDG operation north west of Quan Loi. Both batteries returned to Quan Loi the next day (10 March).

(17) 10 March: In the operational area (Phase I), Arty Bases I and II came under mortar and ground attack. Arty Base II in particular was hard hit, receiving many rds of 60mm and 82mm mortar and 75mm RR at least 4 rounds of 120mm mortar (one of which was a dud). Artillery and mortars at Arty Bases I,II,III fired 5079 rounds during the attack.

(18) 11 March: Search and destroy operations continued in the operational area - Phase I. Positioning and clearing of Hwy 13 in preparation for convoy operations began. 3 tubes D/1/5 Arty displaced to An Loc to provide coverage for C/7/9 and 8in How Plt, A/6/27 which were moved from Quan Loi to XT768773. B/1/84 displaced to Chon Thanh. B/7/9 displaced to XT775687. In preparation for Phase II, the 1/7 Arty began movement from Di An/Phu Loi area by displacing B/1/5 to Lai Khe.

(19) 12 -15 March: During this period Phase I of the operation terminated and repositioning for Phase II was accomplished. HQ, B/2/33 and C/2/35 Arty were positioned at Arty Base I on 12 March. C/2/33 Arty displaced to Arty Base II on the same date. On 13 -14 March, 2/33 with C/2/35 attached convoyed to Lai Khe and C/8/6 and LHAM moved to Phu Loi. The Division Artillery Headquarters displaced from Minh Thanh to Lai Khe on 15 March.

(20) 16 -17 March: Positioning in preparation for Phase II. 3d Bde with 2/33 Arty DS relieved 2d Bde with 1/7 Arty DS of the Base Defense/Lamson mission. 2d Bde and 1/7 Arty prepared to displace north to a staging area at Quan Loi.

3. (C) Concept of Operation (Phase II).

a. Organization for Combat

1/5 Arty (+) DS 1st Bde.
A/1/5 DS 2/18 Inf
LHAM attached A/1/5
B/1/5
D/1/5

1/7 Arty DS 2d Bde (Reinf 1/5 during staging and displacement of Phase II positions.)
A/1/7
B/1/7
C/1/7

2/33 Arty DS 3d Bde.
A/2/33
B/2/33
C/2/33

8/6 Arty
A/8/6 GSR 7/9 Arty
B/8/6 GSR 1/5 Arty
C/8/6 GSR 2/33 Arty
D/8/6 GSR 1/5 Arty
LHAM Base Det at Phu Loi
LHAM C GSR 1/5 Arty.
C/2/35 (attached GSR 1/5 Arty)

3/319 Arty DS 173d Abn Bde.

7/9 Arty (+) DS 1st Bde, 9th Div
A/7/9
B/7/9
C/7/9
B/1/84 (attached)

6/27 (-) GSR 2/33 Arty
A/6/27 Arty GSR 7/9 Arty.

2/11 Arty (-) GSR 2/33 Arty.

C/1/11 Arty GSR 2/33 Arty.

b. Artillery Bases: Fire support Bases for Phase II were planned as listed below. Bases in the Phase II Operational area were designated by a letter or a name. Bases used in conducting the supporting Hwy 13 Operation were designated by a number. In several instances, the positioning of artillery was such that one base could be used to support both areas.

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(1)	FSB "A"	:XT7061
(2)	FSB "B"	:XT6281
(3)	FSB "C	:AT5685
(4)	FSB "THRUST"	:XT4179
(5)	FSB "PARRY"	:XT4975
(6)	ENGINEER BASE	:XT6987
(7)	DUTCHMANS HOUSE	:XT7481
(8)	FSB 10	:LAI KHE
(9)	FSB 20	:BAU BANG
(10)	FSB 30	:CHON THANH
(11)	FSB 40	:XT7677
(12)	FSB 50	:QUAN LOI

c. Deployment:

(1) 1st Bde's mission was to secure the logistics base at Quan Loi, the An Loc area, the Engineer Base (XT6987), FSB"A" Dutchman's House, FSB"B", FSB"C" (Until 2d Bde occupies) and Hwy 246 from An Loc west to FSB"C". In addition, at FSB"B" an airstrip and Special Forces Camp were to be constructed during the operation. 1/5 arty positioned B/1/5 at FSB"B and D/1/5 at the Engineer Base. A/1/5 remained at Minh Thanh. B/8/6 and HHBC were positioned at FSB"B". D/8/6 was positioned at the Engineer Base.

(2) 2d Bde with 2/11 ACR OPCON staged at Quan Loi and was to conduct an airmobile assault into AO DAGGER (just west of FSB"C"). 2/11 ACR would attack from FSB"C" south to positions THRUST and PARRY. 1/7 arty while staging for the assault was reinforcing 1/5 arty. 1/7 was to displace to FSB"C" to prep LZ's and support the 2d Bde assault. How Btry, 2/11 ACR would accompany its parent unit, initially occupying FSB"C" than Base THRUST. Two 155 Batteries would be moved to FSB"C" to reinforce the fires of 1/7.

(3) 173d Abn Bde staged at Minh Thanh and was to conduct an airmobile assault in AO Parachute, south of Base Parry. 3/319 would airlift to Base Parry to support.

(4) 1st Bde, 9th Division was to conduct road clearing and security operations on Hwy 13, from Lai Khe north to Quan Loi. 7/9 arty DS. A/7/9 at FSB 10, B/7/9 at XT7882, C/7/9 at FSB 40, B/1/84 at FSB 30. A/8/6 GSR at FSB 10. A/6/27 GSR at FSB 50, 8in Platoon at FSB 40 B/1/7 GSR at FSB 20.

(5) 19 March: A/1/5 displaced by road from Minh Thanh to XT7882 relieving B/7/9 in place. B/7/9 displaced to FSB 20 relieving B/1/7. B/1/7 displaced north to An Loc.

(6) 20 March: At 0010H FSB 20 (Bau Bang) was attacked by the 273 VC Regiment. The battle raged until dawn when contact was broken. A/7/9 and A/8/6 from FSB 10, B/7/9 at FSB 20, and B/1/84 from FSB 30 fired in support of the defense of Bau Bang. 2148 rds 105mm 688 rds 155mm, 69 rds 8in and 39 rds of 175mm were expended in support of this battle. VC casualties were 227 KIA (BC). U.S. casualties were 3 KIA, 63 WIA. The 1/7 arty and C/2/35 arty displaced to FSB"C" A/2/11 arty moved from Phu Loi to Lai Khe to replace A/8/6 which moved north to An Loc.

(7) 21 March: 2d Bde conducted airmobile assault with two battalions. The 2/11 ACR attached on an axis running southwest and south to base Thrust. How Btry 2/11 ACR displaced from it's staging area at Dutchman's House to FSB"C", then to base Thrust by 1830H. A/8/6 displaced to to FSB"C", closing at 1300 and relieving B/8/6 which moved to An Loc. B/1/5 displaced to An Loc thus closing out the Engineer Base as an artillery position.

(8) 22 March: 3/319 arty displaced by CH 47 to FSB Parry, closing 1630. This enabled them to support the airmobile assault by 173d Abn Bde to the south of Parry on 23 March. On Hwy 13, C/7/9 arty and 8in Flt, A/6/27 Arty displaced to DUTCHMAN'S HOUSE. A/1/5 moves to An Loc and B/8/6 moved south to Phu Loi.

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(9) 23 March: A/1/5 displaced to FSB"B".

(10) 24 - 27 March: S & D Operations continued in the (Bau Bang) changed places. LHAmB was displaced to FSB"C". On 24 March, FSB"C" received incoming rds 82mm mortar at 1955H. Attack resulted in 2 WIA from 1/7 Arty. The MPQ4 radar at FSB"C" picked up two mortar locations and counter mortar fires were delivered with unknown results. On 25 March approximately 40 rds of 60mm mortar hit in and near the MACV compound at Chon Thanh. Counter mortar fires were delivered by 6/27 Arty at Phuoc Vinh and B/1/84 at Chon Thanh with unknown results negative U.S. casualties.

(11) 28 March: 2/11 ACR withdraw from the operational area (FSB Parry) to DUTCHMANS HOUSE. The How Btry 2/11 ACR went into position at that location. C/1/11 Arty (Base Defense at Phuoc Vinh) was released from OPCON 1st Division and returned to Bear Cat. A/1/5 moved by fixed wing aircraft to Phuoc Vinh to take over the base defense role. B/1/5 sent 3 tubes to Quan Loi to support defense of that area. A/2/11 Arty returned to Phu Loi. Early in the morning, 0030H, elements of 173d Abn Bde came under mortar attack (30 to 40 rds, resulting in 10 WIA.) Counter mortar fires by 3/319 and C/2/35 were delivered with unknown results.

(12) 29 March: HQS,A,C/1/7 displaced to FSB Thrust in order to support S & D operations by 2d Bde further west. A/8/6 Arty also displaced to Thrust to provide medium reinforcing fires. D/8/6 moved to FSB"C" to provide heavy support to the west. B/1/84 Arty was released from attachment to 7/9 Arty and displaced from Chon Thanh to Bear Cat.

(13) 30 March: FSB"C" received 20 incoming mortar rds. Negative casualties. MPW4 radar immediately picked up mortar location. Counter mortar fires resulted in a secondary explosion and stopped durther incoming rounds.

(14) 31 March: C/8/6 Arty displaced to Lai Khe. 1/26 Infantry (2d Bde) came under heavy mortar and ground attack, vicinity of XT436857 by an estimated VC Regiment. Artillery from FSB"J" and Thrust fired in support. Unit identification indicated the 271 VC Regiment. Rds fired in support: 5155 - 105mm, 1048 - 155mm, 270 - 8in.

(15) 1 April: 3/11 ACR OPCON 1st Division, 11 ACR (-) assumed Hwy 13 clearance and security mission. How Btry 3/11 ACR was positioned at Chon Thanh. 7/9 Arty (with OPCON of ACR How Btrys) assumed mission DS to 11 ACR (-).

(16) 2 April: LHAmB displaced by CH 47 to LZ George (1/26 Inf location. During the early morning hours LZ George and FSB"C" cam under mortar attack.

(17) 3 - 15 April: During this period, S & D operations were continued throughout the operational area. Several more VC mortar attacks occured as follows:

3 April - FSB"C"
4 April - FSB"C"
5 April - 2/16 Inf (near Thrust)
6 April - FSB"C" (twice)
8 April - LNGR Base
9 April - FSB Thrust

On 5 - 6 April, LHAmC and B/1/5 were withdrawn from the operational area and moved to Bunard on another operation. A/8/6 and D/8/6 displaced to FSB"B" to provide coverage in the area vacated by B/1/5. On 8 - 9 April, 3/319 Arty displaced by CH 47 to Minh Thanh and subsequently departed the operational area (realeased OPCON) on 13 April. 1/7 Arty and 8/6 displaced by echelon from Thrust to FSB"C" and FSB"B on 12,13,14 April as 2d Bde phased out of the operation. Both battalions closed into their base camps at Phu Loi and Di An on 14 April. The 1/5 Arty (-) displaced by fixed wing aircraft to Phuoc Vinh on 15 April. 11 ACR (-) 7/9 Arty closed Hwy 13 from Lai Khe north on 15 April displacing all Arty south except C/7/9 which remained at An Loc. Division Artillery HQS displaced from Lai Khe to Phu Loi on 15 April.

(18) 152400 April Operation Junction City terminated.

d. Army Aviation Support:

(1) The Div Arty Aviation Section, with 10 assigned aircraft, flew in support of the operation. Primary mission was command and control. During the operation, two (2) H-13 helicopters were destroyed. Total missions flown: 2,216. Total hours flown: 1,448. Average number of flyable aircraft per day was 5.

(2) The aerial observer section flew 1,272 missions for a total of 1,714 hours. The 184th Aviation Company provided 01 aircraft (2 or 2½ aircraft per day). Aerial observers were utilized in firing LZ Preps, TOT's, Registrations, targets of opportunity, and defensive concentrations and for VR and night eagle watch (as a part of the counter-mortar program).

e. Artillery Advisory (AWCC). During Phase I, "Danger Blue" and "Danger Red" announced air advisories for their respective portions of the operational area. During Phase II, each Brigade (US Army, Inf) operated its own air advisory. "Trooper Control" for 2D Bde area, "Casper Control" for 173D ABN Bde, "Quan Loi Tower" for 1st Bde area and south to Chan Thanh, and "Dungeon Control" for the area between Loc Ninh and Chon Thanh (Hwy 13).

f. Survey: During the operation, a new system of survey called the "PHOTOGLONETRIC SYSTEM" was introduced. This system, which employs aircraft, is particularly adaptable to the terrain found in Vietnam. It proves very effective by allowing units to place quick and accurate fire on target. Under this system, the position area and target area are placed on a common grid thus reducing the error inherant in map inspection.

g. Metro: Electronic metro messages were broadcast by FM radio and/or wire (VHF) from data obtained from Phu Loi, Phuoc Vinh, and Cu Chi. Visual mets (wind) were received for Quan loi.

4. (C) Commanders During Operation.

1st Inf Div Arty - Col Lawrence H. Caruthers, Jr
1/5 Arty - Lt Col William L. Depew
1/7 Arty - Lt Col George L. McFadden, Jr.
2/33 Arty - Lt Col Charles D Daniel, Jr.
8/6 Arty - Lt Col Benjamin D. Safar

5. (C) ADMINISTRATION:

a. Participating Strength:

Unit	Start of Opn	End of Opn	Casualties
Div Arty	114	69	2-WIA
1/5 Arty	464	397	1-KIA 13-WIA
1/7 Arty	377	322	30-WI
2/33 Arty	325	325	22-WIA
8/6 Arty	753	824	8-KIA, 73 WIA
TOTAL	2033	1937	9-KIA, 140-WIA

b. Awards and Decorations

	ACM	BS	SS	DFC	PH
HHB Div Arty	10	2	3	0	2
1/5	98	62	2	2	13
1/7	141	70	2	7	30
2/33	178	65	0	0	22
8/6	11 (95)	22(50)	0(1)	0(2)	73

* Figures in parentheses are recommended but not received.

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6. INTELLIGENCE: Artillery targeting was performed by FSE and Div Arty S-2. Intelligence information was gained from Division G-2, DS Arty Battalions, Special Forces Advisors at Minh Thant, CI Team 4, JTAD Field Station at Phu Loi, Red Haze Agents and VR (Div Arty S-2 and Aerial Observers).

7. (C) COMMUNICATIONS:

a. FM voice radio. Radio communications between Div Arty HQs and subordinate battalions was generally good. The retransmission station located a Nui Ba Den was utilized throughout. Without retransmissions, FM radio with subordiante battalions would have been virtually impossible. The Div Arty CF (both primary and alternate) and Retrans frequencies were crowded with non-divisional units - both US and ARVN. This caused some difficulty in that transmissions were constantly being "cutout" necessitating many "say again". This problem was never entirely solved.

b. VHF. VHF communications was excellent. A minimum of breakdowns occured and the system was installed quickly after unit displacements.

c. AM Radio Teletype. TRA communications was good. In instances where units moved by CH-47, i.e. 1/5 Arty in Phase I, RTT was not available until a road convoy reached the unit several days later. Non-divisional units were not on the Div Arty net, thus no RTT communications was possible. This was rectified in most cases as necessary information was exchanged between units.

d. Scrambler Equipment: The KYB6-TSEC Voice Scrambler never worked satisfactorily. The use of retrans on the Div Arty CF prohibited its full use.

8. (C) LOGISTICS

a. During Phase I, a logistics base was established at Suoida. 1st LOG Command established an ASP and the 1/5, 8/6 and 2/33 Arty established unit support bases at this location. Ammunition resupply for all artillery units except 3/319 Arty was accomplished by convoy from Suoida north, using Hwy TL4. The 1/5 Arty was resupplied during the first two days, prior to TL4 being completely cleared, by CH47 from Suoida. A22 bags were kept packed by 1/5 Arty personnel and were ready for routine or emergency resupply at any time. 3/319 Arty was resupplied by heavy air drop north of KaTUM. The 1/5 Arty also received some ammunition by this means. 1st Infantry Division Artillery and attached artillery units drew 123,000 rds of 105mm HE, 36,700 rds of 155mm HE, 32,000 rds of 8 in HE and 32,600 rds of 4.2 in HE from ASP's. Units carried ammunition available from their own Battalion Ammo Trains and from Minh Thant during the initial positioning of units.

b. During Phase II, a logistics base was established at Quan Loi. 1st LOG Command established an ASP and 1/5, 1/7, and 8/6 Arty established unit support bases. Most ammunition resupply was from the ASP at Quan Loi, however, during northound (Hwy 13) 1st LOG Convoys, direct delivery to firing units was effected. This "through-put" proved very succesful and reduced the amount of double-handling of ammunition. The following amounts of ammunition were drawn by 1st Infantry Div Arty and attached units: 206,900 rds of 105mm HE, 84,600 rds of 155mm HE, 8000 rds of 8 in HE, and 55,000 rds of 4.2 in HE.

9. (C) AMMUNITION EXPENDITURES.

	Phase I	Phase II	Total
105mm:	128,242	204,390	332,632
155mm:	25,982	64,548	90,530
8 in:	2,237	6,731	8,968
175mm:	469	1,170	1,639
4.2in:	21,124	20,144	41,268
TOTAL:	178,054	296,983	475,037

10. (C) Conclusions and Lessons Learned:

a. During Phase I, some ammunition resupply was accomplished by heavy air drop. The ammunition was dropped in jungle packs thus creating larger than usual requirements for backhaul. In addition the ammunition was unfused. Fuzes were dropped separately. This resulted in the components becoming widely scattered over the DZ. Removal of the ammunition from the DZ was further complicated by muddy conditions which made it difficult to move trucks into the area for pickup. One attempt to overcome this latter problem was to use CH 47 lift from the DZ to the firing units. This was not entirely satisfactory in the case of 1/5 Arty since that unit, already manning a logistics base at Suoida, was required to split its ammunition section in order to bag ammo at the DZ. In addition, only 72 jungle packs of ammo could be hauled per load versus 160 rds in filber containers. Recommend that if ammunition must be heavy dropped, that it be in a fuzed configuration. Additionally, it would be highly desireable to develope a means of dropping ammunition in filier containers thus reducing the backhaul requirements of the firing unit.

b. During Phase II, units at FSB"B", FSB"C" and FSB Thrust received the bulk of their ammunition resupply direct from the northbound (Hwy 13) 1st log ammunition convoy - "through put." This worked exceptionally well in that it eliminated double handling of ammunition, thus reducing the burden on battalion ammunition sections and trucks. It also simplified the condination of resupply convoys since only one large convoy, as opposed to several smaller battalion ammunition convoys, had to be coordinated for road clearance and escort. Recommend that this system of through-put be continued in future operations where road resupply is feasible.

c. During Phase I in particular a large number of mining incidents occured and although several trucks were lost, personnel losses were kept to a minimum due, in great part, to sandbagging on truck beds and floorboards. Recommend that sandbagging of vehicles as indicated above be continued and strongly emphasized.

d. The limited availability of OI aircraft for use by aerial observers (2 or 2½ aircraft per day) was insufficient to provide effective coverage of the operational area plus coverage of Larson, Bunard, and Hwy 16 convoy operations. When night "eagle watch" was required, there was the loss of an aircraft for the next day, reducing availibility to 1½ aircraft per day in several instances. In addition, considerable time was lost from available aircraft because they were required to return to Phu Loi at mid-day each day for pilot and/or aircraft change. This was true even on the few occasions when the aircraft had only been flown 1 hour during the morning. Due to this limitation, registration of units, support of units not involved directly in Junction City, and VR capability were significantly reduced. During air operation of this magnitude 3 or 4 OI aircraft should be allocated each day (as was done on Operation Attleboro) for use by aerial observers. An alternate solution would be to provide the Div Arty Aviation section 4 or 5 additional H 13 aircraft and pilots or assigning OI aircraft and pilots to Div Arty Aviation section.

e. A Common system of reference points and check points should be established by Division and followed by Brigades and maneuver battalions. In numerous instances, Brigades and battalions establish their own reference systems. In some instances two units may be using two different points, with the same designations, i.e. "CARS" or "BEERS" etc. This could create misunderstandings and confusion. From the Artillery stand point, this practice poses on definite safety hazard.

f. All Artillery units, but particularily medium and heavy artillery, are required to haul and stock large amounts of ammunition - more than their organic transportation will allow. Thus, in order to move with adequate ammunition supply, vehicles must often be "pooled" from several batteries in order to move one. This requires that these units, therefore Div Arty, must receive maximum notification of intent to displace in order that sufficient vehicles be made available. It is recommended that additional trucks, preferably 5 ton, be made available from 1st Sand T Bn or other sources for use in hauling artillery ammunition.

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g. On two separate occasions, 155~~MM~~ batteries had accidents due to burning waste coming out of the muzzle of the tube during firing and setting unused powder charges on fire. A partial solution is to insure that unused powder bags are immediately placed in a covered powder pit until destruction can be accomplished. However one instances is of particular note and should be widely disseminated to all 155 SP units. It occurred essentially as follows: The battery was positioned "in line." A fire mission was received which required a shift of 1600 mils from the initial azimuth of lay, thus causing the tubes to point over each other. The mission in question required charge 1. During the firing burning waste from one tube was propelled into the rear of the turrent of the piece in front of it causing loose powder to catch fire. The resulting fire and detonation of ammunition caused the total loss of one M 109 howitzer and one M 577 command track with FDC equipment.

h. Helicopters should approach artillery positions with caution. On two occasions, helicopters approached firing positions (to land) while powder was being burned. The down draft and prop wash caused fire to spread out of control destroying ammunition and creating a hazard to mens lives and equipment. Recommend that pilots be instructed to be particularily observent of such hazardous conditions and effect coordination with the unit on the ground prior to landing.

i. During Phase II, the MPQ 4 radar positioned at FSB "C" proved invaluable in the conduct of an effective counter-mortar program. During the battle of Bau Bang (20 March), the MPQ 4 at Lai Khe proved the value of having this equipment available. Recommend that additional MPQ 4 radars with crews be obtained from FFVII for use in base defense roles thus freeing organic radar sets with the DS Battalions for use in field locations.

j. Tables of Organization and equipment do not provide for adequate FDC personnel to operate efficiently and safely 24 hours a day over extended periods. By taking personnel from firing sections, this situation can be somewhat alleviated, but only at the expense of reducing the capability of the firing sections to deliver timely and accurate fire. A recommendation and request for authorization of additional FDC personnel under TO & E has been submitted

FOR THE COMMANDER:

James E. Tarrant Jr

2 INCL
1. Schematic of operational area - Phase I
2. Schematic of operational area - Phase II

JAMES E. TARRANT JR
CPT, Arty
Asst Adjutant

DISTRIBUTION:
Special



INCL 1 - SCHEMATIC PHASE I



INCL 2 - SCHEMATIC PHASE II

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HEADQUARTERS
121ST SIGNAL BATTALION
APO 96345

2 May 1967

AVDB-SI-3

SUBJECT: After Action Report, Operation JUNCTION CITY, PHASE I & II (U)

TO: Commanding General
1st Infantry Division
ATTN: AVDB-T
APO 96345

1. (U) Name and Type Operation:

JUNCTION CITY, PHASE I & II, a search and destroy operation.

2. (U) Dates of Operation:

22 February - 15 April 1967

3. (C) Location:

WAR ZONE C, vicinity of MINH THANH and LAI KHE.

4. (U) Command Headquarters:

121st Signal Battalion, 1st Infantry Division

5. (C) Unit Commanders:

LTC James M. Rockwell	Battalion Commander
CPT Pierce A. Rushton	CO, Company A
CPT Gary D. Hawley	CO, Company B
CPT Allen R. Wild	CO, Company C
1LT Arpad De Kovacsy	Plt Ldr, 1st Fwd Sig Plt
1LT Dale A. Carlsen (Phase I)	Plt Ldr, 2d Fwd Sig Plt
1LT Michael E. Bryant (Phase II)	Plt Ldr, 2d Fwd Sig Plt
1LT Richard D. Mohlere	Plt Ldr, 3d Fwd Sig Plt

6. (U) Intelligence: No enemy electronic warfare was noted during Operation JUNCTION CITY.

7. (C) Mission: To provide VHF, single sideband, AM and FM radio, and secure on-line teletype to all advanced elements of Division Forward. Provide all three Infantry Brigades, including Opcon units of the Division, with a VHF link into the Division Communications system.

8. (C) Concept of Operation: Phase I - Prior to the operation, a team was sent to Minh Thanh in advance of the Division move, to erect the AB-216 Tower, which would mount the antenna for the Division Radio-Wire-Integration (RWI) net, the Commanding General's net, and VHF systems terminating at that location. The tower was completed in less than 24 hours,

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

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ANNEX F

equipment was convoyed in and systems established on schedule without any difficulty. All facilities controls were instructed to pre-patch and party those circuits being extended. Upon deployment of Division Forward, the circuits had already been established and the "party" discontinued at the former CP location. Phase II - Upon notification of the Division move from Minh Thanh to Lai Khe, Company "C" deployed its jump equipment to Lai Khe by air and by convoy. The jump CP was established in which a patch panel was pre-patched, VHF systems brought up in preparation to re-terminate the systems at Lai Khe and the Jump FM radio for the TOC established. Since the Division had been in Lai Khe several times in the past, no problem was encountered in setting up the CP. All facility controls were prepared to switch 26 pair cables from those systems extending to Minh Thanh to the new systems at Lai Khe. Upon deployment of the Division to Lai Khe, all systems were in, circuits re-established and all comms operational.

a. Company A was given the mission to support Division Main and supporting elements at Di An Base Camp.

b. Company B was tasked to support Division Artillery at Phu Loi and provide a VHF link into the Division Communication System for each of the Division's Brigades.

c. Company C was tasked to provide VHF, AM and FM radio communication for Division Forward.

9. (C) Execution:

a. During Phase I, Company A was given the mission of providing communication support for Division Main and Di An Base Camp. Company A provided one AN/MRC-69 for deployment to Suoi Da to terminate the 54-78 system. One supervisor was also provided. Personnel were also provided to supervise the construction of the AB-216 tower at Minh Thanh. During Phase II, Company A had the mission as described in Phase I, including the responsibility of re-establishing those systems extended forward at Minh Thanh back to Lai Khe. Additional systems were established and when the Division deployed, Company A made the switch on schedule, firmly retaining continuity of all circuits to Danger Forward. Major items of equipment utilized were:

EQUIPMENT	QUANTITY	PURPOSE
AN/MRC-69	6	Provide 144 channels for elements of Division Base Camp.
AN/GRC-46	2	Provide AM RTT communications for Division Net #1
AN/VRC-46	4	Provide FM radio in support of Division NWI and Division Command Net.
AN/MTC-1	2	Provide local and trunk switching for all elements at Di An.
SB-675	1	Provide patching and test facility for all VHF circuits.
AN/MRC-69	1	Provided to establish 54-78 system from Suoi Da to Minh Thanh.

b. Company B was given the mission of providing communications support for Division Artillery, 1st, 2d, and 3d Brigades. The company displaced the following personnel and equipment:

(1) 1st Platoon: Received warning order on 18 February, checked all equipment and personnel and prepared to deploy to Devil Forward location. On 22 February, equipment was airlifted from Phouc Vinh to Brigade Forward and upon arrival, established the 54-76X system. Remainder of the platoon at Phouc Vinh maintained base camp communications. Upon termination of Phase I, the 1st Platoon moved from the field location with 1st Brigade to Minh Thanh and from there to Quan Loi. For Phase II of Junction City, 1st Brigade established their CP at Quan Loi and the 1st Platoon established the 54-79 system through the Relay on Nui Ba Den. Major items of equipment utilized were:

EQUIPMENT	QUANTITY	PURPOSE
AN/MRC-34½	1	Provide VHF radio link into Division Communication System from Brigade Forward location.
AN/GRC-46	1	Provide secure on-line RTT with Division Communication Systems, from Brigade Forward location.
AN/MGC-17	1	Provide secure on-line TT from Brigade into the Division Communication system.

(2) 2d Platoon: For Phase I, Junction City, the second platoon's mission was to continue to provide communication for the 2d Brigade in support of Operation LAM SON. During Phase II, Junction City, 2d Brigade was tasked to move to Fire Support Base Charlie in War Zone C and the 2d Platoon prepared to deploy on order. Warning order was received on 14 March and on 18 March, 2d Platoon convoyed from Di An to Quan Loi. On 20 March, the platoon was airlifted from Quan Loi to Fire Support Base Charlie and upon arrival established the 54-77 system. Major items of equipment utilized were:

EQUIPMENT	QUANTITY	PURPOSE
AN/MRC-34½	1	Provide VHF radio link into Division Communication System from Brigade Forward location.
AN/GRC-46	1	Provide secure on-line RTT with Division Communication Systems, for 2d Brigade.
AN/MGC-17	1	Provide secure on-line TT from Brigade into the Division Communications system.

(3) 3d Platoon: Received warning order on 18 February for Phase I, Junction City. After checking all equipment and personnel, airlifted from Lai Khe to Duty Forward location, and established the 54-78 system. The remainder of the platoon at Lai Khe had the responsibility for patching circuits from the 54-73A and 73B systems into Division Forward CP location, plus maintaining base camp communications. For Phase II, Junction City, the 3d Brigade assumed Operation LAM SON from the 2d Brigade and the 3d Platoon prepared to support the Brigade for the operation. At Lai Khe, the 3d Platoon had the mission of establishing the 73-71 system

between Lai Khe and Phouc Vinh and to patch all circuits from 73-54 in preparation for the Division move, the platoon handled all comm center traffic for the Division CP until the main comm center was established. The 54-D1 system for Diehard was re-established at Lai Khe when Division displaced and redesignated 73-D1. Major items of equipment utilized were:

EQUIPMENT	QUANTITY	PURPOSE
AN/MRC-34½	1	Provide VHF radio link into Division Communication System from Bde Forward locations.
AN/MGC-17	1	Provide on-line secure TT link into Division teletype system from Bde Forward location.
AN/MRC-69	1	Provide VHF radio link between Lai Khe and Division Forward.
AN/MRC-112	1	Provided by B Company for 73-D1 system.

(4) Company Headquarters: Received warning order on 14 Feb 67 for Phase I, Junction City. Mission was to patch all circuits as required from Division Forward, provide airborne relay as needed and provide 2 MRC-112's in support of Rimrock Forward. Additionally, B Company provided two personnel to assist in the construction of the AB-216 tower at Minh Thanh. Phase II, Junction City, required B Company to provide a MRC-112 system in support of Devour between Quan Loi and Brunard. On 5 April, one MRC-112 was airlifted to Quan Loi and then convoyed to Brunard. The second MRC-112 convoyed from Lai Khe to Quan Loi and the 79-F1 system was established. Major items of equipment utilized were:

EQUIPMENT	QUANTITY	PURPOSE
AN/MRC-112	2	Provide 4 channel VHF radio link for Rimrock Forward, Diehard Forward and Devour Forward.
AN/MRC-69	1	Committed in support of "C" Company at Minh Thanh.

c. Company "C" was given the mission to provide personnel and equipment to support the Division CP. During Phase I, Junction City, Company "C" received their warning order and prepared their equipment and personnel for deployment to Minh Thanh. One supervisor and six EM were deployed to Minh Thanh on 15 Feb 67 and an AB-216 tower was erected at that location. Company "C" mounted antennas on the tower and established the following systems: 54-73A, 54-73B, 54-B1, 54-D1, 54-78, 54-79, 54-76X, 50-54A, 50-54B and 54-P1. In preparation for Phase II, Junction City, Company "C" deployed its "jump" equipment from Minh Thanh to Lai Khe on 12 Mar 67. Equipment was airlifted in 2 sorties by C-123. Equipment was also convoyed from Di An to Lai Khe on the same date. Upon arrival, the SB-611 patch panel was set up with all intra-signal center cables in preparation for the Division move. All circuits were pre-patched and the 50-54X system was established to take over from the 50-54A going to Minh Thanh. Once Division Forward displaced, all circuits to Minh Thanh were dropped off and the main circuits to Lai Khe were completely operational. Major items of equipment utilized were:

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EQUIPMENT	QUANTITY	PURPOSE
AN/MRC-69	6	Provide 12 channel VHF radio links from Division Forward to the following: Division Main, Division ARTY, 3 Brigades, Rimrock Forward and Parachute Forward.
AN/MRC-34½	1	Provide 12 channel VHF radio jump capability.
AN/MRC-112	2	Provide 4 channel VHF radio link into Division Communication System for Diehard.
AN/MTC-3	1	Provide switching capability for all Division Forward circuits.
SB-611	2	Provide patching and test facilities for all VHF circuits.
AN/GRC-46	1	Provide secure teletype and back-up for communications center teletype.
AN/GRC-26	1	Provide secure teletype for III Corps net.
AN/MGC-17	1	Provide secure on-line teletype communications.
AN/MSC-29	1	Provide message center capability.
AN/ARC-128	1	Provide FM communication for Divisional and Brigade nets.
AN/ARC-121	1	Provide FM communication for Divisional and Brigade nets.
RWI	1	Provide integrated radio and telephone communications.
AN/GRC-106	1	Provide single sideband communication into II FF log net.
AN/MRC-54	1	Provide VHF radio relay at Lai Kho for 50-54B system.

10. (C) Results:

a. The Battalion provided simultaneous communication for 11 different elements of the Division plus two non-divisional units.

(1) Division Main

(2) Division Forward

(3) Division Artillery

(4) Devil

(5) Devil Forward

(6) Dagger

(7) Dagger Forward

(8) Duty

(9) Duty Forward

(10) Quan Loi

(11) Diehard Forward

(12) Rimrock Forward

(13) Parachute Forward

(14) Devour Forward

b. Telephone Circuits Provided:

(1) Sole User Circuits at:

(a) Danger Forward	49
(b) Danger Main	11
(c) Phu Loi	6
(d) Devil (Phouc Vinh)	1
(e) Devil Forward	7
(f) Dagger (Di An)	1
(g) Dagger Forward	7
(h) Duty (Lai Khe)	4
(i) Duty Forward	7
(j) Quan Loi	3
(k) Diehard Forward	1
(l) Rimrock Forward	2
(m) Parachute Forward	3
(n) Devour Forward	2

(2) Common User Telephone Service:

(a) Danger Main - Danger Forward	9
(b) Danger Main - Phu Loi	5
(c) Danger Main - Phouc Vinh	4
(d) Danger Main - Dagger	4
(e) Danger Main - Duty (Lai Khe)	4
(f) Danger Main - Quan Loi	1

(g)	Danger Spt - Diehard Forward	1
(h)	Danger Forward - Devil	2
(i)	Danger Forward - Dagger	1
(j)	Danger Forward - Duty	2
(k)	Danger Forward - Quan Loi	2
(l)	Danger Forward - Devil Forward	2
(m)	Danger Forward - Dagger Forward	3
(n)	Danger Forward - Duty Forward	3
(o)	Danger Forward - Parachute Forward	2

11. (C) Administrative Matters:

a. Forward elements received Administrative Support from the headquarters with which they were deployed.

b. Transportation from rear to Forward areas and vice versa remained a problem throughout this phase of the operation. Movement of parts critical to system and or equipment was not managed as expeditiously as was desired.

c. Division Forward, due to the large number of VHF systems employed, developed problems in the area of maintenance. A forward repair capability had to be established in order to handle the deadlined equipment.

12. (C) Commanders Analysis:

a. It's a well known fact that the heavy vegetation in the Third Corps Tactical Zone severely limits the range of FM and VHF communications, and degrades the quality of the VHF systems. Prior to JUNCTION CITY I, this Battalion obtained three AB 216 towers to provide a higher elevation for the antennas. One tower (120 feet) was erected at the Division Base Camp at Di An, and one was erected at the 3d Brigade Base Camp at Lai Khe. These towers improved the quality of VHF systems between all base camps and made it possible to free a MRC-54 radio relay at Nui Ba Den which was relaying between Lai Khe and Di An.

b. It was decided to hold the third AB-216 as a "jump" capability for Division Forward. It was felt that with sufficient training, a team of about eight men could erect the AB-216 at any location within the Area of Operation on short notice. Accordingly, an erection team was formed and commenced training, using the "jump" tower, at Di An.

c. About a week prior to JUNCTION CITY the Division Commander met with his staff to discuss the location of the Division Forward CP for the operation. The sites under consideration were:

Suoi Da

Dau Tieng

Lai Khe

Minh Thanh

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d. Since the Division Forward was already at Lai Khe, most staff members recommended staying there. As Division Signal Officer I pointed out the criticality of the communications and stated that I could best support the operation from Suoi Da, but could also support it adequately from Minh Thanh. With this and other factors in mind, the Division Commander made the decision to establish the forward CP at Minh Thanh. He also directed that the forward CP at Lai Khe be completely disestablished and re-established at Minh Thanh, fully operational, by noon on 20 February.

e. Since the Minh Thanh area was already secured by the 1st Brigade, arrangements were made for a Chinook helicopter to lift the AB-216 from Di An to Minh Thanh, together with the eight man erection team.

f. The tower departed Di An at 1330 hrs 15 February 1967 and was fully erected at Minh Thanh by 1630 hrs on the following day. It is important to note that a single Chinook sortie enabled the Division to establish and maintain high quality communications throughout the vast area of operations during JUNCTION CITY I.

g. During the operation there were 11 multichannel systems terminated at Division Forward. All systems were terminated on the tower at a height of 60' or more. In addition, two other 60' VHF antennas were erected to be used in emergency, should the tower have been destroyed.

h. Three RC-292 antennas were mounted at the top of the tower, connected by coaxial cable to RT 524 radios at the base of the AB-216. The functions of these towers were as follows:

(1) One was used as the Division Forward RWI station. This station proved invaluable during the operation in that it enabled units and individuals, not served by the Division VHF/telephone system, to gain access to that system. Examples of users were:

(a) Infantry Battalion S4's calling their base camp offices for supplies. Often the S4 would be calling from the field position over a PRC 25 radio, to his base camp 30 or more miles distant.

(b) Infantry Battalion's S1 calling battalion commanders at field locations on personnel matters.

(c) Members of Division Staff, and Assistant Division Commanders, making administrative calls from helicopters in flight, to offices at base camps throughout the division area, and even into Saigon offices.

(2) The second radio was on the Division CG Command Net and was remoted into the DTOC. Since the DTOC was also provided three RC 292 antennas all on a separate 60' mast, this was used as a back-up and when extended ranges were required.

(3) The third radio was on the Signal Battalion Command net and was remoted into the C Company (forward) CP, as well as the DSO MSC-31. This provided quick, reliable FM communications with Signal Battalion elements throughout the Division area of operations.

i. It was found that the long coaxial cables required for the tower-mounted RC-292 antennas sometimes acted as antennas themselves, thus tending to pickup annoying interference. This was especially true on the CG Command Net. In order to eliminate the long cable, a RT-524, complete with antenna matching unit, was removed from a ¼ ton truck and installed at the top of the tower, together with Power Supply PP 2953/U (convertor). AC power was supplied to the PP 2953 by cable from an AC generator at the tower base. This radio was placed on the CG Command Net

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SUBJECT: After Action Report, Operation JUNCTION CITY, PHASE I & II (U)

frequency and was remoted by WD-1 to the DTOC. This arrangement proved to be so satisfactory that it was used as the primary FM means of communication by the DTOC during most of the operation.

j. The use of an AB-216 as a jump capability proved to be so successful that it is now included as part of the normal Division Forward communications package. It will be erected at every location which the Division Forward occupies, if conditions indicate that it will be required.

k. Secure voice traffic:

(1) The KY-8 was used extensively during the operation to pass classified traffic by FM radio between Division TOC and two additional brigade TOC's which were opcon (173d Airborne Bde and 1st Bde 9th Inf Div). The Division also established secure voice communications which HQs, IIFFV. However, this was seldom used for operational traffic. Since IIFFV and Division used different key lists for the KY-8, the following procedure was used in the DTOC to preclude installation of two KY-8's: Two "cardwhich boards" were kept in the DTOC, one with the IIFFV key set on it and the other with the Division key. These boards would be inserted in the KY-8 as required. This precluded simultaneous secure voice transmissions with IIFFV and brigades, but proved to be satisfactory.

(2) A separate frequency was reserved for secure voice transmissions, called "NET 2". When a station desired to make a secure voice transmission it called on the primary command frequency and stated "meet me on net 2". This proved to be a highly satisfactory arrangement, in that secure traffic and non-secure traffic could be passed simultaneously without danger of mutual interference.

l. Air Conditioning:

(1) Air conditioners were installed in many of the AN/MRC-69 rigs within the Battalion. This resulted in a considerable improvement in the operation of the equipment and a marked decline in the number of failures due to overheating. The only disadvantage to this was that additional generators were required to power the air conditioning units.

(2) The MSC-29 was also air conditioned. This decreased the maintenance required, especially on TH-5's.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

DALE A. CARLSEN
1LT, SigC
Assistant Adjutant

5 Incls
Annex A - ~~Typewriter Traffic Summary~~ wd, Hqs DA
Annex B - VHF Tactical Diagram
Annex C - Common User Telephone Routing Diagram
Annex D - HF Radio Diagram
Annex E - Danger Fwd Teletype-writer Routing Diagram

VHF TACTICAL DIAGRAM




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TON LE
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CON
TRANG
P1
MINH
THANH
B1
76
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BRUNARD
54-77
71-79
73-D1
54-B1
54-P1
NBD
RELAY
50-71
71
PHOUC VUH
54-71
50-54A
54-B1
54-77
73
LAI KHE
24-80
55-71
54
LAI KHE
HURRICANE
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PHU LOI
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50
DIAN

(Phase II)



ANNEX "C" PHASE I & II


1st BDE
2nd BDE
3rd BI
DIV ARTY
DIV MN (ACT NCS)
DIV FWD (NCS)
III CORP NET
II FFV

ANNEX "D"

DANGER FWD TELETYPEWRITER ROUTING DIAGRAM



ANNEX "E"

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 1ST ENGINEER BATTALION
APO 96345

AVDB-CE-3 2 May 1967

SUBJECT: Combat Operation After Action Report

THRU: Commanding General
1st Infantry Division
ATTN: AVDB-T
APO 96345

TO: Commander
US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
ATTN: J321
APO 96307

1. NAME OF OPERATION: Operation Junction City I and II.

2. DATE OF OPERATION: 192330 Feb 67 - 152400 Apr 67.

3. GENERAL: The command headquarters for the Engineer portion of Operation Junction City was Headquarters, 1st Engineer Battalion acting in accordance with 1st Infantry Division OPLANS 5-67 and 6-67 dated 151200H Feb 67 and 022000H Mar 67 respectively. The 1st Engineer Battalion provided combat support to 1st Infantry Division operations in War Zone C. The 1st Engineer Battalion was supported by the 168th Engineer Battalion (-) during Phase I and the 27th Engineer (-) during Phase II of Operation Junction City.

a. Reporting Officer: LTC J.M. KIERNAN, JR.
Commanding Officer
1st Engineer Battalion

ANNEX G

CONFIDENTIAL

b. Task Organization:

(1) Phase I - 20 Feb 67 - 5 Mar 67.

HQ's, 1st Engineer Battalion - LTC KIERNAN

(a) Company A - WAYNE L. LUCAS, CPT, CE

(b) Company C - LARRY A. BLAIR, CPT, CE

(c) Company D - ROGER M. MILLAR, CPT, CE

(d) Hq Company (-) - THOMAS J. WOODALL, CPT, CE

HQ's, 168th Engineer Battalion - LTC PELOSKY

(a) Company A - DONALD WHITLEY JR. CPT, CE

(b) Company B - DWAYNE G. LEE, CPT, CE

(2) Phase II

HQ's, 1st Engineer Battalion - LTC KIERNAN

(a) Company A - WAYNE L. LUCAS, CPT, CE

(b) Company B - ROBERT C. LEE, CPT, CE

(c) Company D - ROGER M. MILLAR, CPT, CE

(d) Company E (-) - ROBERT R. OLSON, CPT, CE

(e) Hq Company (-) - THOMAS J. WOODALL, CPT, CE

HQ's, 27th Engineer Battalion - LTC ROBERTS

(a) Company B - JERRY E. LOWRANCE, CPT, CE

(b) Company C - THOMAS E. WAHBORG, CPT, CE

4. INTELLIGENCE:

a. Intelligence Prior to Operation:

(1) Friendly elements will encounter mines, booby traps, and permanent type fortified positions in War Zone "C".

(2) War Zone "C" has long been a major VC stronghold and base area, and indications are that VC will attempt to defend.

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(3) Indications of both COSVN and 9th Division Headquarters, are situated in operational area.

(4) The 271st VC, 272nd VC and 101st NVA Regiments of the 9th VC Division and the 70th Security Guard Regiment are the major Viet Cong Forces that are expected to be encountered in the operational area.

b. Enemy Capabilities.

(1) Reinforce with 52nd NVA Regiment within 36-48 hours.

(2) Reinforce with 141st and 165th NVA Regiment within 48 to 72 hours.

(3) The 14 Local Force and the Tay Ninh Local Force companies and guerillas can also be expected to be encountered in harassing tactics, or employed in a limited reinforcing role.

c. Intelligence During Operation:

(1) The following items were detected and either removed or destroyed:

(a)	271020H Feb 67	2 Pressure Mines	vic XT966034
(b)	011745H Mar 67	30 Claymore Mines	vic XT333898
(c)	130745H Apr 67	1 Pressure Mine	vic XT673858
(d)	211030H Apr 67	2 Pressure Mines	vic XT547845 and XT556844
(e)	230845H Apr 67	2 Pressure Mines	vic XT552845 and XT541844
(f)	091000H Mar 67	4 Mines	vic XT527829
(g)	090630H Mar 67	7 Mines	vic XT500821

(2) The 1st Engineer Battalion suffered the following mine damages:

(a)	011640H Apr 67	VTR Minor Damage	vic XT302840 1 WHA

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(b)	C31005H Apr 67	Tank Dozer (Combat Loss)	vic XT733910 4 WHA
(c)	051815H Apr 67	Attached Lowbed minor damage	vic XT543177 No Casualties
(d)	071750H Apr 67	1/4 ton Trk (Combat Loss)	vic XT641826 1 WHA
(e)	260845H Apr 67	5 ton dump Extensive damage	vic XT750850 1 WHA

(3) Company B, 1st Engineer Battalion received five (5) separate mortar attacks at XT 565843 with an extensive 170 rounds total during the period 30 Mar 67 thru 6 Apr 67. The unit suffered 13 WHA during the five attacks.

(4) The Battalion received numerous small arms and automatic weapon fire.

(5) There were approximately 53 aerial reconnaissance flights in addition to daily command and control flights in the operational area.

5. MISSION: The 1st Engineer Battalion reinforced with elements of the 79th Engineer Group provided combat support by opening, improving and maintaining roads, constructing bridges, constructing airfields and Special Forces Camps.

6. CONCEPT OF OPERATION: The Engineer effort of Operation Junction City began with the construction of the Suoi Da Airfield by A Company on 10 December. A Company worked until 16 December on the Airstrip, when they were pulled out for a possible tactical deployment. D Company, reinforced with equipment from Headquarters Company, convoyed from Di An to Suoi Da on 26 Jan with supporting elements, and construction was continued on 27 Jan 67. Construction of the compacted silt airfield terminated on 22 Feb 67 with the installation of T-17 Membrane.

During Phase I of the Operation, the 1st Engineer Battalion deployed A Company, D Company, and C Company along Route TL4. A Company, in D.S. of the 1st Brigade, performed road maintenance in the northern section of TL4, D Company constructed a C-130 airstrip vic KATUM, and C Company performed road maintenance in the southern section of TL4.

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During Phase II of the Operation, the 1st Engineer Battalion deployed on route 246 west of AN LOC. Before the participation of the 2nd Brigade, B Company had the mission to improve route 246 from the Bn NDP (XT695872) to the Saigon River. A Company had mission to construct a Bailey Bridge over Saigon River, and D Company, reinforced with equipment from Headquarters Company, to construct a C-130 airstrip just west of the Bailey Bridge Site. With the arrival of the 2nd Brigade, B Company had the responsibility of opening and maintaining route 246 from the Bailey Bridge to FSB "C" (XT565850), and providing direct support to include LZ teams.

7. EXECUTION:

20 Feb 67: Headquarters, 1st Engineer Battalion, Headquarters 168th Engineer Battalion, A Company and B Company 168th Bn departed Di An at 0020H and convoyed to Suoi Da arriving at 1500H. C Company departed Ben Cui at 0730H for Suoi Da. A 2000 meter pioneer bypass was constructed vic XT 275510. At 1030H a C Company Pole Trailer struck a command mine at XT 287520, wounding one man slightly. Immediately after closing Suoi Da at 1130H, work was initiated on construction of defensive positions and a reinforced platoon departed to sweep 8.5 kms of route 243 along the east side of Nui Ba Den. At 1700H while reconning a by-pass from route 243 to TL4, a "Duster" hit a command mine at XT 292606; negative casualties.

21 Feb 67:

A Company - Convoyed from Dau Tieng via routes 239 and 26 to Arty Base I closing at 1630H. Set up NDP at that location and prepared to open TL4 north the following morning.

C Company - Performed road maintenance on routes 246 and TL4 to vic Arty Base I (XT2868). Three culverts were installed at XT 284600, XT 283665 and XT 281679. At 1200H the three culverts were completed, the route had been swept to Arty Base I (three Chicom grenades found and destroyed at XT 283665), fill was being hauled to the bypass, and the road was ready to accept heavy artillery and armored vehicles. C Company continued to improve the road to Artillery Base I until 1900H, returned to Suoi Da, loaded up, and moved to NDP with 2/2 Inf at XT 289639.

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D Company - Finished placing the T-17 Membrane on the Suoi Da Airstrip and continued to work on drainage ditches on airfield, turnaround and parking apron.

22 Feb 67:

A Company - Moved north on TL4 opening and improving road to allow passage of wheeled vehicles. Enroute A-40 tank dozer hit a mine at XT 278700, injuring four. The tank dozer was later determined to be a combat loss. Three AVLB's were placed at XT 306843, XT 307851 and XT 333897 on TL4 as A Company continued north to their NDP at XT 333925.

C Company - Departed from their NDP and followed A Company north of TL4 performing road maintenance enroute. One acre of jungle was cut in their NDP (Arty Base IV), defensive positions were constructed, and work areas for the following day were reconnoitered.

D Company - Finished cutting drainage ditches on airfield, turnaround, and parking apron. The roads around the Suoi Da Airfield were reshaped and ditched. Preparation was also made for the following days move.

23 Feb 67:

A Company - Moved north west along TL4 to XT 274963, repairing the road as they moved to their new NDP. At 2400H the NDP was mortared; one man was injured..

C Company - Initiated deliberate road repairs on TL4. The AVLB at XT 307851 was removed, a corduroy road was constructed and the road reopened at 1200 hours. Construction was started on a 36' timber trestle bridge at XT 370851. A borrow pit was opened at XT 298830, and 50 loads of fill were hauled repairing the road between XT 298830 and XT 302841. One 105 shell, pressure mine, was detected and blown in place at XT 307850. A LZ was cleared for the 2/28 Inf at XT 306852.

D Company - Departed Suoi Da at 0730H and moved north along TL4 to their NDP at KATUM (XT335903). The remainder of the day was spent constructing defensive positions and clearing fields of fire.

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24 Feb 67:

A Company - Mine detector teams cleared TL4 from XT 274963 to XT 283957. The road was repaired from XT 323943 to XT 274963, and an AVLB was placed at XT 322940.

C Company - Detector teams swept 9 kms of road from XT 274284 to XT 367852. Sixty loads of fill were hauled to repair the 9 kms of road. Seven acres of jungle were cleared along both sides of the road. The 36' timber trestle bridge with intermediate bent completed.

D Company - Construction on defensive positions continued. Dozers were dispatched to XT 332897 and began clearing the centerline for the 2900 ft C-130 airstrip.

25 Feb 67:

A Company - Road maintenance in section continued and jungle clearing was started along TL4 from XT 322940 to XT 306448.

C Company - Road maintenance continued, between XT 271770 and XT 273783, with 76 loads of fill being hauled. At 1000 hours, a two man security element was ambushed by an automatic weapon at XT 271770, resulting in one KHA and one WHA. Sweep of area yielded negative results. 12 loads of fill were hauled to improve approaches to the timber trestle bridge and the AVLB was removed.

D Company - Jungle clearing continued at the south eastern edge of the airstrip. Ditches were cut, graded shaped and compacted on southern 500' of runway. A recon party in search for laterite received automatic weapons fire at XT 333896; 3 WHA.

26 Feb 67:

A Company - At 1245 hours, the 1st Platoon was ambushed, while enroute to KATUM, at XT 304947; 2 men wounded. Road maintenance continued with 14 loads of fill placed on road from grid coordinates XT 280957 to XT 290954. The jungle on both sides of TL4 was cleared for 75 meter width from XT 286956 to XT 301954. One platoon on 1 hour LZ standby.

C Company - TL4 was improved from XT 307850 to XT 328890 and the corduroy road at XT 307849 was widened; 75 loads of fill placed. The bridge site at XT 337894 was reconnoitered.

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D Company - Jungle clearing continued on airstrip. Cutting of drainage ditches, shaping and compaction of sub-grade continued. A laterite source was located at south end of airstrip. Placement, compaction and shaping of laterite initiated, with 400' of runway being completed.

27 Feb 67:

A Company - Seventy-five meters of jungle on both sides of TL4 were stripped from XT 287956 to XT 301949, and the road was reshaped and ditched. One platoon remained on LZ standby.

C Company - Construction started on 46' class 50 timber trestle bridge. Abutment and stream bed preparation begun. Extracted blown Eiffel Bridge. Jungle cleared along TL4 from XT 316870 to XT 322380, and a 50mX50m radar site cleared at XT 317873. Bomb craters along side and on road were filled, and 4 kms of road maintained and improved.

D Company - Clearing of jungle, cutting of ditches reshaping of sub-grade, placement, compaction, and shaping of laterite continued. 900' of runway completed.

28 Feb 67:

A Company - Jungle from XT 301949 to XT 305947 cleared along TL4. Pulled maintenance on vehicles. One platoon on LZ standby.

C Company - Headwalls for timber trestle bridge completed. Construction of cribs for timber bents started. 81 loads of fill were used to fill bomb craters on road.

D Company - Work continued on airstrip, with 1300 feet of runway being completed.

1 Mar 67:

A Company - 45 tons of rice was hauled from VC base camp at XT 307977. Destroyed and buried 45 sacks of fish, 2 sacks of peanuts, 1 sack of beans, and 23 tons of rice at XT 302917.

C Company - Construction of crib continued. LZ was improved at bridge site to assist in rice extraction. Road improvement continued between XT 301840 and XT 312860; 56 loads of filled hauled.

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D Company - Same as previous day. 1900 feet of airstrip finished.

2 Mar 67:

A Company - Convoyed south at 1300 hours to Suoi Da, closing at 1615 hours.

C Company - Cribs, and bents constructed. Backfill completed on far shore headwall. Hauled laterite in support of airfield operations. At 1630 hours company moved to new NDP at KATUM.

D Company - 2300 feet of airfield completed.

3 Mar 67:

A Company - Departed Suoi Da at 1530 hours, and cleared Di An at 0830 hours.

C Company - Due to change in tactical situation, work on timble trestle bridge was stopped. Continued to haul laterite and clear approach zones in support of airfield operations.

D Company - Completed 2900 feet of runway. Air Force inspected and approved "KATUM Airfield" for C-130 traffic (Class I).

4 Mar 67:

A Company - Stood down for maintenance at Di An.

C Company - Departed KATUM, along with Battalion Headquarters, at 1300 hours. Company (-) one platoon HON in Tay Ninh West. One platoon and Battalion Headquarters set up NDP at Suoi Da.

D Company - Convoyed from KATUM to Tay Ninh West along with C Company.

5 Mar 67:

A Company - Departed Di An at 0730 hours and convoyed to Lai Khe closing at 1045.

B Company - Convoyed to Lai Khe closing at 1100 hours.

C Company - Convoyed to Di An closing at 2400 hours.

D Company - Same as C Company.

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E Company - Convoyed to Lai Khe with elements of 500th Panel Bridge Company.

6 Mar 67:

Battalion Headquarters was airlifted via C-130 from Suoi Da to Quan Loi, closing Quan Loi at 1730 hours.

A Company - Departed Lai Khe and convoyed to An Loc closing at 1430 hours.

B Company - Convoyed from Lai Khe to An Loc closing at 1500 hours.

C Company - Convoyed from Di An at 0800 and closed Lai Khe at 1045 hours.

D Company - Stood down for maintenance at Di An until 11 March 1967.

E Company(-) - Convoyed from Lai Khe to An Loc with supporting 500th Panel Bridge elements.

7 Mar 67:

A Company - Convoyed along with Battalion Headquarters to XT 691870 and set up NDP. Opened 7 kms of route 246 to XT 624815. Demolition changes were set up on destroyed Bailey Bridge, (XT624814) and 2 VTR's tried to pull the old Bailey Bridge from the river bed, but the attempt was unsuccessful.

B Company - Convoyed from An Loc to NDP at XT 691870, prepared defensive positions and reconned route 246 west of NDP.

E Company - Convoyed from An Loc to NDP at XT 691870.

8 Mar 67:

A Company - Constructed forms for intermediate pier footers at Bailey Bridge site (XT 624814). Started work on east bank headwall and approach. A laterite pit was located just north of route 246 on the east side of the Saigon River and 50 loads of laterite were hauled to the eastern approach.

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B Company - Started to improve route 246 from NDP to Saigon River. The road was reshaped and cleared out to the drainage ditches, and the ditches were improved. The by-passes at XT 665845 and XT 653811 were improved and maintained. Working around the clock, the concrete footers for the intermediate pier were poured.

E Company - Constructed a tramway across the Saigon River to facilitate the placement of concrete for footers.

9 Mar 67:

A Company - Completed near shore abutment and began construction of headwall on far shore. A dozer was sent to the far shore and 350 cubic yards of fill were moved to construct the western approach. 350 loads of laterite were hauled to east approach.

B Company - Road maintenance continued on route 246, and materials were hauled to bridge site for construction of intermediate pier. At night the construction site for the Bailey Bridge was laid out.

E Company - Working at night, provided technical assistance to B Company in preparing the construction site.

10 Mar 67:

A Company - Started construction of the 20' high standard triple truss, 140 ton capacity intermediate pier for the Bailey Bridge. 80% of the pier was completed at nightfall. The western abutment and approach was completed, as was the east approach road. 120 loads of laterite hauled. Construction of the 120' DD, 100' TS Bailey Bridge began.

B Company - Stood down for maintenance of vehicles and TOE equipment.

E Company - Assisted construction of intermediate pier and provided technical knowledge.

11 Mar 67:

A Company - Intermetiate pier completed. 100 meters of road was constructed on the west side of the bridge. Bailey Bridge completely launched to intermediate pier and far shore.

B Company - Opened route 246 west of the bridge site from XT 624815 to XT 615863. Continued to improve route 246 west of bridge site.

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E Company - Assisted in the construction and completion of the intermediate pier and layed out far shore site to accept bridge.

13 Mar 67:

A Company - Bridge broken at pier, jacked down, decked, and open to traffic at 1200 hours. 95 loads of laterite were used to raise both approaches to the bridge.

B Company - Opened route 246 from XT 615823 to XT 596823. Installed 24 inch culvert, 30 feet long at XT 614823. Shaping and ditching of route 246 continued.

D Company - Convoyed from Di An to NDP at XT 691870.

E Company - Provided technical and construction assistance in the breaking and jacking down of the bridge.

13 Mar 67:

A Company - Put triple concentina around bailey bridge pier. The road leading to the proposed Special Force Camp was cleared of jungle and ditched. The timber trestle bridge ite at XT 623815 was recomed.

B Company - Cleared jungle around NDP and enlarged the LZ. Pulled maintenance on vehicles. Assembled 48" and 36" culvert for following day's use.

D Company - Started to clear centerline for airfield to be constructed at XT 620815.

14 Mar 67:

A Company - Started construction of fender around intermediate pier. Completed construction of north abutment to timber trestle bridge at XT 623815 and improved road leading to bridge by shaping, placing and compacting laterite. 119 loads of laterite hauled and dumped on road.

B Company - Continued to improve route 246 west of the Saigon River. Five culverts were installed:

2ea 48" X 36' at XT 612822.

1ea 36" X 38' at XT 609822.

2ea 36" X 38' at XT 602822.

D Company - Continued to clear centerline and to determine profile of airstrip.

15 Mar 67:

A Company - Pile driving crane and material located vic of intermediate pier. South abutment of timber trestle bridge completed. Continued to improve road leading to timber trestle bridge, 160 loads of laterite, hauled, placed, shaped and compacted.

B Company - Constructed headwalls for culvert placed pervious day. Continued to improve route 246 from XT 612822 to XT 602822. Assembled 56' of 36" culvert for future use.

D Company - Centerline of airfield moved 50 meters to the east to minimize the amount of earthwork. Centerline cleared and staked. Jungle clearing of strip began at southern end.

16 Mar 67:

A Company - Set up pile driving equipment and sank 2ea 48" culverts into the sandy bottom in preparation to pour concrete footers for the fender. Construction of 16 foot timber trestle bent was completed, as were the wingwalls for the abutments. 104 loads of laterite were hauled raising the centerline of the road to the bridge site.

B Company - Conducted training in helicopter assault from CH 47. Installed three 36 inch 38 feet long culverts at XT 599822. One platoon set up NDP with 1/26 Inf at XT 566843.

D Company - Moved to FSB Bravo (XT624814) and constructed defensive positions. Continued to clear southern portion of airfield. Laterite pit found at XT 617823, and clearing of pit was initiated.

17 Mar 67:

A Company - Work continued on fender with 4ea 48 inch culverts being sunk. The far shore sill was placed on the timber trestle bridge, all stringers were placed, and 75% of decking completed. 104 loads of laterite hauled for improvement of road to the timber trestle bridge and near shore abutment.

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B Company - Continued to improve route 246 west of the Saigon River to XT 596862. Made preparation to open route 246 to XT 566843.

D Company - Continued to improve defensive positions and clear fields of fire. Clearing of jungle on airfield continued. Enough jungle had been cleared from the runway to start the construction sequence; subgrade brought to desired level, shaped and compacted, ditches along airstrip dug, laterite hauled, dumped, spread, compacted and graded. Airfield cleared of jungle to station 12, subgrade shaped and compacted to station 5, 100 loads of laterite hauled, shaped and compacted to station 2.

18 Mar 67:

A Company - Continued to sink 48" caissons and set up one pole in concrete for the Bailey Bridge fender. The class 55, 40 foot timber trestle bridge at XT 623815 was completed. 45 loads of laterite hauled for improvement of far shore abutment. Constructed three pads for artillery; one powder pad at XT 625816 and 2 ammo pads at XT 624814.

B Company - Hauled 50 loads of laterite to improve route 246 west of the Saigon River. Assembled two (2) each 36" culverts 38 feet long.

D Company - Clearing of jungle continued. A total of 1800 feet of runway cleared. Shaping and compacting of subgrade continued as did the hauling, placing, spreading and compacting of laterite. 400 feet of runway completed.

19 Mar 67:

A Company - Completed sinking caissons. Poured concrete in 6 caissons and set up 6 poles for fender. Road to timber trestle bridge also completed.

B Company - Opened route 246 west to XT 570840. Received rifle grenade fire from south west of road vic XT 573873, negative injuries.

D Company - Overburden on laterite completely cleared. Jungle cleared to station 26. Shaped and compacted subgrade to station 9. Hauled shaped and compacted laterite to station 7.

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20 May 67:

A Company - Finished pouring concrete in caisson and set up the last three poles for the fender. Cleared a total of 52,000 sq meters of jungle along both sides of route 246 from XT 676862 to XT 675860.

B Company - Relocated to FSB Charlie (XT567847). Route 246 was opened and improved from XT 572847 to XT 566843. 6 Anti-tank mines and one Anti personnel mine vicinity XT 5684, and blown in place. Cleared fields of fire around the NDP and constructed defensive positions.

D Company - Jungle cleared to station 31. Runway and shoulders shaped and compacted to station 8. Started the assembly of culvert for station 9.

21 Mar 67:

A Company - Started to work on fender of bridge. The front portion of the fender was completed. Pulled maintenance on vehicles and equipment.

B Company - Opened 8 kms of route 246 from XT 529833 to XT 588828. Repaired 4 kms of road from XT 548848 - XT 529833, and XT 555846 - XT 566852. Bomb crater at XT 539842 was filled. Cut 425' X 225' LZ at XT 520870.

D Company - Started clearing lateral clearance on southern end of runway. Continued to haul laterite to station 1 thru station 8. Assembly of culverts continued.

22 Mar 67:

A Company - Continued working on fender, 75% of the 3x12 paneling completed. Relocated company minus 1st Platoon to An Loc (XT 757873).

B Company - Improved emplacements and fields of fire around NDP. Utilized combat entrencher to connect bunkers in the area. Improved route 246 east of FSB Charlie for 3 kms.

D Company - Same as pervious day.

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23 Mar 67:

A Company - Fender on Bailey Bridge completed. 1st Platoon convoyed to An Loc and joined up with the remainder of the company. Pulled maintenance on vehicles and equipment.

B Company - Maintained 3.5 kms of road from XT 537840 to XT 567850. Cut LZ 450' X 300' with dozer at XT 537840. Tank dozer hit by RFG at XT 537840; 1 WIA.

D Company - Lateral clearance, and hauling of laterite on southern end of field continued. Installed 2ea 18" culverts at station 9 and assembled culverts for station 23.

24 Mar 67:

A Company - Continued to maintain equipment.

B Company - Maintained vehicles and equipment. Assembled LZ kits in preparation for future LZ missions.

D Company - Constructed by-pass road for laterite pit on north end of airstrip. Completed backfill of culverts at station 9, and continued to haul laterite to both the North and South ends of the airfield.

25 Mar 67:

A Company - Departed An Loc at 0900H and closed Lai Khe 1230H. Pulled maintenance remainder of the day.

B Company - Discovered and destroyed 14ea - 3 man bunkers and a mess hall bunker at XT 515863. Two resupply LZ's cut; one in support of 173rd Bde (Location unknown), and a 100'X150' LZ at XT 540870.

D Company - Cleared 140'X100' turnaround area on north end of field. Hauled laterite to north end of field. Shaped and compacted turnaround. Started installation of 2ea 24" culverts under runway at station 23.

26 Mar 67:

A Company - Continued to pull maintenance and prepare for following day's move.

B Company - Maintained road from NDP to Saigon River. Cut heliborne LZ 150' X 100' at XT 541855.

D Company - Diverted all dozer effort to clear fields of fire for the Infantry. Final grade complete to station 9. Continued to cut from station 9-16 and fill between 16 and 25. Culvert at Station 23 installed and backfilled.

27 Mar 67:

A Company - Moved from Lai Khe to Phuoc Vinh.

B Company - Continued to improve fields of fire around NDP. Cleared ammo storage area at FSB Charlie. Cut 60'X60' LZ adjacent to Co B CP for Diehard use.

D Company - Cleared fields of fire with all available dozers. Laterite hauled to turnaround. Final grade completed to station 12. Placed RC-3 on southern 900 feet of runway.

28 Mar 67:

B Company - Constructed truck turnaround at FSB Charlie (XT539842). Began construction of Objective Thrust, and used 1000 lbs of demolition while clearing trees. Improved and dug emplacements with combat entrenches.

D Company - Cleared 500'X100' parking apron, on southeast side of airstrip, and assembled culvert for parking apron taxi ways. Final grade completed to station 17, and RC-3 applied up to station 12.

29 Mar 67:

B Company - Cut LZ using dozers and tank dozers at XT 500800. Continued to clear FSB Thrust. Combat entrenches used to improve emplacements at FSB Charlie.

D Company - Installed 4ea 18" culverts under each ramp to parking apron. Hauled laterite and shaped parking apron. Final grade completed to station 22. RC-3 applied up to station 17.

30 Mar 67:

B Company - Constructed 500 meters of interior road at FSB Charlie and 20,000 square meters of jungle at that location.

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D Company - Final grade of runway and turnaround completed. Applied RC-3 on turnaround and on runway up to station 22. Completed installation and backfill of culverts for parking apron.

31 Mar 67:

B Company - Performed maintenance on vehicles and equipment.

D Company - Started clearing of north approach zone, and shaped and ditched north overrun. Ditching of east side of runway started. RC-3 placed on 2900 feet of runway. Hauling, shaping, and compacting of laterite on parking apron continued.

1 Apr 67:

B Company - Cleared fields of fire around FSB Thrust. Performed maintenance on vehicles and equipment.

D Company - Multiple applications of RC-3 placed on runway. Cleared south approach zone and extended south overrun. Final grade completed on parking apron. Ditching of east side of runway continued.

2 Apr 67:

B Company - Spread 10,000 gallons of bunker oil as a dust control measure at FSB Charlie Thrust. Pulled maintenance of vehicles and equipment.

D Company - Completed lateral clearing, and continued to clear south approach zone. Applications of RC-3 continued on runway, overruns, turnaround, and parking apron. Continued ditching on east side of runway.

3 Apr 67:

B Company - Located and destroyed in place four (4) each 10 lb Anti-tank mines at XT 5282. Cut 50mx100m heliborne LZ at Objective George.

D Company - South approach zone completed. Continued to place RC-3. At 1400 hours 2 platoons and Company Headquarters moved to Quan Loi.

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4 Apr 67:

B Company - Repaired 30" culvert at XT 564843. Prepared culvert sites at XT 564843 and XT 568841.

D Company - Elements at Quan Loi convoyed to Di An closing at 1430 hours. East ditch along airfield completed, and airfield marking signs installed.

5 Apr 67:

B Company - Installed one 18" culvert at XT 571841 and two 36" culverts at XT 532835. Cut 100mX50m resupply LZ for 173rd Bde at XT 443755.

D Company - Airfield 100% completed. Acceptance inspection satisfactory, and airfield approved for C-130. Remainder of Company along with TOC moved to Quan Loi.

6 Apr 67:

B Company - Opened route 246 east to XT 500810. Installed 2ea 36"X38' culverts at XT 532835. Prepared 10 helicopter capacity LZ for 2nd Bde at XT 461810.

D Company - Initiated repairs of 3500 foot airstrip to include 500' X 300' parking area and 300'X 200' turnaround. 45 loads of laterite stockpiled near airstrip during day. Starting at 1900 hours 500' of airstrip scarefied, stockpiled laterite placed, graded and compacted. Work completed and airstrip reopened at 0700 hours.

7 Apr 67:

B Company - Constructed additional trenchs and emplacements at FSB Charlie. Prepared for additional LZ missions and maintained TOE equipment.

D Company - Worked on additional 500' of runway using same procedure as previous night. Peneprimed portion of airstrip worked previous night.

8 Apr 67:

B Company - Assembled and installed 2 ea 36"X30' culverts at XT 532834, and completed headwalls.

D Company - Reshaped and graded 1000' feet of runway. Continued to apply peneprime to sections worked previous nights.

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9 Apr 67:

B Company - Repaired route 246 vic XT 7181. Shaped and ditched road from XT 715815 to XT 722890 and XT 678861 to XT 623815. Found and blew in place 5ea Anti-tank mines on shoulder of road vic XT 5282. Cut 150mX20M heliborne resupply LZ at XT 548785.

D Company - Scarified, graded and compacted, 500' X 300' parking area, and 500' of runway. Peneprimed 2000' of runway previously worked.

10 Apr 67:

B Company - Located and blew in place one Anti tank mine at XT 501821. Improved LZ at XT 548785, enlarging it to 150mX400M.

D Company - Graded and compacted 300'X200' turnaround during daytime. Continued to peneprime airfield, parking apron, and turn-around.

11 Apr 67:

B Company - Shaped and ditched route 246 from XT 567843 to XT 590827. Constructed 2 resupply LZ's, 50' X 100' at XT 555880, and 100' X 200' at XT 579807.

D Company - Continued applying peneprime to airfield, parking apron, and turnaround.

12 Apr 67:

B Company - 2 platoons convoyed to Quan Loi. Remaining elements at FSB Charlie filled in holes and trenchs and prepared to move out.

D Company - Prepared for move back to Lai Khe.

13 Apr 67:

B Company - Remainder of company convoyed and RON at Quan Loi.

D Company - Departed Quan Loi at 0845 hours, and closed Lai Khe at 1230 hours.

14 Apr 67:

B Company - Convoyed to Di An.

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8. RESULTS:

a. Personnel: The 1st Engineer Battalion sustained 1 KHA and 42 WHA during the operation.

b. Awards: 1st Engineer Battalion personnel received 1-Silver Star, 2-Soldiers Medals, 3-Bronze Stars with "V" device, 30 Bronze Stars, 11-ACM's with "V" device, and 78 ACM's for their actions in Operation Junction City. The awards were personally presented by the Commanding General of the 1st Infantry Division, the Assistant Division Commanders, the Chief of Staff, and the CO, 1st Engineer Battalion, at an Awards Ceremony held at Di An Base Camp, 20 April 1967.

c. Equipment: The following combat losses were sustained during the Operation: 1 Tank Dozer, 1 Pole Trailer, 21 Chain Saws, 3 Pioneer Tool sets, 2ea RC-292 Antennas, 1 CP Tent, and an Electric Tool Trailer.

d. Enemy Losses - 1st Engineer Battalion credited with 48 VC KHA during the Operation.

e. Construction:

(1) Roads and Bridges:

(a) Repaired and maintained 56 kilometers of road.

(b) Constructed 3 kilometers of by-pass road.

(c) Installed a total of 13 culverts for a total length of 455 feet.

(d) Constructed one 220 feet combination 120' Double Double and 100' Triple Single Bailey Bridge with Bailey Panel intermediate pier.

(e) Constructed one 36' class 60 timber trestle bridge, one 40' class 55 timber trestle bridge, and 50% completed 46' timber trestle bridge.

(f) Installed 5 AVLB bridges.

(2) Field Fortification: Individual and command protective emplacements were constructed for several infantry units as well as those constructed for our own use. Maximum use was made of combat entrenches to dig holes and to dig connecting trenches.

(3) Landing Zones: 13 heliborne and 4 Ground LZ's were constructed.

(4) Airfields: Constructed 3ea C-130 airfields. Two airfields having a compacted laterite surface, and the third having T-17 membrane covering the compacted silt base.

(5) Engineer Reconnaissance: Numerous aerial, and ground recons were performed by 1st Engineer Battalion elements daily.

(6) Water Supply: Suoi Da; approximately 20,000 gallons daily. Katum; 18,000 gallons daily. Baily Bridge Site; 30,000 gallons daily. A total of 960,000 gallons were distributed during the Operation.

9. ADMINISTRATIVE:

a. Average strength in field during the Operation - 460.

b. Supply: Normal supply channels were used for resupply of units in the field. During Phase I almost all resupply was effected by air from Suoi Da to field locations. During Phase II resupply was effected by convoys from Quan Loi to forward locations. S-4 representatives were located at the supply points (Suoi Da and Quan Loi) to assist units.

c. Maintenance: Company maintenance personnel maintained and repaired vehicles and equipment in the field. They were assisted by the Battalion Maintenance Section which stayed with the Battalion forward CP during the entire operation. Additional maintenance support was provided by a contact team from the 701st Maintenance Battalion.

d. Transportation: With the exception of occasional low boy support from D.S. units, organic transportation was used.

e. Communication: TOE AM and FM radios were principle means of communications. An additional VHF unit allowed the Battalion to have telephone to Division Forward and rear locations.

f. Medical: The Battalion Aid Station was operational in the field with the Aid Station set up with Battalion forward. The Battalion Surgeon and his medics conducted roving patrols to the work sites daily, both by air and ground, so as to be close to areas of possible trouble.

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10. SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES:

a. Constructing timber bents in soft bottom streams often presents problems. C Company's solution was to drive five foot sections of creosoted 3"x12" into the mud, much as a steel pile is driven using an 85lb air hammer, to form a crib. The crib formed is bound with 5/8" cable, the mud excavated, and filled with rock which is tamped to provide approximately 100 sq ft of bearing area. For a single lane bridge, this should be adequate in all but the very worst conditions.

b. In areas where Engineer dump trucks cannot traverse terrain APC's from supporting units can easily pick up work parties and pole trailers loaded with culvert, timber, tools, etc.

11. COMMAND ANALYSIS: During Operation Junction City, the largest and probably the most significant operation in all of Vietnam to the date, the "Always First" Engineer Battalion was relied on time after time to accomplish the mission correctly and quickly. The Suoi Da Airfield had to be open on D-Day, and it was; routes 243 and TL4 had to be made passable for artillery vehicles on D-Day, and they were; the KATUM Airfield had to be completed before Phase I terminated, and it was; the 220' combination 120' DD and 100' TS Bailey Bridge had to be ready by D-Day, (Phase II) to allow passage of the 11th ACR, and it too was ready. Demonstrating once again that the "can do" 1st Engineer Battalion is in fact: "ALWAYS FIRST".

FOR THE COMMANDER:

THOMAS E. BEMES
CPT, CE
Adjutant

DISTRIBUTION:
Special

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS
1ST BRIGADE, 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96345

AVDB-SP-O 4 May 1967

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (MACV/RCS/J3/32)

THRU: Commanding General
1st Infantry Division
APO San Francisco 96345

TO: Commanding General
US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
ATTN: J321
APO San Francisco 96345

1. (U) NAME AND TYPE OF OPERATION: Operation JUNCTION CITY, search and destroy.

2. (U) DATES OF OPERATION: 220800 Feb 67, 152400 Apr 67.

3. (C) GENERAL: The control and command headquarters for this operation was 1st Brigade Headquarters with task organization as stated in OPORD 6-67 (Operation JUNCTION CITY). The operation was conducted in TAY NINH and BINH LONG Provinces. The plan envisioned by the commander divided the operation into two phases. Phase I was conducted in TAY NINH Province, in an area south of the Cambodian border and west of route TL-4. The 1st Bde conducted an air mobile assault employing the 1/26 Inf, 1/2 Inf and 1/28 Inf on LZ 1, 3 and 5 respectfully. The 1/26 Inf, 1/28 Inf and 1/2 Inf blocked along phase line BOB, conducted search and destroy operations to destroy VC/NVA forces and installations. The 2/18 Inf Bn secured the MINH THANH logistical base. Phase II was a search and destroy, road and engineer construction site security operation in BINH LONG Province and Eastern War Zone C.

a. Reporting Officer: Colonel William B. Cladwell III

b. Task Organization:

(1) 1st Brigade, Colonel William B. Caldwell III
(2) 1st Bn, 2nd Inf, LTC William C. Simpson
(3) 1st Bn, 28th Inf, LTC Stanley J. Kuick
(4) 1st Bn, 26th Inf, LTC Alexander M. Haig Jr
LTC Joseph H. Hoffman 2 Apr - 15 Apr 67
(5) 1st Bn, 18th Inf, LTC Earle L. Denton
(6) 2nd Bn, 18 Inf, LTC Lewis R. Bauman
(7) 1st Bn, 16 Inf, LTC Rufus E. Lazzell
(8) 2nd Bn, 2 Inf, LTC Edward J. Collins
(9) 1st Sqdn, 4th Cav, LTC Thomas W. Fife
(10) 1st Bn, 5th Arty, LTC William L. Depew
(11) A Co, 1st Engr Bn, Cpt Wayne L. Lucas
(12) C Co, 1st Engr Bn, Cpt Larry A. Blair

4. (C) INTELLIGENCE:

a. Intelligence prior to the operation: Intelligence reports, captured documents and ralliers indicated that COSVN and 9th VC Div Hq were in the northern TAY NINH Province, JUNCTION CITY operational area, and the VC would defend the area. The 9th VC Div, consisted of the 271st VC, 272nd VC and 101 NVA Regiments constitute a major threat to friendly operations in the III CT Z. These regiments were expected to be in the operational area. Elements of the 70th Security Guard were expected to protect COSVN's withdraw to Cambodian border. The 9th VC Div could be reinforced by battalion size elements of the 7th VC Div in 36 to 72 hours, the 1st and 2nd battalions, 273 Regiment could possibly be operating in the area of operation although the 2nd battalion was recently identified in the TAN UYEN area.

ANNEX H

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Downgraded at 3 yr Intervals
Declassified after 12 yrs

Local force units were expected to be encountered in strengths as large as company size. The limited penetration of this area in operation ATTLEBORO uncovered numerous base areas, training sites, supply depots, and medical complexes. Friendly elements expected to encounter mines, booby traps and permanent type fortifications throughout the area. In the second phase of operation JUNCTION CITY, no significant regular units were reported by the enemy order of battle to be operating in the QUAN LOI area. Only small local force units were expected to be encountered.

b. Enemy Situation During Operation:

(1) The VC evaded major contact, and limited operations to sn ing, and hit-and-run tactics by squad size or smaller units. Mines and booby tr ps were employed extensively. Captured documents identified COSVN admin and logistical elements as having been in the northern TAY NINH area. Large amounts of supplies and equipment were captured in the northern TAY NINH area. One large hospital complex was located, and 90 tons of rice were found in one cache. All other equipment and supplies were located in small scattered base camps.

(2) Around QUAN LOI, the VC continued to be evasive. The VC did not oppose US operations in any strength, nor initiated any action with any significant force. Very little supplies or equipment were captured due to the nature of operations in this area, and the limited S&D operations.

c. The terrain varied from heavy jungle with dense undergrowth to sparse forest with trails and little undergrowth. The majority of the terrain was difficult to travers, and was conducive to evasive operations conducted by the VC. The weather was dry, clear, and hot, and had little effect on operations.

d. The fortifications encountered were permanent type bunkers with overhead cover that afforded good protection against artillery, and airstrikes. The bunkers ranged from 2 man to squad size.

5. (C) MISSION: The mission as directed by Division was for the 1st Brigade to conduct airmobile assault into multiple landing zones and block VC/NVA escape routes in AO from South Vietnam to Cambodia, conduct S&D operations in sector to destroy VC/NVA forces and installations, secure engineer work parties in AO and secure MINH THANH with one battalion.

6. (C) CONCEPT OF OPERATION: This operation was conducted in two phases. Phase I (JUNCTION CITY-1) 22 Feb 67 to 4 Mar 67, Phase II (JUNCTION CITY-2) 5 Mar to 15 Apr 67. JUNCTION CITY-1, 1st Brigade conducts airmobile assaults into multiple LZ's vic XT207978, XT244965 and XT275967 commencing 220800H Feb 67, to block VC/NVA escape routes in AO from South Vietnam to Cambodia, conduct search and destroy operations in AO and to destroy VC/NVA forces and installations. JUNCTION CITY-2, 1st Brigade conducts operation JUNCTION CITY-2, employing 1/2 Inf, 1/26 Inf, 1/18 Inf, 1/28 Inf and 1/4 Cav to secure AN LOC/QUAN LOI area, MINH THANH, SF Camp, bridge and airfield construction sites vic XT624485 and secure AN LOC along route 13 and 246.

7. (C) EXECUTION: The 1st Brigade initiated Operation JUNCTION CITY at 220724H Feb 67. The Brigade CP (FWD) remained at MINH THANH and the Brigade CP (TAC) displace to vic XT274964, at 0724H, Defiant, 1/28 Inf, conducted a heliborne assault into LZ 5, AO MARY vic XT274968, the heliborne lift consisted of 1 lift of 70 slicks and was completed by 0811H, at 0812H C company received sniper fire and automatic weapons fire resulting in 2 KIA, 4 WHA. At 1310, B company at XT275594 found 200 bicycle tires and tubes, 25 bunkers with overhead cover and 11 gals of cooking oil. At 1350H XT264967, A company located a small base camp which had recently been occupied. In the base camp was found 1 bag of rice, assorted clothing and 1 canteen. At 1500H C company XT285964 located a small base camp containing 1 rifle, 1 rifle grenade and several hand grenades. At 1540H, C company located 15 bags of rock salt (100 lb bags), 1 AP mine, 1 cartine. At 1559H 2 personnel were wounded from a booby trap. 1/26 Inf Bn, conducted a heliborne assault into LZ 1, AO ALICE vic XT244966, again 1 lift of 60 slicks lifted from MINH THANH, the lift began at 1130H and the Bn was in their new location at 1205H, as the Bn approached their landing zone, fire was received from XT241955, several of the aircraft took hits without casualties. The Bn conducted a sweep in all directions from the LZ then consolidated and established a defensive perimeter; ambush sites were established during the night without contact. 1/2 Inf Bn, Dracula, commenced a heliborne airlift at 1547H to LZ 3, AO JUNE XT205974. The lift consisted of 1 lift of 60 aircrafts and the Bn had completed their lift at 1640H. The Bn immediately moved to NDP position to prepare for the night, at 1922H B company XT210980 received a light, probe from the east. At 2015H B company received a mortar round tree burst at XT209979, resulting in 2 WHA. 2/18 Inf Bn continued to secure MINH THANH logistics base, Div FWD CP and 1st Bde FWD CP. The Bn was Div RRF, and conducted patrols without contact. 1/5 A Btry (DS) continued to support 1st Bde.

D 1/5 was helilifted to LZ 5 in 2 lifts of CH-47 and closed new location at 0934H. B 1/5 was helilifted to LZ 1 with CH-47's closing the new location at 1515H. C Btry remained at MINH THANH.

1st Bde continued operation JUNCTION CITY on the 23 Feb, receiving OPCON B 1/4 Cav at 0700H. 1/2 Inf continued search and destroy operations while blocking in AO JUNE. At 0935H, vic XT214976, C company located a VC base camp with 15-20 bunkers, the company had a claymore detonated against them resulting in 1 WHA and 1 Scout Dog killed, later in the same vic C company located another base camp and received automatic weapons fire, airstrikes were called in. Later the company inspected the airstrike area, they found bloody cloths and spotted 3 VC, results 2 VC (KIA) (BC). In the same area was found 30 bunkers, 6 huts, and cooking area. At 1655H vic XT215977, B company engaged 2 VC, killing 1. 1/26 Inf Bn continued to block in AO ALICE and conducted search and destroy operation in zone. At 0935H vic XT242972 the recon platoon located a small base camp which contained a hut 20'x30', hospital room, classroom, 200 lbs of rice, 25 rds S/A, 2 blasting caps, ox-cart, 3 pigs, 20 chickens, 400 lbs of peanuts and misc documents. C company, while in their assigned search and destroy area located another base camp at XT241955 which contained 2 rice bins of 7540 lbs rice, 2 shower points, ping pong tables, indicating an R&R center. 1/28 Inf Br blocked in AO MARY and conducted S&D in assigned AO. At 1600H the Bn received OPCON B 1/4 Cav (-) to support in S&D operation. During the days operation B company located a VC base camp at XT280953. In the base camp the company found 23 bunkers, fortified and foxholes positions, a claymore, 30-5 gal cans of fish, 2600 prs of sandals and 135-200 lbs bags of rice. At 2355H the 1/28 Bn, 1/5 Arty (-) and 1st Bde CP received a mortar attack from vic XT274964, 12 mortar rounds of unk size landed in the perimeter causing 12 US WHA. 2/18 Inf Bn remained at MINH THANH logistics base for security and patrolled without contact.

On 24 Feb 1st Brigade continued to block and conduct search and destroy operation. At 0012H VC mortars were observed firing vic XT255969 LZ 5 was under mortar attack. At 0012H, A 1/26 ambush patrol observed VC mortar, firing, and the rounds landing on LZ 5. Counter-mortar and artillery fired were fired, and at 0052H the VC mortars ceased. At 0205H airstrikes were placed in the area with illumination provided by a flare ship. A patrol was dispatched to take an assessment of the area with neg results. At 1230H vic XT245950, C company located a transistor radio and moments later sighted 6 VC, they engage the VC with small arms resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC). In the same area, C company located a large hut containing 1-sub machinegun, 4,536 BA-30 batteries, 1,750 erasers, 700 pencil 500 ball point pens, 5000 rounds 9mm ammo, 1 walkie talkie, 1 PRC-10 with frequer set at 43.50, five rifles, 3 US carbines, 70 reams of paper, 10 reams carbon pape 18 Sony portable radios, 4 civilian telephones, 80 oil lamp glasses, a tape recorder with two tapes, 100 entrenching tools, 1-25 pound claymore, 20 gal keros 300 lbs polished rice, 1 new Briggs and Stratton 3 HP engine and generator, 3 bundles of documents. Most of those items were evacuated. At 1510H C company engaged several VC vic XT245950, resulting in 3 VC KIA, 1 WIA, and 1 US WHA. 1/2 Inf Bn remained in blocking position and conducted search and destroy operati in assigned AO. At 0936H, vic XT206977, B company located a small base camp and 4 bicycles. In the same vic, contact was made with an unk VC force. Arty and Airstrikes were called in which opened part of the jungle area. A patrol was dispatched to inspect the area with neg results. At XT224975 B company patrol located 2 tons of unpolished rice, 80 lbs of dynamite and 100 lbs of dryed fish, 1000ft of detonating cord. At 1120H, 500 meters away XT224972, a Co size base camp was found which contained 15 huts, 3 pigs, 8 chickens, 280 gallons kerosene, 2000 rds S/A, 500 lbs dry beans and 100 lbs of cloths. The 1/28 Inf Bn continue to search and destroy while blocking in AO MARY. At 0003H, 1/28 received 9 rds of 60 mortars within their perimeter with neg casualties. While on search and destroy, B company made contact with an unknown VC force vic XT274977 and XT2709 respectfully with neg casualties. A base camp was located at XT269957 and B company came in contact with an unknown size VC unit. As they entered the base camp, B company sustained 1 US KHA, 1 VC KIA and 2 probable was sustained by the enemy forces. The base camp contained 79 rifle grenades, 2 concussion grena 3 home-made mines, 16 frag grenades, 2 bosex of blasting caps, 1400 ft electric wire, 12 flash light batteries, 4000 rds of S/A ammo, 2 axes, 1 machette, all were destroyed in place. At 1245H XT282981 C company received sniper fire. As the searched the area C Company located 1500 lbs of rice, 25 bags of salt and some livestock.

1st Bde continue operation JUNCTION CITY on 25 Feb, the TAC CP remained at XT274964, the battalion activities for the day included. 1/2 Inf Bn, while in blocking positions and search and destroy, located a hut at XT212964, a few minutes later (at 1305H) in the same location C company came under sniper and automatic weapons fire, they had located an estimate VC company in fighting positions. A/S was placed on the target area and the VC fled leaving behind 3 VC KIA (BC), friendly forces sustained 1 KHA and 2 WHA. At 1130H, XT205977, B comapny located and destroyed 500 lbs of polished rice and at 1200H XT201986 A company destroyed another 500 lbs polished rice.

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At 2055H just outside B company perimeter XT214977 a company element engaged 6 VC with claymore and artillery with unknown results. 1/26 Inf continued with assigned mission of search and destroy and blocking, vic XT251953 C company located an open area with punji stakes 10-12 inches long which were destroyed. B company at XT260954 located 18 tons of rice. At XT256965 C company located a bicycle storage area with 27 bicycles and 1000 rds of 9mm ammo. at 1515H vic XT260959 found a hut containing 20-200 lbs bags of rice and 1-10'x20'x25' bin full of rice. In this area were many indications of recent use. During their sweep, C company located at XT240951, the following items, a bin of polished rice 12'x6'x3', 13 commercial transistor radios, (Sharp, Standard, Sony), 5 BA-30 batteries, 53 unservisable bicycles, 3 boxes of bicycle tires, 12-3 gal of POL, 1 Chinese rifle with folding bayonet, 1000 rounds 9mm ammo, 1-25 lb claymore, 500 paper plates, 25-5 gallon cans of dried fish with Chinese markings, 4 lbs of nails, 4 picks, 3 shovels, 3 crosscut saws, 8 black uniforms, 17 yrds of black material, 100 yrds of plastic material, 100 books, (math and chemistry) and 5 bundles of documents. All food was destroyed and other items evacuated. 1/28 Inf with a platoon B 1/4 Cav attached continued search and destroy operations. At 0920H XT264955, B company located a small base camp with 4 bunkers built with overhead cover, at the same location 10 tons of unpolished rice was destroyed. 2/18 Inf remained at MINH THANH for security of the logistics base and Div RRF. A 1st Engr Bn supported the 1st Brigade in sector and cleared sides of the road from LZ 5 to the 173rd Abn Bde boundary. 1/5 Arty (DS) supported the 1st Bde. D 1/5 Arty remained at XT274964, B 1/5 XT245965 and A 1/5 was located at MINH THANH.

26th Feb, 1st Brigade continued blocking and search and destroy operations. During S&D operation, 1/2 Inf Bn located 500 lbs of rice, a portable switch board, and part of a telephone, returning to their NDP without incident. A 1/26 began patrolling west from NDP and C company to the southeast. At 1345H, C company vic XT246952 found 150 pairs of "Ho Chi Minh" sandals, 40 lbs of polished rice, 40 cans of Cambodian tomatoes, 5 pigs, 40 chickens, 20-10 gallons cooking pots, 17-5 gal pots, 13 cooking pans and 10 bottles of penicilin, the Bn closed their NDP without contact. 1/28 Inf with B 1/4 Cav (-) attached conducted search and destroy operations in AO MARY. During the days operation the Bn located 2 base camps, XT283950 and XT299955, the following was found in the base camp, 2-10 gal cans of salt, 3 kitchen areas, the Bn returned to its NDP without contact. A 1st Engr supported the 1st Bde and while clearing the route at XT302947 a 1/4 ton vehicle was hit by an AT weapon, resulting in 2 US WHA, and light damage to the vehicle.

On 27th Feb, the 1st Bde continued to block in zone and conduct search and destroy operations to destroy VC/NVA forces and installations. The 1/2 Inf blocked in sector and conducted S&D operation. At 1145H vic XT209962 C company located a small base camp, close to the base camp was a crater caused by previous arty firing and a great deal of blood was observed around the crater. The base camp consisted of 3 bunkers and 1 hut. A claymore and a leather jacket was found at the base camp. At 1440H XT258974 B company observed 1 VC running from them, the unit engaged with S/A, 1 VC KIA (BC). TF 1,26 employed two rifle companies and the recon plat in AO's with 1 rifle company and Cav plat from B 1/4 as RRF in LZ 1. At 1345H vic XT256972, 2 platoon size patrols from B company began to cloverleaf in the area, and a cultivated area containing 12 water buffalos was located. Signs of recent use and occupance was evident. A tunnel leading to an underground room was discovered at XT256972, and destroyed, C company located a VC base camp at XT235949. At 1130H, as they approached the fringe of the base camp the lead element received sniper fire from a VC squad. Fire was returned, mortar, artillery and air were place in the target area. While two platoons engaged the VC, the 3rd platoon was dispatched to the south to secure a near by LZ. However, the LZ was defended by another VC force, equipped with sniper rifle and automatic weapons, because this action was on the border of 1/26, and the 1/11 Cav was within 1000 meters away, C company was placed OPCON 1/11 Cav. The Cav sqd move toward C company at the same time airstrikes were being placed on the enemy position. C company trapped 2 VC in a bunker complex vic XT235949. The VC waved a white flag as C company approached, but fired instead of surrendin 1/11 Cav A troop approached from the south, the VC resistance was eliminated, one VC was crushed by a tank, the other captured by C company 1/26. Both VC were armed with high powered rifles with sniper scopes. C company suffered 2 KHA, and 3 WHA, VC casualties were 4 KIA (BC) and 1 VCC WIA, at 1430H, it was determined the prisoner taken was from D Co 795th Regiment. C company was moving from the contact area back to LZ 1, at 1550H vic XT237959, sporadic sniper fire was received by lead element. The fire increased and the VC force developed into a platoon. Air and Artillery was placed on the target. A platoon from B 1/4 was sent in to enforce C company at 1635H. At 1655H the Cav platoon received three RPG-2 rounds without casualties. At the same time VC S/A fire was received from XT228950. Cannister, HE and white phosphorus tank rounds as well as .50 cal was fired point blank, resulting in 4 VC KIA (BC). The remainder of the VC force fled. As the VC fled to the northwest airstrikes and arty were placed on routes of withdrawl. Team C suffered 1 KHA and 4 WHA's.

VC casualties were 8 KIA (BC) with another 15 VC KIA (probable). Team C captured 2 French sub-machineguns, 1 US M1 rifle, 2 mauser, and 2 M-60 machinegun barrels. Casualties were evacuated and C company resupplied, the company returned to NDP at 2015H. 1/28 continued to block in sector and conducted S&D in AO's with B 1/4 Cav (-) attached. At 1135H vic XT293965 A company made contact with an estimated VC squad. Airstrikes and Arty were employed with unknown results. US casualties were 2 KHA, 3 WHA, VC broke contact at 1150H. A company observed 2 platoons of VC wearing black uniforms.

28 Feb, 1st Brigade continued operation JUNCTION CITY. On 28 Feb by continuing to block and conducting search and destroy operations in sector. During the days operation the 1/2 Inf Bn located and destroyed 8,200 lbs of rice at XT198893 & XT198975. At 1540H A company located a small base camp consisting of several bunkers and a trench line. The 1/26 Inf Bn conducted search and destroy operations. At XT227950 C comapny found 7-81mm mortar rds, 1-60mm mortar rd, 159 rifle grenades, 1-AT rocket, 1 frag grenade, 1 anti-aircraft mount for .50 cal, 1-M14, and 1 Chinese assault rifle. The mortar rounds and grenades were destroyed, the weapons returned with the Bn as they moved into NDP at LZ 1. At 1115H 1/28 Inf located 450 bags (250 lb. bags) of rice. 47 bags of fish (100 lb bags) at XT293968. At 1440H while cloverleafing at the same location, the Bn located a base camp which contained 6 booby trap grenades, a kitchen complex, and fresh blood was found on the table. A few hundred meters from there XT284962, C company located a smaller base camp containing 6 bags of fish (250 lb bags) each. The 2/28 Inf Bn was conducting search and destroy operations and secured MINH THANH without contact.

On the 1st of March the 1st Brigade continued with its mission and located several base camps with numerous VC supplies. During search and destroy operation the 1/2 Inf Bn located a company size base camp with the camp fires still burning. In the camp the Bn found medical supplies, a few hundred meters from the base camp XT203975, B company received sniper fire, it came from a bunker, and vic the bunker the company sighted 8-10 VC. Fire was returned resulting in 3 VC KIA (BC), 2 weapons were captured, 1 Russian sub-machinegun, 1 US M1 rifle. At 1548H vic XT221959 B company engaged 3 VC that was creaping up on their psn. Results 1 US KHA, enemy casualties were 3 VC KIA (BC). At 0800H, 1/26 Inf conducted a sweep of their perimeter and departed for search and destroy operation. At 1440H vic XT 239958 C Co found a large propaganda school base camp approximately 400 meters long, recent occupancy was indicated by a calendar which reflected the current date, found in the camp complex was a bag of documents, 1 claymore, 1 grenade, 30 cal ammo, bicycle parts, a standard 4 band radio, medical supplies, speaker system with speakers and amplifiers. The base camp had light, office type huts, mess hall, 2 dispensaries and sleeping quarters. No fighting positions were found in the camp. All items were evacuated. The Bn closed their NDP without contact. The 1/28 Inf continued to search and destroy in the Bn AO. At 1020H XT287952 the Bn located 10 huts and 10 bunkers, all were destroyed. 2/18 secure the log base at MINH THANH without contact.

2 March, 1st Brigade continued operation JUNCTION CITY, Bde CP Fwd remained at MINH THANH. Bde TAC CP remained at XT274964. 1/2 Inf Bn airlifted from PZ vic XT208979 to QUAN LOI using 10 UH-1D aircraft and 4 CH-47 the last lift closed QUAN LOI at 1300H and the Bn prepared for future operation. 1/26 Inf Bn departed for search and destroy operations at 0805H. During the days operation the Bn located and destroyed 36 bunkers, all had overhead cover. Upon returning to NDP the Bn prepared for a move the following day to MINH THANH. 1/28 Inf Bn patrolled in zone and located 4 bags of rice (400 lb bags), some documents and 9 newly built bunkers XT262948. The bunkers and rice were destroyed. The documents were evacuated. 2/18 Inf Bn continued defense of MINH THANH and remained Div RRF. A 1st Engr was released OPCON 1st Brigade at 1500H, and moved to SUOI DA.

The 1st Brigade continued operation JUNCTION CITY on 3 March, the TAC CP (-) departed XT274964 for QUAN LOI and MINH THANH. The 1/2 Inf Bn stood-down at QUAN LOI, conducted maintenance and prepared for future operations while the Bn trains lifted from MINH THANH to QUAN LOI in 10 sorties C-130 aircraft closing QUAN LOI at 1221H. 1/26 Inf airlifted from PZ vic XT242963 to MINH THANH, using 60 sorties of UH-1D and 4 CH-47 aircraft. The first lift was off to LZ 5 vic XT275964 at 1040H, then on to MINH THANH. At 1043H vic XT242981 a UH-1D from 162nd Avn had mechanical difficulties and made a forced landing, five men from B 1/26 were injured slightly, the ship was destroyed by armed gun ships. The Bn closed MINH THANH at 1500H. The 1/28 Inf continued the operation by blocking in position and search and destroy operation in sector. At 0900H vic XT285949, the recon element located a small base camp, 2 huts and 6 bunkers, were destroyed. 1/5 Arty (DS) continued to support the 1st Brigade, Bn CP departed LZ 5 vic XT275964 by 6 sorties CH-47 at 1100H, closing QUAN LOI at 1300H. B 1/5 moved from LZ 1 vic XT242963 to LZ 5 then to AN LOC closing at 1130H. D 1/5 continued to support 2/28 Inf at LZ 5, and A 1/5 supported 2/18 Inf at MINH THANH.

4 March, The 1st Brigade terminated phase I of operation JUNCTION CITY. (JUNCTION CITY-1) 4 March 1967. The Brigade CP remained at MINH THANH. 1st Brigade TAC CP departed LZ 5 vic XT274964 by CH-47 at 1411H. The Bde continued to secure MINH THANH, QUAN LOI area and prepare for phase II (Operation JUNCTION CITY-2) OPORD 7-67 was issue this date. 1/2 Inf Bn conducted local patrols in QUAN LOI area, conducted maintenance and training at MINH THANH, 1/26 Inf and 2/18 Inf conducted security of MINH THANH, trained and patrolled in sector. Commencing at 1356H, 1/28 Inf airlifted from LZ 5 to KATUM closing at 1445H and become OPCON 173rd Abn Bde upon closing. The 36th Rngr Bn and 3/1 Cav (ARVN) OPCON TF Dixie, continued to secure QUAN LOI without incident. 1/5 Arty (DS) and 7/9 Arty (DS) continued to support 1st Brigade and TF Dixie. D 1/5 Arty moved by convoy at 1100H from LZ 5 under Div Arty control to KATUM.

On 5 March 1967, 1st Bde continued to defend MINH THANH/QUAN LOI and prepared for JUNCTION CITY-2, 1/2 remained at QUAN LOI and was charged with its security. 1/26 Inf and 2/18 Inf continued with the defense of MINH THANH and patrolled actively in zone. TF Dixie continued with the security of QUAN LOI/ AN LOC. 1 Company of 36th Rngr Bn conducted S&D operations and search and seal of village vic XT871964, finding a .50 cal machinegun barrel and trigger housing group. 1/5 Arty (DS) and 7/9 Arty (DS) continued support of 1st Brigade and TF Dixie. Commencing at 1100H, B 7/9 Arty airlifted with 8 sorties C-130 from PHUOC VINH closing QUAN LOI at 1630H.

6 March, 1st Brigade conducted defense of MINH THANH/QUAN LOI and positioned units for upcoming operation. At 0700H, 1st Brigade CP airlifted by C-130 from MINH THANH to QUAN LOI closing at 1158H. 1/2 Inf continued maintenance, training and patrolling at QUAN LOI. At 1800H 1/2 received attachment A 3/5 Cav and given the mission of securing engr units at AN LOC. 1/26 & 2/18 secured MINH THANH without contact. At 0600H, 36th Rngr Bn and 3/1 (ARVN) Cav became OPCON 1st Brigade 9th Div. 7/9 Arty became (DS) 1st Bde 9th Div.

7 March, 1st Brigade initiated operation JUNCTION CITY-2. At 070700H March 1967 and continued to defend MINH THANH.

1. (C) MISSION: 1st Brigade opens route 246 west, southwest from AN LOC and secures engr construction party at bridge site vic XT624815, secures engr work parties constructing SF/CIDG camps and airfield vic XT6281.

2. (C) CONCEPT OF OPERATION: 1st Brigade secured route 246 from AN LOC to the bridge site vic XT624875, secured landing zones vic XT625815 for air-landing of 1/26 Inf Bn. TF 1/2 with A 3/5 attached provided security for engr work parties, conducted search and destroy operations in AO WILLIE and JOE and secure fire support base BRAVO on order, TF 1/2 was employed to the east and 1/2 Inf Bn to the west of the Saigon river and 1/28 Inf, Div RRF at MINH THANH. 2/18 Inf Bn was to airlift to FSB CHARLIE vic XT5685 and become OPCON 2nd Brigade O/A 17 March 1967. Task Force 1/2 crossed the SP at 0710H and arrived at the bridge site XT624815 at 1000H. B company crossed the river and secured LZ PINE XT619816 The Bn secured and cleared the route from QUAN LOI to CP 13, (bridge site) for the engineer work parties and established the Bn NDP at XT644822. A 3/5 Cav attached to 1/2 Inf vic XT674859, hit an AT mine resulting in light damage to the tank, at 1605H XT673860, a second mine was hit, resulting in 4 US WHA, APC destroyed. The Bn moved to NDP without contact. At 1300H 1/26 commenced an air-lift from MINH THANH to LZ PINE vic XT619816, closing at 1500H. The Bn moved to NDP without contact. 2/18 Inf remained at MINH THANH to secure the MINH THANH base with neg contact. 1/5 Arty (-) supported 1st Bde while being controlled and secured by 1st Bde 9th Div at QUAN LOI. C 7/9 Arty moved from AN LOC to FSB A (XT798818) and B 1/5 Arty from QUAN LOI to AN LOC for mutual support of QUAN LOI and FSB-A. B 8/6 Arty remained at FSB-A. A 1st Engr company began construction on route 246 and on the bridge. At 1753H vic XT641826, and engr 1/4 ton hit a mine resulting in 1 US WHA, and 1/4 extensively damaged.

8th March, 1st Brigade conducts route security and search and destroy operations in zone. TF 1/2 secured route GREEN and the bridge construction site, while elements of A 1st Engr Bn repaired route 246 and the bridge. During S&D operations located and destroyed 29 fortified positions vic XT646822. At 0004H C company patrol spotted 3 VC vic XT641826, they engaged the enemy with unknown results. The 1/26 Inf on the west side of the river, secured their portion of the bank and engr work parties. At 1300H a patrol of 1/26 Inf located a crashed airplane identified as a 2 engine jet with markings "NC" XT600800. At 1500H they recovered 4 bodies, 2 sets of dog tags, 2 M-14 rifles, 1 M-16 rifle, 6 M-60 machineguns, 1 .45 cal pistol from a helicopter crash at XT618818. 2/18 Inf Bn continued to secure MINH THANH and conducted patrols in the MINH THANH area. A company patrol located and destroyed two mine fields of 30 mines each, XT644689, XT649694. 1/5 Arty continued to support 1st Brigade and A 1st Engr continue construction on route 246 and the bridge site.

9th March, 1st Brigade continued with operation JUNCTION CITY-2 secured route 246 and conducted search and destroy operations. Task Force 1/2 secured route GREEN and the bridge construction site. A 3/5 was utilized for five thunder runs in 1/2 Inf area between the hours 2000 and 0500H, the Bn closed NDP XT646826 without contact. 1/26 Inf Bn secured the bridge area for A 1st Engr Bn and conducted search and destroy operations in AO WILLIE. C company was the Bn RRF. At 1500H XT597797 B company located a large base camp 500 meters by 200 meters. The camp contained permanent latrines and bridges over the ravines, probably a main force way station. 2/18 Inf Bn secured MINH THANH and conducted search and destroy operations. At 1430H XT636586, B company located a mine field of 14 mines (Bouncing-Betty mines). The mine field was destroyed. 1/5 Arty supported 1st Brigade with A battery located at MINH THANH, B battery at FSB-A and D battery at XT699871.

10th March, 1st Brigade continued security of MINH THANH, QUAN LOI, route 246 and Engr construction site. The Bn's conducted search and destroy operations in assigned AO's. 1/2 Inf Bn patrol located a trail and tunnel to the river XT629800. A 3/5 while conducting "Thunder runs" at XT663843 received 2 magazine of carbine fire, 2 US WHA (Slight). 1/26 Inf conducted a company size sweep to the north and south of the bridge site. At 0950H XT608822 made contact with 4 VC, the enemy was engaged with mortar and arty with unknown results. 2/18 Inf Bn secured MINH THANH without incident.

11 March, 1st Brigade continued operation JUNCTION CITY-2, conducted search and destroy missions and secured assigned areas. 1/2 Inf Bn secured route GREEN, the construction site and conducted a company size patrol. The Bn closed NDP without contact. 1/26 Inf continued with security mission and search and destroy operations. At XT616767, XT600785 and XT599781, the Bn located 3 base camps, after destroying these base camps. A company made contact with 5 VC vic XT585792 air and arty were called resulting in 1 VC KIA, 3 WIA and 1 AK-47 captured. The 2/18 secured MINH THANH without incident.

12 March, 1st Brigade continued with operation JUNCTION CITY-2, the defense of MINH THANH and assumed responsibilities for security of QUAN LOI/AN LOC area. The 1/2 Inf Bn continued with security of a portion of route GREEN and the construction site vic XT695870 until releived by A 1/28 Inf. At 0750H an element from the Bn located a pressure type AT mine at vic XT674856. In the same vic A 3/5 Cav destroyed a small base camp. During search and destroy operations in 1/26 Inf area. At 1336H elements of the Bn observed 20 armed VC XT569857 who were dressed in green uniforms with steel helmets, approximately 30 VC were sighted 800 meters to the south. Arty and Airstrikes were placed in both areas with unknown results. 1/28 Inf took up positions at the bridge construction site releiving 1/2 elements of the security mission. The Bn (-) conducted maintenance at QUAN LOI and prepared for future operations. Task Force Dixie secured QUAN LOI/AN LOC area, FSB-A and secured a portion of the route in sector for movement of Spt Cmd convoy. The convoy closed QUAN LOI at 1530H, At 0600H B 2/47 became OPCON 1st Brigade and was utilized to escort B 1/5 from FSB-A to FSB-B. A 1st Engr continued construction on the bridge and route 246.

13 March, 1st Brigade continued security and search and destroy operations and airlifted 1/18 from PHUOC VINH and MINH THANH to QUAN LOI. At 1900H XT652832 1/2 Inf sighted 4 VC which were immediately engaged with arty, the area was checked at first light the following day with neg results. 1/26 & 1/28 conducted S&D operation without contact. A 1/18 airlifted from LAI KHE to QUAN LOI. A 1/18 from PHUOC VINH to QUAN LOI and became OPCON 1st Bde upon closing. 2/18 Inf secured MINH THANH vic XT637657, B company located a small base camp with 30 foxholes and 4 ambush positions. TF Dixie secured QUAN LOI and a portion of route 13 for movement of the south bound logistics convoy. B 2/47 vic XT670833 made contact with an estimate 2 platoons of VC in a base camp. The VC force fled to the south leaving behind 3 VC KIA, 4 WIA, 2 Chinese rifles, 140 rounds M-16 ammo, 2 claymores and 1 CS grenade. B 2/47 received several rounds of VC mortar without casualties. At 1000H FSB-A was closed and B 8/6 Arty moved from FSB-A to FSB-B XT636815. B 8/6 moved to 1st Engr base XT6987.

14 March, 1st Brigade continued with security mission and airlifted 1/18 Inf to field position, along route 246. 1/2 Inf secured portion of route GREEN and conducted search and destroy in sector. At 0945H A 3/5 was detached from the Bn and attached to 1/26 Inf, with A 3/5. 1/26 Inf conducted search and destroy without contact and secured the bridge site and engineers work in sector. A 1/28 Inf secured engineer arty base at XT696872, C 1/28 departed for FSB-ECHO and closed at 1720H XT781821 to secure 7/9 Arty (-). 1/18 Inf airlifted by UH-ID at 1445H from QUAN LOI to LZ 1 XT707759 and LZ 2 XT728782 closing at 1515H. B 2/47 arrived LZ 2 at 1600H and was attached to 1/18 Inf Bn. At 1740H XT729783 an APC from B 2/47 hit a large pressure type mine resulting in 2 KHA, 2 WHA, and APC destroyed. 2/18 continued to secure MINH THANH and at 1050H airlifted by UH-ID from MINH THANH to LZ 3 vic XT687747 closing at 1100H and established NDP. At

1645H a plat from A 3/5 was attached to C 2/18 at LZ 3[illegible]. TF Dixie consisting of 36th Rngr Bn and 3/1 Cav (ARVN) secured portions of hwy 13 for logistics convoy and secured QUAN LOI.

15 March, 1st Brigade continued operation JUNCTION CITY-2, secure MINH THANH, QUAN LOI/AN LOC areas, hwy 13, route 245 and 246. 1/2 Inf with B 2/47 attached secured route GREEN and Engr portion in sector. At 1330H the recon element located a small base camp XT500794 which contained 29 covered bunkers and several cooking fires indicating the VC had just fled the area. 1/28 Inf secured Engr-Arty base at XT696872. B company airlifted from QUAN LOI to LAI KHE at 1500H and became OPCON 1st Bde 9th Div upon closing. While on patrol A company sighted 30 VC XT691879 moving north. Arty was employed killing 1 VC (BC). TF 1/18 with a platoon of A 3/5 and B 2/47 secured route 245. At 0730H C company found and destroyed 1 large pressure tupe mine and home-made pressure type mine. While returning to NDP a VTR from A 3/5 hit a pressure mine XT737931 resulting in 1 slightly wounded and the VTR damaged. It was repaired in place. 2/18 with 1 platoon A 3/5 secured the southwest portion of route 245 and secured Div Hq at MINH THANH. The patrols from the Bn closed their perimeter without contact. TF Dixie secured QUAN LOI/AN LOC area. 3/1 Cav and 1 company 36th ARVN Rngr Bn secured a portion of hwy 13 for convoys. A report was received from 2/9 ARVN Recondo indicating a VC company at 0720H at XT858852. Arty was placed in the area and 3/1 Cav departed in pursuit of the enemy, but did not make contact.

16 March 67, Operation JUNCTION CITY-2 continued with 1st Bde conducting security of MINH THANH, QUAN LOI/AN LOC and routes 13 and 245. 1/2 Inf secured route 245 with B 2/47 (-) and patrolled without contact. 1/26 Inf secured portion of route GREEN, bridge site, airfield and CIDG construction sites without contact. 1/28 Inf secured Engr-Arty base and B company remained OPCON 1st Bde, 9th Inf Div. At 0405H, TF 1/18 with A 3/5 Cav (-) spotted several VC to their front XT729784. M-79's and Arty was fired at the target. At 0710H same location B company received sniper fire. The fire was returned resulting in 1 VC KIA. A patrol was dispatched for an assessment of the area. The patrol found 4 VC KIA (BC) by arty and mortar, 13,000 piasters, 1 rifle (Model 98 Mauser), assorted clothing and web gear, a bag of mediacal supplies (15lbs) and assorted documents, and VC mail. There were no US casualties. 2/18 Inf with A 3/5 Cav secured route 245 from MINH THANH to XT695750. The Bn secured and escorted the 1st Div Hqs (Fwd) in its move from MINH THANH to LAI KHE. 1/5 Arty continued support of 1st Bde, A 1st Engr continued construction work at bridge site and along route GREEN.

17 March 67, 1st Bde continued operation JUNCTION CITY, opened and secured route 245, Hwy 13 and secured construction sites in sector. 1/2 Inf Bn with B 2/47 (-) attached continued with its security mission. At 1500H the Bn release attachment of B 2/47 which became OPCON 1st Bde, 9th Inf Div at QUAN LOI . At 1407H A 3/5 (-) was detached 1/18 and convert to control of 1/2 Inf. At 1735H A 3/5 Cav received S/A fire vic XT673858, resulting in 3 slightly wounded US personnel. Mortar and Arty was fired with unknown results. 1/26 secured route GREEN without contact. The 1/18 Inf secured route 245 in sector and at 1200H, received attachment of A 3/5 Cav. The Bn returned to NDP without contact. 1/28 Inf A Co continued security of Engr-Arty base at XT696872. At 1600H B 1/28 closed QUAN LOI reverting to control of 1st Bde from 1/9 Div. C Co secured 7/9 Arty at FSB-ECHO, XT778822. There was no contact throughout the day. TF Dixie continued with security mission without contact. The supporting units, A 1st Engr and 1/5 Arty had no incidents through the day.

18 March 67, 1st Bde continued to secure AN LOC/QUAN LOI area and SF/CIDG camp, bridge and airfield construction site vic XT624815 and from AN LOC to QUAN LOI along route 246 to vic XT5684. Established and prepared to pass forces responsible for the security to the 2nd Bde. 1/2 Inf with A 3/5 secured route GREEN and the eastern side of the bridge site. At 1500H 1/4 Cav (-) relieved A 3/5 Cav (-) in position and became OPCON 1/2 Inf. Upon relief A 3/5 moved to QUAN LOI and became OPCON 1st Bde, 9th Inf Div upon closing. Throughout the day's operation the Bn located a resting place where approximately 50 VC had stopped to rest, XT673852. 1/26 Inf securing the bridge site, airfield and CIDG camp construction, remained in position until relieved in place by 1/18 Inf. The platoon A 3/5 attached to 1/26 was replaced by platoon 1/4 Cav (-) at 1010H. At 1345H XT585830, the Bn received small arms fire. Gunships were employed which also received fire from the same area. Arty then airstrikes were placed in the target area with unknown results. 1/18 Inf moved by vehicle from QUAN LOI and relieved 1/26 and assumed responsibility for security of the bridge site, airfield and CIDG camp construction. 1/28 with their companies employed in different security locations continued with their present mission. 2/18 continued to secur MINH THANH and prepared for future operations. 1/4 Cav Sqdn (-) closed AN LOC at 1325H, becoming OPCON 1st Bde. A 1st Engr continued construction of bridge site, CIDG camp and airfield at 2145H, XT696954 elements of 1/28 securing the Engineers spotted movement with a starlight scope. An M-60 machinegun was fired resulting in one VC KIA.

19 March 67, 1st Bde continued operation JUNCTION CITY-2 with security mission in Bde sector and search and destroy operation. 1/2 Inf with A 1/4 (-) attached secured route 246 from AN LOC to the bridge site. At 1220H vic XT648-828 A 1/2 found and destroyed 8 frag grenades. A few minutes later same vicinity small arms fire was received by elements of A 1/4 Cav and an RPG-2 rd resulting in light damage to the APC. Small arms fire and arty was returned, a brief fire fight lasting only a few minutes took place with the VC. The VC estimated at 2 plts, fled to the east. Results of the skirmish were 2 US WHA. Meanwhile at XT676862 A 1/4 APC hit a mine causing 2 (slight) WHA and extensive damage to the APC. The Bn returned to NDP without further contact. 1/26 Inf continued with security of route 246 from AN LOC to the XT602822 to CP 8 and secured Engr work parties at 1025H. A 1/26 XT585831 received automatic small arms fire and grenades from an estimated platoon size VC force. Heavy mortar, arty, gunships and airstrikes were placed on the VC location and the routes of withdrawal to the south and west. There were no US casualties. The area was checked with the following results: 4 VC KIA (Prob), 50 rds M-16, AK-47, crimp cartridge for M-1 rifle. At 1145H while on search and destroy vic XT574838, A 1/4 APC hit a pressure type AT mine made from a 105mm rd, resulting in 1 US KHA and extensive damage to the APC. At 1545H, XT573838, A 1/26 located and destroyed 3 AT plastic type mines. Two minutes later, same vicinity, A 1st Engr tank dozer hit a pressure type mine resulting in slight damage to the track and no casualties. 1/18, 1/28 continued with security responsibilities without incident. 2/18 Inf continued to secure Engr/Arty base, FSB-B and MINH THANH respectively without contact. 1/4 Cav (-) assisted TF Dixie in defense of QUAN LOI and prepared for future operations. 1/5 Arty (DS) continued to support 1st Bde. 8/6, 1/7, 7/9, and C 2/34 Arty were GS. 1/5 Arty prepared for future operations. At 0945H, Div G-2 Air on recon mission located an estimated VC Bn at XT5797 moving south. At 1005H Div Arty AO took over arty fire missions. 3 Airstrikes were put in by 1st Bde FAC's and 261 rds 8" and 91 rds 175mm Arty were fired by 1700H. Results: 37 VC KIA (BC), 40 VC KIA (Prob), 0 VC WIA (Prob), 5 log and thatch building 60'x20' destroyed.

20 March 67, 1st Bde continued operation JUNCTION CITY-2 secured MINH THANH QUAN LOI/AN LOC and conducts search and destroy in sector. 1/2 Inf with A 1/4 (-) secured the bridge site, route GREEN (246). The Bn cleared and secured route 246 and outposted the route for engr work parties in sector, without contact. 1/26 Inf with a platoon of A 1/4 Cav secured route 246 from XT602822 to CP 14, and secured FSB-C for movement of 36th Ranger Bn (ARVN), C 8/6 Arty and C 2/35 Arty into FSB-C. The route was secured and the Arty units began their move at 1400H, and closed at 1815H. A 1/26 while on search and destroy missions located and destroyed 16 old bunkers and 3 M-1A1 AT mines. In the same vic the patrol sighted 2 VC, a few minutes later they spotted 5 more VC in black uniforms while arty was being employed, a brief fire fight took place with neg US casualties. Arty was placed on the target area with unknown results. At 1745H XT570852, 1 VC was spotted and fired upon, results 1 VC KIA (BC) and 1 AK-50 rifle captured. At 1800H XT559853 A Co received sniper fire from a single sniper. Results 1 sniper VC KIA (BC). A 1/28 Inf continued to secure the Engr/Arty base XT696872 OPCON 1st Engr Bn. C Co had the responsibility to secure FSB-E XT780822. B Co attached to 1/4 (-) secured route 245 in sector, without contact. 1/18 Inf continued to secure the bridge site, CIDG camp and airfield and conducted patrols in sector without incident. The 2/18 Inf was tasked with security of MINH THANH and a portion of route 245, the Bn closed NDP without contact. 1/4 Cav hit a pressure mine with neg casualties or damage to the vehicle. TF Dixie continued to secure QUAN LOI/AN LOC and portion of Hwy 13 without contact.

21 March 67, 1st Bde continued with security mission and search and destroy operations while encountering mines and booby traps. 1/2 Inf retained attachment of A 1/4 (-) and secured the bridge site and route 246. At 1030H XT677862 the recon element of 1/2 Inf hit a pressure type mine with a 1/4 ton vehicle, resulting in 1 US KHA and 3 WHA. The vehicle was destroyed. As the Bn conducted search and destroy operations they surprised a VC squad. At 1243H XT674-866, C patrol encountered a VC squad in a heavy ambush site. A brief exchange of small arms fire took place with no US casualtied. However, VC results are as follows: 8 VC KIA, 6 Mausers, 2 US carbines, 1 P-38, 1 RPG-2, 1 claymore, 2 bayonets, 1-2 lb block of Chicom TNT and 1 US smoke grenade were captured. 1/26 Inf secured FSB-C without incident and became OPCON 2nd Bde at 0800H. 1/28 Inf continued security of Engr base XT5988?2 and FSB-E XT780822 without contact. 1/18 Inf with A 1/4 Cav secured the bridge, CIDG camp, airstrip construction site and route 246 in sector. At 0240H XT618822, A Co heard movement to their front. Illuminating mortar rds were rifed and 2 VC were sighted 25 meters from an LP. The LP threw hand grenades with unknown results. 2/18 Inf assisted in the security of MINH THANH and became OPCON 2nd Bde at 0800H. The responsibility of security for MINH THANH passed to the 173rd Abn Bde. A 1/4 Cav (-) remained attached to 1/2 Inf and 1/18 Inf while the sqdn (-) escorted convoys between QUAN LOI and FSB-O. At 1200H vic XT645827, B 1/4 APC was hit by AT rds resulting in 2 US WHA and slight damage to the APC. Arty and mortar were employed with unknown results, B 1/4 was employed at QUAN LOI and assisted in defense of QUAN

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area. At 0800H 1/26 and 36th Ranger Bn (ARVN) remained at FSB-C and became OPCON 2nd Bde. 1/5 Arty supported 1st Bde, moving B 1/5 from Engr base to AN LOC. A 1st Engr continued construction of the airstrip, CIDG camp and route 246. At 0725H, XT677862 a 5 ton truck from A 1st Engr was hit by a command detonated mine, causing 1 US WHA and destruction of the vehicle.

22 March 67, the Bde continued with operation JUNCTION CITY-2 and received sporadic sniper fire. The 1/2 Inf with A 1/4 (-) conducted their security mission at the bridge site and rote 246 in sector. At 1505H, vic XT644840, B Co sighted 4 VC, Arty and mortar fires were called in, after the Arty lifted, the patrol checked the area, locating blood trails but no VC. 1/28 Inf secured the Engr base XT696872 and FSB-E XT700872 with A and B Co's respectively until 1700H, at which time they returned to QUAN LOI. The 1/28 (-) assisted TF Dixie in security of QUAN LOI. 1/18 Inf and 1/4 Cav (-) conducted security of the bridge site and route 246, returning to NDP without incident. 1/5 Arty continued to support 1st Bde and displaced A 1/4 from FSB-E to AN LOC closing at 1700H. A 1st Engr supported the Bde with construction and with 3/1 Cav (ARVN), moved from Engr base to AN LOC where they conducted security for A and D 1/5 Arty.

23 March 67, 1st Bde continued operation JUNCTION CITY-2 and secured Engr construction sites and conducted limited search and destroy operations in sector. 1/2 Inf with attachment A 1/4 (-) established 2 hunter-killer teams. At 1650H vic XT675856 a patrol sighted 2 VC and engaged them with small arms, mortar and arty with unknown results. During the hours of darkness, A 1/4 Cav (-) conducted 4 thunder runs on route 246 without contact. 1/28 Inf secured route 246, the bridge, CIDG camp and the airstrip construction site. At 0920 vic XT570837 A company destroyed 2 plastic AT mines in place. 1/4 Cav (-) with A 1/4 Cav attached to 1/2 Inf and a platoon of 1/18 Inf, secured the convoys between QUAN LOI and FSB-C. At 0825H XT687869 B 1/4 located and destroyed a pressure type AT mine. 1/5 Arty and A 1st Engr continued to support 1st Bde.

24 March 67, the 1st Bde continued to secure the resupply route in sector, conducting local patrols and provided convoy escort. 1/2 Inf secure route 246 between XT637816 and XT676863. B 1/2 Inf moves from the bridge site on the 2nd Bde resupply vehicles to QUAN LOI, closing at 1225H. 1/28 Inf with TF Dixie secured QUAN LOI to PHUOC VINH closing at 1810H, becoming OPCON 3rd Bde upon closing. 1/18 Inf and a platoon of 1/4 Cav secured the Engr construction sites in sector. At 0845H, XT578837 A 1/18 Inf located and destroyed an AT mine in a platic bag. The mine had been laid during the night. 1/4 Cav (-) assisted in security of QUAN LOI and conducted escort duties between QUAN LOI and FSB-C. TF Dixie secured QUAN LOI without incident. In the Bde area, the day passed without contact.

25 March 67, the Bde continued to secure the construction sites in sector and provided escort for resupply convoys. 1/2 Inf secured route 246 and conducted thunder runs during the hours of darkness without contact. 1/18 with a platoon 1/4 Cav secured the bridge, CIDG camp, and airfield construction site without incident. TF Dixie with assistance of 1/4 Cav (-) secured QUAN LOI.

26 March 67, 1st Bde with 1/2 Inf, 1/18 Inf, 1/4 Cav (-), TF Dixie and the support elements of 1/5 Arty and A 1st Engr, continued to secure route 246, and Engr construction sites in sector without contact.

27 March 67, 1/2 Inf secured route 246 and at 0810H departed QUAN LOI for FSB-C under operational control of 1/4 Cav. The Bn closed their new location at 1110H becoming OPCON 2nd Bde. 1/18 Inf and platoon 1/4 Cav (-) secured the bridge at CP 13, CIDG camp, and airfield construction site without contact. 1/4 Cav assumed security fo route 246 from 1/2 Inf at 1110H.

28 March 67, 1st Bde continued operation JUNCTION CITY-2. 1/18 Inf with A 1/4 Cav attached secured the bridge, CIDG camp and construction sites in sector At 1300H the Bn was relieved in place by 2/16 Inf. The 1/18 Inf moved by road to FSB-C closing at 1855H and becoming OPCON 2nd Bde. At 0820H A 1/18 at XT577837 located and destroyed 2 AT plastic pressure mines. The 2/16 Inf with a platoon C 5/2 attached, relieved 1/18 in place and accepted the security mission previously held by 1/18 Inf and became OPCON 1st Bde at 1300H. The 1/4 Cav (-) secured rte 246 from XT637816 to XT676863 and performed escort mission for the convoys. At 1820H XT656837, received 3 rds sniper fire resulting in 1 WHA. At 1840H, the troop received small arms sniper fire without casualties, XT661841. 1/5 Arty continued to support 1st Bde, A 1/5 Arty airlifted by C-130 aircraft at QUAN LOI and closed PHUOC VINH at 2125H becoming OPCON 3rd Bde.

29 March 67, 1st Bde with 2/16 Inf and 1/4 Cav (-) continued JUNTION CITY-2, 2/16 Inf with platoon 5/2 Arty attached secured the bridge, CIDG camp and airfield construction site without incident. 1/4 Cav (-) with A 1/2 Inf attached secured route 246 from XT637816 to XT676863 and performed convoy escort missions. TF Dixie, sealed and searched AP TRA THANH with neg results. In support of the Bde, 1/5 Arty (DS) (-) remained in present postions.

30 March 67, 1st Bde continued JUNCTION CITY-2 and secured QUAN LOI/AN LOC area. 2/16 Inf with attachment of platoon 5/2Arty remained at the construction sites in sector. While 1/4 Cav (-) secured route 246 from XT637816 to XT676863 and performed convoy escort for resupply convoys. A 1/2 moved by road at 1500H and became OPCON 2nd Bde at FSB-C upon closing the base withot incident.

31 March 67, 1st Bde continued to secure the resupply route in sector. 2/16 Inf with a platoon 5/2 Arty secured the bridge, CIDG camp, and airfield construction sites without contact. 1/4 Cav (-) continued the security of route 246 and conducted escort for resupply convoy. C 1/4 Cav moved north on hwy 13, returning to parent unit control at 1200H. TF Dixie secured QUAN LOI and at 0830H, the 36th Rngr Bn moved by C-130 to PHU LOI. The 1/2 Inf (-) moved by C-123 from PHUOC VINH to QUAN LOI closing at 2055H, becoming OPCON TF Dixie for security of QUAN LOI. 1/5 Arty continued to support he Bde.

1 Apr 67, 1st Bde continued operation JUNCTION CITY-2, and secured QUAN LOI/ AN LOC area. The Bde assumed OPCON 2/18 Inf and FSB-C. The 2/16 Inf with a platoon 5/2 Arty attached secured the bridge CIDG camp and airfield construction sites. While clearing route 246, B Co located and destroyed 5 pressure type mines XT577837. The 1/4 Cav Sqdn secured route 246 in sector from vic XT637816 to XT676863 and performed escort for resupply convoys and secured D 1/5 Arty vic XT576874. At 0910H, vic XT714876, a tank from 1/4 Cav was hit by an RPG-2 round resulting in 1 US KHA, 1 WHA and light damage to tank. TF Dixie and 1/28 (-) continued to secure QUAN LOI and patrolled without incident. At 1240H, the Bde received OPCON 2/18 Inf and FSB-C at 1930H, XT596844, and again at 2208H, smae vicinity, 2/18 Inf received several mortar rounds (81mm or 82mm) on their positions with neg casualties. Arty and mortar fires were employed in suspected VC mortar locations with unknown results. The remainder of the 1st Apr passed without incident.

2 Apr 67, 1st Bde continued operation JUNCTION CITY-2. Secured QUAN LOI and assumed OPCON of 1/18 Inf and Obj THRUST. 2/16 Inf secured and outposted route 246 in sector and was relieved in place by 1/28 Inf (-) at 1100H. The Bn then helilifted from FSB-B to LZ GEORGE and became OPCON 2nd Bde upon closing at 1455H. The 1/28 Inf (-) lifted by CH-47 from QUAN LOI to FSB-B and relieved 2/16 in position. The Bn closed without contact. The 1/18 Inf became OPCON 1st Bde at 1700H and secured route 246 in sector. TF Dixie continued to secure QUAN LOI/AN LOC without incident and employed RF/PF forces to secure hwy 13 for convoys. 1/26 Inf helilifted from field postions vic LZ GEORGE to QUAN LOI at 1425H and became OPCON TF Dixie.

3 April 1967, The 1st Brigade continued to secure QUAN LOI/AN LOC and the resupply route. 2/18 Inf with platoon 1/4 Cav attached secured FSB-C, cleared and outposted route 246 in sector. At 0520H, FSB-C was under mortar attack, 40-60 rds of 82mm mortar landed in FSB-C from suspected VC locations vic XT57148715 and XT58528699, the counter-mortar program was fired and airstrikes were placed on the suspected locations, by 0540H the mortar rounds had stopped falling and the VC fled with unknown results from mortar and arty. The VC mortars caused 4 US WHA. The 1/18 Inf secured Obj THRUST, cleared and outposted route 246 in sector 0800H, CO, 2/18 Inf C&C ship received AW fire vic XT504814, Arty, mortar and air were placed in the area with unknown results. At 1830H an ambush patrol moving toward night ambush positions made contact with an estimated VC platoon vic XT498811. Automatic fire was exchanged, mortar and arty was placed in the area. No US casualties, enemy casualties are unknown. The 1/28 Inf (-) secured the construction sites, secured and outposted route 246 in sector without incident, 1/4 Cav Sqdn secured route 246 from XT637816 to XT676863, performed convoy escort mission and secured D 1/5 Arty vic XT637874. At 0300H vic XT639876 movement was detected outside the perimeter, small arms and M-79 fire were fired without results. TF Dixie continued security of QUAN LOI/AN LOC without contact. 1/26 Inf assisted TF Dixie.

4 April 67, 1st Bde continued operation JUNCTION CITY-2 and received OPCON 1/16 Inf. 1/18 Inf continued to secure Obj THRUST, clear and outpost route 246 and conduct local patrols without contacts. 1/28 Inf (-) secured the construction sites, cleared and outposted rte 246 for resupply convoy. At 2125H vic FSB-B, the Bn CP received 50 rds VC mortar fire (60mm). The rounds landed outside the perimeter to the north without causing casualties or damage. 1/4 Cav secured rte 246 and performed convoy escort for supply convoy. At 0308H, vic CP-C, the Sqdn received 10 rounds 60mm mortar fire without casualties. TF Dixie continued to secure QUAN LOI with 1/26 Inf. The RF/PF for escort from AN LOC provided security for Hwy 13 for north-south bound convoys. The 1/16 Inf Bn airlifted from field to QUAN LOI becoming OPCON TF Dixie upon closure. The 1/5 Arty (-) continued to provide indirect fire support for the 1st Brigade.

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5th April 67, the 1st Brigade continued operation JUNCTION CITY-2 with the 1/18 Inf securing objective THRUST, returning OPCON to 2nd Bde at 1200H, 2/18 Bn with a platoon 1/4 Cav secured FSB-C, cleared and secured route 246, and conducted local patrols. At 2007H FSB-C received 1 rd of incoming mortar fire which landed just outside the perimeter with neg casualties, the counter-mortar plan was fired with unknown results. The 1/28 Inf (-) secured the construction site in sector for elements of 1st Engr Bn. At 1600H patrol from 1/28 spotted an est VC squad XT635810, arty was fired with unknown results. 1/4 Cav secured a portion of route 246 from XT637816 to XT636863, performed convoy escort and secured B 1/5 at XT637874. TF Dixie continued to secure QUAN LOI/AN LOC area without incident. RF/PF forces outposting hwy 13 made contact at 1700H vic XT880795 with an est VC plat., resulting in 1 VC KIA, 5 US WHA, The 1/4 secured QUAN LOI while 1/16 Inf lifted by fixed wing from QUAN LOI to BUNARD YT272884, closing at 1430H. Light Horse C moved by C-130 from FSB-B to BUNARD and was attached to 1/16 Inf.

6 April 67, 1st Bde continued operation JUNCTION CITY-2 and secures QUAN LOI/ AN LOC area. 2/18 Inf and FSB-C became OPCON 2nd Bde. The 2/18 Inf with 1 plat, 1/4 Cav secured FSB-C, closed and secured route 246 in sector and conducted local patrols. At 1020H, the lead element of the road clearing team moving toward THRUST received 4 RR rounds vic XT529830. A tank from A 1/4 Cav received light damage. However, 5 US WHA with unknown VC losses from arty that was fired. At 1115H, FSB-C received approximately 100 mortar rounds (81mm or 82mm) resulting in 1 US KHA and 48 US WHA. Counter-mortar was fired and airstrikes placed in the suspected VC location with unknown results. C 1/28 Inf helilifted from PHUOC VINH to FSB-B returning under control of point unit. At 1128H, XT592825, A 1/28 received 6 mortar rounds into their position causing 1 US WHA. 1/16 Inf secured Engr construction sites vic BUNARD. At 1000H, XT278878 a patrol located and destroyed 1000 lbs of unpolished rice. At 1300H vic YT282883 A 1/16 located and destroyed an additional 4000 lbs of unpolished rice. 1/4 Cav secured route 246 from XT637816 to XT676863, performed escort missions and secured D 1/5 Arty. At 0920H, vic XT696873, the tail vehicle received 1 rd of sniper fire without casualties. TF Dixie and 1/26 Inf secured QUAN LOI without contact.

7 April 67, operation JUNCTION CITY-2 continued with the 1st Bde transfering 1/28 Inf and FSB-B to OPCON 2nd Bde. 1/28 Inf with a platoon of 1/4 Cav attached became OPCON 2nd Bde at 1115H, 1/16 Inf continued to secure Engr construction sites vicinity camp BUNARD and patrol in sector. At 1450H vic YT278884, A Co patrol located and destroyed 10 recently used huts and 700 lbs of polished rice. The Bn units returned to the perimeter without contact. The 1/4 Cav (-) cleared and secured route 246 in sector and secured B1/5 at XT757874. At 0735H vic XT650831 a tank from 1/4 Cav hit a pressure type mine damaging a road wheel and track. It was repaired in place. At 1403H vic XT662842, A 1/4 spotted a lone VC with a weapon running. The VC was taken under automatic weapons fire with unknown results. TF Dixie and 1/26 Inf secured QUAN LOI logistical base without contact. 1/5 Arty supported the Bde and at 1040H, B 1/5 moved from FSB-B to camp BUNARD, closing at 1510H.

8 April 67, the 1st Bde continued operation JUNCTION CITY-2 and operation HARVEST MOON. 1/16 Inf continued operation HARVEST MOON at BUNARD and patrolled in sector during the days patrols, the Bn located and destroyed 5-55 gal drums of polished rice, YT265882, YT257880, YT763881 and YT261881. At vic XT261881, one man from B Co was wounded when he stepped on a punji stake. The 1/4 Cav (-) cleared and secured route 246 in sector and secured B 1/5 Arty at XT757874. TF Dixie with 1/26 Inf secured QUAN LOI without incident. 1/5 Arty continued to support 1st Bde, with Light Horse C in (DS) of 1/16 Inf at camp BUNARD.

9 April 67, 1st Bde continued operation JUNCTION CITY-2, secured QUAN LOI/ AN LOC area and arty at camp BUNARD XT2788. 1/16 Inf continued to secure camp BUNARD and patrolled in sector. At 1110H, YT263881 C patrol located and destroyed 2-55 gal drums of unpolished rice, 1 bicycle, a tunnel 20 ft long and some rusty tools. At 1420H YT273873 B patrol located and destroyed 1000 lbs of loose unpolished rice. 1/4 Cav (-) cleared and secured route 246 in sector and performed escort missions. At 0750H YT708877, B 1/4 located and destroyed 1 AT mine, TF Dixie with 1/26 Inf Bn secured QUAN LOI/AN LOC area and conducted a seal and search of AP SOC ZIEM (XT862899) with neg results. The element of the Brigade closed their perimeter without contact.

10 April the 1st Brigade continued operation JUNCTION CITY-2, 1/16 remained at camp BUNARD on operation HARVEST MOON and conducted patrols in AO. At 0830H vic YT273875, C company located and destroyed 9 huts and 1-55 gal drum of unpolished rice. At 1000H the same patrol destroyed 1 buner and a bicycle at YT279874. They closed the perimeter without incident. 1/4 Cav (-) secured route 246 in sector and B 1/5 at XT757874. At 0805H C tropp destroyed 4 pressured mines and received 2 AT mds at 1345H from vic XT652836 causing 1 US WHA, and slight damage to an APC. A couple of minutes later a recoilless rifle round was received from the same location without results. Arty and mortar was employed with unknown

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results. TF Dixie and 1/26 Inf Bn conducted patrols in the QUAN LOI area. At 1305H, vic XT794879, B 1/26 received 2 sniper rounds, fire was returned with unknown results. There was no friendly casualties as a result of the fire, and the Bn closed the perimeter without further incident.

11 April 67, 1st Bde continued operation JUNCTION CITY-2, operation HARVEST MOON and secured QUAN LOI. The 1/16 Inf Bn remained at camp BUNARD and conducted combat reconnaissance patrols in the TAOR witout incident. 1/4 Cav provided convoy escort for resupply convoy and secured a portion of route 246. At 1515H A troop became OPCON 11th ACR and departed 1st Bde area. 1/26 Inf and TF Dixie secured QUAN LOI without contact, and the 1/5 Arty continued with indirect fire support for the Bde.

12 April 67, The Brigade continued operations JUNCTION CITY-2 and HARVEST MOON, secured QUAN LOI and route 246 in sector. The 1/16 Inf Bn on operation HARVEST MOON, destroyed 8 huts and 2400 lbs of unpolished rice YT255875. At 0833H, YT256879, located and destroyed 2-55 gal drums of unpolished rice, 1 Chicom grenade and 1 US claymore. The same patrol at 1330H, vic YT260871 destroyed 600 lbs of polished rice. Bn became OPCON 1st Bde at 1100H, and secured route 246 in sector. The 2/16 Inf Bn and 2/18 Inf Bn became OPCON 1st Brigade at 1100H and secured route 246 in sector. TF Dixie and 1/26 Inf Bn secured QUAN LOI without incident and employed RF/PF forces from AN LOC along hwy 13 for north and south resupply convoys.

13 April 67, The Brigade continued operation JUNCTION CITY-2 and HARVEST MOON, secured QUAN LOI, and route 246 in sector. The 1/16 Inf Bn on HARVEST MOON patrolled actively without contact. 2/16 Inf Bn secured route 246 and conducted S&D operations without contact. The 2/16 Inf and TF Dixie secured QUAN LOI employing RF/PF forces on hwy 13 for logistics convoys north and south. The 13 April ended without incident in the Bde area.

14 April 67, The 1st Brigade prepared to terminate operation JUNCTION CITY-2 secured route 246 and continued operation HARVEST MOON. The 1/16 Inf continued operation HARVEST MOON by patrolling and securing camp BUNARD without incident. 1/18 Inf,, cleared and secured route 246 in sector and airlifted from their field location along route 246 to QUAN LOI by UH-ID closing at 1500H. The 2/16 Inf Bn secured a portion of route 246 and at 0900H, airlifted from FSB-B to BIEN HOA becoming OPCON 2nd Bde upon closing at 1600H. 2/16 Inf Bn airlifted commencing at 0730H from QUAN LOI to BIEN HOA becoming OPCON 2nd Bde. The security of QUAN LOI was the responsibility of TF Dixie and 1/26 Inf Bn, there was no contact throughout the day.

On the 15th April 67, 1st Bde terminated operation JUNCTION CITY-2. At 1643H and continued operation HARVEST MOON. The 1/16 Inf Bn continued with 1/26 Inf Bn airlift by fixed wing aircraft from QUAN LOI to PHUOC VINH closing at 1700H. TF Dixie and 1/18 Inf Bn secured QUAN LOI/AN LOC area without incident. This terminated operation JUNCTION CITY for the 1st Bde.

8. (C) SUPPORTING FORCES:

a. Artillery: 1/5 Arty provided DS for the 1st Brigade and its elements 2/33 Arty, 8/6 Arty, 2/35 Arty, 1/7 Arty, 5/2 Arty, the 1/5 Arty fired.

(1)	4.2 Inch mortar	12,814
(2)	105mm	112,670
(3)	155mm	2,857
(4)	8 Inch	736
(5)	175mm	96

b. Engineer: 1st Engr Bn supported 1st Brigade during operation JUNCTION CITY-2.

c. Air Force: They flew 83 immediate strikes of close air support. 141 preplanned strikes and 25 strikes were diverted for targets of the 1st Brigade for a total of 611 sorties. The results of the strikes were:

	UNCOVERED	DESTROYED	DAMAGE
Bunkers	109	67	20
Buildings		18	3
Fighting Pos	105	81	
Trenches	570	50	
Rafts		1	
KBA	17 KBA	1 WHA	
Secondary Fires	6		
Bridges	1		

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(b) Army Air Support: Brigade LOH's flew 2[illegible] missions logging a total of 817 hours 15 minutes.

9. (C) RESULTS PHASE I:

(a) US Losses:

1. Personnel: 10 KHA, 33 WHA, 0 MHA

2. Equipment Damaged: 2 M-48 tanks, 1 APC (M-113), 1 1/4 ton trk all light damage, no equipment destroyed.

(b) Enemy Losses:

(1) Personnel: 29 VC KIA (BC), 9 VC KBA, 4 CHIEU HOI.

(2) Equipment Captured: 12 Chicom rifles, 1 Russian carbine, 345 carbines, 4 Chicom SMG, 1 LMG (Chicom manufactured), 1 .50 cal MG, (anti-aircraft), 32 Sony AM-FM radios, 1 tape recorder, 1 portable radion PHILCO, 3 HP Briggs and Stratton engine, 1 walkie talkie, 1 rifle grenade launcher, 1 PRC-10 radio, 2-M-60 MG barrels, 1 MG barrel 12.7mm.

(3) Equipment Destroyed: 86,8 tons of rice, 3300 lbs of salt, 17 frag grenades, 248 rifle grenades, 7-81mm mortar rds, 1-60 mortar, 3 concussion grenades, 4 mines, 5 claymores, 4 RPG AT rds, 800 lbs of dynamite, 1600 ft of detonation cord, 217 tires w/tubes, 57 bicycles, 34 cans of condensed milk, 12,725 lbs of dried fish and rice, 700 lbs of dried beans, 600 lbs of peanuts, 43 pigs, 78 chickens, 200 lbs of cloth, 355 gals of fuel oil, 1 machette, 4520 meters of wire, 1000 entrenching tools, 3900 pair of Ho Chi Minh sandals, 5074 BA-30 batteries, 2 axes, 70 reams of bond paper, 500 ball point pens, 700 pencils 1750 erasers, 80 oil lamps, 78 sheets of tin , and 6 million units of penicillin.

10. (C) RESULTS PHASE II:

(a) US Losses:

(1) Personnel: 4 KHA, 43 WHA.

(2) Equipment Destroyed: 1 1/4 ton truck, 2 APC (M113).

(3) Equipment damaged: 4 APC (M113), 5 M-48 tanks, 1 VTR and 1 tank dozer.

(b) Enemy Losses:

(1) Personnel: 21 VC KIA (BC), 7 VC KBA.

(2) Equipment Captured: 1 bridge frame (42'x12'), 2 AK-47 rifles, 2 claymores, 140 M-16 rds, 1 CS grenades, 13,000 piasters, 1 Mauser Model 98 rifle, 1 AK-50,rifle, P-38 pistol, 2 US carbines, 2 bayonets, 2 lbs block of TNT, 15 lbs medical supplies, 25 lbs of clothing.

(3) Equipment Destroyed: 30 huts, 33 bunkers, 5 large buildings, 8 grenades, 20 AT mines, 14 AP mines, 2 claymores, 1-155mm rd, 2400 lbs unpolished rice, 1200 lbs polished rice,

(c) Civil Affairs and Psychological Warfare Operations:

(1) MEDCAP: 441 patients were treated during MEDCAP's conducted in VINH HOA, BO MUA, BAO AO, LE TRANG, HAI MOOI BA.

(2) Captured Supplies and Relief Supplies:

a. 63.5 tons polished rice captured and extracted.

b. 900 lbs of rice, 3 cases of powered milk, 3 cases of cooking oil, and other miscellaneous items were distributed during MEDCAP's and other activities.

(3) Psychological Operations:

a. 15 hours and 45 minutes of loudspeaker broadcast were used in support of tactical operations in forward areas of operation.

b. 1,243,000 leaflets dropped over the 1st Brigade operational area. Themes used: Safe conduct, Weapons rewards, Chieu Hoi, exploiting captured VC, come out of your tunnels, 274 map, SP-893, Direction of lost NCO from 1st Battalion, 2nd Infantry (Live), ST-893, PO-4, F-03, SP-139, Dont Fire on US Forces or your village will be destroyed.

11. (C) ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS:

a. Supply:

(1) JUNCTION CITY-1 (MINH THANH):

a. Class I: A&B rations were available after the 1st day of operation. The forward support section of the S&T Bn provided very good response in this class of supply. Rations at PHUOC VINH, however, did not compare with ration being consumed in the field.

b. Class II&IV: Adequate stocks of barrier items were on hand. Class II such as Bn clothing packets were delivered on request. Sandbags were still critically short supply at the beginning or this operation.

c. Class III: At the beginning of the operations stocks of Class III were not adequate to meet all demands. Further requirements to place stocks of Class III at the forward LZ 5 position seemed beyond the capabilities of the support elements to handle. The product was in most cases available, but pumping equipment, hoses, connectors and trained operators were not available. As a result, the Bde S-4 section which is not staffed for such an operation, was forced to personally load, off load and pump great quantities of Class III at the forward location.

d. Class V: A sizable quantity of 175mm and 8" ammunition was programmed into MINH THANH resulting in considerable handling and storage problems. Units using this type of ammunition did not remain in the AO for any length of time generating additional problems of double handling and transportation.

b. Services:

(1) Engineer: Outstanding service was performed by A Co, 1st Engr Bn during this operation.

(2) Water/Shower Point: The lack of an adequate water source within the MINH THANH perimeter prevented the co-location of the water and shower points. As a result the water had to be transported to the shower point. The shower point personnel were sent on this operation their parent unit without adequate preparation of all equipment. Many necessary components were missing or broken upon arrival at MINH THANH.

c. Maintenance:

(1) The contact Team of D Co, 701st Maint, provided excellent support throughout the operation.

(2) Direct support and attached units, often do not bring their PLL to the field. This results in unnecessary and off-times unreasonable demands on the supporting elements. Support companies carry on limited 2nd echelon parts with them since they are designated to render 3d echelon maintenance support.

d. Medical: Medical reaction from D Co, 1st Med Bn was prompt and adequate. Two problems in this field are still prevelant:

(1) Initial request for dustoff often arrives with a priority of urgent, although in many cases the nature of the wound is really very minor. Medically trained personnel if available, should be the ones to determine the priority of a dustoff aircraft.

(2) "Slick" aircraft often beat a dustoff aircraft to the scene of a pickup. In most cases the dustoff is never more than 10 minutes behind and the result of a wounded man being moved by untrained personnel and being deprived of emergency medical treatment available aboard a dustoff aircraft could be fatal.

e. General Comments: During this operation, the 1st Bde at one time had OPCON of over 70% of the Division units without having the benefit of the logistical support of the 1st Log Command. The 1st Div S&T Bn did an outstanding job but was sorely taxed.

e. Supply (JUNCTION CITY-2) (QUAN LOI):

(1) Class I: A and B rations were adequate during this operation. Command emphasis was placed on increasing amount of juices and beverages base

for use by combat element. The delivery time of potable ice was not compatable with food preparation and resupply to forward elements by aircraft. Many times ice would arrive late in the afternoon hours after the last resupply convoy had left the log base. A morning delivery time would have been more suitable.

(2) Class II and IV: Sandbags were still in short supply. Toward the end of the operation, clevis, donut and slinging equipment were in short supply.

(3) Class III: No problems encountered,

(4) Class V: No problems encountered except that a forklift should be permanently stationed at QUAN LOI for use by the ASP personnel.

f. Methods of Resupply: Overload resupply was the primary method during this operation. Aircraft were used to resupply units with access to a road and to bring out last minute items that missed resupply convoys.

g. Maintenance: No problems encountered.

h. Medical: See JUNCTION CITY-1.

i. Transportation: Transportation was a major problem during JUNCTION CITY-2. Since road nets were available, many movements accomplished by aircraft in the other operation, were directed to be performed by ground resources. Unfortunately the Division operation under an " airmobile Heavy" concept and therefore does not usually bring many heavy vehicles to the field. As a result, whenever a movement by ground was ordered, the Bde had to go outside of its own resources to "borrow" vehicles from other units. In the future each Infantry Maneuver Battalion should take at least three 2½ ton trucks with it on an operation so that they are capable of sustaining themselves and contributing their fair share in the support of other units.

(1) General Comments:

a. When the 1st Log Command sets up an FSA, they should be prepared to support their own people at least to the extent of messing facilities.

(2) All command inquiries of individual soldiers as to the extent of logistical support provided should be referenced to the local commander and appropriate staff officer to determine if the required item is on hand in the unit rather than going thru command channels and causing time consuming chain reactions. The appropriate staff officer then should contact his counterpart at the next higher level keeping all commanders in the chain advised of either pro or con actions and the reasons therefore.

j. Communications: During operation JUNCTION CITY the 1st Brigade expsrience considerable radio interference at the Bde CP with FM voice on both the Brigade and Division Command Frequencies. The interference seemed to be local but its source could no be located. The interference seemed to be noise and was the same strength as authentic radio signals. At times the interference signal strength would increase at the time an incoming signal was being received. The interference did not seem to effect transmission to other units. It is recommended that steps be taken to procure equipment for the purpose of locating the source of radio interference so that action may be taken to eliminate the interference.

k. Personnel Analysis Section:

(1) 1st Brigade HHC	Opn Initiated	Opn Terminated
Auth	122	122
Asgn	165	160
PFD	100	77
PIF	48	48
PBC	52	52

(2) 1/2 Infantry	Opn Initiated	Opn Terminated
Auth	789	789
Asgn	760	752
PFD	636	710
PIF	462	556
PBC	174	154

	PIF	PBC	PIF	PBC
HHC	107	121	135	95
A Co	118	24	133	24
B Co	116	17	143	14
C Co	121	12	145	21
Total	462	174	556	154

(3) 1/26 Infantry

	Opn Initiated	Opn Terminated
Auth	789	789
Asgn	763	769
PFD	743	734
PIF	496	515
PBC	247	219

	PIF	PBC	PIF	PBC
HHC	122	146	136	137
A Co	149	27	128	25
B Co	114	31	122	30
C Co	111	43	129	27
Total	496	247	515	219

(4) 1/28 Inf

	Opn Initiated	Opn Terminated
Auth	789	789
Asgn	753	746
PFD	683	699
PIF	511	502
PBC	172	197

	PIF	PBC	PIF	PBC
HHC	142	82	128	115
A Co	134	27	132	29
B Co	109	35	109	34
C Co	126	28	133	19
Total	511	172	502	197

(5) 2/18 Infantry

	Opn Initiated	Opn Terminated
Auth	789	789
Asgn	755	722
PFD	655	600
PIF	467	415
PBC	188	185

	PIF	PBC	PIF	PBC
HHC	139	84	141	86
A Co	109	35	92	33
B Co	108	35	91	31
C Co	111	34	91	35
Total	467	188	415	185

12. (C) COMMANDER'S ANALYSIS:

a. The Brigade was employed primarily in securing logistical bases, fire support bases, engineer construction sites, and supply routes. In conjunction with these missions the brigade conducted road clearing, convoy control, seal and search, and search and destroy operations.

b. It is imperative that armored cavalry units be available to the brigade during road clearing and security operations. The mobility, communication and fire power of the armor force are essential for the security and control of march columns. The attachment of armor permit them to control the road while the infantry patrols in depth to the flanks to detect enemy movement or activities directed towards the roads.

c. Artillery must be positioned for direct support coverage of company size units and larger. The fire support bases must be mutually supporting, and secured by infantry and or armor forces.

13. (C) LESSONS LEARNED AND CONCLUSIONS:

a. Conclusions: 1st Bde action in operation JUNCTION CITY was extremely successful, denying the VC food and supplies stored in the operational area.

b. Lessons Learned:

(1) The use of finance NCO attached to Brigade Headquarters provides more personal service to the men. Moreover, he must be attached for rations and quarters. This enables him to have a base of operations from which he can move to the units in their field locations.

(2) Units conducting operations near a boundary or adjacent to another unit must try to maintain a 1000-meter zone around their operational area to facilitate the immediate employment of artillery and close air support in the event of enemy contact. It was learned on operation JUNCTION CITY-1 that when units were too close together, the response time for artillery and close air support was lengthened because of the longer time period necessary to identify and locate friendly units in or adjacent to the target area.

(3) The employment of the 4.2" mortar greatly reduced the problem of minimum range artillery limitations on operation JUNCTION CITY-1 and 2, and permitted great flexibility between mutually supporting fire support bases.

(4) To accomplish rapid, yet effective, mine sweeping of the road on a road clearing operation, mine sweeping teams should start at as many points along the road as permitted by route security. This could be best accomplished by lifting security elements and mine sweeping teams by helicopter, provided such transportation is available.

(5) During operation JUNCTION CITY-2, patrolling along routes to be cleared often times proved more effective than outposting. However, due to the resources abailable, experience on JUNCTION CITY indicated that the 1st Bde could best accomplish the mission by a combination of patrolling and outposting. Moreover, thunder runs at night along routes secured during the day aided in effectively reducing mines emplaced during the night along the route to be secure

(6) Clearing of jungle from both sides of a route which has been secured is essential for the detection of newly emplaced mines. Experience on TUCSON DELTA and JUNCTION CITY indicates that the longer a route is secured, the farther from the road the jungle should be cleared. Jungle clearing should be preplanned and integrated into the security operations planning for the route to be secured.

(7) Areas previosly occupied by US combat vehicles are likely to be heavily mined. During operation TUCSON DELTA this was the case at Arty Base III (vic XT6658). Numerous AT mines were found on the roads, shoulders of the roads, and adjacent to the roads out to 30 meters. Such areas should be thoroughly swept by mine detector teams and should be completely traversed by a tank prior to occupancy by other vehicles. In additon, several casualties (arty personnel) were sustained as a result of personnel gathering together too close to the vehicles moving through the area. A mine was detonated by a passing tnak which injured five arty officers standing together nearby. The particular mine was the third or fourth that exploded within the immediate area over a one-hour period.

(8) Regular vehicular movement over the same route invites ambush. The routes and times of movement should be planned to prevent the enemy from fixing your position and planning an ambush.

(9) Repeated use of the same entrance and exit for a main road parallel by pass invites mining of the entrance and exit. If the main road must be paralleled due to damage or other causes, the entrance and exits should be change repeatedly.

(10) Armored vehicles leading and intregated in the march column of a motor convoy provide security and act as a reaction force.

(11) Employing the technique of the TURKEY SHOOT, artillery units in the QUAN LOI/AN LOC area have been able to effectively disrupt VC operations in the area by providing a wider area of coverage. It was accomplished west of AN LOC after JUNCTION CITY by moving the artillery with escort, firing from field positions, and then returning to AN LOC prior to night fall.

(12) The sheep's foot roller proved its worth, by setting off many pressure mines on road clearing operations. A technique that should prove effective is to employ the sheep's foot roller ahead of the rotor that is cutting wires to any command detonated mines along the road.

(13) If troop resources for route clearing and security operations are limited, a satisfactory method for added security is the use of artillery down both sides of the route being secured. Constantly shifting arty fire 1000 meters on either side of the road moving first ahead of the resupply convoy proved very effective in reducing VC initiated convoy harassing actions.

(14) Dropping pallets of unfused projectiles and boxes of fuses resulted in the components becoming widely scattered on several occasions. If ammunition must be air dropped, it should be dropped in the fused configuration.

(15) When ammunition is dropped in jungle packs, it results in an additional backhaul requirement for the containers. Fused ammunition in fiber containers is the most appropriate configuration for air lift resupply.

(16) The vehicles utilized in the road resupply from Suoi Da to LZ 5 "aged" rapidly due to the overload of the trucks and the poor condition of the road. Five ton trucks are needed to maintain an acceptable level of ammunition on hand in field locations when the unit is being resupplied by road with only its organic transportation.

(17) The concept of mutually supportinf artillery bases has been proven innumerable times. It is recommended that when a base is receiving enemy mortar rounds, the inhabitants of that base take cover in bunkers with overhead cover. The counter-mortar program should be fired by the artillery at the supporting base.

(18) Mortar crews must be able to fire during enemy mortar attacks, these personnel should wear protective armor vests.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Franklin M. Hinton CPT

WILLIAM S. TUCKERMAN
Major, Infantry
Adjutant

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 2D BRIGADE 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION
APO U.S. FORCES 96345

AVDB-AMT 13 May 1967

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (MACV/RCS/J3/32)

THRU: Commanding General
1st Infantry Division
APO US Forces 96345

TO: Commander
US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
ATTN: J321
APO US Forces 96243

1. NAME AND TYPE OF OPERATION: Operation JUNCTION CITY II, a multi-division search and destroy operation in War Zone C.

2. DATES OF OPERATION: 210800H March 1967 to 141344H April 1967.

3. GENERAL: Command Headquarters: 2d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division OPLAN 6-67(Operation JUNCTION CITY II) and 2d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division OPORD 12-67 (Operation JUNCTION CITY II) dated 161200H March 1967. Operation JUNCTION CITY II was conducted in War Zone C and north and east of TAY NINH. The 2d Brigade was to conduct airmobile assaults into eastern War Zone C; conduct search and destroy operations, to find, fix, and destroy COSVN/VC/NVA forces and installation; to concurrently conduct ground assaults along designated axies to clear and outpost Route 246; and to secure designated forward support bases.

a. Reporting Officer: LTC Alexander M. Haig

b. Task Organization:
Headquarters 2d Brigade, LTC Alexander M. Haig, CO
2-16 Infantry, LTC Joseph R. Ulatoski, CO
1-18 Infantry, LTC Richard E. Cavazos, CO
2-18 Infantry, LTC Lewis R. Baumann, CO
1-28 Infantry, LTC Stanley J. Kuick, CO
1-16 Infantry, LTC Rufus C. Lazzell, CO
2-28 Infantry, LTC Elmer D. Pendelton, CO
1-2 Infantry, LTC William C. Simpson , CO
D Troop 1-4 Cav, Major Robert E. Oberg, CO

4. INTELLIGENCE:

a. Intelligence Prior to Operation: All intelligence concerning VC forces in the area of operations was furnished by Division G2 Section. The following units were either in or near the area: Hqs 9th VC Main Force Division, vic XT4865, 272 VC Regiment XT5662, 271 VC Regiment XT3089, 101st NVA Regiment unlocated, and the 70th VC Guard Regiment XT3890. An AMS 1:50,000 set of maps was furnished overprinted with enemy installations and was useful in targeting VC activity.

b. Intelligence During the Operation: Intelligence was gained units on the ground, from agent reports and from visual reconnaissance co[illegible] by D Trp 1-4 Cav and Brigade Aviation Section. There were three major activities initiated by the VC during this phase of JUNCTION CITY. The VC

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ANNEX I 140

conducted eleven mortar attacks on FSB CHARLIE (XT567853) and three other attacks on battalions in field location. These ranged in magnitude from 5 - 10 60mm mortar rounds to 200 rds of 60mm, 82mm mortar, 57 and 75mm RR on the morning of 1 April 67. Two daylight attacks were carried out on FSB CHARLIE 6 April 67. On 31 March 67 contact was gained with the 271st Main Force VC Regiment by the 1st Bn 26th Inf. The VC were intrenched along the edge of a wood line vic XT427853 to XT436859. At 1255H the Recon Plt 1-26 Inf received heavy MG, AW, SA and B40 fire. Contact was maintained until 010900H April with the 271st Regiment. The VC launched one ground attack at 010530H April following a mortar preparation. After this attack the VC conducted mining and ambush activities along Route 246 and 244. The majority of incidents occured between XT500810 and XT520820. This road was kept open from 29 March - 10 April 67. During this period 38 AT mines were found, 9 AT rounds were fired at vehicles, 2 claymores were detonated and 6 contacts were reported with small groups of VC. The VC in small 3 - 4 man groups maintained continuous pressure on the road during this time. In search and destroy operations to the NW, S, and west of FSB CHARLIE (vic XT5188, XT5586, XT4283 center of mass) only sporadic contact was made with the VC. Contact was made with 5 - 6 individuals as friendly units would enter a base camp. These were caretaker forces left at the base camp. Following contact they would withdraw from the area. Documents found in base camps indicated the following units had been in the area: Signal Section of the Military Staff Section COSVN.(XT527868),elements of 9th VC Division(XT499887),logistical element and medical unit 9th VC Division (XT490880), 271st Regimental Headquarters(XT436860),and Transport Co C 239, vic XT560796. No further identifications were made.

c. ENEMY INSTALLATIONS: Installations in the area of operations consisted of large base camps and storage areas. These had extensive bunkers, huts and foxholes in them. Some of these had not been used for several months others had been occupied within a week of the arrival of friendly units. Large complexes located in defoliated areas were normally abandoned. See Incl 1-6 for schematic drawings of base camps. Infantry and engineers were used to destroy these fortifications with demolitions as well as air and artillery. The trench system used by the 271 on 31 March and 1 April appeared to have been dug within 24 hours of the time of contact. There was very little overhead cover. On 21 March 67 the 36th Ranger Bn discovered batteries and wire vic XT563849 in the wood line near FSB CHARLIE. Following the wire they found four holes filled with explosives on the landing that was being used at FSB CHARLIE.

d. WEATHER AND TERRAIN:

(1) Weather: From 20 March until 12 April the weather was clear and very hot. Early morning fog forced postponement of resupply and airstrikes from sunrise until 0930H. These conditions were anticipated and did not interfere with operations. Between 8 and 12 April afternoon thundershowers began to occur. These were of short duration and had little effect on operations.

(2) Terrain: Generally flat covered by evergreen rainforest. Enough clearings existed for adequate LZs. Some required clearing. At this time grass in the clearings was dry and very easy to ignite. Smoke grenades had to be thrown in Holes to prevent landing zones from catching fire. A burned LZ creates as much dust as one cleared by engineers bulldozers. After several days the dust is ankle deep and the same consitancy as flaur. These conditions make it difficult for helicopters to land.

e. CONCLUSIONS: The area of operation had provided elements of COSVN a safe area in which to rest and train their personnel. The headquarters and rear service units had moved out of the area leaving small detachments behind to harass and block friendly operations. The 271st Regiment was sent into the area in an attempt to gain a quick victory for the VC. Unable to gain this victory and sustaining heavy losses the Regiment broke contact.

Following withdrawal of U.S. Forces, the area again provides the VC a safe area for training and resupply activities. The VC will return to the base camps in the area and continue to use them.

5. MISSION: 2d Brigade conducts brigade airmobile assaults into eastern War Zone C commencing on 21 Mar 67; conducts search and destroy operations to find, fix, and destroy COSVN/VC/NVA forces and installations in AO DAGGER, and concurrently to conduct ground assault along Axis PANZER; to secure FSB CHARLIE on order and conduct search and destroy operations Obj FAUST area; to secure FSB THRUST on 29 Mar 67; to conduct airmobile assaults into Obj SIOUX area on 30 and 31 Mar 67 to continue search and destroy operations in AO DAGGER; to continue to secure FSB THRUST and CHARLIE and on order open and outpost Route YELLOW between bases during daylight hours; and to continue conducting search and destroy operations in AO DAGGER until termination of the Operation.

6. CONCEPT OF OPERATION: Opn JUNCTION CITY II was conducted in three phases. Phase I (21 - 28 Mar 67): 2-18 Inf conducted airmobile assault into LZ BRAVO at 211115H Mar 67; conducted search and destroy operations in western Objective FAUST area and seized Obj 1, 2, 3, and 5; continued south to Route 246. 2-16 Inf conducted airmobile combat assault onto LZ CHARLIE at 211443H Mar 67, conducted search and destroy operations in eastern Objective FAUST area and seized Obj 2, 4, and 6; continued operations south to Route 246. 1-26 Inf remained at FSB CHARLIE as Bde RRF, secured the east portion of FSB CHARLIE (secured entire perimeter on 29 Mar 67)cleared and outposted Route 246, conducted road clearing operations between check points, and conducted search and destroy operations and ambush patrols in AO. 36th ARVN Rgr Bn secured west portion of FSB CHARLIE until 27 Mar 67 and conducted search and destroy operations in assigned AO. 2-11 ACR conducted ground assaults along Axis PANZER and Axis 88, secured Obj THRUST and PARRY and the fire support bases of these objectives, and conducted search and destroy operations in AO. Phase II (28 - 29 Mar 67): 2-16 Inf continued search and destroy operations in eastern Obj FAUST area through 280750H Mar 67; moved to secure pick-up point vic XT5400843; moved by truck to FSB BRAVO at 201144H Mar 67, relieved 1-18 Inf in place and was attached 1st Brigade 281300H Mar 67. 1-28 Inf (attached after relief by 2-16 Inf) moved Bn (-) to field psns vic XT5397846 closing at 281530H Mar 67 and moved Co C into FSB CHARLIE at 281540H Mar 67; assumed OPCON G Trp, 2-11 Cav at Obj THRUST at 290700H Mar 67; inserted company by air into Obj THRUST at 290732H and opened and outposted Route YELLOW in sector until passage of last convoy on 29 Mar 67; and coordinated security of FSB THRUST. 2-18 Inf continued search and destroy operations in western Obj FAUST area. 1-26 Inf continued search and destroy operations vic FSB CHARLIE; opened and outposted Route YELLOW in sector on 28 Mar until relief of 1-18 Inf by 2-16 Inf had been completed and on 29 Mar until passage of last convoy; and assumed OPCON of C 5-2 Arty for road security missions. 1-2 Inf conducted search and destroy operations vic FSB CHARLIE. Phase III (30 Mar - 13 Apr 67): 1-18 Inf (+) (G Trp, 2-11 Cav OPCON) daily outposted Route YELLOW in sector and coordinated security of FSB THRUST. At 021700H Bn was attached 1st Bde and security of FSB THRUST was also assumed by 1st Bde at that time; was returned back to control 2d Bde at 051200H Apr 67; secured FSB BRAVO; secured and outposted Route 246 in zone and conducted combat recon patrols; conducted search and destroy operations N of FSB CHARLIE; was airlifted from FSB CHARLIE and attached 1st Bde 130835H Apr 67. 2-18 Inf continued search and destroy operations in western Obj FAUST area; at 301505H Mar 67 was airlifted to FSB CHARLIE closing at 301611H Mar 67 and assumed responsibility of the east portion of FSB CHARLIE; coordinated security of FSB CHARLIE; cleared and outposted Route YELLOW in sector (commencing on 31 Mar 67) with C 5-2 Arty; and was attached to 1st Bde at 011236H Apr 67; reverted back to 2d Bde control at 061155H Apr 67; secured FSB CHARLIE; secured and outposted Route 246 in zone; conducted recon patrols of FSB CHARLIE; 1-26 Inf conducted an airmobile assault into LZ GEORGE at 301331H Mar 67 in Obj SIOUX; secured LZ until arrival of 1-2 Inf on 31 Mar 67; conducted search and destroy operations in eastern Obj SIOUX area, seizing Obj 11, 13, and 15; and conducted S&D opns S and SE of Obj SIOUX; and at 021140H was airlifted from LZ GEORGE; upon closure QUAN LOI reverted 1st Bde control. 1-2 Inf cleared and outposted Route YELLOW in sector; was airlifted from FSB CHARLIE at 310906H Mar closing LZ GEORGE at 311005H Mar 67; conducted search and destroy operations in

western Obj SIOUX area seizing Obj 12, 14, and 16; conducted search and destroy operations south and east of NDPs (XT441857, XT442829, XT462810, XT449819); and was airlifted to FSB BRAVO on 7 Apr 67 and attached 3d Brigade. 1-26 Inf was airlifted from PHOUC VINH to LZ GEORGE and became OPCON to 2d Bde upon closure at 311733H Mar 67; conducted search and destroy operations in zone vic XT4385, NE, NW of NDP (XT441857), NNW of NDP (XT441857); and was airlifted from LZ GEORGE at 041055H and attached 1st Bde upon closure at QUAN LOI. 2-16 Inf reverted back to 2d Bde control at 021110H Apr 67 and at 021130H Apr 67 airlifted from FSB BRAVO to LZ GEORGE closing at 021457H Apr 67; conducted search and destroy operations NE & E of LZ GEORGE, SW of NDP (XT428847), NW and SE of NDP (XT430805) and at vic Obj 12 (XT406824), 14(XT419817), 16 (XT414810); was airlifted from NDP (XT430805) commencing 070930H Apr 67, closing FSB BRAVO at 071115H Apr 67 relieving 1-28 Inf in place; secured FSB BRAVO; cleared and outposted Route 246 in zone; and conducted combat recon patrols and positioned night ambushes; became OPCON to 1st Bde at 131720H Apr 67. 1-28 Inf was attached 2d Bde at 071015H Mar 67 and airlifted from FSB BRAVO to FSB THRUST; conducted search and destroy operations N of NDP (XT551768), NE and SW of NDP (XT548787), SE of NDP toward XT551768; and was airlifted commencing 130920H Mar 67 and reverted 1st Bde control upon closure at PHOUC VINH. D 1-4 Cav was placed OPCON 2d Bde 070900H Apr 67; screened area N of FSB CHARLIE; and conducted aerial recons N and W of FSB CHARLIE. 1-7 Arty (+) remained in DS of 2d Bde throughout all three phases of the operation firing disruptive fires, targets of opportunity, preparations and defensive concentrations. On 13 Apr 67 the Brigade CP moved from FSB CHARLIE and closed QUAN LOI at 1315H Apr 67; and then moved by road to DI AN Base Camp, closing at 1413H Apr 67 thus terminating JUNCTION CITY II.

7. EXECUTION:

21 March: 2d Bde initiated Opn JUNCTION CITY II. Bde Fwd CP became operational at 0800H at FSB CHARLIE (XT568851). 2-16 Inf commenced participation in Opn JUNCTION CITY II making airmobile assault onto LZ CHARLIE (XT524900) at 1443H. At 1519H Trp E 2-11 ACR was placed OPCON 2-16 Inf, 1-18 Inf remain attached 1st Bde. 2-18 Inf reverted 2d Bde control at 0800H and initiated Opn JUNCTION CITY II making an airmobile assault at 1115H onto LZ BRAVO (XT521904). 1-26 Inf with C 5-2 Arty was attached to 2d Bde at 0800H and secured E portion of FSB CHARLIE; Bn (-) secured and outposted Hwy 246 from FSB CHARLIE to vic XT573840. 2-11 ACR was attached 2d Bde at 0800H. Sqdn (-) attack W from FSB CHARLIE along Axis PANZER commencing 0952H and Trp E attacked N along Axis 88 commencing 0952H; Trp B was placed OPCON 2-16 Inf at 1518H. 36th ARVN Ranger Bn became OPCON 2d Bde at 0800H and secured W portion of FSB CHARLIE. C 5-2 Arty was OPCON 1-26 Inf.

22 March: 2d Bde continued Opn JUNCTION CITY II. 2-16 Inf continued Opn JUNCTION CITY II conducting S&D opns south from LZ CHARLIE. Trp E 2-11 ACR was OPCON 2-16 Inf and remained at LZ CHARLIE until 1455H at which time Trp was placed OPCON 2-18 Inf. 1-18 Inf remain attached 1st Bde. 2-18 Inf continued Opn JUNCTION CITY II conducting S&D opns S of LZ BRAVO. At 1455H Trp E 2-11 ACR was placed OPCON 2-18 Inf and closed LZ BRAVO at 1830H. 1-26 Inf with C 5-2 Arty continued Opn JUNCTION CITY II securing E portion of FSB CHARLIE. 2-11 ACR (-) continued Opn JUNCTION CITY II attacking S from NDP (XT500802) commencing at 0643H. At 1100H Sqdn (-) was placed OPCON 173d Abn Bde. Trp E was placed OPCON 2-18 Inf. 36th ARVN Ranger Bn continued Opn JUNCTION CITY II securing W portion.

23 March: 2d Bde continued Opn JUNCTION CITY II. 2-16 Inf continued Opn JUNCTION CITY II conducting plt size cloverleaf patrols vic Obj 2 (XT521868). 1-18 Inf remain attached 1st Bde. 2-18 Inf continued Opn JUNCTION CITY II conducting cloverleaf patrolling S from LZ BRAVO towards LZ ECHO (XT503-887). Trp E 2-11 ACR reverted to Bde control at 0800H. 1-26 Inf with C 5-2 Arty continued Opn JUNCTION CITY II. Bn (-) cleared and outposted Route YELLOW (Route 246) commencing 0900H. Co C with Recon Plt cleared and outposted Route YELLOW from FSB CHARLIE east to vic XT573840 by 0905H. All elements closed FSB CHARLIE by 1855H. Bn (-) continued to secure E portion of FSB CHARLIE. 36th ARVN Ranger Bn continued Opn JUNCTION CITY II securing W portion of FSB CHARLIE. Trp E 2-11 ACR reverted OPCON 2d Bde at 0800H.

24 March: 2d Bde continued Opn JUNCTION CITY II. 2-16 Inf continued Opn JUNCTION CITY II conducting cloverleaf patrols S from Obj 2 (XT521868)

towards Obj 4 (XT514855) commencing at 0900H. 1-18 Inf remain attached 1st Bde. 2-18 Inf continued Opn JUNCTION CITY II conducting cloverleaf patrols SW of LZ ECHO (XT503887) commencing at 0831H. 1-26 Inf (+) continued Opn JUNCTION CITY II conducting S&D opns vic XT533809 and XT546810 elements of C 5-2 Arty cleared and outposted Rte 246 from FSB CHARLIE to vic XT573840. All elements closed FSB CHARLIE by 1810H. Bn (-) continued to secure E portion of FSB CHARLIE. 36th ARVN Ranger Bn continued Opn JUNCTION CITY II defending W portion of FSB CHARLIE. Trp E 2-11 ACR continued Opn JUNCTION CITY II. Trp (-) stood down for maintenance at FSB CHARLIE; C 5-2 Arty continued Opn JUNCTION CITY II defending perimeter at FSB CHARLIE.

25 March: 2d Bde continued Opn JUNCTION CITY II. 2-16 Inf continued Opn JUNCTION CITY II conducting S&D opns in zone towards Obj 6 (XT530847) commencing at 0734H. 1-18 Inf remained attached 1st Bde. 2-18 Inf continued Opn JUNCTION CITY II conducting S&D opns in zone toward Obj 3 (XT495827) commencing at 0811H. All elements closed NDP (XT518863) by 1650H. 1-26 Inf with Trp E 2-11 ACR and 1 section C 5-2 Arty continued Opn JUNCTION CITY II. ObA with 1 section C 5-2 Arty cleared and outposted Rte YELLOW from FSB CHARLIE to XT573840. Tm C (Co C and 1 plt Trp E 2-11 ACR) began S&D opns in AO PANTHER (XT570855) at 0858H. Trp E 2-11 ACR (-) and Recon plt outposted E portion of FSB CHARLIE. 36th ARVN Ranger Bn continued Opn JUNCTION CITY II. At 0847H a company size patrol was conducted SW of FSB CHARLIE (vic XT560860). Bn (-) continued to support W portion of FSB CHARLIE. C 5-2 Arty continued Opn JUNCTION CITY II providing section to 1-26 Inf for road clearing. Btry (-) continued to secure portion of FSB CHARLIE.

26 March: 2d Bde continued Opn JUNCTION CITY II. 2-16 Inf continued S&D operations in eastern Obj FAUST area with B and A Cos moving to SE from NDP at XT518863 and conducting cloverleaf patrols S toward Obj 4 and 6; and with Co C and Recon plt in reserve. Opn commenced at 0838H. 1-18 Inf remained attached 1st Bde. 2-18 Inf continued S&D opns in western Obj FAUST area. 1-26 Inf continued Opn vic FSB CHARLIE. At 0745H Co B with section of C 5-2 Arty OPCON commenced road clearing opns between CP-14 and CP-18. At 0757H Bn (-) began S&D opns and local ambush patrols around FSB CHARLIE N of Route YELLOW. E 2-11 Cav stood down for maintenance and participated in defense at FSB CHARLIE. C 5-2 Arty furnished 1 section to 1-26 Inf for route security and participated in defense of FSB CHARLIE. 36th ARVN Ranger Bn participated in defense of FSB CHARLIE and dispatched company size patrol to S of Route YELLOW.

27 March: 2d Bde continued Opn JUNCTION CITY II. 2-16 Inf continued S&D opns in zone; oriented patrols to SSE. 1-18 Inf remain attached to 1st Bde. 2-18 Inf continued S&D opns in zone; oriented towards Obj 3 and base camp to west. 1-26 Inf continued S&D opns and ambush patrols in AO; relieved 36th ARVN Ranger Bn of perimeter at 1000H; secured entire perimeter until relieved by 1-2 Inf (-); and cleared and outposted Rte YELLOW from CP-14 to CP-18 by 0840H. At 0725H Co C moved out for road clearing. At 0755H Bn commenced S&D opns and ambush patrols vic FSB CHARLIE. 1-2 Inf (-) was attached 2d Bde at 1202H upon closure at FSB CHARLIE. 36th ARVN Ranger Bn departed FSB CHARLIE at 1243H reverted to DS of 1st Bde at 1503H at QUAN LOI. Trp E, 2-11 Cav cleared Route YELLOW from CP-14 to 54 N-S grid line commencing at 0750H for passage of Sqdn convoy coming from FSB PARMY. After cancellation of convoy Troop (-) returned to FSB CHARLIE. At 1040H plt was placed OPCON 1-26 Inf for action to N; reverted Trp control at 1425H. C 5-2 Arty furnished one section to 1-26 Inf for route security, one section to 1-26 Inf for action to N without contact.

28 March: 2d Bde continued Opn JUNCTION CITY II. 2-16 Inf concluded S&D opns in Obj FAUST area at 0750H; moved by truck to FSB BRAVO at 1144H; relieved 1-18 Inf in place; and was attached 1st Bde at 1330H. 1-18 Inf reverted to 2d Bde control at 1330H. After relief by 2-16 Inf, Bn (-) moved to field psns vic XT538844, closing at 1530H and Co C moved into FSB CHARLIE at 1520H. Bn (-) occupied NDP vic XT538845. 2-18 Inf continued S&D opns zone; oriented opns toward VC base complexes located SW and SSW. 1-26 conducted S&D opns N of FSB CHARLIE; opened and outposted Rte YELLOW from

CP-18 to vic XT538841; and outposted NDP vic XT538844 until closure of 1-18 Inf. 1-2 Inf (-) conducted S&D opns to W of FSB CHARLIE. E 2-11 Cav pushed through 1-26 Inf and opened Rte YELLOW from XT538841 to link-up with 2-11 Cav (-) at 1555H; and reverted to Sqdn (-) control upon link-up. G 2-11 Cav OPCON 2d Bde at Obj THRUST at 1440H; secured area for engineer LZ clearance team; and remained vic XT500796 in NDP. C 5-2 Arty outposted perimeter during the day; provided elements for 1-26 Inf for road clearance and outposting; placed one platoon OPCON to 2-16 Inf (attached 1st Bde); and received OPCON of platoon A 1-4 Cav.

29 March: 2d Bde continued Opn JUNCTION CITY II. 2-16 Inf remained attached to 1st Bde. 1-18 Inf secured and outposted Rte YELLOW from CP-153 (vic NDP) to XT500759. Bn (-) commenced opn at 0645H and moved SW. At 0700H Bn assumed responsibility for security of Obj THRUST; at 1905H Bn closed NDP vic XT500796. 2-17 Inf continued S&D opns in zone; oriented opns to W. 1-2 Inf conducted S&D opns N of FSB CHARLIE. 1-26 Inf with C 5-2 Arty secured and outposted Rte YELLOW from CP-18 to CP-137. At 0720H elements departed on road clearing opns and by 0850H linked-up with 2-16 Inf on east. At 1020H Bn linked-up with 1-18 Inf.

30 March: 2d Bde continued Opn JUNCTION CITY II. 2-16 Inf remained attached 1st Bde. 1-18 Inf with G 2-11 ACR secured and outposted Rte YELLOW (Rte 246)from FSB THRUST (XT500808) to CP-137 (XT530853) with Tm G (1 plt Co A , 1 plt Co B, 1 plt Co C, 2 plts Trp G 2-11 ACR). 2-18 Inf continued S&D opns vic NDP (XT498868). At 1505H Bn was airlifted to FSB CHARLIE closing at 1611H and assumed responsibility of the E portion of FSB CHARLIE. 1-2 Inf cleared and outposted Route YELLOW from CP-18 (XT573842) to CP-137 (XT580833); at 1532H Co A closed FSB CHARLIE reverting Bn control. 1-26 Inf commenced local patrol vic FSB CHARLIE at 0657H. At 1331H Bn conducted an airmobile assault into LZ GEORGE (XT428847) in Obj SIOUX. C 5-2 Arty remained OPCON 1-26 Inf until 1330H and at 1611H was placed OPCON 2-16 Inf.

31 March: 2d Bde continued Opn JUNCTION CITY II. 2-16 Inf remained attached 1st Bde. 1-18 Inf with Trp G 2-11 ACR cleared and outposted Rte YELLOW from FSB THRUST to CP-137 with Tm G commencing at 0649H. 2-18 Inf continued to secure FSB CHARLIE and cleared and outposted Route YELLOW from CP-18 to CP-137. 1-2 Inf was airlifted from FSB CHARLIE commencing at 0906H and closed LZ GEORGE (XT428847) at 1005H. At 1013H Bn began S&D opns to SW. 1-26 Inf secured LZ GEORGE for 1-2 Inf. Bn (-) conducted S&D opns to S and E of LZ GEORGE. 1-16 Inf (-) became OPCON 2d Bde upon closure LZ GEORGE at 1733H and established NDPs vic XT427856.

1 April: 2d Bde continued Opn JUNCTION CITY II. 1st Bde assumed responsibility for security of FSB CHARLIE at 1236H. At 1527H Bde TAC CP was established at LZ GEORGE (XT428847). 2-16 Inf remained attached 1st Bde. 1-18 Inf continued to secure FSB THRUST (XT499800). 2-18 Inf with C 5-2 Arty continued to secure FSB CHARLIE and cleared and outposted Rte YELLOW from CP-14 (XT564843) to CP-18 (XT573384) by 0873H. At 1236H Bn (+) was attached to 1st Bde. 1-16 Inf conducted S&D opns NNE of LZ GEORGE. 1-26 Inf continued S&D opns in zone vic XT4385. 1-2 Inf continued S&D opns NNE of LZ GEORGE commencing at 1135H.

2 April: 2d Bde continued Opn JUNCTION CITY II. 2-16 Inf reverted to 2d Bde control at 1110H and at 1130H airlifted from FSB BRAVO to LZ GEORGE (XT428847) closing at 1457H. 1-18 Inf with Trp G 2-11 ACR continued to secure FSB THRUST, and cleared and outposted Rte 246 from FSB THRUST to CP-137 (XT530833). At 1700H Bn was attached 1st Bde and security of FSB THRUST was also assumed by 1st Bde at that time. 2-18 Inf remained attached 1st Bde. 1-16 Inf continued S&D opns NE and NW of NDP (XT441857) commencing at 0835H. 1-26 Inf was airlifted at 1140H and upon closure QUAN LOI reverted 1st Bde control. 1-2 Inf (-) conducted S&D opns ESE of NDP (XT441857).

3 April: 2d Bde continued Opn JUNCTION CITY II. 2-16 Inf continued Opn JUNCTION CITY II conducting S&D opns NE and E of LZ GEORGE (XT425848) commencing at 0902H. 1-18 Inf and 2-18 Inf remain attached 1st Bde. 1-16 Inf continued Opn JUNCTION CITY II conducting S&D opns NNW of NDP (XT441857) beginning at 0830H. 1-2 Inf conducted S&D opns S from NDP (XT441857) commencing at 0830H.

4 April: 2d Bde continued Opn JUNCTION CITY II. Prior TAC CP airlifted

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from LZ GEORGE closing FSB CHARLIE. 2-16 Inf conducted S&D opns SW of NDP (XT428847) commencing at 0800H. 1-18 Inf and 2-18 Inf remained attached 1st Bde. 1-16 Inf continued conducting local patrols vic NDP. Bn commenced airlifting from LZ GEORGE at 1055H and was attached 1st Bde upon closure at QUAN LOI. 1-2 Inf conducted S&D opns S and E of NDP (XT442829).

5 April: 2d Bde continued Opn JUNCTION CITY II. 2-16 Inf conducted S&D opns vic Obj 12 (XT406824), 14 (XT419819) and 16 (XT414810). 1-18 Inf returned to control 2d Bde at 1200H. Bn continued to outpost Rte 246 between FSB THRUST and CP-137 (XT530833) with G 2-11 Cav (-). 2-18 Inf remained attached 1st Bde. 1-2 Inf conducted S&D opns SE of NDP commencing 0805H.

6 April: 2d Bde continued Opn JUNCTION CITY II. 2-16 Inf continued S&D opns NW and SE of NDP (XT430805) commencing at 0800H. 1-18 Inf with Trp G 2-11 ACR continued to secure FSB THRUST, cleared and outposted Rte 246 from FSB THRUST to CP-137 by 1055H, and conducted local patrols. 2-18 Inf with C 5-2 Arty reverted to 2d Bde control at 1155H at which time the responsibility for scty of FSB CHARLIE also reverted to 2d Bde. Bn (+) cleared and outposted Rte 246 between CP-14 and CP-18 closing FSB CHARLIE at 1522H. 1-2 Inf conducted S&D opns SE of NDP (XT462810) commencing at 0830H.

7 April: 2d Bde continued Opn JUNCTION CITY II. At 1115H Bde assumed responsibility for security of FSB BRAVO (XT623815). 2-16 Inf was airlifted from NDP (XT430805) commencing at 0930H, closing FSB BRAVO at 1115H relieving 1-28 Inf in place; Bn conducted local recon patrols. 1-18 Inf with B 2-11 ACR cleared and outposted Rte 246 between FSB THRUST and CP-137. 2-18 Inf with C 5-2 Arty cleared and outposted Rte 246 from CP-18 to CP-137 and conducted local patrols NW of FSB CHARLIE. 1-2 Inf was airlifted to FSB BRAVO and attached 3d Bde. 1-28 Inf was attached 2d Bde at 1015H and airlifted from FSB BRAVO to FSB THRUST and conducted close-in local recon patrols. Trp D 1-4 Cav was placed OPCON 2d Bde at 0900H.

8 April: 2d Bde continued Opn JUNCTION CITY II. 2-16 Inf continued to secure FSB BRAVO, cleared and outposted Rte 246 in zone, and conducted combat recon patrols vic XT5982, XT6182, and XT6382. 1-18 Inf with G 2-11 ACR continued to secure FSB THRUST, cleared and outposted Rte 246 in zone, and conducted local combat recon patrols. 2-18 Inf with C 5-2 Arty continued to secure FSB CHARLIE, cleared and outposted Rte 246 in zone, and conducted a plt size combat recon patrol NW of FSB CHARLIE. 1-28 Inf conducted S&D opns SE and E of NDP towards XT551768. D 1-4 Cav continued to screen area N of FSB CHARLIE.

9 April: 2d Bde continued Opn JUNCTION CITY II. 2-16 Inf continued to secure FSB BRAVO (XT624815), cleared and outposted Rte 246 in zone, and conducted 4 combat patrols. 1-18 Inf with B 2-11 ACR secured FSB THRUST, cleared and outposted Rte 246 in zone, and conducted local recon patrols. 2-18 Inf with C 5-2 Arty continued to secure FSB CHARLIE, cleared and outposted Rte 246 in zone and conducted a plt size patrol to the NW of FSB CHARLIE. 1-28 Inf conducted S&D opns N of NDP (XT551768) commencing at 1035H. D 1-4 Cav continued to screen N of FSB CHARLIE. At 0815H Trp was placed OPCON 1st Bde and reverted to 2d Bde control at 1415H continuing screening mission without incident.

10 April: 2d Bde continued Opn JUNCTION CITY II. 2-16 Inf continued to secure FSB BRAVO, cleared and outposted Rte 246, and conducted local combat recon patrols. 1-18 Inf w/G 2-11 ACR continued to secure FSB THRUST and cleared and outposted Rte 246 in zone. Bn departed FSB THRUST at 1330H and closed FSB CHARLIE at 1817H. Trp G 2-11 ACR reverted Sodn control at 1545H. 2-18 Inf with C 5-2 Arty continued to secure FSB CHARLIE, cleared and outposted Rte 246, and conducted local recon patrols. 1-28 Inf conducted S&D opns NE and SW of NDP (XT548787). D 1-4 Cav continued to conduct aerial recons N of FSB CHARLIE.

11 April: 2d Bde continued Opn JUNCTION CITY II. 2-16 Inf continued to secure FSB BRAVO, cleared and outposted Rte 246, and conducted combat recon patrols. 1-18 Inf conducted S&D opns N of FSB CHARLIE commencing at 0830H. 2-18 Inf continued to secure FSB CHARLIE, cleared and outposted Rte 246 from FSB CHARLIE to vic XT530833, and conducted a company size S&D opn

NE of FSB CHARLIE. 1-28 Inf conducted S&D opns NE of NDP. D 1-4 Cav conducted aerial recons N of FSB CHARLIE.

13 April: 2d Bde continued Opn JUNCTION CITY II. Bde CP moved by road from FSB CHARLIE and closed QUAN LOI at 1513H. 2-16 Inf continued to secure FSB BRAVO, cleared and outposted Rte 246 in zone, and conducted combat recon patrols. At 1720H 1st Bde assumed control of the Bn along with security of FSB BRAVO. 1-18 Inf was airlifted from FSB CHARLIE and attached 1st Bde at 0835H. 2-18 Inf with 1 section C 5-2 Arty continued to secure FSB CHARLIE and cleared and outposted Rte 246 in zone. 1-28 Inf was placed OPCON 2d Bde upon closure FSB BRAVO, airlifted commencing at 0920H and reverted 1st Bde control upon closure at PHUOC VINH. D 1-4 Cav continued to conduct aerial recons N and W of FSB CHARLIE. One section, C 5-2 Arty remained OPCON 2-18 Inf until 1720H at which time it reverted to Btry control.

14 April: 2d Bde Fwd CP moved by road from QUAN LOI to DI AN Base Camp, closing at 1344H thus terminating Opn JUNCTION CITY II. 2-16 Inf airlifted from FSB BRAVO and reverted to 2d Bde control upon closure DI AN at 1557H and stood down for maintenance. 1-18 Inf remain attached 1st Bde. 2-18 Inf airlifted from QUAN LOI, closing DI AN at 1415H and stood down for maintenance.

8 SUPPORTING FORCES:

a. Artillery:

(1) Artillery Support for the 2d Brigade during the operation and their missions were as follows:

(a) 1st Bn 7th Artillery: Direct Support 2d Brigade.

(b) Btry 2d Bn 35th Artillery (155mm SP): Reinforcing 1st Bn 7th Artillery.

(c) A Btry 8th Bn 6th Artillery (155mm SP): Reinforcing 1st Bn 7th Artillery.

(d) D Btry 8th Bn 6th Artillery (8"): GS/R 1st Bn 7th Artillery.

(e) A, C, Platoon Light Horse Battery (4.2"): General Support.

(2) Expenditures during the operation were as follows

(a)	105mm -	162,508
(b)	155mm -	35,432
(c)	8 in -	4,372
(d)	4.2 in -	9,402
	TOTAL	211,714

(3) Missions fired during the operation were of the following type:

(a) Preparations

(b) Targets of Opportunity

(c) Blocking, flanking, and reconning fires

(d) Counter mortar fires

(e) Defensive fires

(4) One of the most serious threats posed by the enemy was his mortar capability which was used quite often. In defense of this form of attack

The MPQ-4A Counter Mortar radar set was used quiet effectively. In each case when a target, located by the radar set, was fired upon, the mortaring ceased.

(5) Artillery adjustment was performed by many various personnel including forward observers, air observers, forward controllers, air cavalry troops, and once by engineer Company Commander while on an aerial reconnaissance.

b. Air Force: The Air Force provided aerial observation and reconnaissance for the maneuver elements throughout the operation TAC Air was used for preparation of LZ's for combat assaults, convoy cover; prestrike of search and destroy areas; LZ cover for extraction of combat elements; close air support for units in contact and destruction missions on known enemy troop emplacements. A total of 715 sorties of tactical air were flown in direct support of the 2d Brigade during Operation JUNCTION CITY II.

9. RESULTS

a. U.S. Losses: 28 KHA, 275 WHA

b. V.C. Losses: 796 KIA (BC), 5 PWs, 3 WIA, 8-CHICOM LMGs, 1-hvy MG, 4 BARs, 30-AK47s, 1 Russian asault rifle, 9 CHICOM carbines, 2-60mm mortars, 2 rifles, 4-M79s, 1-.45 cal pistol, 10-RPGs, 33-81mm mortar rds, 58-60mm mortar rds, 8-75 RR rds, 5-57 RR rds, 22 AT mines, 1-CHICOM mine, 6 AP mines, 3-plastic mines, 3-US grenades, 6 CHICOM grenades, 26 rifle grenades, 3,000 hand grenades w/o fuzes, 910 rds SA ammo, 7 claymores, 12 CBUs, 2-105mm rds (duds), 3-booby trapped CHICOM grenades, 1 booby trapped 61mm rd, 1 booby trapped 82mm rd, 3 cases TNT, 5 cases C-4, 10 lbs black powder, 933 bunkers, 166 huts, 6 mortar psns, 24 tunnels, 78 foxholes, 9 bomb shelters, 5 underground rooms, 2 classrooms, 2 mess halls, 13.7 tons rice, 50 lbs sugar, 17 gal cooking oil, 5 gal alcohol, 5 cans milk, 6 cans "C" rations, 75 lbs poppy seed, 1 pig, 12 chickens, 31 ponchos, 8 uniforms, 2 packs, 3-VC helmets, 14 hammocks, 2 pistol belts, 3 canteens, 1 canteen cup w/cover, 7 ruck sacks, 8 sweat shirts, 5 pr black pajamas & civilian clothes, 1 VC gas mask, 1 AM radio, 1 saw, 2 shovels, 2 typewriters, 1500' elec wire, 13 cooking pots, 21 bicycles, 1 printing press, 1 barber kit, 702 packs cigarettes, 3 doz "I" beams, 3 oxcarts, 331 empty ammo boxes, miscellaneous documents and medicines.

10. ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS: Administrative plans were considered adequate throughout operation

a. Supply:

(1) On 19 March 67 the Brigade Trains planned and prepared for resupply of Opn JUNCTION CITY II. The Brigade Trains was established at QUAN LOI. On 21 March 67 Brigade Trains commenced aerial resupply of units on closure in the forward area. To reduce aircraft turn around time, a forward supply base was established at FSB CHARLIE. At this base a 2 DOS of Class V, "C" rations and the units 81mm mortars were kept. The resupply of the forward resupply point was accomplished by wheel vehicle convoy from the Brigade Trains area to FSB CHARLIE.

(2) Class I:

(a) All Class I was drawn from the Class I point at QUAN LOI by the using units. Resupply to the field was accomplished by helicopter from QUAN LOI to the forward location of the individual units.

(b) Ice was drawn from S & T, but only in limited quantity. Supplemental ice was obtained by civilian contract. An average of 75 blocks of ice was obtained daily through this contract and issued to the attached units of this Brigade.

(c) Water was drawn from the water point at QUAN LOI for trains and other elements located at QUAN LOI. Two 5,000 gallon tankers were used to haul water from FSB BRAVO to FSB CHARLIE and FSB THRUST when road conditions permitted. At FSB CHARLIE a water point was located, however,

it was only able to produce approximately 4,000 gallons of potable water daily. The additional water was transported from FSB BRAVO.

(3) Class II & IV:

Class II & IV: was drawn from S & T location at QUAN LOI. In some instance equipment in the volume desired was not immediately available, but in every instance, within a short time, the desired items were made available in the quantities requested. The reaction time by supply personnel was excellent.

(4) Class V:

(a) Class V was drawn from the ASP located at QUAN LOI.

(b) Sufficient quantities of ammunition of all types were maintained with exception of 81mm ammunition and fuses. Steps were taken immediately to rectify this situation; however, in one instance insufficient fuses were on hand for the quantity of 81mm ammunition. This rectified immediately upon notifying LOCC and sufficient fuses were flown in that day.

(c) The 22 bags maintained by the units were found to be too heavy for lift by the UH1B and UH1D helicopters. A reduction in weight to 800 lbs was found to be adequate and excellent usage was effected thereafter.

(d) Ammunition needed by the 2-11 ACR was flown in by CH-47 as sling loads when road conditions were insecure. Otherwise, vehicular transport was used for movement of Class V in support of that unit.

b. Maintenance

(1) A contact team from Co B, 701st Miantenance accompanied the Brigade move to QUAN LOI and remained with Brigade Trains throughout the operation.

(2) As required, teams were sent forward to make on the spot repairs. When this was unfeasible, equipment was evacuated to the trains location for repair. Some equipment such as tube replacement on artillery pieces necessitated movement of the equipment and necessary personnel to the forward location to effect the necessary repairs.

(3) C Bty, 5-2 Army ADA experienced an abnormal number of power train failures. In most instances the necessary repairs were made by the unit's organic maintenance section.

c. Treatment of Casualties and Evacuation and Hospitalization:

(1) Preventive Medicine: A representative of the 20th Preventive Medicine Unit accompanied the Brigade to its trains location. He supervised and took an active part in the construction and care of latrines and urinals. Utilizing an insecticide been pump, all tents, latrines, messes and sumps were sprayed unsing malathion 57% conic. With diesel fuel in a 3-6% solution. The pump was also used to create twilight mists for diminishing the flying insect population. Chlorine residual in potable water was tested daily and recommendations concerning water treatment were made.

(2) Medical support for Brigade Staff and attached units: The Brigade Surgeon, with the permission of the Division Surgeon, brought to the Brigade Trains area an Aid Station. Enlisted personnel working out of the aid station included the HHC Medic and two other medics from the 1st Medical Battalion. Over 200 patients were seen in the trains area alone. When the forward CP was located at FSB CHARLIE, two medics from the 1st Medical Bn accompanied those 2d Brigade, HHC and attached personnel who went forward. The need for these medics was realized during the operation, considering the number of casualties resulting from hostile action at FSB CHARLIE. The surgeons from the 1-7 Artillery, 2-18 Infantry and the Brigade Surgeon constituted the physician support at the FSB.

(3) Medical Support for battalions attached to the Brigade:

(a) First echelon of care: The medical platoon of each battalion.

(b) Evacuation: 428th Helicopter Ambulance unit and one helicopter from the 1st Aviation Battalion for forest penetrator utilization.

(c) Second echelon of care: D Company, 1st Medical Battalion forward clearing station at QUAN LOI, with 1st and 2d Brigade surgeons in support.

d. Transportation: No major problems with transportation arose during the operation.

e. Communication: Overall, communications in support of Operation JUNCTION CITY II was reliable and responsive to a fast moving tactical situation. FM radio provided the dominant means of communication from the 2d Brigade to its subordinate and attached units. Wire provided a backup means for the Bde FM nets. The primary problem encountered was that of radio frequency interference from friendly stations and jamming from enemy transmittance. In coping with this problem, frequency changes were made within the operational area when necessary, thereby reducing the friendly interfenence problems. In addition, alternate frequencies were utilized in an effort to minimize the effect of enemy jamming. Extensive use was made of airborne relay facilities in order to maintain solid contact with units moving through the jungle. Ground relay stations were also emplaced when needed. Radio set, AN/PRC-74 was field tested during this period. It provided an additional means of of communication from the staging area at QUAN LOI to the operational area.

f. Medical Evacuation: Medical support was more than adequate. No problems were encountered.

g. Personnel:

(1) Personnel Strength: The assigned strength of the Bde as of the befinning of the period was 127 Officers, 8 Warrant Officers, and 2,548 Enlisted Men. Strength of the Bde at the end of the period was 119 Officers, 9 Warrant Officers, and 2,340 Enlisted Men, as opposed to an authorized strength of 171 Officers, 15 Warrant Officers, and 2,913 Enlisted Men.

(2) Replacements: The Bde received 226 personnel replacements, and lost 441 during this period. The status of training of replacements was excellent.

(3) Military Discipline: Military discipline during the period was excellent. There were no unusual problems concerning law and order.

11. SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES: There were no special techniques or equipment used during Operation JUNCTION CITY II.

12. COMMANDERS'S ANALYSIS: Operation JUNCTION CITY II proved to be by far the most singularly productive operation in which the Brigade participated during the last reporting quarter. The 2d Brigade's participation in the Operation was characterized by rapid movement, precise planning, and massive and accurate fire control of both air and artillery. The most significant contacts during the operation occured on 31 March and 1 April respectively. On 31 March the 1-26 Inf which had air assaulted into LZ GEORGE on 29 March made contact with a large force of VC regulars just before noon. The VC utilized automatic weapons, mortars and recoiless rifles from the outset and were initially emplaced in an extensive defensive complex which ran in depth for a distance of approximately 800 meters. U.S. forces were hard pressed during the action and were able to achieve fire superiority only after two rifle companies and displacing the U.S. forces away from the point initial contact. This maneuver brought the VC out of their defensive positions and permitted US air and artillery to inflict heavy casualties on the VC force which was anxious to press its advantage in manpower and individual firepower.

During this portion of the action the VC attempted to envelop both flanks of the U.S. force while exerting maximum pressure in the center. Close air and artillery together with gunships along the US flanks combined with a deliberately executed displacement by the US forces finally forced the VC to break contact at approximately 1700H. PW's captured on 1 April confirmed that over 80 VC were killed in the action primarily from the 32d Battalion of the 271 Regiment. Elements of the 70th Guard Regiment were also identified. That afternoon the 1-16 Infantry, minus one company, was brought into LZ GEORGE to reinforce 1-26 Inf which was heavily engaged. They landed under heavy sniper fire but did not become involved in the main action. That evening 1-26 and 1-16 prepared for further action in a coordinated NDP location, straddling both sides of LZ GEORGE. At 0550H 1 April both elements came under heavy mortar attack (est 500 rds) followed by a ground attack from the N and NE, primarily against the 1-26 Inf perimeter. The attack was initiated by the entire 271 Regiment with elements of the 70th Guard Regiment and was extremely well coordinated. Contact was maintained until 0807H and a limited penetration was made in the 1-26 perimeter. Extensive air and artillery were called into the area Sporadic contact was made throughout the day. By 0750H The VC attackers were in full retreat as the full weight of US close air was brought to bear. Wounded, dead and weapons were abandoned on the battle field by the VC Regiment which retreated to the north, east and southeast. The action was marked by close hand to hand contact in the C Company portion of the 1-26 perimeter and the US perimeter was tested to its limit in that sector. When the VC broke contact the battalion's reserve (Recn plt) had been committed to contain the breach in friendly lines. As the VC broke contact the 3rd Co of 1-16 was airlifted in LZ GEORGE and the 1-16 Inf together with 1-2 Inf which was moved overland from its NDP to the south exploited the battlefield to the north and east. Results for the day at LZ GEORGE were 576 VC KIA (BC). On 1 April 67 at 0513H, in coordination with the ground mortar attack on LZ GEORGE, 2d Brigade Fwd CP at FSB CHARLIE came under intensive mortar attack. Approximately 250 rds of assorted caliber were received from the north. Counter-mortar fire was initiated immediately and a LFT, flareship, and FAC were airborne. Attack had ceased by 0615H. During the attack the Brigade Commander, Col Grimsley was wounded and evacuated to the rear area. GEN Hollingsworth, Ass't Division Commander assumed command of the Brigade. At 011000H Apr 67 LTC Haig, CO, 1-26 Inf assumed command of the 2d Brigade.

13. CONCLUSION: All in all, Operation JUNCTION CITY II went smoothly in virtually all respects. Support from higher Headquarters was more than adequate. Communications was good, logistics was satisfactory, and intelligence was timely thus enabling the Brigade to successfully accomplish its mission. The large quantity of VC KIA, VC captured and wounded, VC supplies and equipment captured, and base camps, bunkers, tunnels, foxholes and fighting positions destroyed during the operation suggest that a heavy blow was delivered to the VC during the operation. The AP GU victory confirmed again the decisive role played by US air and artillery in the Vietnam conflict. It also confirmed the soundness of 1-26 defensive positions. The overhead cover provided by its bunkers enabled the unit to withstand the heavy mortar attack without a single casualty. The AP GU victory also confirmed the wisdom of initiating heavy artillery fires at the outset of a contact. This action insured that maximum fires were falling accurately when the main VC attack was launched. The principle of coordinating air and artillery to insure that both are employed simultaneously was also confirmed. Past attack analysis suggests that CBU was the most effective killer on the battle field during periods when VC forces were in the open. The action also confirmed the wisdom of providing defense in depth, providing for resupply of Class V down to the fire team level and insuring that each defensive position is properly located and interlocked with adjacent positions. Claymores and machine guns were the most effective kill weapon in the close in fighting. VC tactics were sophisticated and sound. Initial elements attempted to locate US machine guns through probing action around the US position utilizing RPG and 57mm recoilless fire. Light and heavy machine guns were then moved far forward to neutralize US automatic fire. The final VC assault was made in great depth employing AK47 rifles and heavy grenade activity. VC employed their main attack in a narrow front in depth and were ecnelon-

at greater depth to exploit when the leading forces faltered and withdrew in confusion.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

CHARLES F. BAMFORD II
Major Infantry
Adjutant

Enclosures: 1 - 6 (Intelligence)
7 - Psy Ops/Civil Affairs

Incl 1 (Intelligence), After Action Report Junction City

Unit: Recon, 1/26 Inf

Time: 231320 Mar 67

Location: XT568832



Incl 2 (Intelligence) to After Action Report Junction City



Unit: B, 2/16

Date-Time: 231530H Mar 67

Location: XT522868

TOP VIEW OF BUNKERS



Incl 3 (Intelligence) to After Action Report Junction City



POSSIBLE PW CAMP
(RECENTLY USED)

Unit: B 2/18

Date-Time: 240900H Apr 67

Location: XT498887

Incl 4
After Action Report
Junction City

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Incl 5 [illegible] (Intelligence) to After Action Report Junction City

Trench used by 271 Regt
31 Mar-1 Apr 67, vic
XT431855



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Incl 6 (Intelligence)

Unit: 36th Ranger Bn

Date-Time: 211005 March 67

Location: XT563849

IZ MINE



(1)
5-81mm rds
3-60mm rds
35 lbs TNT
5-caps

(2)
8-75mm RR rds
7-81mm rds
14-60mm rds
105 lbs TNT
10-caps

(3)
6-81mm rds
8-60mm rds
35 lbs TNT
4 caps

(4)
8-81mm rds
18-60mm rds
35 lbs TNT
4 caps

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PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS/CIVIC ACTION: Psy Ops support of Operation JUNCTION CITY II consisted of leaflet/loudspeaker missions flown in coordination with ground action. During the reporting period, some 3,100,000 leaflets were dropped, and more than 10 hours of taped messages were broadcast. Following the battle of 1 April, extensive use was made of messages, both printed and taped, addressed to the 271 VC Regiment. No Hoi Chanh Vien were received as a direct result of these operations, probably because of the hard-core nature of the enemy. Ralliers may be expected in the futtre, when those who might have been affected by these messages have had sufficient time to evade the cadre. Civic Action during the course of Operation JUNCTION CITY II was limited, due to the nature of the adversary and the location of maneuver elements. Maximum support was given to the Chieu Hoi Center in AN LOC. This support took the form of donation of foodstuffs declared excess to US needs. Items donated consisted of the following: 20 cases of canned milk; 8 cases of powdered milk; 45 cases of assorted canned fruits and vegetables

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 3D BRIGADE
1st Infantry Division
APO 96345

AVDB-WB-C 25 April 1967

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (MACV/RCS/J3/32)

THRU: Commanding General
1st Infantry Division
APO US Forces 96345

TO: Commander
US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
ATTN: J321
APO US Forces 96243

1. NAME AND TYPE OF OPERATION: Operation "JUNCTION CITY", search and destroy.

2. DATES OF OPERATION: 220700 February 1967 to 141530 March 1967.

3. GENERAL: Command Headquarters - 3d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division. 1st Infantry Division OPLAN 5-17 (Operation JUNCTION CITY I) dated 151200 February 1967 and 3d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division OPORD 5-67 (Operation JUNCTION CITY I) dated 191930 February 1967. Operation JUNCTION CITY was conducted in TAY NINH Province, North and East of TAY NINH. The 3d Brigade plan was to secure Highway 4 in sector from TAY NINH to KATUM, conduct combat reconnaissance within AO to destroy VC/NVA forces and bases and prevent exfiltration of VC/NVA forces along Eastern portion of AO.

a. Reporting Officer: Colonel Sidney M. Marks

b. Task Organization:
Headquarters 3d Brigade, Colonel Sidney M. Marks, CO
1/28 Infantry, LTC Stanley J. Kuick, CO
1/16 Infantry, LTC Rufus C. Lazzell, CO
2/28 Infantry, LTC Elmer D. Pendleton, CO
2/2 Infantry, LTC Edward J. Collins, CO
1/4 Cavalry, LTC Thomas W. Fife, CO
2/33 Artillery, LTC Charles D. Daniels, CO

4. INTELLIGENCE:

a. Intelligence prior to the operation: Intelligence received prior to the operation was based upon confirmed information gained during operation ATTLEBORO in November 66. The area of interest to the 3d Brigade was generaly the Eastern and Northeastern sectors of War Zone C along route 4. Throughout the area, which had been under VC control for many years, there were numerous base camps, supply depots, training sites and medical complexes. As a result of their long occupation of the area, it was well known that the VC had many permanent type fortified defensive positions. There were indications that the VC would strongly defend the area. It was known, from documents, rallier reports and captured enemy material, that both COVSN and 9th Division Headquarters were situated in the area of operation. 9th Division Headquarter's controlled the largest VC Division in III CTZ and presented the greatest threat to friendly operations. OB information listed the following units as being in or near the operational area:

(1) Main Force Units: The 271,272 and 101st NVA Regiments of the 9th Division and the 70th Security Guard Regiment supported by elements of the 69th Artillery Regiment (U-80), and the 680th Training Regiment.
(2) Reinforcements: The 52d, 141st and the 165th NVA Regiments of the 7th Division, although weakened, were available to reinforce the 9th Division.
(3) Intelligence prior to deployment of the 3d Brigade confirmed the

presence of the 2d Battalion 272nd Regiment. Reports also confirm that the 14th Local Forces Companies and other possible units will also be expected to employ harassing tactics, or be employed in a limited reinforcing role.

b. The VC initially did not defend base camps or resupply installations. Numerous small contacts were made with fleeing VC squad size units. Most base camps showed signs of recent use. Bunkers of all descriptions were found throughout the area. Most were foxhole type fighting positions-many with overhead cover. Numerous trenches and storage bunkers containing rice and arms caches were located. Most base camps were located near streams or roads in what appeared to be a plan to locate all installations close to transportation routes. Numerous man-traps consisting of holes filled with punji stakes were found. It appeared that the VC were well prepared to defend against armor and mechanized units. This was evidenced by the extremely heavy volume of AT fire directed against US track vehicles. The majority of AT fires were from RPG-2 rockets. Numerous AT mining incidents were recorded. The heavy volume of AT fire by the VC continued throughout the entire operation.

c. Major contact was made with elements of the VC 9th Division on 28 February 1967 when elements of B 1/16 Infantry, while on a combat reconnaissance, made contact with an estimated multi-battalion force believed to be from the 101st NVA Regiment. The action by B 1/16, disrupted what appeared to be a staging area for a planned attack on a US convoy passing thru the area. The enemy force sustained heavy casualties and withdrew after being hit repeatedly by air and artillery. On the evening of 10 March 1967, the 2d Battalion (Mech) 2d Infantry and elements of the 168th Engineer Battalion, located at Artillery Base II, were taken under heavy mortar and automatic weapons fire by a multi-battalion force from the 272d Regiment. The VC attempted to overrun the base with a ground attack but were repulsed and suffered heavy casualties. The 272 was supported by the 69th Artillery Regiment (U-80) who supported the attack with 120 MM mortars. A substantial amount of weapons, ammunition and explosives were captured as detailed in paragraph 9.

d. Terrain in the area of operation was low flat land with very gentle slopes. Elevations were less than 100 meters. Most of the area was dense jungle interspersed with many clearings, marshes, ponds, waste lands, and streams. Concealment and cover were generally excellent but fields of fire were limited. Weather was hot and humid throughout the operation and did not cause any significant change in plans or conduct of the operation. Soil conditions were generally suitable for the conduct of extensive tracked vehicle operations. Dust, caused by ordnance expenditures on landing zones, created hazardous conditions for helicopters making final approaches. Dust of this nature was found in numerous places throughout the operational area.

e. The civilian populace presented no problem to the operation since the majority of contact was with hard core units.

5. MISSION: 3d Brigade conducts a ground assault along Axis Iron on 220630 February 1967. Opens and secures Highway 4 from TAY NINH to KATUM, conducts combat reconnaissance within AO to destroy VC/NVA forces and bases. Secures work parties in zone; prevents exfiltration of VC/NVA forces along the Eastern portion of the AO.

6. CONCEPT OF OPERATION: The 3d Brigade conducts a ground attack on D-Day along Axis Iron with 1/4 Cavalry leading and 2/2 Infantry (-) following and supporting. The 2/2 Infantry (-) secures the artillery bases and route in sector from XT285618 to Artillery Base III. The 1/4 Cavalry secures the route in sector from Artillery Base III to KATUM. The 2/28 Infantry initially the Brigade reserve; on order conducts an air assault into either LZ North or LZ South. The 7th TAF provides CAS. One FAC will be airborne during operations. Artillery support initially will be from SUOI DA. Artillery will move on order to establish artillery bases as follows:

a. Artillery Base I (vic XT2869)
b. Artillery Base II (vic XT2879)
c. Artillery Base III (vic XT290815)

7. EXECUTION:
22 February - At 0700 hours the 3d Brigade attacked North along Axis Iron (Route 4) with 1/4 Cavalry leading, 2/2 Infantry following and the 2/28 Infantry in Brigade reserve. At 0715 hours, a 1/4 Cavalry tank hit a mine vic XT272728, resulting in minor damage to the tank. at 0750 hours, vic XT268748, the 2d APC in the 1/4 Cavalry lead element hit a mine sustaining extensive damage to the vehicle. At 0830 hours, a 2/33 Artillery towed howitzer, hit a mine, vic XT281687 resulting in 3 minor casualties. At 0836 hours, a tank dozer from the 1/4 Cavalry hit a mine vic XT275775, resulting in damaged road wheels and track. At 0915 hours, 2/2 Infantry (-) established base at Artillery Base II and was joined by 2/33 Artillery which closed at

1[illegible]5 hours vic XT276[illegible]. At 19[illegible] hours, a 1/4 Cavalry [illegible] vic XT319[illegible], resulting in light damage to the [illegible]. The 1/4 Cavalry set up it's night defensive position vic XT322883. The 2/2 Infantry (-) secured the three artillery bases and route in sector from XT285618 to Artillery Base III. The 1/4 Cavalry secured the route in sector from Artillery Base III to KATUM. The remainder of the 22d of February passed without further incident.

23 February - 3d Brigade continued operation JUNCTION CITY by securing the supply route in sector, and conducted limited combat reconnaissance in AO Blue. At 0045 hours, an APC from C Company 2/2 Infantry, hit a mine vic XT296527, resulting in 2 US WIA. The APC was declared a combat loss. At 0159, an A 1/4 Cavalry tank hit a mine vic XT319874, resulting in 1 US WIA and 1 US KIA. 2/2 Infantry received 10 rounds of mortar fire vic XT277785 at 0353 hours, without casualties. At 0528 hours, vic XT296527, a C Company 2/2 Infantry APC hit a mine resulting in severe damage to the APC. The 2/28 Infantry conducted an airlift from SUOI DA to an LZ vic XT321-871 commencing at 0905 hours and closing at 1056 hours. The Battalion assumed responsibility for the road in sector from XT306850 to XT326888. At 1018 hours, vic XT267745, A Company, 2/2 Infantry had an APC hit a mine causing 7 US WIA. The APC was a total loss. At 1025 hours, A Company 2/28 Infantry found a bicycle, vic XT[illegible]-[illegible]32 and at 1425 hours, vic XT308853, 2 huts and a human left foot were found. The huts were destroyed and the foot buried. The 1/16 Infantry airlifted from LAI KHE to SUOI DA, commencing at 1530 hours and closing at 1746 hours. At 1640 hours, a tank from A 1/4 Cavalry hit a mine vic XT278700 resulting in light damage to the vehicle. At 1800 hours, vic XT268747, an APC from the Recon Platoon, 2/2 Infantry was hit by a 57 MM recoilless rifle round. The vehicle caught fire and was a total loss. A Company, 2/28 Infantry established an NDP vic XT308853 and the Battalion (-) established an NDP vic XT320875. The remainder of the 23d of February passed without further incident.

24 February - The 3d Brigade continued to secure the Division resupply route from TAY NINH to CP D (XT327890). At 0315 hours, the Battalion trains area and assembly area of the 1/16 Infantry at SUOI DA received approximately 120 rounds of 82 MM mortar fire. There were two killed and five wounded, including one company commander. The 2/28 Infantry rear elements at SUOI DA received 1 US WIA from the mortar attack. At 0835 hours, Company A patrol from the 2/28 Infantry located the first of three communication wires vic XT307852. The wire ran from the Northwest to the Southeast. RRU teams from Division monitored the lines through the night. The wire was followed to a well used trail vic XT308856 where the patrol discontinued following it. At 0858 hours, vic XT268744, a POL truck from the 11th Cavalry was hit by a 57 MM Recoilless Rifle round, resulting in 2 US WIA and a total loss of the truck. At 1000 hours, the lead tank in the convoy hit a mine vic XT327887, resulting in minor damage to the vehicle. The 1/16 Infantry was airlifted into LZ Apple (XT268748) and LZ Peach (XT276713) to provide route security in sector from XT280691 to XT268745. The first liftoff was at 0900 hours, and the final touchdown was at 1010 hours. At 1037 hours, vic XT276716, B Company 1/16 Infantry found and evacuated 200 sandbags filled with rice. At 1100 hours, B Company, 1/16 Infantry found and destroyed 6 boobytraps vic XT279716. At 1130 hours, vic XT320883, C Company, 2/28 Infantry wounded and captured 1 VC. Also found at this location were 1-7.92 bolt action rifle, 2 stick grenades and miscellaneous web gear. B Company, 2/28 Infantry located a well used trail running Northwest to Southeast, vic XT316855. At 1820 hours, vic XT308858, a patrol from the 2/28 Infantry spotted 2 VC checking a commo wire and fired on them, killing 1 VC and capturing a broken carbine. At 1918 hours, A Company, 1/16 Infantry made contact with an unknown size force, resulting in 3 US WIA. The 1/16 Infantry (-) set up its NDP at XT274728. A Company, 1/16 Infantry had its NDP at XT270748 and C Company had its NDP at XT279705. The remainder of the 24th of February passed without incident.

25 February - The 3d Brigade continued to secure the Division resupply route from TAY NINH to CP Delta (XT327890). At 0820 hours, vic XT266746, A Company 1/16 Infantry found and destroyed 1-105 MM round and 12 M-79 rounds, all boobytrapped. A truck from the 11th Cavalry was hit by an anti-tank weapon at XT273720, resulting in 2 US WIA. At 1002 hours, vic XT281779, A Company 2/2 Infantry, took 3 VC under fire with unknown results. At 1030 hours, vic XT272780, C Company, 1st Engineers received small arms fire resulting in 1 US KHA and 1 US WHA. At 1725 hours, C Company, 1/16 Infantry fired an 81 MM short round resulting in 2 US WIA, vic XT278711. At 1920 hours, A Company, 1/16 Infantry received incoming 50 caliber machine gun fire from a 2/2 Infantry unit conducting reconnaissance by fire. There were no casualties but one 81 MM mortar was damaged. At 1939 hours, vic XT265835, a 1/4 ton truck returning from Base III to Base II was hit by a rifle grenade resulting in 2 US WIA. At 2110 hours, B Company, 2/2 Infantry received either a grenade or a mortar round and 20 to 30 carbine

rounds vic XT289815. Three VC were sighted and fire was placed into the area with unknown results. The remainder of the 25th of February passed without incident.

26 February - The 3d Brigade continued to secure the resupply route in sector, provide convoy escort and conduct local patrols. At 0832 hours, a tank from B Company 2/34 Armor was hit by 2 RPG rounds vic XT271768 which caused 1 WIA and minor damage to the tank. The fire was returned and a search of the area revealed a wounded VC. At 1[illegible] hours, A Company, 2/28 Infantry found a recently well used trail running East to West. 44 bags of fish weighing 200-250 lbs each, several cans of condensed milk and lard. At 1116 hours, the 2/2 Infantry found a cable under the road at XT271772. It appeared to be a US manufactured cable with a 3 way sprocket at one end. At 1333 hours, vic XT299850 A Company, 2/28 Infantry, found 64 bags of rice, each weighing 80 lbs. At 1438 hours, vic XT305860, A Company, 2/28 Infantry, received five rounds of small arms fire, resulting in one US WIA. At 1621 hours, C Company 2/28 Infantry vic XT305845, saw a VC setting up a claymore mine. The VC was taken under fire with negative results; the claymore was captured. At 1515 hours, A Company, 2/28 Infantry reported finding a radio, radio parts and documents in a base camp vic XT301869. Also found at this location were numerous claymores, several bicycles, and clothes. The remainder of the 26th of February passed without incident.

27 February - 3d Brigade continued to secure the resupply route in sector, provide convoy escort and conducted patrols in sector. At 0816 hours, the 3d truck in the convoy, hit a mine vic XT288813 resulting in 2 US WIA and a total loss of the truck. The 1/16 Infantry conducted a company size search and destroy operation with C Company being airlifted into an LZ vic XT305775. The first lift was off at 0921 hours and the last touchdown was at 0953 hours. At 1421 hours, vic XT208868 A Company 2/28 Infantry found ten command bunkers with overhead cover and a trenchline, 13 fighting positions, clothing, gasoline, oil and documents. Extraction of C Company, 1/16 Infantry commenced at 1634 hours and was completed by 1707 hours. At 1745 hours, vic XT273720, B Company 1/16 Infantry sighted and fired on 1 VC, with unknown results. The remainder of the 27th of February passed without incident.

28 February - The 3d Brigade continued to secure the resupply route in sector and conducted local patrols. At 0542 hours, vic XT269741, a tank from C Troop, 1/4 Cavalry, was hit by 2 or 3 rounds of anti-tank fire resulting in minor damage to the tank and 1 US WIA. At 0959 hours, a tank from C Troop, 1/4 Cavalry hit a mine vic XT276714, resulting in minor damage to the vehicle. At 1040 hours, B Company, 1/16 Infantry made contact with an estimated VC battalion vic XT292724. Mass artillery and 54 sorties of TAC air were placed into the battle area commencing at 1045 hours. A Company, 1/16 Infantry was airlifted into an LZ vic XT295728 commencing at 1413 hours and closing at 1429 hours. Several small arms rounds were fired at the unit resulting in 1 US WIA. A Company 1/16 Infantry then secured the LZ, for B Company 2/18 Infantry. B Company 2/18 Infantry was airlifted into the LZ immediately behind A 1/16 Infantry and then started moving to the Southwest to link up with B Company 1/16 Infantry. At 1645 hours, C Company 1/16 Infantry was airlifted into the LZ vic XT295728 closing at 1705 hours, and sharing the security of the perimeter with A Company. At 1637 hours, B Company 2/18 Infantry linked up with B Company, 1/16 Infantry and assisted them back to the LZ. All elements closed back into the LZ at 2030 hours where they set up their NDP's. Contact continued throughout the afternoon until approximately 1700 hours, B Company 1/16 Infantry suffered 25 KHA and 28 WIA. The initial VC body count was 144 with 40 weapons captured or destroyed. Elsewhere during the day, C Company, 2/28 Infantry at 1236 hours, vic XT298878, located an abandoned base camp, containing administrative, command type bunkers. At 1532 hours, vic XT291885, C Company 2/28 Infantry found a VC training area, with bleachers, blackboards, and claymore wire. Vicinity XT290882, the unit found 2 bodies apparently killed by airstrikes. The remainder of the 28th of February passed without incident.

1 March - The 3d Brigade continued to secure the resupply route in sector, conducted convoy escort and limited search and destroy operations. At 0720 hours, an APC from the Recon Platoon of the 2/2 Infantry was hit by an anti-tank weapon vic XT271771, resulting in 1 US WIA and minor damage to the vehicle. At 0941 hours, A Company 1/16 Infantry found and evacuated one VC (WIA) from vic XT291727. During the day, vic XT291843, B Company 2/34 Armor found and evacuated 10.9 tons of rice and destroyed 3000 lbs of dried fish. At 1055 hours, A Company 1/16 Infantry found and destroyed 2 bicycles vic XT291727. At 1210 hours, B Company 2/28 Infantry found and destroyed 10 sheets of plastic and 2 sheets of tin vic XT296852. At 1345 hours, vic XT293608 an APC from C Troop, 1/4 Cavalry hit a mine resulting in 1 US WIA and minor

damage to the vehicle. At 1436 hours, vic XT288852, B Company 2/28 Infantry located and destroyed 100-200 lb bags of polished rice, 51 bags of [illegible] fish (50 lb each), cooking oil and 60 ounces of milk. Prior to 1000 hours, all the survivors of B 1/16 Infantry were evacuated to SUCT DX. B 2/18 Infantry replaced B 1/16 Infantry and all elements of the 1/16 Infantry closed into their respective NDP's, along Route 4 prior to 1615 hours. During the evening, all companies of the 2/28 Infantry reported movement about the perimeter, but there were no engagements. The remainder of the 1st March passed without incident.

2 March - The 3d Brigade continued to secure the resupply route in sector, conducted local patrols in sector and provided convoy escort. At 0904 hours, an S&T Battalion truck hit a mine vic XT283670. The truck was a total loss. At 0929 hours a 8/6 Artillery truck hit a mine vic XT283673 resulting in moderate damage to the vehicle. At 1153 hours C Company, 2/28 Infantry found 1 VC body apparently killed by airstrike or artillery, vic XT300887. At 1614 hours, the Recon Platoon from the 1/16 Infantry found 10-200 lb bags of rice vic XT259727. The remainder of the 2d of March passed without incident.

3 March - The 3d Brigade continued to secure the resupply route in sector, conducted local patrols and provided convoy escort. At 0914 hours, vic XT281687, C Company 2/28 Infantry found and destroyed 4 mines. At 1445 hours, B Company 2/28 Infantry found a platoon size base camp and several trails leading into the area, vic XT314847. At 1542 hours, vic XT313849, B Company 2/28 Infantry found a wire running Southeast, Northwest. There were several fighting positions located in the area. At 1640 hours, vic XT324851, B Company 2/28 Infantry made contact with an estimated VC squad. Fire was exchanged resulting in 4 VC (BC) KIA and no US casualties. Airstrikes and artillery were called into the area and the aerial observer spotted 3 additional VC KIA. The remainder of the 3d of March passed without incident.

4 March - The 3d Brigade continued to secure the resupply route in sector, conducted limited search and destroy operations and provided convoy escort. A and C Company, 2/28 Infantry secured the highway in sector conducting local patrols without contact. B Company 2/28 Infantry conducted a company size combat reconnaissance to the Southeast to the Battalion AO. The 1/16 Infantry secured the road in its sector with B Company2/18 Infantry in the North and C Company 1/16 Infantry in the South. A Company 1/16 Infantry conducted a company size combat reconnaissance to the East of the Battalion AO. The 2/2 Infantry conducted search and destroy operations around Base II and Base III with negative contact. At 1255 hours, vic XT288629, a 5 ton dump truck from A Company, 168 Engineer Battalion hit a mine resulting in heavy damage to the vehicle. At 1510 hours, B Company 2/28 Infantry found and evacuated a pair of binoculars, and a pack of letters vic XT324851. An airstrike, at 1555 hours, vic XT340-597 uncovered 11 sampans, 4 were destroyed. At 1634 hours, B Company 2/28 Infantry, located a platoon size base camp, vic XT321838. The camp contained 12 bunkers with overhead cover, a fighting trench which surrounded the camp and two communication lines leading out of the camp. At 1704 hours, A Company 1/16 Infantry closed into its NDP. At 1830 hours, B Company 2/28 Infantry closed into its NDP. At 1907 hours, a 1/4 ton truck from E Troop 17 Cavalry hit a mine vic XT279687 causing 3 US wounded and damaging the vehicle. The remainder of the 4th of March passed without incident.

5 March - The 3d Brigade continued to secure the resupply route in sector, conducted limited search and destroy operations and provided convoy escort. At 0825 hours, vic XT275715, C Company 1/16 Infantry located and destroyed a large (13" diameter) AT mine. At 0840 hours, the Recon Platoon, 2/2 Infantry found and destroyed a mine vic XT267746. At 1106 hours, vic XT267693, E Troop, 17 Cavalry, located 2 huts, 1 bunker and 1 VC. The VC was taken under fire with unknown results. At 1136 hours, E Troop 17 Cavalry loated and destroyed a boobytrapped 55 gallon drum vic XT262694. At 1214 hours, vic XT264727, the Recon Platoon 1/16 Infantry located a hut, a bunker, 10 bags of unmilled rice and a notebook. All was destroyed except the notebook. At 1240 hours, vic XT275715, C Company 1/16 Infantry found and destroyed a 15-16 lb Chicom, AT mine and at vic XT277710 located and destroyed a 12-16 lb homemade bomb. The bomb had a CBU bomblet as a detenator. B Company, 2/18 Infantry was detached from the 1/16 Infantry at 1558 hours. At 1504 hours, vic XT265720, Recon Platoon, 1/16 Infantry found and evacuated several documents. A truck from 8/6 Artillery hit a mine at 1515 hours, vic XT286650, causing extensive damage to the truck. At 1541 hours, vic XT286687, a 5 ton truck hit a mine, causing extensive damage to the truck. At 1615 hours vic XT268740, and APC from the 1/4 Cavalry hit a mine resulting in minor damage to the APC. At 1614 hours, vic XT270768, an APC from C Company, 2/2 Infantry was hit by an RPG round causing 3 US wounded and damage to the vehicle. The remainder of the 5th of March passed without incident.

6 March - The 3d Brigade continued to secure the resupply route and conducted limited search and destroy operations in sector. B Company 2/2 Infantry conducted a company size sweep to the East of Base III. C Company 2/28 Infantry conducted a company size search and destroy operation to the Northwest of their AO. At 0700 hours, 1/28 Infantry came under OPCON of the 3d Brigade and secured PZ's for the 173d BDE Brigade vic KATUM. The Battalion then assumed responsibility of the area from XT320818 North to the border. At 0918 hours, a tank from the 1/4 Cavalry hit a mine, vic XT302843 resulting in moderate damage to the tank. At 1000 hours, B Company, 1/16 Infantry closed into the Battalion CP, vic XT274726, from SAOI DA. At 1135 hours, vic XT293809, C Company, 2/28 Infantry located and traced a wire to XT289894, where the patrol stopped following the line. At 1136 hours, vic XT 284710, C Company, 1/16 Infantry located and destroyed 2 M-79 rounds, 5 Chicom grenades and 100 lb of rice. At 1145 hours, vic XT316828, B Company, 2/2 Infantry found and destroyed a mine vic XT270766. The 1/28 Infantry established its NDP at KATUM. The remainder of the remainder of the 6th of March passed with ut incident.

7 March - The 3d Brigade continued to secure Highway 4 in sector, conducted limited search and destroy operations and provided convoy escorts. A Company 2/28 Infantry conducted a company size search and destroy operation in the western portion of their AO. At 0905 hours, a tank and a truck were hit by a mine vic XT288630, resulting in minor damage and 2 US WIA. B Company 1/28 Infantry found 1 VC body at 1117 hours, vic XT353917. There were no documents or weapons with the body. At 1242 hours, vic XT351906 1/28 Infantry found 2 VC bodies. Again no documents or weapons were found on the bodies. At 1256 hours, a tank from 1/4 Cavalry, the lead tank in the convoy, was hit by 3 RPG rounds vic XT290883 resulting in 3 US WIA and minor damage to the tank. At 2219 hours, vic XT309847, A Company 2/28 Infantry received either a grenade or a claymore detonated against its perimeter causing 2 US KIA and 2 US WIA. Through the remainder of the night both 2/2 Infantry and 2/28 Infantry patrols reported hearing movement but no contact.

8 March - The 3d Brigade continued to secure the resupply route in sector, conducted limited search and destroy operations and provided convoy escort. C Company, 1/16 Infantry, with the Recon Platoon attached, conducted an airmobile assualt into an LZ, vic XT236745 and then conducted search and destroy operations back to Route 4. B Company, 2/28 Infantry, conducted a company size search and destroy operation to the East of their AO. C Company, 1/16 Infantry and the Recon Platoon lifted into an LZ vic XT236745 commencing at 0845 hours, and closing by 0930 hours without contact. At 1000 hours, vic XT323660, a patrol from C troop, 17th Cavalry found 5 bodies, 5 oxcarts with oxen and documents. Artillery had been fired into this area at 072130 hours when movement had been detected. At 1222 hours, vic XT333872, B Company, 2/28 Infantry found a large base camp containing huts, a tunnel system, 50 miles of commo wire, copper electrical and WD-1 wire, one US telephone, a switchboard, a French telephone, documents and several sampan docking sites. At 2345 hours, vic XT294824, an APC from the Scout Platoon, 2/2 Infantry hit a mine, resulting in severe damage to the vehicle. The remainder of 8 March passed without incident.

9 March - The 3d Brigade continued to secure the resupply route and conducted limited search and destroy operations in sector. B Company, 2/28 Infantry conducted a company size search and destroy operation to the East of its AO. At 0853 hours, vic XT284617 the lead tank of the Northbound convoy hit a mine , resulting in minor damage to the tank. At 0837 hours, vic XT352910, B Company, 2/34 Armor still in the same base camp, found 100 lbs salt, 300 lbs of rice and some documents. The document were evacuated. At 1205 hours, vic XT304696, C Company, 2/28 Infantry made contact with a reinforced VC squad. Air and artillery were placed into the area of contact with unknown results. At 1452 hours, C Company, 2/28 Infantry found a large base camp vic XT297893. The base camp contained large quantities of fish, clothing, documents, three RPG rounds, one German Mauser rifle, 10 packs, one C W Key and medical supplies. At 1650 hours, vic XT302842, C Company, 2/2 Infantry had one APC hit by an RPG round, damaging the vehicle and wounding two. Fire was returned with unknown results. The remainder of the 9th of March passed without incident.

10 March - The 3d Brigade continued to secure the resupply route, provided convoy escort and conducted limited search and destroy operations. C Company 1/16 Infantry conducted a company size search and destroy operation in the Northwest portion of their AO. A Company, 2/2 Infantry conducted a search and destroy operation to the West of Artillery Base II. At 0740 hours, vic XT284647, E Troop, 17 Cavalry engaged two VC with small arms fire. Blood trails were later found in the area. At 0955 hours, vic XT289629, a C Troop, 1/4 Cavalry APC hit a mine resulting in 1 US WIA and severe damage to the vehicle. At 1315 hours, vic XT295893, C Company, 2/28 Infantry

found 2-TA 312 telephones, one TT-1 telephone, one 1/2-ton rubber rectangular shaped heavy duty cloth repair kit, one lensatic compass, one 32-volt 3 gang generator, 1 roll rolls of communication wire, one eighteen inch Chicom hand grenade sewing machine. A Company, 2/2 Infantry, located and destroyed 2 tons of unmilled rice. At 1340 hours, vic XT309925, B Company 1/28 Infantry located a base camp, containing a small Japanese hand-crank d generator with cover plates and a WW dynamotor design GE-9X. At 1600 hours, vic XT290791, C Company 2/28 Infantry located a Chinese radio with component parts and radio code books. At 1655 hours, vic XT306700, C Company, 1/16 Infantry received 7 WIA, from 2 booby-trapped Chicom grenades. C Company 2/28 Infantry at XT305790 found a grave containing a body which appeared to have been dead 2 or 3 days. At 1754 hours, A Company, 2/28 Infantry located three sets of bloodied VC uniforms vic XT292851. At 2200 hours, Artillery Base II came under a heavy mortar attack. (Later confirmed 166 round were fired into the perimeter including 120 MM, 82 MM and 60 MM mortars). At 2220 hours, the mortar fires lifted and a heavy ground attack ensued. The attack came first, from the East into A Company, 2/2 Infantry's position. Small arms, automatic weapons, RPG's and 75 MM recoilless rifles were used. A secondary attack came from the Southwest into C Company, 2/2 Infantry position. Artillery and airstrikes were called into the area. By 2330 hours, the ground attack had been repelled and only sporadic sniper fire continued. At 110200 hours, March, the firing completely stopped. At 2237 hours, Artillery Base I came under a mortar attack. Small arms, automatic weapons and mortars were fired into Base I. Fire was returned with small arms and artillery. At 110302 hours, March, the attack on Base I stopped with negative US casualties.

11 March - The 3d Brigade continued to secure the resupply route, conducted local search and destroy operations, provided convoy escort and policed the battle area around Artillery Base II. At 0200 hours, the attack on Artillery Base II ceased. A search of the area at daylight was conducted with the following results:

Casualties:
Friendly - one (1) KIA; thirty-one (31) WHA.
Enemy - 197 KIA (BC); 5 - POW's.

Numerous weapons, grenades, ammunition and web gear also was found. A Company 1/16 Infantry conducted a company size search and destroy operation in the eastern sector of their AO. A Company, 2/28 Infantry conducted a company size search and destroy operation to the West of its NDP. At 0654 hours, a patrol from C Company, 1/28 Infantry made contact with a reinforced VC rifle squad vic XT344698. Airstrikes and artillery were placed into the area. At 0921 hours, the contact was broken. There was 1 US KIA, 2 US WIA and unknwon VC casualties. At 1007 hours, vic XT284660, a tank from the 1/4 Cavalry, leading the Northbound convoy hit a mine which caused minor damage to the tank. At 1102 hours, a truck from C Battery 2/35 Artillery hit a mine, vic XT284660, and was damaged extensively. At 1138 hours, vic XT344697, C Company, 1/28 Infantry found a freshly dug base camp containing 1 claymore, 5 bicycles 6 huts, a kitchen, VC uniforms, documents and a flag shaped like a triangle with a red background and a yellow star with the following letters T O K U N U T. During the day A Company, 2/28 Infantry located and destroyed 40 bags of unmilled rice and 7 bags, 275 lbs each of dried fish. At 170 hours, B Company, 2/28 Infantry found a body in a well, vic XT300873. At 1900 hours, 2/34 Armor became OPCON, 3d Brigade and established its RON position at K TUM. The remainder of 11 March passed without incident.

12 March - The 3d Brigade continued to secure the resupply route in sector, conducted limited search and destroy operations, provided convoy escort and positioned units for extraction. The 1/28 Infantry was relieved in sector by 2/34 Armor at 0715 hours and was airlifted to QUAN LOI where they became under OPCON of the 1st Brigade upon closing. At 0920 hours, 1/16 Infantry was relieved in sector by A Company, 2/2 Infantry. The 1/16 Infantry was airlifted to SUOI DA, closing at 1145 hours. B Company 2/28 Infantry conducted a company size search and destroy operation in the Northwest portion of their AO. At 1505 hours, B Company 2/28 Infantry found a company size base camp vic XT297888. In a well in the camp the patrol found a body. At 2025 hours, an ambush patrol from A Company 2/2 Infantry took 6 VC under fire vic XT276714 with negative results. At 2205 hours, a tank from A Troop, 1/4 Cavalry hit a mine vic XT288627 causing minor damage to the tank. The remainder of 12 March passed without incident.

13 March - The 3d Brigade continued to secure the resupply route in sector and positioned units for extraction. At 0609 hours, a tank from 1/4 Cavalry hit a mine vic XT288625, resulting in minor damage to the vehicle. At 0833 hours, vic XT308855, A Company, 2/28 Infantry located and destroyed a booby-trapped 81 MM mortar round. At 1045 hours, 2/28 Infantry was airlifted to SUOI DA, closing at 1250 hours, without

incident. The 1/16 Infantry (-) was airlifted from [illegible] closing at 1230 hours. A Company 1/16 Infantry was airlifted from [illegible] closing at 1245 hours. The remainder of 13 March passed without incident.

14 March - The 3d Brigade terminated its portion of JUNCTION CITY. The 2/2[illegible] Infantry was airlifted from SUOI DA to LAI KHE, closing at 0950 hours. The Brigade was relieved in place along Highway 4 by elements of the 196th Infantry Brigade at 1415 hours and turned over responsibility for the SUOI DA base to the 173d Airborne Brigade at 1530 hours. The final extraction of Brigade combat and combat support units was at 1600 hours.

8. SUPPORTING FORCES:

a. Artillery: The operation was supported by 2/33 Artillery and 2 batteries of 8/6 Artillery GSR to 2/33 Artillery. Artillery fires were planned along axis of advance and on all LZ's during the operation. Artillery fires were used extensively in support of ground forces. A total of 59,312 rounds of 105 MM and 19,417 rounds of 155 MM were expended.

b. Air Force: The Air Force provided aerial observation and reconnaissance throughout the operation. Air Force ordnance was used in preparation of LZ's and in support of ground forces. A total of 338 close air support sorties were flown in conjunction with the operation.

9. RESULTS:

a. Personnel Losses:

	US	VC
KIA	35	414
WIA	147	8
VCC	-	8

b. Equipment Losses:

(1) US Losses: 3 Armored Personnel Carriers, 1 Tank Dozer, 1 1/4 Ton Truck, and 1 81 MM Mortar.

Damaged during the operation where 18 Tanks, 1 Towed Artillery Howitzer, 4 Armored Personnel Carriers, and 8 Vehicles.

(2) VC Losses:

(a) Weapons:

7.62 Carbine	3
12 Guage Shotgun	1
Russian or Czech Carbine	1
Rifles	6
Browning Automatic Rifle	1
AK 47's	3
Assorted Rifles	40
Total	55

(b) Ammunition:

12 Guage Buck Shot Shells	12
82 MM Mortar Round	1
105 MM Round	1
7.62 Ammo Rounds	3,245
7.92 Ammo Rounds	1,[illegible]
RPG-2 Rounds	[illegible]
Mortar Firing Table	1
Mines (AT and Claymore)	19
M-79 Rounds	15
Grenades	72

(c) Signal Equipment:

Radios (Chinese and US)	3
Earphone Sets	3
Generators	3
Code Book	1
Telephones	4
Telephone Switchboard	1
Telegraph Key Sets	3
Miles of Comm Wire	80
Flashlights with 12 Batteries	2

(d) Foodstuffs:

Rice	51,4[illegible] LBS
Rice (Destroyed)	1[illegible],760 LBS
Total	7[illegible],1[illegible] LBS
Dried Fish	1[illegible],915 LBS
Salt	100 LBS
4 Ounce Cans of Milk	20

(e) Documents found throughout the operation were evacuated through S-2 channels.

(f) Material:

Web Gear Sets with Canteen	30
Ruck Sacks	5
Magazines for AK 47	27
BAR Magazines	25
Australian Binoculars	1
Bicycles	13
5 Gallon Cans of Oil	95
Sheets of Tin	10
Sheets of Plastic	10
Water Cans	2
Ox Carts	9
Oxen	14
Medical Aid Bag	1
Hammocks	40
Ponchos	30
VC Flag	1

10. ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS: Administrative plans were considered adequate throughout the operation.

a. Supply: The 3d Brigade moved to SUOI DA. The First Log Command operated an ASP at SUOI DA and supplied all Class V items. A water point was established at SUOI DA by the 1st Engineer Battalion and 168th Engineer Battalion. Resupply was made by road and air. During one phase of the operation the Iron Brigade supported 4 Infantry Battalions, 1 Cavalry Squadron (-), 1 Artillery Battalion and 1 Tank Company.

b. Maintenance: No major problems arose with maintenance during the operation.

c. Treatment of Casualties and Evacuation and Hospitalization: The treatment of casualties on the battlefield, evacuation by dust-off and subsequent hospitalization generally went very smoothly. Clearing station support was provided by C Company, 1st Medical Battalion. The Clearing station was placed at SUOI DA and provided more than adequate support. There was some difficulty obtaining a dustoff helicopter to be placed at SUOI DA in support of the 3d Brigade and C Company, 1st Medical Battalion, however this was solved within 48 hours.

d. Transportation: No major problems with transportation arose during the operation.

e. Communication: During Operation JUNCTION CITY the 3d Brigade experienced considerable radio interference at the Brigade CP with FM voice on both the Brigade and Division Command Frequencies. The interference seemed to be local but its source could not be located. The interference was reported to the Division Signal Officer and also to RRU. The interference seemed to be noise and was of the same strength as authentic radio signals. At times the interference signal strength would increase at the time an incoming signal was being received. The interference did not seem to affect transmission to other units. It is recommended that steps be taken to procure equipment for the purpose of locating the source of radio interference so that action may be taken to eliminate the interference.

f. Medical Evaluation: Medical support was more than adequate. No major problems were encountered.

11. Special Equipment and Techniques: There were no special techniques or equipment used during Operation JUNCTION CITY.

12. COMMANDER'S ANALYSIS: Operation JUNCTION CITY was, for the Iron Brigade, a road clearing and security operation. The road was initially opened by a cavalry squadron in order to rapidly clear the area and to provide as much fire power as possible to the lead elements. Infantry was used to secure the road since vigorous patrolling is the only way to provide adequate protection and security for this type of operation. Initially the Brigade was given an operational area 1000 meters on either side of Route 4. This was unsatisfactory since a unit providing security must

be able to patrol extensively out to two or three kilometers, with occasional patrols going out five or six kilometers. As the operation progressed the Brigade's AO was increased until there was room enough to adequately protect the road. When used in conjunction with Infantry patrolling the flanks, roadrunner operations greatly assist in keeping the road clear of mines. However, when used exclusively to secure an area, roadrunner operations cannot protect the convoy from sniper and anti-tank fire and the unit conducting the operation will probably suffer numerous losses to mines planted between runs.

13. CONCLUSION: Operation JUNCTION CITY was a successful operation for the Iron Brigade. Convoys moving through the Brigade sector suffered minimum losses and delays were few. The losses suffered by the enemy during both his attack on Company D, 1/16 Infantry and on the 2/2 Infantry have greatly reduced his capability to maintain the initiative in TAY NINH Province.

Sidney M Marks

SIDNEY M. MARKS
Colonel, Infantry
Commanding

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HEADQUARTERS
1ST AVIATION BATTALION
1ST INFANTRY DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96345

AVDB-AVT 29 April 1967

SUBJECT: After Action Report Operation "Junction City"

TO: Commanding General
1st Infantry Division
APO 96345

1. GENERAL: The 1st Aviation Battalion furnished general aviation support to the 1st Infantry Division throughout Phase I and II of Operation Junction City. In essence this general support can be further defined as: a. Planning, coordinating, and executing airmobile assaults with organic and nondivisional aviation assets; b. Furnishing organic aircraft to units within the division requesting aviation support (i.e. resupply and command and control (C&C) aircraft) on a daily basis; and c. Providing direct fire support in the form of gunships from the organic armed helicopter platoon.

2. MISSIONS: PHASE I — D-Day for Operation Junction City, Phase I, was marked by five (5) battalions conducting airmobile assaults into War Zone 'C'. In terms of planning this was a joint exercise by the Headquarters, 1st Aviation Battalion and the Headquarters, 11th Aviation Battalion. A joint order was written and 60 aircraft were used for the multiple assaults on D-Day. As in previous operations of this magnitude, the command and control group of each aviation battalion was used for each separate infantry battalion airmobile assault.

a. The 1st Aviation Battalion led off D-Day, H-Hour, by airlifting elements of the 1/28 Infantry and a small tactical party of Headquarters, 1st Infantry Brigade from Minh Thanh to LZ 5 located deep in War Zone 'C' (XT275965). Noteworthy of this initial airlift was the manner in which the aircraft were staged in to Minh Thanh. Locating Minh Thanh at night can be a difficult job, especially when there is little or no moonlight. Therefore, it was decided to employ the use of a radio non-directional beacon to aid pilots in locating Minh Thanh (aircraft had to arrive at 0630 hours, 22 February to meet H-Hour). The beacon, through mechanical difficulties, became inoperative the night before. A quick discussion with the fire support element (FSE) as to the feasibility of firing illuminating rounds commencing at 0615 22 February was made, and agreed upon. At exactly 0615 the rounds started coming out of the "tube", furnishing continuous illumination and most of all providing the much needed guide to get all aircraft in on time. This proved to be especially helpful for the Aviation Companies from the 13th Combat Aviation Battalion (from the Delta), whose familiarity with the area was very limited. At 0700 all aircraft were landed at Minh Thanh without incident. The initial landing at LZ 5 was carried out without any major incidents. some of the "lift" aircraft did report small arms fire with few receiving hits. Gunships were

ANNEX M 170

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quickly brought in to silence the VC ground fire. This lift utilized 70 aircraft thereby allowing the elements of the 1/28 Infantry Battalion and the tactical command post of the 1st Brigade to be landed in one lift. The total number of aircraft was then reduced to 60 because of a previous commitment of 10 aircraft. The remaining 60 aircraft were then turned over to the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion for an airmobile assault by the 173rd Airborne Brigade.

This procedure of "flip-flopping" aircraft on alternate lifts continued throughout the day. The 1st Aviation Battalion inserted the 1/26 Infantry Battalion into LZ 1 (XT244965) without incident. The last unit to be inserted was the 1/2 Infantry Battalion into LZ 3 (XT205976). It was here at this LZ that a problem became apparent that became a serious consideration in airlifting elements during the remainder of Junction City. The problem was that of dust and ash caused by the LZ having been burned either before the lift, or a result of the prep fires placed upon it (a discussion of this problem is made at the end of this report). The first 10 aircraft into the LZ were quickly obscured and visual contact was lost with any ground reference by the dust and ashes raised by the helicopter downwash. It was immediately recognized as a serious threat to the entire lift. Quickly taking action to preclude any accidents the remaining 50 aircraft were put into an orbit until some of the dust cleared from the LZ. Thereafter only 5 aircraft were allowed to land at any one time. The vulnerability of the entire lift into LZ 1 using this slow method goes without saying, however the lift was completed without incident. From this method evolved the "dust landing formation" which became SOP in many of the airmobile assaults conducted during both phases of Junction City.

b. The next mission for the 1st Aviation Battalion was the extraction of 1/2 Infantry Battalion out of LZ 3 to Quan Loi on 2 March 1967. This airlift was unique in that 3 CH-47's were used in addition to 10 UH-1D's to extract the troops. The previous dust and ash problem did not present itself in this operation because during the period of time the 1/2 Infantry Battalion was in the LZ much of the resupply helicopter traffic had blown most of the ash out of the area. In addition, a fresh growth of elephant grass further reduced the dust problem. This lift was conducted without incident.

c. On 4 March 1967 the 1st Aviation Battalion received the mission to extract the 1/28 Infantry Battalion from LZ 5. This was accomplished with 20 aircraft. Originally scheduled to be extracted to Minh Thanh, the 1/28 Infantry Battalion Commander received word about 2 hours prior to lift time that his unit was to move into LZ's in the vicinity of Katum (XT332899). Therefore aircraft flight leaders had to be briefed on this change while inbound to the pick up zone. As the Air Mission Commander knew the location of the LZ's his aircraft was used to mark the LZ's. While on final approach into the first LZ an artillery unit of 155's located adjacent to the LZ commenced firing directly over the LZ making landing into the LZ impossible. Therefore, a quick decision was made by the Air Mission Commander and the Infantry Battalion Commander to land at an alternate site, the Katum airstrip. The remaining sorties were airlifted into the second LZ without incident.

d. Although not directly part of Junction City but conducted during the same time frame was the mission of conducting an airmobile assault with elements of 2/16 Infantry Battalion from Phu Loi into multiple LZ's vic grid squares (XT7620, 7619, 7618 and 7617) on 26 February 1967. This was in support of the

5th ARVN mission as part of LAM SON 67. This was conducted without incident.

e. On 12 March 1967, the 1st Aviation Battalion planned and executed an airmobile assault for 1st Brigade, 9th Infantry Division in order to accomplish the Brigade's mission of opening and securing Highway 13. This was done with 30 aircraft, airlifting elements of the 4/39 Infantry Battalion from Quan Loi to multiple LZ's north of Chon Thanh (XT767622). This was accomplished without incident.

f. The A and B Companies of the 1st Aviation Battalion continued furnishing the division general support. (Inclosure 1 and 2) A Company did participate in some small scale air lifts as well (Inclosure 1).

3. PHASE II MISSIONS:

a. D-Day for Phase II was again led off by the 1st Aviation Battalion as it planned and executed two airmobile assaults. The first was the lift of 2/18 Infantry Battalion from Minh Thanh to LZ B (XT513904). This was accomplished by utilizing 35 aircraft. Problems encounted were: A weather delay of one hour, and the necessity to hold the lift aircraft in orbit over the release point (RP) for an additional 20 minutes to allow air strikes to be completed on the LZ itself. This latter delay, coupled with flight distances involved and fuel on board the helicopters, almost brought about a critical situation. The clearance to land in the LZ's was finally given to the lift force after termination of the additional air strikes and thus the lift force completed the two lifts necessary to bring in the assault elements of the infantry battalion. Some aircraft did however land at the next pick-up zone, Quan Loi, with minimum fuel loads remaining.

The next lift, of 2/16 Infantry Battalion from Quan Loi to LZ C (XT523899), again was delayed. This however was to insure that the needed fire support had time to prep the LZ. This lift was marked with a new problem caused by smoke and dust raised by the air and artillery strikes which reduced in-flight visibility as well as obscuring the LZ. Added to this problem was the surface of the LZ itself which had residue ash caused by the earlier burning of the grass. To handle this dilemma the "dust landing formation" was further spread out with aircraft landing in groups of two's and three's. To insure the correct touchdown point was used, double charges of yellow smoke were utilized. As a result of their rotor downwash the first aircraft eventually began to "clean" the area by blowing the dust and ash away. It then became possible to return to 10 aircraft per landing as originally planned. After this initial slowdown, the lift proceeded without delay or incident.

b. As in Phase I, A and B Companies provided continuous general support to the division. Of note are the amount of night missions flown by the gunships. (Inclosure 1). Company A also participated in numerous small air lifts as well as extractions. (Inclosure 1).

c. In the closing days of Junction City the 1st Aviation Battalion Commander was given the mission of overseeing the multiple extractions that were to be conducted. The most notable was the day of 13 March in which the greatest amount of extractions took place. Aircraft utilized ranged from C-123's and CV-7's, to CH-47's and UH-1D's. This task assigned required the battalion comman-

der to fly from end of the TAOR to the other insuring the close coordination necessary. In essence the day started with the 173rd, utilizing CV-7's initially, moving out of Minh Thanh to Bien Hoa (The CV-7's were later supplimented with C-123's). At 0730 elements of the 1/18 began moving from Fire Support Base "Charlie" to multiple LZ's along Route 246. This move was then to be followed by the extraction of elements of the 173rd Airborne Brigade located along Route 245, back to Minh Thanh. Although initially scheduled to move only one company from the road to Minh Thanh it was decided to "police up" two companies to expedite the move of the 173rd to Minh Thanh. To accomplish this the 15 aircraft in the lift force were landed in various spots along the road to pick up the ground troops. From the road they were flown to Minh Thanh, placed aboard CH-47's and then moved to Lai Khe. The road itself was a poor landing site due to dust, however the use of the "dust landing formation" and outstanding flying by the pilots brought off this operation without a hitch.

As mentioned earlier, CH-47's were being used to shuttle 173rd troops from Minh Thanh to Lai Khe throughout the early part of the day. Upon completion of this mission the CH-47's (5) were moved to Quan Loi where they joined forces with the 15 UH-1D lift force to move elements of 2/18 Infantry from Fire support Base "Bravo" to Quan Lo. With such a formidable force of lift aircraft this move was accomplished in short order without incident.

Of all airmobile assaults conducted during Operation Junction City, the most noteworthy was that of the TAC-E received by the 1st Aviation Battalion on 31 March 1967. Approximately 15 minutes after receiving the mission the TAC-E aircraft, scrambled by ACC, started arriving at Lai Khe, the pick up point used for the division RRF (1/16 Infantry). Since aircraft were arriving from all points, aviation unit integrity was therefore forgotten and aircraft were lined up as they appeared on the scene. In about two hours and 13 minutes the lift force of 35 aircraft was formed, briefed, troops loaded and on their way for the battle area, LZ George. The lift force arrived on the scene while the battle of LZ George was still going on. In less than two hours the entire assault elements of the 1/16 Infantry Battalion were on the ground at LZ George able to assist the beleagured force in this most notable of battles fought during Operation Junction City.

4. STATISTICS:

a. In considering the airmobile assault and extractions planned for and executed by the 1st Aviation Battalion during Operation Junction City, the statistics are as follows:

(1) PHASE I:	UNIT	No of A/C	SORTIES	PAX
a.	Air Assault of 1/28 Inf & TAC CP 1st Bde	70	70	490
b.	Air Assault of 1/26 Inf	60	60	420
c.	Air Assault of 1/2 Inf	60	60	420
d.	Extraction of 1/2 Inf	13	62	434
e.	Extraction of 1/28 Inf	20	64	468

f. Air Assault 2/16 Inf	30	54	378
g. Air Assault 4/39 Inf	18	36	252
	261	405	2842

(2) PHASE II:

	No of A/C	SORTIES	PAX
a. Air Assault of 2/16 Inf	35	70	490
b. Air Assault of 2/16 Inf	35	70	490
c. Air Assault of 1/16 Inf	35	67	469
	105	207	1449

Grand Total of personnel moved: 4,291

b. In terms of organic aircraft the figures are:

(1) Aircraft Hours Flown:

Aircraft	Phase I	Phase II	Total
UH-1D	1617.6	2017.3	3634.9
UH-1B (Armed)	229.0	326.3	655.3
UH-1B (C&C)	101.2	58.9	160.1
OH-13S	452.8	493.2	946.0
OV-1	233.3	291.6	524.9
			5921.2

(2) Average Daily Aircraft Availability:

Aircraft	Phase I	Phase II	Overall Average
UH-1D	61%	62.5%	61.75%*
UH-1B	70%	70%	70%
OH-13S	49%	53%	51%*
OV-1	51%	74%	62.5%

* Figures indicated are not as high as they might have been. Consideration must be given to these two aircraft availability figures in that: a. 2 UH-1D's were lost as a result of crashes (attributed to extreme dusty conditions), b. 'B' Company had 3 UH-1D's undergoing a 11th Periodic inspection which is a major one requiring such things as engine change, transmission change, and rotor head change,

c. An OH-13S was crashed at Lai Khe, d. Unscheduled maintenance caused by the extreme dusty conditions -- leaky blade grip seals was a continuing maintenance problem throughout the period, e. Unscheduled maintenance brought about by bullet damage.

(3) Cargo Transported (tons):

Phase I	175.3
Phase II	245.3
Total	420.6

(4) Troops Carried:

Phase I	6,916
Phase II	9,636
Total	16,552

(5) Casualties Evacuated:

Phase I	42
Phase II	79
Total	121

(6) Ammunition Expended:

Type	Phase I	PhaseII	Total
7.62	171,180*	351,570*	522,750
40MM	800	350	1,150
2.75 Rockets	265	874	1,139

* The introduction of the minigun on the Gunships.

(7) Friendly Casualties:

In each of Phases I and II there were 2 men slightly wounded for a total of 4 WIA during Operation Junction City.

(8) Enemy Losses: (for Phases I and II)

1.	VC KIA	67
2.	VC WIA	0
3.	VC Captured	1
4.	Sampans or small craft damaged and destroyed	2
5.	Structures Destroyed	2
6.	Bunkers Damaged	5
7.	Bicycles Captured or destroyed	1
8.	Documents Captured	225 lbs
9.	Ox carts destroyed	4
10.	VC Oxen KIA	15

5. CONCLUSIONS:

The 1st Aviation Battalion proved to be ready and responsive to all demands placed upon it. The work of the gunships was exemplary, especially the vast amount of night flying to provide cover to the many base camps throughout the Junction City Area of Operations. The work of the Service Platoons in each company is worthy of note particularly in the case of 'B' Company (Incl #2).

Additionally, throughout the operation the 1st Aviation Battalion provided the division with but another capability that of aircraft equipped with a hoist, forest penetrator, and stokes litter. This capability proved to be invaluable especially on D-Day, Junction City, Phase II, when it was used to evacuate 22 wounded personnel from inaccessible jungle areas.

6. Lessons Learned:

a. Operation Junction City was conducted during the Northeast Monsoon Season, an extremely dry period. The effect it had on aviation operations were quite evident by the amount of accidents that occured during the period. A majority of the accidents were caused by landing or taking off in extremely dusty areas.

b. To prevent these accidents, increased emphasis was placed upon pilot techniques in dusty conditions. Engineer support was requested to provide dust suppressants in those areas of likely take offs or landing. Commanders at all echelons were briefed as to exercising extreme care in selection of areas of helicopter operations; that is to keep to a minimum vehicular traffic or any other type of activity that would ruin the surface of helicopter landing or take off areas.

c. Engineers, in bulldozing areas, must whenever possible attempt to only knock down trees and not scrape up any natural vegetation that might "knit" the soil together.

d. Ground traffic around airfields continued to present problems during Operation Junction City. The hazards of vehicles driving in close proximity to runways during landings and take offs of aircraft is fairly self evident. Aircraft can communicate with one another or with a ground controller but in no way with vehicles that decide to cross runways. In too many cases vehicles were allowed to run hap-hazardly around the major airfields used, i.e., Minh Thanh and Quan Loi. The problem of Minh Thanh was fairly well resolved by appointing a Pathfinder Lieutenant as Airfield Commander. The Military Police aided as well by "ticketing" any vehicle driven on the airfield. Barricades were also put up. Quan Loi, however, remainded a dangerous area. A more positive approach by the commander responsible for an airfield must be taken to prevent what may be a costly accident in terms of lives and equipment. It is not sufficient to appoint only an airfield commander, he must be given assistance to perform this job i.e., men and equipment.

Associated with this problem is the damage continuous vehicular traffic does to the surface of an airfield. Example was Minh Thanh, initially in the operation. The engineers covered much of the sides of the runway with penaprime where helicopters were to land and take-off. This proved to be quite effective, however, wheeled vehicles, and even in some cases tracked-vehicles, destroyed all the dust suppressant cover in short order. Only by barricading and military police patrolling was the situation eventually brought under control. This was not the case at Quan Loi.

e. Better coordination must be effected by units providing air traffic facilities to airfields. The 12th Aviation Group provided air traffic control teams for the major fields as did the Air Force with their Combat Control Teams. These proved to be extremely helpful, however when time came for these teams to be moved the necessary coordination to advise people concerned with these matters was not always done. In one case a hurried call to USARV stopped one movement. The system of providing and removing air traffic controllers needs to be tightened up.

Another result of this poor coordination was the convergence of more teams than was necessary on an airfield.

f. Perhaps the most pressing problem that presented itself during Junction City was the question as to whether or not to burn LZ's prior to conducting airmobile assaults into them.

In addition to the problem of dust hazards encountered during Operation Junction City, there was the continuous threat of LZ's catching fire as a result of air and artillery prep fires. Most of the LZ's used during Junction City contained either tall grass or dried out shrubbery, highly susceptible to burning; therefore prior to conducting an airmobile assault into these LZ's decisions had to be made prior to the air assault as to the possibility of "preburning" the LZ to preclude the chance of it burning at the planned time of landing.

If the decision was made to "pre-burn" the LZ the problem of "tipping ones' hand" then presented itself. This was solved to some extent by setting fires to many possible LZ's throughout the area. However, this was only feasible if time was available. In those cases where time was not available the necessity or requirement of having alternate LZ's was then used.

In essence advantages versus disadvantages had to be weighed. These were as follows:

Advantages:

(1) Removes the possibility of burning during "H-Hour".

(2) By burning out the tall grass and clumps of shrubbery it gives the pilots a better view of the landing area; also exposes any areas where booby traps may have been laid; and in some cases detonates them.

Disadvantages:

(1) The necessity for time prior to H-Hour to "pre-burn" likely areas to confuse the enemy as to the actual LZ.

(2) The dust hazard caused by the charred material laying in the LZ must be planned for i.e., aircraft must land in loose formation; not as many can land in the LZ at the same time; strict control must be maintained at all times.

(3) The slow process of bringing in troops as described in item 2 above means that the ground commander does not get the chance, initially, to "drop" his troops in with sufficient force to meet the challenge if a strong enemy force is encountered within the LZ area.

ALGIN S. HAWKINS
LTC, Armor
Commanding

2 Incls
1. A Co After Action Report
2. B Co After Action Report

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COMPANY A, 1ST AVIATION BATTALION
1ST INFANTRY DIVISION
APO US FORCES 96345

AVA

20 April 1967

SUBJECT: After Action Report

TO: Commanding Officer
1st Aviation Battalion
1st Infantry Division
APO 96345

1. GENERAL. A Company, 1st Aviation Battalion supported the "Big Red One" and attached units on Operation Junction City I and II during the period 22 February 1967 to 14 April 1967. Missions included airlanded assaults, combat resupply, command and control, aeromedical evacuation and armed helicopter operations.

2. MISSIONS. The company was essentially in a general support role, providing aviation support to various units and staff sections during the operation. There were, however, a number of occasions where "Bulldogs" were placed in a direct support role for maneuver battalions.

During the night of 10 March 1967 and the early morning hours of 11 March 1967, the 2d Battalion, 2d Infantry (Mechanized) was attacked by a large Viet Cong force. Five "Bulldogs" and a "Rebel" light fire team were scrambled to Suoi Da to resupply and support the units at Artillery Base I and II, north of Suoi Da. Sixty four sorties were flown, under fire, into the beleaguered unit's positions. A total of 16 tons of desperately needed ammunition was delivered by sling load between 2400 and 0400 hours. Two light fire teams had earlier been scrambled when Phu Loi came under mortar attack. The "Rebels" had located two of the mortar positions by the flashes of firing. Directing their heavy fire on the locations, they silenced the two tubes.

On 20 March 1967 the 3rd Squadron, 5th Cavalry was attacked by the Viet Cong at Bau Bang. Again the "Bulldogs" responded to the occasion by providing a command and control aircraft and one resupply aircraft. One ton of ammunition was delivered under fire to the unit. The "Rebel" fire team which had scrambled to the aid of the cavalry unit provided devastating suppressive fire and undoubtedly accounted for many of the more than 200 Viet Cong killed in the battle.

An aircraft equipped with a hoist, jungle penetrator, and stokes litter was on constant standby at Phu Loi to assist in medical evacuation.

INCL #1 to ANNEX M

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During the later p[illegible] of the operation this aircraft was used daily to Quan Loi to reinforce the dust off aircraft there. During the reporting period this aircraft evacuated 72 casualties.

During the reporting period approximately 55 VC KIA were directly attributed to "Rebel" fire teams. These were observed and/or verified by ground units or observers. On numerous occasions they placed fire on known Viet Cong concentrations and emplacements. Many of the instances were at night when assessment could not be made. There is no doubt that many more Viet Cong were destroyed. In addition to the two instances on 10 March 1967 and 20 March 1967 previously mentioned, "Rebel" fire teams supported almost every major action during Junction City. While providing an all night standby fire team at Minh Thanh, the "Rebels" responded nightly to enemy attacks at F[illegible] Support Base B, C, and other field locations in the operational area. It is particularly noteworthy that the "Rebels" accumulated 116 hours of night time during the operation. Much of this time was during periods of extremely poor visual conditions. No missions under any circumstances were delayed or aborted attesting to the continuous support rendered the manuever elements.

3. STATISTICS.

A. Aircraft Hours Flown:

(1) Junction City I
   a. UH-1A: 229.0
   b. UH-1B: 101.2
   c. UH-1D: 1016.8
(2) Junction City II
   a. UH-1A: 326.3
   b. UH-1B: 58.9
   c. UH-1D: 1310.2

B. Average Daily Aircraft Availability:

(1) UH-1B: 7 for 70% Junction City I and II
(2) UH-1D: 9 for 60% Junction City I and II

C. Troops Transported:

(1) Junction City I
   a. UH-1B: 129
   b. UH-1D: 5,707
(2) Junction City II
   a. UH-1B: 92
   b. UH-1D: [illegible]

D. Cargo Transported:

(1) Junction City I: 175 tons
(2) Junction City II: 243.6

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E. Casualties Evacuated:

(1) Junction City I: 42
(2) Junction City II: 79

F. Sorties:

(1) Junction City I:
a. UH-1A: 138
b. UH-1B: 195
c. UH-1D: 2312
(2) Junction City II:
a. UH-1A: 56
b. UH-1B: 143
c. UH-1D: 3619

G. Ammunition Expended:

(1) Junction City I:
a. 7.62mm: 129,850
b. 40mm: 600
c. 2.75" Rockets: 265
(2) Junction City II:
a. 7.62mm: 304,550
b. 40mm: 350
c. 2.75" Rockets: 874

H. Friendly Losses:

(1) Four Aircraft Damaged By Ground Fire

I. Enemy Losses:

(1) Junction City I:
a. Estimated 30 VC KIA
(2) Junction City II:
a. 25 VC KIA (Estimated)
b. 4 Occarts
c. 15 Oxen

4. CONCLUSIONS: The successful resupply operation at Suoi Da on 11 March 1967 was attributable not only to the "Bulldogs" can do attitude and willingness but also to the planning and organization of the sling loaded supplies and ground handlers. This method of delivery proved to be fast and efficient. Although reduced loads were carried, the fast turn around times more than made up for this drawback. Once lift operations began, the only lost time or pause was for refueling aircraft. Refueling periods were staggered among the five aircraft so that a constant stream of supplies were being delivered. In a total flying time of 18 hours and an elaptsed time of 4 hours 30 minutes, 16 tons of ammunition had been delivered.

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The employment of the hoist on evacuation missions was a critical manuever. It was necessary to reduce fuel loads to approximately 1000 pounds so that the operating weight would be such that a hover out of ground effect could be accomplished in the most unfavorable atmospheric conditions expected. Also critical, was lateral CG and operation of the hoist controls. All aircrews were given classes and demonstration of this operation. However, actual experience is necessary to fully appreciate these problems and alleviate them. Although numerous evacuations were accomplished while the aircraft was stationed at Quan Loi, many of these could have been accomplished by the Dustoff aircraft on standby there with that primary mission. Our mission as backup could have been more efficiently accomplished from Phu Loi. This would have prevented the tie up of as many as three aircraft on standby in the operational area. The response time with prior notification can be reduced to approximately 15 minutes.

HENRY G. WILLIFORD JR.
MAJOR, CE
Commanding

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COMPANY B, 1ST AVIATION BATTALION
1ST INFANTRY DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96345

AVDB-AVB-O 20 April 1967

SUBJECT: After Action Report, Operation "Junction City" (Phase I and II)

TO: Commanding Officer
1st Aviation Battalion
ATTN: S-3
APO 96345

1. GENERAL: During the period 22 February to 15 April 1967, this unit participated in Operation "Junction City" (Phase I and II), providing general aviation support to the Division.

2. MISSION: The following type missions were performed by the unit during the above period.

a. Aerial Command and Control
b. Aerial Reconnaissance
c. Aerial Convoy Control
d. Aerial Photographic Coverage
e. Aerial Surveilance
f. Aircraft Maintenance

3. STATISTICS:

a. Aircraft hours and sorties flown.

		Hours	Sorties
(1)	Phase I		
	(a) UH-1D	600.8	1590
	(b) OH13S	452.8	1011
	(c) OV-1	233.3	833
(2)	Phase II		
	(a) UH-1D	707.1	1844
	(b) OH13S	493.2	1092
	(c) OV-1	291.6	1398

b. Average daily aircraft availability (percent)

(1)	Phase I		
	(a) UH-1D	62%	(6.2 A/C)
	(b) OH13S	49%	(4.5 A/C)
	(c) OV-1	51%	(2.0 A/C
(2)	Phase II		
	(a) UH-1D	71%	(7.1 A/C)
	(b) OH13S	53%	(4.2 A/C)
	(c) OV-1	74%	(3.0 A/C)

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Inc/ II 2 to Annex M

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c. Cargo moved (tons)
(1) Phase I 0.3
(2) Phase II 1.7

d. Passengers transported
(1) Phase I 1209
(2) Phase II 1474

e. Ammunition expended
(1) Phase I 41,330 (7.62mm)
(2) Phase II 47,020 (7.62mm)

f. Friendly casualties
(1) Phase I
(a) WIA 2
(b) KIA 0
(2) Phase II
(a) WIA 2
(b) KIA 0

g. Enemy losses
(1) Phase I
(a) VC WIA 0
(b) VC KIA 9
(c) VC Captured 1
(d) Equipment captured or destroyed
1 Documents captured 225 lbs
2 Bunkers damaged 3
3 Buildings destroyed 1
4 Bicycles destroyed 1
5 Sampans destroyed 2
(2) Phase II
(a) VC KIA 3
(b) VC WIA 0
(c) VC Captured 0
(d) Equipment captured or destroyed
1 Bunkers damaged 2
2 Buildings destroyed 1

4. DISCUSSION:

a. The great amount of flying time accumulated during Operation "Junction City" increased the maintenance workload a proportionate amount. Service Platoon responded to this challenge and kept pace with the maintenance requirements. Working two 12-hour shifts the following work was accomplished:
(1) Initiated 1645 supply requests to their direct support unit.
(2) Completed 38, 100-hour periodic inspections.
(3) Changed 44 major aircraft components.
(4) Expended 7,340 man-hours for aircraft maintenance.

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b. Accurate and timely intelligence information was provided to the Division by the Aerial Surveillance and Target Acquisition Platoon. This included the detection of an estimated enemy battalion near the Cambidian border on 18 March 1967. The platoon was responsible for processing detailed photographic coverage of all prospective landing zones. These photographs were not only an aid in planning but were also an important tool in the successful execution of the various heli-borne assaults. The following missions were flown by the ASTA Platoon.

(1)	Photographic missions	142
(2)	Infra-red missions	136
(3)	SLAR missions	157

3. LESSONS LEARNED:

a. The hazards of operating in dusty conditions require the following:

(1) Review of operating procedures in dusty conditions prior to and periodically during the dry season. This should include a thorough understanding between the aircraft commander and pilot as to the duties of each during landing and take-off under dusty conditions.

(2) Engine barrier filters on UH-1D aircraft require cleaning several times during the days operation. Engine inlets should be cleaned daily while the engine requires internal leaning, using the solvent-water method, at each intermediate inspection.

b. Command and Control aircraft should be released as early as possible to reduce the amount of night maintenance and to better assure aircraft availability for the following day.

c. Request for photographic missions should be submitted as early as possible before the desired delivery date to allow for bad weather and high priority missions of an immediate nature.

d. In the interest of safety, the importance of crew-rest, should be stressed to the senior commanders within the Division.

e. Seat belts must be used by gunners and crew chiefs during take-off and landing or during low-level operations. The "gunners harness" does not provide the necessary protection during these critical operations and may allow the individual to be thrown outside the aircraft in case of an accident.

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6. CONCLUSION: The ability of the unit to provide and maintain the required aircraft during Operation "Junction City" is a tribute to the efforts and dedication of each member of this organization.

DALE E. DOBSON
Major CE
Commanding

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