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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

IN REPLY REFER TO

AGAM-P (M) (23 May 68) FOR OT RD 681156

3 June 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 52d
Combat Aviation Battalion, Period Ending 31 January 1968 (U)

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2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appro-
priate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current
operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

Kenneth G. Wickham

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
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⑥ Lessons Learned

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 52D COMBAT AVIATION BATTALION (U).
APO San Francisco 96318
~~FLYING DRAGONS~~

AVGD-CC

11 6 February 1968

SUBJECT: ⑨ Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968.
RCS-CSFOR

①⑧ OACSFOR

①② 119p.

TO: See Distribution

①⑨ OT-RD-681156

SECTION I - Significant Organizational Activities

1. (C) General: This report covers the period 1 November 1967 through 31 January 1968, and is submitted in compliance with Headquarters I Field Force Vietnam Regulation 1-3, dated 23 March 1967, and Headquarters 17th Combat Aviation Group Regulation 1-3, dated 12 July 1967.

a. Mission: The mission of the 52d Combat Aviation Battalion (Flying Dragons) is to provide aviation support to US Forces, Republic of Vietnam Forces and Free World Assistance Forces in the II Corps area, with priority to the 4th Infantry Division.

b. Station Plan: The 52d Combat Aviation Battalion is stationed at Camp Holloway, Pleiku, RVN, and is commanded by LTC Edward P. Lukert Jr. Subordinate elements consist of the following units: (Detailed list of detachments is shown in inclosure 1.)

- (1) Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment - Pleiku, RVN
- (2) 57th Assault Helicopter Company - Kontum, RVN. Equipped with UH-1H and UH-1C(A) helicopters.
- (3) 119th Assault Helicopter Company - Pleiku, RVN. Equipped with UH-1H and UH-1C(A) helicopters.
- (4) 155th Assault Helicopter Company - Ban Me Thout, RVN. Equipped with UH-1H and UH-1C(A) helicopters.
- (5) 170th Assault Helicopter Company - Pleiku, RVN. Equipped with UH-1H and UH-1C(A) helicopters.
- (6) 189th Assault Helicopter Company - Pleiku, RVN. Equipped with UH-1H and UH-1C(A) helicopters.
- (7) 179th Assault Support Helicopter Company - Pleiku, RVN. Equipped with OH-47A helicopters.
- (8) 355th Assault Support Helicopter Company (Heavy) - Pleiku, RVN. Equipped with OH-54 helicopters.

c. Type aircraft authorized and on hand as of 31 January 1968:

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	<u>AUTHORIZED</u>	<u>ON HAND</u>
(1) MH-1C(A) -	40	32
(2) MH-1C -	2	0
(3) MH-1H -	115	92
(4) CH-47A -	16	13
(5) CH-54 -	9	3
(6) H-6A -	1	1
TOTAL	<u>183</u>	<u>141</u>

(For a more detailed account, see inclosure 2.)

2. (C) Intelligence: The battalion S-2 Section published a Daily INTSUM in November and December. Starting 1 January the INTSUM was deleted and a numbered Intelligence Bulletin was published with distribution to Battalion units and selected Holloway Tenant Units. (See section II para 2)

a. Enemy Activity: The enemy activity in the Central Highlands was extremely heavy during the reporting period. Activity during the early part of the period was heaviest in the Dak To area but shifted south to the Pleiku area towards the latter part of the period. The Battalion suffered losses both to personnel and equipment as a result of attacks on its installations at Ban Me Thuot, Kontum, and Camp Holloway. Intelligence estimates of the attack on Kontum on 10 January 1968, and Camp Holloway on 26 January 1968 are included in the after action reports attached as Inclosures 7 and 8. The first two attacks on Ban Me Thuot were both conducted by the 301st Local Force Battalion. The first attack, on 7 November 1967, was initiated at 2340 hours and lasted for 10 minutes. From forty to fifty rounds of 82mm impacted within the 155 Maintenance area, resulting in 2 ships destroyed and 8 damaged. There were no casualties. The second attack on 4 January 1968, was initiated at 0320 and consisted of 20 to 25 rounds of 60mm and 82mm, satchel charges and B-40 rockets. Target again was the 155 Maintenance area and there were 2 ships destroyed and 11 damaged, 1 fire truck destroyed, 1 fire truck damaged, Maintenance area destroyed and 2 jeeps damaged. There were no casualties. The last two days of the period saw the beginning of an all out effort by the enemy to either keep us tied down in place or to take and hold one of the Province Capital cities. Of particular interest to this battalion were the hits taken by Kontum, Ban Me Thuot, and Pleiku. All three installations were under attack on these two days. Heavy activity continued into the next period and comprehensive analysis is not yet possible.

(1) In addition to the hits on 52d Aviation Battalion Installations, other significant items were; the Battle of Dak To (See incl 6) the rocket attacks of II Corps Hqs, Arty Mill, 71st Evac and 433 Sig on 20 Jan 68 and again on 27 Jan 68, the Sapper attack on 937th Eng Bn Compound on 21 Jan 68 and the ground attack against the city of Pleiku on 30, 31 Jan 68.

(2) Situation:

(a) Kontum: The 24th NVA Regiment is located, with

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elements of the 174th NVA Regiment in the Toumorong Base area, north east of Dak To. The 66th NVA Regiment and possible elements of the 174th NVA Regiment are occupying positions west and north west of Dak To. The 40th NVA Arty Regiment is currently unlocated in the tri-border area. The 304th Local Forces Battalion is located approximately 15 Km northeast of Kontum city. Unlocated, but last reported headed for a target in the Kontum area is the 408th Sapper Battalion. As of the close of the period, the 24th NVA Regiment is reported massing north of Kontum City.

(b) Pleiku: The 4th Battalion, 95B Regiment and elements of the 5th Battalion are located approximately 25 KM NE of Pleiku City. Elements of the 5th Battalion are also located in an area approximately 15 Km East and South East of Pleiku City. The K101 Battalion, 95B Regiment is unlocated, last believed in an area approximately 25 Km West of Pleiku City. The K-6 and possible the K-4 Battalions (of the 32 NVA Regt) last contacted at Dak To, have moved south through the Plei-Trap Valley and are believed located in an area approximately 15-20 Kms WNW of Pleiku City. The 200th Arty Bn, an element of the 40th Arty Regiment, was believed located in the same general area. The H-15 Local Force Battalion, last seen in the An Khe area, is believed heading to the Pleiku area. The 407th Sapper Bn is currently unlocated in Pleiku Province. The X-17 and X-18 Sapper companies are currently unlocated.

(c) Darlac: Elements of the 33d NVA Regiment are currently operating both south and north (40 KM) of Ban Me Thuot. The 301st Local Force Battalion is unlocated.

(3) Capabilities:

(a) Kontum: To attack in the Dak To area with up to 6 NVA Infantry Battalions supported by heavy mortar and rockets from the 40th Arty Regiment. To attack Kontum City with up to 3 regular Battalions of the 24th NVA Regiment and 1 Sapper Battalion, the 408th. Continued interdiction of highway 14N utilizing possible elements of the 24th NVA Regiment and the 304th Local Force Battalion.

(b) Pleiku: To attack Pleiku City with up to 5 NVA Battalions, 4th and 5th of the 95B and possibly, K4 and K6 of the 32d Regt, supported by artillery elements of the 40th Arty Regiment, 1 Sapper Bn plus local units and guerrillas from VC districts 3, 4, and 9. As an alternate course, using elements of both NVA Regiments, conduct multi-Bn attack against Duc Co, Plei Morong, or Plei Dierang. Continuous interdiction of highways 19E and 14N using elements of the VC 3d district and the 40th Sapper and H-15 Local Force Battalions.

(c) Darlac: Conduct a multi-Bn attack on Ban Me Thuot using elements of the 33d NVA Regiment, with local harassment and interdiction of highways by the 301st Local Force Battalion.

b. Ground to air fire was reported on 88 occasions resulting in

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62 aircraft hit, 3 crew members killed and 25 crew members wounded in action. Of the aircraft hit 29 were UH-1H's and 32 were UH-1C's and 1 was a CH-47. Altitudes of aircraft receiving hits varied from 25 feet to 4,000 feet. Specifically 26 received hits below 500 feet, 17 received hits between 500 and 1000 feet, 14 between 1000 and 2000 feet, and 5 above 2000 feet.

c. The Intelligence Section of the 155th Aslt Hel Co continues to have the responsibility of gathering intelligence information on the Ban Me Thuot area and receiving reports from local civilian agencies and military organizations in the Ban Me Thuot area.

d. The Intelligence Section of the 57th Aslt Hel Co in Kontum has effected direct liaison with the S-2 advisory elements of Kontum Sector Headquarters.

e. Intelligence briefings and indoctrinations were given to the newest member of the Battalion, the 355th Heavy Helicopter Company, stationed at Camp Holloway. A basic load of maps was provided the Company.

3. (C) Operations and Training Activities

a. Operations:

(1) Support: The 52d Combat Aviation Battalion (Flying Dragons) supported numerous operations including Mac Arthur (92 days), Tran Son I (7 days), Michael (10 days), Co "B", 20th Inf (62 days), FOR-II (92 days), ARVN (92 days), CRID (4 days), Press Camp (66 days). In addition aviation support was provided II Corps Fqs (92 days), Co "B", 5th SFG (91 days), 52d Arty Gp (91 days) and 17th Aviation Group (78 days). In general during the reported period, the "Flying Dragons" supported II Corps with one Assault Helicopter Company and one Assault Helicopter Company minus. The 4th Infantry Division was supported with two Assault Helicopter Companies, and the II Corps ARVN with one Assault Helicopter Company. The percentage of the battalions lift capability allocated, by month, was as follows:

	<u>NOV</u>	<u>DEC</u>	<u>JAN</u>
4th Inf Div -	66%	65%	63%
ARVN -	12%	13%	13%
Other -	22%	22%	24%

(For detailed sequence of significant events and statistics, see inclosure 4; for a map of the operational area, see inclosure 5.)

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(2) Operational Statistics (1 Nov - 31 Jan 68)

<u>CBT</u> <u>SORTIES</u>	<u>OTHER</u> <u>SORTIES</u>	<u>UH-1H</u> <u>HOURS*</u>	<u>UH-1C</u> <u>HOURS*</u>	<u>CH-47A</u> <u>HOURS*</u>
85,319	43,228	29,391	7,527	3,597
<u>TOTAL</u> <u>HOURS*</u>	<u>PAX</u>	<u>CARGO</u> <u>TONS</u>	<u>A/C</u> <u>HIT</u>	<u>A/C**</u> <u>DAM/DEST</u>
40,515	175,270	21,380	62	129/22
<u>CREW MEM</u> <u>INJ/K**</u>	<u>ENEMY</u> <u>KRA</u>	<u>STRUCT</u> <u>DEST</u>	<u>MED</u> <u>EVACS</u>	<u>SORTIES DELAY</u> <u>OR CXL FOR WX</u>
37/6	217	167	1,506	62

* Adjusted DA Form 1352 time.

** Includes results of hostile fire and accidents.

(3) UH-1H and UH-1C(A) Support: During November, the increased demand for UH-1 aircraft, brought on by the Battle of Dak To, had a lasting effect of this battalions availability for the remainder of the reporting period. Demands made it necessary to reinforce this battalion with elements of several units within the 17th Combat Aviation Group. This support extended anywhere from a day to in excess of one week. (For a more detailed analysis of this problem area; see Section II, Part I)

(4) 355th Assault Helicopter Company (Heavy) arrival: The main body of the 355th Assault Helicopter Company (Heavy) deployed to Vietnam beginning 10 January 1968, and completed the move on 12 January. The company (-) was assigned to the 52d Combat Aviation Battalion at Camp Holloway, Pleiku, RVN. The TO&E equipment began arriving on 24 January 1968. A small delegation from the company was sent to Qui Nhon to organize the shipment of aircraft and equipment to Pleiku, RVN. The remainder of the company worked to complete facilities prior to the arrival of their equipment.

(5) CH-47A Support: During this reporting period the demand for CH-47A support in the Central Highlands continued at a phenomenal rate. Again, it was necessary to reinforce the 179th ASFC with aircraft from other units within the 17th Combat Aviation Group, for short periods.

(6) 335th Aslt Hel Co: In mid-November the 335th returned to the Central Highlands and Pleiku area in support of the 173d Abn Bde. Although OPCON to the 173d, the 335th was attached for administration and logistics to the 52d Cbt Avn Bn. The statistics reflected in this report do not include those of the 335th Aslt Hel Co.

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(7) Major Operations Supported: The 52d Combat Aviation Battalion supported operations Mac Arthur, and the Battle of Dak To during the reported period. (For aviation support statistics of Dak To, see inclosure 6.)

(8) Weather: During the month of November, the weather was characterized by high ceilings, moderate winds and good visibility. Winds were predominately out of the NNE during this period. In late December, the winds began shifting to the ENE bringing cooler temperatures and excellent flying conditions for the remainder of the reporting period. (For more detailed meteorological data, see inclosure 4)

(9) Enemy Attacks: In the past quarter all units of this battalion have been attacked. Both NVA and VC units conducted attacks on Kontum, Ban Mo Thuot, and Holloway airfields. The enemy used 82mm mortars, 122 & 140mm rockets, sappers and infantry assaults during his campaigns. (For detailed information on each attack see inclosure 7, 8, and 9.)

b. Training:

(1) During the reported period, the following subjects were stressed:

(a) Aviation Training:

1. Pre-flight Inspections
2. Rules of Engagement
3. Instrument Training
4. Formation Flying
5. Escape and Evasion
6. Monsoon Weather Procedures
7. Cam Ranh, Nha Trang and Saigon control zone Procedures
8. Emergency Procedures

(b) Ground Training:

1. Code of Conduct
2. Rules of Engagement
3. Geneva Convention
4. Gas Chamber Exercises
5. Viet Cong Tactics
6. Immediate Action Drills
7. Mines and Booby Traps
8. Security and Sentry Duty
9. Weapons Safety
10. Familiarization and zero firing of individual weapons

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(2) Portions of the ground training program have been eliminated during this reporting period. This was primarily due to higher Headquarters assuming responsibility for the initial in-country training.

(3) Instructor Pilots from the 355th ASHC(H) were sent to the 478th ASVC(H), located at An Khe, for training with that unit. This training included ground, flight, and operational procedures peculiar to these units.

c. Research and Development: During the reporting period, the 52d Combat Aviation Battalion took part in a minimum number of evaluations and no significant advances were made.

4. (C) Logistics

a. Class I: No significant problems.

b. Class II: Command emphasis placed on control and turn in of excess equipment and conex containers throughout the period.

c. Class III & IIIA:

(1) Over 4,000,000 gallons of JP4 used by the battalion during the period.

(2) Holloway miniport relocated on the new heliport to vacate previous location for the 355th Assault Support Helicopter Company (Heavy). The 350 GPM POL pump provides adequate pumping pressure over a lateral distance of 800 feet.

(3) Approval was received from 1st Log Command to retain the 3-3000 barrel POL storage tanks at Holloway should the Class III storage facility be moved.

d. Class IV: No significant problems. Command emphasis placed on class five accountability and storage facilities during the period.

5. (U) Civil Affairs

a. The Battalion Civic Action Officer, the Battalion Chaplain and volunteers from subordinate units are now engaged in civic action activities in five Montagnard villages in the battalion area of operations. The battalion continues to receive many boxes of soap, vitamins and clothing from friends in the US. As new personnel arrive, so do new sources of donations. These items are being distributed through village chiefs, the Pleiku Province Hospital, the Evangelical Hospital, and the Christian and Missionary Alliance. The battalion conducts medical assistance clinics with emphasis on hygiene; eg, washing and treating skin disorders. The Battalion Civic Action Fund continues to receive donations from organizations interested in the program. (For a pictorial account of Civic Action similar to that of the 52d, see inclosure 3.)

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b. Emphasis in the Civic Action Program is being placed on establishing channels of communications between GVN and the Montagnard Chiefs. The Montagnards definitely prefer to work directly with the Americans, although resistance to the idea is present on both sides.

c. Specifically, the Chaplain contributed:

(1) Over 20 boxes of sheets, clothing, soap and drug items were received from churches and individuals in the States. These were distributed for use by the CMA missionaries and the VNCS Clinic - Hospital.

(2) Two sewing machines found in the Special Services storage building were given to the Pleiku Montagnard Farm and School.

(3) Approximately 300 cases of surplus food from units at Camp Holloway and the PX warehouse were distributed to the Montagnard tribes through the CMA missionaries.

(4) The Protestant congregation received special offerings for the following causes:

(a) \$668.95 to Jorai Church for construction of library and reading room.

(b) \$50.75 to the Bible Societies of Vietnam.

(c) \$80.00 to the CMA missionaries at Ban Me Thuot for the Montagnard Church under construction.

(5) The Catholic congregation received \$128.53 in offerings for Catholic missionary activities in the area.

6. (C) Personnel

a. PIO activities during the period November 1967 - January 1968.

(1) Feature stories submitted: 8

(2) Pictorial releases (hometown and in-country): 30

(3) Taped interviews: 23

(4) Formal press interviews: 4

(5) Newsmen and representatives surveyed: 48

(6) The "Dragon Fire" was revived and increased in size and scope during this period. It provides local news of interest and selected news service items.

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(7) The nightly report of daily aviation activities has greatly improved during the period. Unit PIO's are beginning to submit better reports, thereby enabling the Battalion PIO to submit more effective reports.

b. Special Services activities for the period November 1967 - January 1968.

(1) During the period, a total of 506 out of country R&R quotas were received; of these, 396 were filled.

(2) A total of 6 in-country R&R quotas were received, 3 for EM and 3 for officer. This is a notable decrease from the last reporting period.

(3) The arts & crafts shop as well as the library have expanded to a seven day a week operation.

c. Awards and Decorations:

(1) Total number of awards and decorations submitted during this period are as follows:

<u>AWARD</u>	<u>NUMBER SUB</u>	<u>APPROVED</u>
Silver Star	22	0
DFC	47	19
Soldiers Medal	6	3
Bronze Star	36	26
Air Medals	1487	2035
ACM	37	34
Purple Heart	14	8
TOTAL	1649	2127

d. Personnel problems during the period November 1967 - January 1968.

(1) The problems of receiving replacements in our critical MOS areas still exists. Most critical during the period were helicopter Tech Inspectors (MOS 67W), Aircraft Armament Repairmen (MOS 45J), Petroleum Storage Specialists (MOS 76W) and Cooks (MOS 94B). The shortage of personnel in MOS 11B continues to be a matter of grave concern.

e. Command Changes:

The following new commanders assumed command on dates indicated:

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COMMANDER	UNIT	DATE
Maj Billy R. Goodall	155th AHC	6 Nov 67
Maj Eugene P. Falkoff	165th TC Det	6 Nov 67
Maj Joseph R. Campbell III	119th AHC	20 Nov 67
Maj George E. Burnison	57th AHC	1 Dec 67
Maj Neil I. Lova	189th AHC	2 Jan 68
*Maj Glenn E. Morgan	355th ASHC	
*Maj William H. Winds	622nd TC Det	

NOTE: Does not indicate date individuals assumed command of respective units, only when they reported in-country as elements of this command.

f. Gain and Losses

(1) The following gains and losses occurred during the period November 1967 - January 1968:

(a) GAINS	OFF	EM
November	118	212
December	36	140
January	42	114

(b) LOSSES	OFF	EM
November	83	282
December	26	150
January	28	164

(2) At present the battalion is 298 EM and 4 officers and warrant officers below TO&E strength.

g. Morale: The morale of officer and enlisted personnel throughout the battalion continues to be exceptionally high. This was due primarily to the following:

- (1) Maximum recognition for job accomplishment through promotions, awards and decorations and letters of appreciation.
- (2) Liberal leave and R&R policies.
- (3) Continually improving standards of living.
- (4) Availability of post facilities.
- (5) Continual indoctrination in job performance and mission orientation.

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h. Religious Activities:

(1) During the quarter the Battalion Chaplain was responsible for all religious activities at Camp Holloway and at the operational sites. Protestant services were conducted by the Battalion Chaplain.

(2) Religious services were provided for the 155th Avn Co in Ban Me Thuot on a weekly basis by the Protestant missionaries and the Catholic Chaplain from MACV.

(3) Religious services for the 57th Avn Co in Kontum were provided by the Protestant Chaplain and the ARVN Catholic Chaplain.

(4) Catholic services for Camp Holloway were conducted each Sunday by the PSAC Chaplain.

(5) Transportation was provided from Camp Holloway to the 71st Evac Hospital Chapel each Friday for Jewish personnel.

(6) The Protestant congregation continues to attend the hymn sings at the CMA compound each Sunday. One cook out was held jointly with the CMA missionaries in January.

(7) In November, a bus tour was taken of all the missionary institutions of the Pleiku area.

(8) At Christmas time, several packages were received from individuals and churches for distribution to men of the units.

(9) In January, a regular pianist/organist was secured for the Chapel, and a choir was started.

(10) During the quarter new light fixtures were installed inside the Chapel, outside speakers were erected to play religious music on Sunday and at other special times.

7. (U) PSYOPS

The battalion continues supporting the Chiu Hoi and Hoi Chanh programs. The battalion works jointly with the 4th Infantry Division, distributing leaflets and in aerial sound broadcasts. These activities are programed in known or suspected enemy areas of operation and are the responsibility of the PSYOPS Officer.

8. (C) Safety and Standardization

a. Standardization: The Battalion Standardization Pilot flew 24 check rides in November, 21 in December and 14 in January. These check rides are broken down as follows:

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- (1) 5 SIP (Standardization Pilot)
- (2) 9 IP (Instructor Pilot)
- (3) 7 AC (Aircraft Commander)
- (4) 42 Quarterly check rides and in-country standardization and orientation.
- (5) 3 Post Accident Check Rides

Primary emphasis during all rides has been upon aircraft and emergency procedures. Young aviators soon develop a high degree of proficiency but may arrive at AC status without ever having a review of emergency procedures. This is an underlying cause of "complacency" and leads to unnecessary low level flight, take-off over unnecessary barriers, disregard for routes offering good forced landing areas, failure to make precautionary landings and to execute successful autorotations. Daily commitment of all flyable assets precludes adequate scheduled unit flight training.

b. Safety:

(1) The accident rate (per 100,000 flight hours) for this period was 24.6 for 40,515 flight hours. All were major accidents.

- (a) November - Three accidents, rate; 21.6
- (b) December - Four accidents, rate; 27.3
- (c) January - Three accidents, rate; 23.8

(2) The following causes (all were major accidents) are cited.

(a) #391 22 Nov 67

1. FOD
2. Maintenance error
3. Lack of forced landing sites in AO

(b) #390 25 Nov 67

1. Material failure (sun gear shaft)
2. Failure to execute successful autorotation

(c) #759 28 Nov 67

1. Crew error, hit tree

(d) #577 6 Dec 67

1. Crew error
2. Fatigue
3. Possible engine deficiency

(e) #219 16 Dec 67

1. Over loaded

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2. Possible engine deficiency
2. Poor selection of flight route

(f) #154 20 Dec 67

1. Crew error, hit tree
2. Fatigue

(g) #697 21 Dec 67

1. Crew error
2. Poor judgement
3. Poor operating conditions (dust, crowded, no control)

(h) #075 6 Jan 68

1. Over loaded
2. Crew error

(i) #168 10 Jan 68

1. Short shaft failure
2. Lack of forced landing site in AO

(j) #181 21 Jan 68

1. Overweight
2. Went IFR in dust

(3) During the period an air traffic flow plan has been devised for the Pleiku metropolitan area. The plan, accepted by the Air Force and 4th Infantry Division, is still being staffed prior to implementation.

(4) The airfield at Holloway has new improved runway markings, runway lighting and a lighted miniport. Several major dust areas have been pene-primed, and several hazardous wires have been marked.

(5) A new Aviation Accident Prevention SOP has been written and a new Ground Safety SOP is close to completion. Both functions have been consolidated into one office. This action will not only reduce the commanders span of control for safety matters, but will provide the best qualified personnel to direct the Ground Safety Program. The two programs normally overlap and integration should not create any major problems.

9. (C) Post Headquarters (Camp Holloway)

a. During this reporting period, Post Headquarters continued normal operation and continued effort was expended on various projects

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with the goal of improving Post Headquarters and Defense Structures:

(1) With an increase in availability of material the perimeter light project made considerable progress during the period. Approximately 50% of the system is operational and approximately 30% is currently in use. The major problem encountered during the period was the inability to get a crane into a swamp to erect light poles. This problem was solved by sling loading the poles with a UH-1H helicopter.

(2) The 815th Engineer Battalion continued to progress on the 70 pad Christmas Tree Heliport. Progress was delayed due to increased Combat Engineer support and emergency road work during this period. Estimated completion date is now 1 March 1968.

b. The Airfield Operations Detachment was reorganized under a new TO&E. There were changes in personnel and equipment with the major change being the upgrading of the Commander from Captain to Lieutenant Colonel.

10. (C) Signal

a. Dial telephone service was installed at Camp Holloway during the month of December. Although this system is not complete, all major staff sections and companies have dial telephone service. This new dial system has greatly increased the quality of telephone service and reduced the time needed to place calls.

b. Two types of telephone service have been installed. Class A and C service. Class A service gives the subscribers access to the long distance telephone system. All major staff section and companies have Class A dial service. This is especially important in an aviation battalion where units are separated and operate over a large geographical area. Class C service within the Pleiku area has provided faster service for subscribers at Camp Holloway who still do not have dial telephones.

c. The dial telephone system will eventually replace the Camp Holloway AN/TTC-7 switchboard. Existing dial telephones at Camp Holloway have greatly reduced the amount of traffic handled by the Holloway switchboard. This in turn has provided faster switchboard service for subscribers at Camp Holloway who still do not have dial telephones.

d. VHF radio relay-carrier communications are presently being used to link Camp Holloway with the 155th AHC at Ban Ma Thuot and the 57th AHC at Kontum. Direct OKTS to these companies has greatly improved command and administration between 52d CAB and these two companies. As soon as the new AN/VSC-2 or AN/MRC-119 radios are issued to these companies a more reliable voice communications net will be established.

e. The new AN/VSC-2 HF/RTT radio has proven to be a reliable and useful piece of equipment. This SSB radio has provided the battalion

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with a reliable means of radio communications with the 17th Aviation Group Headquarters. Previous radios utilized were not as reliable and voice communications was often weak and distorted.

2. The AN/VSC-2 or AN/WRC-119 radio set will be issued one each per aviation company as soon as they arrive within the command. These radios will net with each other and provide an HF net between battalion and company operations.

11. (U) Aircraft Maintenance

a. Maintenance Statistics:

	<u>UH-1H</u>	<u>UH-1C</u>	<u>CH-47A</u>
Aircraft Authorized -	115	40	16
A/C Assigned (AVG) -	18	6	13
Availability Rate -	80.8	75.7	58.1
EDM Rate -	14.7	15.7	28.8
EDP Rate -	3.6	5.6	13.0

(For detailed statistical data, see inclosure 10)

b. Due to the increase in enemy attacks on units of this battalion availability has dropped to some extent. However, after attack repairs and round the clock maintenance has kept the availability at a phenomenal rate. More specifics are presented in Section II.

12. (U) Flight Surgeon

a. During the last three months the Camp Holloway Dispensary has been averaging 1900 outpatients visits per month while supporting about 4000 personnel.

b. There have been no significant outbreaks of unusual or epidemic diseases during the past reporting period. Upper respiratory infections, venereal diseases and dermatological conditions are the most prevalent diseases. The rate for these diseases have remained about the same month to month with the exception of an upsurge in URI during November.

c. The significant aviation medicine problem is aviator fatigue. This problem cannot be solved until sufficient aviators and equipment are available for use in Vietnam. Aviators are automatically grounded at 140 hours by their company and allowed to fly if the mission dictates only if cleared by the flight surgeon.

SECTION II - Commanders Observations and Recommendations Part I, Observations (Lessons Learned)

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1. (C) Intelligence

a. Item: Daily INTSUM

Discussion: The Daily INTSUM published by the Battalion S-2 Section consisted of, for the most part, a listing of contacts, agent reports, etc, extracted from INTSUMS published by various G2 sections in the Fleiku, and Kontum area. A time study revealed that preparation and publication of the INTSUM cost upwards from three (3) hours daily. Coordination with adjacent and higher headquarters subscribers revealed that they were merely receiving from this Battalion, several days later, items that they had already published. Coordination with subordinate subscribers revealed that a daily listing of Corps wide contacts, incidents, agent reports, etc., was of no benefit to company size aviation units.

Observation: A numbered Intelligence Bulletin containing High Hazard areas, 24 hour weather forecast, aircraft Shot Afs, and a discussion of current enemy capability and probable course of action, would perform a much more beneficial service. Bulletin was initiated 1 Jan 68 and time saved by not preparing and publishing the Corps wide listing, was used to prepare the more comprehensive "Discussion Section".

2. (C) Operations

a. Item: Bomb Crater Landing Zones

Discussion: The use of the bomb crater landing zones increased significantly during the past quarter. During the past several months this battalion has experimented with the use of these landing zones on many minor operations. However, during the Battle of Dak To, it became an operational necessity to use them in almost every airmobile operation. The terrain within the Spaatz AO (Dak To) is characterized by double and triple canopy jungle, thick undergrowth, and 200 - 300' trees; landing zones are almost non-existent. Seeking the utmost in airmobile flexibility, the U.S. Air Force was frequently called upon to develop helicopter landing areas. To perform this task they employed the use of several 750 and 1,000 pound bombs concentrated into a small area. Unfortunately present delivery techniques precluded any two bombs from falling into the same area. Many of the bombs fell onto steep slopes in the terrain, leaving large gaping holes that were unusable for heliborne operations. It was found that at best, only one ship landing zones could be expected. However, even these had the one single tree or stump in the wrong place, requiring the ship to hover at 15 - 20 feet to discharge its passengers. The undesirability of this is obvious; personnel injuries, rotor blade strikes and aircraft accidents rates went spiking.

Observation: The basic concept of this technique is excellent. It broadens the employment of helicopter forces immeasurably. However, extensive improvements must be made in both delivery techniques and the type ordinance used. The use of A-1H aircraft equipped with 2,000 pound daisy cutters, has been the most effective in this area. This is primar-

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ily due to the increase in accuracy by slower delivery speeds and the increased effectiveness of the 2,000 pound daisy cutter. Unfortunately the bomb shackles on this aircraft were found to be unsafe to carry this load, and the use of this type of ordnance was discontinued.

b. Item: Dust Hazards

Discussion: During this reporting period several incidents have occurred as a result of dust hazards. These incidents have ranged from the close-call category to the major accident. Operational requirements compel continued usage of the numerous semi-improved airfields located in the Central Highlands. This fact alone does not always create the hazardous conditions. These conditions normally arise with the selection of these sites for major operations. With this selection comes a vast armada of men and equipment to an airfield never designed to accommodate the increased traffic. The area is quickly leveled by bulldozers and vehicular traffic over the dirt roads is doubled. In addition, the increase of air traffic aggravates the already hazardous dust conditions.

Observation: Obviously it would not be tactically sound to make major improvements to an airfield prior to a major operation. However, if immediate engineer assistance could be made available, many of the dust problems would never occur. Immediate construction of necessary road nets would preclude the taxi-ways from becoming major highways for resupply. Helipads and heavy traveled roads should be penepripped as soon as possible to further improve the area. In most cases if the above improvements could be made early in the operation, the dust problem could almost be eliminated.

c. Item: Late Releases by Support Units

Discussion: This unit is still encountering a recurring problem of supported ground units failing to release their C&C and resupply aircraft at the appointed time. Aircraft have been released as late as 2100 hours which in several instances has contributed to crew fatigue, delayed intermediate inspections, and late arrivals for other missions assigned the aircraft.

Observation: Aircraft scheduled to be released at a specific time should be released at that time. The supported unit should be made aware of the problems incurred by their failure to observe the release time.

d. Item: Low Level Approaches in Support of Clandestine Reconnaissance Operations.

Discussion: On numerous occasions this battalion has been required to perform the covert infiltration of reconnaissance teams into areas known or suspected enemy activity, as well as effecting the ex-filtration of these units, often under fire. The clandestine nature of these operations created a requirement for reconnaissance at altitude

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several days prior to the infiltration, and insertion during those hours of limited visibility, utilizing techniques which would minimize the possibility of enemy detection. A covert exfiltration was also required to limit the exposure of the exfiltration aircraft to enemy fire.

Observation: It was determined that the best technique to perform this mission was a low level approach, controlled throughout its conduct by an aircraft at altitude. The command aircraft is positioned so that visual contact with the primary landing zone can be effected. With both the landing zone and the infiltration aircraft in sight, the command aircraft directs the infiltration aircraft to touchdown with the LZ. It was found that the infiltration pilot need not have seen the landing zone prior to the flight. The same procedure is used for exfiltration and emergency extraction, with the exception that the reconnaissance teams select the pickup site, and identify their location to the command ship by the use of pannels, signal mirrors, or smoke.

e. Item: Daily CH-47 Operational Commitments

Discussion: During this period, as with the last, the battalion has had to fly many loads to areas where airfields are available. The number of sorties involving moves of the supported units continue to increase. There have been many instances where the loads were not "CH-47" loads in that the weight was far below the desired 7,000 pounds. Also the Chinook is still being used for loads that are capable of being carried by smaller, less expensive aircraft. Many hours of CH-47 flying time are still being used to transport units to an area accessible by roads. In most cases these areas are but a few miles from the resupply point.

Observation: The Chinook should seldom be used in flying loads into areas where airfields are available. With improved planning and coordination, fixed wing aircraft are available for these missions. Continued emphasis must be placed on the requirement for reducing sorties in unit moves. Units should monitor all Chinook sorties and make certain that the loads are as close to 7,000 pounds as possible or that they are at least an item that a smaller aircraft cannot carry. Every effort should be made to utilize the existing road network for unit movement and resupply of units that are accessible by roads.

f. Item: Flying Hour Program

Discussion: During the reporting period a series of inevitable circumstances led to some interesting developments. Due to the maximum support effort of this organization during the Dak To campaign, post Dak To aircraft availability was vastly decreased. However, even with the loss of aircraft, using units appeared to be functioning normally. Some investigation of this matter revealed, that when aircraft were only available for a few hours, using commanders became keenly aware of his aircraft utilization. Missions well planned and organized to achieve the maximum, with the allotted time.

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Observation: Considering the above; a possible solution to the present shortage of mission ready aircraft is apparent. A closely monitored, five hour flying day for other than tactical requirements, could be established. This should be sufficient support in almost every case. Exceptions to this rule could be taken on a mission basis only. This would keep blade time at a minimum, and allow for sorely needed daylight maintenance. If additional administrative time is needed on one day, an equal amount of ground time should be allowed the following day.

g. Item: Sapper Attacks

Discussion: During the reporting period assaults on this battalions installations have increased considerably. In almost every instance the enemy has successfully employed the use of sappers. Analysis of after action reports clearly indicate, that damage suffered at the hands of the sapper far exceeds that of the damage caused by mortars.

Observation: In an attempt to reduce the effectiveness of the sappers, new precautions have been taken. New and strategically placed positions have been constructed in the aircraft parking areas. These positions are automatically manned when the units are placed on fifty per cent alert. Personnel in these positions are to stop the sapper before they have the time to place their charges.

3. (C) Signal

a. Item: Shortage of Maintenance Float FM, UHF, VHF RT Units

Discussion: Maintenance float FM, UHF, VHF RT units never seem to reach the 52d CAB Avionics Shop. Equipment has been released by the 58th Transportation Bn and never arrived here.

Observation: The close liaison with the supporting facility is often necessary in order to determine whether parts have been shipped and to which location.

b. Item: Shortage of APH-5 Parts

Discussion: The Avionics Shop has experienced great difficulty in receiving parts for the APH-5 protective helmet. According to the Avionics News Letter published by the 34th General Support Group, those repair parts are in country. Repair parts for the APH-5 often take more than sixty days to receive on an O2 priority.

Observation: That immediate action is received if requisitions are carried to 34th General Support Group.

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4. (IV) Maintenance

a. Item: Revetments

Discussion: The value of revetments in helicopter maintenance areas can not be minimized. The last four attacks against units of this battalion have been concentrated against maintenance areas. The enemy has used mortars, rockets, and hand carried sapper charges or a combination of all three. In general, the maintenance areas offer the larger structures, the greater concentration of equipment and aircraft and are lighted at night. In addition a successful attack limits a units maintenance repair capabilities. When aircraft are reveted a mortar round landing outside a revetment will cause damage to a single ship and usually only to the area extending above the revetment. Extensive damage to main rotor, tail rotor, and pylon assembly (UH-1) is often incurred, however, this is usually repairable. When a helicopter is not reveted, which is frequently true in crowded maintenance areas, a round falling some distance away will cause extensive damage. Aircraft in this situation suffer considerable sheetmetal, wiring and window damage which requires much time and effort to repair. Even in case of fire a revetment will confine the damage to one aircraft which is not the case when unreveted ships are parked some distance apart. The tendency of maintenance personnel to park the aircraft as close to the work area as possible is a common error.

Observation: Revetment should be as high as practical and long enough to protect the full length of the aircraft. Extra revetments should be constructed in maintenance area in anticipation of peak input of aircraft. Consideration should also be given to parking 2 1/2 tons trucks on the open side of the revetments this also gives dispersion to vehicles, which are also prime targets of the enemy.

b. Item: Radio Retrofit Program (Project ZYR)

Discussion: UH-1 aircraft continue to be received without the KY-28 retrofit being completed. This program places an additional burden on maintenance, administration and operations. This unit has had two aircraft at a time in Project ZYR for six month. This is two aircraft that can not perform a mission.

Observation: The retrofit on new aircraft should be accomplished in CONUS before they are sent to RVN.

c. Item: Repair of Helicopters After Attack

Discussion: Following a concentrated ground attack on a helicopter unit there will be a considerable amount of sheetmetal repair to be performed, usually beyond the capabilities of the unit. The unit will often times be reluctant to turn work over to support maintenance to repair knowing that given enough time they can make the repairs themselves.

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Observation: Upon notification of an attack the support maintenance unit should be prepared to provide a sheetmetal repair team. In the case of extensive aircraft destruction a contact team should be provided to assist in classification, inventorying and expeditious processing of aircraft to supporting maintenance. Unit maintenance personnel should be encouraged to turn in as much work as possible to their support and not to get tied up in major repair projects.

d. Item: Armament Capabilities

Discussion: Due to the lack of armament personnel (9 on had of 39 authorized) assigned to the units at Camp Holloway (3 AHC and 1 ASHC) consideration is being given to establishing a consolidated armament shop. This will provide a pooling of personnel and physical resources.

Observation: When an adequate physical facility is located and a qualified shop commander is found this consolidation will take place.

e. Item: Dispersal of Vehicles and Equipment

Discussion: During January this battalion lost numerous vehicles and equipment. This combat damage was incurred by satchel charges, and could as well have been by mortar fire.

Observation: By dispersal of equipment the number incurring damage would have been reduced. Compound areas do not lend themselves for wide dispersal, also security of equipment cannot be maintained with wide dispersement. The equipment can be spread throughout the compound and eliminate congestion. When possible, revetted areas should be provided for prime equipment i.e., Wreckers, Fuel Tanker and Aircraft Service vehicles. Maintenance shop areas should never be allowed to become congested at night. During good weather most maintenance can be performed by operators within assigned parking areas.

5. (V) Aviation Safety

a. Item: Foreign Object Damage

Discussion: Foreign object damage (FOD) was identified as a major cause of engine usage. A request for assistance is the design of a "last chance" filter for the T-53-L13 engine installation was requested of WSABAAR. In addition the units have been instructed to perform a last chance inspection of the sand and dust separator and plenum chamber area.

Observation: Failure of the sand and dust separator to stop FOD and increased night maintenance are believed to be the primary causes (See incl 11)

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b. Item: Accident Cause Factors

Discussion: In our continuing search for accident cause factors an analysis of the Crash Facts Message File was made. (See incl 12 from 1 Jun 67 to 22 Dec 67 time of analysis). The 41 events lead to the following conclusions. First, that there were no accidents, incidents, forced or precautionary landing from 0700 - 0920 hours. Second, that 67% of the major accidents occurred after 1500 hours or during the last 25% of the normal flying day.

Observation: It appears that aviator fatigue may be more closely related to the number of hours flown in one day than it is related to flying time per month. Consideration for a 5 hour non-tactical mission flying day and a 1700 hour aircraft release time has been requested. This will not only provide for aviator fatigue prevention, but will provide some daylight hours for maintenance.

c. Item: Maintenance Personnel

Discussion: The fatigue factor of maintenance personnel is also serious. Continuous daily commitment of flying assets beyond the flying hour program and the shortage of skilled personnel, especially supervisors, cannot help but effect the quality of maintenance.

Observation: The aircraft are flying more and more hours than programmed. Trained maintenance personnel become fewer and are forced to work longer and harder under poor lighting (or none at all). The inevitable result can only lead to mistakes and accidents. We must either reduce the flying hours and force the user to improve his use of the aircraft and increase the number of maintenance personnel or accept lower standards and high accident rates.

PART II: Recommendations:

1. (C) Operations: Reference Section II, Part I, para a, b, c, e, f.

a. Recommend increased use of the 2,000 pound daisy cutter for this type operation. In addition, that the necessary modifications be made on the A-1E aircraft be made to carry the larger loads.

b. Recommend closer direct liaison between the major aviation unit and engineer support unit concerned, prior to the commencement of a major operation in the vicinity of an airfield.

c. Recommend command emphasis be placed on the absolute necessity of scheduled release times being honored.

d. Recommend a study be made to determine the reason behind the phenomenal increase in sorties for battalion moves. In addition, that requests for CH-47 support be closely monitored.

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e. Recommend a study be conducted to determine a realistic flying hour program, which would meet operational requirements and increase needed ground time for aviation units.

2. (C) Signal: Reference Section II, Part I, para 3b. Recommend present system of requisitioning be inspected. Several sections still report difficulty in receiving requested items through supply channels. This would indicate requests are not being properly processed.

3. (U) Maintenance: Reference Section II, Part I, para 4b.

Recommend future acquisitions of aircraft be retrofitted during production.

4. (U) Safety: Reference Section II, Part I, para 5a.

a. Recommend immediate implementation of a "last chance" filter for the T-53-I13 engine. That the sand and dust separator inspection be emphasized to other aviation units with similar difficulties in this area.

b. Recommend a study be conducted by a USABOAR team concerning the fatigue problem. This should encompass both aviators and maintenance personnel. In addition, that aircraft utilization be monitored for a possible increase in daylight maintenance time.

12 Incl
as

Edward P. Lukert Jr.
EDWARD P. LUKERT JR.
LTC Inf
Commanding

1. List, 52d CAB Detachments withdrawn, Hqs. DA
2. Recapitulation of flying hours and availability
3. Civic Action photographs withdrawn, Hqs. DA
4. Chronological Sequence of Significant Events
5. Map of operational area
6. After Action Report (Dak To)
7. After Action Report (KEM Attack)
8. After Action Report (Hol Attack)
9. After Action Report (BMT Attack)
10. Recapitulation of availability, mission ready, EDP, and EDM percentages by month
11. Crash Facts Extract
12. F.O.D. Problem areas

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
AVGD-SC (16Feb 68) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968.

HEADQUARTERS, 17TH COMBAT AVIATION GROUP, APO 96240

TO: Commanding General, 1st Field Forces Vietnam, APO 96350

1. (U) The 52d Combat Aviation Battalion Operational Report for quarterly period ending 31 January 1968 is forwarded for information and action as necessary.
2. (U) This headquarters has reviewed this report and concurs with the report as modified herein.
3. (C) Reference section I para 106 concerning classes of Telephone Service. Last sentence should read; "class c service within the Pleiku area has provided faster service for subscribers at Camp Hollaway who have received dial telephones."
4. (C) Reference section I para 10d concerning voice communications. Concur the intent of this item is to emphasize that the AN/USC-2 and AN/MRC-119 will provide an organic means of communications that may be used as a back up when circuits provided through the Army Area communications systems fail.
5. (C) Reference section II Part I para 4a. Concur. Command emphasis is being placed on revetment criteria and design to afford maximum protection of aircraft.
6. (C) Reference Inclosure 8 para 5b (3). Item concerning perimeter lighting. Perimeter lights at Hollaway has been completed. Short circuits in some of the wiring exist but is being isolated and corrected.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


ROBERT R. LOVELY
CPT, AGC
Asst Adjutant

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DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10

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AVFA-GC-OT (6 Feb 68) 2d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending
31 January 1968 RGS CSFOR-65 UIC MCNICK 52d CAB (J)

HEADQUARTERS, I FIELD FORCE VIETNAM, APO 96350 9 MAR 1968

TO: Commanding General, 1st Aviation Brigade, APO 96375

Concur.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

ROBERT C. GABBARD
ILT, AGC
ASST ADJUTANT GENERAL

Copy furnished:
17th Cbt Avn Gp

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AVBA-C (6 Feb 68) 3d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period
Ending 31 January 1968 RCS CSFOR-65 (UIC WCYMT0)(U)

HEADQUARTERS, 1ST AVIATION BRIGADE, APO 96384 MAR 31 1968

THRU: Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST, APO 96375
Commander in Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPCP-OT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed this report and concurs with the report as modified herein.
2. (C) Sec I, para 10f, page 15: The AN/VSC-2 radio sets are being issued as they arrive in RVN. The AN/MRC 119 are being shipped direct to the using unit from the manufacturer. The logistical elements in RVN do not exercise any control over distribution of these radio sets.
3. (C) Sec II, para 3b, page 19: This headquarters is issuing instructions concerning requisitioning of APH-5 and ballistic helmet parts. These helmet parts are a 1st Logistical Command responsibility, not a responsibility of the 34th General Support Group. All helmet parts on hand at the 34th General Support Group are being turned over to this headquarters for redistribution to 1st Aviation Brigade units.
4. (C) Sec II, para 1a, page 22: This headquarters recommends that USARV establish coordination with 7th USAF to deal with this problem. The availability of 2000 pound daisy cutter bombs does not meet the demands. Additionally, the techniques used should be analyzed jointly in search for improved employment.
5. (C) Sec II, para 1b, page 22: This is a matter which must be accomplished at 52d Combat Aviation Battalion, supported division and engineer support unit level.
6. (C) Sec II, para 1c, page 22: Headquarters I Field Force Vietnam published a letter subject, Aircraft Accidents, dated 10 Jan 68 that encourages units to plan the use of their supporting aviation to insure minimum flying during the hours of darkness which will improve safety and aircraft maintenance. Additionally, Headquarters 4th Infantry Division published a letter subject, Aviation Utilization, dated 20 Feb 68 encouraging all subordinate units of that division to adhere to the 1700 release time as much as possible.
7. (C) Sec II, para 1d, page 22: This is a matter which should be determined by the 52d Combat Aviation Battalion and its supported units.

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DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10

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
AVBA-C (6 Feb 68) 3d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - lessons learned for Quarterly Period
Ending 31 January 1968 RGS CSFOR-65 (UIC XXXXXX)(U)

MAR 31 1968

8. (C) Sec II, para 4a, page 23: This headquarters published a letter subject, Prevention of FOD to T-53 Engines, dated 1 Mar 68 which requires a daily inspection of the particle separator. The crew chief is required to have the cowling opened, air filters removed and the top half of the particle separator removed. The pilot or co-pilot from the first crew of the day to fly the helicopter inspects for foreign objects and makes a directed entry in the DA Form 2408-13.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


JAMES M. GOLDMANN
1LT/AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

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AVHGC-DST (6 Feb 68) 4th Ind (C) CPT Arnold/twl/LBN 4485
SUBJECT: Operational Report For Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968
RCS-CSFOR

HEADQUARTERS, US ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 12 APR 1968

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,
APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1968 from Headquarters, 52d Combat Aviation Battalion as indorsed.

2. (C) Pertinent comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning bomb crater landing zones, page 16, paragraph 2a; and page 22, paragraph 1a; and 3d Indorsement, paragraph 4. A letter has been forwarded to COMUSMACV, ATTN: MACJ3 regarding this matter.

b. Reference item concerning radio retrofit program, page 20, paragraph 4b; and page 23, paragraph 3.

(1) The MD-736 discrete discriminators and shielded cabling have not been available for installation in aircraft at the time the aircraft were processed through ZYR retrofit sites. Originally, when the ZYR retrofit kits were assembled, the requirement for the MD-736's was not known. This requirement became known after the KY-28 failed the tempest testing. At that time, procurement action was initiated for the MD-736's. Shielded cabling is now arriving in sufficient quantities to incorporate this modification in the normal ZYR program.

(2) Replacement aircraft and new production aircraft are scheduled to have this modification accomplished in CONUS in addition to all other modifications now in the ZYR program.

c. Reference item concerning accident cause factors, page 22, paragraph 5b; and page 23, paragraph 4b. A study by this headquarters indicates a pattern of accidents entirely different. It is found that aircraft accidents occur on a rather even basis throughout the day from 0800 to 1800 with the largest number actually occurring between 0800 and 1000 hours. It has been established that measuring aviator fatigue based on the number of flying hours per

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DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10

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AVHGC-DST (6 Feb 68) 4th Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report For Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968
RCS-CSFOR

month leaves much to be desired. USABAAR is currently conducting a study on this matter.

d. Reference item concerning maintenance personnel, page 22, paragraph 5c; and page 23, paragraph 4b:

(1) Night maintenance and resultant problems are recognized. Two actions are pending to relieve this situation:

(a) Expedited procurement of portable lights to provide adequate lighting for the performance of night maintenance.

(b) Expedited approval of USARPAC manpower survey requested through channels.

(2) The matter of monitorship of aircraft utilization for a possible increase in daylight maintenance time should be acted on at Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam since operational control of aviation assets rests with that headquarters (reference page 23, paragraph 1c).

3. (U) A copy of this indorsement will be furnished to the reporting unit through channels.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C. S. Nakatsukasa
C. S. NAKATSUKASA
Captain, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Copies furnished:
HQ 52d Cbt Avn Bn
HQ 1st Avn Bde
HQ I FFORCEV

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GPOP-DT (6 Feb 68) (U) 5th Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 52d Cbt Avn Bn for Period Ending
31 January 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 3 MAY 1968

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding
indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.
2. Reference 4th Indorsement, paragraph 2d(1)b. The Manpower Survey-
USARV Security Forces, conducted during December 1967, approved by:
1st Indorsement, GPOP-FD (23 Jan 68), subject: Manpower Survey-USARV
Security Forces (TDA P-5-WIZJAA-00) recognized additional security
personnel which would release crew chiefs, gunners, and maintenance
personnel to perform their primary duties. The 52d Combat Aviation
Battalion was specifically identified with the aforementioned survey.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

C.L. Shortt

C.L. SHORTT
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

CONFIDENTIAL

5 February 1968

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 52D CG-BAT AVIATION BATTALION
APO San Francisco 96318
"FLYING DRAGONS"

AVGD-CZ

SUBJECT: Recapitulation of Flying Hours

UNIT	Month	UH-1C			UH-1H			Avail- ability	Combined			% of Dk Prog.
		Avg Hr. Guns on Hand	Hours Flown	Avg. Hours Guns	Avg Hr. Slicks on Hand	Hours Flown	Avg. Hours Slicks		Total Hours	Combined Avg Hours		
57th	Nov	8	466	58.3	21.0	1622	77.2	76	2088	72.0		120%
	Dec	8	605	75.6	21.0	2456	117.0	73	3061	105.6		176%
	Jan	6.9	359	52.0	18.5	1928	104.2	63	2287	90.0		150%
119th	Nov	7.2	496	67.5	20.5	2176	106.2	83.4	2672	96.5		162%
	Dec	7.4	438	59.2	20.1	1545	76.9	80.8	1983	72.1		119%
	Jan	6.4	404	63.1	19.0	1626	85.6	81.6	2030	79.9		133%
155th	Nov	7.1	414	58.3	20.4	1948	95.5	91.8	2362	85.9		143%
	Dec	6	430	71.7	20.0	1827	91.4	87.4	2257	86.8		145%
	Jan	6	461	76.7	17.5	1591	90.3	83.4	2052	87.3		146%
177th	Nov	7.5	519	69.2	18.7	2307	123.4	84.1	2826	107.8		180%
	Dec	8	634	79.3	18.9	2518	133.2	84.2	3152	117.2		194%
	Jan	7.8	540	69.2	18.6	1972	105.0	78.6	2512	95.2		159%
187th	Nov	7.4	576	77.8	20.2	1809	89.5	83.2	2385	86.4		144%
	Dec	7.5	546	71.8	20.2	2182	108.0	80.3	2728	98.1		164%
	Jan	8.0	639	79.9	18.0	1884	104.7	78.1	2523	97.0		162%

52d	Nov	37.2	2471	63.5	100.8	9862	97.8	84.6	12333	89.4		149%
	Dec	37.0	2653	71.7	100.2	10528	105.1	81.1	13181	95.3		159%
	Jan	35.5	2403	67.7	92.5	9001	98.4	76.9	11404	89.1		148%

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Unit	Month	Avg. CH-47 On Hand	Hours Flown	Avg. Hours per CH-47	Percent of DA Program	Avail- ability
179th	Nov	15.8	1118	70.8	142%	55.0%
	Dec	15.6	1305	83.7	168%	65.0%
	Jan	14.0	1174	83.9	169%	54.5%

REMARKS:

Average number of aircraft is based on those actually on-hand with the following provisions: (1) Destroyed aircraft are dropped from accountability the day following destruction, and (2) Replacement aircraft are picked up on accountability on the first day that they become "mission ready" or within 72 hours following receipt, whichever occurs first.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 52D COMBAT AVIATION BATTALION
APO San Francisco 96318
"FLYING DRAGONS"

AVGD-CC

31 January 1968

SUBJECT: Detailed Chronological Sequence of Significant Events 1 November thru 31 January 1968

1. (J) General: This detailed summary of significant events is extracted from the Daily Journal (J), Daily Intelligence Summary (I), Daily OPREP-5 (W), Daily Allocation Report File (A), JSAFIDR (Shot At Reports) (H), After Action Report File (R), and covers the period 1 November - 31 January 1968.

2. (C) Supported Unit Activities: Units and activities supported by the 52d Combat Aviation Battalion utilized aircraft in support of the type operation indicated. (See inclosure for diagram of operational area):

a. 4th Infantry Division (4th Inf Div)

(1) Operation Mac Arthur (2nd Bde, 4th Inf Div) Middleton AO - Search and Destroy.

(2) Operation Mac Arthur (1st Bde, 4th Inf Div) Spaatz AO - Search and Destroy.

(3) Operation Mac Arthur (2nd Bde, 4th Inf Div) Middleton AO - Search and Destroy.

(4) Operation Mac Arthur (TASK FORCE 22, 4th Inf Div) Wainwright and Corrigidor AO - Search and Destroy.

(5) Operation Mac Arthur (173d Abn Bde, OPCON 4th Inf Div) Bataan - Leyte - Luzon AO - Search and Destroy.

b. ARVN - includes all II Corps ARVN units; primarily in Kontum, Darlac, and Pleiku Provinces.

(1) Road clearing operations

(2) Search and Destroy

(3) Cordon and Search

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c. DSA II Corps

- (1) Support of HQ, II Corps, Pleiku
- (2) Support of Senior Advisors, primarily at Kontum and Ban Me Thuot.

(3) VIP Flights

d. Company "F", 20th Infantry - a First Field Force Vietnam (IFFV) long range reconnaissance organization. Details of operation are classified.

- (1) Infiltration and exfiltration of reconnaissance teams.
- (2) Reconnaissance
- (3) Search and Destroy

e. Operation Prairie Fire - An operation conducting clandestine ground reconnaissance. Details of operation are classified.

f. Operation Daniel Boone - An operation conducting clandestine ground reconnaissance. Details of operation are classified.

g. 52d Artillery Group - Command and Control for Group Headquarters and emergency resupply of fire bases.

h. Aviation Command and Control - Aircraft utilized by 17th CAG for Command and Control of aviation operations.

i. 5th Special Forces Group - Support of Company "B", 5th SFG, Pleiku; Special Forces camps and Special Forces operations not included in other allocations.

j. Press Camp - Support of authorized representatives of civilian news agencies.

3. (C) Sequence of Events:

Period 1 Nov 67 - 2 Nov 67

a. Weather (I):

Sky conditions averaged 3,500 scattered to 8,000 broken, high thin overcast with rain showers during the early part of the afternoon lasting approximately one hour. Visibility varied on both days from one mile during the rain to thirteen miles after the weather cleared. Morning temperatures averaged 64°, afternoon temperatures ranged from 75° to 83°. Wind was from the NE at an average speed of 10 knots during daylight hours. Minimum density was during the hours of 0400 - 0600 at 3,500'. Maximum DA was during 1300 - 1500 hours at 4,600'.

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b. Aircraft Allocation (Average per day) (A):

	<u>UH-1H</u>	<u>UH-1C</u>	<u>CH-47A</u>
4th Inf Div -	24	8	8
ARVN -	11	4	0
17th CAG -	4	1	0
52d Arty Gp -	1	0	0
DSA II Corps -	8	0	0
Press Camp -	*	0	0
Avn CAC -	4	0	0
5th SFG -	2	0	0
Prairie Fire -	3	4	0

* Supported for less than majority of period and average is less than on aircraft.

c. Significant Events (I) (D) (J) (H) (R):

(1) 02 Nov - 179th conducted a Fire Base Move for 3/8 Inf, 4th Inf Div, in Mac Arthur AO. They moved 179 pax and 116 cargo tons in 74 sorties. The mission was conducted with no incidents and negative contact.

(2) 02 Nov - 170th UH-1H model aircraft received heavy enemy small arms and automatic weapons fire, vicinity YB8812. Aircraft took seven (7) rounds, 1 WIA and returned to Dak To Airfield.

d. Operational Statistics (W) (J) (H):

<u>CET</u>	<u>OTHER</u>	<u>UH-1H</u>	<u>UH-1C</u>	<u>CH-47A</u>
<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>HOURS</u>	<u>HOURS</u>	<u>HOURS</u>
1394	719	375	156	68
<u>TOTAL</u>		<u>CARGO</u>	<u>A/C</u>	<u>A/C**</u>
<u>HOURS</u>	<u>PAX</u>	<u>TONS</u>	<u>HIT</u>	<u>DAM/DEST</u>
599	2,950	328	1/0	1/0
<u>CREW MEM</u>	<u>ENEMY</u>	<u>STRUCT</u>	<u>MED</u>	<u>SORTIES DELAY</u>
<u>INJ/K**</u>	<u>KBA</u>	<u>DEST</u>	<u>EVACS</u>	<u>OR CXL FOR WX</u>
1/0	0	0	6	0

** Includes results of hostile fire and accidents.

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Period 3 Nov 67 - 9 Nov 67

a. Weather:

Generally sky conditions digressed as total sky cover averaged 9/10. Light to moderate rain showers of one hour duration occurred the 4th and 7th of November during the early morning hours (0500 - 0700). Ceilings in the area of operation averaged 1000' scattered, 5,000' broken and 7,000' overcast from 0900 - 1500 daily. Best sky conditions occurred during early morning or late afternoon hours. Heavy ground fog was encountered and reduced visibility to 1/2 mile. Winds were calm during fog and rain conditions but increased to average speeds of 5 - 9 knots ENE during clear conditions. Daily temperatures varied from 60 - 83 degrees. Generally temperatures averaged 75° during the best flying conditions and in the low 60's during the poorer flying conditions. Density altitudes up to 4,660' were encountered 1300 - 1500 daily.

b. Aircraft Allocation:

	<u>UH-1H</u>	<u>UH-1C</u>	<u>CH-47A</u>
4th Inf Div -	25	8	7
ARVN -	11	4	0
17th CAG -	1	1	0
52d Arty Gp -	1	0	0
DSA II Corps -	8	0	0
Avn C&C -	2	0	0
Press Camp -	1	0	0
5th SFG -	2	0	0
Prairie Fire -	4	5	0

c. Significant Events:

(1) 03 Nov - 155th conducted a CA for 22nd ARVN Div, vicinity Kontum. 338 pax in 184 sorties. Mission was conducted with no incidents and negative contact.

(2) 03 Nov - 170th conducted a CA for the 3/8 Inf and 3/12 Inf, 4th Inf Div, in Mac Arthur AO. Two assaults of 513 pax in 216 sorties. The mission was conducted with no incidents and negative contact.

(3) 03 Nov - 119th conducted a CA for the 1/12, 4th Inf Div, in Mac Arthur AO. 211 pax in 103 sorties. The mission was conducted with no incidents and negative contact.

(4) 06 Nov - 155th conducted a CA and Final Extraction for 22nd ARVN Div, vicinity of Ban Me Thuot. 252 pax in 118 sorties. Mission was conducted with no incidents and negative contact.

(5) 06 Nov - 170th conducted a CA for the 2/504 Abn, 173d

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Abn Bde, vicinity of Dak To. 120 pax in 65 sorties. Heavy enemy fire was encountered in the landing zone. One (1) UH-1H received 5 hits, wounding one (1) crew member.

(6) 07 Nov - 155th and Ban Me Thuot City Airfield came under enemy attack at 2345 hours. The enemy attacked with 81mm mortars and the rounds fell for approximately ten minutes. Two (2) UH-1C gunships destroyed and others received heavy damage, but were repairable. Five (5) UH-1H model aircraft were damaged, but were repairable. One (1) transient UH-1H model from 4th Avn Bn was also damaged. Negative friendly or enemy KIA-WIA were reported.

(7) 08 Nov - 179th sent 2 CH-47 aircraft to Dak To, in response to a Tactical Emergency for 1st Avn Bde, 4th Inf Div. Aircraft departed Heliway Army Airfield at 0220 hours, hauling Class V and med evacs throughout the night.

(8) 08 Nov - 189th UH-1C model aircraft shot down in classified area. The ship was on initial (hot) run and encountered intense enemy automatic weapons fire. Aircraft suffered loss of power and settled into trees. Heavy enemy activity hampered rescue efforts. One (1) KIA and three (3) WIA. Aircraft was total loss and was destroyed on site by Air Force tac-air. The 189th had a total of two (2) UH-1C aircraft shot-up on this mission.

(9) 09 Nov - 170th conducted a CA in support of the 3/8 Inf, 4th Inf Div, in Mac Arthur AO. They lifted 283 pax in 121 sorties. Aircraft received light small arms fire approaching LZ. As aircraft departed LZ, heavy mortar fire was encountered. UH-1H was shot down and destroyed, resulting in one (1) crew member WIA.

(10) 09 Nov - 119th conducted a CA for B/24th CIDG, in vicinity of Dak To. They lifted 130 pax in 51 sorties. Mission was conducted with no incidents and negative contact.

(11) 09 Nov - 179th conducted a Fire Base Move in support of 173d Abn Bde, vicinity of Dak To. They moved 56 pax and 180 cargo tons in 54 sorties. The mission was conducted with no incidents and negative contact.

(12) 09 Nov - 179th CH-47A received two (2) hits from enemy heavy automatic weapons, in vicinity of YB850175. Negative injuries and the aircraft continued to fly.

d. Operational Statistics:

<u>CBT</u> <u>SORTIES</u>	<u>OTHER</u> <u>SORTIES</u>	<u>UH-1H</u> <u>HOURS</u>	<u>UH-1C</u> <u>HOURS</u>	<u>CH-47A</u> <u>HOURS</u>
4,926	1,783	1,589	373	258

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<u>TOTAL</u> <u>HOURS</u>	<u>PAX</u>	<u>CARGO</u> <u>TONS</u>	<u>A/C</u> <u>HIT</u>	<u>A/C**</u> <u>DAM/DEST</u>
2,220	9,575	1,250	6	7/4
<u>CREW MEM</u> <u>INJ/K**</u>	<u>ENEMY</u> <u>KBA</u>	<u>STRUCT</u> <u>DEST</u>	<u>MED</u> <u>EVACS</u>	<u>SORTIES DELAY</u> <u>OR CXL FOR WX</u>
5/0	2	10	179	26

Period 10 Nov 67 - 16 Nov 67

a. Weather:

Generally flying conditions improved over the previous reporting period. 10 Nov 67 is the only exception with light rain showers throughout the area of operation from 0600 - 1600. Total cloud cover averaged 3/10 at 3,500' scattered, 8,000' broken and improved throughout each day to clear skies. Morning temperatures averaged 67° increasing to daily highs of 78°. Winds were predominately out of the NE (050° - 070°) at 5 - 8 knots increasing in late afternoons 10 - 17 knots. In mountainous terrain winds were steady at 20 - 35 knots with light to moderate turbulence. Density altitude reached highs of 4,500' and dissipated later in the day to 1,000' - 1600'. Visibility remained constant throughout each day at 12 - 15 miles.

b. Aircraft Allocation:

	<u>UH-1H</u>	<u>UH-1C</u>	<u>CH-47A</u>
4th Inf Div -	22	6	7
ARVN -	11	4	0
52d Arty Gp -	1	0	0
DSA II Corps -	8	0	0
Avn C&C -	3	0	0
Press Camp -	1	0	0
5th SFG -	2	0	0
Prairie Fire -	7	8	0
17th CAG -	*	0	0

c. Significant Events:

(1) 10 Nov - 119th conducted a CA in support of 1st Inf Bde, 4th Inf Div, in Spaatz AO. They lifted 60 pax in 23 sorties. One (1) UH-1C was hit with heavy enemy anti-aircraft fire while on firing run. The aircraft fuel cell was hit and exploded at approximately 300' altitude. Three (3) members were WIA and one (1) KIA. Aircraft was a total loss.

(2) 10 Nov - 119th UH-1H model aircraft was hit by enemy air

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burst, vicinity of YB893146. Air-burst was believed to be 37mm anti-aircraft fire, but was not confirmed. Aircraft sustained one (1) schapnel hole and continued to fly. Negative injuries to crew members.

(3) 11 Nov - 119th conducted a CA in support of the 3/12 Inf, 4th Inf Div, in Spaatz AO. They lifted 120 pax in 57 sorties. The mission was conducted with no incidents and negative contact.

(4) 12 Nov - 119th conducted a CA in support of the 1/8 Inf, 4th Inf Div, in Spaatz AO. They lifted 180 pax in 78 sorties. Enemy small arms fire was received in the vicinity of the landing zone. One (1) UH-1H model, assisting in the lift, sustained two (2) hits. Negative injuries and aircraft continued to fly.

(5) 12 Nov - 179th conducted a Fire Base Move in support of the 1/12 Inf, 4th Inf Div, in Spaatz AO. They lifted 175 pax and 93 cargo tons in 69 sorties. The mission was conducted with no incidents and negative contact.

(6) 12 Nov - 179th conducted a Battery Move for 1/8 Inf, 4th Inf Div, in Spaatz AO. They lifted 293 pax and 199 cargo tons in 145 sorties. Mission was conducted with no incidents and negative contact.

(7) 13 Nov - 52d CAB conducted a battalion size CA and Fire Base Move in support of 1/8 Inf, 4th Inf Div, in Spaatz AO. 24 UH-1H, 4 UH-1C, and 9 CH-47A's were used to move over 550 pax and 143 cargo tons in 437 sorties. Fog and enemy automatic weapons fire delayed lift for over an hour. One (1) UH-1H model aircraft was hit with an enemy rocket (B-40) and was destroyed. The crew members were all WIA.

(8) 13 Nov - 155th conducted a CA in support of the 11th ARVN RANGER Bn, vicinity of Bao Loc. They lifted 729 pax in 226 sorties. The mission was conducted with no incidents and negative contact.

(9) 13 Nov - 179th conducted a Fire Base Move for 173d Abn Bde, in Spaatz AO. They lifted 36 pax and 179 cargo tons in 106 sorties. Mission was conducted with no incidents and negative contact.

(10) 14 Nov - 119th conducted multiple CA's in support of 3/8 Inf, 4th Inf Div, in Spaatz AO. They lifted 450 pax in 212 sorties. Enemy sniper fire was received in all quadrants around the LZ. No hits were sustained and negative injuries.

(11) 14 Nov - 155th conducted a CA in support of 23d ARVN Div, vicinity of Phu Hoip. They lifted 555 pax in 193 sorties. Two (2) UH-1C model aircraft were shot down by heavy automatic weapons fire. Both aircraft received over 20 hits and were major combat losses. Two (2) crew members were WIA.

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(12) 15 Nov - 170th conducted multiple CAs in support of ARVN Abn, in Spontz AO. They lifted 600 pax in 164 sorties. Intense enemy small arms fire was received in the vicinity of the LZ. One (1) UH-1H model sustained one (1) hit, wounding a crew member.

d. Operational Statistics:

<u>CBT</u> <u>SORTIES</u>	<u>OTHER</u> <u>SORTIES</u>	<u>UH-1H</u> <u>HOURS</u>	<u>UH-1C</u> <u>HOURS</u>	<u>CH-47A</u> <u>HOURS</u>
6,556	2,259	2,198	523	348
<u>TOTAL</u> <u>HOURS</u>	<u>PAX</u>	<u>CARGO</u> <u>TONS</u>	<u>A/C</u> <u>HIT</u>	<u>A/C**</u> <u>DAM/DEST</u>
3,069	16,016	1,693	3	3/2
<u>CREW MEM</u> <u>INJ/KW*</u>	<u>ENEMY</u> <u>KB*</u>	<u>STRUCT</u> <u>DEST</u>	<u>MED</u> <u>EVACS</u>	<u>SORTIES DELAY</u> <u>OR CXL FOR WX</u>
8/1	10	10	380	10

Period 17 Nov 67 - 23 Nov 67

a. Weather:

There was a noticeable improvement in sky conditions. Ceilings usually were 4,500' scattered, high thin broken throughout each day. Total cloud cover averaged 2/10. Temperatures increased to average 79° each day and dissipated later in the afternoon (0900 - 1630). Wind direction shifted more easterly and average speed remained 8 - 11 knots during the reporting period, visibility was 12 - 15 miles. Daily high density altitude averaged 4,300'.

b. Aircraft Allocation:

	<u>UH-1H</u>	<u>UH-1C</u>	<u>CH-47A</u>
4th Inf Div -	20	10	3
ARVN -	11	4	0
52d Arty Gp -	1	0	0
DCA II Corps -	8	0	0
Avn C&C -	4	0	0
Pross Camp -	1	0	0
5th SFG -	2	0	0
17th CAG -	*	0	0
Freddie Fire -	9	8	0
Co "E", 20th Inf -	1	0	0

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c. Significant Events:

(1) 19 Nov - 119th UH-1H model aircraft received heavy enemy automatic weapons fire in the vicinity of YB876078. One (1) UH-1C model gunship also received fire from the same area later in the day. Both aircraft sustained one (1) hit, and continued to fly with negative injuries.

(2) 21 Nov - Intelligence reports indicated a high probability of an attack on the Kontum military complex: All Army aircraft not of an immediate operational need or not in revotments were evacuated to Heliway Army Airfield. The possibility of an attack was verified by the discovery of rocket launching sites within 10 KMS of the Kontum Airfield.

(3) 21 Nov - 155th conducted a CA in support of the 144th Inf (ARVN), in the vicinity of Bao Loc. They lifted 361 pax in 47 sorties. Mission was conducted with no incidents and negative contact.

(4) 21 Nov - 155th conducted a Final Extraction in support of the 24th Mike Force Company, vicinity of Di Linh. The extracted 126 pax in 24 sorties. Mission was conducted with no incidents and negative contact.

(5) 22 Nov - 119th conducted a CA in support of the 173d Abn Bde, in Spaatz AO. They lifted 120 pax in 19 sorties. Two (2) UH-1H model aircraft received hits from enemy small arms fire in the vicinity of the LZ. Three (3) passengers were WIA, but only minor damage to the aircraft.

(6) 22 Nov - 119th responded to TAC "E" with a night resupply of Class V to Dak To. They lifted 18,000 lbs of Class V in 3 sorties. The mission was conducted with no incidents and negative contact.

(7) 22 Nov - 189th UH-1C gunship received four (4) hits from heavy enemy automatic fire in classified area. One (1) crew member WIA and aircraft continued to fly.

(8) 22 Nov - 170th UH-1H crashed in the vicinity of Dak To. Complete engine failure, and the autorotation was made into the trees. One (1) crew member sustained minor lacerations and a broken nose.

(9) 23 Nov - 119th conducted multiple CA's and Final Extraction in support of the 3/8 Inf, 4th Inf Div, in Spaatz AO. They lifted 360 pax in 117 sorties. Enemy small arms fire was received from the vicinity of the LZ (5 reported hits). Negative injuries and aircraft continued to fly.

(10) 23 Nov - 119th UH-1H model aircraft received heavy enemy automatic weapons fire vicinity of Dak To. Aircraft sustained 8 - 13 hits and continued to fly. One (1) crew member WIA.

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d. Operational Statistics:

<u>GRT</u> <u>SORTIES</u>	<u>OTHER</u> <u>SORTIES</u>	<u>UH-1H</u> <u>HOURS</u>	<u>UH-1C</u> <u>HOURS</u>	<u>CH-47A</u> <u>HOURS</u>
5,416	3,937	2,321	603	191
<u>TOTAL</u> <u>HOURS</u>	<u>PAX</u>	<u>CARGO</u> <u>TONS</u>	<u>A/C</u> <u>HIT</u>	<u>A/C**</u> <u>DAM/DEST</u>
3,115	11,677	923	11	10/1
<u>CREW MEM</u> <u>INJ/K**</u>	<u>ENEMY</u> <u>KRA</u>	<u>STRUCT</u> <u>DEST</u>	<u>MED</u> <u>EVAOS</u>	<u>SORTIES DELAY</u> <u>OR CXL FOR WX</u>
7/1	11	0	353	11

Period 24 Nov 67 - 30 Nov 67

a. Weather:

Lower temperatures made a noticeable change in density altitude during this reporting period. Average highs were 74° of short duration (1100 - 1300). Morning and evening averaged 60 to 65 degrees. Density altitudes were lower throughout the day (4,250'). Ceiling conditions were lower, averaging 3,500' scattered, 8,000' broken. Total cloud cover average 5/10 covered throughout each day. There was no change in visibility (12 - 15 miles). Wind direction shifted slightly ENE (070° - 090°) at 5 - 10 knots.

b. Aircraft Allocation:

	<u>UH-1H</u>	<u>UH-1C</u>	<u>CH-47A</u>
4th Inf Div -	22	10	5
ARVN -	11	5	0
52d Arty Gp -	7	0	0
Avn C&C -	5	0	0
Press Camp -	1	0	0
5th SFG -	2	0	0
Prairie Fire -	11	8	0
Co "E", 20th Inf -	2	0	0
DSA II Corps -	8	0	0

c. Significant Events:

(1) 24 Nov - 119th conducted a CA in support of the 1/12 Inf, 4th Inf Div, along with the 170th, in the vicinity of HILL 875. 120 pax were assaulted onto the LZ in 23 sorties. Intense enemy anti-aircraft fire was received from all quadrants of the LZ. Two (2) aircraft were hit;

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one by 8 rounds, the other by 10 rounds. One (1) crew member WIA.

(2) 24 Nov - 119th conducted a Final Extraction in support of 2/503d Abn Bn, 173d Abn Bde, from HILL 875. The extraction of 150 pax was made in 31 sorties. A heavy volume of enemy small arms, and automatic weapons fire was received from the area surrounding the LZ.

(3) 25 Nov - 119th conducted multiple CA's and Extractions in support of 1/8 Inf, 3/8 Inf, and 3/12 Inf, 4th Inf Div. The operation took place in the vicinity of Dak To, moving over 610 pax in 226 sorties. Sporadic enemy resistance was encountered during the lift. Negative aircraft hits or injuries were reported.

(4) 25 Nov - 170th conducted a CA in support of the 3/12 Inf, 4th Inf Div, vicinity of Dak To. They lifted over 300 pax in 100 sorties. Mission was conducted with no incidents and negative contact.

(5) 25 Nov - 155th UH-1H model aircraft crashed in the vicinity of ZA220890. Aircraft experienced a short shaft failure and entered autorotation. The ship landed in a field, hit a stump and rolled over. The crew and passengers experienced minor lacerations. Aircraft was recovered by the 179th ASHC.

(6) 26 Nov - 189th conducted three (3) night emergency medical evacuations in support of FOB-II. The evacuation took place in a classified area under intense enemy automatic weapons fire. One (1) UH-1H received several hits, wounding both the aircraft commander and pilot. The pilot maintained control of the aircraft and returned to Dak To.

(7) 28 Nov - 170th and 189th conducted multiple CA's and Final Extractions in support of 1/8 Inf, 1/12 Inf, 4th Inf Div, vicinity of Dak To. They lifted 846 pax in 429 sorties. One (1) UH-1H crashed in the bomb crater used for the LZ. There were negative injuries sustained by the crew and passengers. Enemy fire was received from all quadrants. Negative hits were reported.

(8) 28 Nov - 155th UH-1C received one (1) hit from enemy small arms fire, vicinity CRO55352. Negative injuries and aircraft continued to fly.

(9) 28 Nov - 179th conducted a Fire Base Move in support of the 3/12 Inf, 4th Inf Div, vicinity of Dak To. They lifted 439 pax and 151 cargo tons in 100 sorties. Mission was conducted with no incidents and negative contact.

(10) 29 Nov - 189th conducted a Final Extraction in support of 1st Bde, 4th Inf Div, vicinity of Dak To. They extracted 252 pax in 87 sorties. Mission was conducted with no incidents and negative contact.

(11) 29 Nov - 155th conducted a CA in support of 22d ARVN

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Div, vicinity of Chao Reo. They assaulted 130 pax in 28 sorties. The mission was conducted with no incidents and negative contact.

(12) 30 Nov - 189th conducted a CA in support of 3/12 Inf, 4th Inf Div, vicinity of Dak To. They lifted 585 pax in 182 sorties. The Battalion Commander of the 3/12 Inf received a minor facial wound when his C&C aircraft came under enemy anti-aircraft fire: Negative injuries to crew and the aircraft continued to fly.

d. Operational Statistics:

<u>CBT SORTIES</u>	<u>OTHER SORTIES</u>	<u>UH-1H HOURS</u>	<u>UH-1C HOURS</u>	<u>CH-47A HOURS</u>
6,994	3,784	2,797	701	254
<u>TOTAL HOURS</u>	<u>PAX</u>	<u>CARGO TONS</u>	<u>A/C HIT</u>	<u>A/C** DAM/DEST</u>
6,752	13,501	1,547	4	5/0
<u>CREW MEM INJ/K**</u>	<u>ENEMY KBA</u>	<u>STRUCT DEST</u>	<u>MED EVACS</u>	<u>SORTIES DELAY OR CXL FOR WX</u>
2/0	20	10	85	2

Period 1 Nov 67 - 30 Nov 67 TOTALS

<u>CBT SORTIES</u>	<u>OTHER SORTIES</u>	<u>UH-1H HOURS*</u>	<u>UH-1C HOURS*</u>	<u>CH-47A HOURS*</u>
25,286	12,482	9,862	2,471	1,118
<u>TOTAL HOURS*</u>	<u>PAX</u>	<u>CARGO TONS</u>	<u>A/C HIT</u>	<u>A/C** DAM/DEST</u>
13,451	53,719	5,741	25	26/7
<u>CREW MEM INJ/K**</u>	<u>ENEMY KBA</u>	<u>STRUCT DEST</u>	<u>MED EVACS</u>	<u>SORTIES DELAY OR CXL FOR WX</u>
23/2	43	30	1,003	49

* Adjusted DA Form 1352 time.

** Results of hostile fire and accidents.

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Period 1 Dec 67 - 7 Dec 67

a. Weather:

On the 1st and 2nd very light showers were reported throughout the area of operations (1300 - 1500). Ground fog was reported in low valleys on the morning (0500) 5 Dec 67 that reduced visibility to 1/2 mile but dissipated by 0700. Total cloud cover was 6/10 with ceilings at 3,500 scattered, 6,000 - 8000' broken. Winds remained ENE 060° - 090° degrees at 5 - 10 knots. High density altitude averaged 4,400' each day from 1400 - 1500 hours.

b. Aircraft Allocation:

	<u>UH-1H</u>	<u>UH-1C</u>	<u>CH-47A</u>
4th Inf Div -	22	10	5
ARVN -	11	5	0
52d Arty Gp -	7	0	0
DSA II Corps -	8	0	0
Avn C&C -	5	0	0
Press Camp -	1	0	0
5th SFG -	2	0	0
Prairie Fire -	11	8	0
Co "E", 20th Inf -	2	0	0
Avn Tng -	2	0	0

c. Significant Events:

(1) 01 Dec - 119th UH-1C received one (1) hit from enemy small arms fire in classified area. Negative injuries and aircraft continued to fly.

(2) 02 Dec - 179th conducted a night resupply mission in support of 1st Bde, 4th Inf Div, in Spaatz AO. They responded to the TAC-E with 17 sorties of Class V. Mission was conducted with no incidents and negative contact.

(3) 02 Dec - 170th conducted a CA in support of the 1/12 Inf, 4th Inf Div, in Spaatz AO. They assaulted 270 pax in 125 sorties. The flight received enemy small arms fire from the SE quadrant, but sustained no hits.

(4) 03 Dec - 155th conducted a CA in support of the 23d ARVN Div, vicinity of Bao Loc. They assaulted 80 pax in 45 sorties. The mission was conducted with no incidents and negative contact.

(5) 04 Dec - 155th conducted a CA in support of the 23d ARVN Div, vicinity of Phan Rang. They assaulted 58 pax in 35 sorties. The mission was conducted with no incidents and negative contact.

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(6) 04 Dec - 170th conducted a CA in support of the 3/8 Inf, 4th Inf Div, in Spaatz AO. They lifted 160 pax in 30 sorties. Mission was conducted with no incidents and negative contact.

(7) 05 Dec - 119th UH-1C received one (1) hit from enemy small arms fire in classified area. Negative injuries and the aircraft continued to fly.

(8) 06 Dec - 189th conducted a CA in support of the 1/8 Inf, 4th Inf Div, in Spaatz AO. They lifted over 255 pax in 45 sorties. The mission was conducted with no incidents and negative contact.

(9) 06 Dec - 170th UH-1H model aircraft crashed in vicinity of ZP132315. Aircraft lost RPM on termination of an approach, turned 360°, and settled onto slope. Main rotor blade hit a tree and separated from the aircraft. The aircraft then rolled inverted. One (1) ARVN KIA and two (2) other WIA. Negative injuries to crew.

d. Operational Statistics:

<u>CBT</u>	<u>OTHER</u>	<u>UH-1H</u>	<u>UH-1C</u>	<u>CH-47A</u>
<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>HOURS</u>	<u>HOURS</u>	<u>HOURS</u>
6,249	3,818	2,201	775	253
<u>TOTAL</u>		<u>CARGO</u>	<u>A/C</u>	<u>A/C**</u>
<u>HOURS</u>	<u>PAX</u>	<u>TONS</u>	<u>HIT</u>	<u>DAM/DEST</u>
3,229	14,929	1,630	12	2/0
<u>CREW MEM</u>	<u>ENEMY</u>	<u>STRUCT</u>	<u>MED</u>	<u>SORTIES DELAY</u>
<u>INJ/K**</u>	<u>KBA</u>	<u>DEST</u>	<u>EVACS</u>	<u>OR CXL FOR WX</u>
0/0	14	5	73	7

Period 8 Dec 67 - 14 Dec 67

a. Weather:

Weather summary for this reporting period indicated a slight increase in total sky cover, 8/10 covered at 2,500' scattered to broken with a high partial obscuration on 9, 11, 12, and 14 December. Visibility averaged 10 miles with HK as the only obstruction to vision. Light rain was encountered on the mornings of 8, 11, and 12 December with 30 minutes duration throughout the area of operations. Wind remained out of the ENE (070° - 090°) but increased in velocity to 10 - 15 knots gusting to 25 knots. Temperatures remained cool during nights and early mornings (58° - 65°) increasing throughout each day to average 73° - 75°. Density altitude decreased to average a daily high of 3,800'.

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b. Aircraft Allocation:

	<u>UH-1H</u>	<u>UH-1C</u>	<u>CH-47A</u>
4th Inf Div -	26	9	7
ARVN -	10	4	0
52d Arty Gp -	1	0	0
DSA II Corps -	10	0	0
Avn C&C -	5	0	0
Pross Camp -	*	0	0
5th SFG -	3	0	0
Prairie Fire -	11	8	0
Co "E", 20th Inf -	4	2	0

c. Significant Events:

(1) 08 Dec - 119th UH-1C model aircraft received one (1) hit from enemy small arms fire, in a classified area. Negative injuries and the aircraft continued to fly.

(2) 09 Dec - 170th conducted a CA in support of the 1/12 Inf, 4th Inf Div, in Spaatz AO. They lifted 240 pax in 49 sorties. The mission was conducted with no incidents and negative contact.

(3) 10 Dec - 155th UH-1H model aircraft had a forced landing in the vicinity of AQ839115. The engine failed and the aircraft autorotation was made into an open field. Negative injuries and only minor damage to aircraft.

(4) 10 Dec - 170th conducted a CA in support of the 1/8 Inf, 4th Inf Div, in Spaatz AO. They lifted 121 pax in 35 sorties. The mission was conducted with no incidents and negative contact.

(5) 10 Dec - 155th UH-1H model aircraft received two (2) hits from enemy automatic weapons fire, vicinity VB170270. Negative injuries and the aircraft continued to fly.

(6) 12 Dec - 119th conducted a CA in support of FOB-II into a classified area. Intense enemy anti-aircraft fire was encountered with the following results:

- 3 UH-1H models damaged
- 1 UH-1C model damaged
- 1 UH-1H model destroyed
- 1 UH-1C model destroyed

Heavy enemy contact hampered rescue efforts. One (1) crew member was WIA.

(7) 13 Dec - 170th conducted a CA in support of the 5th SFG, CIDG Force, vicinity of YA669551. They lifted 121 pax in 77 sorties. The

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mission was conducted with no incidents and negative contact.

(8) 13 Dec - 119th UH-1H model aircraft received two (2) hits from heavy enemy automatic weapons fire, in a classified area. Negative injuries and the aircraft continued to fly. In addition, one (1) UH-1C model took one (1) 50 cal. round. Negative injuries and the aircraft continued to fly.

(9) 14 Dec - 119th and 170th had three (3) UH-1C model aircraft shot-up by heavy enemy automatic weapons fire, in a classified area. One (1) crew member was WIA and all aircraft continued to fly.

(10) 14 Dec - 189th UH-1H model aircraft was hit by enemy automatic weapons fire. Negative injuries and the aircraft continued to fly.

c. Operational Statistics:

<u>CH-47A</u>	<u>UH-1C</u>	<u>UH-1H</u>	<u>OTHER</u>	<u>CH-47A</u>
<u>HOURS</u>	<u>HOURS</u>	<u>HOURS</u>	<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>SORTIES</u>
362	637	2,352	4,374	7,779
<u>A/C**</u>	<u>HIT</u>	<u>TONS</u>	<u>PAX</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
12/2	14	2,068	15,312	3,351
<u>OR CXL FOR WX</u>	<u>EVACS</u>	<u>DEST</u>	<u>KBA</u>	<u>INJ/K**</u>
4	39	21	11	2/0

Period 15 Dec 67 - 21 Dec 67

a. Weather:

Sky conditions improved during this period, especially night conditions. Total cloud cover averaged 4/10 covered at 3,500' scattered high broken. At night clear sky prevailed. Visibility increased 12 - 15 miles. 20 Dec proved to be the only exception with 1/2 mile visibility from 0200 - 0600 throughout the area of operations because of ground fog. Definite wind change was observed with a marked decrease in speed, 010° - 030° at 3 - 7 knots. There were no changes in daily temperatures and duration (averages, early mornings 53° - 60°, mid-afternoon 73° - 78°). Density altitude increased to highs of 4,100'.

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b. Aircraft Allocation:

	<u>UH-1H</u>	<u>UH-1C</u>	<u>CH-47A</u>
4th Inf Div -	25	6	7
ARVN -	9	7	0
52d Arty Gp -	1	0	0
DSA II Corps -	10	0	0
Avn C&C -	3	0	0
Press Camp -	1	0	0
5th SFG -	2	0	0
Prairie Fire -	11	8	0
Co "E", 20th Inf -	4	2	0

c. Significant Events:

(1) 16 Dec - 170th UH-1H model aircraft crashed in vicinity of XE935186. Aircraft took off to the North and failed to clear barriers. The ship crashed into an area with 200' trees; killing three (3) and wounding three (3) crew members. Aircraft was a total loss.

(2) 16 Dec - 119th two (2) UH-1H model aircraft received five (5) hits from enemy automatic weapons fire, in a classified area. Negative injuries to crew and the aircraft continued to fly.

(3) 17 Dec - 170th conducted a CA in support of the 1/503d Abn, 173d Abn Bde, vicinity of Dak To. They lifted 120 pax in 96 sorties. The mission was conducted with no incidents and negative contact.

(4) 20 Dec - 189th UH-1H model aircraft crashed and burned, vicinity of Dak To. Two (2) crew members were KIA and the other two (2) were WIA. Aircraft burned and was a total loss.

(5) 21 Dec - 119th had three (3) UH-1H model aircraft shot-up in a classified area. Each ship took one (1) round. One (1) crew member was WIA.

(6) 21 Dec - 189th UH-1C model aircraft crashed at Polie Kling AAF. Negative injuries and the aircraft was a total loss. One (1) U.S. was KIA by flying schapnel from the crash.

d. Operational Statistics:

<u>CBT</u>	<u>OTHER</u>	<u>UH-1H</u>	<u>UH-1C</u>	<u>CH-47A</u>
<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>HOURS</u>	<u>HOURS</u>	<u>HOURS</u>
7,383	3,638	2,280	535	289

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<u>TOTAL</u> <u>HOURS</u>	<u>PAX</u>	<u>CARGO</u> <u>TONS.</u>	<u>A/C</u> <u>HIT</u>	<u>A/C**</u> <u>DAM/DEST</u>
3,104	14,260	2,153	5	5/3
<u>CREW MEM</u> <u>INJ/K**</u>	<u>ENEMY</u> <u>KRA</u>	<u>STRUCT</u> <u>DEST</u>	<u>MED</u> <u>EVACS</u>	<u>SORTIES DELAY</u> <u>OR CXL FOR WX</u>
7/3	10	9	34	5

Period 22 Dec 67 - 28 Dec 67

a. Weather:

Cloud cover averaged 2/10, 4,000' scattered. Visibility remained at 12 - 15 miles. Winds increased in velocity 10 - 14 knots out of the ENE 080° - 110°. Higher temperatures caused a smaller temperature - dew point separation (79° temp - 65° dew point), and resulted in a high daily average density altitude of 4,300'.

b. Aircraft Allocation:

	<u>UH-1H</u>	<u>UH-1C</u>	<u>CH-47A</u>
4th Inf Div -	22	9	7
ARVN -	10	4	0
52d Arty Gp -	2	0	0
DSA II Corps -	10	0	0
Avn C&C -	3	0	0
Press Camp -	1	0	0
5th SFG -	2	0	0
Prairie Fire -	11	8	0
Co "E", 20th Inf -	2	0	0

c. Significant Events:

(1) 24 Dec - Notified of arrival of 73 cargo tons for the 355th ASHC (CH-54A). The equipment arrived by the USNS Canyon Victory at Qui Nhon, RVN.

(2) 25 Dec - 170th UH-1H model aircraft received several hits from an enemy B-40 rocket, vicinity YR799110. Negative injuries and aircraft continued to fly.

(3) 26 Dec - 170th conducted a CA in support of 1/22 Inf, 4th Inf Div, in Spaatz AO. They lifted 118 pax in 30 sorties. The mission was conducted with no incidents and negative contact.

(4) 27 Dec - 189th conducted a CA in support of the 2/503d Abn, 173d Abn Bde, vicinity of Kontum. They lifted 252 pax in 42 sorties.

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The mission was conducted with no incidents and negative contact.

(5) 28 Dec - 189th conducted a CA in support of the 1/503d Abn, 173d Abn Bde, vicinity of Kontum. They lifted 120 pax in 20 sorties. The mission was conducted with no incidents and negative contact.

(6) 28 Dec - 170th conducted a CA in support of the 3/8 Inf, 4th Inf Div, in Spaatz AO. They lifted 209 pax in 198 sorties. The mission was conducted with no incidents and negative contact.

d. Operational Statistics:

<u>GBT</u> <u>SORTIES</u>	<u>OTHER</u> <u>SORTIES</u>	<u>UH-1H</u> <u>HOURS</u>	<u>UH-1C</u> <u>HOURS</u>	<u>CH-47A</u> <u>HOURS</u>
7,013	4,053	2,181	584	283
<u>TOTAL</u> <u>PAX</u>	<u>PAX</u>	<u>CARGO</u> <u>TONS</u>	<u>A/C</u> <u>HIT</u>	<u>A/C**</u> <u>DY/DEST</u>
3,048	15,159	1,857	1	1/0
<u>CREW MEM</u> <u>INJ/K*</u>	<u>ENEMY</u> <u>KB*</u>	<u>STRUCT</u> <u>DEST</u>	<u>MED</u> <u>EVACS</u>	<u>SORTIES DELAY</u> <u>OR CXL FOR WX</u>
0/0	18	20	45	0

Period 29 Dec 67 - 31 Dec 67

a. Weather:

Cloud cover average 5/10 cover during this reporting period, 3,500' scattered, high thin broken. Night flying weather continued clear. Visibility averaged 12 - 15 miles daily with the following exception; 0400 - 0800 hours ground fog throughout the area of operations. Winds continued out of the NE (040° - 090°) at 5-10 knots. Temperatures increased to an average high of 77°. Density altitude averaged a high of 3,850'.

b. Aircraft Allocation:

	<u>UH-1H</u>	<u>UH-1C</u>	<u>CH-47A</u>
4th Inf Div -	21	10	6
ARVN -	10	5	0
52d Arty Gp -	3	0	0
DSA II Corps -	10	0	0
Avn C&C -	3	0	0
Press Camp -	1	0	0
5th SFG -	2	0	0
Prairie Fire -	11	8	0
Co "E", 20th Inf -	2	0	0

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c. Significant Events:

(1) 29 Dec - 189th conducted a CA in support of the 3/12 Inf, 4th Inf Div, in Spantz AO. They lifted 120 pax in 24 sorties. Enemy small arms fire was received from the SW quadrant of LZ. One (1) UH-1C gunship sustained one (1) hit, with negative injuries to crew.

(2) 29 Dec - 189th conducted a CA in support of the 6th ARVN Abn Bn, vicinity of Dak To. They lifted 352 pax in 44 sorties. The mission was conducted with no incidents and negative contact.

(3) 30 Dec - 170th conducted a CA in support of the 6th ARVN Abn Bn, vicinity of Dak To. They lifted 126 pax in 48 sorties. The mission was conducted with no incidents and negative contact.

(4) 30 Dec - 170th conducted a CA in support of the 3/12 Inf, 4th Inf Div, in Spantz AO. They lifted 310 pax in 175 sorties. The mission was conducted with no incidents and negative contact.

(5) 31 Dec - 189th conducted a CA in support of 3/12 Inf, 4th Inf Div, in Spantz AO. They lifted 150 pax in 50 sorties. The mission was conducted with no incidents and negative contact.

(6) 31 Dec - 119th had two (2) UH-1C models and one (1) UH-1H model receive three (3) hits from enemy small arms fire in a classified area. Two (2) crew members were WIA.

d. Operational Statistics:

<u>CH-47</u>	<u>OTHER</u>	<u>UH-1H</u>	<u>UH-1C</u>	<u>CH-47A</u>
<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>HOURS</u>	<u>HOURS</u>	<u>HOURS</u>
3,127	1,386	917	206	98
<u>TOTAL</u>		<u>CARGO</u>	<u>A/C</u>	<u>A/C**</u>
<u>HOURS</u>	<u>PAX</u>	<u>TONS</u>	<u>HTC</u>	<u>DAM/DEST</u>
1,221	6,532	601	4	4/0
<u>CREW MEM</u>	<u>ENEMY</u>	<u>STRUCT</u>	<u>MED</u>	<u>SORTIES DELAY</u>
<u>INJ/K**</u>	<u>KBA</u>	<u>DEST</u>	<u>EVACS</u>	<u>OR CXL FOR WX</u>
2/0	0	0	24	0

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Period 1 Dec 67 - 31 Dec 67 TOTALS

<u>CBT SORTIES</u>	<u>OTHER SORTIES</u>	<u>UH-1H HOURS*</u>	<u>UH-1C HOURS*</u>	<u>CH-47A HOURS*</u>
31,551	17,269	10,528	2,653	1,305
<u>TOTAL HOURS*</u>	<u>PAX</u>	<u>CARGO TONS</u>	<u>A/C HIT</u>	<u>A/C** DAM/DEST</u>
14,486	66,192	8,309	26	25/5
<u>CREW MEM INJ/K**</u>	<u>ENEMY KRA</u>	<u>STRUCT DEST</u>	<u>MED EVACS</u>	<u>SORTIES DELAY OR CXL FOR WX</u>
11/3	53	55	215	9

Period 1 Jan 68 - 4 Jan 68

a. Weather:

Cloud cover averaged 4/10 cover during this reporting period; 3,500' scattered, high thin broken. Night flying weather continued clear. Excellent visibility (12 - 15 miles) throughout the period. Winds were NNE at 5 - 10 knots, occasional gusts to 20 knots. Temperatures increased to an average high of 77°. Density altitude averaged 3,850'.

b. Aircraft Allocation:

	<u>UH-1H</u>	<u>UH-1C</u>	<u>CH-47A</u>
4th Inf Div -	20	9	7
ARVN -	8	5	0
52d Arty Gp -	1	0	0
DSA II Corps -	10	1	0
Avn C&C -	2	0	0
Press Camp -	1	0	0
5th SFG -	2	0	0
Prairie Fire -	11	8	0
Co "E", 20th Inf -	2	0	0

c. Significant Events:

(1) 03 Jan - 170th conducted multiple CA's in support of the 1/8 & 3/8 Inf, 4th Inf Div, in Spaatz AO. They lifted over 408 pax in 115 sorties. The mission was conducted with no incidents and negative contact.

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(2) 04 Jan - At approximately 0230 hours the Ban Me Thuot Airfield Complex came under an attack by a company size VC unit. The attack lasted approximately 30 minutes. The enemy utilized 82mm mortars, B-40 rockets, sapper element and a unknown number of small arms. Approximately 25 - 30 rounds of mortar fire was received with negative US casualties. Ten (10) UH-1H models were damaged and two (2) were completely destroyed. One (1) fire truck was damaged and another destroyed.

d. Operational Statistics:

<u>CBT SORTIES</u>	<u>OTHER SORTIES</u>	<u>UH-1H HOURS</u>	<u>UH-1C HOURS</u>	<u>CH-47A HOURS</u>
3,075	2,173	1,046	202	172
<u>TOTAL HOURS</u>	<u>PAX</u>	<u>CARGO TONS</u>	<u>A/C HIT</u>	<u>A/C** DAM/DEST</u>
1,420	8,007	1,117	0	10/2
<u>CREW MEM INI/K**</u>	<u>ENEMY KRA</u>	<u>STRUCT DEST</u>	<u>MED EVACS</u>	<u>SORTIES DELAY OR CXL FOR WX</u>
0/0	4	2	10	0

Period 5 Jan 68 - 11 Jan 68

a. Weather:

Slightly lower cloud layer prevailed throughout this reporting period at 5/10 covered, 3000' scattered variable broken. Visibility averaged 12 - 15 miles, except during fog conditions on 6 & 8 Jan at 1/2 mile during the hours 0500 - 0800. There was no significant wind change which remained 040° - 090° at 8 - 10 knots. Temperatures remained at an average of 78° - 82° and dissipated later each day. High Density altitude was lower and of short duration (3,750).

b. Aircraft Allocation:

	<u>UH-1H</u>	<u>UH-1C</u>	<u>CH-47A</u>
4th Inf Div -	20	9	7
ARVN -	8	5	0
52d Arty Gp -	1	0	0
DSA II Corps -	10	1	0
Avn C&C -	2	0	0
Press Camp -	*	0	0
5th SFG -	2	0	0
Prairie Fire -	11	8	0
Co "E", 20th Inf -	2	0	0

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c. Significant Events:

- (1) 05 Jan - 170th conducted a Final Extraction in support of the 5th SFG. They extracted 31 pax in 12 sorties. The mission was conducted with no incidents and negative contact.
- (2) 05 Jan - 57th UH-1C model aircraft received one (1) hit from heavy enemy automatic weapons fire. Negative injuries to crew and aircraft continued to fly. Aircraft was on a classified mission.
- (3) 06 Jan - 119th UH-1C model aircraft received one (1) hit from heavy automatic weapons fire. The ship was on a armed escort mission in a classified area when hit. Negative injuries to crew and the aircraft continued to fly.
- (4) 06 Jan - 170th OH-47A model aircraft crashed in the vicinity of 48468. The aircraft was on final approach to a fire base, lost power and settled to the ground. Major damage to the aircraft with negative injuries to the crew or passengers.
- (5) 08 Jan - 189th UH-1H model aircraft while running in a fire base (ZB206522) received extensive main rotor damage. An Infantry detail working at the fire base cut a tree down and it fell into the turning blades. The aircraft was recovered and no injuries to the crew.
- (6) 09 Jan - 170th conducted a CA in support of the Capital Republic of Korea Division in the vicinity of BR804367. They assaulted with 224 pax in 40 sorties. The mission was conducted with no incidents and negative contact.
- (7) 10 Jan - 57th AHC and Kontum Airfield came under heavy enemy attack at approximately 0200 hours. The NVA used mortars, B-40 rockets, stachel charges and heavy small arms fire. The contact lasted approximately 7 - 8 minutes, resulting in; six (6) US KIA, 20 MIA, 2 UH-1H destroyed, 2 UH-1C destroyed, 2 UH-1H major damage, 7 UH-1H and 2 UH-1C moderate damage. Member of the 57th AHC close with, and killed a North Vietnamese. An additional five (5) NVA were killed by B Troop, 2/1 CAV.
- (8) 10 Jan - 189th conducted a CA and Final Extraction in support of the 1/12 Inf, 4th Inf Div, vicinity of ZA885788. They lifted 254 pax in 42 sorties. The mission was conducted with no incidents and negative contact.
- (9) 10 Jan - 189th UH-1H model aircraft crashed in the vicinity of AR884796. Major damage to the aircraft with negative injuries to crew.
- (10) 10 Jan - 189th conducted a CA and Final Extraction in support of 2/503 Abn, 173d Abn Bde, in the vicinity of Kontum. They lifted 252 pax in 40 sorties. The mission was conducted with no incidents and negative contact.

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(11) 11 Jan 68: 57th and (1) 1st Air Force aircraft were fired upon in the vicinity of ZK105013. One (1) ship took one (1) hit and continued to fly. Negative injuries to crew.

d. Operational Statistics:

<u>CRT</u> <u>SORTIES</u>	<u>OTHER</u> <u>SORTIES</u>	<u>UH-1H</u> <u>HOURS</u>	<u>UH-1C</u> <u>HOURS</u>	<u>CH-47A</u> <u>HOURS</u>
6,230	3,731	2,325	860	265
<u>TOTAL</u> <u>HOURS</u>	<u>PAX</u>	<u>CARGO</u> <u>TONS</u>	<u>A/C</u> <u>HIT</u>	<u>A/C**</u> <u>DAM/DEST</u>
3,450	12,948	1,886	3	17/4
<u>CREW MEM</u> <u>ENT/23*</u>	<u>WOUND</u> <u>KIA</u>	<u>STRUCT</u> <u>DEST</u>	<u>WED</u> <u>EVACS</u>	<u>SORTIES DELAY</u> <u>OR CXL FOR WX</u>
6/0	11	23	65	4

Period 12 Jan 68 - 18 Jan 68

a. Weather:

Cloud cover remained 3/10 covered at 3,500 scattered, variable thin broken. 10 - 15 miles visibility prevailed daily except 13 Jan, with dense ground fog through the area of operation; especially in the valleys of the mountainous terrain. Winds remained calm during early morning hours with low temperatures dissipating later each morning. Winds increased in late afternoon to remain steady at 10 - 15 knots with frequent gust to 20 - 25 knots. Daily high temperature occurred later each day to average 73° - 77°. Density altitude remained 3,750'.

b. Aircraft Allocation:

	<u>UH-1H</u>	<u>UH-1C</u>	<u>CH-47A</u>
4th Inf Div -	18	7	5
ARVN -	16	5	0
52d Artv Gp -	1	0	0
DSA II Corps -	10	0	0
Avn C&C -	3	0	0
Pross Camp -	0	0	0
5th SFG -	1	0	0
Prairie Fire -	11	8	0
Co "E", 20th Inf -	1	0	0
CRID -	1	0	0

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c. Significant Events:

(1) 12 Jan - 189th conducted a series of Combat Assaults and Extractions in support of the 3/8 and 1/8 Inf, 4th Inf Div, in Spaatz AO. They lifted 777 pax in 139 sorties. The flight received moderate enemy automatic weapons fire in the vicinity of EB910120. 170th UH-1H model aircraft, assisting in the lift, sustained one (1) hit with negative injuries to crew. The aircraft continued to fly.

(2) 13 Jan - 170th conducted multiple CA's and Final Extractions in support of 3/12 Inf, 4th Inf Div, in Spaatz AO. They lifted over 420 pax in 228 sorties. The mission was conducted with no incidents and negative contact.

(3) 14 Jan - 189th conducted multiple CA's and Extractions in support of the 1/8 and 3/12 Inf, 4th Inf Div, in Spaatz AO. They lifted 256 pax in 43 sorties. The mission was conducted with no incidents and negative contact.

(4) 14 Jan - 170th conducted multiple CA's and Extractions in support of the 1/503 Abn, 173d Abn Bde, in the vicinity of Kontum. They lifted over 380 pax in 216 sorties. The mission was conducted with no incidents and negative contact.

(5) 15 Jan - 170th conducted a CA and Final Extraction in support of the 3/8 Inf, 4th Inf Div, in Spaatz AO. They lifted over 240 pax in 40 sorties. Three (3) UH-1C model aircraft escorting the mission sustained several hits from intense enemy automatic weapons fire. Negative injuries to crew and the aircraft continued to fly.

(6) 15 Jan - 170th UH-1H model aircraft crashed and burned in the vicinity of ZB185110. The aircraft landed with toes of skids on an upslope, when the tail rotor disintegrated. Heavy enemy contact was reported in the vicinity of the LZ. Aircraft rolled onto ammunition stores and exploded. One (1) crew member KIA, no other injuries were reported.

(7) 16 Jan - 179th conducted multiple Fire Base Moves in support of 1st Bde, 4th Inf Div, in Spaatz AO. They lifted 144 pax and 85 cargo tons in 60 sorties. The mission was conducted with negative incidents and no contact.

(8) 17 Jan - 170th conducted a CA and Final Extraction in support of 1/8 Inf, 4th Inf Div, in Spaatz AO. They lifted 330 pax in 165 sorties. The mission was conducted with no incidents and negative contact.

(c) 17 Jan - 179th conducted a Fire Base Move in support of 1/12 Inf, 4th Inf Div, in the vicinity of ZA036625. They lifted 14 pax and 43 cargo tons in 29 sorties. The mission was conducted with no incidents and negative contact.

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(10) 17 Jan - 155th and Ban Me Thuot Airfield came under attack at approximately 0125 hours. The enemy used 82mm mortars. U.S. losses: Five (5) UH-1H damaged, and no U.S. MIA or KIA. Enemy Losses: Unknown.

(11) 18 Jan - 189th conducted a CA and Final Extraction in support of the 1/503 Abn, 173d Abn Bde, in the vicinity of Kontum. They lifted 478 pax in 158 sorties. The mission was conducted with no incidents and negative contact.

(12) 18 Jan - 170th conducted a Final Extraction in support of the 1/8 Inf, 4th Inf Div, in Spaatz LO. They extracted 330 pax in 168 sorties. They conducted the mission with no incidents and negative contact.

c. Operational Statistics:

<u>OBT</u>	<u>OTHER</u>	<u>UH-1H</u>	<u>UH-1C</u>	<u>CP-47A</u>
<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>HOURS</u>	<u>HOURS</u>	<u>HOURS</u>
7,345	2,660	1,958	548	287
<u>TOTAL</u>		<u>CARGO</u>	<u>A/C</u>	<u>A/C**</u>
<u>HOURS</u>	<u>PAX</u>	<u>TONS</u>	<u>HIT</u>	<u>DAM/DEST</u>
2,793	14,403	1,696	4	9/1
<u>CREW MEM</u>	<u>ENEMY</u>	<u>STRUCT</u>	<u>MED</u>	<u>SORTIES DELAY</u>
<u>INJ/K**</u>	<u>KBA</u>	<u>DEST</u>	<u>EVACS</u>	<u>OF CXL FOR WX</u>
0/1	9	0	11	0

Period 19 Jan 68 - 25 Jan 68

a. Weather:

Total sky cover averaged 5/10 cover. 3000' - 3500' scattered variable thin broken. Clear nights with calm wind conditions, caused fog to prevail 0400 - 0800 on 19, 20, 21, and 24 Jan. Light rain showers were encountered throughout the area of operation on 1700 - 1900, 18 Jan. Visibility remained constant each day 10 - 15 miles, except during fog conditions (1/4 - 2 miles). Winds shifted NNE 020° - 080° and increased in velocity 10 - 15 later each afternoon. Temperatures - dew point conducive to fog existed later each day (0400 - 0800). Daily high temperatures averaged 70° - 73°. Density altitude increased to 4,175'.

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b. Aircraft Allocation:

	<u>UH-1H</u>	<u>UH-1C</u>	<u>CH-47A</u>
4th Inf Div -	20	3	4
ARVN -	8	3	0
52d Army Gp -	1	0	0
DSA II Corps -	10	0	0
Avn C&C -	2	0	0
Press Camp -	1	0	0
5th SFG -	2	0	0
Prairie Fire -	11	8	0
Co "E", 20th Inf -	1	0	0
CRID -	1	0	0

c. Significant Events:

(1) 19 Jan - 170th conducted a CA in support of the 2/503 Abn, 173d Abn Bde, in the vicinity of ZA029625. They lifted 272 pax in 92 sorties. One (1) UH-1H model aircraft received one (1) hit from enemy small arms fire. Negative injuries and the aircraft continued to fly.

(2) 20 Jan - 179th conducted a Fire Base Move in support of the 173d Abn Bde, in the vicinity of ZA0768. They moved 384 pax and 68 cargo tons in 65 sorties. The mission was conducted with no incidents and negative contact.

(3) 20 Jan - 189th conducted a CA and Extraction in support of the 2/503d Abn, 173d Abn Bde, vicinity of ZA108680. They lifted 369 pax in 62 sorties. The mission was conducted with no incidents and negative contact.

(4) 21 Jan - 170th conducted multiple CA's in support of 1/12 Inf, 4th Inf Div, vicinity of YA964474. They lifted 244 pax in 132 sorties. The mission was conducted with no incidents and negative contact.

(5) 21 Jan - 179th conducted a Fire Base Move in support of 1/12 Inf, 4th Inf Div, vicinity of YA860540. They moved 171 pax and 40 cargo tons in 41 sorties. The mission was conducted with no incidents and negative contact.

(6) 21 Jan - 155th UH-1H model aircraft crashed in the vicinity of Gia Nghia airfield. The aircraft went IFR from dust off the end of the dirt strip; main rotor contacted ground on right side. The aircraft sustained major damage and negative injuries.

(7) 23 Jan - 189th conducted multiple CA's in support of the 173d Abn Bde, vicinity of ZA132570. They assaulted with 380 pax in 68 sorties. The mission was conducted with no incidents and negative contact.

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(8) 23 Jan - 179th conducted a Fire Base move in support of the 173d Abn Bde. They moved 36 pax and 37 cargo tons in 24 sorties. The mission was conducted with no incidents and negative contact.

(9) 24 Jan - 170th conducted a CA in support of the 1/22 Inf, 4th Inf Div, vicinity of ZA222678. They lifted 366 pax in 90 sorties. The mission was conducted with no incidents and negative contact.

(10) 24 Jan - 189th conducted a CA and Final Extraction in support of the 1/503 Abn, 173d Abn Bde, vicinity of ZA143483. They lifted 117 pax in 20 sorties. The mission was conducted with no incidents and negative contact.

(11) 25 Jan - 170th conducted multiple CA's in support of the 3/8 and 3/12 Inf, 4th Inf Div, in Spaatz AO. They lifted 360 pax in 66 sorties. The mission was conducted with no incidents and negative contact.

d. Operational Statistics:

<u>UPT</u>	<u>OTHER</u>	<u>UH-1H</u>	<u>UH-1C</u>	<u>CH-47A</u>
<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>HOURS</u>	<u>HOURS</u>	<u>HOURS</u>
6,589	2,890	1,920	487	210
<u>TOTAL</u>		<u>CARGO</u>	<u>A/C</u>	<u>A/C**</u>
<u>HOURS</u>	<u>PAX</u>	<u>TONS</u>	<u>FIT</u>	<u>DAM/DEST</u>
2,617	11,551	1,216	1	2/0
<u>CREW MEM</u>	<u>ENEMY</u>	<u>STRUCT</u>	<u>MED</u>	<u>SORTIES DELAY</u>
<u>INF/K**</u>	<u>KBA</u>	<u>DEST</u>	<u>EVACS</u>	<u>OR CXL FOR WX</u>
0/0	0	0	72	0

Period 26 Jan 68 - 31 Jan 68

a. Weather:

Total sky cover averaged 6/10. 3,500' - 4000' scattered variable thin broken. Morning ground fog prevailed, causing some delay in early take-offs. Late afternoon rain showers occurred over the entire area of operation. Winds were generally out of the ENE at 5 - 10 knots, gusting occasionally to 20 knots. Temperatures ranged from 72° - 76° and the density altitude increased to 4,350'.

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b. Aircraft Allocation:

	UH-1H	UH-1C	CH-47
4th Inf Div -	19	4	5
ARVN -	0	4	0
52d Arty Gp -	1	0	0
NSA II Corps -	9	0	0
Avn C&C -	2	0	0
Press Camp -	1	0	0
5th SFG -	1	0	0
Prinric Fire -	10	7	0
Co "E", 20th Inf -	0	0	0

c. Significant Events:

(1) 26 Jan - At approximately 0230 hours, Camp Holloway came under attack. The initial attack came when sappers penetrated the 28th S&S Bn perimeter, slipped by U.S. personnel on Guard, and planted satchel charges in and around the ISP area. Initial knowledge of enemy in the area came as the enemy were leaving the perimeter, when either a flare was fired by a VC, initiating the mortar attack (one M-26 chicom flare pistol was found approximately 10 feet behind one VC KIA within the perimeter) or a flare tripped by a VC retreating through the perimeter. The sappers left charges in the 28th S&S Bn Class I, II, and IV wards and one ammunition pad. The mortar attack was initiated at 0245 hours against the 52d Cbt Avn Bn and the 219th Avn Co. An estimated 110 - 120 82mm mortar rounds fell in the vicinity of the aircraft parking ramps. The attack was broken at approximately 0320 hours local. Results friendly: 40 U.S. WIA, 24 aircraft damaged, 3 major, 21 minor. VC losses: 1 KIA, 1 WIA captured by 52d Security Detachment.

(2) 26 Jan - 170th conducted a CA in support of the 44th ARVN RNG Bn, vicinity of YB881312. They lifted 500 pax in 188 sorties. The mission was conducted with no incidents and negative contact.

(3) 26 Jan - 179th conducted a Fire Base Move in support of 1/12 Inf, 4th Inf Div, in Spaatz AO. They moved 40 pax and 34 cargo tons in 23 sorties. Mission was conducted with no incidents and negative contact.

(4) 26 Jan - 189th and 57th UH-1C model gunships (3) received 12 hits from intense enemy automatic weapons fire, in a classified area. Negative injuries to crew and aircraft continued to fly.

(5) 28 Jan - 189th conducted multiple CA's and Extraction in support of the 3/8 and 1/8 Inf, 4th Inf Div, in Spaatz AO. They lifted 610 pax in 200 sorties. Some enemy small arms and automatic weapons fire was received, but no hits were sustained.

(6) 29 Jan - 170th conducted a CA in support of the ARVN,

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vicinity of YN69006. They lifted 223 tons in 130 sorties. The mission was conducted with no incidents and negative contact.

(7) 30 Jan - At approximately 0305 hours all units and associated airfields of this battalion came under a heavy coordinated enemy attack. The attack on Follower lasted 30 - 35 minutes. The attack on Ban Me Thuot and Kontum, RVN, continued through the night.

(8) 31 Jan - Attacks on Kontum and Ban Me Thuot continue. The enemy continues with heavy mortar and rocket attacks, followed by human wave assaults. Both the perimeters have held. Friendly and enemy losses undetermined at this time.

(A detailed report on these attacks will be inclosed to this report).

d. Operational Statistics:

<u>CBT</u>	<u>OTHER</u>	<u>UH-1H</u>	<u>UH-1C</u>	<u>CH-47A</u>
<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>HOURS</u>	<u>HOURS</u>	<u>HOURS</u>
5,243	2,023	1,355	432	203
<u>TOTAL</u>		<u>CARGO</u>	<u>A/C</u>	<u>A/C**</u>
<u>HOURS</u>	<u>PAX</u>	<u>TONS</u>	<u>HIT</u>	<u>DAM/DEST</u>
1,990	8,450	1,415	3	40/3
<u>CREW MEM</u>	<u>ENEMY</u>	<u>STRUCT</u>	<u>MED</u>	<u>SORTIES DELAY</u>
<u>INJ/K**</u>	<u>KRA</u>	<u>DEST</u>	<u>EVACS</u>	<u>OR CXL FOR WX</u>
3/0	97	55	130	0

Period 1 Jan 68 - 31 Jan 68 TOTALS

<u>CBT</u>	<u>OTHER</u>	<u>UH-1H</u>	<u>UH-1C</u>	<u>CH-47A</u>
<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>HOURS*</u>	<u>HOURS*</u>	<u>HOURS*</u>
28,482	13,477	9,001	2,403	1,174
<u>TOTAL</u>		<u>CARGO</u>	<u>A/C</u>	<u>A/C**</u>
<u>HOURS*</u>	<u>PAX</u>	<u>TONS</u>	<u>HIT</u>	<u>DAM/DEST</u>
12,578	55,359	7,330	11	78/10
<u>CREW MEM</u>	<u>ENEMY</u>	<u>STRUCT</u>	<u>MED</u>	<u>SORTIES DELAY</u>
<u>INJ/K**</u>	<u>KRA</u>	<u>DEST</u>	<u>EVACS</u>	<u>OR CXL FOR WX</u>
3/1	121	82	288	4

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SPAMTZ - 1st Bde, 4th Inf Div
and 173rd Abn Bde (OPCON)
4th Inf Div.

POWERHOUSE - 173rd Abn Bde (OPCON)
4th Inf Div.

WAINWRIGHT - Taskforce 22 (OPCON) 4th
Inf Div.


CORRIDOR - 173rd Abn Bde (OPCON) 4th
Inf Div.

PLEIKU - 52d Cbt Avn Bn (-)

KONTUM - 57th Aslt Hel Co

BAN ME THOUT - 155th Aslt Hel Co

NHA TRANG - 17th Cbt Avn Co
AO MACARTHUR



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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 52D COMBAT AVIATION BATTALION
APO San Francisco 96318
"FLYING DRAGONS"

AVGD-CC

10 December 1967

SUBJECT: After Action Report, Operation MAC ARTHUR (AO SPAATZ), 25 October - 30 November 1967

TO: See Distribution

1. (C) GENERAL: This report covers Operation MAC ARTHUR (AO SPAATZ) in the vicinity of DAK TO, Kontum Province, Republic of Vietnam, for the period 25 October - 30 November 1967.

a. Command Headquarters. The command headquarters, from the standpoint of aviation operations, was the 17th Combat Aviation Group.

b. Mission. The mission of the 52d Combat Aviation Battalion (FLYING DRAGONS) was to provide aviation support to the 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division and its attached and supporting elements within the confines of AO SPAATZ (see inclosure 1).

c. Participating Units.

(1) Units organic to the 52d Combat Aviation Battalion, commanded by LTC Edward P Lukert Jr, which participated in Operation MAC ARTHUR, are as follows:

Headquarters, 52d Combat Aviation Battalion
57th Assault Helicopter Company
119th Assault Helicopter Company
155th Assault Helicopter Company (-)
170th Assault Helicopter Company
189th Assault Helicopter Company (-)
179th Assault Support Helicopter Company

(2) Supporting detachments organic to units in paragraph 1c(1), which supported the operation, were:

545th Transportation Detachment
70th Signal Detachment
94th Medical Detachment
405th Transportation Detachment
448th Signal Detachment
755th Medical Detachment
402nd Transportation Detachment
604th Transportation Detachment

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SUBJECT: After Action Report, Operation MAC ARTHUR (AO SPATZ), 25 October - 30 November 1967

6th Signal Detachment
615th Transportation Detachment
822nd Signal Detachment

(3) Additional aviation support elements, OPCON to the 52d CAB during Operation MAC ARTHUR, were:

Gun Platoon, 192nd Assault Helicopter Company
180th Assault Support Helicopter Company
196th Assault Support Helicopter Company
213th Assault Support Helicopter Company
243rd Assault Support Helicopter Company

2. (C) INTELLIGENCE:

a. INTSUMS pertaining to Operation MAC ARTHUR were published as early as 15 October 1967, containing reports showing the build-up of enemy forces in preparation for the Battle of DAK TO. However, taken as they occurred, the reports were not significant until on or about 29 October when they began to indicate a pattern.

(1) During the period 15-21 October, there were several reports of small arms fire directed at aircraft in an area 20 kilometers (km) northeast of DAK TO. TAN CANH City (4 km northeast of DAK TO) received 5 rounds of mortar fire.

(2) 22-29 October, contact was made with an unidentified company size unit 8 km southeast of DAK TO. Heavy trail building activity was reported 30 km northwest of DAK TO. An agent reported that a 4000 man force would use the trails indicated to move into KONTUM Province.

(3) From 30-31 October, an agent reported the 24th NVN Regiment in an area 25 km northwest of DAK TO. A Special Forces vehicle hit a mine 12 km northwest of DAK TO.

(4) During the period 1-7 November, several mines were detonated along Highway 14, between DAK TO and KONTUM City. Ground contacts took place daily in an area West and South of DAK TO. The National Police reported extensive propaganda and anti-government lectures throughout KONTUM and PLEIKU Provinces. They also reported plans to cut Highway 14 and hit KONTUM with rockets and mortars. NVA Sgt Vu Hung, 66th NVA Regiment, rallied at DAK KPI Village, near DAK TO. He gave locations and battle plans for the 66th, 32nd, 24th and 174th Regiments. He also mentioned the 40th Heavy Artillery Regiment. These units were reported by Sgt Vu Hung to be deployed in the vicinity of DAK TO, and planned to rocket DAK TO and KONTUM and overrun DAK TO.

(5) From 8-14 November, savage fighting occurred in the DAK TO area, with almost continuous heavy contact. 8-10 November, contact centered 7-15 km westsouthwest of DAK TO. After the 10th, the heaviest concentration of activity was approximately 15-20 km westsouthwest of DAK TO.

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SUBJECT: After Action Report, Operation MAC LITHOR (AO SP. LTZ), 15 October - 30 November 1967

(6) On 15 November, the second phase of the DAK TO battle began. From 15-21 November, heavy contact continued. Enemy troops seemed to be well entrenched. Their objective seemed to be an attempt to inflict as many US casualties as possible, rather than attempting to overrun DAK TO itself. Units mentioned in paragraph 2a(4) had by now been confirmed in contact.

(7) During the period 22-28 November, enemy activity decreased significantly. In what appeared to be an attempt to divert US Forces from DAK TO, the enemy began to increase ambush and harassing activities in the KONTU City, PLEIKU area. KONTU City was mortared on the 27th. The 32nd, 66th and 174th Regiments were badly mauled and attempted to pull back and regroup and resupply, with the 24th remaining in contact northeast of DAK TO.

3. (C) OPERATIONS:

a. The 52d CAB was the principle supporting aviation element during Operation MAC LITHOR. The battalion's normal daily operational commitment to the 4th Infantry Division was 22 UH-1Hs, 10 UH-1Cs and 7 OH-47s, the majority of which was allocated to the 1st Brigade at DAK TO.

b. Significant Events. A day-by-day account of significant events is listed below. Due to the heat of battle and the maximum effort required of the operation, only the most important events are recorded. Single ship operations and miscellaneous missions will only be reflected in the overall statistics.

(1) 25 October 67 - 170th Assault Helicopter Company (AHC) participated in a combat assault (CA), lifting the 1/8th Inf and 1/22nd Inf, for a total of 550 passengers (PAX) and 150 sorties. 119th AHC moved a portion of the 1/12th Inf, totaling 54 PAX in 20 sorties.

(2) 26 October 67 - 170th AHC conducted a CA, lifting the 1/8th Inf, totaling 225 PAX and 143 sorties. 119th AHC conducted a final extraction for the 3/12th Inf, totaling 100 PAX.

(3) 27 October 67 - 170th AHC conducted a CA for the 3/12th Inf, lifting 132 PAX in 40 sorties. 119th AHC conducted a CA, lifting 108 PAX; then conducted a final extraction for 3/8th Inf, totaling 261 PAX.

(4) 28 October 67 - 170th AHC participated in a CA for the 1/8th Inf.

(5) 30 October 67 - 170th AHC conducted a CA for 3/12th Inf, totaling 254 PAX in 158 sorties.

(6) 31 October 67 - 170th AHC conducted a CA for 1st Bde lifting 72 PAX in 45 sorties.

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SUBJECT: After Action Report, Operation LEO CENTER (AO SPATZ), 25 October - 30 November 1967

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(7) 3 November 67 - 170th AHC conducted a CA for the 3/8th Inf, lifting 264 PAX in 111 sorties; followed by 4 assaults for the 3/12th, totaling 249 PAX in 105 sorties. The 119th then assaulted with the 1/12th, airlifting 211 PAX.

(8) 6 November 67 - 170th AHC conducted a CA for the 2/504th Abn, lifting 120 PAX in 65 sorties. Heavy enemy fire was encountered in the landing zone (LZ). 1 UH-1H received 5 hits and 1 crewman was wounded.

(9) 7 November 67 - 170th AHC participated in a CA for the 1st Bde.

(10) 9 November 67 - 170th AHC conducted a CA with the 3/8th Inf, lifting 121 PAX in 54 sorties. Aircraft received light small arms fire approaching the LZ. As aircraft were departing the LZ, heavy mortar fire was received. 1 UH-1H was hit and destroyed, wounding 1 crewman. The 170th then assaulted with elements of the 3/8th Inf, lifting 162 PAX in 67 sorties. That same day, the 119th lifted B/ 24th CIDG, totaling 130 PAX.

(11) 10 November 67 - 119th AHC lifted a 4th Div element, totaling 60 PAX. 1 UH-1C was shot down while providing covering fire.

(12) 11 November 67 - 119th AHC conducted a CA for the 3/12th Inf, totaling 120 PAX.

(13) 12 November 67 - 119th AHC conducted a CA for the 1/8th Inf, lifting 130 PAX. Sniper fire was received in and around the LZ with negative results. The 170th, on the same lift, had 1 UH-1H hit by 2 rounds of small arms fire, sustaining minor damage.

(14) 13 November 67 - 119th AHC assaulted with B and C Companies, 1/8th Inf, lifting 210 PAX and 4 additional sling loads. Sniper fire was received from 6 locations in and around the LZ, with negative results. On the same assault, the 170th had 1 UH-1H hit by rocket fire (B-40). The aircraft was destroyed and 4 crewmen wounded.

(15) 14 November 67 - 119th AHC conducted 2 CAs for the 3/8th Inf, totaling 450 PAX. Sniper fire was again received from all quadrants.

(16) 15 November 67 - 170th AHC conducted 2 CAs with the ARVN in support of the 1st Bde. A total of 690 PAX were lifted in 164 sorties. 1 UH-1H was hit by small arms fire and 1 crew member was wounded.

(17) 18 November 67 - 170th AHC participated in a 4th Inf Div CA.

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SUBJECT: After Action Report, Operation MAC ARTHUR (AO SPAAITZ), 25 October - 30 November 1967

(18) 19 November 67 - 170th AHC participated in 4th Inf Div CA. 1 UH-1C was hit by small arms fire, sustaining only minor damage.

(19) 22 November 67 - 170th AHC participated in a CA for the 4th Inf Div. The 119th assaulted with the 173rd Abn, lifting 120 PAX. 2 aircraft were hit by small arms fire without major damage.

(20) 23 November 67 - 170th AHC participated in a CA for the 4th Inf Div. The 119th conducted an assault and final extraction for the 3/8th Inf, totaling 120 PAX. Another final extraction for the 3/12th Inf resulted in the movement of 240 PAX.

(21) 24 November 67 - 170th and 119th AHCs conducted assaults with the 1/12th Inf, vicinity HILL 875. 120 PAX were moved. Automatic weapons fire was received from all quadrants of the LZ. 2 aircraft were hit; 1 by 8 rounds, the other by 10 rounds. 1 crew member was wounded. The 119th then made a final extraction for 2/503rd Abn from HILL 875. 150 PAX were extracted.

(22) 25 November 67 - 119th AHC conducted an assault and final extraction for the 1/8th Inf, totaling 240 PAX and 10 sling loads. A final extraction was also executed for the 3/8th and 3/12th Inf with 370 PAX. Immediately following, the 170th assaulted with the 3/12th with 300 PAX in 100 sorties.

(23) 26 November 67 - 189th AHC executed 3 night medical evacuations under emergency conditions.

(24) 27 November 67 - 189th AHC moved 73 PAX and 1600 pounds of cargo for 4th Inf Div.

(25) 28 November 67 - 170th AHC conducted a CA with the 1/8th Inf, moving 121 PAX in 58 sorties. The 1/12th Inf was then lifted, totaling 353 PAX in 183 sorties. The 189th also participated in this lift, moving 372 PAX. 1 UH-1H crashed in the LZ with negative injury to the crew.

(26) 29 November 67 - 189th AHC conducted a final extraction and an assault, moving 252 PAX.

(27) 30 November 67 - 189th AHC conducted another move, lifting 585 PAX. 1 aircraft received automatic weapons fire, suffering 1 hit with negative injury to the crew. However, the battalion commander of the 3/12th Inf received minor facial wounds from flying metal particles.

c. Operational Statistics. The following is a resume of statistics amassed by the 52d CAB during Operation MAC ARTHUR. Those totals do not include performances of those units attached or OPCON to the battalion during that operation.

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<u>CBT</u> <u>SORTIES</u>	<u>UH-1</u> <u>HOURS</u>	<u>CH-47</u> <u>HOURS</u>	<u>TOTAL</u> <u>HOURS</u>
17,563	6325	1225	7550
<u>CBT</u> <u>ASLTS</u>	<u>BTRY</u> <u>MOVES</u>	<u>TOTAL</u> <u>PLX</u>	<u>CARGO</u> <u>TONS</u>
64	20	32,516	9075
<u>MED</u> <u>EVACS</u>	<u>DEAD</u> <u>EVACS</u>	<u>ENEMY</u> <u>KBL</u>	<u>A/C</u> <u>HITS</u>
*720	*320	UNKNOWN	16
<u>A/C</u> <u>DAMAGED</u>	<u>A/C</u> <u>DEST</u>	<u>DOWN A/C</u> <u>RECOVERED</u>	<u>CREW MEM</u> <u>INJ/KILL</u>
24	3	**40	15 / 3
<u>AMMUNITION EXPENDED</u>			
<u>7.62mm</u>	<u>2.75mm</u>	<u>.40mm</u>	
577,900	3488	6329	

* Figures include ARVN evacuations.

** Figures include aircraft evacuated for the 335th Aslt Hel Co (attached to 173rd Abn Bde and B/229th Avn Bn (attached to elements of 1st Cav Div)).

4. (C) MAINTENANCE:

a. During the period 25 October - 30 November 1967, elements of the 52d CAB flew in excess of 10,000 hours, the majority of which were flown in support of the 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, on Operation MOC ARTHUR. The elements involved performed 330 PMIs and 121 PMP inspections during that same period.

b. In and around DM TO, 40 aircraft were evacuated by the 179th Aslt Spt Hel Co. All of these aircraft had been damaged by enemy fire or due to operating in extreme confined areas. Most of these aircraft were repairable, but may have been otherwise lost except for the professional competence of the 179th.

c. It required approximately 25,000 maintenance manhours to perform the inspections mentioned in paragraph 4a. Additionally, it took an estimated 25,000 maintenance manhours to perform unscheduled maintenance. Because of the shortage of maintenance personnel in critical skills, crews often worked around the clock to supply aircraft to meet operational requirements. Because of their efforts, the battalion was able to maintain throughout the operation an availability rate of 78.4% on UH-1Cs and 84.6% on UH-1Hs.

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5. (U) AWARDS AND DECORATIONS: The following recommendations for awards and decorations have been forwarded or are being prepared as a result of the Battle of DAK TO.

Silver Star	25
Distinguished Flying Cross	41
Bronze Star	13
Air Medal with "V" Device	74
Army Commendation Medal	16
Purple Heart	18

6. (U) COMMANDER'S OBSERVATIONS, DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. Landing Zones.

(1) Observation and Discussion. During this operation, an increased rate of combat and operational damage was experienced in infantry battalion and company size landing zones. On several combat assaults bomb craters were used for landing zones. This situation, although extremely hazardous, was unavoidable due to the terrain and location of the enemy. However, these same hazardous landing areas were used again and again with little or no improvement. In addition to the extremely small landing areas, trash in these landing zones doubled the risks to incoming aircraft. Loose ponchos, C-ration boxes and cans, as well as empty sandbags, were to be found in quantity in and around all landing zones. During this operation alone, this battalion replaced 38 main rotor blades and 35 tail rotor blades, the majority of which were caused by flying debris. The incidents cited cost the government approximately \$123,500.

(2) Recommendation. I recommend that commanders place increased emphasis on proper landing zone selection and preparation. The police of the area should be the responsibility of the individual within the infantry unit who is responsible for unit resupply by aircraft, and the clean-up program should be closely monitored.

b. Aircraft Utilization.

(1) Observations and Discussion. During the Battle of DAK TO, a misutilization of aircraft was experienced on a number of occasions. This was due primarily to inadequate planning or a lack of sufficient planning time. On several occasions, aircraft were assembled from all over II Corps for a priority lift when existing assets could have served the purpose, properly utilized. Commanders failed to seek aviation advice during mission planning. Consequently, aviation supporting elements suffered. Aircraft would arrive on station, on time, only to find loads not ready for pickup or the intended delivery point had not been decided upon. Due to excessive idle time, critical blade time was expended, thereby reducing the aviation effectiveness during peak operational periods. Aviation requirements were constantly changed without warning, and using units had difficulty determining what might be needed two hours hence. The more aircraft allocated a unit, the more sorties added on to

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the existing requirements. Frequently, aircraft were extended to conduct emergency resupply at night, though these same aircraft may have remained idle for prolonged periods throughout the day. Whenever possible, missions should be given to the aircraft commander, not just a commitment for a certain number of aircraft. This way full utilization of the aircraft can best be managed with maximum flexibility.

(2) Recommendation. Commanders of supported units should place increased emphasis on the need to make known their requirements as far in advance as possible, utilizing warning orders which should be issued to aviation units as well as to ground elements. If a combat assault is to be conducted at first light, the mission requirements should be made known early enough the day before to provide time for a daylight reconnaissance of landing zones, flight routes and pickup zones. Execution of immediate combat assaults should be kept to a minimum and ordered only in the case of a combat emergency. With adequate planning time, a greater aviation effort can be made with fewer aircraft.

c. Airfield Operations.

(1) Observations and Discussion. A common practice of ground commanders is to establish their base of operations adjacent to the air facility serving the area. Of course, this is for convenience of the headquarters, as well as facilitating air support to forward elements. However, after a time, so many restrictions are placed on the aviation elements involved that it ceases to function as an aviation base of operations; and at times, aircraft are forced to divert to alternate, poorly equipped areas to continue operations. The haphazard mixing of Air Force cargo aircraft, helicopters, light fixed-wing aircraft and LOHs, plus the lack of ramp space and inadequate refueling and rearming facilities, cause confusion and resulted in a distinct safety hazard during the Battale of DAK TO.

(2) Recommendations. Extreme care should be exercised in the development of a small airfield into an adequate facility for supporting the various aviation elements required for a major operation. Priority engineer support must be allocated to build adequate parking ramps, dispersed POL points and rearming points. Consideration must be given to separating fixed-wing traffic and parking from helicopter traffic and parking. Right and left hand traffic patterns should be initiated. Also, hover lanes should be provided gunships, so that they may move to the runway for a running takeoff after refueling and rearming. A high priority should be given to dust control. Artillery positions should be placed so they do not fire through traffic patterns or otherwise restrict the full utilization of the airfield. Airfield perimeters must be moved out far enough to meet the above requirement and to provide for adequate dispersion of aircraft to preclude excessive losses to rocket or mortar attack. Vehicle traffic must be routed away from the active runway(s), taxi strips and parking areas. The location of VIP pads, medevac pads and other critical installations should be dispersed parallel to and along the active runway.

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d. Safety.

(1) Observations and Discussion. During the Battle of DAK TO, several extremely unfortunate accidents occurred; accidents which could have easily been avoided. Passengers loading and off-loading helicopters continued to walk into turning rotor blades. Turning blades are a hazard at any time; however, when operating on other than level ground, the hazard increases ten-fold. A rotor strike will almost always result in decapitation and death to the individual involved.

(2) Recommendation. Personnel operating in the vicinity of helicopters should be constantly reminded of the dangers involved. Classes or demonstrations should be given as to the proper method of boarding or departing a helicopter. On the just concluded operation, 3 lives were unnecessarily lost due to carelessness in this manner.

FOR THE COMMANDER

1 Incl
Map-(AO-SPAATZ) Not Received
Hqs DA

s/ Curtis D. Green
T/ CURTIS D. GREEN
MAJ INF
Adjutant

Distribution
2-1st Avn Bde
4-17th Cbt Avn Gp
2-4th Inf Div
1-1st Bde, 4th Inf Div

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
57TH ASSAULT HELICOPTER COMPANY
APO 96490
"GLADIATORS"

5 February 1968

SUBJECT: After Action Report 30 January thru 4 February 1968

TO: Commanding Officer
526 Combat Aviation Battalion
APO 96318

1. General

a. The sustained attack by NVA/VC forces in the Kontum area began 30 January at 0212 hours and was reduced to minor sniper fire and occasional mortar/rocket rounds by 0600 hours on 5 February 1968. This was a coordinated attack against the city of Kontum as well as all U.S. and ARVN military installations in the area. The magnitude of the attack requires consideration of the entire Kontum action rather than the 57th Assault Helicopter Company area alone.

b. Indications are that the overall plan called for taking advantage of the isolated locations of US and ARVN compounds. The plan was time phased to eliminate specific compounds on given dates. The 57th Assault Helicopter Company was the first to come under heavy ground attack. This attack, from 300230 thru 310900 January 1968, was an estimated force of 200 and included sapper, security and indirect fire elements.

c. The major attack on this compound was basically a repeat of the 10 January action. NVA intelligence had not been updated since that defensive posture. The enemy was either over confident in their ability to eliminate this unit or were inflexible to initiate alternate plans once the attack had failed. The action on subsequent days was oriented mainly against MACV, Special Forces, 43d Signal and 24th STZ compounds.

2. Sequence of Events

a. 30 January 1968

(1) At 300212 hours a coordinated rocket, mortar and ground attack was launched against the 57th Aslt Hel Co compound. During the battle that followed NVA forces reached a point within 50 meters of our defensive wire. Gunships engaged the enemy outside the entire eastern perimeter

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at a range of 20 -30 meters utilizing miniguns and M-5 systems. This action, combined with ground defensive fire, broke the attack but fighting continued until 0900 hours on 30 January.

(2) Defensive fires of this unit combined with those of 1 Troop, 2/1 Cav inflicted heavy casualties upon the attacking forces and a sealed off escape routes for NVA elements.

(3) The action during the early morning hours of 30 January resulted in one aircraft receiving minor damage on the ground while six additional aircraft, including four gunships, received varying degree of damage from intense enemy fire while performing aerial flight.

(4) From first light until 0900 hours gunships of 52d Battalion engaged isolated units to the east and northeast of this compound. Action was later continued with TAC air. A firm body count for all 52d Combat Aviation Battalion gunships was not obtained but 57th guns accounted for 35 NVA bodies during this phase of the action.

(5) A sweep of the area initiated at 0900 hours to conduct a body count along the perimeter. This action was terminated by intense sniper fire prior to completion. Body count had reached 59 at this time.

(6) Sniper fire continued throughout the day along the east, west and north perimeter.

(7) 122mm rocket and mortar attack was initiated at 1845 hours. Sporadic fire and small scale problems continued until 2400 hours.

b. 31 January 1968

(1) Between the hours of 0230 and 0330 a series of reports from the 24th STZ indicated a severe situation in their compound.

(a) NVA/VC forces, estimated at 150 strength, were over running their perimeter and final bunkers were occupied.

(b) The 105mm battery was reported to be infiltrated and possibly in enemy hands.

(c) This unit was notified that MACV and 3-24 compounds were being overrun. Gunships dispatched and engaged the NVA forces along the wire defenses at which time enemy forces withdrew.

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(d) Zone notified this unit of a confirmed NVA forces of 300 - 500 men located 2000 meters to the east of 57th Aslt Hel Co compound.

(e) At this time the Senior Advisor, 24th STZ declared a tactical emergency in an effort to obtain additional gunships and TIG air support. This unit was advised that zone communications were out and request we relay the situation and declaration to II Corps headquarters through 52d Combat Aviation Battalion.

(2) Enemy forces infiltrated RVN forces defending the south side of Kontum Airfield and were within hand grenade range of our southern perimeter. Gunships were employed and a low pass with searchlights on indicated seven bodies along the fence.

(3) Steady but light contact was maintained on the east and west perimeter between the hours of 1900 and 2400.

c. 1 February 1968

(1) Gunships of 52d Combat Aviation Battalion were employed from 0230 thru 0800 against targets within the built-up area of Kontum and to the north. Targets included building, churches, streets on housing and government complexes. In each case fire was requested and targets identified by ground commanders and/or advisors.

(2) Sniper activity continued on east and west perimeter of the 57th Assault Helicopter Company throughout the period.

(3) A rocket and mortar attack was launched by the enemy at 1745 hours. Counter fire in close proximity to our perimeter, when mixed with enemy fire, made it extremely difficult to differentiate between friendly and enemy rounds.

(4) Light probes against the western perimeter were encountered from 1910 hours until the end of this period.

d. 2 February 1968

(1) At 0220 hours a mortar/rocket and ground attack was launched against the MACV, Signal and Special Forces complex. Gunships were dispatched in support of local defense.

(2) Six teams of 52d Combat Aviation Battalion gunships were on-station supporting local forces against heavy enemy fire in and around the city. Methods of control included:

(a) Targets and clearance to fire were obtained from ground commanders.

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(b) Those targets familiar to personnel operating Gladiator TOC, for which definite targets identification control measures could be established, were controlled by this unit. Targets that were unfamiliar to TOC personnel were passed to the requesting agency for identification and control.

(c) Gunships not assigned to the 52d Combat Aviation Battalion were operating in area without contact and minor control problems were encountered.

(d) All 52d Combat Aviation Battalion aircraft were given a cease fire and returned to 57th Assault Helicopter Company revetments area until positive fire control was established.

(e) See lessons learned.

(3) Cantonment area received 2 122mm rockets at 1000 hours setting fire to a 5,000 gallon tanker.

(4) Isolated sniper fire during the remainder of the period. Total cumulative KIA and KBA count was 203.

e. 4 February 1968. Relatively inactive with the exception of 2 122mm rockets in the compound at 1600 hours. The city of Kontum was reported secure except for sniper fire. The 57th Assault Helicopter Company continued on 100% alert and provided continuous illumination during the hours of darkness.

f. 3 February 1968. Enemy activity decreased considerably however, rocket attacks on this compound occurred at 1040 and 1200 hours.

g. 5 February 1968. An estimated enemy battalion moved within 3 Kms of MACV compound during the early hours and were engaged by artillery and gunships. Activity was on a small scale and this unit received six unidentified rounds that failed to explode and penetrated to a depth of six feet (assumed to be 105mm illumination). Flare coverage was reduced to a standby status and the unit went on 50% alert.

3. Significant Factors

a. The NVA intelligence on local defense appeared to be the same as 10 January attack. This possibly is due to control of civilian traffic around the 57th Assault Helicopter Company compound. In addition, local hire personnel are used outside the compound only.

b. The security force of 35 provided to this unit after the 10 January attack was instrumental in improving defensive facilities during the 20 day period between attack. Major accomplishments included:

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(1) Defensive wire was improved and expanded out to encompass a larger area. This work is still in progress.

(2) Temporary perimeter lighting had been installed.

(3) Bunkers had been improved and repositioned.

(4) A larger force was employed on the perimeter.

c. The NVA/VC body count reached a total of 203 by KIA and KRA. This figure is by no means all inclusive for 52d Combat Aviation Battalion action in the Kontum area. In addition, secondary explosions were obtained during gunship employment against four mortar and rocket positions.

d. A search of the battle area in the vicinity of the 57th Assault Helicopter Company perimeter revealed numerous satchel charges, bangalore torpedoes (home made and manufactured), wire cutters and 60mm mortars, thus, verifying the intent to destroy this complex in include aircraft.

e. The sequence of events indicated the enemy respected the potential of helicopters being employed against their force and therefore intended to eliminate that threat on the first day of the attack.

f. Continuous illumination of the battle area around Kontum was a major factor in the successful defense by all US and RVN forces during the hours of darkness.

g. Night employment of gunships in a final protective fire role was a significant factor in preventing enemy penetration of compounds on at least two occasions.

h. A listing of casualties is at inclosure 1.

i. The major impact of personnel losses for both attacks is in the maintenance area. Shortages are as indicated at inclosure 2.

j. This unit suffered no loss or damage to major items of equipment other than aircraft. All aircraft damaged appear to be repairable.

k. The parking area for O-1 and O-2 aircraft (south side of the field) was destroyed. An emergency work order is being submitted to prepare temporary parking facilities.

4. Lessons Learned

a. The armed helicopter is an accurate and effective weapon platform that can be integrated into final protective fires. Employment at night, as well as in built-up areas, requires close coordination,

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target identification and positive location of friendly troops by the commander being supported. These systems are area type weapons and ground commander must accept a degree of risk that some rounds will inadvertently land within their positions when employed close-up or on point targets.

b. The enemy force, when employing infiltration and sapper tactics, is inflexible to changes in defenses that disrupt his rehearsed plan. Continued improvement to wire locations, bunkers location and overall security serves to deny him the intelligence, detailed planning and rehearsal so often employed in successful infiltrations.

c. The lack of combat forces in the immediate vicinity of Kontum and the covered avenue of approach from the north thru the south-east continues to be the major problem in providing adequate security for this compound. An enemy force of any size has a high probability of reaching this unit's perimeter prior to detection.

d. The physical location of US and ARVN compounds are such that any mutual support is denied. This situation favors the enemy in that he can attack and eliminate compounds one by one with minimum interference. The major exceptions are supporting artillery and gunships.

e. The organic fire power of an assault Helicopter company and its detachments is capable of defending against a substantial attacking force. However, manning the perimeter on 50% alert during the hours of darkness degrades immensely from the aircraft maintenance effort and results in a slow recovery to full operational capacity.

f. It is essential that one agency have knowledge of all gunships operating in the area. At one time, two gun teams (other than 52d CAB) were operating independently in and around Kontum City. Friendly forces were being fired upon and 57th Assault Helicopter Company TOC had no means of contacting these elements to effect a cease fire.

5. Planned action and recommendations

a. Planned actions

(1) Work will continue to replace defensive wire destroyed, expand the outer perimeter wire and install anti-personnel mines along the north and east side.

(2) Civilian access to the compound is limited to permanent hire and KP personnel who have received a local clearance. Civilian traffic through the area will continue to be denied.

(3) Continued improvement on defensive bunkers.

(4) Temporary perimeter lighting will be improved. The

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major limiting factor is a readily available power source. This unit has operated on TO&E generators since arrival in-country. The demand for power has reached the stage where lights to the billeting area is occasionally denied to provide perimeter lights.

(5) Defensive plans will continue to be reviewed and updated as required.

b. Recommendations

(1) A US Combat unit be stationed in the Kontum area to provide early detection and warning of any forces approaching along the major avenues of approach.

(2) Designation of one agency to control all gunships operating within the immediate tactical area.

(3) Immediate replacement of key personnel losses during the month of January.

(4) Authorization be given to retain the security augmentation from other battalions until planned improvements to local defenses are completed. (Estimated 2-3 week period)

(5) USARV approval and engineer tasking for the 57th Assault Helicopter Combat base development plan be executed so that construction of permanent defenses can be accomplished with minimum time delay.

2 Incl
as
Incl 1; Withdrawn, Hqs, DA

t/GEORGE E. BURNISON
Major, Infantry
Commanding

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Incl 2

MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL SHORTAGES

The following list shows the maintenance personnel shortages within the 615th Trans Det and Service Platoon at this time. Shortages which are directly affecting maintenance productivity are designated by an asterisk.

A. 615th Det:

Item	Qty	Job Title	Grade	MOS
(1)	*1	Aircraft Maintenance Technician	WO	062R
(2)	*1	Detachment First Sergeant (Note 1)	E-8	67740
(3)	*1	Assistant Shop Foreman	E-6	67240
(4)	*2	Senior Engine Repairman	E-5	68R20
(5)	*2	Senior Airframe Repairman (Note 2)	E-5	68G20
(6)	*2	Airframe Repairman	E-4	68G20
(7)	1	Aircraft Electrical Repairman	E-4	68H20
(8)	*1	Aircraft Supply Specialist	E-5	76H20
(9)	1	Aircraft Supply Specialist	E-3	76H20
(10)	*1	Aircraft Tech Inspector (Note 3)	E-6	67H20
(11)	*1	Aircraft Armament Repairman	E-4	45J20

B. Service Platoon Maintenance Shortages

Item	Qty	Job Description	Grade	MOS
(1)	1	Maintenance Supervisor	E-6	67N40
(2)	3	Senior Helicopter Repairman	E-5	67N20

Note 1. Although the Det First Sergeant does not directly affect the maintenance output, his absence requires most of the time of the Shop Foreman acting as First Sergeant.

Note 2. Includes one man who is DEROS in 10 days.

Note 3. Includes one man who is on emergency leave and is not expected to return.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 52D COMBAT AVIATION BATTALION
APO San Francisco 96318
"FLYING DRAGONS"

AVGD-CC

31 January 1968

SUBJECT: Enemy Attack on US Installations After Action Report

TO: Commanding Officer
17th Combat Aviation Group
APO San Francisco 96240

INFO: Commanding General
1st Aviation Brigade
APO San Francisco 96384

1. General: Camp Holloway, Pleiku, RVN, was attacked by four (4) mortar tubes and elements of the 408th NVA Sapper Battalion at 0230 hours on 26 January 1968. The attack lasted approximately fifty (50) minutes, and concentrated the sapper attack against the 88th S&S Bn area, with the mortar concentrating along the aircraft revetment areas adjacent to the runway and the 604th Trans Maint Co (GS) area (See inclosure 1).

2. Sequence of Events:

a. The sapper unit, an estimated 50 - 60 man force, approached the perimeter from the east, and a 20 man team undetected, breached the perimeter in the 88th S&S Bn area. Entry was made by tying off trip flares and cutting of barrier wires. Upon entry, 30 - 50 satchel charges (3 blocks of TNT, 200 grams, with fuze wells in center blocks) were placed adjacent to numerous supply and storage facilities. At this point, the sappers departed the area. Upon departing the area, via same route, either a trip flare was ignited or a flare was fired, and members of the unit were detected. At approximately 0247 hours, fire was placed on the fleeing enemy, killing one and wounding another (See inclosure 2).

b. At about the same time the retreating sappers were detected, four mortars, located in the vicinity of AR818477, opened fire on Camp Holloway Complex, and between 0247 and 0305 hours, 110 - 120 rounds of 82mm were fired into aircraft parking and maintenance areas. The heaviest concentrations fell into the 604th Trans Maint Co (GS) area, the miniport refueling area, and the aircraft parking areas adjacent to and paralleling both sides of the runway.

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c. Immediately following the incoming rounds, counter-mortar radar confirmed the location of the enemy mortars and return mortars, and gunship fire was brought to bear on the confirmed position. Within minutes incoming fire, except for sporadic sniper fire, ceased.

d. At approximately 0310 hours, a tremendous explosion occurred in the 88th S&S Bn area. Ammo Pad #8, probably caused by a satchel charge, exploded, causing blast damage throughout the complex. At 0320, the alert ceased and Camp Holloway returned to a fifty per cent status.

e. The attack was well planned and executed with precision. Indications are that the enemy possesses a detailed knowledge of the general layout of the compound, and probably selected this course of action because:

(1) Detonation of the ASD area of the 88th S&S Bn area would place an increased logistical burden on an already strained line of resupply.

(2) The enemy may well have been testing our security alertness in preparation for a larger attack during the TET season.

f. Though local reaction had little effect on the sapper attack, the reaction of the mortar element of the security detachment, and gunships, probably caused the enemy mortar element to cease fire and disperse.

3. Significant Intelligence Information:

a. Sapper personnel were NVA, assigned to the 408th Sapper Bn. This is the first known contact with the element in the vicinity of Pleiku.

b. The mortars were positioned in approximately the same location as during the previous two attacks.

c. The enemy was equipped with satchel charges, 82mm mortars, M-26 chicom flare pistols, AK-47's, B-40 rockets, bangalore torpedoes and chicom cannister stick concussion grenades.

(1) The satchel charges were 3 blocks of TNT, 200 grams with a fuze well in the center blocks. Approximately half of the charges failed to detonate. The only major damage caused was to Ammo Pad #8.

(2) The 82mm mortar fire was erratic with about ten per cent of the rounds failing to detonate. Eleven rounds were later found at firing site.

(3) One M-26 chicom flare pistol was found near the body of the slain NVA.

(4) One AK-47 was left within the perimeter along with three magazines.

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(5) One B-40 rocket launcher and two rounds were left behind, but no rockets were known fired during the attack.

(6) Two five inch bangalore torpedoes were found, but none employed.

(7) Eight chicom cannister stick grenades were recovered.

d. It appears that the enemy was not particularly interested in inflicting personnel casualties, but attempted to destroy supply facilities with sapper charges and aircraft and maintenance facilities with mortars.

4. Damage Information:

a. Personnel losses by unit are listed in inclosure 3.

b. Major items of equipment damaged or destroyed are listed in inclosure 4.

5. Planned Action and Recommendations:

a. Planned Actions:

(1) The defensive wire will be repaired where breached and reinforced throughout the perimeter. Random wiring will be placed throughout the contonement area to channelize and confuse a successful penetration.

(2) All trip flares were inspected and expended flares replaced.

(3) Additional anti-personnel mines will be sown throughout the outer perimeter.

(4) Additional bunkers are being constructed to provide better visual coverage of the perimeter and to provide increased fire power where initial engagement is probable.

(5) Defense plans are constantly being reviewed and revised as deemed necessary.

b. Recommendations:

(1) Replacement of destroyed equipment as soon as possible, with priority on aircraft.

(2) Increase manning level of security detachment. Detachment presently operating at approximately fifty (50) per cent strength.

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(3) Present perimeter lighting is inadequate. Since 7 January 1967, this project has supposedly had top priority, but has yet to be completed. Recommend immediate completion of project for maximum security vigilance.

5 Incl

1 - Defensive Posture (OMITTED)

2 - Comment Relative

Capture of Prisoner

~~3 - Personnel Losses Withdrawn, Hqs, DA~~

4 - Equipment Losses

5 - After Action Report - Period 30 January 1968

EDWARD P. LUKERT JR.

ITC

Inf

Commanding

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CONFIDENTIAL**Inclosure 2: Comments Relative Capture of Prisoner**

A captured PW stated two (2) companies of the 408th Battalion (Sapper) were responsible for the attack on Camp Holloway. One, a combat support company (numerical designation unknown), which handled the 82mm mortars, and the K-90 Company of the 408th, which handled the sapper activities. The PW stated his unit (K-90 Company) was located northwest of Pleiku, north of Plei Mrong. The company took two days to reach the target area. He states that 20 sappers penetrated the 88th S&S Bn area; the remainder waiting outside to provide covering fire with small arms and automatic weapons. Whether all sapper personnel exfiltrated the area was not known. The PW stated the combat support company utilized four mortar tubes in the attack (verified by area sweep the morning after the attack). (They were fired from the vicinity of AR818477, approximately 50 meters from previously used site.) He further stated that his unit was not to launch a new attack the following night (27 January), but to return to their base camp in the vicinity of Dai Thong (coordinates unknown). His battalion was to conduct an attack on another location prior to TET.

The 408th units, as was the case with the 60th Company, 408th, which conducted a raid against the 937th Engineers on 21 January, used Highway 14N as its primary route of advance to the target area. The PW further stated that he carried no weapon during the attack and that his primary mission was to carry wounded or dead personnel to the village (assumed to be Mo'nu) during the attack.

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Incl 8**CONFIDENTIAL**

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Inclosure 4: Equipment Losses

1. The following damage was sustained by aircraft stationed at Camp Holloway:

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>A/C #</u>	<u>TYPE DAMAGE</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
UH-1H	57th	109	Minor Windshield	604th DSU
UH-1H	170th	394	Minor T/R & Windshield	604th DSU
UH-1H	189th	153	Minor T/Boom	604th DSU
UH-1H	119th	374	Minor T/R	CO Area
UH-1H	119th	376	Minor T/Boom	CO Area
UH-1H	119th	524	Minor M/R Blades	CO Area
UH-1H	119th	517	Minor T/Boom 7 Blades	CO Area
UH-1H	119th	609	Minor T/B & Engine	CO Area
UH-1H	119th	533	Minor T/B & Trans	CO Area
UH-1H	119th	534	Minor T/Boom	CO Area
UH-1H	119th	527	Minor Exhaust Cover	CO Area
UH-1H	335th	643	Minor T/R & Pilots Door	Trans Ramp
UH-1H	335th	702	Minor M/R Blades & T/Boom	Trans Ramp
UH-1H	335th	638	Minor T/R Eng & Windshield	Trans Ramp
UH-1H	335th	620	Major T/Boom & M/R Blades	Trans Ramp
UH-1H	4th Div	589	Evac Destroyed	604th DSU
UH-1H	604th TC	092	Minor Shootmetal	604th DSU
UH-1C	119th	591	Major Destroyed	604th DSU
UH-1C	170th	483	Major Destroyed	604th DSU
UH-1C	189th	690	Minor T/B & Dr Shaft	CO Area
UH-1C	335th	612	Minor T/B & Windshield	Trans Ramp
UH-1C	335th	664	Minor T/B & Tail Rotor	Trans Ramp
UH-1C	7/17th	063	Evac Destroyed	604th DSU
UH-1C	7/17th	735	Major Over 7 days	604th DSU
UH-1C	134th	632	Minor M/R Blades	604th DSU
UH-1D	604th	018	Evac Destroyed	604th DSU
CH-47	179th	978	Minor Aft Vert Fin	604th DSU
OH-6A	7/17th	807	Minor Shootmetal	604th DSU
U-6A	125th ATC	733	Major Over 7 days	604th DSU

2. The following damage was sustained by equipment other than aircraft:

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>DAMAGE</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
3/4T Truck	189th	Windshield, radiator, all tires and shootmetal	CO Area
Forklift	88th S&S	Radiator	Bn Area
Forklift	88th S&S	Radiator	Bn Area
Pad #8	88th S&S	Amo Pad destroyed	Bn Area

3. Substantial structural damage throughout contentionment area due to blast effect when Ammo Pad #8 exploded.

Incl 4 to

Incl 8

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 52D COMBAT AVIATION BATTALION
APO San Francisco 96318

AVGD-SC

4 February 1968

SUBJECT: Enemy Attack on US Installations After Action Report

TO: Commanding Officer
17th Combat Aviation Group
APO San Francisco 96240

INFO: Commanding Officer
1st Aviation Brigade
APO San Francisco 96384

1. General: Camp Holloway, Pleiku, RVN, was attacked by two (2) 82MM mortar tubes of an unknown main force unit at 0140 hours on 30 January 1968. The duration of the attack was approximately thirty (30) minutes, during which 20-30 rounds fell within the confines of Camp Holloway.

2. Sequence of Events:

a. The enemy mortar crews (estimated 12 men) moved into position, vicinity AR 817477 (1400 meters from target center of mass) using the village of Plei Mo'nu as their base of operations. At 0140 hours, approximately 10-15 rounds were fired, impacting north to south on a lateral sheath 200 meters wide (maximum deflection spread at that range without re-laying the tubes).

b. The location of the enemy position was visually confirmed from the H&F control tower and counter-mortar and gunship fire was employed to neutralize the position. However, after a three to five minute pause, 10-15 additional rounds were received, impacting from south to north along a lateral sheath. The gunships again engaged the position with aerial rocket and mini-gun fire. Incoming rounds ceased at approximately 0210 hours, immediately after the gunships engaged them for the second time.

c. Gunships and counter-mortar fire continued to engage the confirmed enemy position and possible infiltration routes (Inclosure 1).

d. During the attack, this installation was on 100% alert and remained so until approximately 0700 hours. Throughout the night gunships and mortars continued H&I fires with unknown results. There are no indications that the Camp holloway perimeter was penetrated during the attack.

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4 Feb 68

SUBJECT: Enemy Attack on US Installations After Action Report

e. The mortar attack again indicates that the enemy has used his detailed knowledge of the Camp Holloway facilities. Intended targets were the aircraft refuelments and support facilities. Factors that may have influenced the enemy course of action are:

(1) Passive defense measures provide more protection to personnel than aircraft.

(2) Destruction of aircraft denies combat elements the prime movers of supplies, equipment and troops into forward areas, seriously affecting combat operations.

(3) Armed aircraft located at this installation constitute a major deterrent to ground assaults of installations in the Pleiku area.

3. Significant Intelligence Information:

a. The enemy mortar section used the same general location as the mortar element of the 408th Sapper Bn which attacked this installation on 26 January 1968.

b. The reaction of the gunships probably caused the enemy mortars to cease fire, and may have spoiled a planned ground attack. 250 enemy personnel had earlier been reported in the vicinity of AR815565, preparing for an attack on some installation in the area.

c. The following morning the same enemy element (identified as the H-15 Bn) was located, taken under fire, and destroyed by 52nd CAB gunships. 130 VC and NVA were killed by aircraft and the Battalion Commander captured.

4. Damage Information:

a. Personnel losses by unit are listed in inclosure 2.

b. Major items of equipment damaged or destroyed are listed in inclosure 3.

5. Planned actions and recommendations:

a. Planned Actions.

(1) When an attack is eminent, aircraft will be evacuated from Camp Holloway to an area less likely to be attacked.

(2) Aircraft will be dispersed to decrease the danger of excessive damage to aircraft.

(3) Additional protection will be provided by placing vehicles around the aircraft to absorb as much of the shrapnel damage as possible.

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AVGD-CC

SUBJECT: Enemy Attack on US Installation After Action Report

CONFIDENTIAL 4 Feb 68

b. Recommendations.

(1) Increase the manning level of the assigned Security Detachment, that it may secure and interdict the area around Camp Holloway, to preclude the employment of enemy mortars.

(2) Replace damaged or destroyed equipment as soon as possible. Priority of replacements should be to aircraft to enable the battalion to continue to meet its support requirements.

(3) Present perimeter lighting continues to be inadequate. The emergency request of said lighting, dated 10 December 1966, has yet to be completed. Recommend immediate action.

3 Incl

- 1-Defensive Posture *(omitted)*
- ~~2-Personnel Losses~~ W/d, Hqs, DA
- 3-Equipment Losses

Edward P. Lukert, Jr.
EDWARD P. LUKERT, JR.
LTC, Inf
Commanding

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WCS & A

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Inclousure 3: Equipment Losses

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1. The following aircraft were damaged as a result of the mortar attack on Camp Holloway on 30 January 1968.

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TYPE A/C</u>	<u>A/C NR</u>	<u>DAMAGE</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>
134th	C	632	Minor	Sheetmetal & blades
134th	C	148	Minor	Sheetmetal & windshield
170th	C	546	Minor	Vert fin
170th	C	140	Major	Fuselage, tail boom, tail rotor & engine deck
119th	C	685	Minor	Tail boom
189th	C	691	Minor	Sheetmetal & tail boom
189th	C	696	Minor	Sheetmetal
189th	C	690	Minor	Main Rotor Blade
170th	H	537	Major	Fuel cell & tail boom
170th	H	218	Minor	Vert fin
170th	H	358	Major	Fuselage, tail boom, tail rotor & engine deck
170th	H	323	Major	Sheetmetal & tail boom
170th	H	220	Minor	Sheetmetal
170th	H	170	Minor	Sheetmetal
189th	H	066	Minor	Engine cowl & exhaust cowl
189th	H	385	Minor	Chin bubble & windshield
170th	H	538	Major	Sheetmetal & main rotor blade

2. The following major items of equipment were damaged as indicated.

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TYPE EQUIP</u>	<u>DAMAGE</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>
179th	2 1/2 T Trk	Destroyed	
179th	2 1/2 T Trk	Major	
179th	2 1/2 T Trk	Major	
344th AOD	3/4 T Trk	Major	Cabin, Windshield, Hood, Engine & Skin
344th AOD	1/2 T Trk	Moderate	Radiator, Windshield, & Skin

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Incl 3 to
Incl 5 to
Incl 8

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
57TH ASSAULT HELICOPTER COMPANY
APO 96499

11 January 1968

SUBJECT: Report of Sapper Attack

TO: Commanding Officer
52d Combat Aviation Battalion
APO 96318

1. General

a. This unit was attacked by a NVA sapper unit at 0200 hours on 10 January 1968. The attack lasted for twenty-five (25) minutes and was concentrated against the motor pool and aircraft maintenance areas inflicting major damage to each. (See attached diagram at inclosure 1)

b. The sapper unit, an estimated 30 - 40 man force, approached the compound from the north east through an area serving as a boundary between C Troop 2/1 Cav and 173d Abn Pde maintenance area. The 57th Assault Helicopter Company compound lies within the area covered by these units. Entry into the compound was gained by using bamboo sticks 18 - 24 inches high and notched on each end to prop-up the wire. Four such lanes were made within a 10 meter section. This area was blown during the attack and provided the escape route.

c. The attack was well planned and executed with precision. Indications are that the NVA had detailed knowledge of the general layout of the compound. The enemy probably selected this section of the compound due to:

(1) A 30 - 40 man crew performs maintenance every night utilizing exterior lighting.

(2) A defile running from the north through east provided a covered approach to US defense.

(3) The lights of the maintenance area provided an excellent ground guide. They also silhouetted maintenance personnel as well as aircraft while providing cover for sapper teams.

d. Sapper teams were organized in groups of five with a combination of satchel men and automatic weapons personnel.

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SUBJECT: Report of Sapper Attack

11 January 1968

A minimum of three such teams plus one rocket team were within or around the compound perimeter.

a. It is concluded that the reaction of organic personnel precluded the accomplishment of the overall plan of the sapper teams.

(1) Upon completion of sweeping the maintenance area, sapper teams were encountered as they approached the tent billets, taken under fire and then withdrew.

(2) NVA bodies left behind had baskets with a total of 25 - 30 charges and grenades to be used.

(3) A briefing map drawn on the ground included the maintenance area and COC bunker.

(4) A rocket team was operating separately along the north west sector thus indicating an attempt to destroy structures to the front of the compound.

2. Sequence of events

a. At 0200 hours action was initiated by a minimum of two teams placing demolitions in vehicles and aircraft. Simultaneously, maintenance personnel were taken under fire and work areas blasted. Reaction by on-duty personnel was probably slow due to an immunity to fire brought on by sporadic fire from local ARVN forces over the past few weeks.

b. A NVA security force outside the perimeter pinned down the north east machine gun positions during the majority of the attack.

c. After setting explosive charges, sapper teams proceeded to the eastern edge of billet area and were engaged by organic personnel.

d. Teams withdrew to the north east without entering the billets.

e. A rocket team with one launcher and four rounds were killed while attempting to enter the compound. No rounds were expended.

f. The sapper force withdrew from the compound and entered the 173d Abn Bde maintenance area.

g. Nine NVA bodies were found in and around the north and north east portion of the 57th Assault Helicopter Company perimeter.

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SUBJECT: Report of Sapper Attack

11 January 1968

3. Significant factors

a. The NVA had excellent intelligence as to the layout of this compound which could be attributed to one or a combination of factors.

(1) Local civilians (assumed) have constantly been along the roads bordering the compound attempting to sell items and pick-up material. On numerous occasions this unit has contacted Province for their removal as well as driving them away. This is effective for periods of hours only.

(2) Surrounding hills and easy access to the city of Kontum allows uncontrolled surveillance of the area.

(3) Local hire personnel are being used on the compound to free personnel for utilization in their MOS.

b. 24th STZ and Sector personnel report that this group is the first encountered who were carrying knives. When associated with the "tent city" at Kontum it is assumed overall plans were to sweep the billet area placing charges in numerous tents.

c. NVA personnel were all outfitted in shorts. When considering US and ARVN forces wear fatigue uniform and the cold weather now prevailing it is concluded this is an easy means for them to distinguish between friend and foe when engaged at close range. If this tactic is substantiated it could be used as factors in identification by our forces.

d. It appears the enemy desired to inflict heavy casualties and destroy aircraft with vehicles being convenient target because of location. Destruction of aircraft must have been the paramount desire. Had the attack originated in the tent area casualties would have been extremely high but reaction of on-duty maintenance personnel would have precluded the destruction of helicopters. A three-prong attack against motor pool, aircraft maintenance and quarters would have been disastrous.

e. A listing of personnel losses by MOS is at inclosure 2.

f. A listing of major items of equipment damaged or destroyed is attached at inclosure 3.

g. The posture and capability to provide Aircraft Field Maintenance Support is at inclosure 4.

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SUBJECT: Report of Sapper Attack

11 January 1968

4. Lessons learned by this action.

a. This action again confirms that an assault helicopter company is neither organized nor manned to provide its own local security with organic assets and provide continued maintenance support on a 24 hour basis. The aviation company should be treated like a supporting artillery element where the supported force is required to provide local security. The lack of adequate security and personnel has been recognized by this unit and a letter drafted on 9 January 1968 is attached at inclosure 5. (Not received, Hqs, DA)

b. Defensive wire around the 57th Assault Helicopter Company compound requires improvement, expansion and incorporation of anti-personnel mines, and warning devices. Trip flares previously installed have been removed by civilians on numerous occasions.

c. The best wire barrier is of little value if not illuminated by perimeter lighting and covered by fire.

d. Alert procedures require reevaluation. Current defensive concepts call for individuals to remain in bunker or protective area during mortar or rocket attack and to occupy defensive positions along the perimeter during ground attack. The major problem encountered is distinguishing between sapper attacks and incoming mortar rounds. The majority of personnel interpreted this as a mortar attack and remained in place for 5 - 10 minutes.

e. Overall security must be planned and coordinated by the senior commander in the area. However, a sufficient security force must be provided to the assault helicopter company to guard against infiltration of outer units and local defenses.

5. Planned actions and recommendations.

a. Planned actions

(1) The defensive wire around this compound has been relocated to include all of the permanent cantonment area. Improvements are now being made to include anti-personnel mines. The wire design is depicted at inclosure 6. (Not received, Hqs DA)

(2) Roads passing through the compound are being blocked off by wire thus including the entire area and denying civilian traffic access to the compound.

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SUBJECT: Report of Sapper Attack

11 January 1968

(3) Night maintenance is being reduced drastically and local security increased to a size capable of providing minimum cover of our one mile long perimeter. This action is planned to continue until a sufficient security force is made available. If additional personnel can not be provided consideration should be given to relocating this unit to a more secure area such as Camp Holloway.

(4) Present defensive bunkers are being reevaluated and some repositioned. Additional bunkers are being prepared.

(5) This unit now has three search lights on hand which were inoperative on the night of attack because of a lack of bulbs which are not available through supply channels. Four bulbs have now been found and the lights are being employed as perimeter lights until adequate equipment can be provided.

(6) Defensive plans are being reviewed and updated as deemed appropriate.

b. Recommendations:

(1) Replacement of destroyed equipment as soon as possible with priority on aircraft.

(2) An absolute priority be established to provide the 57th Assault Helicopter Company with the 66 man security force outlined in inclosure 5 and scout dogs.

(3) Permanent perimeter lighting be issued on a priority basis.

(4) If the above can not be accomplished recommend restationing of the 57th Assault Helicopter Company to a more secure area.

5 Incl
as
Incl 2 withdrawn, Hqs, DA

/s/GEORGE E. BURNISON
/t/GEORGE E. BURNISON
Major, Infantry
Commanding

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
PAUL R. DAVIS
CPT, Infantry

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Incl 1
Incl 91

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57TH ASSAULT HELICOPTER COMPANY DAMAGED EQUIPMENT

6115-833-1498	Generator Set 10 KW, AC	SN: 3505	1 ea
2330-141-8050	Trailer, ego, 1 1/2 T M105A2	USA# 685094	1 ea
	Fire Units, feild range		3 ea
2330-542-2029	Trailer, tank, water, M107A2	USA# 6R6732	1 ea
6115-913-9290	Generator Set 3 KW	SN: 01489	1 ea
6115-074-8830	Generator Set 5 KW	SN: 0917	1 ea
6115-736-8509	Generator Set 1.5 KW	SN: 1702	1 ea
7330-236-2411	Food Container, insulated		2 ea
2320-542-4783	Truck, util, 1/2 T, M151	USA# 2D6635	1 ea
2320-542-4636	Truck, ego, 3/4 T M37B1	USA# 304935	
		3A5699, 3B7593	
		3B7321, 2D3332	5 ea
2320-835-8322	Truck, ego, 3/4 T M37	USA# 2443447	1 ea
2320-055-9262	Truck, dump, 5T M51A2	USA# 5R8513	1 ea
4210-202-8076	Fire fighting equipment		
	Set TRK MTD	USA# 4R9910	1 ea
2320-077-1631	Truck, Tank, Fuel, 2 1/2 T, M49A2C	USA# 4J3224	
		4J3514, 4J3503	3 ea
2320-738-9509	Trailer, ego, 3/4 T M101	USA# 6T1861	1 ea
2320-141-8050	Trailer, ego, 1 1/2 T, M105A2	USA# 655095	1 ea
1520-859-2670	Helicopter, Util, UH-1H	SN: 66-1138,	
		66-1066, 6601055,	
		66-1196, 66-1065	5 ea
		SN: 66-15081,	
		66-15149.	2 ea
1520-997-8862	Helicopter, Util, UH-1C		5 ea
8340-543-7787	Tent, GP, Medium		3 ea
5805-503-2775	Telephone set TM-43/PT		5 st
5180-323-4692	Tool Lit, Acft, Mech Gen		1 st
4933-994-9242	Tool Set, Acft, Arat, Supplement		2 st
4933-989-9816	Tool Set, Acft, Armt Rpmn Basic		5 ea
8470-926-1574	Body Armor AcftF & B plates w/carrier		3 ea
7330-721-8499	Container, thermal, 3 gal		1 ea
1005-214-0934	Revolver Cal .38	SN: 953838	1 ea
8415-817-0598	Jacket, aviators		2 ea
8415-782-3037	Helmet APH-5		
1005-907-0720	Armament Sub-system M23		
	MG	Mounts	
	3123	2676	
	4745	2713	

Incl 3
to

Incl 9

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DAMAGED

-2-

EQUIPMENT

7090-923-5671

Ammanent Sub-system H/C XM21

<u>Fylon #</u>	<u>Barrel #</u>	<u>Pods #</u>
1253	1379	1702
1253	1426	1714
1250	1429	1747
1250	1661	1741
1289	2825	
1400	2787	

7110-270-9870

Desk, flat top, double pedestal 60x34-30 1/2"

5 ea

7110-270-9838

Desk, TYT, pull-out, left

pedestal

60x34x30 1/2"

1 ea

7110-286-3796

Filing Cabinet, Cap sz, 5 drs,
w/Lock

1 ea

5826-92607228

Radio Set AN/ASC-10

1 ea

8340-262-2402

Tent Liner, GP Med

3 ea

5820-892-0864

Radio Set, AN/VRC-47, MTD 1/2 TRK

1 ea

/s/ RUSSEL L. WENG JR.

/t/ RUSSEL L. WENG JR.

WO1, GNC

Supply Officer

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PAUL R. DAVIS
CPT, INFANTRY

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615TH TRANSPORTATION DETACHMENT DAMAGED EQUIPMENT

2320-542-4636	Truck, ego, 3/4 T 137B1	USA# 3DC286	1 ea
2320-055-9260	Truck, tractor, 5T, M5A2	USA# 5F3139	1 ea
2320-077-1631	Truck, tank fuel, 2 1/2 T,	USA# 4J2410	1 ea
2320-077-1616	Truck, ego, 2 1/2 T, M35A2	USA# 4F2314	2 ea
		4K2360	1 ea
2330-141-8050	Trailer, ego, 1 1/2 T, M1D5A2	USA# 6S4617	1 ea
8340-951-6419	Tent, frame, type, maint		1 ea
5180-754-0641	Tool Kt, Auto Mech		1 ea
5180-323-4692	Tool Kt, Acft Mech, General		3 ea
5180-323-4876	Tool Kt, Air Frame, Repairman Army Acft		3 ea
5180-323-4915	Tool Kt, Electrical Repairman Army Acft		2 ea
7125-330-0130	Cabinet, Tool & Spare Parts		2 ea
1005-073-9421	Rifle, 5.56mm XM16E1		1 ea
6625-553-0142	Multimeter		1 ea
6133-222-6204	Charger Battery (Rectifier)		1 ea
4920-962-3097	Test Set, Liquid quantity		1 ea
3439-585-6057	Soldering, gun		1 ea
3415-242-5789	Drill, Grinder		1 ea

/s/ RUSSEL L. WENG JR.

/t/ RUSSEL L. WENG JR.

WO1, MC

Supply Officer

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PAUL R. DAVIS
CPT, INFANTRY

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Incl 4
to
Incl 9

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
155TH ASSAULT HELICOPTER COMPANY
"FLYING DRAGONS"
APO 96297

27 January 1968

SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report (AVRA-G-1)

TO: Commanding Officer
17th Combat Aviation Group
APO 96240

1. Following report is submitted in accordance with
1st Aviation Brigade Regulation #335-1.
2. Map overlay showing location of rounds is inclosed with each
copy.

2 Incl
1. Combat After Action
Report
~~2. Map~~
Withdrawal,
Hqs, DA

/s/BILLY R. GOODALL
/t/BILLY R. GOODALL
Major, Infantry
Commanding

100

INCL 9A

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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
WPTW FILLED IN

VC Attack on US Installations
After Action Report (AVRA-G-1)

1. DED: 170125 Jan 68
2. Unit or Units: 155 AHC, 165 Trans, 185 HAC
3. Strength of Units (2 above): approx. 550 - 600
4. Estimated number of Viet Cong: Unknown
5. Location (6 digit coordinates): 17805042
6. Casualties:

	<u>FRIENDLY</u>	<u>VC</u>
FIA	0	0
WIA	0	0
MIA	0	N/A

- 7. Description of friendly losses of personnel by type N/A.
i.e. (CE, Gunner, etc.)
8. Description of equipment losses, friendly or VC: See attached sheet.
(Aircraft, Weapons by type, etc.)
9. Estimate of weapons used by the VC: 82mm mortar
10. Gunships and other reinforcements used: 2 Floreships, 2 Guns, Spooky.
11. Estimated number of rounds fired:

	<u>FRIENDLY:</u>	<u>VC:</u>
60mm Mortar	N/A	N/A
81mm Mortar	52	26
4.2" Mortar	N/A	N/A
Artillery	N/A	N/A
Gunships	N/A	N/A
Other	N/A	N/A

Annex A to 1st Aviation Brigade Regulation 335-1 dtd 20 June 1967

Incl 1 to

INCL 9A

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12. Did the VC use satchel charges: YES _____ NO XX.

How many? N/A What type? N/A.

How employed? N/A.

13. Distance at which action was initiated 3200 meters.

14. What was the duration of the attack? approx. 4 - 5 minutes

15. Why was the engagement broken off?

Installation defense was adequate YES

Installation defense was inadequate NO

VC stopped shooting and withdrew YES

Other reasons (briefing explain) N/A

16. Generally, what was the friendly reaction and behavior? (discuss)

See attached sheet

17. Name of senior 1st Aviation Brigade Officer present 1st Caldwell

18. Unit having primary responsibility for defense of installation: 155

19. Attach a scaled diagram indicating the following:

a. Sketch of friendly position prior to and deployment immediately after the initiation of the attack.

b. Target location of suppressive and supporting fires by types (i.e., Armed Helicopter, Artillery, etc.)

c. Other information considered pertinent by reporting officer not in format.

/s/BILLY R. GOODALL

/t/BILLY R. GOODALL

Major, Infantry
Commanding

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8. A. Aircraft:

1. 155th AHC:

4 UH-1H - Light Damage

1 UH-1H - Moderate Damage

2. 185th RAC: None

3. 165th Trans: None

4. 92nd AHC (TDY):

2 UH-1H - Light Damage

1 UH-1H - Extensive Damage

B. Buildings:

1. 155th AHC: None

2. 165th Trans: Extensive damage to maintenance office and orderly room.

3. 185th RAC: None

16. Flareship and gunships airborne at approximately 0145 hours and remained aloft until approximately 0300 hours when relieved by Spooky aircraft. Mortar crews fired White Phosphorous and Illumination rounds on preplanned concentrations from 0135 to 0230 hours with unknown results. All personnel manned bunkers and berm positions from 0130 until 0700 hours expending heavy small arms fire on Brown and suspected enemy positions until relieved by an ARVN reaction force outside of the compound. A state of readiness was maintained until 0700 hours, 17 January 1968.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
155TH ASSAULT HELICOPTER COMPANY
"FLYING DRAGONS"
APO 96297

3 February 1968

SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report (AVBA-G-1)

TO: Commanding Officer
9th Combat Aviation Battalion
APO 96318

1. Following after action report is submitted in accordance with
1st Aviation Brigade Regulation 335-1.

2. Map overlays unavailable for enclosure at this time. Will forward
as soon as possible.

/s/BILLY R. GOODALL
/c/BILLY R. GOODALL
Major, Infantry
Commanding

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Incl 9 B

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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
WHEN FILLED IN

VC Attack on US Installations
After Action Report (AVR-0-1)

1. DTG: 040245 Jan 68
2. Unit or Units: 155th APC, 165 TD, 185th BAC
3. Strength of Units (2 above): Approx. 550 - 600
4. Estimated number of Viet Cong: Unknown
5. Location (6 digit coordinates): 10805042
6. Casualties:

	<u>FRIENDLY</u>	<u>VC</u>
KIA	0	0
WIA	0	0
MIA	0	

7. Description of friendly losses of personnel by type N/A.
i.e. (CE, Gunner, etc.)
8. Description of equipment losses, friendly or VC: See attached sheet.
Aircraft, Weapons by type, etc.
9. Estimate of weapons used by VC: 82mm Mortar; B-40 Rockets
10. Gunships and other reinforcements used: 1 Flareship; 2 Gunships
11. Estimated number of rounds fired:

	FRIENDLY: N/A	VC: N/A
60mm Mortar		
81mm Mortar	68	40
4.2" Moratr	N/A	N/A
Artillery	N/A	N/A
Gunships	N/A	N/A
Other (B-40 Rockets)	N/A	6

Annex A to 1st Aviation Brigade Regulation 335-1 dtd 20 June 1967

WCH 9

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12. Did the VC use satchel charges: YES _____ NO _____.
- How many? N/A What type? N/A
- How emplaced? N/A
13. Distance at which action was initiated 3200 meter.
14. What was the duration of the attack? Approx. 5 - 8 minutes
15. Why was the engagement broken off?
- Installation defense was adequate YES
- Installation defense was inadequate NO
- VC stopped shooting and withdrew YES
- Other reasons (briefly explain) N/A
16. Generally, what was the friendly reaction and behavior? (Discuss)
- See attached sheet
17. Name of senior 1st Aviation Bde unit officer present Maj Caldwell
18. Unit having primary responsibility for defense of installation 155
19. Attach a scaled diagram indicating the following:
- a. Sketch of friendly position prior to and deployment immediately after initiation of attack.
- b. Target location of suppressive and supporting fire by types.
(i.e., Armed Helicopter, Artillery, etc.)
- c. Other information considered pertinent by reporting officer not contained in format.

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c. A. Aircraft

(1) 155

2 UH-1H, Destroyed
3 UH-1H, Extensive Damage
3 UH-1H, Moderate Damage
4 UH-1H, Minor Damage
2 UH-1H, (Dustoff) Minor Damage

(2) 185

9 C1-G, Minor Damage

b. Buildings

(1) 155

Maintenance Hangar, Extensive Damage
COC & Officers Club, Minor Damage
Fire House, Minor Damage

(2) 165

Maintenance Office, Extensive Damage
Sheet Metal Shop, Extensive Damage

(3) 185

Motor park Tent, Extensive Damage

c. Vehicles

(1) 155

1 Fire Truck, Minor Damage
2 1/4 Ton Jeeps, Moderate to Extensive Damage

(2) 185

1 Fire Truck, Extensive Damage
1 Fuel Truck, Extensive Damage
1 2 1/2 Ton Truck, Light Damage
2 5 Ton Trucks, Light Damage
6 Trailors, Light Damage
1 Power lubricator, Extensive Damage

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16. One Flareship and 2 Gunships were airborne by 0250 to 0255 hours and remained aloft until approximately 0500 hours. Mortar crews fired H.E. and W.P. rounds from 0250 until 0410 hours (approximately 68 rounds), on preplanned concentrations. Results unknown. All personnel manned bunkers and berm positions from 0245 until 0500, exchanging heavy fire upon known and suspected enemy positions outside the compound. Negative results known at this time. Friendly casualties were non-existent. Maintained state of alert readiness until 0700 hours, 5 January 1968.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
155TH ASSAULT HELICOPTER COMPANY
"FLYING DRAGONS"
APO 96297

11 February 1968

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (AVBA-G-1)

TO: Commanding Officer
52d Combat Aviation Battalion
APO 96318

1. Following is a narrative description of the mortar attack which occurred at Camp Coryell, RVN, on 30 January 1968.

a. At 0250 hours, 30 January 1968, Camp Coryell came under a mortar attack. Approximately 20 rounds fell within the limits of the compound, the majority of which fell in the helicopter parking area.

b. The compound had been put on 100% alert by Major Billy R. Goodall, Commanding Officer of the 155th Assault Helicopter Company, at 0200 hours.

c. At the time of the attack, one Flareship and two Gunships were airborne to give support to units in the Ban Mo Thuot area. These ships gave continual support until daylight and were credited with the destruction of two mortar positions.

2. Attached hereto as Annex I is a list showing aircraft damage.

3. Due to the number of rounds that have fallen during the period of these attacks it has been impossible to plot the location of each round.

/s/BILLY R. GOODALL
/t/BILLY R. GOODALL
Major, Infantry
Commanding

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ANNEX I

NUMBER

DAMAGE

66-16381

Moderate

66-16377

Moderate

66-16389

Moderate

66-16580

Moderate

66-16375

Light

66-16441

Light

ANNEX I
to
INCL 9B.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 52D COMBAT AVIATION BATTALION
APO San Francisco 96318
"FLYING DRAGONS"

AVGD-GZ

6 February 1968

SUBJECT: Recapitulation of Availability, Mission Ready, EDP and EDM
percentage taken from DA Form 1352 and daily aircraft status.

UH-1C	STD	NOV	DEC	JAN
Availability	75	78.4	79.4	68.2
Mission Ready	80	58.1	64.6	54.8
EDM	17	15.1	15.8	16.4
EDP	8	6.7	4.8	5.4

UH-1H	STD	NOV	DEC	JAN
Availability	78	84.6	82.5	77.6
Mission Ready	80	72.4	68.2	60.8
EDM	17	13.6	14.3	16.6
EDP	5	1.7	3.2	5.9

UH-1 Combined	STD	NOV	DEC	JAN
Availability	80	81.5	81.0	72.9
Mission Ready	80	65.3	66.4	57.8
EDM	17	14.4	15.1	16.5
EDP	5	4.2	4.0	5.7

CH-47	STD	NOV	DEC	JAN
Availability	65	55.0	65.0	54.5
Mission Ready	50	43.2	43.0	39.5
EDM	23	29.0	23.0	34.5
EDP	12	16.0	12.0	11.0

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52D BN CRASH FACTS INCIDENT & ACCIDENT EXTRACT

#	DATE/TIME	DAMAGE	FATAL TOTAL AMOUNT	UH-1 MODEL	UNIT	SYNOPSIS
1.	081915Jun67	INCIDENT	\$6000.	D	170th	TOWER DIRECTED LOW-LEVEL - HIT WIRES
2.	101030Jun67	INCIDENT	\$100	D	1stC	FUEL HOSE OVER SKID
3.	221510Jun67	MAJOR	HEAVY	D	170th	RPM DECAY LANDING - TIGHT LZ
4.	221545Jun67	MAJOR(2H)	HEAVY	H's	189th	INTERMESHED BLADES - SHUT DOWN
5.	261130Jun67	MAJOR	NOT BAD	C	170th	LOST RPM (POWER RECOVERY AUTO-ROTATION)
6.	271645Jun67	INCIDENT	\$1500	H	189th	TREE STRIKE INTO CONFINED AREA
7.	011615Jul67	MAJOR	TOTAL	D	335th	TAIL ROTOR STRIKE
8.	071030Jul67	INCIDENT	\$400	H	155th	ENGINE FAILURE--TAIL BOOM STRUCK PADDY DIKE
9.	121135Jul67	INCIDENT	\$6556	D	335th	RPM DECAY-BLADE STRIKE BAMBOO
10.	191425Jul67	MAJOR	TOTAL(1inj)	D	335th	RPM DECAY TAKE OFF TIGHT PZ
11.	310945Jul67	MAJOR	TOTAL (3KIA-1WIA)	H	189th	WX - INADVERTANT IMC
12.	131630Aug67	MAJOR	HEAVY	H	335th	RPM DECAY-LANDING TIGHT LZ
13.	181545Aug67	INCIDENT	\$4000	C	189th	AMMO BOX COVER-TAIL & MAIN ROTOR
14.	241600Aug67	MAJOR	TOTAL (6KIA-3WIA)	H	119th	CRASHED INTO WATER (FOOLISHNESS)
15.	251320Aug67	INCIDENT	\$6330	H	189th	ENGINE FAILURE-STRUCK BRUSH
16.	020055Sep67	MAJOR	TOTAL (2KIA-4WIA)	H	119th	NIGHT WX-INADVERTANT IMC
17.	031130Sep67	MAJOR	NOT BAD	C	189th	ENGINE FAILURE-SOFT EARTH
18.	041500Sep67	MAJOR	TOTAL(2inj)	H	170th	AMMO BOX COVER-TAIL ROTOR OFF
19.	211930Sep67	MAJOR	TOTAL(4WIA)	H	189th	TAIL ROTOR FAILURE-AUTOROTATION TO TREES
20.	291100Sep67	INCIDENT	\$2721	H	170th	TAIL ROTOR STRIKE (DIRT MOUND)
21.	051020Oct67	INCIDENT	\$7000	H	189th	TREE STRIKE
22.	061350Oct67	MAJOR	TOTAL (1WIA)	C	119th	RPM DECAY T/O RWY (4th ATTEMPT)
23.	141050Oct67	MAJOR	NOT BAD	H	170th	REVIEWMENT STRIKE (TEST FLIGHT)
24.	191545Oct67	MAJOR	TOTAL	H	155th	WX-LOW LEVEL TURN LOST RPM
25.	221520Oct67	MAJOR	TOTAL (1 SMOKE INHLE)	H	170th	FIRE IN AVIONICS COMPARTMENT
26.	220920Oct67	MAJOR	TOTAL (4KIA)	H	170th	TAIL ROTOR STRIKE-LOW LEVEL
27.	261743Oct67	MAJOR	TOTAL	C	170th	TAIL ROTOR FAILURE (IP GOOD SAVE)
28.	301848Oct67	INCIDENT	\$1000	D	281st	NIGHT ENGINE FAILURE (GOOD SAVE)
29.	071600Nov67	MAJOR	TOTAL (2WIA)	H	335th	DECLAYED RPM TAKE OFF
30.	171130Nov67	INCIDENT	\$3000 (1KIA LRVN)	H	57th	BLADE STRIKE ARVN HEAD W/HELMET
31.	220930Nov67	MAJOR	TOTAL (1 LIGHT WIA)	H	170th	ENGINE FAILURE (500') AUTORO-TATED INTO TREES
32.	231045Nov67	INCIDENT	\$3000	H	170th	TREE STRIKE INTO TIGHT LZ

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33.	251340Nov67	MAJOR	HEAVY (2WIA)	H	155th	N1 SHAFT FAILURE-LOW AUTO-ROTATION
34.	261600Nov67	INCIDENT	\$4,000	H	155th	TAIL ROTOR STRIKE IN TIGHT LZ
35.	271515Nov67	INCIDENT	\$5,000	H	57th	RPM DECAY-TAKE OFF HIT MOUND
36.	281240Nov67	MAJOR	TOTAL	H	189th	BLADE STRIKE LANDING TIGHT LZ
37.	061730Dec67	MAJOR	TOTAL	H	170th	RPM DECAY LANDING TIGHT LZ
38.	101735Dec67	MAJOR	NOT BAD (1KIA ARVN-2WIA)	H	155th	TEST FLIGHT ENGINE FAILURE
39.	161545Dec67	MAJOR	TOTAL (2KIA-6WIA)	H	170th	RPM DECAY TAKE OFF PINACLE
40.	201600Dec67	MAJOR	TOTAL (4KIA 2WIA)	H	189th	TREE STRIKE (200' HOVER) EQUIPMENT DROP
41.	211300Dec67	MAJOR	TOTAL (2HEL) (1KIA-1WIA)	H	189th	INTERMESHING ROTOR -- CONGESTED LANDING FIELD

- NOTES:
1. Normal Flying Day 0700 to 1900 (12 Hours)
 2. *41 Considered events: 22 (51%) occurred after 1500 hours (Last 25% of day)
 3. *27 Major Accident: 17 (67%) occurred after 1500 hours (Last 25% of day)
 4. Two peak periods: 1030-1330, 1500-1800 (Worst) for all 41 events
 5. No accidents, incidents, forced landings or precautionary landings from 0700-0920 every one on file considered (approx 75) Practically all the aircraft fly during this period.

*Some from other units, but reported through this Hqs.

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PRIORITY
IMMEDIATE

CO, 52D CBT AVN BN, PLEIKU, RVN

USABM/R, FT RUCKER, ALA
INFO: USAMAC, ST LOUIS, MO
CG, USAFV, LONG BINH, RVN
CG, 1ST AVN BDE, LONG BINH, RVN
CO, 34TH CEN SPT GP, SAIGON, RVN
CO, 17TH CBT AVN GP, NHT, RVN

UNCLAS AVGD-CFS 8003-2U

SUBJECT: PROBLEMS, AIR FILTER, SAND AND DUST SEPARATOR.

1. FIELD EXPERIENCE HAS SHOWN THAT SEVERAL RELATED PROBLEMS EXIST INVOLVING THE AIR FILTER, SAND AND DUST SEPARATOR (MANUFACTURERS PART NO. 1-010-500-05 AND 1-010-500-06) INCORPORATED WITH THE T-53-L13 INSTALLATION.

2. TIME DOES NOT PERMIT A THOROUGH REVIEW OF RECORDS TO REVEAL ACCURATE STATISTICS. SUFFICIENT EXPERIENCE CLEARLY POINTS TO TRENDS THAT WARRANT IMMEDIATE ACTION. ANY SIMPLE SURVEY WILL REVEAL THE VALIDITY OF THESE TRENDS.

3. A. FIRST: THE INCIDENCE OF FOD DUE TO INGESTION OF SMALL AND LARGE OBJECTS HAS RISEN TO AN ALARMING RATE. AN OVERSIGHT MUST HAVE EXISTED WHEN THE FILTER WAS DESIGNED.

B. REASONS CAN BE FOUND FOR THE INCREASED AMOUNT OF FOREIGN OBJECTS INGESTED FROM THE PLENUM CHAMBER AREA:

- (1) INCREASED NIGHT MAINTENANCE DUE TO INCREASED MISSION SUPPORT.
- (2) REDUCED MAINTENANCE MANPOWER, ESPECIALLY SUPERVISORS.
- (3) INCREASED USE OF PENEPRIME (ASPHALT) CAUSING OBJECTS TO ADHERE TO THE BOOTS.
- (4) REDUCED MECHANIC EXPERIENCE.
- (5) CREW FATIGUE

EMPHASIS TO REDUCE THE ABOVE CAUSES CAN MAKE SOME REDUCTION IN FOD, BUT THE SIMPLEST AND MOST EFFECTIVE SOLUTION IS TO EFFECT AN IMMEDIATE ENGINEERING FIX.

03 1100

JAN 1968

1 3

HOL 176/216

DANNY L. LINDBURG, SP4, DRAFTER

DAVID L. BOIVIN, MAJ, INF, AAPO

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C. THE INCIDENCE OF FOD ASSOCIATED WITH THE T-53-L13 IS DISPROPORTIONATE TO THE T-53-L11, WHICH HAD THE SQUIRREL CAGE THAT STOPPED MOST FOD. IT IS EVIDENT THAT THE NEW SYSTEM IS NOT AS EFFECTIVE IN FOD PREVENTION. THIS SYSTEM DOES NOT INCORPORATE A LAST CHANCE FILTER WHICH WILL PREVENT FOD. A FIX IS POSSIBLE IN MINIMUM TIME AND COST. THE COST OF DAMAGED ENGINES AND AIRCRAFT AND ASSOCIATED LOSS OF LIFE WILL FAR OUTWEIGH ANY COSTS TO EXPEDITE THIS SIMPLE ITEM. UNTIL A PERMANENT FIX CAN BE DEVELOPED AND PRODUCED, A NYLON MESH SCREEN MAY PROVE SATISFACTORY. SUCH MATERIAL WAS USED IN 1964 TO PREVENT HAY INGESTION DURING DEVELOPMENT OF THE BARRIER FILTER. SEVERAL SOLUTIONS ARE POSSIBLE. A SCREEN BETWEEN THE SAND AND DUST SEPARATOR AND THE ENGINE AIR-INTAKE IS RECOMMENDED. THUS THE ADDED SCREEN WOULD FILTER PRIMARILY FOD. ITS OPERATION IN RELATIVELY CLEAN AIR WOULD AVOID CLOGGING FOR A LONGER TIME, AND MAKE FOR SAFER OPERATION AND LESS REQUIRED MAINTENANCE. THE SAND AND DUST SEPARATOR IS ACCOMPLISHING THE PURPOSE FOR WHICH IT WAS DESIGNED. BUT, OF THE TWO PROBLEMS, FOD IS THE MOST SERIOUS SINCE THE FAILURE IS OFTEN CATASTROPHIC AND WITHOUT WARNING.

4. A. SECOND: CLEANING OF THE ENGINE COMPRESSOR ASSEMBLY AND STATORS (A FREQUENT NECESSITY IN THIS ENVIRONMENT) IS HAMPERED BY THE LOWER HALF OF THE SAND DUST SEPARATOR. TO REMOVE THIS SECTION, THE SHORT SHAFT (PSN 1560-862-3819) MUST BE REMOVED. DUE TO DEMANDS UPON MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL OFTEN THIS TIME CONSUMING PROCEDURE IS BY-PASSED. WHEN THE LOWER HALF IS PRESENT DURING CLEANING, THIS RESULTS IN CLEANING OF THE ROTATIONAL COMPRESSOR BLADES BUT ONLY THE UPPER HALF OF THE FIXED STATION BLADES. THIS METHOD CAUSES A VARIATION OF COMPRESSOR AIRFLOW THAT CREATES COMPLETE LOADING OF THE BLADES PASSING THROUGH THE UPPER HALF AND SOME UNLOADING IN THE LOWER HALF. THE RESULTANT FLUTTER AND VIBRATION OF THE BLADES CAN CAUSE FATIGUE FAILURE. YET, THE MOST IMMEDIATE AND DIRECT RESULT OF THE DISRUPTED FLOW PATTERN IS HIGH EGT AND LOW POWER OUT-PUT. THIS CONDITION CAN BE TRANSIENT AND VARIATIONS DO EXIST AS TO EGT AND POWER OUT-PUT, DUE TO THE RANDOM EFFECTIVENESS OF THE CLEANING METHOD. LOW POWER OUT-PUT IS NOT ALWAYS ACCOMPANIED BY HIGH EGT; IS INSIDIOUS AND MAY BE TRANSIENT.

B. THE SOLUTION IS REVAMPING OF THE LOWER HALF OF THE PARTICLE SEPARATOR FOR EASY REMOVAL. VISUAL INSPECTION IS NOT POSSIBLE (EVEN WITH A MIRROR) OF THE OPEN INLET AIR SECTIONS AT THE BOTTOM HALF OF THE SEPARATOR. THIS IS THE AREA THAT IS DIRTIEST AND SUSPECT OF THE MAJORITY OF FOD INGESTION. ELIMINATION OF THE FIVE RETAINING BOLTS IN THE LOWER HALF MAY BE ELIMINATED BY INCORPORATING ANOTHER (QUICK DISCONNECT) V-BAND COUPLING AROUND THE MOUNTING RING ASSEMBLY. IT MAY BE POSSIBLE TO FORM AN ADEQUATE LIP (TO HOLD THE V-BAND) ON THE COMPONENTS NOW IN USE.

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5. THESE TWO FACTORS CAN BE DIRECTLY RELATED TO THE PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH THE HIGH USAGE OF T-53-L13 ENGINES IN THIS COMMAND. THESE FACTORS ARE ALSO RELATED DIRECTLY AND INDIRECTLY TO ACCIDENT CAUSES. EMPHASIS ON THESE TWO FACTORS WILL SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCE ENGINE USAGE. THIS ENGINE WOULD BE FAR MORE RELIABLE THAN IS INDICATED BY THE HIGH USAGE AND SHORT LIFE EXPERIENCED IN THIS COMMAND DURING THE PAST SIX MONTHS.

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DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA - R & D

(Security classification of title, body of abstract and indexing annotation must be entered when the overall report is classified)

1. ORIGINATING ACTIVITY (Corporate author) OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310		2a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION Confidential	
		2b. GROUP 4	
3. REPORT TITLE Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Hqs, 52d Combat Aviation Battalion (U)			
4. DESCRIPTIVE NOTES (Type of report and inclusive dates) Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Nov 67-31 Jan 1968			
5. AUTHOR(S) (First name, middle initial, last name) CO, 52d Combat Aviation Battalion			
6. REPORT DATE 6 February 1968		7a. TOTAL NO. OF PAGES 117	7b. NO. OF REFS
8a. CONTRACT OR GRANT NO.		9a. ORIGINATOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S) 681156	
b. PROJECT NO. N/A		9b. OTHER REPORT NO(S) (Any other numbers that may be assigned this report)	
c.			
d.			
10. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT			
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES N/A		12. SPONSORING MILITARY ACTIVITY OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310	
13. ABSTRACT			

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DD FORM 1 NOV 65 1473

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Security Classification